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W.M. (40)

265th Conclusions.

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WAR CABINET 265 (40).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at Paddock on Thursday, October 3, 1940, at 11.30 A.M.

Present :

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (*in the Chair*).
 The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Lord Privy Seal. | The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 The Right Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.

The following were also present :

The Right Hon. Sir KINGSLEY WOOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.	The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CALDECOTE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.	The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. LORD LLOYD, Secretary of State for the Colonies.	The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.	The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW RAE DUNCAN, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. A. DUFF COOPER, M.P., Minister of Information.	Sir HORACE J. WILSON, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (<i>Item 9</i>).
Air Chief Marshal Sir CYRIL L. N. NEWALL, Chief of the Air Staff.	Admiral of the Fleet Sir DUDLEY POUND, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

General Sir JOHN DILL, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat.

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
 Major-General Sir HASTINGS ISMAY.
 Mr. W. D. WILKINSON.
 Mr. L. F. BURGIS.

WAR CABINET 265 (40).

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**Naval, Military
and Air
Operations.**

(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 264th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)
Air Operations.

1. *The Chief of the Air Staff* reported that on the previous day 250 enemy aircraft had been over this country but had only dropped a few bombs on the South Coast. Casualties had been:—

Our own—

1 machine (pilot safe but wounded).

Enemy—

10 certain.

1 probable.

2 damaged.

On the previous night the weather had been very bad but a few of our bombers had reached Berlin. We had lost 1 medium and 2 heavy bombers.

Our aircraft had bombed enemy concentrations and aerodromes at Assab.

**Naval
Operations.**

The Chief of the Naval Staff reported that the Mediterranean Fleet had returned to Alexandria. Two Italian U-boats had been sunk in the Mediterranean.

The *York* and the *Warspite* had been unsuccessfully attacked by bombs and had shot down a number of enemy aircraft.

**Enemy attacks
on shipping.**

On the previous day we had lost a merchant ship of 4,600 tons and belated reports had been received regarding the sinking of 3 other merchant ships far out in the Atlantic.

**Military
Operations:
Middle East.**

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported that there had been no change in the situation in the Middle East. A number of perimeter camps in the Desert had been observed. The Italians had not yet mended the road between Sollum and Sidi Barrani.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

France.

**Policy towards
the Vichy
Government.**

(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 264th
Conclusions,
Minute 6.)

2. A further discussion took place on this subject and is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

**Germany and
Italy.**

**Possible future
strategy.**

3. *The Foreign Secretary* drew attention to two telegrams (Nos. 1265 from Angora and 638 from Sofia) reporting statements that the German Government did not now expect to succeed in invading England, but that they hoped by bombing the Midlands and South to bring about the collapse of the present Government and its replacement by a more amenable one.

What then was likely to be Germany's probable strategy in the next few months?

Certain indications pointed to a move of German troops through Italy to Libya, to take part in the Egyptian campaign; this seemed more likely than an attempt to move through Spain and Morocco, or a move into the Balkans.

**Reinforcements
for the Middle
East.**

(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 260th
Conclusions,
Minute 8.)

Should further reinforcements be sent to Malta or the Middle East? *The Prime Minister* thought that this should be considered again in a few days' time.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

**Air Raid
Damage.**

(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 264th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)

4. *The Home Secretary* said that very little damage had been caused in the previous 24 hours. There had been a serious fire at a rubber factory in Lancashire.

Reference was made to the fact that the "All Clear" had been sounded on the last two nights early in the night, and had been followed, after an interval, by another "red" warning. This had resulted in a certain number of people leaving their shelters and subsequently returning to them. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the period of an hour during the previous night between the "All Clear" and the further "red" warning had given great relief to civil defence services, and had speeded up traffic. There was, therefore, much to be said for continuance of the present practice.

Stepney
Shelter.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Mr. Victor Cazalet, M.P., who had visited the large shelter in Stepney on the previous night, had given a very favourable account of the conditions there.

Rescue
Parties.

Reference was made to complaints of delay in digging out people who had been buried under houses.

Clearing of
debris: use of
troops.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 261st
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
Funerals.

