WAR CABINET (WITH PRIME MINISTERS OF DOMINIONS), 484.
IMPERIAL WAR CABINET, 35.

Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Friday, October 11, 1918, at 4 P.M.

Present:
The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia.
The Right Hon. Sir G. Cave, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs (for Minutes 6).
The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.
The Right Hon. the Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for War.

The following were also present:—

The Right Hon. J. I. MacPherson, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War (for Minute 6).

General Sir H. H. Wilson, K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff (for Minutes 1 to 5).

The Right Hon. the Lord Newton, Controller, Prisoners of War Department (for Minute 6).

Captain R. A. Nugent, Naval Intelligence Department, Admiralty (for Minutes 6).

Sir L. Chiozza Money, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Minister of Shipping (for Minute 6).


Captain L. F. Burgis, Assistant Secretary.

Captain Clement Jones, Assistant Secretary.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P., Assistant Secretary.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. Storr, Assistant Secretary.
The Western Front.

1. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported that a telephone message had been received from General Du Cane, who said that the Germans appeared to be falling back along the whole line between the Ailette and the Meuse. Our troops were following.

Steamship “Leinster.”

2. The First Sea Lord reported that the Irish mail boat “Leinster,” outward bound from Kingstown, had been torpedoed and sunk on the previous morning. Two torpedoes had been fired, the first at 9:28, and the second at 9:47, and the vessel had sunk three minutes later. A very heavy sea was running at the time, which had increased the difficulty of rescue work. It was feared that 50 officers and 300 other ranks had been lost.

Allied Conferences in Paris.

Prime Minister’s Statement.

German Proposal for Armistice.

3. The Prime Minister, dealing with the Conferences which had been held in Paris between the 5th October and 9th October, 1918, said that he went over to confer with the French and Italian Governments, after the discussions which had taken place in the War Cabinet, mainly with regard to the situation in Turkey and Bulgaria; but, after arrival in France, the news was published of the German proposal of an armistice in order to negotiate peace, on the basis of President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.” For some days no official intimation was received by any of the Prime Ministers, either from the United States of America or from any neutral country, as to this proposed armistice, and, although it appeared in the newspapers that Prince Max of Baden had read out to the Reichstag the message which he had despatched to President Wilson, it was not possible for some days, owing to lack of official information, for the Prime Ministers in Paris to deal with the question. The representatives of the three Governments, however, met every day and discussed the situation. They also conferred with Marshal Foch and his Chief of Staff, and with the Military Representatives at Versailles, and, as a preliminary step, directed their attention to the terms of an armistice. All the military authorities demanded very drastic terms if an armistice were to be granted, and the Military Representatives at Versailles differed from Marshal Foch to the extent that they were in favour of the German army being disarmed before the evacuation of the occupied territories. All, however, were agreed that the German army must retire to the Rhine, and Marshal Foch, moreover, urged the setting up of two or three bridgeheads on the right bank. The Italian Government not only demanded the evacuation of the Trentino but also asked for the evacuation of Istria. The principal point made by the military authorities was that, if an armistice were once granted, there would probably never be any resumption of hostilities, particularly if the enemy evacuated all occupied territories, and it was therefore essential that the terms of the armistice should approximate as closely as possible to the conditions of peace which could be accepted. The military authorities laid stress on the point that merely to allow the army to retire from conquered territories would enable the Germans to do what they were most anxious to do, namely, to shorten their line, re-constitute their armies, and place themselves, from a military point of view, in a better position to resume battle at a later date. On the receipt of President Wilson’s telegram in answer to the message of Prince Max of Baden, the French Government were, on the whole, pleased, but Marshal Foch thought that the part dealing with the conditions of an armistice was insufficient. Mr. Lloyd George said that he, personally, was alarmed at the telegram, and that undoubtedly a very difficult situation would be created if the German Government was wise enough to accept President Wilson’s terms. Accordingly a telegram was sent, approved by the Conference, for transmission to President Wilson, dwelling on the desirability of demanding greater guarantees with regard to the military position (Appendix, Annex IV). Mr. Lloyd George expressed the opinion
that the statements made by President Wilson to the effect that unless his terms were accepted he could not recommend an armistice, implied that if they were accepted he would recommend such a course; and then for an armistice to be refused would have a bad effect not only on the Allied troops engaged, but also a most serious effect on public opinion in the Allied countries. It was undoubtedly a fact that many interpretations could be put on the meaning of some of the "Fourteen Points" which were to be the basis of the acceptance of the Germans' request for an armistice, more particularly those passages which related to the freedom of the seas, to Austria, and to Alsace-Lorraine.

