CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at the House of Commons, S.W./l on TUESDAY, 31st JULY, 1923, at 5.30 p.m.

PRESENT:--
The Prime Minister (in the Chair)
The Rt Hon. W.C. Bridgeman, M.P., Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

His Grace the Duke of Devonshire; K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Rt Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.
The Rt Hon. L.S. Amory, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Rt Hon. Neville Chamberlain, M.P., Minister of Health.
The Rt Hon. Sir Robert Sanders, Bt., M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.
The Rt Hon. Viscount Novar, C.C.M.C., Secretary for Scotland.

The Rt Hon. the Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.B., C.C.V.O., Secretary of State for War.
The Rt Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Rt Hon. Sir Philip Lloyd-George, K.B.E., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Rt Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P., President of the Board of Education.
The Rt Hon. Sir Montague Barlow, K.B. M.P., Minister of Labour.
The Rt Hon. Sir W. Joynson Hicks, Bt., M.P., Financial Secretary to the Treasury.

Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B. ......................... Secretary
CABINET 43 (23).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet, held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1923, at 5–30 p.m.

1. The Cabinet agreed —

To approve the proposals of the Secretary for Scotland contained in his Memorandum (Paper O.P.-342/23) in regard to the Scottish National War Memorial, that is, a scheme under which the old barracks in Edinburgh — Billings Buildings — should not be pulled down but should be adapted inside for the purpose of a Memorial Gallery and an apsidal shrine of a height that would make no material alteration in the sky-line would be abutted on to the north elevation of the building.
2. The Cabinet resumed the discussion, which had been adjourned from the meeting the same morning, on the Relations of the Navy and the Air Force.

After a prolonged discussion the Cabinet agreed (by a majority) —

(a) To adopt the Covering Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee on National and Imperial Defence, together with the Report of Lord Balfour's Special Sub-Committee (Paper C.P.-349(35)) (Appendix I), subject to the following amendment to the former Report:

The omission of the following words in line 14 (of N.D.-65):

"the Fleet Air Arm is to form part of the Air Service and".

"A Proposal to insert in line 17, after the words "posted to units of the Navy by the Air Service", the words "on the nomination of the Admiralty", and again in line 20, after "by the Air Service", the words "after consultation with the Admiralty" was referred for decision to " etc.

The Secretary of State for Air.

(b) That the Covering Report of the Sub-Committee on National and Imperial Defence, amended in accordance with (a), and the Report of Lord Balfour's Special Sub-Committee, should be published as a Parliamentary Paper. (See also Conclusion 3(b)).

(c) That a statement should be made in both Houses of Parliament.

(d) That the terms of the statement should be prepared by the Lord President of the Council for consideration by the Prime Minister.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (who had expressed grave doubts as to whether the Sub-Committee's proposals were workable) and the Secretary of State for Air undertook to do their utmost to carry out the decision of the Cabinet in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation.
The Cabinet resumed the discussion, which had been adjourned from the meeting the same morning, on the Relations of the Navy and the Air Force.

After a prolonged discussion the Cabinet agreed (by a majority) --

(a) To adopt the Covering Report of the Sub-Committee on National and Imperial Defence, together with the Report of Lord Balfour's Special Sub-Committee (Paper O.P.-749/23) (Appendix I), subject to the following amendment to the former Report:

The omission of the following words in line 14 (of N.D.-65):

"the Fleet Air Arm is to form part of the Air Service and".

A Proposal to insert in line 14 after the words "posted to units of the Navy by the Air Service" and again in line 20 after "by the Air Service", the words "in consultation with the Admiralty" was referred for decision to --

The Lord President of the Council,
The First Lord of the Admiralty,
The Secretary of State for Air.

(b) That the Covering Report of the Sub-Committee on National and Imperial Defence, amended in accordance with (a), and the Report of Lord Balfour's Special Sub-Committee, should be published as a Parliamentary Paper. (See also Conclusion 3(b).)

(c) That a statement should be made in both Houses of Parliament.

(d) That the terms of the statement should be prepared by the Lord President of the Council for consideration by the Prime Minister.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (who had expressed grave doubts as to whether the Sub-Committee's proposals were workable) and the Secretary of State for Air undertook to do their utmost to carry out the decision of the Cabinet in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation.
3. After consideration of a Memorandum by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on National and Imperial Defence, reporting the recommendations of the Committee in regard to the co-ordination of the defence forces (Paper C.P.-346(23), the Cabinet agreed—

(a) To approve the recommendations contained in C.P.-346(23) (Appendix II), subject to the following amendment—

Conclusion (6). The insertion in the penultimate line, after the word "summoned", of the following words, "as members".

(b) That the recommendations should be published, as a decision of the Government, in the same Parliamentary Paper as the Reports on the Relations of the Navy and the Air Force (Conclusion 2(b) above), and that they should be amended before publication by substituting the word "will" for the word "should" throughout.

(c) That the Lord President of the Council should be responsible for editing the Conclusions for publication.
The Cabinet had before them the following documents—

A Note by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, covering the Report of the Cabinet Committee on the Future of Palestine (Paper C.P.—351/23 Appendix III):

An Extract from the Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the Standing Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in regard to the Strategic Importance of Palestine (S.S.35th Minutes):

Memoranda prepared in the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office; the General Staff, War Office; the Air Staff; and the Naval Staff, on the subject of the Strategic Importance of Palestine.

The Cabinet agreed—

(a) To approve the Report of the Cabinet Committee (Paper C.P.—351/23) subject to the following amendment introduced with the object of securing that the Jewish Agency and the Arab Agency shall have an identical position in regard to the question of immigration, viz:

Page 6, line 8: After the word "contemplation" insert "together with the Jewish Agency."

(b) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should consult with the Lord Privy Seal before any action is taken to give effect to the suggestion that the League of Nations should be asked to amend the Mandate for Palestine—action which, in the most favourable circumstances, could not be undertaken this year.

