FUTURE SIZE OF OUR REGULAR ARMY.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

1. I circulate to my colleagues in the Cabinet a paper prepared by the General Staff to serve as a basis for the discussion of this vitally important subject in the Committee of Imperial Defence. Since my return to office I have been above all impressed by the necessity of arriving without further delay at a definite and stable basis upon which our Army organization may be firmly rebuilt, after four years spent in temporary expedients dictated by ever-varying demands and conditions. The Army has met fully and with absolute loyalty the call made upon it for heavy reductions of officers and men, but the result of cutting adrift large numbers of young officers, who a few years before had taken permanent commissions, has inevitably been to destroy the confidence of the rising generation, and its parents, in the Army as a career; and the declared shortage of suitable candidates for commissions which is already in evidence, must be expected to continue until it is authoritatively announced that the era of reductions has come to an end. It is also impossible for the Army Council to make sound and permanent plans for obtaining the greatest possible fighting strength from the men and money available, so long as it is liable to be called upon to make piecemeal reductions indefinitely.

2. Two main instructions were given to the War Office by the late Government: (a) not to provide for the contingency of another national war for the present, and (b) to organise on the basis of mobilizing at home for a minor war an Expeditionary Force of 1 Cavalry division and 5 divisions, with 14 Territorial divisions in second line, available as the first step towards expansion to a national army (recommendation of Mr. Churchill's Committee on the Geddes Report, accepted by the Cabinet in February, 1922).

3. As regards war on a national scale, for the present we stand far better than in 1914. We have a much larger stock of munitions of all kinds, not yet out of date; the Territorial Army, though greatly reduced from its 1914 strength, is well armed and equipped and contains many officers and men with war experience; and there is in our population a large reserve of men trained to arms, who for some years longer would be available in support of a cause that re-aroused the national spirit. Only in one respect is the position worse. In a great war it is the function of the Regular Army to hold the ring (so far as that task is military) while the Territorials and national army are prepared, and to find the necessary leaven of instructors and leaders. In these tasks, which grow heavier as the men of the Great War cease to be available, the loss of 23,000 men from the establishment of 1914 (about 13 per cent.) will become increasingly serious.

4. But as regards a minor war our position, as compared with 1914, is much less favourable. The accompanying General Staff paper, which deals with present commitments of this character—the proximate task of the Regular Army—shows how serious are the calls that may be made upon that Army for causes that not only might not arouse national enthusiasm, but might be so far the reverse of popular that we should have difficulty in either passing the necessary Bill to send the Territorial Army abroad, or enlisting the necessary numbers of tradesmen from the unions to fill the gaps in our organization.

5. The details of our commitments, of course, vary continually; the danger-point shifts from time to time, and it may even be possible to believe that on the whole the movement is towards stability; but looking at the history of the last four years, the universality of our national interests and the existing temper of European as well as non-European races, is there anyone who will say that the time has come when a further weakening of our land forces would make for peace? Let me invite the attention of my colleagues to what has already been done in this direction.
6. In 1914 we mobilized 17 regiments of Cavalry and 6 divisions at once, and a 7th division within a few weeks; a total force of 182,000 men. We have now lost not 1 but 2 divisions (22 Line battalions), and 9 regiments of Cavalry. The utmost we could put into the field to-day would be 1 Cavalry brigade (3 regiments) and 2 divisions; say 51,000 men. When the situation in the Near East permits, this force can be increased to a Cavalry division (9 regiments) and 3 divisions; say 98,000 men. The Cavalry division, by reason of the reduced peace establishment of horses, would be incapable of action until additional horses had been hardened and trained. Mobilization of the 4th and 5th divisions would depend upon recruiting, and would in any event take some months.

7. The chief reasons why, for the present, we cannot mobilize the 4th and 5th divisions on the outbreak of war are the exhaustion of the Army Reserve (now 76,000, to be brought up this year by special recruiting to 84,000, against 146,000 in 1914), the reduction of the number of field batteries below that required for 5 divisions, so that we should have to form fresh cadres not only of Signals, Transport, &c., but even of Field Artillery, and the fact that the tradesmen necessary to complete the increasingly large technical parts of a modern army do not exist either in the ranks, in the reserve, or in the shape of Militia. After two years delay we are at last proceeding with a school for training boys as tradesmen for the Army, and are preparing to organize a technical Militia, and the mobilization position will gradually improve; but in any event it will take years of steady progress at our present Establishment before we can bring 5 divisions to the same pitch of readiness for war as the 7 of 1914.

