G A B I N E T.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY.

Note by the Secretary.

By direction of the Prime Minister I attach herewith certain papers that have been circulated to the Committee of Imperial Defence on the above subject, viz:

Military Aspects of the Treaty.

Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee.
(C.I.D. Paper No. 1225-B).

Letter from the Foreign Office.
(C.I.D. Paper No. 1229-B).

Inclusion of a Time Limit.

Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee.
(C.I.D. Paper No. 1228-B).

A Memorandum by the Foreign Office reviewing the present position is being circulated separately as C.P. 112 (36).

The Conclusions of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which is meeting late on the afternoon of April 27th, will be circulated as soon as they are available.

(Signed) M.P.A. HANKEY.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.,
27th April, 1936.
1. ARISING out of consideration by the Cabinet of the position reached in the negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, we have been asked to examine and report on the counter-proposals made by Nahas Pasha, and contained in the Foreign Office telegram No. 233 dated the 20th March, 1936, printed as an Annex to this Report.

2. We have again considered this problem and are still of opinion that the priority of the stages of discussion, "A," "B," and finally "C," as set forth in Sir Miles Lampson’s telegram No. 125 of the 8th February, 1936, are the proper measures for consideration in connection with the military aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

3. If, however, on political grounds for the purposes of securing a Treaty, it is considered necessary to abandon the proposals to locate a British garrison at Helouan, we consider it of fundamental importance that there should be in Egypt strong military forces in both the Suez Canal zone and the Alexandria area, and that the strength of these forces should be that considered necessary by His Majesty’s Government to enable them to carry out their rôle. On military grounds we cannot contemplate the acceptance of any proposal limiting the British forces to the Suez Canal zone only as suggested by Nahas Pasha. The abandonment of the Cairo area would necessitate a larger garrison at Alexandria.

4. We wish to point out that the evacuation of the British garrison from the Cairo area involves grave disadvantages, namely:

(a) The steadying effect of the presence of British troops in the neighbourhood of Cairo will be lost. In the years of comparative quiet that we have had in Egypt lately we are very apt to forget this very important fact.

(b) In the event of the Egyptian Government failing to fulfil her responsibilities for the maintenance of internal order and protection of foreign interests and it becomes necessary in the last resort to despatch British troops to Cairo, we shall be faced with a very difficult military proposition. It might even be necessary to reoccupy Cairo in the face of a disaffected Egyptian Army trained and equipped by us to a higher standard of efficiency than at present.

(c) In the event of trouble at Alexandria necessitating reinforcements from the Canal Zone, such reinforcement will be rendered uncertain owing to the vulnerability of the communications across the Nile Delta, however much improved, to sabotage, whereas the road from Cairo running across the Desert would permit of reinforcement in 24 hours.
The advantages of the "pooling system" which we are now advocating with the object of ensuring a close connection between the Egyptian and British Armies, so that they can be regarded as one force to meet external aggression, would be lost.

5. Increased numbers in the Canal Zone, as appear to be offered by Nahas Pasha, have little bearing on any of the above matters. We have already recommended (C.I.D. Paper No. 1212-B, paragraph 39) that His Majesty's Government should retain the right to reinforce Egypt in emergency and that the Treaty should contain provision for increasing the strength of the peace time garrison if events indicate that step to be necessary. Further, we advised that—

"The number of troops to be stationed in Egypt in normal times to be a matter of discussion between the two countries when the existing international situation has become stable."

6. "Air facilities in the Western Desert" constitute only a part of those facilities which we have already recommended as being necessary (C.I.D. Paper No. 1212-B, paragraph 39). Similarly we have always contemplated that there should be "general compliance with the British Military Mission's advice" (C.I.D. Paper No. 1212-B, paragraph 20).

(Signed) ERNLE CHATFIELD.

A. A. MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD.

E. L. ELLINGTON.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1.

April 1, 1936.

ANNEX.

Decypher Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson (Cairo), No. 233, dated March 20, 1936.