(c) That for the present nothing should be made public in regard to the Government's policy, but that this should be announced by the High Commissioner on his return to Palestine in September:

(d) That the despatch to the High Commissioner authorising him to make an announcement should be prepared by the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

(e) That in the meantime efforts should be made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to induce the supporters in this country of the Arab Nationalists in Palestine to use their influence with the latter to secure their co-operation in the Government's policy.

Mitchell Gardens, S.W.1, July 31, 1923.
CABINET.

NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

THE RELATIONS OF THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE.

Note by the Chairman.

I ATTACH hereto a Memorandum by the Sub-Committee on National and Imperial Defence, covering the Report of Lord Balfour's Special Sub-Committee on the Relations between the Navy and the Air Force (N.D. 60). Subject to the remarks in the attached Memorandum, the main Committee recommend the Sub-Committee's Report for adoption by the Cabinet.

(Initialled) S.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1.
July 27, 1923.
SECRET.
N.D. 65.

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

MEMORANDUM COVERING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE RELATIONS OF THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE.

THE Main Committee observe that the Special Sub-Committee are not altogether satisfied with the term "Seconded" which they have used in describing the status of Naval officers serving in the Fleet Air Arm. It is clear that the actual position of a Naval officer seconded to the Air Service afloat differs from a seconded officer as hitherto understood. For example, he continues to be under the ultimate tactical and disciplinary orders at sea of an officer of the Service to which he permanently belongs, whilst he is serving under the immediate command of an officer of the Service to which he is temporarily attached. Moreover, the work he is called on to do in his temporary Service directly relates to the needs of his parent Service, and he carries it out under the eyes of a commanding officer of his parent Service. The Main Committee therefore consider the term "Seconded" not altogether appropriate. They would prefer the more general term "Attached," provided the conditions of attachment necessary in this particular case are clearly understood, as follows: The Fleet Air Arm is to form part of the Air Service, and these Naval officers belonging to the Fleet Air Arm are therefore to be attached to the Air Service. But whilst after their training under the Air Service they will be posted to units of the Navy by the Air Service and will serve under the immediate command of Air Service officers, yet afloat they will be under the ultimate command of the Naval officers of the Fleet. Though their temporary pay and their acting rank will be determined by the Air Service, yet their permanent rank and promotion will continue to be subject to the regulations of the Navy. Lastly, though they must serve with the Air Service and not be moved from it during the period of their attachment without the consent of the Air Ministry, yet as regards discipline and status afloat they will in all respects be in precisely the same position as officers of the Royal Marines.

With regard to uniform, the officers and men generally of the Fleet Air Arm will wear a distinguishing badge on their uniform. If the Admiralty desire, the Naval officers attached to the Fleet Air Arm will retain their Naval uniform with the same badge.

If any Naval other ranks and ratings are employed in the Fleet Air Arm, the same principle as regards uniform and badges would apply.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1.
July 27, 1923.
SECRET.
N.D. 60.
(Also N.D. (R) 20.)

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE.

Sub-Committee on Relations between the Navy and the Air Force.

REPORT.

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PART I.
The General Problem.

1. YOUR Sub-Committee were instructed to enquire into the relations of the Navy and the Air Force as regards the control of Fleet air work, and on this point they have taken a great deal of evidence from witnesses representing both Departments.

In addition to this, two of our members, Lord Peel and Lord Weir, accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey (Secretary), paid a visit to the aerodromes in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth and the Aircraft Carriers "Argus" and "Eagle."

2. In the course of the somewhat acute controversy between the two Departments, a very large number of points have been raised whose importance is subsidiary and illustrative. This was inevitable, and probably desirable; but the broad principles lying at the root of the policies respectively advocated by the contending parties are perfectly intelligible, quite apart from the detailed arguments and counter arguments by which they are supported.

3. To the Air Ministry was given in 1917 control over the air forces of the country. The Department was at one stroke placed on a par with the Admiralty and the War Office, for, though aerial warfare is a growth of yesterday, it was felt that its rapidly increasing importance required an organisation which would ensure its development under the most favourable conditions. In these circumstances it was only natural that the Air Ministry should strongly object to being partially dismembered so soon after it had been brought into existence, the more so as in the early days of this dispute the severance of the Fleet Air Arm from the rest of the Air Force meant an immensely larger proportionate loss than it would mean at the present moment. But though the injury involved in the complete removal from their jurisdiction of the Fleet Air Arm is relatively diminished, it remains in principle the same, and if carried out to its logical conclusions would, in the opinion of the Department, lead to many administrative difficulties and much overlapping, while in the region of supply and research it would hamper progress and increase expense.

[10370]
4. The Admiralty case is not less worthy of most serious consideration. In their view a Fleet Air Arm is now as necessary to a Fleet as cruisers, destroyers or submarines. Aerial reconnaissance and aerial "spotting" are as strictly naval activities as gunnery, torpedo work and wireless telegraphy. It seems to them intolerable that, while they are responsible for the safety and success of our Battle Fleets, the air work on which that safety and that success in large measure depend should be performed by persons belonging to another Service, imbued by different traditions, and looking for support and promotion to a different Department.

5. Your Sub-Committee have the greatest sympathy with both these points of view, and they have given much anxious thought to the question of how they can best be dealt with. They do not think that the present system can remain altogether unchanged; neither do they think it possible to sever completely the Air organisation which does work for the Fleet from the Air organisation which is responsible for Home Defence against air attack and for co-operating with the Army in other theatres of operation. A course somewhere between these two extremes is the one we recommend but before describing our suggestions in detail it seems desirable to give a brief sketch of the system now in course of development along the line where the two Services come into contact.

