CONCLUSIONS of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W., on Saturday, 30th September, 1922, at 5 pm.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister (in the chair)


The Right Hon. Viscount Peel, G.B.E., Secretary of State for India.


The Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P., Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Kt., E.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon. Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.


The Right Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir A. Griffith-Boscawen, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The Right Hon. R. Munro, E.K., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. The Earl of Crawford & Balcarres, K.T., First Commissioner of Works.

The following were also present:

Mr. Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

The Right Hon. F.E. Guest, G.C.M.G., D.S.O., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.


Capt. Col. Sir J. Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Principal Assistant, C.I.D.
With reference to Cabinet 51(22),

The Prime Minister said he had summoned a Cabinet because he had anticipated confidently that a reply would be received from General Sir Charles Harington which would probably call for important decisions. As yet, however, this had not arrived.

He then made to the Cabinet a statement regarding the general situation, to the following effect. Mustapha Kemal had paid no heed to the Paris Note or to the warnings of General Harington, and continued to pour cavalry and perhaps artillery into the neutral zone. These troops were very insolent in their demeanour. They walked up to the wire entanglements of the British forces and made grimaces through them. The General Staff had advised that our troops were being netted in and that in a short time this process would render them ineffective because the positions that were being taken up by the Turks would make their situation impossible. The three Staffs had examined the question and had considered it essential that something should be done to clear up this situation. The Conference of Ministers had therefore decided on the previous afternoon that General Harington should arrange for notice to be given to the local Commander of the Turkish forces outside Chanak, that if his troops were not withdrawn by a fixed time, all the forces at our disposal—naval, military
and air — would be used to reject them. Nothing had been heard in reply to this telegram, which had been despatched on the previous afternoon and this was rather perplexing. At the moment, therefore, there was nothing to be done except to inform the Cabinet as to the general position.

In reply to various questions, he stated that as regards France, she had withdrawn her troops from Chanak. The local Commanders had sent a contingent, but the French Government had insisted on their withdrawal. Since that time they had offered us no support whatsoever. At the present moment the French Government were supposed to be pleading with Mustapha Kemal in our interests and he had no doubt that the French Government were doing their best in this respect. However, they were not helping at Chanak. The Australian Government were willing to send a force. As regards the Americans, he had been impressed by a remarkable statement issued by Mr. Hearst.

The Cabinet were informed by Captain Guest, who had just returned from the United States of America, that he had received a telegram from the Air Attaché, whom he had given instructions to report on this question, to the effect that the American press was displaying the greatest interest and that a very large portion of it was favourable to the British policy and strongly opposed to the return of the Turks to Europe.

The Cabinet were reminded that the American Government were sending destroyers.

On adjourning, the Prime Minister asked —

That all Cabinet Ministers should remain within easy reach in case a further meeting of the Cabinet was required the same evening.
2. The Cabinet took note of the following:—

(a) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Wednesday, 27th September, 1922 at 7.0 p.m.

(b) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Thursday, 28th September, 1922 at 11.0 a.m.

(c) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Thursday, 28th September, 1922 at 4.0 p.m.

(d) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Thursday, 28th September, 1922 at 7.0 p.m.

(e) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Friday, 29th September, 1922 at 11.30 a.m.

(f) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Friday, 29th September, 1922 at 10.0 p.m.

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2. Whitehall Gardens, S.W./1
30th September, 1922
SECRET.

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers
held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1., on
Wednesday, 22nd September, 1922, at 7 p.m.

PRESENT:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (IN THE CHAIR).


The Right Hon. The Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.
The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-


Mr. R.B. Howorth .................................. Assistant Secretary, Cabinet.
CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT A CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 27th SEPTEMBER, 1922, AT 7.00 p.m.

The Conference agreed:-

(a) That the Secretary of State for War should arrange for the despatch to General Harington of a telegram on the following lines:

"Your telegrams Nos. 2438 and 2469 are being very carefully considered and we suspend reply until we have your answer to Mustapha Kemal."

(b) That the Secretary of State for War should arrange for a telegram to be sent to the Military Attache at Athens asking him to report with the least possible delay as to the number and character of the Greek troops available in Athens, Thrace and elsewhere, and to give the appreciation of their probable fighting qualities.

(c) That the Secretary of State for War should send a personal letter to the Editor of the "Daily Mail" informing him he had been apprised by General Harington that the morale of the troops in the Near East was being affected by the tenor of the articles appearing in the "Daily Mail" protesting most strongly against the nature of these criticisms, and saying that the Government would have to take steps to secure that the military position was not prejudiced. The Editor should also be reminded that the Turkish agents were making use of these articles for the purpose of Nationalist propaganda.

(d) To request the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff to consider and report to the Committee to-morrow morning on the question of the feasibility of General Harington being able to maintain his position in Constantinople in the event of the evacuation of the Chanak position, and to advise the Committee as to the best means of reinforcing and maintaining the British forces in Constantinople on the assumption that the Southern shore of the Dardanelles would, in the event of evacuation of Chanak be in the hands of Kemalist forces.

2, Whitelhall Gardens, S.W.1.
28th September, 1922.
SECRET.

PARAPHRASE

Clear the line. DESPATCHED 0230 27. 9.22.

Received 0400 27. 9.22.

From: General Farington.

To: War Office.

2468 cipher 26/9.

Part I. I again interviewed Hemid Bay to-day and got him to wire directly to Mustapha requesting that Turkish cavalry should be withdrawn from Lapsaki and Branksui and I wired personally to Mustapha also. Every effort is being made by me to get them out without force. We cannot allow them to remain or they will bring up guns and be dangerous to fleet. An ultimatum has been issued by Colonel Shuttleworth that he will be obliged to use force at 0700 to-morrow but this I have cancelled. General Marden, who knows my desire to avoid conflict has been sent off to-day to investigate on spot and report. I shall give Mustapha 48 hours to reply and withdraw his troops. It will show that forces are moving up behind if he does not withdraw his troops.