(Important.)

MY telegrams Nos. 230 and 231.

Whilst we can doubtless continue to spin our talks out for some time still (which is what I propose to do), I estimate that following may turn out to be not far off the mark:

(a) If we stick to it we may (and I myself hazard that we will) be able to get something acceptable as regards Alexandria or neighbourhood. But we should have to fight hard for it, and it is by no means certain.

(b) As regards Cairo (Abbassia and Helmieh), I gauge the indications as being that Egyptians will definitely not agree, however hard we fight for it, and that if we insist a break is almost certain. The same may well prove to be the case over Helouan.

2. In order to clear our minds betimes it would be helpful to know His Majesty's Government's reaction to what Nahas Pasha has so far offered over and above 1930 provisions, e.g., (1) improved communications (railway and road) to our satisfaction; (2) increased numbers in Canal Zone (also to our satisfaction, though he is less explicit as regards the amount of increase over 1930 figure; (3) air facilities in western desert; (4) general compliance with British military mission's advice. It may be that these factors may influence the views of His Majesty's Government as regards instructions to which I am at present working (your telegram No. 4 [sic]), and it would be helpful if I could know betimes if this is so. To the lay mind they seem to have some value.

3. I have a meeting with service advisers on Saturday and hope to be able to telegraph their views.

* Not reproduced.
SECRET.

1229-B.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF AN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY.
(Previous C.I.D. Paper No. 1225-B.)

Letter from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.

[No. J 2939/G]

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 15, 1936.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to state that he has had under consideration the report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, dated the 1st April, on certain points arising in connexion with the military aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty. The report in question, which is numbered C.O.S. 454, is contained in C.I.D. Paper 1225-B.

2. Mr. Eden considers that in the light of discussions held in Cairo between the British and Egyptian delegations subsequent to the date of the Chiefs of Staff's report, it would be politically desirable for His Majesty's Government to abandon insistence on the location of a British garrison at Helouan in spite of the military disadvantages entailed by such a move as set out by the Chiefs of Staff in their report.

3. In this connexion, I am to call attention to the views of the General Officer Commanding in Egypt and of the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East, as reported in the telegram from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, No. 28, Saving, of the 2nd April, a copy of which is attached.

4. I am to request that the recommendation contained in this letter may be discussed by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their next meeting.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RONALD CAMPBELL.

ENCLOSURE.

Telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Cairo), No. 28, Saving, dated April 2, 1936.

MY telegram No. 236.*

Following are notes by Air Officer Commanding and General Officer Commanding on strategical value of concessions so far proposed by Nahas Pasha:—

1. Alexandria.
   (a) Alexandria will always be of the utmost importance to the British Empire, second only in Egypt to the Canal, as it is the natural harbour for our fleet to use in the Eastern Mediterranean.
   (b) A sudden landing is more likely in the neighbourhood of Alexandria than anywhere else in Egypt.

* Not reproduced.
(c) In the event of serious rioting in Egypt, foreigners are just as likely to
be attacked in Alexandria as in Cairo, but intervention by another European
Power would be far more likely to occur at Alexandria than in Cairo.

(d) In case of a hostile landing British reinforcements moving from the
Canal Zone towards Alexandria would have to cross the Delta. Could be held up
in a great many places either by enemy air bombing or by sabotage, and might take
days to get there.

(e) Deduction.—It would be a great risk to agree to moving all British troops
from the neighbourhood of Alexandria.

2. Cairo.

(a) Affords a better place for a mobile reserve than anywhere else in Egypt,
but, provided communications are improved, the difference in time of movement
between having a mobile reserve in Cairo or having it in the Canal Zone would
only be a matter of hours.

(b) With the increased speed of movement due to the development of
mechanisation, it seems less necessary now to keep forces in Cairo to quell
internal unrest. We don't want our army to act as a police reserve and to be
called upon frequently, but only to come in if rioting is developing to insurrection.