PART II.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

The General System

6. The general system is that the Air Ministry raises, trains and maintains the Fleet Air Arm. At sea the Fleet Air Arm comes under the operational and disciplinary control of the Admiralty, which designs, builds and maintains the carriers. The functions of the Fleet Air Arm comprise aerial reconnaissance, naval gunnery, spotting, bombing and fighting. The Fleet Air Arm operates at sea from a carrier, which is a floating aerodrome. In addition, in time of war, capital ships and cruisers will embark aeroplanes, but at present the risk to personnel and matériel is too great to justify this in time of peace. Air Force squadrons also operate over sea from shore bases in cooperation with the Navy, but these are not at present in question. The numbers of the Royal Air Force personnel at present employed with the Fleet Air Arm are 115 officers and 681 other ranks.

Policy

7. Naval Air policy is concerted by the Air Staff and Admiralty War Staff. Initiative may come from either side, but Naval officers of high rank do not, under the present system, have many opportunities of obtaining experience or training in air matters to fit them for this work.

The Coastal Area

8. Apart from matters of policy, liaison is secured between the Navy and the Air Force by a special machinery termed the "Coastal Area" Organisation. This is provided by the Air Ministry for the purpose of administering the Fleet Air Arm on land, subject to the general control of the Air Ministry. The Coastal Area is commanded by a senior Air Force Officer (the present occupant is an ex-naval officer) who is responsible for the maintenance at full strength of the personnel and matériel of the Fleet Air Arm, and for its special training for naval purposes. He is the adviser to the Admiralty on Air matters other than policy, and communicates directly with the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, on all matters connected with the Fleet's requirements.

9. Under the Air Officer Commanding the Coastal Area are two Group Captains, with headquarters at Leuchars (the Forth) and Lee-on-Solent respectively. In the case of larger operations involving the embarkation of aircraft or the carrying out of operations from shore bases, the Naval Commander-in-Chief notifies his requirements direct to the Air Officer Commanding Coastal Area. For minor operations he deals directly with one or other of the Group Captains.

10. Corresponding arrangements are made at Malta for the Mediterranean Fleet.
Position on Board Carriers

11. As soon as the Air Units are on board the carriers they come under the orders of the naval Commander-in-Chief, and are altogether outside the control of the Coastal Area Organisation, which is then, as we have already noted, only responsible for keeping units up to strength in air personnel and matériel. The orders for flying are given by the naval Commander-in-Chief (who has an Air Force Officer on his Staff) to the captain of the Aircraft Carrier, who is, of course, a naval officer, and he gives his orders to the senior Air Force Officer on board. The Royal Air Force personnel are responsible for the cleanliness and maintenance of their own quarters and some other parts of the ship, such as the aeroplane deck. They can be employed on the general duties of the ship. Difficulties have, however, been made in regard to the performance of particular duties, such as the training and use of Air Force personnel for passing ammunition to the guns.

12. A certain amount of co-operation is practised between the skilled mechanics of both Services. The Royal Air Force may, for example, utilise the services of the ship's blacksmith for certain repairs to aeroplane engines, and the Royal Air Force may undertake repairs to motor-boat engines. Such co-operation is naturally limited by the highly specialised training which is inevitable in each Service.

Supply of Personnel

13. The Air Ministry are responsible for the supply of officers and other ranks for duty with the Fleet Air Arm, with the exception of certain naval officers, who, after training in Air Force establishments, are employed as observers in “spotting” machines and some naval ratings employed as wireless telegraph operators.

14. It is of importance to note that the Royal Air Force possesses a number of officers who were formerly in the Royal Naval Air Service, many of whom were trained as naval officers. The senior positions in the Fleet Air Arm are at present largely filled by these officers. The original intention of the Air Ministry was that, in order to replace these, some 30 per cent. of the officers of the Fleet Air Arm should consist of naval officers seconded for a term of years. Unfortunately, however, only a very few naval officers responded to the invitation to volunteer for this service.

15. It may be worth noting that the general system for the supply of Air Force officers to meet future demands is divided into two classes:

(a.) Officers holding permanent Commissions, and
(b.) Officers holding short-service Commissions.

16. Officers holding permanent Commissions, on leaving Cranwell, are given the choice of the particular branch in which they wish to specialise. Those selecting the Naval side will, in the first instance, do four years with the Fleet Air Arm. They may then serve with other branches, including courses of instruction, for a term of years in order to gain wider experience, but will ultimately return to the Naval side again. This practice will ensure that there will always be a proportion of senior officers in the Royal Air Force with Naval experience obtained in the Fleet Air Arm.

17. A proportion of the officers holding short-service Commissions for five years, after receiving their initial training of one year, are posted for duty with the Fleet Air Arm, and do the whole of their service with that branch. On completion of their five years' service they are posted to the Reserve for five years, when they are earmarked as reserves for the Fleet Air Arm in case of emergency.

18. The Air Ministry endeavour to retain the personnel with the Fleet Air Units for the normal term of service (i.e., four years), but exceptional cases arise when it is impossible to allow them to remain for the whole of that period.

Training

19. The whole of the primary training of flying personnel, whether their future work is to be on sea or on land, is carried out by the Air Ministry. No criticisms of it have been brought to our notice, and we do not propose to refer to it again. The later and more specialised training of the Fleet Air Arm is partly conducted in the
carriers and partly on land at technical schools maintained by the Air Ministry at certain naval ports. Apart from their initial training, before they are embarked, the Air Detachments of Carriers use these establishments for training, when not required by the Naval Commander-in-Chief for exercises. It will be seen therefore that as things are at present these establishments are used entirely for the purposes of the Fleet Air Arm or for shore-based aircraft co-operating with the Navy. The Air Force training schools in the Portsmouth area work in close touch with the naval gunnery and torpedo schools. Behind the establishments devoted exclusively to training for the Fleet Air Arm are a series of technical centres maintained for the Air Force as a whole, the resources of which are available for the Fleet Air Arm.