Part II. He can produce 7 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions (total 23,000 sabres and rifles) Balikesri and Gumen - Pandarina areas for an attack on Chanak. I can offer a stout resistance, and by evacuating Constantinople which I should have to do, could obtain a reserve brigade. Allies have agreed together to defend the Straits - British in fact, others on paper. I presume policy remains same that I am at all costs to hold Gallipoli and Chanak. If I do this, would other divisions be sent to? Before I become seriously engaged I must know this as I should have to make preparations to hang on some 35 days. I should have to judge moment to evacuate if I am not to be reinforced. I can do whatever you wish. My own personal opinion is that Mustapha will not attack seriously. He is trying to force me into firing the first shot. I am trying to avoid this but he cannot be allowed to put a net round us and put guns on Straits.
DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministries held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 28th September 1922 at 11 a.m.

PRESENT:-

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B.; First Lord of the Admiralty.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.


Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,

Lieut-Col. Sir W.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, Cabinet.
Lieut-Col. Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., Principal Assistant Secretary, G.I.B.
1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that it was desirable that we should secure the evacuation of the refugees at Smyrna before September 30th. If, as was stated in that morning's newspapers, the number left was only about 15,000, it should be possible to do this. It was important to consider what would happen to these refugees on their arrival in Greece. Mr. Lindley had suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be set up at Athens to arrange for the relief of the refugees, and through the League of Nations.

It was agreed --

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph to Lord Balfour, asking him to invite the League of Nations to set up machinery to deal with the relief of the refugees in Greece.
2. The attention of the Conference was drawn to the fact that the invitation to Mustapha Kemal to the Conference agreed to in Paris on September 24th, provided that the line behind which the Greek troops were to retire should be fixed by the Allied Generals in accord with the Greek and Turkish Military Authorities. No action, it was pointed out, had yet been taken to invite a Greek General to the Conference. The Allied High Commissioner at Constantinople, however, had asked what action was being taken in this respect.

It was agreed:

(a) That the War Office should ask General Harington to arrange for the presence of a Greek General.

(b) That the Foreign Office should send a telegram to Athens on the subject.

(? Notify Paris and Rome).
3. Apart from Conclusion 2 above, no conclusions were reached on the main subject of the crisis in the Near East, but the following represents the trend of the discussion together with certain interim steps decided on with a view to clarifying the situation at a further meeting to be held at 4 p.m.
(a) The primary British interests in the position in the Near East are —

(1) **Peace**: but our position is one of mediators. We do not propose to use force to establish peace, either against the Turks or against the Greeks. Thus if the Turkish Nationalists decline to make peace, we shall not march an army against them. If the Greeks decline, we shall not use our fleet to coerce them.

(ii) **The Freedom of the Straits**: — for this, as a great maritime Empire primarily interested, we are prepared to use force, if necessary. We are not in a position to send an army to protect the Bosphorus, but we do intend to hold both sides of the Straits.

(iii) **The maintenance of the Alliance with France and Italy**: But, while anxious that the Allied status should be preserved at Gallipoli, we intend to hold on to the Gallipoli Peninsula, whether the French detachment now there remains or not.

(b) In order to carry out the above policy it is essential that, if serious fighting should occur at Chanak, mobilisation should be decided on and further reinforcements sent out, which involves the immediate summoning of Parliament.

(c) In regard to General Harington’s proposal (in his telegram No. viz. that the Turkish Nationalists should be allowed to cross the Sea of Marmora, anywhere outside the zones which were declared by the Allied High Commissioners to be Neutral in May 1921), it must be borne in mind that —

(i) We are bound to be absolutely impartial and to give fair play to both sides. Thus if the Turkish Nationalists, a military Power, are to be allowed to try and move their armies into Thrace, Greece, which is a naval Power, must not be debarred from trying to prevent them. Consequently the proposal in Sir Horace Rumbold’s telegram No. 457 that Greek warships should be withdrawn from the Sea of Marmora must not be pressed, and the detention at Chanak of Greek transports bound for the Sea of Marmora, announced in Sir Horace Rumbold’s telegram No. 455 of 26th September, must cease, if General Harington’s proposal is adopted.

(ii) The Paris Note of 24th September, 1922, inviting Mustapha Kemal to the Conference, specifically provides that the Government of Angora shall not cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora.
General Harlington's proposal would be contrary to the policy declared in the speech addressed to journalists by the Prime Minister on Saturday, September 23rd in which he mentioned our desire to prevent the conflict from spreading into Europe. This, however, is probably counterbalanced by a new factor, viz: the Greek revolution with the avowed object of defending Thrace.

Primary conditions of any consent to the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces to the neutral zone are that the Greeks should have refused to withdraw behind the line to be fixed at the Indanlia Conference and that the Turkish Nationalists should have withdrawn from the neutral zone.

That, in order to assist the Conference in arriving at a decision, and without prejudice to their decision, the following draft telegrams should be drawn up, to be based on the above, for consideration at a meeting to be held at 4 p.m.

The War Office to prepare a draft telegram to General Harlington informing him that the British Government favour his proposal subject to the considerations set forth above; that in view of the fact that the Allied invitation to Mustapha Kemal specifically provided that the Government of Angora should undertake not to send troops to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmora the matter could only be settled after obtaining agreement with the Allies; that the Allies were being consulted, and that a further communication would be made to him as to the result; that if his proposal was agreed to by the Allies, it was presumed that his intention was to raise the matter at his proposed conference at Indanlia. The draft telegram should conclude by a statement on the lines of a draft read by Mr. Churchill, expressing appreciation of his forbearance at Chanak and promising support and reinforcements if he is compelled to undertake hostilities.