8. Even then, on mobilization a battalion will be only 888 strong as against 1,000 in 1914, and a battery will consist of 4 guns instead of 6; and there will nowhere be any power to expand to the full war strength until, in a general way, the reserve army is ready. This is because we cannot now find money for the Infantry and Field Artillery Militia (Special Reserve), which existed in 1914. It may be true that, owing to improved weapons, the fighting power of each unit would be as great as in 1914, or greater, but the same increase of power will be found in possible adversaries, such as Turks or Afghans.

9. It may not be fully understood by all my colleagues that the existence at the present time of considerable bodies of troops on the Rhine, in Turkey, and in Egypt does not mean that, if released from those countries, they would become surplus to our requirements; and far less does it justify that curious perversion of the Cardwell system, current in some quarters, which reads the principle that there should always be at least one battalion at home for every battalion abroad as meaning that, however few battalions there may be abroad, there should never be more at home. In fact, the troops on the Rhine and most of those in Turkey still count as on paper as at home, while the increase in Egypt has been largely provided by denuding Malta and Gibraltar of infantry and this country of cavalry.

10. The true position is that, when we have got half our Line infantry (63 battalions) and all the 10 Guards battalions home again, after mobilizing 5 divisions we should have 13 battalions over for internal security and other home duties and for lines of communication. In 1914 we had 11 battalions at home over and above the 6 divisions (83 in all), in addition to a large number of Special Reserve battalions capable of garrison duty. From this point of view the utmost we could possibly now reduce without breaking into the 5th division would be 2 additional battalions.

11. But here other considerations enter. We have now no 4-battalion regiments left, and could not reduce even 2 battalions without breaking up either a county regiment or Rifles or Guards. I need not labour the unwisdom of opening such thorny questions for any but really important savings, and I am convinced that any important further reduction of men would bring the central striking force of the Empire definitely below safety-point.

12. In this connection I must emphasize the fact that the proposed reductions of the British Army in India, however welcome they may be to Indian opinion from fiscal as well as from other points of view, inevitably throw a greater strain on the Home Establishment. The reduction in men in the Infantry and Artillery, to which the Army Council has felt constrained to agree, as well as the proposed loss of 3 more Cavalry regiments (making 12 out of the 1914 total of 31) to which I cannot consent, all lessen the reserve-producing power of the Army as a whole, while they undoubtedly reduce the margin of safety in India and pro tanto increase the probable calls for reinforcements to be met by us from diminished resources.

13. I do not overlook the fact that the increasing importance and cost of the Air Force necessarily affects the question of the funds available in future for the Army; but it must be understood that, apart from the 8 Air squadrons to be regarded as definitely
earmarked for service with the Expeditionary Force, any expansion of the Air Force is required to meet corresponding developments in other countries, and does not in any way relieve us of the necessity for maintaining the Army at a standard which has some practical relation to the commitments and possible dangers we may have to face.

14. Nor do I claim that no further paring of the total establishment of the British Army is possible. The detailed examination of the establishment of each Arm, spoken of in my Memorandum on the Estimates, is not yet complete, and as regards departmental Arms in particular, the withdrawal of troops from abroad should enable appreciable reductions to be made; but apart from such departmental and administrative economies, I trust that the Cabinet, after examination of the matter by the Committee of Imperial Defence, will agree with me that the limit of policy reductions in fighting troops has been reached, and will authorize me to make a public announcement to that effect.

THE WAR OFFICE,
17th April, 1923.
OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN RELATION TO OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE GENERAL STAFF.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.
1. The Present Military Situation.
2. Commitments in India.
3. Commitments in Iraq.
5. Commitments in Egypt.
7. Commitments on the Rhine.
8. Commitments in Great Britain.
10. Possible Demands for Reinforcements.
11. Our Available Forces.
12. Present Distribution of our Military Forces (excluding India).
13. Objectives of the Forces at Home.
15. Conclusion.

1. The Present Military Situation.

If we consider our actual military situation as it exists at the moment, it is possibly correct to say that the position is better than it was 12 months ago. The two main reasons for this statement are that—

(a) We have no longer any military commitments in Southern Ireland, and
(b) The internal situation in India is easier, at least for the time being, owing to the loss of power of the Gandhi faction, and two successive good monsoons.

On the other hand, the situation in many parts of the world remains uncertain and unstable. Thus in Egypt, where only a few weeks ago we appeared to be within sight of an agreement with the Egyptian Government on various outstanding points, intrigues which had for some time been quiescent have again become active, and outrages are again being perpetrated. In Palestine we are no nearer to a solution of the Arab-Jew difficulties. The situation in China is uncertain, and on the North-West Frontier of India we are, at this moment, carrying out military operations against the tribes of Waziristan. And, lastly, the situation vis-à-vis Turkey is unsettled, and it is possible, though unlikely, that if Russian influences prevail at Angora, we may find ourselves in a position where war with Turkey can hardly be avoided without loss of prestige in the East. Consequently, although it is true to say that our actual military situation is easier, the future still contains potentialities of which the extent can hardly be foreseen. The liabilities which we may have to meet as regards reinforcements in various parts of the world are discussed in paragraph 10 below, and here it is sufficient to say that, having regard to the general state of unrest both in Europe and in the East, our army, as it exists at present, is actually insufficient to meet all the calls which may possibly be made upon it, and to make any further reduction would be, in fact, to accept a risk which, in the opinion of the General Staff, would be absolutely unjustifiable. The most vital necessity at the moment is that some degree of finality should be reached, regarding the size, distribution, composition and establishments of the Army.
2. Commitments in India.