Design and Research Work

20. New design, experimental and research work to meet naval requirements are carried out by the Air Ministry after consultation with the Admiralty. The Admiralty, after consultation between the two Departments, put forward their suggestions as to the types of machines which they require, and the Air Ministry design such machines, as far as is practicable from the point of view of aerodynamics and similar technical consideration. The Air Ministry draw up the specification of the type required, and call for designs from the trade, and the Admiralty are kept fully informed of the progress made during the whole process and after the trials have been carried out.

21. The Navy are not directly represented on the design, experimental or research branches at the Air Ministry, but the Air Ministry utilise the services of a certain number of ex-Naval officers, who have now transferred to the Air Force, in these departments, and also receive reports as to defects in design and performance of machines from Air Force officers serving with Fleet Air Units, thus ensuring that due weight is attached to the user’s point of view in the modification and improvement of design.

22. There is also in existence an Inter-Departmental Committee called “The Joint Technical Committee on Aviation Arrangements in His Majesty’s Ships,” which consists of representatives of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. Its functions are to examine the technical problems which may arise with regard to the suitability of the types of aircraft intended for embarkation on board carriers, and the modifications and improvements which can be effected on board the carriers themselves. It is clear from the evidence that new uses of aircraft involving possibly new types can be proposed either by the Admiralty or the Air Ministry, and that the latter give full consideration to all suggestions which may be put forward by the Navy.

The Supply of Materiel

23. At present the Air Ministry are solely responsible for the supply of all matériel connected with aircraft. An establishment of the machines required for the Fleet Air Arm has been agreed upon between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, and the latter is responsible for maintaining that establishment at full strength with its correct proportion of machines in reserve, the necessary spare parts and the various shore organisations required for its maintenance. This establishment is at present limited by the number of Aircraft Carriers in commission in the Navy, but the Air Ministry have made the necessary arrangements in their programme of construction to increase the number of machines up to the number which will be required when the two new Aircraft Carriers are completed in 1923–24.

PART III.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

24. We have endeavoured to explain, in the first place, the general nature of the objection felt by the Air Department to any important change in the existing system and by the Admiralty to its maintenance. We have also given a full account of the system as it has been developed up to the present moment. We now propose to turn to the future and make certain suggestions which, as we hope, may go far to reconcile the contending parties and to make material improvements in the existing system.

25. Our task is materially lightened by the fact that, in the course of discussions before your Sub-Committee, a larger measure of agreement was found possible on certain aspects of the problem than had at one time seemed likely.
26. In the first place, it appeared that on some important points the practice, though not the written law, of the Air Department was already in conformity with the wishes of the Admiralty. For example, the Admiralty are very desirous that the Group Captains in contact with the Navy should be officers with experience of the Fleet Air Arm.

Broadly speaking, the Air Ministry take the same view, and we recommend that it be made part of the settled practice of the Air Ministry to consult with the Admiralty before such appointments are made. We think the same principle should be extended to the Air Officer Commanding the Coast Defence Area and the Senior Air Officer on board a carrier.

27. The Admiralty desire that the Air Ministry shall provide all the matériel which they demand. This, we believe, has always been the intention of the Air Ministry. We think it should be formally laid down, and that, in the event of the Air Ministry for one reason or another not carrying into effect the wishes of the Admiralty, there shall be an appeal by either party to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

28. We have no reason to believe that there is any fundamental difference of opinion between the two Services with regard to certain questions of discipline, such, for example, as those which might arise when a member of the Air Force leaves the ship, where he is under the command, for every purpose, of the Captain, and goes for training to the aerodrome, which is under the control of an officer of the Air Force.

But though there are no differences of principle, there are certain obscurities which it would be desirable to clear up, and we therefore recommend that the two Departments, in collaboration, draw up a code of regulations which would make clear the relations between them at all points where they come in contact.

29. In all the cases that we have so far enumerated there may have been misunderstanding, but there has not been at any time, so far as we are aware, any difference of principle.

30. We now turn to a class of cases where, as a result of discussion before your Sub-Committee, the Air Department have shown a disposition to meet Admiralty views. The first of these relates to the framing of the Naval Estimates. The Admiralty desire that in these Estimates should be included the cost of the Fleet Air Arm. The Air Department are of opinion that technically this course would be inconvenient, but have no objection to it in principle. Your Sub-Committee are of opinion that this question should be settled by the Treasury in consultation with the two Fighting Services.

31. The Admiralty require that the Air Force on board ship should be completely under the orders of its Captain. Your Sub-Committee are of opinion that, as much as all the airmen on board ship are under the Naval Discipline Act, this, in theory, is already provided for, but undoubtedly in the minds of those chiefly concerned some obscurity hangs over the subject. This, we think, should be explicitly cleared up.

The position of a member of the Air Force when on board ship does not differ in law, and should not differ in practice, from the position of, say, a Marine.

32. In order fully to carry out the policy laid down in the preceding paragraph, we recommend, and have reason to believe that the Air Ministry will accept the principle, that all reports on officers of the Fleet Air Arm, whether confidential or otherwise, should be signed by the Captain of the ship and passed through the Naval Commander-in-chief to the Air Officer Commanding the Coastal Area.

33. A further point which should be dealt with under this heading is one on which the Admiralty have expressed considerable anxiety and on which we have reason to believe that the Air Force are prepared to meet their wishes. The Admiralty are apprehensive lest, in time of war or other emergency, the Air Ministry might withdraw from the Navy units of the Fleet Air Arm, and use them for other purposes. In respect of this we recommend that it should be definitely laid down that the personnel, matériel and reserves of the Fleet Air Arm should not be withdrawn by the Air Ministry without either the consent of the Admiralty or a decision of the Cabinet.
34. Before concluding this class of questions we must take note of a complaint made by the Admiralty that on board the Carrier there is a good deal of duplication of effort between the purely Naval Service and the Air Force.

We think this subject should be looked into by the two Departments concerned, and we do not doubt that arrangements can be made by which all overlapping can be effectively avoided.