By the Foreign Office informing Sir Horace Rumbold of the above decision.

By the Foreign Office approaching the Allies in regard to the above proposal.

By the Admiralty informing Admiral Brock of the situation, and explaining that if General Harlington's proposal should eventually be approved by the Allies, he should not in future interfere with the movements of Greek warships in the Sea of Marmora, or with their passage through the Straits, provided that they undertook belligerent operations within the neutral zone.
DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 28th September, 1922, at 4.0 p.m.

PRESENT:

THE PRIME MINISTER (IN THE CHAIR).


The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.


The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.


THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:


Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.

Capt.-Col. Sir M.I.A. Hankey, G.C.B. ............... Secretary, Cabinet.

Commander H.R. Moore, D.S.O., R.N. ............... Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.
The Conference agreed:

(a) That the War Office should be authorised to make perfectly clear to General Harington, if it is not clear in his existing instructions, that he is at liberty to withdraw the British Forces from Constantinople, if they are required for the defence of Chanak or Gallipoli, and that they should suggest to General Harington that he should warn the General Officers Commanding the French and Italian Forces at Constantinople that this may be necessary in certain eventualities.

(b) That the War Office should send to General Harington a telegram expressing appreciation of his endeavours to avoid fighting at Chanak and of the forbearance displayed, and promising full support if he is compelled to fight as well as reinforcements. In addition the General should be told in the same telegram that the proposals contained in his telegram No.2485 (regarding the passage of Nationalist Forces outside the Neutral Zones) is receiving careful consideration, and that the Cabinet wish before taking a decision to learn Sir Horace Rumbold's views on the subject; and that it is deemed undesirable that General Harington unaccompanied should meet Mustapha Kemal. If Mustapha Kemal should accept General Harington's invitation to meet him, the General should endeavour to utilise the opportunity to bring about the meeting at Mudania, to be attended by Greek as well as Allied and Turkish Generals, as proposed in the invitation sent from Paris on September 24, for the sole purpose of fixing the line behind which the Greek army is to retire.

(c) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should send the British High Commissioner a telegram, containing a summary of the general considerations arising out of this day's meetings of the Conference of Ministers, and inviting Sir Horace Rumbold's views on General Harington's proposals.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

28th September, 1922.
SECRET.

DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 28th September, 1922, at 7 p.m.

PRESENT:

THE PRIME MINISTER ( IN THE CHAIR).


The Right Hon. The Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.


THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:


Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.

Lieut. Col. Sir H.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B. Secretary, Cabinet.

Commander H.R. Moore, D.S.O., R.N. Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.
CONCLUSIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS
held on Thursday, September 28th, 1922
at 7.0 p.m.

The Conference agreed :-

(a) To approve attached telegram No. 91247 for despatch
    by the War Office to General Harington (Appendix I)

(b) To approve the attached telegram No. 441 for
    despatch by the Secretary of State for Foreign
    Affairs to the British High Commissioner at
    Constantinople. (Appendix II)

(The above two conclusions resulted from discussions at
the two meetings of the Conference held earlier in
the day).

(c) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
    should instruct the High Commissioner at
    Constantinople to notify the representative of
    the Angora Government in Constantinople that,
    on the basis of the Allied Note of September 24th,
    we had hitherto prohibited and were still pro­
    hibiting Greek transports from entering the Sea
    of Marmara, but that, if Mustapha Kemal did not
    retire from the neutral zone, this prohibition
    would be withdrawn. In addition, Sir Horace
    Rumbold should be told that there are no grounds
    for expelling the Greek fleet from the Sea of
    Marmara. Sir Horace Rumbold should be instructed
    to inform General Harington and the Naval Com­
    mander-in-Chief of these decisions. (See Telegram 442)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W./1
29th September, 1922
SECRET.

PARAPHRASE. Despatched 2200 28.9.22.

From :— War Office.
To :— General Harington.
91247 cipher 28/9.

Following from Cabinet.

Part I. Your 2485 cipher 27/9. Your desire for solution is fully appreciated here and we are seeking Sir H. Rumbold's advice upon your proposals which will receive careful consideration: they raise political considerations of most serious importance and can be discussed in telegrams between Foreign Office and Rumbold in view of your military pre-occupations. Meanwhile we point out that Kemal's argument which you think may be legally right takes no account of the specific conditions regarding the Straits and the Dardanos in the Allied Paris note of 23rd September.

With reference to your No. 1223 and proposed meeting with Kemal, if he replies accepting the meeting, you should inform the Allied Generals and the representative of the Greek forces and arrange for their presence in accordance with the Allied Paris note. It is undesirable to meet him separately as this would be misunderstood by the Allies.

Part II. We are without information whether a clash has occurred at Chanak.

We warmly approve forbearance you have shown in face of repeated provocation and the efforts you have made to avert hostilities.

You can rely upon our whole-hearted support if notwithstanding your efforts, fighting breaks out or has broken out in the Chanak zone or hostilities are forced upon you by attempts of the Kemalists to net you in.
As soon as it is clear that our troops are seriously engaged we shall mobilise two divisions and call for extra recruits so that reinforcements may be sent you at the earliest possible moment and meanwhile, in order to reinforce Chanak, you may, if necessary, evacuate Constantinople and Ismid.

Our policy is to hold Gallipoli at all costs and to hold on to Chanak so long as this can be done without undue military risk.

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NOTE: In view of the particularly secret character of this telegram, it has been given a strictly limited circulation and Members of Council are requested themselves to issue any necessary instructions to their directorates.
Cypher telegram to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

Foreign Office, 10.15 p.m. 28th September 1922.

No. 441.