The Prime Minister of Australia, in supporting the contention of the military authorities that an armistice must approximate to the basis of the conditions of peace, urged that, as Germany had, since the outbreak of hostilities, made commercial treaties with Russia which would undoubtedly be greatly to her advantage from an economic point of view on the cessation of hostilities, it should be a condition of any armistice that such treaties should be null and void. It would be impossible, once hostilities had ceased, to start them again to prevent Germany gaining these or any other economic advantages. Mr. Hughes suggested that steps should be taken to prevent Germany being given a position of economic advantage at the expense of Britain, France, or any of the Allies, and that a dragnet clause should be inserted in the conditions of armistice which would generally give power to the Allied Governments to take any action necessary to safeguard Allied interests in this or any other direction.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Clause 17 of the Joint Resolution, regarding the conditions of an armistice with Germany and Austria-Hungary, provided for the present blockade conditions remaining unchanged, and this power would provide a lever for the enforcement of conditions such as Mr. Hughes spoke of without, the renewal of hostilities. Moreover, as no final decisions were taken, and as the actual conditions of an armistice must vary, as the Conference had agreed with Marshal Foch, according to the military situation existing at the moment at which it was arranged, the conditions proposed would undoubtedly have to be reconsidered.

The First Sea Lord urged that, while one of the conditions of the armistice was that at least sixty German submarines should be retained in Allied ports (Clause 10), no mention was made of the German fleet, and, if the conditions of an armistice were in any way to have an effect on the conditions of peace terms, this point should, in his opinion, have most careful consideration.

Attention was called to a telegram from Mr. Barclay, dated the 9th October, saying that President Wilson was astounded at the receipt of two telegrams from General Bliss enumerating the terms upon which the Prime Ministers had agreed as a basis for an armistice with Germany and Austria, and it was explained that an error, due probably to the illness of General Bliss, who had not been able to attend the meeting of the Military Representatives in person, had been made, and the misunderstanding on this question had now been cleared up, a telegram having been sent to Washington by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 10th October.

With reference to the suggestion which had been made to President Wilson in telegram No. 7239 of 9th October, that he should send to Europe an American representative, possessing the full confidence of the United States Government, to confer, when occasion arose, with the other Associated Governments so as to keep them accurately and fully informed of the point of view of the United States Government; Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the Conference met with many difficulties through having no authoritative representative of the United States present. As a consequence, President Wilson might have assumed that the conditions of an armistice with Germany, which were discussed at
the Conferences, but on which no decision was taken, had been agreed to. As a matter of fact, they were only prepared in order to be ready.

Lord Reading, questioned as to whether he considered it was not advisable that Colonel House should be at Versailles, urged that the difficulty about Colonel House leaving America was that he was the only means by which the representatives of the Allied Governments could reach President Wilson informally, which was very essential. At the same time, Lord Reading expressed an opinion in favour of Colonel House going to Versailles, if President Wilson approved.

The War Cabinet decided that—

(a.) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with Lord Robert Cecil, who had attended the Paris Conferences, should prepare a telegram to send to the President of the United States, giving a full account of the discussions which took place at the Conferences held in Paris with regard to the conditions of an armistice with Germany.

(b.) A corresponding telegram should also be sent to all the Dominion Prime Ministers, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to the Viceroy of India, by the Secretary of State for India.

Mr. Lloyd George said that, with regard to Bulgaria, the only trouble which arose was that the French Government was anxious to have full control of an attack on Constantinople. The British army in Salonica had for three years occupied a position on the right flank, in a most unhealthy situation, where it had suffered severely, and the moment when the right flank came to be the post of honour General Franchet d'Esperey issued instructions for the British Army to be broken up and for another army, organised under a French General, to take its place in that position. General Franchet d'Esperey had also issued orders for French contingents to be sent to Albania, and for another French army to proceed to Belgrade, all under the command of French Generals. Mr. Lloyd George said that he instantly protested, pointing out that General Franchet d'Esperey had made his dispositions without consulting General Milne, which Marshal Foch never did with regard to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, and also that, if a similar situation occurred during an advance on Berlin, Marshal Foch, he was convinced, would never displace Field-Marshal Haig. The result of the negotiations on this subject, however, was that General Milne was to be left in command of the section of the Allied Army of the East marching on Constantinople, on condition that contingents of all the Allies were incorporated in his army, which, however, should consist mainly of British troops.