35. We now come to the last class of questions with which we have to deal, which are at once the most difficult and the most important. We are strongly of opinion, and we have every hope that the two Services share our view, that, since in war the Services may have to co-operate, it is vital that in time of peace they should form an accurate estimate of each other's needs and capacities.

We therefore recommend:

(i.) That Naval officers should be appointed to the Air Staff,
(ii.) That Air Force officers should be appointed to the Naval War Staff,
(iii.) That some means should be devised by which the wealth of technical knowledge at the disposal of the Admiralty should be utilised in the technical departments of the Air Ministry, preferably by reinforcement of the staff of these departments by naval technicians.

36. These recommendations refer exclusively to the headquarters of the two Services; but it is perhaps even more important that the junior ranks of the two Services, who will in time occupy responsible positions, should have a considerable sprinkling of persons familiar with the needs and capacities of the other Service.

37. The Air Force look to a system of naval seconding for carrying out half this policy, and we cannot believe that the Admiralty would be averse to having members of the Air Force on board the carriers. Unfortunately, seconding from the navy to the Air Force, as at present understood, must be deemed to have been hitherto a failure, and we find it difficult to believe that, if the present system remains unchanged and unexplained, any great improvement is likely to occur. We cannot be surprised that a young officer who has just joined the Navy is reluctant to abandon, even temporarily, the department under which he expected to serve and to exchange it for one which is essentially different. The feeling is natural, and cannot be ignored.

It must, however, be pointed out that if the word "seconding" is thus used this is not what any naval officer under the present scheme is expected to do. In ordinary practice, when we say that an officer is "seconded" to another Service we do not intend to express the idea that for the duties which he had to perform and for the authorities he had to obey in the Service which he has temporarily left, will be substituted new duties and new authorities. But this does not really represent the facts in the case of so-called "seconding" from the Navy into the Air Force. The duties of the seconded officer, though carried out in the air, remain, nevertheless, Naval duties, and the Captain whom he has to obey continues to be a Naval Captain.

In order to make this situation perfectly clear, we recommend that no seconded Naval Officer shall be asked to perform non-naval air duties, except with the consent of the Admiralty. We believe the Air Force are prepared to accept this principle.

38. If this recommendation be carried into effect, the most important change involved in the operation of what is (somewhat inaccurately) called "seconding" is the change from the Naval to a Flying uniform—a change which can hardly be said to touch the essence of the situation.

We suggest, however, in order to meet the sentimental, though not on that account unimportant objection, that the uniform of a Naval flying man who, except for his period of training, is to all intents and purposes still under the Admiralty, should be distinguished from the flying men under the Air Force by some differentiating badge or mark. This would be the outward and visible sign that he still remains a member of the Service which he originally joined. It would be a clear indication that what he proposes to do is to add accomplishments in Naval flying to the other accomplishments which his brother officers are cultivating. If such a plan were found practicable, the objection felt by the Admiralty to the introduction of what they deem an alien element into the domestic life of the ship should be largely mitigated.
39. It might well be that, if this scheme succeeded, the number of officers seconded from the Navy to the Air Force would exceed the 30 per cent. of the total contemplated by the Air Service.

We see no reason why 30 per cent. should be regarded as the maximum, and we should propose to leave it to the Admiralty to determine what the proportion should be, subject to the proviso that not less than 30 per cent. of Air Force Officers, whether regular or short service, should serve on board the Carriers.

40. There is another point of great practical importance on which something must be said. It is agreed that the work of spotting for naval gunnery is one which should be undertaken in all cases by Naval officers, but such investigations as we have been able to make convince us that naval spotting and fleet reconnaissance cannot be sharply divided, and that the officer entrusted with the one may inevitably find himself called upon to perform the other also. We have been unable to discover any objection to this change, which, on the face of it, seems obviously reasonable.

We therefore recommend that fleet reconnaissance, as well as naval spotting, should be entrusted to naval officers seconded or otherwise.

41. If anybody will take the trouble to read the evidence given before us they will, we believe, be impressed by the number of problems for which a solution has been found by the two Departments or suggested in this Report. We earnestly trust that no merely technical difficulties will be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement which in the public interest is most urgently required.

(Signed) BALFOUR (Chairman).
P EEL.
WEIR.

M. P. A. HANKEY (Secretary).

2, Whitehall Gardens,
July 21, 1923.
SECRET.
C.P.-S46 (23).

Appendix II

CABINET.

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE ON NATIONAL AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Co-ordination of the Defence Forces.

Memorandum by the Chairman.

ALTHOUGH the Committee on National and Imperial Defence has reached the final stages of its enquiry, I regret that we shall not be able to present the final Report to the Cabinet before the Recess, owing to the heavy demand made by other urgent questions on the time of my colleagues and myself.

2. The Cabinet have already taken decisions on Interim Reports and Resolutions submitted by the Committee in regard to—
   The strength of the Royal Air Force for Home Defence,
   The Relations of the Army and the Air Force,
and I am submitting to my colleagues, in a separate Memorandum, the Committee's recommendations on the Relations of the Navy and the Air Force in regard to Fleet Air work.

3. There is one other question of great public interest which was included in the Committee's Terms of Reference, and on which it is possible that my colleagues will think that a statement should be made before Parliament rises. I refer to the Co-ordination of the Defence Departments.

4. A large part of our enquiry has been devoted to this question in regard to which we obtained Memoranda from the following authorities outside the Government Service:—
   Lord Middleton.
   Lord Haldane.
   Major-General Seely.
   Sir Eric Geddes.
   Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson.
   Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston.
   Major-General Sir John Davidson.
   Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes.

We also discussed the question very fully with the Chiefs of Staff of the three Fighting Services.

