CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, June 17, 1940, at 11 A.M.

Present:

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Viscount Caldecote, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Lord Hankey, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Item 10).
The Right Hon. H. Dalton, M.P., Minister of Economic Warfare (Item 10).
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

The Right Hon. A. Greenwood, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. A. Duff Cooper, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. Lord Lloyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies (Item 10).
Mr. G. H. Shakespeare, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office (Item 11).
Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L. N. Newall, Chief of the Air Staff.
General Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat.

Sir Edward Bridges.
Major-General H. L. Ismay.
Captain A. D. Nicholl, R.N.
Mr. W. D. Wilkinson.
Lieutenant-Colonel V. Dykes, R.E.
Mr. E. P. Donaldson.
Mr. G. N. Flemming.
## WAR CABINET 170 (40).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Air Situation</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British air force in France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Military Situation</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Western Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Naval Situation</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrival of Australian and New Zealand convoy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attacks on trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy mining activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formation of new Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British consent to the French seeking an armistice.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Evacuation of Belgian military personnel</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action in the Baltic States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rumours of concentration against Roumania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with the U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Defence against invasion</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State of readiness of the army and the Local Defence Volunteers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength of the army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Local Defence Volunteers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rifles from the United States of America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>French request for an armistice</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Our requirements from the French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Colonial Empire and mandated territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Evacuation of children from Great Britain overseas</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>French proposals for an armistice</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suggested broadcasting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **The Chief of the Air Staff** said that, owing to bad weather, there had been very little air activity on either side. An enemy aircraft had been plotted proceeding towards Ireland. This brought the total of German aircraft believed to have been flown to Ireland to six. The **Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs** said that Mr. de Valera was kept fully informed of these German activities.

Some further Italian petrol dumps had been destroyed in air operations in the Middle East.

More raids had been carried out on Malta, but no casualties or damage had been reported.

The British Air Forces in the South of France had been ordered to evacuate. The aircraft could be flown back to this country. The more formidable question was the evacuation of some 1,500 maintenance personnel with a number of A.A. guns. Air Marshal Barratt had been instructed to concert the best means of evacuation with the Senior Naval Officer. The alternatives were from Toulon to North Africa or from Bordeaux.

**The Chief of Naval Staff** said that evacuation from Toulon would require six destroyers to escort the transports. The only ships available were patrolling the Straits of Gibraltar.

**The Prime Minister** was reluctant to see the plans for continuing air attack on North Italy abandoned and thought that orders for evacuating the Air Force from the South of France should be held up until the matter had been investigated further.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statements.

**NOTE.**—Later in the meeting, when the news was received that the French Armies had ceased fire, the Secretary of State for Air was authorised to proceed with the evacuation of the British Air Forces from the South of France.

2. **The Chief of the Imperial General Staff** said that General Brooke was now at Redon. Evacuation had been started from Nantes and Cherbourg. 51,000 men had been withdrawn from the lines of communication and 6,500 from Cherbourg. Some 50,000 remained to be withdrawn.

General Marshall-Cornwall had been ordered to hold on with the French 10th Army at all costs. His force now comprised the Beauman force, one infantry brigade of 52nd Division, one armoured brigade (strength reduced to about one regiment), a total of about 5,000 men. He was falling back on his lines of communication to Cherbourg. The War Office were not in communication with General Marshall-Cornwall, but General Brooke had reported that the French 10th Army were disintegrating. One battalion with anti-tank guns was covering the Cherbourg Peninsula. There was general agreement that, now that the French Government under Marshal Petain were suing for an armistice, we would be sacrificing our men to no purpose if we told them to fight on. The French would no doubt reproach us for evacuating our troops while fighting was still in progress, but further sacrifice would serve no useful purpose and would not prevent the French from blaming us in any case.

There was some discussion whether General Brooke should remain in France, either at Nantes or Cherbourg, or return to this country.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff felt that no useful purpose would be served by General Brooke's remaining in France.

**The Prime Minister** hoped that the War Office would not recall General Brooke so long as his presence in France could be of value to the difficult withdrawal with which our troops were faced.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that General Marshall-Cornwall should be told forthwith to withdraw his force to the coast.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War to give further consideration to the question whether General Brooke should now be recalled, in the light of the views expressed by the Prime Minister.