Cabinet have given prolonged and anxious consideration to proposals made by Harington in his telegram No. 2485. We should have been glad if his views, which he had apparently communicated to you, had been accompanied by an expression of your opinion, the more so as the proposals made raise political issues of gravest importance, involving some departure from Paris agreement, and therefore necessitating communication with our allies.

Harington's first proposal is for a personal meeting with Mustapha Kemal. War Office has telegraphed to him that an independent meeting is inconsistent with Paris agreement, but that we are entirely in favour of Mudania meeting taking place at once under conditions laid down at Paris and that if personal meeting be proposed it should be converted into Mudania conference.

Harington's second proposal is to fix line to which Greek army are to be invited to retire at Maritsa River. Should the generals concur in this proposal at Mudania, and should the Greeks accept it, no question of a military crossing by Kemalists into Europe will arise, though in that case we shall have to provide for provisional administration in evacuated areas, as contemplated in your telegram No. 469. It seems to us useless to assign this task to Constantinople government, because in the first place we doubt their ability to carry it out, and secondly we doubt if Kemal would agree. He will no doubt express his opinions on the/
the matter at Mudania, and final decision should not be made without reference to High Commissioners and to Allied Powers, since matter is evidently political rather than military.

In the contrary event of the Greeks declining to accept Mudania decision, and refusing to withdraw, a new situation is created, and Harington's plan for meeting it is not strictly in accordance with Paris decisions. He proposes that passage of Marmora should be permitted to Kemal because the waters and coasts of the Marmora are not included in the neutral zones which the latter has been told to respect. As to this it must be pointed out (1) that the crossing of the Marmora at present state is expressly prohibited in the Paris terms and could only be permitted with allied consent; (2) that it would involve consequences which Harington has not fully foreseen and which must be carefully considered before proposal is made. The liberty accorded to Kemal could not in logic or fairness be unilateral. If he were permitted to cross into Europe to fight the Greeks and anticipate the decision of peace conference by establishing his rule in Eastern Thrace Greek ships could not be prevented from using non-neutral waters of Marmora at same time.
in order to resist his passage: and embargo placed on Greek ships and transports would have to be withdrawn.

In this way proposed plan might have consequence of not only re-opening war between Turkey and Greece but of transferring theatre of that war to Europe with consequences that cannot be foreseen.

These are the important considerations to which we invite your attention and upon which we are reluctant to decide until we have heard your views.

Broadly speaking our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris terms and only to contemplate departure from them where such departure is made subject of allied consultation and can be justified in interest of peace.

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DRAFT CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Friday, September 29th, 1932 at 11-30 a.m.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The following were also present:


Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.


Colonel W.H. Bertholomow, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Deputy Director of Military Operations & Intelligence.

Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,

Lieut-Col. Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, Cabinet.

Lieut-Col. C.V.G. Walker, D.S.O., Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.
The Conference agreed:--

**REPARATIONS**

(a) To concur in the proposals made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet Papers C.F.4194 and C.F.4223 that is to say, to take no action for the present.

**MESOPOTAMIA.**

(b) To take note that the Secretary of State for the Colonies urgently desired that within the next few days the Cabinet should meet to consider the Iraq Treaty, which was now ready for their approval. Also, that there was another Colonial Office question urgently requiring consideration.

**GREECE.**

(c) To take note, with approval, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had already informed the British Minister in Athens that if necessary, the ex-King Constantine and his family might be taken away from Greece in a British man-of-war to any non-British port, if a request was made to us.

**RUMOURED WITHDRAWAL OF ITALIANS FROM CONSTANTINOPLE.**

(d) To take note, with approval, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had instructed the British Ambassador at Rome to ascertain if there was any truth in the report published by Reuter's agency that the Italian forces were being withdrawn from Constantinople.

**REFUGEES FROM SYRIA.**

(e) To instruct the Secretary to reply to Lord Balfour's telegram of September 28th (Geneva, No.37) to the effect that the Cabinet would give him a free hand and would support the line taken in his speech to the Assembly whatever it was.
PROPOSED
IMMEDIATE
WITHDRAWAL
OF GREEKS
FROM EASTERN
THRACE.

(f) In regard to the proposal contained in Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No.474 of September 29th that the three Powers should inform Greece that Greek troops should immediately be drawn behind the Maritza line - the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was approved that he should reply by drawing Sir Horace Rumbold's attention to the sequence of events foreshadowed in the Paris note of invitation to the Conference. From this it would seem that the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw was to be fixed by the Allied Generals in accord with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. The High Commissioner's proposal would be tantamount to a new concession to Mustapha Kemal at a time when he was flagrantly contravening the condition in the Paris Note that he should observe the neutral line, and the moment for putting pressure on Greece would be after the line had been fixed.

GREEK WARSHIPS (g) In regard to Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram AID TEAK SPORTS HO.476, to take note that the question of the policy to be adopted towards Greek ships in the Sea of Marmora had already been settled by the Conference of Ministers, and their decision had been communicated to the High Commissioner in Foreign Office telegram No.442.

IMPORTANCE (h) In regard to the proposal of the French High Commissioner at Constantinople (Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No.477) that the British troops might withdraw from Chanak if and when the proposed Conference met at Mudania, to approve the answer given by Sir Horace Rumbold, namely, that we could not withdraw as the Kemalists at Constantinople could then mount guns and be in a position to render the passage of the Straits difficult if they were dissatisfied with the progress of the Conference.

PROPOSED
FRANCH AND
ITALIAN NAVAL
CO-OPERATION
IN THE STRAITS.

(i) In regard to the proposal contained in Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No.479 (which, it was noted had crossed Foreign Office telegram ITALIAN NAVAL No.441) that the French and Italian Admirals should assist to prevent the passage in Europe of Mustapha Kemal's troops, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should instruct the British High Commissioner formally to approach his French and Italian colleagues with a request for assistance by the French and Italian naval squadrons.