(c) Provided we retain our headquarters in Cairo and have a strong British
mission with the Egyptian army, we ought to be able to keep in touch with the
internal situation, and to know whether any revolts were being hatched in
the army.

(d) Deduction.—The real risk of removing British troops from Cairo is the
difficulty of establishing a base and recovering control of all means of communica­
tion with a really hostile Egyptian Government in power.

But if an agreed treaty is considered of the greatest importance and
negotiations are likely to break down over this question, such a risk would have
to be accepted. An agreed treaty renders the probability of a really hostile Egypt
more remote.

3. With regard to the R.A.F.

(a) We must locate any army co-operation squadrons near the army.

(b) If we have a fighter squadron primarily for the defence of Alexandria,
it must be stationed near Alexandria. Amiriya would be suitable.

(c) Although we don't want to move from Cairo, bomber squadrons could
operate almost as efficiently from the Canal Zone as from Heliopolis.

(d) Provided a suitable site can be found, there would be no objection to
moving the depot from Aboukir to the Canal Zone.

(e) The R.A.F. must have freedom of flight over the whole of Egypt, and be
given facilities for the establishment of landing-grounds.

(f) Deduction.—Given (b) and (c), if applicable, we can agree to R.A.F. bases
being located in the Canal Zone.

4. The concessions already given by Nahas go a considerable way to meet
our essential requirements.

We still require:

(a) British troops in the neighbourhood of Alexandria.

(b) Headquarters in Cairo.

(c) Freedom of manoeuvres for land forces during the training season.

(d) Definition of 'air facilities' to meet our requirements.

5. If British troops move out of Cairo, who will find the Residency guards?

NOTE.—Although the time-limit for the occupation of the Canal Zone has not
been mentioned and may not be raised by the Egyptian delegation, they are certain
to ask for a time-limit for the occupation of Alexandria.

The question to be decided is whether it is worth wrecking the negotiations
for the sake of avoiding a time-limit at Alexandria.

Would a British guard on the Embassy be necessary if the treaty goes
through?
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY—INCLUSION OF A TIME LIMIT.

(PREVIOUS C.I.D. PAPER NO. 1225-B.)

REPORT BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.

1. WE have had under consideration a letter from the Foreign Office to the Under-Secretary of State, War Office (No. J. 2615/2/16 of the 27th March, 1936—copy attached as Appendix I) referring to the question of the inclusion of a “time limit” on the lines of Article 14 of the 1930 Draft in an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. As Sir Miles Lampson considers that a refusal by us to agree to any time limit or reference to the League of Nations would prove a major difficulty, the Foreign Office have put forward certain proposals, which, briefly, are to the following effect:

(a) If no provision for a time limit as was contemplated in Article 14* of the draft Treaty of 1930 is included in a Treaty, the legal position will be somewhat uncertain. It is, therefore, suggested that His Majesty’s Government should begin by attempting to secure agreement upon an article in the terms of Article 16† of the 1933 draft.

(b) If the Egyptian negotiators reject an article in the above terms the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would propose that an attempt should be made to secure an article on the lines of Article 111 of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq.

(c) If the Egyptian delegates refuse to accept an article in these terms and stand on Article 14 of the 1930 draft treaty, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers that it would be preferable to agree to the Egyptian demand rather than that treaty negotiations should break down on this point.

They have asked that if the Army Council agree, a recommendation may be made to the Committee of Imperial Defence to the effect that the procedure outlined in (a), (b) and (c) above should be adopted in principle; as a matter of convenience we have considered this matter at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in order that a co-ordinated view may be presented.

Our Responsibility for the Maintenance of Imperial Communications in Egypt.

