CONCLUSIONS of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W., on Friday, 6th October, 1922, at 11-15 a.m.

PRESENT:--

The Prime Minister (in the chair).


The Right Hon. Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.


The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. S. Baldwin, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

The Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, M.P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.


The Right Hon. Sir A. Mond, Bart., M.P., Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The Right Hon. R. Munro, K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. The Earl of Crawford, K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The following were also present:--


1. With reference to Cabinet 57 (22), the Cabinet were informed that the Foreign Office and War Office had, during the night, received very important telegrams from Sir Horace Rumbold and General Harington, which, on the whole, answered the questions which had been raised at the Cabinet's previous meeting.

(Discussion was adjourned for ten minutes pending the arrival of the Lord President of the Council.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs read to the Cabinet telegram No. 523 (See Appendix I) received from Sir Horace Rumbold, giving a description of the proceedings at the Mudania Conference, in the course of which Ismet Pasha had, at the last moment, demanded, contrary to the terms of the Paris Note, that Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and had intimated that he would set his troops in motion unless this proposal was at once agreed to. This development had necessitated an adjournment of the Conference, and Ismet Pasha had agreed not to move his troops until 11.30 a.m., Greenwich time, today. The French General had announced that he had been authorised by his Government not only to sign the Protocol, giving great and important concessions to the Turks, but also to agree to the restitution to the Turkish authorities of Eastern Thrace before the Peace Treaty, and without Allied supervision. The view of General Harington and Admiral Brock was that the only way to avoid a conflict was for His Majesty's Government to authorise General Harington to tell the Turks that His Majesty's Government would summon the Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace, and Allied troops would be sent there forthwith to replace the Greeks. A further telegram (No. 524) from Sir Horace Rumbold (See Appendix II) was also read to the Cabinet, giving a
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description of the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Generals to discuss the deadlock reached at Mudania.

In the course of this meeting the French High Commissioner had intimated that, according to M. Franklin-Bouillon's instructions, it was desirable, if possible, to maintain the Allied Commissioners and contingents in Eastern Thrace until the conclusion of peace, which indicated that their maintenance, in the view of the French Government, was not indispensable. The French and Italian High Commissioners were strongly in favour of yielding to all the Turkish demands, and made it clear that the questions of Kara Agatch and Eastern Thrace were not such as would justify hostilities. The French High Commissioner had urged that several Allied Battalions should at once be despatched into Thrace as proof of good faith, and the Generals had agreed that without some such gesture the Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance. The British High Commissioner had represented that there were limits to the forbearance of His Majesty's Government, and that the more that was yielded to the Turks the more would be demanded. He had also requested General Harington to make every effort to gain further time. The concrete proposal in these telegrams, Lord Curzon pointed out, was that we should announce our intention to send Allied troops to Thrace and summon the Greeks to withdraw behind the Maritza. The contents of these telegrams, however, raised a much larger question, namely, that of Allied solidarity and the full maintenance, in letter and in spirit, of the Paris Note. In his opinion the time had now arrived when it was necessary to send an immediate communication to the French Government pointing out that the policy which France was pursuing in the Near East was wholly inconsistent with the solemn pledges which had been given to the Allied and embodied in the Paris Note;
pointing out to her the consequences that must inevitably follow from her action; and asking her definitely to state whether she was prepared to stand side by side with Great Britain in carrying out the policy agreed upon in the Paris Note. It would be necessary, in the proposed communication, to acquaint the French Government with the fact that the British Government fully realised the trend of French policy, and the French Government would have to be told that Great Britain would be prepared, in the event of the Greeks retiring from Eastern Thrace, to send British troops into Eastern Thrace for control purposes. The French Government should be asked whether they were prepared to join with Great Britain, and, if not, how they could justify such a refusal, the consequences of which must inevitably be the end to all Allied co-operation in the East and possibly elsewhere. A communication of this character should be made to the French Government at once, as it was essential to bring home to M. Poincaré himself the very serious situation which had arisen in consequence of the inexplicable attitude adopted by France in the last few days.

The terms of the Paris Note (Paper C.F.-4258) were read to the Cabinet, and particular attention was directed to paragraph 3, in which the Allied Governments stated their willingness to support at the Conference the attribution of the Maritza-Adrianople frontier to Turkey. The whole tenour of the Note was unmistakable, and it was most difficult to see how the French Government could reconcile their present conduct with its terms. It was not likely that M. Poincaré would be prepared, when faced with the facts, to give a direct negative to Great Britain's request for co-operation.

