CABINET.

FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN RHODESIA.

Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

IN our Memorandum C.P. 409 (30) of the 5th December we called the attention of the Cabinet to the fact that important questions were likely to arise in the near future affecting Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and intimated that we proposed to bring before them the facts and the relevant considerations as soon as we were in a position to do so. We have now examined the question in detail and submit it for the Cabinet's consideration.

We think it well to preface the statement of the question which the Cabinet is asked to decide by brief introductory statements regarding the two territories concerned. A sketch map is appended.

I.—(a) Introductory Statement as to Southern Rhodesia.

The Colony of Southern Rhodesia is a high-lying country of 150,000 square miles in area, extending from the Zambesi in the north to the Limpopo in the south, and bounded on the west by the Bechuanaland Protectorate and on the east by Portuguese East Africa. It is inhabited by a European population of 45,000 and a native population of 1,000,000. Mineral rights are owned by the British South Africa Company, who also control the railway system which provides through communication with Capetown, Beira in Mozambique, and, through Northern Rhodesia, with the Belgian Congo and (shortly) with Lobito Bay in Angola. Till 1923 the administration of the country was in the hands of the British South Africa Company, but in that year responsible government was granted, subject to certain reservations, of which the most important relates to native affairs.

The chief industries of the Colony are agriculture and mining, which account in equal proportions for practically the whole of the exports. Primarily, however, the European inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia are a community of "farmers," and the Southern Rhodesia Government may be described as a "farmers'" Government. The principal export crop is tobacco, which has made rapid progress of recent years under the stimulus of Imperial preference, but the prospects of cotton are also considered to be good. Since the commencement of mining gold has been responsible for over three-quarters of the mineral output of the Colony, and it is still by far the most important export. The chief other minerals produced are asbestos, chrome and coal.

When responsible government was granted to Southern Rhodesia, it was provided that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should retain the control over native administration which they had exercised in the days of the British South Africa Company. That control has always been exercised through the High Commissioner for South Africa, who, in addition to his other functions as "Governor" of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, is the Agent in Southern Rhodesia of His Majesty's Government in...
the United Kingdom in regard to native affairs and is invested by the constitution of Southern Rhodesia, as embodied in the Letters Patent of 1893, with general supervisory powers over native questions in the Colony. Appointments in the Southern Rhodesia Native Department require his approval. The native reserves are vested in him. No restrictions on natives (except as to arms and liquor) which do not apply equally to Europeans, may be imposed without his consent. He has the right to call for information or investigation in regard to native affairs when he thinks fit. Generally, he is responsible to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom for safeguarding native rights in the Colony.

It may be mentioned here that the Southern Rhodesia Government have recently taken occasion of the separation of the posts of Governor-General of the Union of South Africa and of High Commissioner for South Africa to propose that the functions of the High Commissioner for South Africa in relation to Southern Rhodesia should be transferred to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, and that they have been informed that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom were unable to agree to the adoption of such an arrangement.

The question of the assignment between Europeans and natives of lands in Southern Rhodesia has recently been settled by the Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act, 1930, which follows the lines recommended by a Commission set up to investigate and report upon the question. The substance of the settlement is that, out of the total area of the Colony, 45,600,000 acres are reserved for Europeans, 29,000,000 acres (including both native reserves and native areas, i.e., areas in which only a native may hold or occupy land) are reserved for natives, and the balance of 17,500,000 acres has been unassigned and reserved for future consideration for the purpose of adjusting any miscalculation which time may show to have been made in the present apportionment of land between the two races. In order to safeguard native rights in the unassigned area, provision has been made that within this area no land can be definitely assigned without the prior approval of the High Commissioner, who is also entitled to call for the appointment of a fresh Commission of Enquiry into the whole question of the unassigned area at any time that he thinks fit.

I.—(b) Introductory Statement as to Northern Rhodesia.

The Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia consists of a collection of territories having little geographical or ethnographical connection, with a total area of nearly 290,000 square miles, and a native population of over 1,300,000. The European population in 1928 was about 7,000, but has since increased to 11,000 owing to mining development. A central railway line, 506 miles long (the continuation of the central line passing through Southern Rhodesia), runs across the Protectorate from the Southern Rhodesia border to the Belgian Congo on the north. The mining rights, as in Southern Rhodesia, are owned by the British South Africa Company, which has leased the mining areas to various Companies, in which American capital is prominent.

Like Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company till 1924, when it came under the direct administration of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, who have retained complete control, though an elected minority has been admitted to the Legislative Council.

On taking over, it was found that hardly anything had been done for the native population except to tax it; and the territory still remains far behind any other part of East or Central Africa in matters relating to native welfare. Native rights in land had, however, been partly protected and the tribal reserves which have now been set aside in certain districts appear to be adequate. There are no restrictions on native land-holding in unreserved areas; and there is no legal colour-bar, though, in practice, a bar exists in the neighbourhood of the railway and is enforced in some trades by the Europeans. The Government and the Mining authorities are beginning to train natives to more skilled work and, if this continues, conditions as regards labour may be expected to approximate in time to those in East Africa.

Outside Barotseland, the native organisations had been largely discredited and broken down. A beginning is being made with resuscitating them. Apart from the difference in political structure, the most notable differences between Southern and Northern Rhodesia are that the latter is certainly for the
most part, and possibly nearly all, unsuited for permanent European settlement; and that the native population was never conquered, but has from the first been bound to the Crown by treaties on which, though often ignored where native interests are concerned, all European titles rest.

The territory may be divided into the following areas numbered: (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) respectively.

(1) **Barotseland.**—A native State in treaty relations with His Majesty’s Government, largely self-governing, with an area of about 60,000 square miles and a population of 316,000. There are no settlers among the European population of 150. The Paramount Chief of the Barotse and his Council signed an agreement in 1900 to be “considered in the light of a treaty or alliance made between my Barotse nation and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria, but nothing written in this agreement shall otherwise affect my constitutional power or authority as Chief of the said nation.” The agreement also left all legal cases between natives to the Paramount Chief (or “King,” as he was described in the agreement itself).

(2) **North-Eastern Rhodesia.**—An area of 105,000 square miles, connected by a narrow “bottle-neck” with the rest of the Protectorate, from which it was administered separately till 1911. The natives number about 600,000 and the whites between 700 and 800. Most of North-Eastern Rhodesia is thoroughly tropical, and the trade and communications are, and may be expected to continue to be, chiefly through Nyasaland or Tanganyika Territory. Many of the natives seek employment in the Katanga or Southern Rhodesia, and this area is at present the most important recruiting ground for the new mines in Northern Rhodesia itself.

(3) The Mining Area, athwart the northern end of the railway, separated by a purely conventional line from the mining area of the Belgian Congo. This is undergoing intensive development and is expected to be producing 200,000 tons of copper a year in another four years, and twice as much four years later, at a cost of production below that of any other part of the world. The local native population is sparse, less than a family to the square mile and the mines are at present favouring a policy of introducing and settling native families, and of training natives to skilled work. Over 25,000 are already employed. If this policy, as we hope, continues it is possible that in ten or fifteen years something like 400,000 natives may settle round the mines, coming largely from North-Eastern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Tanganyika. The capital for these mines is drawn about equally from Britain and the United States of America. The white population is already over 6,000, and may possibly treble in four or five years. It is of a different character from that of the rest of the Protectorate, being composed largely of persons who have no intention of remaining permanently, owing to climatic conditions, which in the mining district appear to be unsuited to a settled European population.

(4) An agricultural area south of the mining district, but north of the Kafue River, with a high-lying comparatively healthy patch on the railway line, on which a new capital is being established. Communications to areas (1), (2) and (3) radiate from this neighbourhood.

(5) An area of about 30,000 square miles between the Kafue River and the Zambezi. This marches with Southern Rhodesia for 300 miles and is in the same latitude as the Northern part of the Colony. It contains the present capital, Livingstone, and a considerable proportion of the white settlers. The natives are estimated at 150,000 and the Europeans at 2,400.

II.—Statement of the Question requiring Decision.