GENERAL TOWN (j) That General Townsend's offer, made to the Lord Privy Seal, to proceed as an emissary of the British Government to Mustapha Kemal should not be accepted.
To take note with satisfaction, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will shortly circulate to the Cabinet a comprehensive Memorandum dealing with the question of the freedom of the Straits, and setting forth the meaning attached to this phrase by the British Government and by the Angora Government, respectively.

In view of the critical questions likely to arise for decision within the next few days, to instruct the Secretary:

(i) To arrange for telegrams to be sent to all Cabinet Ministers in the United Kingdom, asking them to be available in London, as a Cabinet meeting might be necessary at any moment.

(ii) To notify the Lord President of the Council and the President of the Board of Education at Geneva that this was being done.

(iii) To arrange for a private telegram to be sent to the President of the Board of Trade (in France) from the Lord Privy Seal, asking him to return.

(iv) To take corresponding action in regard to any other Cabinet Ministers who might be abroad.

To instruct the Secretary to delete Conclusion (d) from the Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers held on Wednesday, 27th September, 1922 at 7.0 p.m. (referring to the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services a question regarding the maintenance of communication with Constantinople, if Chemak was not held).

To take note and approve of a correction to the draft Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on 27th September, 1922 at 7.0 p.m. proposed by the Lord Privy Seal, to the effect that in the event of the evacuation of Constantinople it was for the army to provide transport and that the War Office should ascertain that the military authorities understood their responsibility in this respect.

The attention of the Secretary of State for War was particularly invited to this.
(c) That, while at the moment, no instructions could be given to the Board of Trade in regard to any probable early demand for shipping transport, the Secretary of the Cabinet should warn that Department that during the next two or three days officials should be in attendance or else at hand, in case an emergency requiring the chartering of transports should arise.

(p) That the moment had not yet arrived for sending the draft telegram to the Dominions, attached to the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in regard to the proposed draft Proclamation authorising the requisitioning of shipping. (C.P.4224)

(q) To take note that the Secretary of State for War had decided, after consultation with his advisers, not to make the protest to the Editor of the Daily Mail approved by the Conference of Ministers at their meeting on Wednesday, 27th September, 1922 at 7.0 p.m. (Conclusion (c)).

Note. The Members of the Conference, discussing the matter in the absence of the Prime Minister, rather inclined to the view that representations should still be made, but the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War discussed the matter more fully after the meeting and agreed that no action should be taken.

(r) In regard to General Harington's proposal that Mustapha Kemal's troops should be allowed to cross the sea into Thrace outside the neutral zones (which had been discussed at all the meetings on the previous day) while no final decision was taken pending a reply from Sir Horace Rumbold to Foreign Office telegram No.441, the general view was that the objections, including the risk it would entail to the Balkan lines unless this position was amply defended, altogether outweighed the advantages.

(s) That the War Office should send to General Harington, a telegram (drawn up after an adjournment to enable the Chiefs of Staff of the three services to formulate their views, and after these views had been heard and approved) to the following effect :-

The Turkish Nationalists are obviously moving up troops and seeking to net your forces in. Cabinet are advised
by the General Staff that if we allow
continuance of this, the defensive position
will be imperilled and that the moment
to avert the disaster has arrived. It
has therefore been decided by the Cabinet
that the Officer Commanding the Turkish
forces around Chanak is immediately to
be notified that if his forces are not
withdrawn by an hour to be settled by
you, at which our combined forces will
be impace, all the forces at our dis-
posal - naval, military and aerial -
will open fire. In this latter event
the air forces should be used so long
as the Turkish forces are inside the
neutral zone. The time limit should
be short and it should not be overlooked
that we have received warning regarding
the date - September 30th, from our
intelligence.

(Rough paraphrase of telegram as
approved by the Conference.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1
29th September, 1922
DRAFT MINUTES of a Conference of Ministers held at Lord Curzon's house, No. 1, Carlton House Terrace, London, S.W. 1., on Friday, 29th September, 1922, at 10 p.m.

PRESENT:-

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Privy Seal, (In the Chair).

The Right Hon. The Viscount Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.


The Right Hon. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., I.P., Secretary of State for War.


THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-


Rear-Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff.


Mr. Chamberlain had agreed that the matter which he was about to put to the meeting was of sufficient importance to justify summoning the Ministers who normally attended the Conference dealing with the crisis in the Near East.

At 4 p.m. he had seen Nihad Rechad, who was the Kemalist representative in London.

(Lord Eirkenhead entered at this point.)

He had previously met Nihad Rechad in the Spring, when the latter had come to London with Yussef Kemal Bey. Nihad was a gentlemanly, friendly, outspoken man, friendly to this country, the more so as he aspired to be the future Turkish Ambassador in London. Two days ago Nihad had asked if Lord Curzon would see him, and he had replied that he certainly would. Nihad began by remarks in praise of what had been decided in Paris, which he thought was a work in the interest of peace, and he had congratulated Lord Curzon on the useful part he had played in reaching that agreement. Lord Curzon had then thanked Nihad, but took the occasion to tell him frankly that at the moment it hardly looked like peace and that we appeared to be on the brink of hostilities. Nihad replied by asking what on earth Lord Curzon meant? He replied that more than a week had elapsed since the invitation was sent to Mustapha Kemal to a Conference at Venice and Mudania. During this period no reply had been received, and the only communication had been to General Harington, and of a polemical character. If it was said that Mustapha Kemal was waiting for the arrival of M. Franklin-Bouillon, he would point out that the latter had reached Smyrna on Wednesday and that there had been plenty of time for an answer. In the meanwhile, what was happening on the Chanak front? The Turkish forces had continued to advance to a point where they were in close contact with British troops. They had actually reached the barbed wire of our position and were making grimaces across it! This was in the nature of an
enveloping movement and would soon involve extreme military danger to our troops.

