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W.M. (41)

70th Conclusions.

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WAR CABINET 70 (41).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, July 15, 1941, at 6 P.M.

Present :

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (<i>in the Chair</i>).	
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.	The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Lord President of the Council.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	The Right Hon. A. GREENWOOD, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Minister of Supply.	The Right Hon. Sir KINGSLEY WOOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service	

The following were also present :

The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.	The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport.	The Right Hon. JAMES STUART, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury.

Secretary.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.


**The Future of
the Railways.**

The War Cabinet had a discussion on the future of the railways, and had before them a Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council (W.P. (41) 158) summarising the issues which had arisen in discussions in the Lord President's Committee.

The discussion was of a preliminary nature, and no final decisions were reached on the main issues raised in the Lord President's Memorandum. The general trend of the discussion, and the procedure agreed upon for handling the issues involved, were as follows :—

- (1) The determining consideration must be to ensure the fullest effort from the railways during the war.
- (2) The prevailing view was that a declaration at this stage in favour of unification after the war, if not immediately followed by steps to make it effective, would result in the State getting the worst of both worlds. Further, it was clearly undesirable to make any declaration in general terms in favour of unification until a specific scheme had been worked out and approved.
- (3) The Minister of War Transport was invited to circulate to the War Cabinet his proposals as already submitted to the Lord President's Committee for a revision of the Railway Control Agreement.
- (4) The Minister was also invited to submit a Paper setting out the proposed changes in the control and higher organisation of the railways. This Paper should deal with the following points raised in discussion :—
 - (a) The extent to which the scheme proposed would secure unified operational control during the war.
 - (b) What steps would be taken to ensure that the Railway Managers regarded themselves as having an undivided responsibility to the Ministry of War Transport for the efficient functioning of the railways, in the interests of the State?
 - (c) What functions would the Board of Railway Directors perform under the Minister's scheme? Would they have any effective influence on day-to-day railway management?
 - (d) Was it clear that the Minister of War Transport had all the powers required to ensure that the railways were operated in the interests of the State, and to secure the maximum war effort during the control period?

*Great George Street, S.W. 1,
July 15, 1941.*



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