MOST URGENT.

Part 1.

I commenced meeting this morning by speech of some length introducing treaty, explaining its general character and object and indicating immense concessions which have been made to the Turks in respect of subjects dealt with in my commission. Text has been telegraphed to British press. Garroni followed by expounding quite fairly judicial provisions of treaty. Bompard then explained financial concessions and drew an impassioned picture of Turkey's perfidy in entering the war and her treachery to France. All three speeches concluded with appeal to Ismet to accept treaty and were based on assumption that treaty is our last word. I then resumed the chair in order to hear speeches of remaining delegations. American delegate joined in general appeal in a somewhat involved and nebulous oration ending with declaration that refusal of Turkey to sign would be an irreparable disaster to herself.

Japanese, Roumanian, and Serbian delegates then spoke shortly in similar sense. Ismet Pasha replied........
replied with a brief declaration taking note of what had been said, complaining of novelty of certain demands made in treaty, and concluding with request for eight days delay before giving official reply of Turkish delegation, this period to be consumed in private negotiations, at end of which commissions were to re-assemble to hear results or as is more probable to resume their labours. Cabinet will observe that this was precisely the demand forshadowed in my telegram No. 251 of yesterday. I then adjourned conference for ten minutes to admit of my delivering reply on behalf of the Allies.
Retirement of French and Italian delegates with our own to an adjoining chamber lasted for fifty minutes and was scene of violent discord and even recrimination. Bompard and Garroni, in the spirit of their private conversations of yesterday, repudiated previous agreement with me declaring that Ismet's request was entirely reasonable and could not be refused without discourtesy announced their intention to stay on here and conduct proposed conversations and said that if I refused that I should be responsible for breaking up conference and wrecking treaty. I declined to recede from my main position pointing out complete tergiversation of my colleagues in which I declined to participate and which I threatened to expose, insisting that Ismet's terms meant re-opening whole case which we had unanimously declared to be closed, and if suggested conversations were to fail, revival of conference a week hence. I refused either to agree to this or to leave any member of British delegation (omit.) me or to allow any resumption of public debates. .......
debates. Utmost that I would concede, and that with a reluctance that I cannot exaggerate, was to postpone my departure until Saturday, or at the latest Sunday night, in order that Ismet, who had already had treaty in his possession for three days and knows every article in it by heart might have his stipulated week for consideration and private discussion before giving his final reply. I stated my intention to make this announcement to conference forthwith on my own responsibility whether my colleagues agreed or not and from it I declared my inability to recede.

Upon our return to conference chamber I accordingly announced that I would out of compliment to Ismet Pasha and Turks consent to postpone my departure until Sunday night at latest and that I was at his disposal in the interim. Ismet replied that he would do his best to accommodate me.

Part III follows.
Above dénouement is regretted by no one more than myself but in view of president of the Council's treacherous declaration which I had just received of his intention to conclude a separate treaty with Turks and of Garroni's obvious willingness to take same course with consequence that responsibility for rupture would be thrown exclusively upon me and that I should be represented as throwing away peace for a matter of three days, I felt I had no alternative. I have now written to Ismet asking that conversations for which he begged may begin without delay. Inasmuch as secret telegrams received this morning confirm forecast contained in my telegram No. 251 of yesterday and show that Ismet not only has authority but means to sign, I beg that instructions to General Harington contained in your telegram No. 155 just received be not sent for the present and that French and Italian governments be not warned as proposed. It is to my mind clear that Turks do not mean fighting and must have a treaty, and that enemies whom I have to contend with and defeat are not at Angora but at Paris and Rome. I am reporting in another telegram about president ....
president of the Council's attitude but in the mean-
time I ask for four days additional law which will
result, it is true, either in a treaty or in rupture
but more probably former, while if there is rupture
it will be in a wider field than the Near East.
Cabinet have doubtless observed rising tide in French
press against Poincaré's pusillanimity in which he
finds a faithful adherent in M. Bompara. (Ends).