The Naval Situation.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 168th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

Arrival of Australian and New Zealand convoy.

3. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he had met the Australian and New Zealand troop convoy on its arrival in the Clyde on the previous afternoon and had found the troops in very good heart. He had also had some talk with the party of naval ratings who had arrived with the convoy, including a considerable New Zealand contingent, and had met the officers of the Canadian destroyers who had formed part of the escort on the last stages of the voyage.

The Chief of Naval Staff said that the Empress of Australia had arrived at Reykjavik with 1,000 Canadian troops. The French aircraft carrier Beau and the cruiser Jeanne d'Arc had sailed from Halifax early on the previous day. So far as was known, they were intending to make for North African ports or for Marseilles.

The following losses by enemy submarine attacks had occurred on the previous day:

- S.S. Wellington Star (11,400 tons) torpedoed about 500 miles west of Vigo;
- Norwegian Tanker James Store (8,215 tons); and
- Norwegian ship Bralanta (9,608 tons) sunk by submarine off Aden.

The entrances to the Loire and St. Nazaire were open to demagnetised ships. Caen was closed and the Gironde, Portland, Weymouth and Brest were temporarily closed. We had to provide the ships and gear for the sweeping up of magnetic mines in French ports.

The War Cabinet took note of these statements.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs drew the attention of the War Cabinet to telegram No. 434 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Bordeaux, which had been received at 3:50 A.M. that morning, reporting that the chief members of the new French Government, following on the resignation of M. Reynaud, were as follows:

- M. Chautemps: Vice-President of the Council.
- General Weygand: Minister of National Defence.
- General Colson: Minister for War.
- Admiral Darlan: Minister of Marine.
- General Pujot: Minister for Air.
- M. Baudouin: Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- M. Bouillier: Minister of Finance.
- M. Pomaret: Minister of Interior.
- M. Frossard: Minister of Public Works.

It would be noticed that M. Flandin, M. Laval, and M. Bonnet were not included.
He also referred to telegram No. 435 DIPP reporting a conversation between Sir R. Campbell and Admiral Darlan in regard to the French fleet, during which the latter had said: "So long as I can issue orders to it you have nothing to fear."

He had telegraphed to our Ambassadors at Washington and Madrid in order to keep them in touch with the situation.

The Prime Minister said that he had had a telephone conversation with General Spears, who was returning to England, as he did not think he could perform any useful service in the present situation. General de Gaulle was also coming back with him, as he had apparently been warned that, as things were developing, it might be as well for him to leave France.

Continuing, the Foreign Secretary said that, according to an American broadcast service from Berlin, the German Government would not make any armistice with the French Government, but would proceed to destroy or put out of action all their armed forces.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that, so far as Sir R. Campbell's telegrams showed, our only communication with the French Government had been Sir R. Campbell's interview with M. Baudouin (reported in telegram No. 433).

Reference was made to the telegram which had been despatched to M. Reynaud on the previous day (No. 368 DIPP), in which it was stated that the sailing of the French Fleet for British harbours was a condition of our assenting to the French enquiring as to the terms of an armistice for France. This telegram had been delivered to M. Reynaud, but he had then been asked to suspend action on it, and it was not certain whether he had shown it to the other members of the French Government. Sir R. Campbell had therefore been instructed to deliver the telegram to Marshal Petain.

The Prime Minister suggested that a further telegram should be sent, pointing out that, if the French Government sought an armistice without fulfilling this condition, our consent would not be forthcoming.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to send a telegram in this sense.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told our Chargé d'Affaires that the Belgian Government wished to be entirely associated with His Majesty's Government. He had asked if facilities could be given for the evacuation of some 900 Belgian Officers and 30 to 35 thousand troops, including 7,000 at Brest.

The Prime Minister suggested that a reply should be sent to the Belgians as follows:

1. Their troops should be told to proceed to the ports, and we would do our best to continue evacuation as long as possible.
2. They should be informed as to the ports from which they could most conveniently be taken off. (The Admiralty would advise the Foreign Office on this point.)
3. The Belgians should be asked to inform us as early as possible as to the number of their troops likely to reach each port.