With regard to Turkey, it appeared at one time as if proposals for peace would be put forward by the Turkish Government. The conditions of an armistice with Turkey, which had been agreed upon by the British Admiralty and the British War Office, were submitted to the conference, and, in the main, accepted, a few conditions being added which made the terms of the armistice more drastic. These conditions had now been sent to General Allenby.

It was suggested that it was desirable, now that the conditions of an armistice with Turkey had been approved at the Conferences held in Paris, that President Wilson should be informed of these terms.

The War Cabinet decided that—

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after informing the French and Italian Governments that it was proposed to do so, should telegraph the conditions of armistice, as
Naval Allied Command in the Mediterranean

4. The Prime Minister stated that it had been agreed that a meeting should be held at Versailles between the Military Representatives and Representatives of the American, British, French, and Italian Navies to consider the liaison between the Allied naval and military forces operating against Constantinople, together with the question of the command of the Allied naval forces.

The Deputy First Sea Lord reported that the Naval and Military Representatives, at their meeting at Versailles on the 10th October, were unable to arrive at an agreement on the question of the command of the Allied naval forces engaged in operation against Turkey. A proposal, he said, was put to the meeting that, as the command of the Eastern section of the Allied Army marching on Constantinople had been placed by the Allied Powers under the direct command of a British General who would be under the orders of the French Commander-in-Chief, the Allied naval command should likewise be entrusted, as far as the operations in the Ægean were concerned, to a British Admiral under the orders of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, in order that intimate co-operation between the two services might be ensured.

The French Representatives argued that, since control of all major operations in the Mediterranean was already vested in the hands of a French Commander-in-Chief, it was only logical that he should determine the forces which were required, and should also nominate the officer in command, and they would not agree to the definite proposal that a British Admiral should be placed in command. As no agreement could be reached, the question was referred back to the Prime Ministers.

The First Sea Lord pointed out that the British force in the Mediterranean, although numerically inferior, was superior to the French force. The British naval force in the Ægean had done all the spade-work with regard to any possible attack on the Straits, and he had already issued instructions to concentrate minesweepers, &c., in that area, of which the French had none. In order to take the command from the British Admiral, it would be necessary to send a French Admiral to the Ægean, and Admiral Wemyss expressed the opinion that this would not be done, at any rate, until the moment arrived for the big ships to move up the Straits, because the French Admiral had taken up a strong line in refusing to withdraw battleships from the entrance of the Adriatic to the North Ægean.

The opinion was strongly expressed that, as all the operations against the Turks, with the exception of French contingents sent to Gallipoli during the operations in that peninsula, had been conducted by British naval and military forces, the command both on land and sea in any attack on Constantinople should be British.

The War Cabinet decided that—

The First Sea Lord should prepare a memorandum, setting forth fully the arguments in favour of British command for the Allied naval forces operating against Constantinople, and that the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, should have authority to approve it on behalf of the War Cabinet, and to despatch it to the French President of the Council.
5. The War Cabinet took note of the conclusions reached at
the series of Conferences held between British, French, and Italian
Governments in Paris between 5th and 9th October, 1918. (Appendix.)

Exchange of
Prisoners of War.

6. With reference to War Cabinet 482, Minute 7, the War
Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Inter-Departmental
Prisoners of War Committee (Paper G.T.—592S) with regard to the
ratification of the Anglo-German Agreement for the exchange of
prisoners of war, and the question of reprisals for the ill-treatment of
British prisoners of war in German hands.

Sir George Cave said that the question was very urgent, and
one on which there was very strong feeling in the country. He
urged that it should be a term of any armistice that might be
concluded with the Germans that our prisoners of war should be sent
home immediately. This had already been done as regards Bulgaria,
and he understood that General Allenby had also received
instructions that, in case of Turkey proposing an armistice, he should
include in its terms the return of all British prisoners of war in
Turkish hands.

Mr. Bonar Law said that this provision had been included in the
draft conditions for armistices with Turkey and the Central Powers
respectively, prepared by the naval and military advisers of the
Governments concerned, for the consideration of the recent Paris
Conferences.

Sir George Cave, continuing, said that, with regard to the
clause in the Agreement relating to the exchange of submarine
prisoners, the Germans had declined to give way on this point.
They had also refused to ratify the Agreement unless their proposals
relating to the Germans interned in China were agreed to. On this
latter point Sir George Cave thought that the only way to keep the
matter open was to agree that the Germans in China, though they
must now be interned, should be entitled to be repatriated, in the
same way as Germans in other parts of the world. Sir George Cave
saw no way of getting over the difficulty of the submarine crews. If
we ratified the Agreement as it now stood it would mean that twenty­
five German submarine officers in Holland and Switzerland would be
allowed to return home, on the terms that they were not again to go
to sea or be used at the front. If we held out on this question, he
saw no hope of the Agreement being ratified.