The position in India, although on the surface it appears to have improved slightly during the past year, has not in any sense lessened our commitments. The Treaty with Afghanistan has been in force for over a year now, and our relations with the Amir have been generally satisfactory. We cannot, however, rely on an indefinite continuance of this state of things. We know that Russian influence is increasingly active in Afghanistan, with the object of inducing the Amir to take an anti-British attitude. He has always been anxious to be considered the protector of the tribes on the North-West Frontier, and recently has protested against our action in Waziristan. The Amir has also been elected President of the Pan-Islamic Conference to be held at Angora, in which position he may be led into adopting a more hostile attitude towards us.

In Waziristan we have installed ourselves at Razmak, and have administered punishment to the recalcitrant Mahsuds in the Makin district. This should have a quieting effect, but the hesitation of the Government of India to complete the scheme of road-making in Southern Waziristan, and delay in the organization of the required number of Scouts to hold posts in the Mahsud country leave our position still far from stabilized, so that further operations may yet be forced upon us for the protection of the tribes within our administrative boundary.

The internal situation in India is for the moment easier; but the factors of disturbance are merely dormant, and any opportunity for causing trouble would probably be seized.

To gauge our full commitments in India, however, the potential dangers against which insurance is necessary must also be considered.

The Commander-in-Chief has stated that these are—

(1) War with Afghanistan.
(2) Serious and widespread conflagration amongst the frontier tribes.
(3) Sedition and disloyalty in the Indian Army amounting to mutiny.
(4) Internal rebellion.

For none of these, even singly, is the permanent garrison of India sufficient, and the Commander-in-Chief, India, has estimated that, in addition to the 45 British Battalions, 8 British Cavalry Regiments, and 55 British Field Batteries in India, he would require, for meeting any one, or any combination, of these contingencies, reinforcements ranging from 1 Cavalry Brigade and 1 Division to 4 Cavalry Brigades and 6 Divisions.

It seems possible that even this number of reinforcements will not in future be sufficient, for the Indian Government is proposing, in the interest of economy, to diminish the strength of the British troops already in India. Thus, it is proposed to abolish 3 Cavalry Regiments, 1 Battery Royal Horse Artillery, 1 Brigade Royal Field Artillery, and to reduce each British Battalion by 130 men. This last reduction is to be made contingent, on our ability to despatch 2,500 first reinforcements from England immediately on the outbreak of operations, in addition to the reinforcing formations asked for.

Even by employing the whole of our proposed Expeditionary Force, we shall not be in a position to provide the 4 Cavalry Brigades and 6 Divisions for India, and if further demands are to be made to compensate for the economies of the Indian Government, our commitments will be even further in excess of our ability to meet them. At the present moment we could scarcely go half way towards meeting them.

3. Commitments in Iraq.

Our commitments in Iraq have not been dictated by strategical considerations, but are the result of our acceptance of the mandate, by which we undertook to secure the setting up of an autonomous Arab State.

It is obvious that we cannot provide an Imperial garrison of a sufficient strength to maintain this Arab State, when formed, against external aggression, or even against serious internal rebellion. The policy adopted has been, therefore, to give time for King Feisal to organize an Arab army and gradually to reduce our garrison, so that, from the date peace should be concluded with Turkey, the protection of Iraq could be entrusted to a large number of air squadrons and four Imperial battalions under the control of the Royal Air Force. King Feisal was then to be responsible for holding the vilayets of Mosul, while the Imperial troops were to be stationed at Baghdad and subsequently withdrawn to Basra.

Owing to the failure to conclude peace, however, we are faced with uncertainty as to Turkey's future action. We cannot go away and leave an Arab army and local forces incapable by themselves of resisting an invasion, and a king who would resign if our troops were withdrawn from Iraq. Although the reduction of the garrison has in these
-circumstances been delayed, it is still quite inadequate to deal with the situation which may arise. So long as we keep troops in Iraq, our responsibilities will include—

1. The protection of our interests at the head of the Persian Gulf and in the South Persian oil fields.

2. Our obligation to Feisal under the Treaty (not yet ratified) to provide such material assistance as we can, when necessary.