The Cabinet were then informed of the contents of telegrams Nos. D-2 and D-4 (See Appendix XIII), which had just been received from General Harrington, and which confirmed
the information contained in Sir Horace Rumbold’s telegrams. In Part 3 of D-4, General Harington intimated that he had no doubt that unless the Allied Governments acted at once the Nationalists would march on Constantinople "and can cross into our area in three or four days". This referred to the small perimeter at Scutari at present held by the British troops, and not, of course, to the Ismid neutral zone. In Part 5 of the same telegram General Harington asked whether he was to defend Scutari and Constantinople as long as he could with five Battalions and a few batteries and aeroplanes, assisted by the Navy, in the hole of holding on until reinforcements arrived, or whether he should evacuate at once to Gallipoli and Chanak, leaving afaitaccompli in Constantinople.

The Cabinet at this point were informed that a telegram (No.514) (See Appendix IV) had just been received from Sir Horace Rumbold, giving particulars of the present civil administration in Eastern Thrace. This administration was Greek, and the Police and Gendarmerie were also Greek. If the Greek Army withdrew from Eastern Thrace it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the officials to remain unless they had very definite guarantees of safety. It would be impracticable for the Allies to organise a civil administration in the time available, nor could the Constantinople Government provide such an administration. The only alternative, therefore, appeared to be to allow the Kemalists to take over the civil administration, the Allies taking steps to avoid disturbance and panic. These views were shared by the British Commissioner’s French and Italian colleagues, and in this connection Sir Horace Rumbold referred to his telegram No.506. It seemed clear that the British Commissioner contemplated a Turkish military occupation of Eastern Thrace to prevent fighting and disorder, and a civil administration
which, in the circumstances, as martial law would be in operation, would be of a subordinate character: that Allied forces should be sent into Eastern Thrace, if available: and that, purely from the point of view of the maintenance of order, the country would not be worse off under a Kemalist civil administration than under a Greek regime deprived of Greek military help. Sir Horace Rumbold was disposed, therefore, to advise that Great Britain should yield to the Turkish demand and admit a number of Turkish officials into Eastern Thrace.

The Cabinet were reminded that one of the fundamental conditions of the Paris Note had been that the Kemalist forces should evacuate the neutral zones. Was it now proposed to water down this most important condition? Such a decision might have to be taken, but the full consequences should be weighed before Great Britain lightly abandoned the position which she had up to the present maintained through the negotiations.

The view was then expressed that the responsibility for the consequences would rest with our Allies: that public opinion in Great Britain was not prepared in any event to undertake a war with Turkey, and particularly was not prepared to fight to keep the Turks out of Europe. In these circumstances, it was asked, ought the British Government to take the responsibility of adopting military action in the Near East when her French and Italian Allies had decided that the issues at stake were not worth the contest? The question put on the previous evening (Cabinet 57 (22)-3) was repeated:— "Suppose a decision is taken to instruct General Harington to allow the Turks to occupy Thrace, and suppose the Greeks decline to accept; in those circumstances to what lengths should the British Government be prepared to go to put pressure on Greece?" The reply was made that no
pressure should be put on Greece, but that Mustapha Kemal
should be allowed — since we could not prevent him — to
cross into Europe and fight it out with the Greeks. There
had, it was pointed out, been Balkan Wars in the past in
which Great Britain had not been involved, and we ought
to limit ourselves strictly to securing the freedom of the
Straits. On the other hand, it was pointed out that if
Great Britain should now surrender to the Turkish demands
and allow the Turks to re-occupy Eastern Thrace, the
Greeks would rightly represent that the terms of the Paris
Note had been violated. It should be remembered that the
Greeks were now prepared to agree to the evacuation of
Eastern Thrace provided that the Allies took over the
control of that country. Was it proposed, in these cir-
cumstances, to allow the Kemalists to cross the Bosphorus
and fight out their quarrel with the Greeks in Europe?
It was one thing to say to the Turks that Great Britain
would not allow the invasion of Europe. It might be
doubtful whether Great Britain alone had the
\[power\]
power to prevent such an invasion, but it was quite another thing after the neutral zones had been violated for Great Britain to put pressure on the Greeks to evacuate Eastern Thrace. The most she could be excepted to do in the circumstances was to remain strictly neutral.