The First Sea Lord stated that the Admiralty had estimated
that the return of these twenty-five German submarine officers would
be in effect giving the Germans fifty additional submarines. At the
end of this year the Germans would have a greater number of
submarines than ever before, about 183, and the value of these returned
officers for training submarine crews would be very great, especially
as the Germans were at the moment finding great difficulty in
obtaining and training crews.

Mr. Bonar Law said that the House of Commons felt very
strongly on this matter, and, should the Agreement not be ratified,
the Government might find itself in a difficult Parliamentary situ­
uation. He understood that there were some 60,000 prisoners involved
in the exchange on each side, and, if the Agreement was not signed,
every relation of every prisoner in England would say that the
Government had stopped 60,000 men coming home for the sake of
twenty-five men.

A question was asked as to whether the crews of the submarines
would be involved in the exchange, as well as the officers, and Sir
George Cave said that the wording of this clause was not very clear,
and it was arguable whether the crews should be repatriated as well
as the officers.

Sir George Cave then raised the question of reprisals. He said
that, whether or not we went on with the negotiations in regard to
the Agreement, it was essential to deal with the very urgent matter of the treatment of our prisoners in Germany. The Germans were breaking their agreement, inasmuch as they were making prisoners work within 30 kilom. of the firing line; they were using prisoners for war work of various descriptions, they were grossly overworking them in the salt mines, and were altogether treating them in an abominable way. At The Hague protests had been lodged and the Germans had promised to make reforms, but nothing had been done. He suggested that the British Government should say plainly that the Germans would be held accountable for these breaches of international law, and that the authors and those responsible for carrying out these breaches would be punished. He also suggested that we should threaten reprisals immediately. He agreed that we could never compete with the Germans in cruelty, but the Germans were very sensitive to the treatment of their officers; and if we told them that they must carry out certain reforms in regard to the treatment of our prisoners in Germany and that, if they did not do so, reprisals would be carried out after a certain time, he thought this would have some effect.

Mr. Long said that, while the Germans were committing these atrocious acts, we were treating Germans in this country with the highest honour. He thought that something should be done with regard to the smart German officers' internment camps in this country.

It was suggested that we might make it a condition of the peace that those individuals who had been responsible for the ill-treatment of our prisoners should be tried by a court of law. It was pointed out, however, that it would be very difficult to fix responsibility. In addition, no nation, unless it was beaten to the dust, would accept such terms. If England had been badly beaten in this war, we should never agree to our officers being tried by German tribunals. As a matter of principle, threats should not be made which, in practice, could not be enforced.

Lord Milner said that the main object was to improve the condition of our prisoners, and he thought improvement could be obtained immediately by making the treatment of the German officers in this country more severe. He suggested that this should be done without giving any notice to the German Government, and that we should say that the treatment would be continued until the lot of our prisoners was improved. It was pointed out, however, that under The Hague Agreement of 1917 we were bound to give 28 days' notice before taking measures of reprisal.

Lord Robert Cecil said that he could not recall a single instance when the carrying out of reprisals had obtained good results. The threatening of reprisals had, however, in certain instances, been very effective. The Germans were very sensitive to outside opinion, and he thought if we threatened to publish such instances of ill-treatment as were attached to Sir George Cave's memorandum it would have a great effect on the German attitude to this question. In addition, there had been a change of Government in Germany, at the head of which was now a man who was always reported to have looked at the prisoners of war question from a humane point of view.

Sir George Cave, in support of the statement about the German susceptibility to public opinion, said that the German negotiators at the recent Hague Conference had pressed that the hostile articles in the British press should cease.

The War Cabinet decided—

To adopt Sir George Cave's suggestion with regard to reprisals, with the exception of making it a condition of the peace to hold individual Germans responsible for the ill-treatment of prisoners of war. On this latter point we should inform
the German Government that we would take all steps in
our power to insist that the persons responsible for these
outrages should be punished for their misdeeds.
With regard to the question of submarine prisoners, the War
Cabinet decided that—
We should not insist on an alteration of this clause in the Agree­
ment, but should offer to ratify the Agreement as it stands.