3. The safety of the Imperial garrison and of isolated British officers and officials in Iraq.

The first of these responsibilities the General Staff have always considered would be met by retaining a small force at Basra, capable of safeguarding the port and neighbourhood, and of despatching a column for the initial protection of the South Persian oil fields in case of emergency.

As regards our obligations to Feisal, it is probable that, so far as Treaty liability is concerned, we could limit our material assistance to very small proportions and still keep within the letter of the Treaty. Whether this would cover our moral responsibility under the Mandate and the Treaty is another matter.

The present Imperial garrison of Iraq consists of 8 Air squadrons, 2 British and 7 Indian battalions, 2 batteries, 4 Armoured Car companies (Royal Air Force) and ancillary troops. When peace is concluded with Turkey, it is intended that the battalions shall be reduced to 4 (1 British and 3 Indian). Demands upon our military resources, however, cannot be limited to the size of the garrison maintained. So long as any Imperial troops are in Iraq, there is a direct liability to ensure their safety in all possible eventualities, and therefore to reinforce them, either to enable them to remain or to enable them to get away.


The present garrison in Palestine consists of:

1. Indian Cavalry Regiment.
2. Indian Pack Battery. (This is due to return to India).
3. 2 Indian Infantry Battalions. (1 of these shortly being returned to India.)
4. 750 British Gendarmerie.

This force is intended only to ensure the maintenance of law and order under the conditions of peace at present existing in the country.

An increase in this garrison might, at any time, be necessitated either by a change of French policy in Syria or by an Arab rebellion against the present régime in Palestine.

The French policy in Syria at the moment is extremely difficult to diagnose. Until quite recently the probabilities seemed to be in favour of a cession of some of the Syrian territory to the Turks. Latterly, the French attitude seems to have stiffened, but owing to present commitments in the Ruhr and the pressing necessity for economy, it seems not unlikely that a policy of conciliation and concession will be forced upon the French. The possibility, therefore, that we may find the Turks in juxtaposition to our Palestine frontier cannot be ignored.

The internal situation in Palestine has been satisfactory during the past year. This perhaps may be attributed to the fact that during this period the Arabs have lived in hopes that the Balfour Declaration might be abrogated. This hope has partially been based on the possibility of the support of Turkey at the Lausanne Conference.

His Majesty's Government has recently announced adherence to the Balfour Declaration and the hopes of any help from Lausanne have come to nothing. The Christian and Arab populations have registered their discontent at the present state of affairs by a boycott of the elections which are now being commenced. So long as the Arab population, which is in the majority, remains dissatisfied, there must always be a possibility of reinforcements being required. The fact that any cause of trouble in Palestine will not improbably excite Egyptian sympathies will lessen the possibility of sending reinforcement from Egypt.

5. Commitments in Egypt.

The Declaration of February, 1922, which created an independent Egypt did not free us from commitments in that country; on the contrary it was arranged that the status quo should continue until the discussion of the reserved subjects took place. Whatever be the result of this discussion, our interests in Egypt as an essential link in our communications will still exist.

* At present there are 3 British and 8 Indian battalions owing to an overlap on relief.
Our commitments in Egypt include—

1. Ability to move troops rapidly to the Canal Zone for the immediate protection of the Canal.
2. Power to keep order in Egypt and to suppress risings, whether against the Sultan's Government or against British influence.
3. Holding the Soudan in conjunction with the Egyptian Government's forces.

To meet these commitments, the existing Imperial garrison of 3 cavalry regiments, 7 battalions and 3 brigades of artillery is barely adequate, even supposing reliance could be placed upon Egyptian and Soudanese battalions for garrisoning part of the country, which might quite possibly not be the case.

In two directions, however, our commitments may quite conceivably be extended—

1. Should the Egyptian Government claim complete sovereignty over the Soudan, then our British battalion at Khartoum would obviously be unable to cope with the situation, nor is it likely that in such circumstances, any battalion could be spared from Egypt.
2. We cannot ignore the possibility of reinforcements being required urgently in Palestine or elsewhere in the Middle East. In such an eventuality, it is from Egypt that the major portion of the earliest reinforcements would have to be drawn.


The Lausanne Conference having been suspended, our situation vis-à-vis Turkey stands as agreed at the Conference at Mudania, that is to say, the Allies occupy certain zones on both sides of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Turks are in occupation of the whole of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritza and the Greeks have retired to the west bank of that river. On the Maritza, standing as policemen between the two antagonists, there are 1 British and 1 French battalion and a company of Italian infantry.