(Sir L. Worthington-Evans entered at this point.)

Lord Curzon had then described quite frankly what had happened at the Cabinet that morning. The Government had been told by the military authorities that the position was inconsistent with the security of our forces. It had been tolerated up to the present in the interests of peace, but no-one could tolerate it any longer. He had then told Nihad the steps that were to be taken on the advice of the military authorities. On the following day the General would demand the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, and if this was not complied with they would be fired on. Nihad Rechad had replied, "Bat that means war". Lord Curzon had pointed out that at any rate it probably involved hostilities. Nihad had then said that he had not known that matters were so serious, and he asked permission to communicate this conversation to his Chief. Lord Curzon had replied that he hoped he would not only tell him this but that he would say a good deal more to Mustapha Kemal. He should point out that there had been no reply to the Paris invitation. Why, asked Lord Curzon, was Mustapha Kemal not at Mudania? Where was he at the present moment? Nihad Rechad had then said that Mustapha Kemal was at that moment in the train with M. Franklin-Bouillon on the way to Angora to consult the National Assembly. Lord Curzon replied that it was not his business to criticise the propriety of Mustapha Kemal’s consulting his National Assembly, but he recalled that the Nationalist Cabinet had met at Smyrna and he had asked Mustapha Kemal should not have gone to Mudania on his way to Angora? His whole attitude was consistent with a dilatory and evasive procedure. Nihad Rechad had then said that he was in contact with Mustapha Kemal, and that the latter was suffering under two great apprehensions. First, he believed that the British Government was in communication with and in a conspiracy with Athens,
and was organising Greek military aggression so as to render nugatory all the promises made at Paris in regard to Thrace. Lord Curzon had met this by stating that we were not in communication with the new Government, for the reason, if for none other, that no new Government, so far as he knew, existed, and he had asked what authority Nihad had for making such a statement. Nihad had also said that the British were organising the Greeks in the Straits and in Thrace. Lord Curzon had replied by pointing out that we had actually stopped transports going into the Sea of Marmora and had insisted on the Greek warships leaving Constantinople. He had pointed out, however, that if events developed as they were doing at the present moment, this attitude of restraint on the Greeks would certainly not be continued, and the very situation which Mustapha Kemal appeared to apprehend now would be produced. Nihad had replied that he was very glad to know this. His second apprehension had been that the Turcoman Nationalists were going to be cheated out of the Paris decisions as regards Eastern Thrace, which would be rendered nugatory. He thought that some sort of Government would be set up there which would prevent the Turks coming into their own. Lord Curzon had replied that it was a curious thing that he should mention this today, because the question had only just been discussed at the Cabinet as to the form of interim administration which should be set up during the Conference in Eastern Thrace, and he had telegraphed to Constantinople that this administration would have to be mainly of a Turkish character. If Mustapha Kemal wanted to settle these questions, why did he not go to Mudania, where everything could be arranged? Nihad Rechad had asked permission to tell this to Mustapha Kemal, and he himself had agreed. Nihad had then said he could get in touch with Mustapha Kemal by the following morning, and asked Lord Curzon what he should say. Lord Curzon had replied that it was not for him to say what account Nihad should give of his conversation, but as...
regards the position of Chunuk he hoped he would advise Mustapha Kemal that it was essential he should order the local Commander to withdraw his forces at once, before firing started. If, on the other hand, he was too late and firing had commenced, he should admit that it was an error and give an undertaking that this was an isolated incident which he regretted and that his troops would be withdrawn from the neutral zone. Nihad had replied that he would do this.

LORD CURZON then said he wished to tell his colleagues the conclusion he had since drawn. On the supposition that there was anything in what Nihad had said and that he did speak the views of his Chief, he had said to himself, — Was there not a possibility of escaping from the grave emergency that would arise on the morrow? Even though the position of the Government was irrefutable — and they had an admirable case to make to Parliament — nevertheless they had to remember that a renewal of the war with Turkey would be a most deplorable occurrence and very unpopular. He asked, therefore, if it would be possible to suspend the orders to General Harington for a short period, by one of two methods: either by holding the orders in suspense for 24 hours, or, if that was impossible, whether it would be practicable to tell the Commander to extend the time limit given to the Turks by 24 hours? He felt that the answer to the question mainly rested with the military authorities. Would the delay of 24 hours involve military danger? Would the Turks thereby be enabled to dig themselves in and envelop our force and bring up guns, and so forth, and was the danger of this so great as to make it worth while to neglect this chance of obtaining peace? So many military considerations were involved that he hesitated to express an opinion, but, subject to this, he felt strongly that if military considerations permitted the attempt ought to be made, and, if it was made, that it would immensely strengthen the Government's public position.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL added that just before Lord Curzon had come to see him on this subject at 7:30, his attention
had been called to the headlines in the evening newspapers
to the effect that Komal accepted the Lusitania Conference,
"Better News", and so forth. All this was an ill preparation
for the public reception of the decisions taken by the Cabinet
that day. Then Lord Curzon had come to him and told him what
he had just told the Conference. He had felt that it was too
great a responsibility for any two members of the Cabinet to
take, to decide the question raised by Lord Curzon. He had
asked Sir Maurice Hankey to obtain the Prime Minister's view
upon the subject, and Sir Maurice would no doubt communicate
it later. He himself had told Lord Curzon that he appreciated
the reasons in support of the suggested delay in taking
action, but that after hearing the report of the Naval,
Military and Air Staffs that day he had felt very doubtful
whether military considerations would not render it impractic­
able. It might be that the additional time given would
enable the enemy to dig himself in and bring up heavy guns and
reinforcements. He had also asked Lord Curzon whether he
believed Nihad Rechad to be honest, and Lord Curzon had replied
that he thought he was. He did not ask if Nihad Rechad carried
weight with Mustapha Kemal, but he would ask him that question.
He felt the extreme difficulties that any postponement would
create for General Harington. It would give the impression
of hesitating and of the Government saying at one moment that
he was to act, and at the next that he was to delay. Moreover,
he recalled that September 30th had several times been
mentioned as a critical date. What/did not say, though he
felt sure it was principally what was in the Prime Minister's
mind, was that any delay would destroy the confidence of our
representatives at Constantinople, who, on receiving the fresh
instruction, would be much harassed by the succeeding orders
and counter orders.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he had
no doubt at all that Nihad Rechad was in Mustapha Kemal's
confidence, as he had accompanied his representative to London
last March and had obviously been in his confidence also.
When he had asked Nihad Rechad if he was in touch with Mustapha Kemal he had replied that he was. He could not tell, however, whether he exerted any great influence with Mustapha Kemal. Nihad Rechad had said that he could communicate by wireless, and hoped to be able to reach him at 8 o'clock the next morning. He wished to point out that he had not suggested a telegram of a discouraging character; all he had contemplated was that General Harington should be told to allow an additional 24 hours to elapse before taking action. Moreover, everything he had said was subject to a military opinion, and if the military insisted that an additional 24 hours would jeopardise the position it would greatly influence him.