2. In considering this proposal, the first point which we desire to stress is that the main and overwhelming consideration in any Treaty is the continuing security in all circumstances of our maritime communications through the Suez Canal and of our air communications in Egypt. All other military considerations are contributory to this. The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt was the first of the four reserved points when, in 1922, Egypt was declared by His Majesty’s Government to be an independent Sovereign State, and in recent years this responsibility has been affirmed and reaffirmed both by the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Cabinet.
3. The importance attached by His Majesty's Government to this responsibility is illustrated by the fact that when the Defence of the Suez Canal zone was under consideration at the 207th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the 18th December, 1934, it was agreed on our recommendation that the Government of the day should declare a state of emergency in the Canal zone at any time when the situation might appear to warrant such action. It is well understood that such action would be, mainly, action by Naval Forces, as it is only by forcible Naval Action that certain acts against the security and freedom of the Canal can be prevented.

4. Again, in dealing with a recommendation contained in our report on the military aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, viz. :—(C.I.D. Paper No. 1212-B)

"That His Majesty's Government must remain exclusively responsible for the security of the Suez Canal; no right to participate in this responsibility should be conceded to the Egyptian Government."

the Prime Minister in a report to the Cabinet, stated that the Committee of Imperial Defence had recommended that "this point should not be specifically raised in the negotiations for a Treaty, but our responsibility for the security of the Suez Canal should be assumed" (C.P. 25 (36)). When this report was considered on the 10th February, 1936, the Cabinet agreed that the above recommendation "should not be interpreted as necessarily prohibiting the granting of permission to the Egyptian Government to station a small number of troops (e.g., a battalion or a few companies) within the Canal Zone as an earnest of the sincerity of our desire for co-operation with Egypt as an ally, but that this would only be permitted on the distinct understanding that no abrogation or weakening was involved of our responsibility for the security of the Suez Canal."

5. Up to date, then, the responsibility of His Majesty's Government for the protection of the Suez Canal has always been assumed as a fundamental point and in order to secure the conditions essential to our fulfilment of this responsibility, negotiations have, in the main, centred on the strength and location of the British Forces in Egypt whose main purpose, indeed, is the protection of our Imperial communications.

6. We consider that the role of the British Forces in respect of the Canal is so vital that it is not possible to permit this role to be transferred at any time to any other country, bearing in mind that Egypt will never have naval forces able to relieve our Navy from this responsibility. Unless, therefore, we maintain the security of the Suez Canal in our own hands it will not be possible to safeguard the communications of the British Empire, the Dominions and India. Our Imperial Strategy is based on this foundation. Although political necessities may override military considerations in lesser matters we consider that in this respect a vital strategic question is at stake.

CONCLUSIONS.

7. It appears to us that the proposals of the Foreign Office, as set forth in paragraph 1, risk eventually placing the above vital responsibility of His Majesty's Government in jeopardy. Furthermore, we believe that the same was true of the 1930 draft Treaty. Had we signed that draft Treaty, our right to protect the Suez Canal and the air communications of the Empire would sooner or later have been endangered, since it provided for a time limit at the expiration of which the matter might have been referred to the League of Nations and the decision of the League might have gone against us. We consider it essential to our imperial security that this mistake shall not be repeated.

8. In these circumstances, on military grounds, and from the point of view of safeguarding our Empire Communications, we cannot subscribe to any of the proposals put forward by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which provide for the inclusion in the draft of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of an unqualified "time limit" with possible reference on its expiration to the League.
of Nations. We cannot recommend the conclusion of any Treaty which may have
the effect, at some future date, of depriving us of the right to safeguard the Suez
Canal. We recommend, on the contrary, that as a first step His Majesty's
Government should press for the inclusion early in the Treaty of an article
recognising our antecedent and permanent right to protect the Suez Canal, and
that the position of His Majesty's Government in this respect should be
established. When this fundamental point has been provided and the position is
clearly understood, there would not be the same objection to the imposition of a
time limit as regards other Military aspects of the Treaty, with, perhaps, a
reference to the League of Nations in case of disagreement.

(Signed)  ERNLE CHATFIELD.
           E. L. ELLINGTON.
           C. J. DEVERELL.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1,
April 9, 1936.
APPENDIX I.

Copy of a Letter from the Foreign Office to the War Office.