At the end of September 1930 some of the Elected Members of the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, who objected to the recent White Paper on Native Policy in East Africa, telegraphed direct to the Secretary of State for the Colonies enquiring whether His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared to receive representations with a view to the amalgamation of that Territory with Southern Rhodesia under a constitution similar to that enjoyed by the latter. This was followed a few days later by a telegram from the Government of Southern Rhodesia to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs referring to the representations made by the Northern Rhodesia Elected
Members to the Colonial Office. The Southern Rhodesia Government stated that "not only would they welcome the initiation of discussions on the subject, but failure to take advantage of the opportunity now presented for considering the proposals for the amalgamation would cause profound disappointment to them and to the great majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia." They suggested, therefore, "that a conference be arranged . . . for the purpose of discussing the important questions involved."

It is this proposal by the Southern Rhodesia Government, i.e., that a conference should be held to discuss the possibility of the amalgamation of the whole of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia under a constitution similar to that enjoyed by the latter, to which a definite reply is now required. Since it would be nugatory for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to agree to call a conference unless they were in sympathy with its objects, the question for the Cabinet's decision is, in effect, whether the Government should or should not contemplate the amalgamation of Northern with Southern Rhodesia in the near future, and if not, whether there is any alternative to a mere rejection of the Southern Rhodesia Government's proposal.

III.—(a) Considerations bearing on the Question from the Point of View of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Relation to (a) Southern Rhodesia and (b) the Union of South Africa.

(a) It is of importance to bear in mind, in connection with the request made by the Government of Southern Rhodesia, that the trend of public opinion in the Colony during the last few years has set strongly away from amalgamation with the Union, at one time regarded as the inevitable destiny of the Colony, and towards the ideal of a separate British political unit in the North, large enough to counter-balance the Union of South Africa with its strong Dutch interests. It is symptomatic of this tendency, which has been accentuated by the recent direction of Union domestic politics, that for some years Southern Rhodesia Ministers have lost no opportunity of calling attention to Southern Rhodesia's hopes to the "reversion" of Northern Rhodesia. Mr. Amery, when approached as Secretary of State on this point by the late Sir Charles Coghlan, then Premier of Southern Rhodesia, and other Southern Rhodesia Ministers, both in England in 1926 and in Southern Rhodesia on his world tour in 1927, was careful to explain that he could not commit His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to a statement of future policy, but went so far as to express the opinion that there would be much to be said for an ultimate partition of Northern Rhodesia, North-Eastern Rhodesia (area No. (2)) going with Nyasaland and the East African Dependencies, and the western part of the Protectorate with Southern Rhodesia. It is probable, therefore, that a reply to the present request of the Southern Rhodesia Government, which fell short of the possibility referred to Mr. Amery (i.e., as offering an accession of territory substantially less than that hinted at by him), would be a disappointment to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and that it might be regarded as setting a bar on what has begun to be regarded as a legitimate aspiration. Reference may also be made in this connection to the Hilton Young Commission's Report of 1929, which dealt to some extent with this matter. While the majority of the Commission expressed the view that the independent status of Northern Rhodesia (and Nyasaland) should be maintained pending development and mineral exploitation, the Chairman, on the contrary, recommended that the Governor of Southern Rhodesia should be appointed High Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and contemplated the ultimate amalgamation of the "settled area" (presumably areas Nos. (3), (4) and (5)) of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, the ultimate constitution of Barotseland (area No. (1)) as a native reserve under Southern Rhodesia, and the ultimate union of North-Eastern Rhodesia (area No. (2)) with Nyasaland. No pronouncement upon these recommendations has ever been made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, but, upon their publication, the Government of Southern Rhodesia at once made representations to the effect that they disagreed with the view of the majority and urged that no action might be taken prejudicial to future closer union between Southern and Northern Rhodesia.

Apart from the aspirations of the Southern Rhodesia Government in regard to Northern Rhodesia and the representations made by them in recent
years, which must be reckoned as a factor of importance in this connection, there appears, on the merits, no reason affecting Southern Rhodesia why a change should be made at the present time in the arrangements for the future administration of Southern and Northern Rhodesia respectively, which were concluded only seven years ago, when the two Rhodesias passed from the administration of the British South Africa Company.