The Home Secretary said that, though he had heard of such delay in one or two isolated cases, on the whole the rescue parties had worked very quickly. The proposal that soldiers should help in clearing debris had been satisfactorily settled at a conference the previous day. It was proposed that soldiers should lend a hand during next week, as a temporary arrangement, to overtake arrears, while a civilian labour force was being organised. Some discussion ensued as to the funerals of the victims of air raids. *The Home Secretary* said that arrangements had been made for state funerals at the State expense for all victims of air raids.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

The Far East.

The Burma
Road
Agreement.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (40) 261st
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (40) 400).

It was argued in the Memorandum that, in view of the Japanese aggression in Indo-China, and of the German-Italian-Japanese Pact, the question was not so much whether we should re-open the Burma Road, as when we should do so. Lord Lothian had made it clear that the case for refusing to renew the Burma Road agreement, as seen from Washington, was overwhelming; and he had reported Mr. Cordell Hull as saying that he "greatly hoped that we would re-open the Burma Road."

In these circumstances, the Foreign Secretary suggested that the best and least provocative method of announcing our decision not to renew the agreement would be by means of a reply to a Parliamentary Question on Tuesday, the 8th October, in the sense that the agreement had been concluded for a definite period, and contained no provision for renewal, and that in any case in view of recent developments His Majesty's Government would have felt unable to agree to renewal, if this had been in question.

The Prime Minister was clear that this was the right decision. He did not believe that the Japanese would declare war upon us as a result. We should be justified in taking the line that, whereas we had expected the Japanese during the interval afforded by the currency of the Burma Road agreement to make a genuine effort to reach an all-round settlement, all they had done was to make the German-Italian-Japanese Pact. In these circumstances, we had no option but to carry out our duties as a neutral in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

It was significant that Sir Robert Craigie, who three months ago had thought that Japan would declare war on us, if we did not close the road, was now in favour of the termination of the agreement.

The War Cabinet—

- (a) Unanimously endorsed the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and approved the procedure suggested by the latter, under which the announcement as to the non-renewal of the Burma Road agreement would be made in Parliament on Tuesday, the 8th October.
- (b) Invited the Dominions Secretary to telegraph that day to the Dominion Governments, fully apprising them of all the circumstances, including the attitude adopted by the United States Government, and informing them of the decision which we proposed to announce on the 8th October. The telegrams to the Dominion Governments should take the form that we should take this action, subject to their concurrence. There was no doubt that the views of the Dominion Governments were similar to our own.
- (c) Invited the Foreign Secretary to instruct Sir Stafford Cripps to seek an interview with M. Molotov to apprise him fully of all the circumstances, including the attitude adopted by Mr. Cordell Hull, and to inform him of the decision which we proposed to announce on the 8th October. In stating the case to M. Molotov, Sir Stafford Cripps might take the opportunity of drawing attention to the increasing harmony of opinion and identity of interest between this country, the United States, Russia and China. These instructions would furnish the reply to telegram No. 805 from Moscow.
- (d) Invited the Foreign Secretary to send instructions to our Ambassador in China that General Chiang Kai-shek should be informed of this decision on Sunday, the 6th October.
- (e) Invited the Prime Minister to communicate their decision in a personal telegram to President Roosevelt.

The Far East.
Attitude of
Japan.

6. In connection with the previous Minute, the *Foreign Secretary* said that the Dutch Foreign Minister, at a recent interview, had remarked that the attitude of the Japanese in regard to their dealings with the Netherland East Indies had become much less stiff about the middle of August, *i.e.*, after the first great air battle in this country in which we had defeated the German air forces. The Dutch Foreign Minister did not think that the Japanese were in a position to embark on any important new military venture at the present time.

Position in
event of United
States-Japanese
war.

The Prime Minister drew attention to a recent telegram No. 1901 from Sir Robert Craigie in which it had not been taken for granted, as it should have been, that the British Empire would be involved in the event of war between the United States and Japan.

The Foreign Secretary said that he would make it clear to Sir Robert Craigie that, if the United States were at war with Japan, we should certainly declare war on that country.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

The Far East.

Suggested visit of a United States Naval Force to Singapore. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 241st Conclusions, Minute 4.)