Since the Mudania Conference, and in contravention of the terms of the agreement, the Turks have created in Eastern Thrace an army whose strength is in the neighbourhood of 50,000 men and 80 guns. Of these, 20,000 are Turkish regular troops who have been transferred into Thrace from Anatolia. The remaining 30,000 have been raised by local recruiting, and, though deficient in training and organization, they all possess arms of some description. It appears fairly certain that this Turkish Army in Thrace has been surreptitiously provided, not with aggressive intentions towards the Allies, but in consequence of Turkish fear of aggressive action by the Greeks, who have utilized the period since their retirement out of Anatolia, to reorganize their army, which is now concentrated in Western Thrace and is a formidable force. The remainder of the Turkish Western army is distributed between the Ismid Peninsula and the Chanak and Smyrna areas. In the Ismid area, the strength is in the neighbourhood of 30,000 with 170 guns, and in the Chanak area it is about 10,000 with 40 guns. In addition, the Turks have some 26,000 sabres and rifles in reserve at and north of Smyrna. The Allied troops are distributed as follows:—At the Bosphorus, on the eastern side, 3 British battalions, and on the western side, 4 British (including 1 Marine battalion), 3 French and 2 Italian battalions. At the Dardanelles, on the southern side (i.e., the Chanak area), 6 British battalions, and on the northern side (i.e., in Gallipoli), 1 company of British infantry, a large number of heavy and medium guns, and 1 French battalion.

We still do not know whether the Turks will eventually sign the Treaty presented to them at Lausanne, or any satisfactory modification of it. In view of the great concessions granted to them by the Treaty it is almost inconceivable that they will refuse to sign. We know, however, that the Angora Assembly has been in a bellicose mood, and, as far as we know, may still be so, in spite of the efforts of certain leaders to calm the extremists. We have good ground for knowing that this mood is fostered by Bolshevik influence at Angora. If, however, wise counsels prevail, and the Turks agree to sign the Treaty, we shall have safeguarded the main military points at issue between us and them, i.e., the Dardanelles question and the Northern Frontier of Iraq. If, on the other hand, the Turks refuse to sign, the next move will be with them. They would hardly be prepared to enter into war with the three Allied Powers if they were acting in unison, but it is by no means certain that we should get any real support from our French or Italian Allies, and the Turks may hope to take advantage of this lack of unity. Should this be the case, their probable action would be to endeavour to drive the Allies from Constantinople and the Dardanelles. It is clear that the Allied Force is—
insufficient to protect both these localities against a simultaneous attack in force. The Bosporus is an important point strategically, but the Dardanelles is a vital one, since it would be impossible to maintain troops at the former if the latter were lost. Consequently, in the event of a serious attack on Constantinople, the British Force there would be withdrawn to the Dardanelles area, with a view to the complete safeguarding of the Straits until such time as a decision could be come to as regards future action. It is to be observed that, until three or four weeks ago, our French Allies apparently intended to remain at Constantinople irrespective of any withdrawal by the British, but in view of the anti-French indications given in the refusal of the Turks to sign the Treaty at Lausanne, it now appears probable that the French and Italian troops would be withdrawn at the same time as the British.

A scheme for the evacuation of Constantinople by the British Force, and its transfer to Gallipoli and Chanak, has been worked out. The programme allows for complete removal of all personnel, animals and stores within 6 days from the order being given. No provision has been made for withdrawal of French or Italian troops, so far as we know.

7. Commitments on the Rhine.

Notwithstanding the French advance into the Ruhr, the military situation of the British Force in the Rhineland has not, so far, been altered, and its role remains as it has been since the Treaty of Versailles, that is, the maintenance of internal order in the Cologne area and the safeguarding of communications through that area.

The force at present consists of 8 Infantry battalions, 1 Cavalry regiment, 5 batteries and 1 company of Tanks, and this force is considered sufficient for the protective rôle assigned to it.

The liabilities of the Rhine Force are:

(a) The defence of the Cologne bridgehead;
(b) The maintenance of internal order; and
(c) The provision of a Flying Column, which can operate 40 miles from its base, without prejudicing the efficient performance of the two former duties.

The whole force is normally concentrated in, and close to, Cologne, with a detachment of 1 battalion at Solingen, some 20 miles north of Cologne, on the extreme northern boundary of the British occupied area.

8. Commitments in Great Britain.

The defence of Great Britain from overseas attack, whether by sea-borne or air-borne forces, has not yet been reviewed by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The question of the ground anti-aircraft troops required for the defence of Great Britain from air attack is still under consideration.

As regards the internal security of Great Britain, although the past year has been more tranquil than any year since the Armistice, there is believed, so far as the General Staff are aware, to have been no diminution of revolutionary activity working beneath the surface, while the prevalence of unemployment, still very serious, affords an unusually fertile soil for the disruptive influence to work upon.