It was then urged that instead of sending a written communication to the French Government it would be far better, if such a course were practicable, for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs himself to go over to Paris this afternoon and state to Monsieur Poincare in person the British objections to and criticisms of the French line of policy and also to speak very plainly to him on the subject of the activities of Monsieur Franklin Bouillon. It should be made clear to the French Government that Great Britain had gone to the very furthest limit in promising Eastern Thrace to the Turks, and it should also be made clear that the British Government recognised that it was no longer possible for Great Britain alone to carry out the full policy of the Paris Note in the absence of French and Italian support. In these circumstances it was necessary for Great Britain to separate herself from her Allies in this and perhaps in other questions and she would proceed to occupy and hold Gallipoli and Chanak with such assistance as she could obtain from other quarters. In other respects she ceased to interest herself or take any responsibility for what might happen in Constantinople or in the Balkans and in Thrace. Through the treachery of her allies Great Britain had been rendered powerless to carry out the original policy and the only course consistent with her honour was the one proposed. It was generally accepted that Lord Curzon must have authority to speak to Monsieur Poincare in some such terms if she found that the situation required it.

Some discussion then took place as to the action to be taken in the not impossible event of hostilities breaking out with the Turks in the next few days. General agreement
was expressed with the view that in any event Chanak and the
Gallipoli Peninsula would have to be defended. With regard
to the Scutari position it was urged the situation was very
difficult. The view was expressed that if it became necessary
for Great Britain to adopt a neutral attitude towards the
Turks and to permit them to cross the Straits, it would be
essential to adopt a correspondingly neutral attitude towards
the Greeks and to permit their forces, both naval and military,
to enter the neutral zones for the purpose of defending the
territory allotted to them under the Treaty of Sevres. Further,
it might be necessary to take steps to secure that other powers
maintained an equally neutral attitude towards both combatants.
It was also pointed out that if the French Government maintained
their present attitude it would be most difficult for Great
Britain to justify the continuance of those provisions of the
Treaty of Neuilly under which Bulgaria was not allowed to
maintain an effective army, and indeed that all the peace
treaties would be in jeopardy.

It was agreed:-

(1) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
should be requested to proceed to Paris that
afternoon for the purpose of laying before
Monsieur Poincaré the views of the British Govern­
ment on the lines indicated in the discussion.

(2) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
should cause a telegram to be despatched to Sir
Horace Kumbold informing the latter that the
position was regarded as so grave that he (Lord
Curson) was leaving for Paris to discuss the
position with the French Government and that
arrangements should be made to secure that General
Harington should not return to Mudania or if he
had already left for that place he should be warned
not to commit himself on any important point without
further instructions.

(3) That the Secretary of State for War should send a
telegram to General Harington to the effect that
unless he could rely on the French troops standing
with the British troops at Scutari he was not to
fight at Scutari but was to have the fullest dis­
cretion to withdraw from that position and from
Constantinople at the moment when he was satisfied
that such withdrawal was required by the military
situation.

(4)
(4) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should arrange for an informal message to be sent to Monsieur Veniselos in Paris inviting Monsieur Veniselos to remain in Paris in order that he might be available in the forthcoming discussions between Lord Curzon and Monsieur Poincaré.

(5) That the Secretary of State for Air should arrange for an aeroplane to be available in Paris to bring Lord Curzon's account of his interview with Monsieur Poincaré to the Cabinet.
2. With reference to Cabinet 52 (22), Appendix V, Conclusion (a), the Cabinet were informed by the Secretary of State for War that he had received an assurance from General Harington that he had secured all the transport which he required for the effective evacuation of the British forces at Scutari and Constantinople.

The Cabinet took note of this communication.
2. With reference to Cabinet 52 (22), Appendix V, Conclusion (a), the Cabinet were informed by the Secretary of State for War that he had received an assurance from General Harington that he had secured all the transport which he required for the effective evacuation of the British forces at Scutari and Constantinople.

The Cabinet took note of this communication.
3. The Cabinet were informed that M. Diamandy had expressed a wish to discuss with the Secretary of State for War the question whether Great Britain could furnish Roumania with certain arms and ammunition.

