CONCLUSIONS of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing St., S.W., on Saturday 23rd September, 1922, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister (In the chair)

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne,

The Right Hon. L. Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, M.P.,
Minister of Labour.

The Right Hon. Viscount Birkenhead,
Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. Lord Lee of Fareham,

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood,
Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The following were also present:—

Sir W. G. Tyrrell, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.,
Sir Edward Grigg, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,
C.B.

Lieut.-Col. Sir J. R. Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O. ............ Principal Assistant Secretary, C.I.D.
1. With reference to Cabinet 49/22/2.(k) and to Cabinet Paper C.P.4200, No. 17 containing Mr. Hughes's telegram to the Prime Minister of the 20th September, the Cabinet took note with satisfaction of a telegram received from the Prime Minister of Australia read by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the effect that he was greatly reassured by telegrams received from the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies during the last few days.
The Cabinet instructed the Secretary to call the attention of the Secretary of State for India to the desirability of keeping the Indian Government fully informed as to the situation and as to the Government's policy by means of explanatory telegrams, corresponding to those sent by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Dominions.
3. Considerable stress was laid by the Cabinet on the importance of further publicity to the Government's policy in regard to the situation in the Near East. Resentment was expressed at the attitude of part of the press in throwing on to the British Government the blame for the secrecy which had been preserved in regard to the Prime Minister's statement to the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress on Thursday, September 21st. The Cabinet were informed that in the early part of the meeting before they had heard the Government's case, some of the members of the Deputation had made very extreme speeches threatening strikes and labour difficulties if the Government's policy should lead to war, and that, after hearing the Prime Minister's statement, the members of the Deputation had themselves agreed that in the national interest full publicity was undesirable. The decision not to publish the Report had been taken jointly by both sides.

The Cabinet unanimously approved the proposal of the Prime Minister to see the press the same morning, and make to them a full statement of the Government's policy. Among the points which the Prime Minister was asked to emphasize were the following:

(a) That the British forces at Chanak were merely ensuring the carrying out of the armistice with Turkey which the Turkish Nationalist Forces threatened to break;

(b) That the British attitude was not in the smallest degree based on a desire to take up the cudgels on behalf of Greek interests in Thrace or elsewhere;

(c) That the terms of the Proclamation issued by General Harington warning the Turkish Nationalists to avoid the neutral zone, were the same as those which he had issued when the Greeks were threatening Constantinople;

(d) That/
(d) That the intention of the British Government should be made clear to retain Chanak for the two following essential purposes:

(i) The maintenance of the freedom of the Straits;

(ii) To prevent the war spreading into Europe.
4. With reference to Cabinet 49(22) Conclusion 2(e), the Cabinet had before them the following telegrams received the same morning from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Paris in regard to his conversations with M. Poincare:

1. Lord Hardinge’s telegram No. 472 dated 23rd. September, 1922. (C.P. 4215)

2. The draft of an invitation to the Angora Government to the proposed Peace Conference. (C.P. 4214).

After full discussion the Cabinet agreed:
(a) That as the discussion would occupy some considerable
time the Foreign Office should telephone to Lord
Curzon in Paris warning him that the Cabinet's reply
might not be available by 2 p.m., and should suggest
to him that he should ask M. Poincare to postpone
the meeting until 3 p.m.
(Sir William Tyrrell sent instructions to the
Foreign Office to this effect during the meeting).

(b) That it must be recognised that the policy originally
adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers at the
Paris Peace Conference, according to which the Turks
could not be trusted in future to rule races alien
to them in nationality and religion and should in
future be confined to the government of purely
Turkish peoples, had failed (except so far as related
to the Arab races) owing to various causes. These
causes included more particularly the refusal of
the French to take a mandate for Cilicia; the refusal
of the United States of America to accept a mandate
for Armenia; the withdrawal of the Italians from
Adalia; and the inability of Greece to maintain her
position in Smyrna and the defeat of her army.
In these circumstances it would be advisable to avoid
any phrase which might be construed as committing
the British Government to the moral responsibility
for the inevitable change of policy in regard to
Eastern Thrace, and it would be preferable to face
the facts of the situation by merely stating that
they were prepared at the coming Conference to meet
the desire of the Government of Angora for the return
of Eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkish
sovereignty.