The Lord Chancellor agreed that the considerations Lord Curzon had mentioned required careful examination, but even larger considerations were raised. What new fact had arisen, he asked, since the decision taken that afternoon which would justify a modification of the policy then decided? One of the conclusions reached that morning had been that there should be a very short time limit locally at Chanak. The only question tonight was whether they ought to modify that time limit. He had heard nothing which led him to think it ought to be modified in the slightest degree. If the case had been made that Nihad Rechad had swifter access to Mustapha Kemal than General Harington had, or that Mustapha Kemal had not been in a position to reply to the communications addressed to him, there might be some case for delay. As a matter of fact, however, Mustapha Kemal had had the Allied invitation for the last six days; it was known that he had received the invitation, and he had given no answer whatsoever. There was no reason why he should not have replied that he was satisfied on this or that point but must make qualifications on another, and so forth. But he had done nothing at all. He had received several warnings about the violation of the neutral zone, but he had done nothing but to equivocate, procrastinate and defy us.
somewhat surprised that afternoon when Lord Beatty had said that Mustapha Kemal had received no ultimatum. The Officer Commanding at Chanak had intended to send him an ultimatum but General Harington had stopped it, and he himself had examined the telegrams and to his surprise they confirmed Lord Beatty's statement. One of the telegrams from General Harington said that Mustapha Kemal would be given 48 hours' notice, but there was no evidence that it had ever been sent. He thought, therefore, that Lord Beatty's statement was correct.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that if that was the case he was shocked to hear it. This might slightly weaken the presentation of the case, but it did not alter our fundamental position, which rested on the non-violation of the neutral zone. What was the position today? Mustapha Kemal knew perfectly well the conditions of the Paris offer so far as the neutral zones were concerned. What had he done? He had advanced his troops through the neutral zone right up to our lines, completely ignoring the Paris condition that "In return for this intervention the Government of Angora will undertake not to send troops either before or during the Conference into the zones which had provisionally been neutral", etc. After we had committed ourselves to the Paris Note our troops were now being netted in and blanketed, so that when the time came that they ought to be able to make themselves felt they would not be in a position to do so. In 24 hours new troops would be arriving. He was by no means sure that if we delayed 24 hours the spirit of the troops might not be affected by the insolence of the Turks. He would not whittle down the decision which had been taken, and he had no doubt that Parliament and the public would support the Government if they proceeded with their plan. He was deeply desirous of averting war, and would go to great lengths for this purpose, but he did not think that war would be avoided by weakness of this kind.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he had arrived at the same opinion. He was impressed by the fact that Mustapha Kemal had received the Paris message and had given no reply to it. The impression he got from the account of Lord Curzon's interview with Nihad Rechad was that Nihad had been sent to "blind" London. All the information we had received was in accord with the secret information received that Pared Pasha in Paris had advised Mustapha Kemal not to mind our threats and to bring his troops close alongside ours, in the certainty that he would not be fired at. All indications of Mustapha Kemal's real attitude were to this effect. As regards Mustapha Kemal's suggestion, for example, that the British Government was in collusion with the new Greek Government, he pointed out that there had been no revolution in Greece until two days ago, yet for six days no reply had been received. The Paris Note provided for the non-violation of the neutral zone, yet all the time Mustapha Kemal was pushing up men into it. He regarded Nihad Rechad's statement as probably being for the purpose of blinding us, when Kemal's real object was to get into Thrace. He was inclined to distrust Nihad's suggestions altogether.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said he was convinced that Nihad had not come with any instructions of this kind.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he might be an unconscious agent. For his part, he thought that if the Government indulged in any further delay Mustapha Kemal would get enough men into the neutral zone to blanket us so that our force would be masked from effective action if and when the time came. He would be very sorry to postpone action.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked that the military view might now be heard.

The Lord Chancellor said that, as he conceived it, the soldiers could only tell them as to the effect of the 24 hours' delay.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY added, "And how far the position and moral of the forces at Chanak would be affected by delay?"

THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that, as he read the situation, the ultimatum left the War Office at about 4 p.m. On an average of the time taken by these telegrams it should be reaching General Harington at that very moment (about 11 p.m.). The telegram was a definite, straightforward order. General Harington would at once issue orders to General Marden on the spot. He did not know how long communication with General Marden would take, but it would take General Marden three or four hours to communicate the orders to the troops and to the Turkish local Commander. That would bring the situation up to 4 or 5 a.m. In reply to Lord Curzon, he said there was no day or night in carrying out military orders, and undoubtedly the communication would be made to the Turkish Commander the same night. General Marden could be relied upon to take the quickest possible steps, as the whole tone of the telegram was in that order of ideas. However, it might be 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning before he was ready. A counter order issued now could not, in his view, arrive in time to affect the situation. To issue a counter order after definite operation orders had been issued was fatal and most dangerous. As to the situation opposite the wire, he had not been able to determine whether the Turks were close up to the four miles perimeter of the rain position or to the wire of the outpost line, the existence of which had only been learned that morning. It might be that they were grissling through the wire of this latter line. Every moment's delay meant a larger reinforcement to the enemy, and after tomorrow, when a Battalion of Marines was due to arrive, no further reinforcements would arrive before October 3rd: that is to say, the British forces were at the maximum immediate strength on the morrow.
This was not the case with the Turks, and there might be 5,000 or 6,000 Turks there by this time. The immediate risk, therefore, was that the Turks, whether they were 4,500 or 6,000, would be engaged with 3,500 British Infantry...

It was true that General Marden might be able to withdraw the outposts tonight; probably he would endeavour to do so. If there were a further 24 hours' delay there was a grave danger that the rush of the Turks after the capture of the outpost line might enable the Turks to overwhelm us by force of numbers. In such a situation our own troops and the enemy would be inextricably mixed up, and artillery and machine-gun fire could do very little. The only possible military argument he could think of in favour of delay was the fact that the air fighting squadron, on which a good deal of reliance was placed, could not arrive until tonight or tomorrow. If these aircraft were in action he would feel happier as to the situation. His opinion, however, was that to issue a counter order now would be disastrous.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said he had not suggested a counter order, but merely a delay in giving execution to the order.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL thought that Lord Cavan's opinion was decisive. As Lord Curzon had said, both military and political considerations were involved, and he himself had felt, with Lord Curzon, that it would be right to do everything possible to preserve peace, provided that we did not endanger our troops, but Lord Cavan's statement seemed to leave no doubt of this.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said he had reserved his opinion deliberately until he had heard Lord Cavan, because he thought that military opinion would be decisive on this point. The Government might not be forgiven if it did not make every effort to preserve peace, but they would be still less forgiven if they put our troops in jeopardy. He had
rather expected to hear tonight that there was a new communication from Mustapha Kemal. It transpired, however, that the position was precisely what it had been when the decision was taken that afternoon. In the circumstances, he felt sure the duty of the Government was to adhere to their decision.

The Lord Chancellor said that though he had urged the opposite view to Lord Curzon, he was very glad that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had given an opportunity for this discussion.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said he sympathised most deeply with the Foreign Secretary, who was bound to assure himself, like Sir Edward Grey in 1914, that no stone had been left unturned to preserve peace, and he felt he had the full right to clear his conscience in the matter. After all, it was his duty more than anyone else’s. He agreed, however, in the opinions expressed that it was not physically possible to defer action without the gravest risk. It might upset the whole situation. It would almost certainly make General Haerington feel that he did not know where he was. He would probably say to himself that the Government had "cold feet". Moreover, a counter order issued at the last moment might prove only partially effective. Consequently the Cabinet could not undo what had been done after very careful consideration. He himself, however, did not take a tragic view of the situation, and had by no means lost hope that there might still be a peaceful settlement. He did not think the action to be taken on the morrow would exclude conversations being reopened in a few days’ time. The Turks might scurry off with some loss. He thought it quite possible, however, that this might not result in war. It must be borne in mind that Mustapha Kemal was at war with the Greeks, and his aim was to pursue them into Thrace. So far as he was concerned, the British force at Charak was an
irrelevance. He could hardly believe that Mustapha Kemal wished to embroil himself with us. What Mustapha Kemal thought and what had been dinned into him was that the British could be trampled on and ignored. He might get over that idea if a lesson were given him locally at Chanak. He recalled what had happened in similar circumstances some two and a half years ago, when there had been an operation of this kind. The decision had then had to be taken without consulting the Cabinet. The Nationalists had lost about 100 and we about 15 men, and the incident had closed. He thought, therefore, there was a danger of exaggerating the situation. After all, the Nationalists only had about 80,000 sabres and bayonets in all, and they did not want to lose them fighting us. Moreover, they did not want to waste ammunition. When Mustapha Kemal found he was up against people who would stand up to him, he might change his attitude, and Lord Curzon could then again take up the threads of the peace settlement.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL agreed that it was quite possible this might be the way to avoid trouble, but it was impossible to let off guns without having in mind that greater events might come out of it.

THE LORD CHAMBERLAIN asked Lord Curzon if he differed from the general view?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said he hoped that the decision would prove a right one. He was glad of the reception that had been given to his action in taking what was, he thought, an obvious duty. He still had his apprehension, but he thought the question was decided first by the physical impossibility of communicating, and, second, by Lord Cavan's strong belief that 24 hours, while adding little to our strength, might add considerably to that of the enemy. The course he had proposed, therefore, appeared impracticable, and they could only hope for the best.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, reverting to what Mr Churchill had said as to Chanak being an irrelevance from
Komal's point of view, said he hoped that the Greeks would also be regarded as an irrelevance from our point of view. He felt it was essential that we should not again back up the Greeks.

THE LORD IVY SEAL informed the Conference that the Prime Minister's view accorded with the conclusion which had been reached, namely, that the prospects of securing peace by the proposed delay were not commensurate with the military risks involved.

NOTE. While the Conference was assembling, the First Lord of the Admiralty had read some information received by the Naval Intelligence Department as to the close association by the Soviet Government with the Turkish Nationalists, and with strong indications of support.

The Conference adjourned at 11.30 p.m.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

September 30, 1922.