In this connection reference was made to the fact that the Serbian and Polish Governments had already made arrangements with France for the supply of munitions, and to the desirability at the present juncture of encouraging the maintenance of close and friendly relations between the British and Roumanian Governments.

The Cabinet agreed:

To request the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for War to discuss the question of the supply of arms and munitions with M. Diamandy, with discretion to deal with his requests as they thought fit.

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2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

October 6, 1922.
POLITICAL

TURKEY


D. 3.0 a.m. October 5th 1922.
R. 5.30 a.m. October 6th 1922.
No. 523.

SUB-COMMITTEE.

General Harington has returned from Mudania and has explained situation.

He has shown me protocol drafted by Allied generals as result of three days discussion with Ismet Pasha. This protocol gives very great and important concessions to Turks. Generals hoped that this protocol would have been signed to-day but at the last moment Ismet Pasha demanded that Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks before peace treaty and that all the allied contingents and missions should be withdrawn. This demand is of course entirely at variance with allied proposal of September 23rd.

Ismet Pasha intimated that he would set his troops in motion if allied generals did not agree to this proposal, which annuls the whole basis of the conference.

General Harington proposed that (? conference, omitted) should adjourn until 2.30 tomorrow afternoon in order that generals should have time to refer to their governments and High Commissioners. After some discussion Ismet agreed that he would not move his troops until 2.30 p.m. i.e. 11.30 G.M.T. tomorrow.

French
French general then announced that he was authorised by his government not only to (group omitted) protocol but to restitution to Turkish authorities of Eastern Thrace, before peace treaty, and without allied supervision. He had informed General Harington of these instructions before (? this) last sitting. In view of this situation which hopelessly weakens the allied front, the generals had no alternative but to return to ask for instructions.

Allied generals had no knowledge of reply from Angora accepting peace conference until after they had left Mudania this afternoon. You will have noticed that reply is entirely silent on the subject of acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of conditions attaching to promise of support of Turkish claims to Eastern Thrace.

Turkish claim to consider Eastern Thrace before peace treaty seems difficult of acceptance. I imagine that Paris proposals contemplated setting up of machinery by peace conference for adequate protection of minorities. This would go by the board under new Turkish claim.

Turks (? have, omitted) just requested permission to transport to Eastern Thrace an unlimited force of gendarmerie which might in effect be an army. They also claim Karagach and the right to carry on military operations even (? after) signature of military convention until latter is ratified by governments concerned.

Allied High Commissioners are meeting allied generals
generals immediately to consider deadlock (group undec.) at Mudania.

My colleagues will probably wish unofficially to advise in an identic telegram to three governments, in view of French attitude which can only be characterized as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin Bouillon it was necessary for me to send this separate telegram. In view of General Harington and Admiral Brock the only way to avoid a conflict (?) is for His Majesty's Government to authorise General Harington to tell Turks that His Majesty's Government will summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and allied troops will be sent there forthwith to replace Greeks.

Please get Admiralty to send your instructions to General Harington by wireless tomorrow to "Iron Duke".

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Very Urgent.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Allied High Commissioners and Generals met tonight to discuss deadlock reached at Mudania.

I asked French High Commissioner whether French government was as stated by Franklin Bouillon really ready to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of Eastern Thrace in full sovereignty previous to entry into force of peace treaty and without adequate guarantees through allied commissions for minorities there. If so it was quite contrary to Paris decisions.

French High Commissioner said that Franklin Bouillon was very affirmative on this point and that his own instructions to the effect that it was desirable if possible to maintain allied commissions and contingents there till conclusion of peace indicates that their maintenance in view of French government was not indispensable. I immediately said that I did not recognise Franklin Bouillon as representing my government and that I considered his impolicy had been pernicious.

Italian High Commissioner having said that Franklin Bouillon had had no authority to speak for Italian government at Smyrna argued strongly in favour
favour of yielding to Turks. French High Commissioner took the same line. They said that two points left outstanding namely Karagatch and maintenance until conclusion of peace of allied commissions in Thrace did not constitute justification for possible world war; question of Karagatch was of comparative unimportance and as a suburb of Adrianople Paris note might be interpreted as including it in that city while Thrace was in any case to be restored in a few months time to full Turkish sovereignty and that during that time conference would be sitting.