As long as any chance remains of serious industrial unrest, it is impossible to assess the immediate military commitment involved at less than 40 Regular infantry battalions, totalling 80,000 bayonets, with a proportion of other arms. A dangerous revolutionary movement, if allowed to spread, might involve the creation of additional emergency forces.

The immediate military commitments in Great Britain, therefore, for aid to the civil power in the event of serious industrial troubles, represent the equivalent of the infantry of 3 ½ divisions, with a modified proportion of artillery, &c.


The situation in Ireland has changed since last year through the installation of the Government of the Irish Free State and the withdrawal, less a few coast defence troops of the British forces from Southern Ireland.

As a result of these changes, military commitments in Ireland have been reduced to the extent that we are not now obliged to keep large military forces in the Irish Free State for the purpose of maintaining law and order.

(789)
Military commitments in Ireland as a whole, nevertheless represent a grave responsibility. The security of Ulster and the defence from land attack of the defended ports of Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough Swilly still remain a military responsibility.

In the event of a recrudescence of Republican attacks on Northern Ireland, and unless adequate local forces can be organized and trained, a force of at least 27 battalions, with cavalry, artillery, armoured cars and ancillary services, will be required for the defence of the 80 miles of border and to deal with the situation within the six counties, particularly in Belfast.

The existing garrisons of the defended ports in Ireland are calculated to be sufficient to afford protection against minor attack by local marauding bands only. Should threats of more serious attack materialize, an immediate reinforcement of 3 battalions would be necessary for the bare security of the ports, and further reinforcements would be necessary to achieve anything beyond the actual holding of the occupied forts.

It is clear therefore that, leaving entirely out of consideration the possibility of operations becoming inevitable in the Irish Free State itself, Ireland represents a very definite military commitment of nearly 3 Infantry Divisions, with a proportion of artillery, armoured cars, &c.

To sum up, our total military commitments in Great Britain and Ireland, to maintain internal security in the former and defend remaining Imperial interests in the latter against possible Republican attack, are 70 battalions of Infantry, with the necessary proportion of other arms and ancillary troops. Although not contemplated within the next 12 months, the occurrence of serious revolutionary outbreaks in Great Britain, or the re-occupation of Southern Ireland, would involve the provision of extra troops on a large scale.

10. Possible Demands for Reinforcements.

Reinforcements which may be required in order to meet our overseas commitments are:

- For India. To meet four possible contingencies, viz.:
  - (a) War with Afghanistan.
  - (b) Serious and widespread trouble with the frontier tribes.
  - (c) Sedition and disloyalty in the Indian Army.
  - (d) Internal rebellion.

If (a) and (b) or (c) and (d) occurred simultaneously, as they probably would, we should want 4 Divisions and 2 Cavalry Brigades.

If all four contingencies occurred simultaneously or within a short time of each other, it is estimated that we should require at least 6 Divisions and 4 Cavalry Brigades.

- For Iraq. The Air Ministry have estimated that the possible reinforcements required would be:
  - 1 Infantry brigade and attached troops at once, with a second Infantry Brigade to be held in readiness in India, and with a possible expansion to 1 Division and 1 Cavalry Brigade.

The General Staff consider that the following reinforcements would be necessary under varying conditions:

- (a) If a withdrawal were ordered, while Turkey's action was uncertain.
  - 1 Infantry Brigade and attached troops.

- (b) If negotiations with the Turks definitely break down, involving probable hostilities.
  - 2 Infantry Brigades and attached troops, to help our garrison to maintain itself at Baghdad temporarily, and, subsequently, to withdraw to Basra.

- (c) To maintain the present frontiers of Iraq against a Turkish invasion.
  - 2 Divisions and attached troops.

- For Palestine. The present garrison is actually little more than a police force. In the event of Arab risings within, or attack from without, it is considered that the equivalent of 1 Division and 1 Cavalry Brigade might be required.

- For Egypt. To maintain our position in the country, to defend the Suez Canal, and to protect British and other European communities, in the event of general hostility on
the part of the Egyptian people, and possibly also of the Egyptian Army, we estimate a possible call for 2 Divisions and 1 Cavalry Brigade.

For Constantinople.—It is estimated that, in the event of an attack by the Turks on our positions at Chanak and Gallipoli, we should require, in order to ensure the complete maintenance of the freedom of the Dardanelles, a reinforcement of 2 Divisions.

For the Rhine.—No reinforcements have been considered.

To sum up, our maximum requirements in reinforcements for overseas may be:

For India.—6 Divisions and 4 Cavalry Brigades.

For Iraq.—2 Divisions and 2 Cavalry Brigades.

For Palestine.—1 Division and 1 Cavalry Brigade.

For Egypt.—2 Divisions and 1 Cavalry Brigade.