7. With reference to War Cabinet 483, Minute 13, the War
Cabinet had before them a memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain (Paper
G.T.—5035) in which Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that he had been
commissioned by the Cabinet to discuss with Mr. Summers, of the
United States of America, any questions arising out of the Programme
Committees, and stated that he had already had repeated interviews
on the subject with Mr. Summers and representatives of the Foreign
Office, Colonial Office, War Office, and the Board of Trade. Mr.
Chamberlain suggested that, in the circumstances, and subject to
Lord Reading's concurrence, the decision of the Cabinet recorded in
the aforesaid Minute might be amended so as to leave the settlement
of the wool question to him.
Lord Reading having signified his concurrence, the War Cabinet
approved Mr. Chamberlain's proposal and directed—
The Secretary to take the necessary action to alter the wording
of Minute 13 of the 483rd Meeting.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
October 12, 1918.
APPENDIX.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT THE SERIES OF CONFERENCES HELD BETWEEN THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS IN PARIS, BETWEEN THE 5TH OCTOBER AND 9TH OCTOBER, 1918.

Five Conferences were held in all, in addition to a Conference on Man-Power between the British representatives and Marshal Foch. The principal subjects discussed and the conclusions reached at this series of Conferences were as follows:

Military Operations in the Balkans.

1. The French President of the Council should send two telegrams to General Franchet d'Esperey in the following sense:

No. 1.

While you will continue the movement for the occupation of Serbian and Bulgarian territories, I give you orders to re-group the British armies, which you should not have divided without consulting General Milne and referring to me. You should place them in the eastern region of your position to carry out dispositions we have agreed on with our Allies, and which will be communicated to you in due course. On the other side, the French divisions marching, the one on El Bassan and Durazzo and the other on Alessio and Scutari, should be taken away without being replaced, to dispose of as you wish. Italian troops continuing their advance in these directions. In the execution of your new plan, which you will submit, do your best not to separate the national armies placed under your command.

No. 2.

The British, French, and Italian Governments agree that the immediate action of the Allies for exploiting the situation in the Balkans shall be developed on the following bases:

(1.) The section of the Allied army of the east marching on Constantinople shall be under the immediate command of a British General, who shall himself be under the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief;
(2.) The section of the army of the east marching on Constantinople shall consist mainly of British troops, but shall also include French, Italian, Greek, and Serbian troops;
(3.) Reciprocally, some British troops shall take part in the operation in the north.—(I.C.-79, pp. 4 and 5.)

2. At the end of the last meeting of the Conference, it was agreed, on the motion of Mr. Lloyd George—

To refer to the military representatives at Versailles, with whom should be associated representatives of the American, British, French, and Italian navies, the question of the liaison between the naval and military forces of the Allies in the forthcoming operations against Constantinople, together with the question of the command of the Allied naval forces engaged in these operations. (I.C.-81, p. 11.)

Conditions of an Armistice with Turkey.

3. Information having been received by the British Prime Minister during the Conferences as to a possible imminent approach by Turkey for a separate peace, the Conference considered the question of the conditions of an armistice with Turkey on the basis of proposals drawn up by a conference of Admiralty and War Office representatives in London. After several discussions on the subject, and reference to the naval and military representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy, the conditions set forth in Annex I were approved. (I.C.-77, p. 6; I.C.-78, p. 10; I.C.-80, p. 1.)
the German Government that we would take all steps in our power to insist that the persons responsible for these outrages should be punished for their misdeeds.

With regard to the question of submarine prisoners, the War Cabinet decided that—

We should not insist on an alteration of this clause in the Agreement, but should offer to ratify the Agreement as it stands.

7. With reference to War Cabinet 483, Minute 18, the War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by Mr. Chamberlain (Paper G.T.—5935) in which Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that he had been commissioned by the Cabinet to discuss with Mr. Summers, of the United States of America, any questions arising out of the Programme Committees, and stated that he had already had repeated interviews on the subject with Mr. Summers and representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, War Office, and the Board of Trade. Mr. Chamberlain suggested that, in the circumstances, and subject to Lord Reading’s concurrence, the decision of the Cabinet recorded in the aforesaid Minute might be amended so as to leave the settlement of the wool question to him.

Lord Reading having signified his concurrence, the War Cabinet approved Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal and directed—

The Secretary to take the necessary action to alter the wording of Minute 13 of the 483rd Meeting.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
October 12, 1918.
APPENDIX.

Summary of Conclusions Reached at the Series of Conferences Held Between the British, French, and Italian Governments in Paris, Between the 5th October and 9th October, 1918.