French High Commissioner pointed out that at base of Turkish demands was their distrust of vague promises of Allies and suggested that it might be possible to allay this by some immediate gesture giving proof of our good faith such as despatch forthwith of several allied battalions into Thrace. All three generals agreed that without some such gesture Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance.

Italian High Commissioner urged that if war resulted world would attribute it to unwillingness of allied High Commissioners and generals to take responsibility for concessions which were of small account in comparison with issues involved.
I replied that world would attribute it to intractability of Turks, that the more we yielded to Turks the more demands they would make and that the next might well be evacuation of Constantinople, that General Harington, Admiral Brock and I had done our utmost to avoid war, that there were limits to forbearance of His Majesty's Government and that I must now report facts to my Government and leave it to them to appreciate whether in refusing these demands they were prepared to contemplate war.

In the meantime pending the receipt of your views I have requested General Harington to make every effort to gain time, to point out to Ismet Pasha on his return to Mudania tomorrow that powers have now received reply of Angora Government and to ask him how he can reconcile readiness of that Government to attend conference with threat to recommence military operations.

Repeated to Athens No. 175.
PARAPHRASE. S E C R E T.

Detached 10 p.m. 5/10/22.
Received 8 p.m. 5/10/22.

From:- General Harington.
To:- War Office.

D.2. cipher First of 3 parts.

To-day at Conference after Generals had done utmost to strain their powers on points of detail with a view to meeting the Nationalists Ismet reverted suddenly to basis of conference. He maintained that putting together the Allied note of 29th and Angora's reply seems to be the concoction of Franklin Bouillon. The basis in the event of a conference taking place is that Eastern Thrace shall be restored fully to the Nationalists by Treaty of Peace without any foreign control when the Greeks have left. Charpy stated he was empowered to sign to this effect. Mombelli, however, and I declared our inability to make any such contract. It was quite obvious that Franklin Bouillon has twisted the Turks into thinking he could sway the Allied Governments besides the French and authorise the Generals to make political decisions. It was decided by the Generals after they had consulted together to adjourn Conference until October 6th at 14.30 hours so that they might have time to return to Constantinople and to consult High Commissioner and exchange telegrams with their respective Governments.

Part 2. I think that the net result of the above is good as it has now been made clear that Mombelli and I do not take orders from Franklin Bouillon. We have undertaken to obtain instructions on the following points by 1000 hours G.M.T. October 6th:

(a) Can we commit ourselves to basis that Eastern Thrace is to be restored to Turkish sovereignty before ratification of peace treaty?
(b) Without admitting full Turkish sovereignty in Eastern Thrace can we consent to withdrawal of Allied representatives and troops immediately Turkish authority has been restored in each locality?

(c) Can Adrianople on return of Turks be considered to include the ring of forts (one group under) the Maritsa and also Kara Agatch railway station and village? Turks make a strong military point of this and require Greek Administration removed from Kara Agatch.

(d) Can pressure be exercised on Greeks to restore civil hostages evacuated by them from Anatolia?

(e) If Greeks refuse to sign convention are we still to endeavour to reach agreement with Nationalists?

Last Part. May the replies to the above questions be expedited, please, to H.M.S. Iron Duke so as to reach me before 10.00 hours G.M.T. October 6th?

Franklin Bouillon has been propagandising heavily regarding the military prowess and strength of Turkey. Ismet tried to bluff ? into freedom to renew hostilities but ended by giving his assurance to refrain at least until 1430 hours local time on October 6th. The Turks are worried about report which they received yesterday regarding Greek atrocities in Thrace and they are anxious that the Allies should immediately send troops into Eastern Thrace to ensure security. I have not yet received any confirmation of the report that forty villages were burnt in Thrace the other day. In fact, Colonel Saryanis who is ?here denies it emphatically.

A copy of this telegram will be conveyed to the High Commissioner by hand.
Circulated to the Cabinet.

CLEAR THE LINE.  SECRET.

From: - General Harington H, M, S. IRON DUKE.

To: - War Office,

D.11.55  5.10.22.
R.01.00  5.10.22.


C.H.H. 114 Personal for C.I.G.S. Have had most difficult task.