(b) For reasons which will be apparent from the preceding paragraph, the aggrandisement of Southern Rhodesia at the expense of Northern Rhodesia would be likely to arouse lively interest in the Union. The Union have, of course, no claim to any part of Northern Rhodesia, nor would they be entitled to object to the incorporation of any part of it in Southern Rhodesia, but the eventuality might provoke a request by the Union Government, in its turn, for the transfer to the Union of some or all of the High Commission Territories (Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland) whose ultimate incorporation in the Union is contemplated in the South Africa Act. If such a request were made by the Union Government in this connection, it is likely that it would relate particularly to the Bechuanaland Protectorate, whose frontier, unlike those of the other two territories, marches with that of Southern Rhodesia and at one point touches Northern Rhodesia. The Union Government might consequently think it well to take special steps to safeguard the “reversion” of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Union. A request for the incorporation of any of the Territories in the Union would be embarrassing, as it has for some time, for reasons connected with native administration and for other reasons, been the policy of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to avoid such incorporation, at any rate for the present; it is, moreover, highly improbable that Parliament, under existing conditions, would be willing to approve such incorporation in view of the fact that the native inhabitants of the territories would be strongly opposed to it. In the particular case of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, a predominantly native area, analogous to Barotseland, the question has of recent years come to be considered here whether it might be better, in spite of the South Africa Act, to aim at eventually associating the Territory, or at any rate the northern part of it, with Southern Rhodesia or with Northern Rhodesia, rather than with the Union.

A special point in this connection is that Southern Rhodesia has for some time advanced a claim to the incorporation of the Tati Reserve (part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate) into Southern Rhodesia. This incorporation is also strongly desired by the settlers in the Tati Reserve, and the Union have intimated that they would have no objection to the transfer. The reason why action has been deferred is that it was thought that to proceed in this matter would inevitably cause the question of the incorporation of the rest of the Protectorate into the Union to be raised.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to discuss the future of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in detail in this connection, but the possible repercussion on this matter of the incorporation of any part of Northern Rhodesia in Southern Rhodesia has to be borne in mind.

III.—(b) Considerations bearing on the question from the point of view of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in its relation to Northern Rhodesia.

The following considerations are of special importance:

(a) Barotseland (Area No. (1)) and North-Eastern Rhodesia (Area No. (2)) are almost purely native areas and are akin to the native areas in tropical Africa. There are accordingly strong reasons why they should remain under the direct control of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, like the East and Central African territories, and why their transfer to a self-governing white community should not be envisaged, even if such transfer were made subject to the safeguard that the supervisory functions which the High Commissioner for South Africa exercises in regard to native affairs in Southern Rhodesia would be extended to them. It may be taken as certain that the natives themselves, in so far as they are articulate, would be opposed to such a transfer. A further point in this connection (though it relates to Southern Rhodesia rather than to Northern Rhodesia) is that though the exercise by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom through the High Commission for South Africa of supervisory powers over native affairs in Southern Rhodesia has not hitherto led to friction between them and the Southern Rhodesia Government, the possibility of future friction cannot be ignored if the proportion of natives to Europeans in an enlarged Southern Rhodesia were doubled.

(b) As a matter of Empire policy, it appears desirable that the mining area (area No. (3)) should remain under the control of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. These mines may before long be the governing factor in the copper markets of the world, and their output will become essential to national defence in the event of war and of primary importance to the Empire’s trade and manufacture in peace-time. These questions of policy were recently considered by a Cabinet Committee, and the Board of Trade has at present in hand negotiations to secure a proportion of refining in this country. Delicate diplomatic questions have arisen with the Belgian Congo and will, no doubt, increasingly arise when the output of minerals begins to travel over the Belgian and Portuguese Railways. The conduct of such negotiations would be made more difficult if the mining area were no longer administered under the authority of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the native workers at the mines will be drawn chiefly from Nyasaland and the South-Western parts of the Tanganyika Territory as well as from North-Eastern Rhodesia, and the protection of their interests by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will be facilitated if the mining area remains under the direct control of that Government. It should be noted in this connection that the agricultural area (Area No. (4)) south of the mining area is closely connected with the mining area from the point of view of communications and should remain associated with the mining area in order to ensure convenient arrangements for the administration and supply of the latter. It is also the area in which the new capital of Northern Rhodesia will be located.