(c) That it should be made perfectly clear that effective
guarantees for the security, protection and the enjoy-
ment by all Nations of the freedom of the waters
between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was in-
dispensable.

(d) That it should also be made clear that adequate
securities were necessary for the protection of racial
and religious minorities generally.
(e) That the two objects in (c) and (d) were both attainable under the League of Nations, whose agency the Government of Angora had already declared their willingness in principle to accept.

(f) To approve the telegram to Lord Curzon reproduced in the Appendix, which was drafted during the meeting and was based on Lord Curzon's draft referred to above modified in accordance with the above considerations; and that the Foreign Office should immediately despatch it to Lord Curzon on behalf of the Cabinet.

(g) That the Foreign Office should also immediately inform Lord Curzon in a separate telegram that in the event of its being found impossible to secure agreement with France and Italy on the British text, the Cabinet considered it would not be injurious to make the above communication separately and directly from Great Britain to the Government of Angora.

(h) To approve a Foreign Office proposal that the Foreign Office should further notify Lord Curzon immediately in a separate telegram that before the Note referred to in (f) was despatched, the assent of Roumania and Serbia should be secured. If France and Italy should definitely decline this, Lord Curzon was to be authorised to yield while recording a protest against a refusal to consult Powers which were so vitally interested.

NOTE. The Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister decided, in addition to the above, that Lord Curzon should be asked, in the event of a failure to reach agreement, to suggest the reference of the whole question to the League of Nations, and the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State for the Colonies undertook to draft a telegram to carry this into effect. The Lord Privy Seal, however, later in the morning reported to the Prime Minister that on reconsideration he and the Secretary of State for the Colonies had felt considerable doubt as to the expediency of suggesting this, as the Council of the League of Nations might very probably be induced by the French Government to insist as a condition of the Conference, that the British forces should leave Chanak, the holding of which the British Government considered vital to securing the freedom of the Straits and the prevention of the war spreading into Europe. The Prime Minister, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was with him, concurred in this view and the telegram was not sent.
5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR informed the Cabinet that the forces now at Chanak consisted of 4 Battalions of Infantry, four 4.5 Howitzers, and four 18 pounder guns.

In view of a telegram from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean read by the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Cabinet, in which Admiral Brock described the difficulties to which the Navy would be subjected in fulfilling its responsibilities unless both sides of the Straits were held. (See Conclusion 7)

The desirability was pointed out of strengthening the Chanak position still further. It was suggested that the relative deficiency of the British forces in numerical strength might be compensated to a considerable extent by increasing their mechanical resources in armament and equipment, and more particularly by augmenting the number of guns on the Gallipoli Peninsula for the defence of Chanak.

In this connection attention was drawn to a telephone message sent by the Prime Minister on the previous afternoon to Sir Maurice Hankey, (Appendix to the Conclusions of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers on September 22nd at 5.30 p.m.) and to the Conclusions reached at that meeting.

The further suggestion was made that if personnel was the difficulty, it might be possible to man an additional number of guns by utilising the more highly trained men for the more technical duties with the medium and heavy artillery, diluting them with less highly skilled men for the less skilled duties.

THE SECRETARY/
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR informed the Cabinet that the Turkish Nationalists were reported to have 215 guns of all calibres, as well as 178 guns captured from the Greeks. Little was known of their supplies of ammunition, but he agreed that these probably could not be on a scale comparable with those employed on the Western Front in the Great War. The War Office he said had telegraphed to General Harington explaining the position, and asking if he would be glad of additional medium and heavy artillery if it could be made available.