The War Cabinet invited the Foreign Secretary to reply to the Belgian Government on the above lines.
U.S.S.R.
Action in the Baltic States.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (39) 31st Conclusions, Minute 3.)
Rumours of concentration against Roumania.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had no information of importance about the Russian designs in the Baltic States. It was clear that there had been a considerable extension of the Russian sphere of influence in Lithuania, and they seemed to have similar designs with regard to Estonia. He had no information of the rumours that Russia was concentrating forces for an attack on Bessarabia.
There could be little doubt that the intention behind Russia’s moves was to strengthen her position against Germany, whose military successes were not to her liking.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statement.

Egypt.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 166th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that his colleagues would now have seen his telegram of the previous evening (No. 488 DIPP to Cairo) in which he had authorised Sir Miles Lampson to tell King Farouk that in time of war the worst policy was one of uncertainty, and that the vacillation of Ali Maher was not in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty, nor representative of the feelings of the Egyptian people, nor conducive to Egypt’s ultimate interests. It was, therefore, necessary for another Government to be formed, under another Prime Minister.

He regretted that there had not been time to consult the War Cabinet before this telegram was despatched, but he had had no alternative but to take action quickly. He had received reports which had convinced him that the general situation in that country had been going from bad to worse. It remained to be seen how King Farouk would receive this message. On the whole he thought that the King might be expected to come into line, although he might at first give a certain amount of trouble. One satisfactory feature in the situation was the improved attitude of Nahas Pasha and the Wafd. No serious difficulties were expected with them.

The War Cabinet took note with approval of the above statement.

Japan.
Relations with the U.S.A.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 85th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs drew the attention of the War Cabinet to Tokyo telegram No. 996, dated the 13th June. This telegram showed that the United States Ambassador in Tokyo had been urging on his Government the desirability of not allowing American and Japanese relations to crystallise into a state of deadlock. Mr. Grew had recently had an interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister and it appeared that a measure of improvement in the relations between the two Governments had resulted.

The War Cabinet took note of the above statement.

Defence against Invasion.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 104th Conclusions, Minute 12.)
State of readiness of the Army and the Local Defence Volunteers.

9. In view of the probability that within the next few weeks this country would be faced with an attempted German invasion, whether on a larger or a smaller scale, a discussion took place on the state of readiness of the British Army and of the Local Defence Volunteers. The principal points which were raised were as follows:
Strength of the Army

(1) The strength of the Army was much greater than was commonly realised. We now had approximately 1½ million men under arms in this country. There were deficiencies in their offensive equipment, but all of them had rifles. It was desirable to give publicity to this fact, which ought both to hearten our own people and to give the Germans food for reflection.

The Secretary of State for War undertook to check these facts and figures in order that the Prime Minister might include some reference to them in his speech in the House of Commons on the following day.

(2) Our forces in the United Kingdom would shortly be strengthened by the return of the remainder of the B.E.F., and by the arrival of our Regular battalions from India, and of reinforcements from Canada and Australia.

(3) Voluntary enlistment into the Army was continuing on a considerable scale, above the age groups which were liable for compulsory military service. There was nothing to prevent a fit man between the ages of 30 and 50 from volunteering, and about 1,000 a day were doing so. Thus, of the intake into the Army during the last month, which had been about 165,000, about 30,000 had been volunteers.

(4) Our forces at home were being organised, drilled, trained and equipped as rapidly as possible; and from now onwards they would be permeated with a leaven of men who had seen active service. Nevertheless, some serious defects in the Army had now come to light.

(a) There was a shortage of good officers. Many of the Territorial officers who had joined in peace-time were not really suitable men.

The Prime Minister strongly urged the selection and rapid promotion of men who had made their mark in action.

(b) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the retreats and withdrawals which we had recently been compelled to carry out must necessarily have left their mark on the psychology of our troops. We must once and for all cast behind us the spirit of "looking over one shoulder," and of looking for a position to fall back on.