Apart from these considerations, it may well be doubted whether the Southern Rhodesia Government, which, as stated above, is primarily a “farmers” Government, is really qualified to take over the administration of so large and important a mining area as this promises to become. It is even possible that their doing so might lead to friction and difficulty with the mining interests, and the circumstances existing at Johannesburg in the years preceding the Boer War, different as they were in many respects, may be referred to as showing the possibilities of such a situation.

(c) The objections, set out in the preceding two paragraphs, which exist as regards the possible transfer of areas Nos. (1), (2), (3) and (4) to Southern Rhodesia, would not apply, at any rate to the same extent, to the transfer to Southern Rhodesia of the Livingstone area (area No. (5)). Not only is this area closely allied to Southern Rhodesia geographically, but it is predominantly an area in which there is a settlement by European “farmers,” like Southern Rhodesia itself. Approximately one-fourth of the European population of Northern Rhodesia is in this area. The administration of the remainder of this heterogeneous Protectorate would undoubtedly be facilitated by the transfer of a considerable section of the settled white population to a self-governing Colony with which they are economically, geographically and, somewhat to the Government’s embarrassment, politically allied. In particular, the disappearance of three out of the seven constituencies returning members to the Legislative Council would afford an opportunity for considering the readjustment of the constitution of the Protectorate, which is not well suited to present conditions.

IV.—Brief Recapitulation of Preceding Section.

Before proceeding further, it may be convenient to summarise in a few lines the considerations referred to in the preceding section of this Memorandum:

(i) In relation to Northern Rhodesia, there are important reasons of native policy why the transfer to Southern Rhodesia of areas (Nos. (1) and (2)) of the Protectorate cannot be contemplated at the present time.

(ii) In relation to Southern Rhodesia, while there seems, on the merits, no case at the present time for transferring to Southern Rhodesia a part of Northern Rhodesia (still less the whole of Northern Rhodesia), the attitude and aspirations of the Southern Rhodesia Government, reflecting, as they do, the trend of thought
of the European inhabitants of the Colony, are an important factor, and to disregard them might well affect the relations between the Southern Rhodesia Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which are at present satisfactory.

(iii) In relation to the Union of South Africa, the transfer to Southern Rhodesia of any part of Northern Rhodesia at the present time may well raise the question, which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would gladly see postponed, of the transfer to the Union of the South Africa High Commission Territories—particularly, perhaps, the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

(iv) From the point of view of the Empire as a whole, it is desirable to maintain Imperial control of the mining area (3) and the adjacent area (4).

V.—Fundamental Issue Involved.

The considerations and facts referred to above relate primarily to the present, and deal in the light of existing conditions with the proposal made by the Southern Rhodesia Government. Actually, however, wider considerations are involved in the proposal than such as turn on the situation in this part of Africa as it is at the present time. The fundamental issue is where, in the future, the boundary is to lie between a Southern Africa, with one type of civilisation, and a central, or central and eastern, Africa, with another type of civilisation. It is clear that a final answer to this question cannot be given for a good many years to come; and that much will depend on factors and developments which cannot as yet be clearly foreseen. All that can be hoped for at this stage is to ensure as far as possible that the decision to be taken on the request made by the Southern Rhodesia Government, and any consequential action, shall be such as will not prejudice in a sense contrary to natural development whatever line of division may eventually prove to be the most suitable.

VI.—Proposed Line of Action.