For Constantinople.—2 Divisions.

For Rhine.—Nil.

11. Our available forces.

(a) We have no force at home fit to take the field without mobilization. Our units stationed at home are not designed for anything in the nature of active operations overseas whilst at peace establishment. They are entirely unsuitable for such a purpose as regards strength, training, age and service of personnel, and equipment.

The mobilization of our reserves, or a portion thereof, should be an essential preliminary to the despatch overseas in an emergency of any reinforcements for our foreign garrisons. This principle has recently been disregarded in the case of the Near East, but to the great detriment of efficiency.

(b) In 1914 we had an Army Reserve of 146,000, and a Special Reserve of 55,000. Our Army Reserve is now 76,000, and we have no Special Reserve or Militia. This lack of an adequate Army Reserve, due to the war, seriously prejudices mobilization. It is hoped to improve the position by enlisting on a Militia basis personnel, mainly skilled tradesmen, for whom a high degree of military training is not required, for certain, technical corps.

(c) Our striking force at present consists of 1 Cavalry Brigade and 2 Divisions, which can be mobilized in 15 days after mobilization is ordered. Our existing reserves suffice to maintain this force in the field for 4 months. This force is designed for operations in the Near East. Although mobilization would be completed in 15 days, and embarkation is timed to commence on the 11th day, it is estimated that 3 or 6 weeks would have elapsed from the date when the order for the shipping is given to the Board of Trade before the whole of the force could be embarked, and that consequently it would be over 2 months before the final disembarkation in (say) India and Iraq could be completed. As soon as the situation in the Near East permits, this striking force will be increased to 1 Cavalry Division, and 3 Divisions with non-divisional and Lines of Communication troops. This force is intended for operations of a “small war” nature where ever required.

Our aim will be to mobilize completely this force within 15 days after mobilization is ordered, and maintain it in the field.

Certain deficiencies will, however, exist until the strength of the Army Reserve increases, and until the technical militia is actually in being.

No material increase to the strength of the Army Reserve is likely to take place until 1926. From that year onwards, the strength of the Reserve should increase year by year until 1929, by which year it should reach the maximum strength which our peace establishments will produce. As peace establishments have not yet been fixed for all arms this normal strength of the Reserve cannot be stated at present. Meanwhile, until the strength of the Reserve does increase, and until the technical militia is actually formed, the Corps which will have the largest deficiencies will be the Royal Engineers, Royal Corps of Signals, Royal Army Service Corps (M.T.) and Royal Army Medical Corps.

If mobilization is ordered in the immediate future, the only method by which this increased striking force could be mobilized would be by direct enlistments on the outbreak of war, and the extent to which these would materialize would depend upon the popularity or otherwise of the war.

The abolition of cavalry regiments and the reduction of peace establishments of existing regiments necessitate these units being composed of a large proportion of reservists on mobilization. Moreover, the reduced peace establishments further entail the introduction of a considerable number of untrained horses into units on mobilization. Both these conditions affect the efficiency of cavalry units, and, although they may be brought up to establishment on mobilization, it is doubtful whether the full Cavalry
Division will be really fit to take the Field until time has been available to train and condition the horses. At present 1 Cavalry Brigade only can be considered fit to take the Field within 15 days of mobilization being ordered.

The ultimate striking force which is now contemplated on mobilization consists of 1 Cavalry Division and 5 Divisions, together with non-divisional and lines of communication troops, the last two divisions to be ready at the end of the fourth month after mobilization is ordered. This striking force, for which mobilization equipment is held for all Regular units at home, is also designed for operations on a "small war" scale. The prospects of being in a position to mobilize a striking force of this size are, however, at present remote, and at the moment it seems as if a considerable time must elapse before sufficient reserves and militia are available to place and maintain it in the field within the period designed.

(d) Behind our Expeditionary Force we have the Territorial Army, consisting of 1 Cavalry Division and 14 Divisions which are now some 50 per cent. of their war establishment strength. At least six months must elapse after mobilization is ordered before these Territorial divisions can be ready to proceed overseas.

Although the personnel are enlisted for an overseas liability, no man, unless he volunteers, can actually be sent overseas until an Act of Parliament authorizing the despatch of the Territorial Army overseas has been passed.

19. Present distribution of our Military Forces (excluding India).

On completion of present trooping season and on assumption that Constantinople remains as at present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cavalry Regiments</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions</th>
<th>R.H.A. Brigades</th>
<th>R.F.A. Brigades</th>
<th>Medium Batteries</th>
<th>Pack Batteries</th>
<th>Tank Battalions</th>
<th>Armoured Car Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>Native</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>9†</td>
<td>53*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantinople area (including 1 battalion on Maritsa)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64††</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14†</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 9 Guards.
† Includes 2 Household.
‡ Includes 174 Guards.
| On evacuation, 1 Battalion to Egypt; 2 (of which 1 is Guards) to Gibraltar; 4 (including 1 to North China) to Malta; 8 to Great Britain. |
| Due to Egypt, 1 Brigade to Great Britain; 2 Brigade to Egypt. |
| To Egypt on evacuation. |
†† There is also 1 Marine Battalion in Constantinople.