5. The Committee's recommendations, which I submit to the Cabinet on their behalf, are as follows:—
   (1.) It is undesirable and impracticable to supersede the Ministerial heads of the three Fighting Services by making them subordinates of a Minister of Defence; the alternative plan for an amalgamation of the three Service Departments is equally impracticable.
   (2.) On the other hand, the existing system of co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence is not sufficient to secure full initiative and responsibility for defence as a whole and requires to be defined and strengthened.
Under the existing system the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory and consultative body, enquires into and makes recommendations in regard to the issues of defence policy and organisation which are brought before it. The power of initiative lies with the Government Departments and with the Prime Minister.

This system, though invaluable up to a point, does not make any authority except the Prime Minister, who can only devote a small part of his time and attention to defence questions, directly responsible for the initiation of a consistent line of policy directing the common action of the three or any two of the three Services, taking account of the reactions of the three Services upon one another.

While, therefore, the existing system of departmental initiative should continue, the responsibility for the wider initiative referred to above in conclusion (4) should also rest with the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence acting under the general direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence and with the assistance of the three Chiefs of Staff.

In accordance with the terms of the Treasury Minute of the 4th May, 1904, constituting the Committee of Imperial Defence in its present form, the Committee of Imperial Defence should continue to consist of the Prime Minister, as President, with such other members as, having regard to the nature of the subject to be discussed, he may from time to time summon to assist him. In pursuance of a decision by the Prime Minister, the Committee places on record that the following should be members:—

The Chairman (Deputy to the Prime Minister).
The Secretary of State for War.
The Secretary of State for Air.
The First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Financial Secretary.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Secretary of State for India.
The Chiefs of Staff of the three Fighting Services.
The Permanent Secretary of the Treasury as head of the Civil Service.

Other British or Dominion Ministers of the Crown and other officials, or persons having special qualifications, will be summoned by the President according to the nature of the business.

The functions of the Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence should be:—

(i.) To preside over the Committee of Imperial Defence in the absence of the Prime Minister.
(ii.) To report to the Prime Minister (when he himself has not presided) and to the Cabinet the recommendations of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
(iii.) In matters of detail, to interpret the decisions of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet thereupon to the Departments concerned.
(iv.) Assisted by the three Chiefs of Staff, as laid down in conclusion (5) above, to keep the defence situation as a whole constantly under review so as to ensure that defence preparations and plans and the expenditure thereupon, are co-ordinated and framed to meet policy, that full information as to the changing naval, military and air situation may always be available to the Committee of Imperial Defence and that resolutions as to the requisite action thereupon may be submitted for its consideration.

It should be laid down that, in addition to the function of the Chiefs of Staff as advisers on questions of sea, land or air policy respectively, in their own Board or Council, each of the three Chiefs of Staff should have an individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole, the three constituting, as it were, a Super-Chief of a War Staff in Commission. In carrying out this function they should meet together for the discussion of questions which affect their joint responsibilities.
(9.) Questions relating to co-ordination of expenditure may be entertained by the Committee of Imperial Defence when referred to it by the Cabinet. The Committee (subject to any directions by the Cabinet) should consider such questions in the light of the general defence policy of the Government and of the strategical plans drawn up to give effect to that policy in time of war.

(10.) The Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence should continue to act as liaison officers between the Chairman of the Committee and the Service Departments. The staff of the Committee should be strengthened by the addition of an Assistant Secretary to be nominated by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Air, whose status will be identical with that of the three existing Assistant Secretaries nominated by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for India and the First Lord of the Admiralty.

(11.) The Standing Defence Sub-Committee should be suppressed and its past proceedings should be merged into those of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
July 27, 1923.

(Initialled) S.
SECRET.

C.P.-351 (23).

Appendix II

CABINET.

COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE.

The Future of Palestine.

REPORT.

I CIRCULATE, for the consideration of my colleagues, the Report of the Committee on Palestine, which was appointed on the 27th June, 1923.

(Signed) DEVONSHIRE.

COMPOSITION OF COMMITTEE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.

After a Meeting of the Cabinet on the 27th June, 1923 (Cabinet 33 (23) (7)), the following Committee was appointed by the Prime Minister:—

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (in the Chair) (His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, K.G., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.);

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (The Most Hon. the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.);

The Secretary of State for War (The Right Hon. the Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.);

The Secretary of State for India (The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E.);

The Secretary of State for Air (The Right Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt., C.M.G., M.P.);

The First Lord of the Admiralty (The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P.);

The President of the Board of Trade (The Right Hon. Sir P. Lloyd Greame, K.B.E., M.C., M.P.);

The President of the Board of Education (The Right Hon. E. F. L. Wood, M.P.);

The Secretary for Scotland (The Right Hon. Viscount Novar, G.C.M.G.);

*The Postmaster-General (The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bt., G.B.E., M.P.);

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (The Right Hon. Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, Bt., M.P.);

Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. G. Walker, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence

Mr. S. Moody, Colonial Office

with the following Terms of Reference:—

To advise the Cabinet as to the policy to be adopted by the Government in regard to Palestine.

* Added at a later date.
THE Committee of the Cabinet, who were appointed to examine and advise upon the policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to Palestine, have held several sittings, and now present the following Report:

We have had the advantage of hearing a full exposition of the present situation in Palestine from the High Commissioner, Sir H. Samuel, who answered all our questions with great readiness. We have not taken any other outside evidence, mainly from the difficulty of discriminating between the witnesses who might desire to be heard, still more because the time at our disposal before the end of the Session has been short and because we felt that the most urgent need is a prompt and final decision by His Majesty's Government, whatever be the form that it assumes.

It is not necessary to analyse here the contents of the various papers which have been submitted to and studied by the Committee. Many of them raise issues upon which wide differences of opinion have at different times been held, but which are in a sense obsolete, because no one now seriously advocates a complete reversal of policy on their account. Of such a nature are the promises or pledges, not always clear or consistent, which have been made to the Arabs and about which a wordy warfare can easily be waged. This question may be said to have been finally disposed of in the White Paper of last summer, and unless it is proposed to tear up a toto that declaration of Government policy, it is unnecessary to revive it. Broadly speaking, we can claim with justice to be innocent of any conscious breach of faith either to the Arabs or to anyone else.