Looking at the matter from this point of view, we have come to the conclusion that, if there is to be any addition of Northern Rhodesia territory to Southern Rhodesia in the near future, the most that could be added would be the Livingstone area (Area No. (5)), and that if any Conference is held, it should be strictly limited to consideration of this issue. We consider, however, in order that there may be no misapprehension, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom ought to make it plain, in offering to participate in a Conference on this basis, (1) that, in their view, the time has not yet come when it is possible to determine the future political orientation of that part of Africa which may be generally described as lying between the Zambesi and Tanganyika Territory, but (2) that it is clear to them that it is impossible to consider, in present circumstances, any diminution of their direct responsibilities in relation to the mining area of Northern Rhodesia. By the offer of a Conference, accompanied by an intimation to this effect, His Majesty's Government would have made it clear that they were not opposed to a readjustment of boundaries if there were a practical advantage in this and a definite desire for it. On the other hand, this attitude would also serve as a plain indication that the transfer of the Livingstone area to Southern Rhodesia would not take effect unless the Southern Rhodesia Government were really anxious to take over that area, and, moreover, were willing to do so as an alternative to the idea that they should take over the whole of Northern Rhodesia or of a larger part of Northern Rhodesia than the Livingstone area. There would thus be no question of a transfer of the Livingstone area to Southern Rhodesia under conditions which would encourage Southern Rhodesia to hope for early amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, or, indeed, for the addition of further parts of Northern Rhodesia within a period which can now be envisaged.

It remains to be seen whether the Southern Rhodesia Government would regard it as to their advantage to accept the addition of the Livingstone area in such circumstances. It may well be that they would not. We have not failed to give consideration to this aspect of the matter, but, on a balance of advantages and disadvantages, we are satisfied that, of the two alternatives which alone we are able to contemplate at the moment, i.e., a definite refusal to consider the amalgamation of any part of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia at the
present time, and an offer to Southern Rhodesia to discuss the amalgamation of the Livingstone area only with Southern Rhodesia under the conditions indicated above, the latter course would be the better one to adopt.

If this course should be approved, and the Southern Rhodesia Government should accept a conference on this basis, a number of further questions of importance would require consideration, such as those affecting native interests in the area to be transferred, the actual boundaries of the area to be transferred and the steps to be taken to obtain the views of the natives of that area. These might form the subject of negotiation either at the Conference itself, or afterwards, if necessary.

VII.—Proposed Procedure.

If the line of action recommended in the preceding section is accepted by the Cabinet, the next step will be to consult the Leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties with regard to it. It will be remembered that this proposal was made in our Memorandum C.P. 469 (30) of the 5th December, on the ground that the issues are of such importance that any decision reached should have the concurrence of the Leaders of all Parties in order that continuity of policy might be assured, and that this view was accepted by the Cabinet (Cabinet 72 (36), Conclusion 7). As desired by the Cabinet conclusion referred to, we would report further to the Cabinet on our negotiations with the Leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, and if we should be able to obtain their general concurrence in the line of action proposed, we should be in a position, when reporting to the Cabinet, to submit also for approval the actual terms of the communication which the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs would propose to address to the Government of Southern Rhodesia in the matter.

It is very desirable that the decision of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the matter should be notified to the Southern Rhodesia Government with the minimum of delay. The Southern Rhodesia Government's request was made in a telegram dated the 2nd October. Consideration of the matter was necessarily deferred at the time in view of our preoccupations over the Imperial Conference. Examination of the question which followed served to indicate the complexity of the issues involved. More recently, semi-official communications received from the Governor of Southern Rhodesia appeared to indicate that the Premier of Southern Rhodesia contemplated coming to England early in the summer and would prefer that a decision should be deferred until he could discuss the matter on his arrival. Mr. Moffat has, however, now intimated that he proposes to await a decision upon the Southern Rhodesia Government's request before deciding whether to come to England, and this affords a further reason why an early intimation to the Government of Southern Rhodesia of the decision of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the matter is very desirable.

It is also of grave importance that at least the main lines of policy should be known publicly in Northern Rhodesia as soon as possible. The ostensible ground upon which amalgamation is requested by the Elected Members of Northern Rhodesia is a desire for reversal of the native policy there of His Majesty's Government. Such a change of policy must have a repercussion on industry, and, in present circumstances, the uncertainty which exists is likely to affect seriously the industrial and agricultural progress of the country. The negotiations which are at present proceeding with the Mining authorities in connection with labour supply and legislative control are dependent on acceptance of the principles of the White Paper.

J. H. T.

April 1931.