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3. Reciprocally, some British troops shall take part in the operation in the north.-(I.C.-79, pp. 4 and 5.)

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3. Information having been received by the British Prime Minister during the Conferences as to a possible imminent approach by Turkey for a separate peace, the Conference considered the question of the conditions of an armistice with Turkey on the basis of proposals drawn up by a conference of Admiralty and War Office representatives in London. After several discussions on the subject, and reference to the naval and military representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy, the conditions set forth in Annex I were approved. (I.C.-77, p. 6; I.C.-79, p. 10; I.C.-80, p. 1.)
4. Note was taken of a request made to the French Government by the Greek Government, asking that, in view of the vital interests of Hellenism in great parts of the Ottoman Empire, negotiations for an armistice or peace with Turkey should not take place without a preliminary understanding with the Cabinet at Athens.

The Austro-German Request for an Armistice.

5. After the receipt of information that the Central Powers had applied to President Wilson for an armistice with a view to peace negotiations, the Conference invited the military representatives at Versailles, with whom were associated representatives of the American, British, French, and Italian navies, to consider the question of the conditions of an armistice with Germany and Austria on the basis of the following principles:

1. Total evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Italy.
2. The Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.
3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the Allies.
4. The same conditions to apply to the Trentino and Istriia.
5. Serbia and Montenegro to be evacuated by the enemy.
7. Immediate steps to be taken ("mise en train") for the evacuation of all territory belonging to Russia and Roumania before the war.
8. Immediate cessation of submarine warfare.

(It was also agreed that the Allied blockade should not be raised.) (I.C.-79, p. 9.)

At a subsequent meeting the Conference had before them Marshal Foch's view (Annex II) and a Joint Naval and Military Report from Versailles (Annex III). No final decisions were taken on this subject, as Marshal Foch, at a later meeting, insisted that the actual conditions of an armistice would vary according to the military situation existing at the moment at which it was arranged. (I.C.-81, p. 10.)

6. After a prolonged discussion at one meeting, and an adjournment to enable a draft to be prepared by Lord Robert Cecil, M. Pichon, and Barron Sonnino, the secret and confidential telegrams in Annex IV were approved for presentation jointly by the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Italy to President Wilson. (I.C.-81, p. 10.)

Among minor decisions taken by the Conference, the following are worthy of mention:

Postponement of a Conference of Oppressed Nationalities.

7. It was agreed—

To postpone for a month the congress of oppressed nationalities which had been fixed for the 15th October, 1918, in Paris (I.C.-80, p. 1.)

Transmission to America of a Message from the Socialist Congress at Paris.

8. It was agreed that—

It was undesirable that the French Government should officially transmit to Washington a resolution from the Socialist Congress in session at Paris to President Wilson on the subject of the Austro-German request for an armistice. It was agreed, however, that the French Government should use its discretion to allow the resolution to be despatched as a private message, with or without delay as they might think fit. (I.C.-80, p. 2.)

Belgium and the Supreme War Council.

9. The Conference decided that—

The request of the Belgian Government for a permanent military representative at Versailles could not be agreed to, but that when questions affecting Belgium, such as conditions of an armistice on the Western front, were under consideration by the military representatives at Versailles, a Belgian military representative might be invited to attend.
Man-Power.

10. In addition to the Conference of the three Powers, a useful conversation took place between the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with Marshal Foch and General Weygand, on the question of man-power. No actual decisions are recorded, but the Prime Minister undertook that Marshal Foch’s views should be put before the War Cabinet when the question of man-power came up. A full note of this Conference is, therefore, being circulated separately. (I.C.-78.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
October 11, 1918.

ANNEX I.

Conditions of an Armistice with Turkey. (With Amendments up to and including the 8th October, 1918.)

(Approved at Meetings of the Conference of British, French, and Italian Prime Ministers held from the 5th to the 9th October, 1918.)

1. Immediate demobilisation of the Turkish army except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order (effectives to be determined later by the Allies).

2. Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

2 A. Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.

3. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by enemy.

4. Surrender of all war-vessels in Turkish waters, or in waters occupied by the Turks. These ships to be interned at such port or ports as may be directed.

5. Wireless telegraph and cable stations to be administered by the Allies.

6. Positions of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

7. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

8. Use of Constantinople as a naval base for the Allies and use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

9. Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal, oil, fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources.

10. Occupation by Allied troops of important strategical points.

11. Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Trans-Caucasian railways now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities. This clause to include Allied occupation of Baku and Batoum.

12. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

13. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from North-West Persia and Trans-Caucasia to behind the pre-war frontier.

14. The surrender of all garrisons in the Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, Cilicia, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander or Arab representative.

15. The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison.

16. The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

17. Surrender of all Germans and Austrians (naval, military, and civilian) to the nearest British or Allied Commander.

18. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal and disposition of the Turkish Army and its equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport.

19. Appointment of Allied officers to control Army supplies.

20. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

20 A. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers.
21. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.
22. It should be made clear—
   (a.) That, in case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to
       themselves the right to occupy any part of them;
   (b.) That, in connection with clauses 10, 11, and 12, the towns of Sis, Hajin,
       Zeitun, and Aintab should be occupied.

Villa Romaine, Versailles, October 9, 1918.

ANNEX II.

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY.

Translation of a Note by Marshal Foch.

(Discussed at the Conference, but no decision taken.)

There can be no question for the armies operating in France and Belgium to cease
hostilities without having:

1. Liberated the countries invaded contrary to all right, namely, Belgium, France,
   Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, and brought back their population. The enemy will
   have to evacuate these territories within a fortnight, and their populations will have to
   be immediately repatriated.
   1st condition of the armistice.

2. Assured a suitable military base of departure, permitting us to pursue the war
   up to the destruction of the enemy force in case the peace negotiations should lead to
   no result. For this we must have two or three bridgeheads on the Rhine as high up
   as Restadt, Strassburg, and Neu Breisach (bridgehead of a semi-circle traced on the
   right bank with a radius of 30 kilometres with the end of the bridge on the right bank
   as centre) within a delay of a fortnight.
   2nd condition of the armistice.

3. Taken possession of security for the reparations to be exacted for the destruc-
   tion perpetrated in Allied countries, the demand for which will be presented in the
   course of the negotiations of the Peace Treaty. For this the countries on the left bank
   of the Rhine will be evacuated by enemy troops within a delay of thirty days; they
   will be occupied and administered by the Allied troops, in concert with the local
   authorities, up to the time of the signature of peace.
   3rd condition of the armistice.

Beside the above, it will be necessary to impose the following complementary
conditions:

4. All material of war and supplies of every kind which cannot be evacuated by
   the German troops within the period fixed must be left in place; it will be prohibited
   to destroy them.
5. The units which will not have evacuated the prescribed territories within the
   period fixed will be disarmed and made prisoners of war.
6. The railway material, both permanent way and materials of all kinds, will be
   left in place and must not be the object of any destruction. All the Belgian and
   French material seized (or its numerical equivalent) will be immediately restored.
7. The military installations of every kind for the use of troops, camps, barracks,
   parks, arsenals, &c., will be abandoned intact with prohibition to remove or destroy
   them.
8. The same will apply to industrial establishments and factories of every kind.
9. Hostilities will cease twenty-four hours after the day on which the conditions
   of the armistice shall have been approved by the contracting parties.

(Signed) FOCH.

October 8, 1918.

If these principles are adopted, a text will be prepared to regulate the conditions
of application.
ANNEX III.

JOINT RESOLUTION REGARDING CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY AND
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

( Discussed at the Conference, but no decision taken.)

The military representatives and naval representatives meeting together on the 8th
October, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Conference of Ministers at
their meeting held on the 7th October, 1918, are of opinion that the first essential of an
armistice is the disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies.

This principle having been established, the conditions specified by the Ministers at
their meeting held on the 7th October, require, from a military point of view, to be
supplemented as follows:—

1. Total and immediate evacuation by the enemy of France, Belgium, Luxemburg,
and Italy on the following conditions:—

(a.) Immediate reoccupation by Allied troops of the territories so evacuated.
(b.) Immediate repatriation of the civil population of these regions interned in
enemy country.
(c.) No sabotage, looting, or fresh requisitions by enemy forces.
(d.) Surrender of all arms and munitions of war and supplies between the present
front and the left bank of the Rhine.

2. Germans to retire behind the Rhine into Germany.

3. Alsace-Lorraine to be evacuated by German troops without occupation by the
Allies, with the exception stated in clause 18 below.

It is understood that the Allies will not evacuate the territory in their occupation.

4. The same conditions apply to the territory included between the Italian
frontier and a line passing through the Upper Adige, the Pustertal as far as
Toblach, the Carnic Alps, the Tarvis, and the meridian from Monte Nero, cutting the
sea near the mouth of the Voloska. (See map of the Italian Military Geographical
Institute, 50000.)

5. Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania to be evacuated by the enemy, under similar
conditions to those stated in clause 1.


7. Immediate steps to be taken for the evacuation of all territory belonging to
Russia and Roumania before the war.

8. Prisoners in enemy hands to be returned to Allied armies without reciprocity in
the shortest possible time. Prisoners taken from the armies of the Central Powers to
be employed for the repair of the wilful damage done in the occupied areas by
the enemy, and for the restoration of the areas.

9. All enemy surface ships (including monitors, river craft, &c.) to withdraw to
naval bases specified by the Allies and to remain there during the armistice.

10. Submarine warfare to cease immediately on the signature of the armistice.
Sixty submarines of types to be specified shall proceed at once to specified Allied ports
and stay there during the armistice.

11. Enemy naval air forces to be concentrated in bases specified by the Allies and
there remain during the armistice.

12. Enemy to reveal position of all his mines outside territorial waters. Allies
to have the right to sweep such mines at their own convenience.

13. Enemy to evacuate Belgian and Italian coast immediately, leaving behind all
naval stores and equipment.

14. The Austro-Hungarian navy to evacuate all ports in the Adriatic occupied by
them outside national territory.

15. The Black Sea ports to be immediately evacuated and warships and material
seized in them by the enemy delivered to the Allies.

16. No destruction of material to be permitted before evacuation.

17. Present blockade conditions to remain unchanged. All enemy merchant ships
found at sea remain liable to capture.
18. In stating their terms as above, the Allied Governments cannot lose sight of the fact that the Government of Germany is in a position peculiar among the nations of Europe in that its word cannot be believed, and that it denies any obligation of honour. It is necessary, therefore, to demand from Germany material guarantees on a scale which will serve the purpose aimed at by a signed agreement in cases amongst ordinary civilised nations. In those circumstances, the Allied Governments demand that—

**Within 48 hours:**

1. The fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strassburg, Neu Breisach, and the town and fortifications of Lille be surrendered to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief.
2. Heligoland be surrendered to the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief in the North Sea.

19. All the above measures, with the exception of those specially mentioned in clause 18, to be executed in the shortest possible time, which it would appear should not exceed three to four weeks.

BELIN. C. J. SACKVILLE-WEST. ROBILANT.

DE BON. G. W. P. HOPE. M. GRASSI.
Naval Representative. Naval Representative. Naval Representative.

FRANCE. GREAT BRITAIN. ITALY. AMERICA.

**VERSAILLES, OCTOBER 8, 1918.**

**ANNEX IV.**

Telegrams approved by the Conference for Transmission to President Wilson.

No. 1.

LES Gouvernements alliés ont pris connaissance avec le plus grand intérêt de la réponse adressée par M. le Président Wilson au Chancelier de l'Empire allemand.

Ils reconnaissent les sentiments élevés qui ont inspiré cette réponse. Se limitant à la question la plus urgente, celle de l'armistice, ils pensent, comme le Président des États-Unis, que la condition préliminaire de toute discussion sur cette question est l'évacuation par les ennemis de tous les territoires envahis. Mais, pour la conclusion de l'armistice lui-même, ils estiment que cette condition, tout en étant nécessaire, ne serait pas suffisante.

Elle n'empêcherait pas les ennemis de tirer avantage d'une suspension d'armes pour se trouver, à l'expiration d'un armistice non suivi de paix, dans une situation militaire meilleure qu'au moment de l'interruption des hostilités. La faculté leur serait laissée de se retirer d'une situation critique, de sauver leur matériel, de reformer leurs unités, de raconcer leur front, de se retirer sans pertes d'hommes sur des positions nouvelles qu'ils auraient le temps de choisir et de fortifier.

Les conditions d'un armistice ne peuvent être fixées qu'après consultation des experts militaires et selon la situation militaire au moment même où s'engagent les négociations.

Ces considérations ont été fortement exposées par les experts militaires des Puissances alliées, et particulièrement par le Maréchal Foch. Elles intéressent également toutes les armées des Gouvernements associés dans la bataille contre les Empires centraux.


(R.) (Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 1229, 9th October.)
No. 2.

The Allied Governments venture to point out to President that time has come when decisions of supreme importance in regard to the war may have to be taken at very short notice. They therefore think it would be of very great assistance if an American representative possessing the full confidence of the United States Government could be sent to Europe to confer, when occasion arose, with the other associated Governments so as to keep them accurately and fully informed of the point of view of United States Government.

(Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 1230.)