After 3 days incessant work in a network of political intrigue we
had reached stage when I hoped to sign 2 conventions today (a)
Convention dealing with evacuation of Greeks behind MARITZA and
arrangements for installing Turkish administration subject to
approval of Allied Governments. (b) Convention ensuring security
of neutral zone with modifications in case of Zone at Chanak to
amount of SANDJAK which has already been in British occupation and
a marking on ground of a safety line for immediate future. In
course of today's discussion Ismet no doubt prompted by Hamid, Angora
and Franklin Bouillon demanded that Eastern Thrace and sovereignty
thereof be handed over to Nationalists as soon as Nationalist
administration is installed and Allied Missions and troops withdrawn
that is in 1 month and without waiting treaty of peace.

Part Two.

Allied Generals have had identical instructions until today when
French Government or Franklin Bouillon have given Charpy authority
to agree. Mombelli and I refused and I have adjourned conference
till tomorrow afternoon while we refer to Governments and am returning
10 see Rumbold. After discussion Ismet agreed to withhold
operations till reply received. If unsatisfactory operations will
commence again at once against Greeks via Constantinople with
diversion no doubt against CHANAK. Greek representatives are
here. Had conference with them today. They are trying to
build up force to hold Eastern Thrace. There is no doubt in
my mind that unless Allied Governments act at once Nationalists
will march on Constantinople and can cross into our area in 3
or 4 days.
Part Three.

Government has to say at once whether they will take action to evacuate Greeks immediately and send Allied troops into Eastern Thrace or whether they will engage Nationalist Army. It is very serious situation and I request to know whether I am to defend Scutari and Constantinople as long as I can with five Battalions and a few batteries and aeroplanes assisted by Navy in the hope of holding on till reinforcements arrive or whether I shall evacuate at once to Gallipoli and Chanak leaving a fait accompli in Constantinople. In reality Government have got 24 hours in which to say whether they will give Mustapha Kemal his terms regarding Thrace or whether England is to fight him for Constantinople which it has already been agreed that he shall have.

Last Part.

It is direct threat and at least 3 times during conference Ismet has said that he must cancel stoppage of movements. Charpy behaved very well throughout conference and it was black treachery forcing him to desert me and agree to Mustapha Kemal's terms. If date of peace conference is actually fixed I think I could hold on at Scutari as he will probably come up against us as he has done at Chanak and see what happens.

For our prestige it is best to be here at time of Conference if we can but it will be some time before I can get reinforcements and I cannot take much from Gallipoli and Chanak.

Received 7 a.m. 6.10.22.
URGENT.

Your telegram No. 464.

All my information shows that present civil administration of Eastern Thrace is run by Greek superior officials many of whom come from old Greece and that subordinate staff also is mainly Greek. Police and gendarmerie are directly controlled by military authorities.

If Greek army were to evacuate and existing civil administration were retained difficulty would be to get officials to remain unless their lives were assured by complete allied occupation.

Proceedings of first day at Mudania show that Kemalists would never accept such proposal. Greek administration and more particularly police and gendarmerie cannot fail to go to pieces once Greek army evacuates. Problem is to provide substitute. Allies cannot organise temporary administration of their own. Constantinople government has been ruled out. There remains no alternative but to let Kemalists take over. This will certainly not of itself tend to pacify the country or appease racial animosity but it will not defeat these objects any more than would the maintenance of Greek administration. It is better anyhow than chaos. My proposal is that Kemalists should take over administrative services generally, that...

1.
that we should not attempt to establish control of all such services, but that we should endeavour to obviate panic and mutual vengeance by continued presence of allied commissions, by attaching allied officers to gendarmerie and by reserving the right to send allied detachments to Eastern Thrace.

Question of officials is one of detail. Principal officials would doubtless come from Anatolia but Kemalists can if they like draw on local notables and unemployed officials here to fill subordinate posts.

My French and my Italian colleagues share views indicated in my telegram No. 503. While expressing readiness to join me in elaborating scheme for civil administration as proposed in your telegram No. 455 they have both stated that this procedure does not seem to them to answer the requirements of the situation which necessitates speed above all. French High Commissioner states in this as in all other matters agreement with Turks is necessary and that he has empowered General Charpy to settle question on which agreement depends. In these circumstances it is useless to attempt to formulate scheme until general principles are settled as result of Mudania meeting as contemplated in your telegram No. 441.

I realise my proposal prejudices future of Thrace to greater extent than your note contemplated but we have promised Eastern Thrace to Turks and expediency seems to be only possible guide on this question.

Repeated to Athens No. 169.