No. J. 2615/2/16.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 27, 1936.

In paragraph 39 (i) & (ii) of their report of the 5th February on the military aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty (C.I.D. Paper No. 1212-B, and Paper No. C.O.S. 430), the Chiefs of Staff state that the rule of the British forces in Egypt is immutable and cannot logically be subject to any time limit or be a matter for submission to the League of Nations, as was envisaged in the 1930 draft treaty. Commenting upon this, the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in paragraph 5 of his memorandum of the 7th February (C.P. 25 (36)), pointed out the difficulty of reconciling this condition with an eventual Egyptian membership of the League of Nations, which would enable Egypt to bring the matter before the League under Article 19 of the Covenant; that in the draft treaty of 1930 an attempt was made to overcome the difficulty by the inclusion of a time limit of twenty years, within which the question would not be raised; but that a time limit was a dubious and temporary safeguard, which was open to later challenge by Egypt under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League. (He pointed out, however, that recommendations of the League under Article 19 do not become effective without the assent of both parties to the treaty.) It was therefore recommended (paragraph 6) that the British negotiators should not themselves propose a time limit for the treaty, and that if it were proposed on the Egyptian side they should oppose it. In paragraph 10 of his telegram No. 94, Secret, of the 20th February to His Majesty’s High Commissioner for Egypt, containing instructions for the conduct of the preliminary conversations with the Egyptian delegation on the military aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Mr. Secretary Eden informed Sir Miles Lampson that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Committee of Imperial Defence memorandum should be interpreted, as far as concerns the point regarding the League of Nations, as meaning that it was undesirable in an eventual treaty specifically to mention reference of a dispute between His Majesty’s Government and the Egyptian Government to the League of Nations in connection with the duration or revision of a treaty.

2. In his telegram No. 169 of the 25th February, Sir Miles Lampson, referring to this question, stated his conviction that a refusal to agree to any time limit or reference to the League of Nations would prove a major difficulty, and he pointed out that during negotiations in 1930 the Egyptian delegation were only induced with the utmost difficulty to agree that the maintenance of British troops in the Canal Zone should remain unquestioned for twenty years.

3. In his reply (Telegram No. 122 of the 29th February), the Secretary of State explained that the issue was one between (a) a treaty which would not be limited in point of time, but would go on indefinitely until both parties agreed that it should be changed, and (b) one under which after a fixed minimum period the parties would negotiate with a view to agreeing whether the treaty should be continued or not and a dispute on the point would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. In the same telegram Mr. Eden reminded Sir Miles Lampson that there would be no objection to the inclusion in the treaty of an article in the terms of Article 13 of the 1930 draft, under which any difference on the subject of the application or interpretation of the provisions in the treaty which the high contracting parties were unable to settle by direct negotiations should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. But, of course, if the duration article was in form (a) the League of Nations could at most only make recommendations as regards the continuance or revision of the treaty, whereas if it was in form (b) the Council could give a binding decision in a resolution which would not require the vote of Egypt or the United Kingdom to render it valid. Mr. Eden requested that if Sir Miles Lampson still considered that Egyptian sentiment demanded a time limit after which the question of the duration and revision of the treaty should if necessary be referred to the League, he should report accordingly, in order that
if necessary the matter might be reconsidered by His Majesty's Government with a view to deciding between the disadvantage of agreeing to the specific mention of a time limit and that of failure to secure a treaty. And on the 14th March, in his telegram No 218, His Majesty's High Commissioner replied that he feared there was no hope of Egypt agreeing to any treaty which did not contain some kind of time limit or limitative provision, coupled probably (though on this he was not equally certain) with a provision for reference in the last resort to the League of Nations. He considered it was most improbable that the Egyptian delegation would accept so considerable a departure from what was agreed to in 1930. It should further be observed that the draft treaty of 1928, drawn up by Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha, gave the League of Nations the power to decide where the British forces in Egypt should be located after ten years (Article 7) and that it is most unusual for treaties of alliance to be regarded as of perpetual duration.