13. Objects of the Forces at Home.

(i) To provide reliefs and drafts.—The situation is gradually approaching the normal. But the despatch of reinforcements to Constantinople and the uncertainty of the situation there completely disorganised the reliefs and drafting programme for 1922-23. Moreover, the proposed reductions in India, if approved, will have a far-reaching effect not only on the trooping programme for 1923-24, but on our whole organization, establishments, terms of service, recruiting, &c.

(ii) To support the Civil Power.—As the new Militia will be entirely technical, i.e., will consist mainly of skilled tradesmen for whom a high degree of military training is not required, and there will be no infantry Militia, it follows that the Militia has practically lost all value as a weapon in aid of the Civil Power. There will be certain
classes, e.g., railwaymen and transport workers, who might be of very great value in case of a strike, but they would probably belong to the very Trades Unions who were on strike, and it would be a very doubtful policy to call them up. It may have to be laid down expressly in the terms of engagement of the technical militia that railwaymen and transport workers would not be called out to work the railways, &c., during industrial unrest.

Our recent experiences when calling out the Regular Reserves during the strikes in April, 1921, showed that it would be most undesirable to repeat the experiment on a similar occasion.

Practically speaking, therefore, only the Regulars with the Colours will be available to support the Civil Power at home, since the Territorial Army cannot be used for this purpose.

(iii) To provide a striking force for despatch overseas as circumstances may require.—As can be seen from the first portion of this paper, the size of this force, even when it reaches its ultimate strength of five divisions and a cavalry division, is insufficient to meet the more serious commitments for which we are liable.


Our military expenditure for 1921–22 and our estimated expenditure for the 2 years following is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1921–22 (Account)</th>
<th>1922–23 (Estimates)</th>
<th>1923–24 (Estimates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Votes</td>
<td>£86,035,942</td>
<td>£62,300,000</td>
<td>£52,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Expenditure in Middle East repaid by Colonial Office.</td>
<td>£21,682,301</td>
<td>£4,930,000</td>
<td>£553,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£107,718,243</td>
<td>£67,230,000</td>
<td>£52,553,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including for Terminal</td>
<td>£21,867,677</td>
<td>£7,000,000</td>
<td>£2,588,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Conclusion.

In this paper there have been included nothing but plain facts, most of which are well known, and reasonable deductions therefrom. The intention has been to state the case as a simple balance sheet of liabilities and assets. Also, only essential protective requirements have been considered. There are, of course, further possibilities inherent in the world situation which, though remote, are nevertheless easily imaginable, such as attack by a European Power, or by Japan. An attack on Hong Kong by China has also been relegated to this category. These possibilities must be left to be dealt with by emergency measures, if and when they arise.

It will be seen that should all the most obvious overseas liabilities dealt with in this paper be called in simultaneously, they will greatly exceed our provision for dealing with them.

A settlement with Turkey will ease the situation. But even so the provision which exists is so meagre as to be only justifiable as a measure dictated by the great need for economy; it is far from being a scientific solution of the problem of our Imperial military needs.

As stated in section 1 above, some degree of finality with regard to the size, composition, distribution and establishments of the Army is essential. Uncertainty on these points has made the task of the Army Council an extremely difficult one during the past few years. The bad effects of this uncertainty are reflected throughout the Army, from top to bottom. Administration and training for war cannot efficiently be carried on without a stable foundation upon which to build. This state of affairs reacts adversely on the efficiency and contentment of individual officers and men, amongst whom a feeling of unrest is widespread in consequence of the uncertainty regarding promotion, frequent changes of station, and their future prospects generally. Another result of the present uncertainty is a growing doubt in the minds of parents as to the advisability of sending their sons into the Army. There has been a considerable falling off in the number of candidates competing for entrance to Woolwich and Sandhurst, with the
result that Sandhurst is, at present, 88 cadets below establishment. Unless some practical assurance of a normal career in the Army can be supplied, a serious shortage of officers is likely to arise in 1925.

The first step towards regaining the efficiency and healthy spirit, which permeated the Army before the war, is the settlement of the standard at which the Army is to be maintained, and of its permanent organization. So long as these are lacking, or vary, inefficiency and unrest will result, and the Army cannot be trained for its tasks.

April, 1923.

C.

C.I.G.S.