Similarly, it is no longer pertinent to discuss the policy of the original Declaration of 1917. There are some of our number who think that that Declaration was both unnecessary and unwise, and who hold that our subsequent troubles have sprung in the main from its adoption. But that was nearly six years ago. We cannot ignore the fact that ever since it has been the accepted policy of His Majesty's Government, that it was also accepted, not indeed without some reluctance, by the whole of our Allies, that it met with especial favour in America, that it was officially endorsed at San Remo, that it figured in the original Treaty of Sevres, and that it was textually reproduced in the Mandate for Palestine, which was officially submitted to and approved by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922. Further, it has been the basis upon which Zionist co-operation in the development of Palestine has been freely given and upon which very large sums of Jewish money have since been subscribed.

Whether this policy has been wise or unwise, the above considerations, which cannot be disputed, possess a cumulative weight from which it is well-nigh impossible for any Government to extricate itself without a substantial sacrifice of consistency and self-respect, if not of honour. Those of us who have disliked the policy are not prepared to make that sacrifice. Those of us who approved the policy throughout would, of course, speak in much less equivocal terms.
Nevertheless, the alternative of a complete reversal of the policy hitherto pursued is one that, whatever the price that might have to be paid for it, we have not dogmatically refused to consider. The reasons, apart from those which have already been indicated, which lead us to advise against such a course are these:

1. We see no way of reversing the policy without throwing up the Mandate.

2. If we return the Mandate another claimant would very quickly be forthcoming. Whether that claimant were France or Italy, the result would be equally injurious to British and, as we think, to Palestinian interests.

3. If no applicant were forthcoming and the Palestinian Arabs were left to work out their own destiny, the sequel could hardly fail to be the return, at no distant period, of the Turks. This would be an even more disastrous consequence, and would, indeed, involve the final sacrifice of all for which we fought and won the Eastern war.

4. Although the strategical value of Palestine is rated by the Imperial General Staff less highly than it had been placed by some authorities, yet none of us can contemplate with equanimity the installation in Palestine of another Power.

These considerations led us to a careful scrutiny of the position as it now stands. Great harm has, no doubt, been done by the exaggerated pretensions of the Zionist organisations and press at an earlier stage, and, if the Arabs have been badly frightened, it has been largely in consequence of these mistaken tactics. During the past year, however, the Zionist leaders have greatly modified both their claims and their language, and their acceptance of the policy laid down by the late Government in the White Paper of June 1922 has, we believe, been sincere and ungrudging. On the other hand, the continuance of the agitation here, and perhaps also the change of Government in England, have led the Arabs to think that a complete reversal of policy is still possible, and that by refusing all compromise, perhaps even by organising some form of passive resistance, they may induce His Majesty's Government, if not to abandon the Mandate, at least to give to Palestine a full measure of self-government which they could utilise to obtain a complete ascendency over the numerically small minority of Jews. It would appear to be from this standpoint that the Arabs have boycotted the recent elections for the Legislative Council, and may even, as some anticipate, have recourse to more extreme measures. The conclusion that we deduce from these considerations is not that an agitation so inspired and conducted should be yielded to, but that an early and firm decision is necessary in order to prevent it from attaining a further and more dangerous momentum.

If this object is to be secured, the decision so arrived at should aim at meeting those of the Arab grievances or complaints in which there is substance, without, at the same time, breaking faith with those to whom we are deeply and honourably pledged. Our search for this avenue of extrication has been materially assisted by the complainants themselves. If we study their petitions and speeches we find that it is not so much the existence of the Mandate, or the Balfour Declaration, or the recognition of a Jewish National Home (in its later and narrower interpretation) to which they object, as it is the preferential position which has been accorded to the Zionists in the country, and the universal Arab belief that the scales are weighted against the Arabs in the Administration. The appointment of a Jewish High Commissioner, however able and impartial (and Sir H. Samuel has been both in no ordinary degree); the existence of a Jewish Agency in Palestine with special access to the High Commissioner; the not inconsiderable (although restricted) immigration of many thousands of Jews since the war; the encouragement, however expedient and cautious, of Jewish enterprise, e.g., the Rutenberg Concession, have all fostered this belief that the Jews are being unduly favoured and that the Arabs are being pushed into a background where the spoils of Palestine will be for others, and never for them.

The question to be answered then is this: Is there any real ground for this suspicion, and, if so, can it be relieved?

At this stage our attention was turned to the exact words of the Mandate, Article 4 of which runs as follows:

"An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country."
"The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are, in the opinion of the Mandatory, appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government, to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home."

A little later comes Article 6, which runs thus:—

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes."

Now it is true that Article 6 lays down that "the rights and position of other sections of the population shall not be prejudiced" (in respect of immigration). But this gives no consolation to those who believe that an extended Zionist influx cannot fail to cause such prejudice. Nor is the impression produced by Article 4 diminished; it is, on the contrary, aggravated by the terms of Article 2, which runs as follows:—

"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."

It is difficult to blame those who argue that the two parts of this Article are inconsistent with each other, and, indeed, that the entire Mandate is built on the fallacy of attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable, and to combine in the same framework the creation of Jewish privileges with the maintenance of Arab rights. It would appear then that it is to the terms of the Mandate that we should look for a solution of the difficulty, and that if we can redress the alleged preference to the Jews, by offering similar or analogous advantages to the Arabs, we may succeed in removing the sting. We accordingly proceeded to consider whether, and, if so, how, this could be done.