4. In view of the opinions expressed by Sir Miles Lampson, it cannot, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be anticipated that the Egyptian negotiators will agree to the omission from a treaty of an article on the lines of Article 14 of the draft treaty of 1930. This article, it will be remembered, laid down that at any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years the high contracting parties would, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision by agreement between them of the terms of the treaty as might be appropriate in the circumstances as they then existed: that in case of disagreement the difference would be submitted to the League of Nations; and that negotiations for revision could be entered into with the consent of both parties at any time after ten years. The Committee of Imperial Defence recommended in their memorandum that it would be desirable to avoid the inclusion of any provision referring to the duration of the treaty at all. But Mr. Eden is advised that the legal position in the event of this solution being adopted will be somewhat uncertain. Apart from possible termination under Article 19 of the Covenant, it would be open to Egypt to argue that she could terminate unilaterally at any time on giving reasonable notice, unless the treaty stated that it was to remain in force until revised by common consent or that it was perpetual (see Oppenheim, *International Law*, Volume 1, 4th Edition, page 746). In the circumstances it seems to Mr. Eden to be a matter for consideration whether it would be in the interests of His Majesty's Government to attempt this solution. If the Army Council agree, Mr. Eden would recommend that His Majesty's Government should begin by attempting to secure agreement upon an article in the terms of Article 16 of the 1933 draft, under which the treaty would continue indefinitely in force until both parties agree on what is to take its place. In such an article it would be laid down that at any time after the expiration of, say, twenty years, the parties would negotiate with a view to its revision. But the mention of this period would only have the effect that there would be a moral right when this period had expired to call for negotiations and for an endeavour to reach agreement: unless agreement were reached the treaty would continue in its original form. The article would also state that the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty should be provided for in any revision agreed upon. If the Egyptian negotiators should reject an article in these terms, then Mr. Eden would propose that an attempt should be made to secure an article on the lines of Article 11 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 between the United Kingdom and Iraq. Under this article the treaty is to remain in force for a period of twenty-five years, and at any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of the treaty the high contracting parties shall, at the request of either of them, conclude a new treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement "in this matter" the difference is to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

5. It seems possible that Egyptian desiderata would be satisfied by the mention of a time limit for the treaty and by the provision for reference to the League of Nations of a difference on the question whether the new treaty to be concluded provides for the continued maintenance and protection of the essential communication of His Britannic Majesty, while the requirement that the treaty should safeguard essential British communications might afford
adequate protection to the interests of His Majesty’s Government. The provision is, in any case, an improvement from the point of view of His Majesty’s Government on the terms of the article agreed to (Article 14) in the negotiations with Egypt of 1930.

6. It is nevertheless most probable that the Egyptian delegation will refuse to accept an article even in these terms and will stand upon Article 14 of the 1930 draft. In that case Mr. Eden considers that it would be preferable to agree to the Egyptian demand rather than that treaty negotiations should break down on this point.

7. I am, therefore, to suggest for consideration that if the Army Council agree with the foregoing a recommendation should be made by them to the Committee of Imperial Defence to the effect that the procedure proposed in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above should be adopted in principle. I am to ask that he may be furnished with the views of the Army Council on this suggestion at their early convenience.

8. Similar letters are being sent to the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.

(Signed) RONALD CAMPBELL.

APPENDIX II.

Article 14 of the 1930 Draft Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision by agreement between them of its terms as may be appropriate in the circumstances as they then exist. In case of disagreement the difference will be submitted to the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, at any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the coming into force of the Treaty, negotiations may be entered into with the consent of both the High Contracting Parties with a view to such revision as aforesaid.

APPENDIX III.

Article 16 of the 1933 Draft Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the treaty, the high contracting parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in the circumstances as they then exist, it being understood that the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty shall be provided for in any revision of the present treaty.

APPENDIX IV.

Article XI of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 between the United Kingdom and Iraq.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, conclude a new Treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement in this matter the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.