(c) We had always in the past aimed at training our whole Army to reach a uniformly high level. This method had on occasions resulted in a certain lack of enterprise among the rank and file. This was rather marked at the present time. The Germans, on the other hand, had even in the last war made a distinction between the Storm Troops who led the way and the dull solid mass who consolidated the position after the Storm Troopers had won it. In the present war this differentiation had been much more marked in the German Army. The young Nazi hot-heads who filled the armoured divisions had suffered very heavy losses, but had been responsible for a shattering series of German victories. We should have to take a leaf out of the Germans' book and to organise special squadrons of Storm Troopers (see also at (7) below).
The Local Defence Volunteers.

There had been a good deal of criticism both in the press and among Members of Parliament of the lack of organisation and discipline among the L.D.V's. It was no doubt difficult to reach a very high standard with men who gave part-time service only, on an unpaid basis. On the other hand, the L.D.V's. were now some 500,000 strong and most of them were very keen.

There was also a very widespread demand from men of all ages to be allowed to serve in the armed forces or at least to be given weapons in order to defend their homes. This demand could not be ignored.

The Secretary of State for War described certain steps which he was taking to meet this situation. The organisation of the L.D.V's. had now become too heavy a task to impose on the existing staffs of the Home Defence Forces. It was proposed to reorganise them under separate Central and Local Commanders of their own. The whole organisation would, however, remain under the orders of General Ironside. In order to assist in training, full-time permanent instructors would be taken on. Further assistance in training would be given by drawing on the Officers' Emergency Reserve. (This had originally consisted of 11,000 ex-Officers, of whom some 3,000 had not yet been found posts.)

The Secretary of State said that the L.D.V's. were at the moment largely a "broomstick" Army. Rifles were being provided for them as quickly as possible. We had a supply of rifles which had been kept in store since the last war, and which were now being reconditioned. Another 500,000 rifles were ready to leave the United States. According to the original intention, these would have been divided equally between this country and France, but arrangements were now being made which would ensure that the whole consignment came to us.

The Prime Minister emphasised the importance of getting these rifles shipped at the earliest possible moment. Nothing must be left undone to get these rifles as quickly as possible.

Steps were also being taken to organise sections of Storm Troopers on a full-time basis, as part of the L.D.V's. Tough and determined characters would be selected. Some of these would be armed with "Tommy" guns. Some 2,000 of these weapons were on order, of which some 200 had already arrived.

The press were no doubt doing their best to keep up the public morale, and to a great extent they were succeeding. The mass of our population remained remarkably cheerful under adversity. But the press could not refrain from indulging in one "stunt" after another. These stunts sometimes created a lack of confidence. Again, even the most reputable newspapers treated the guidance which they were given in a rather cavalier spirit. In the last resort the only remedy in the hands of the Government was to order prosecutions, and it seemed undesirable to adopt this remedy at the present juncture.

The War Cabinet:

(1) Approved generally the steps proposed by the Secretary of State for War for the re-organisation and training of the L.D.V's.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War to take action on the following lines to improve the training and to instil an offensive spirit into the Army as a whole:
French Request for an Armistice.

Our requirements from the French.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 168th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

(a) The Storm Troop element should be introduced into the Army.

(b) All leaders who should prove themselves lacking in drive and initiative should be ruthlessly eliminated and replaced by others who had shown themselves active and ardent spirits in battle.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for War, in conjunction with the Minister of Supply, to take all possible steps to expedite the supply of rifles, automatic weapons and ammunition from the United States, and to report the position as soon as possible.

10. The War Cabinet had before them an Aide-Mémoire prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (C.O.S. (40) 466).

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster pointed out that the paper was a policy of perfection, but it was hoped that we might be able to obtain some of our requirements. The difficulties were very considerable owing to the state of disorganisation in France. Nevertheless, consignments of machine tools and the German pilot prisoners were arriving at the ports, and everything possible was being done to get them away. It was hoped to evacuate 250 tons of Belgian gold now at Bordeaux. A somewhat disturbing piece of news had just come in, to the effect that one of our demolition parties at Dinard had been prevented by the French from carrying out their task. If this was done on orders from above, it would be symptomatic of the policy of the new French Government. If France made terms with the enemy, we must expect that large quantities of oil would fall into German hands.