7. *The Prime Minister* drew attention to telegram No. 1905 from Tokyo in which it was suggested that a United States Naval Force might pay a visit to Singapore. He felt that this suggestion was one that we should follow up promptly. It might be possible to combine a courtesy visit to Singapore by an American Battle Squadron with the holding of the British-American-Dutch Technical Conversations which had been suggested by Mr. Cordell Hull (Washington telegram No. 2147).

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Chiefs of Staff to consider as a matter of urgency whether it was desirable that British-American-Dutch Technical Military Conversations should be held at Singapore, and to submit to the Foreign Secretary definite suggestion which he could communicate to Lord Lothian.

Switzerland.

Violation of Swiss neutrality by British Aircraft. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 254th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

8. *The Foreign Secretary* informed the War Cabinet that on the previous day the Swiss Minister had discussed the R.A.F. violations of Swiss neutrality with complete good humour. If we had to pass over Switzerland, he hoped that as far as possible we would use the Geneva route. Later on the weather might make it impossible for us to fly over his country, in which case he hoped that we would make a virtue of necessity and draw attention to the correctness of our attitude. He was emphatically not in favour of a policy of concentrating into, say, one week of intense aerial activity all the visits to Northern Italy which we might otherwise have paid over a period of, say, six weeks.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statement.

Air Raids.

Compensation for damage. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 246th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer outlining a scheme of compensation for damage to immovable property (W.P. (G.) (40) 251).

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it had originally been proposed that the charge of 3 per cent. to be levied on the capital value of all immovable property, should not be paid until after the war. The Lord President's Committee and the Consultative Council at the Treasury had, however, both thought that some payment on account should be made now. This was clearly desirable, provided that suitable machinery could be devised for the purpose. It had been thought that this could best be done by using the machinery of Schedule A, and by levying an extra 2s. in the £. This would mean a payment of £2 10s. on a house worth £500 with an annual value of £25.

In discussion, general agreement was expressed with the scheme. It would give great assurance, especially to the less well-to-do property-owners, to know that if their home or place of business was destroyed, they would get compensation for it. Further, this scheme of compensation would prevent the value of the property declining. The Exchequer would benefit from this, *e.g.*, in death duties.

The President of the Board of Trade said that he had favoured an alternative scheme whereby persons whose property was liable to the charge of 3 per cent. would be invited to liquidate the charge voluntarily during the war, if they so desired; but if they did not so wish, no payment should be made until after the war. If, however, this scheme could not be accepted as an alternative to the extra 2s. in the £ under Schedule A to be paid on account, he then did not wish to press it.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he would like to have seen the scheme worked through the Insurance Companies, and he still thought that this might have resulted in reduced administrative costs.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that this possibility had been explored and was not regarded as practicable, but he would be glad to discuss the point further with the First Lord.

It was pointed out that a number of property-owners, *e.g.*, those whose businesses had been destroyed or whose property was in areas which had been evacuated, could not be expected to pay anything now.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed and said that this would be dealt with as a matter of administration. He proposed to make this clear when introducing the Bill.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer also drew attention to the provision in paragraph 6 of his Paper for a voluntary insurance scheme for furniture and personal possessions above the income limits for free compensation. If possible, this scheme should be brought in at the same time as the scheme for compensation for war damage to immovable property. This was agreed to.

The War Cabinet—

Approved in principle the proposals set out in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Paper, and invited him to consult various Parties and Members in the House, and to arrange for a draft Bill to be submitted to the Home Policy Committee.

Aircraft
Production.

10. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Aircraft Production (W.P. (40) 391).

Proposed
Aircraft Defence
Police.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to discuss the proposals in this Paper informally with the Minister of Aircraft Production.

Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1,
October 3, 1940.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both manual and automated processes. The goal is to ensure that the data is both reliable and representative of the overall population being studied.

The third part of the document provides a detailed breakdown of the results. It shows that there is a clear trend in the data, which is consistent with the initial hypothesis. The statistical analysis confirms that the differences between the groups are significant.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the findings and some recommendations for future research. It suggests that further studies should be conducted to explore the underlying causes of the observed trends.

The following table shows the distribution of the data across different categories. The values are presented in percentages to facilitate comparison.

Category	Percentage
Group A	35%
Group B	45%
Group C	20%

The data indicates a strong correlation between the variables studied. This suggests that the factors being investigated are closely related and may influence each other.