It may be urged, with justice, that the Mandatory Power had its own plan for dealing with the grievance said to have been thus created, viz., by means of the Legislative Council upon which elected representatives of the Arabs were to sit. That is quite true. But the Legislative Council has broken down for the time being, through the refusal of the Arabs to take part in the elections; and although Sir H. Samuel hopes to be able to induce some representative Arabs to serve on the Advisory Council which he is reconstituting as an interim measure, the fact remains that the British policy has for the time being failed and that some other remedy must be sought.

We accordingly advise that as regards the Administration, an Arab Agency shall be set up which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency under the terms of the Mandate, i.e., it will be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the interests of the non-Jewish population, and, subject to the control of the Administration, may assist and take part in the development of the country.

Secondly as regards immigration (Article 6) it will have the right to be consulted as to the means of "ensuring that the rights and position of other (i.e., non-Jewish) sections of the population are not prejudiced."

With regard to public works it will be entitled to be consulted by the Administration in the same way as the Jewish Agency is to be consulted under the terms of Article 11.

Further, Article 84 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 provides that—

"(1.) The High Commissioner shall confer upon all matters relating to the regulation of immigration with a Committee consisting of not less than one half of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and provision shall be made by Order in Council for investing the said Committee with all such powers [10390]"
and authorities and otherwise for the constitution and conduct of the business
of the said Committee, as may be necessary to carry this Article into effect.

(ii.) In the event of any difference of opinion between the High Commiss-
ioner and the said Committee upon any such matter as aforesaid, the High
Commissioner shall make a full report on the subject to the Secretary of State,
whose decision thereon shall be final.

With the breakdown of the Legislative Council, the proposed Committee has
never come into existence. It is proposed that the Arab Agency now in contemplation
should take its place for the purposes of the functions indicated in Article 84.

As regards the composition of the Arab Agency, it is proposed that it should
be left to the High Commissioner to nominate suitable persons, it being of course un-
derstood that representatives of all sections of the Arab community will be included.

Sir Herbert Samuel is of opinion that this proposal may be accepted, not indeed
by the Arab extremists, who want representative Government and Arab ascendancy
at a bound, but by an appreciable section of Arab opinion, to whom indeed it would
not only be a great concession, but would mean the removal of one of the grievances
on which they have laid most emphasis.

It goes without saying that the consent of the Zionists would also have to be
procured. We must do nothing that could be interpreted by them as a breach of faith
and we do not want to staunch the flow of the subscriptions from the Jewish world,
which are still essential for the material prosperity, perhaps even for the continued
existence, of their colonies in Palestine, and secondarily for the future development
of Palestine as a whole. When, however, we recall the terms of their pledge as
recorded in the White Paper in the concluding paragraph of Dr. Weizmann's letter
of the 16th June, 1922, and when they realise that the alternative may be the jeopardy,
if not the loss, of the National Home itself, it cannot, I think, be doubted that counsels
of wisdom will prevail.

We feel, however, very strongly that if this great concession to Arab sentiment
be made, it should only be made as part of an agreed settlement with them, that it
must be accepted by their representative organisations and by their leaders as a
final settlement, and that an end must be placed to the agitation, whether in
Palestine or outside, which has been the fruitful source of so much trouble, expense,
even and even bloodshed. The arrangement is one that must be loyally implemented by
all parties—otherwise we shall have conceded much for no adequate return.

We further discussed the question whether it would be desirable to invest this
settlement, supposing it to be made, with the sanction of a wider authority than
our own, and to endeavour to secure for it the approval of the League of Nations.
We think that there is a great deal to be said for this course, and that, whether
through the medium of a Report to the Council of the League—in response to the
questionnaire which has already under the existing Regulations been addressed by
the League to the Mandatory Power—or by more direct action, the sanction of the
League should be procured. It might even be desirable to apply formally for the
incorporation of the new Articles in the body of the Mandate itself. This, of course,
could only be done with the consent of all the Powers represented on the Council,
which it would be a little invidious for them to refuse. But such a plan must also
be conditional upon the absolute and unequivocal acceptance of the compromise by
the parties principally concerned, i.e., the Palestinian Jews and the Arabs themselves.

While this is the concrete suggestion that we submit to the Cabinet, we should
not like the latter to think that we have not considered whether it would be possible,
as in the case of Iraq, to place a limit of time to our commitments and our expendi-
ture in Palestine. The circumstances, however, differ in toto. In Iraq we are dealing
with an Arab State and an Arab Government, which has already an organised
existence, and the entry of which into the League of Nations we contemplate in a
few years' time. There is no parallel to this in Palestine, where the Arabs in present
circumstances can scarcely be regarded as capable either of forming a Government or
constituting a State. In Iraq we are under no commitments to a particular class of
the population as we are to the Zionists in Palestine. In Iraq we are not present,
as we are in the Holy Land, as the trustees, so to speak, of civilisation, into whose
hands has been intrusted by the world a sacred trust that it would be almost
shameful to abandon. There is, indeed, no analogy between the two situations.

Sir H. Samuel, in his recorded evidence, placed before us his estimate of the
future of Palestine, both as regards the military responsibilities and the financial
obligations which it will entail, and also as regards the economic development of the
country. These estimates may turn out to be unduly sanguine; already they have to
some extent been checked by the less rosy forecast of Sir G. Clayton. We feel that
the only way in which these doubts can be resolved is by securing stability and
creating confidence, and that the best hope for the relief of the British taxpayer lies
in improving the economic conditions of the country. Sir G. Clayton himself
concludes by saying that "there is no ground whatever for advocating the abandon-
ment of the Zionist policy or relinquishing the Mandate," and by asking whether
"a way cannot be found, by modifying objectionable Articles in the Mandate, or at
least by removing all possible grounds for any charges of partiality or bad faith,
"to dissipate the present fear and distrust of the Arabs."
That is the precise object with which we have put forward the proposals
contained in this Report.

Signed on behalf of the Committee,
DEVONSHIRE.
July 27, 1923.