Some discussion followed on what steps could be taken to implement the recommendations in the Aide-Mémoire, which had been originally prepared with a view to its discussion by a British delegation with the French Government. It was recognised that the security of the French Fleet was the most important item. The inclusion of Admiral Darlan in the new Government was perhaps a hopeful sign.

The War Cabinet then considered a further Report by the Chiefs of Staff relating to the French Colonial Empire and Mandated Territories (W.P. (40) 207), and a Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P. (G.) (40) 156).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs supported the view expressed by the Minister of Economic Warfare in his Memorandum, that economic inducements might be offered to the French administrative officers in the Colonies in order to obtain their co-operation. Such co-operation was most important, and it would be worth offering substantial amounts if necessary. We could not rely on the French Government sending a secret message to their Colonial authorities urging them to continue the struggle. He asked the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to consider this possibility.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the Aide-Mémoire of the Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S. (40) 486).

(2) Invited the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to proceed, in collaboration with the other Ministers concerned, with his arrangements to carry out, so far
as possible, the recommendations contained in the Aide-Mémoire, and to report what further action, if any, could be taken to obtain our requirements from the French.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate to Sir Ronald Campbell the more important points in the Chiefs of Staff Aide-Mémoire.

(4) Approved the Report of the Chiefs of Staff on the action which should be taken in respect of the French Colonial Empire and Mandated Territories (W.P. (40) 207).

11. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Home Security covering the Report of an Interdepartmental Committee under the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, on the arrangements for enabling children to be sent to places of greater safety overseas (W.P. (G.) (40) 152).

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security explained that the Report of the Committee, for which he and his colleagues were greatly indebted to Mr. Shakespeare, set out a plan for organising the evacuation of school children to the Dominions and to the United States of America. Many offers to take children for the duration of the war had been received from the overseas Dominions with the approval of the Governments concerned, and similar offers had been received from private organisations in the United States of America. The action to be taken was set out on pages 10 and 11 of the Report, which, if the War Cabinet approved, should be brought into operation forthwith.

The Minister without Portfolio said that, while it was no doubt repugnant to wide sections of public opinion to break up homes in this way, he recognised that, if this country were to become an "island fortress," it would be desirable to have fewer mouths to feed.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs supported the proposals, the success of which would depend upon the work of the proposed Children’s Overseas Reception Board, who would be the executive committee for the scheme.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, said that the Report had been drafted in a form suitable for publication. If the War Cabinet approved the proposals, it was intended to announce the scheme in Parliament in reply to a question on the following Wednesday.

The War Cabinet—

(a) Approved the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee set out in the Report circulated with W.P. (G.) (40) 152.

(b) Agreed that the scheme should be announced in answer to a Parliamentary question the following Wednesday, and that thereafter the Report of the Committee should be published.

12. At this point in the Meeting a message was brought in reporting that the French troops had ceased fire at 12-40, and giving an account of Marshal Pétain’s speech on the wireless at 12 Noon. The Marshal was reported as having said:

"It is with a broken heart that I tell you to-day that fighting must cease. I addressed myself last night to the enemy,
to ask him if he is prepared to seek with me, as between soldiers after an honourable fight, the means of putting an end to hostilities.

Prime Minister's Statement in Parliament.  

13. The Minister of Information raised the question whether the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on Tuesday, the 18th June, should be broadcast.

Before this could be done, it would be necessary that a Resolution should be passed by the House agreeing to the course proposed.

It was pointed out that the Speaker had been closely associated with the previous discussions which had taken place between the Leaders of the Political Parties in regard to the broadcasting of proceedings of the House, and it would clearly be necessary that the Speaker should be consulted before any arrangements were made for broadcasting the speech.

If arrangements were made for the speech to be broadcast, it was suggested that the House of Lords should not meet until after the Prime Minister's speech had been delivered.

The War Cabinet—

Authorised the Minister of Information to consult the Speaker in regard to the proposal that the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on the following day should be broadcast.

Note.—It was eventually decided not to adopt this suggestion.

Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1,  

June 17, 1940.