The Cabinet agreed:--

That the Committee of Ministers which had met at the Colonial Office on the previous day and was composed of --

The S/S for the Colonies,
The First Lord of the Admiralty,
The S/S for War,
Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary,
with such experts as were required, should meet immediately further to consider the question of the provision of additional medium and heavy artillery for General Harington's Command.
6. The attention of the Cabinet was called to a telegram from the Exchange Telegraph Company's representative in Athens published in the "Daily Telegraph" of even date, which recorded the visit of a Commission of French Officers accompanied by a high Turkish officer to Chanak to inspect the war material concentrated there in 1920 by the Inter-Allied Commission charged with the disarmament of Turkey, which war material it was alleged was under the protection of a Greek military detachment.

The Cabinet requested the —

Secretary of State for War to make enquiries as to whether there was any truth in the allegation that this war material was under the protection of a Greek military detachment.
7. THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY read to the Cabinet the attached telegram from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean regard to the difficulty of fulfilling the responsibilities devolving upon him in the event of an advance by the Kemalists forces, if the Asiatic shores of the Straits are not held by the Allies.

*Not yet received from the Admiralty.*
COPY OF TELEGRAM.
From C-in-C Medn. Constantinople.
To— Admiralty.

Cypher F D

385 Your 960 Part two. This difficulty is realised but the only alternative to Golden Horn is Biyuk Chekmejo and I have not got the forces at my disposal to do this. In any case it will be impossible to clear the masses of vessels already in the Golden Horn which extends for several miles. When Asiatic shore is in hands of Kemalists presumably Constantinople will shortly be so too and removal of craft was only intended to have delaying effect on movement of troops and crossing could only be prevented so long as enemy guns were not in a position to shell ships working in Bosphorus. Counter battery fire does not exist. I will of course use my utmost endeavour hold Bosporus after military have evacuated it, order to but as in my opinion naval action will not be effective and the fall of Constantinople would be a matter of time. Even supposing all transport in Bosphors and Golden Horn could be taken away and the Bosphorus closed transport of troops from Nationalist Black Sea ports to Thrace could only be prevented by basing a force on Constanza this force would be isolated and I do not recommend this measure. Even if this was done transport could be extemporised in Bosporus itself in a few days. With regard to (b) embarkation of existing troops and reinforcements expected can be carried out by destroyers and ferry steamers which will be taken up if not too long delayed. Finally if Kemalis attack Isumd front in force only practical policy from naval and military point of view is to retire to Gallipoli and Chanak holding the Balaire line and keeping Straits open for ships to operate in Naromara. If Chanak is lost Straits could still be kept open provided counter battery fire is available on Gallipoli. Effective General Harrington has seen this and entirely concurs. He is confident however of holding Chanak.
COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From: Cein-C Medn., Constantinople.

Date: 22.9.22.

Sent: 9.26pm.

Recd: 12.58am. 23

To: Admiralty.

Cypher F D

384. Your 959 Part one Dardanelles. Transport consists
of a number of caiques of various sizes mostly concentrated on
Chanak. Vessels are forbidden to be under weigh by night and
are seized if discovered to disobey order. When Kemalists
cross neutral line all transport will be removed to European
side this can be done in a few hours. Marmora. Transport
consists of a few steamers and many caiques at the various ports
Captain D 7th D F. with 4 destroyers at Pasha Liman watch coast
from Gemlik to Chardak with orders to turn back any craft
carrying troops regulars or irregulars. Clearances to Marmora
nationalist ports are being refused at Constantinople and
Chanak. Unlikely that Kemalists will take this route to
 Thrace when Kemalists cross neutral line transport will be
sunk or collected at Pasha Liman this would take 2 or 3 days
depending on destroyers available. Bosphorus packed with many
hundreds of craft of all descriptions and sizes. No measures
taken at present to interfere with traffic at request of
military and diplomatic chiefs. If it is intended to hold
Constantinople and Ismail Peninsula all these craft could be
-driven into Golden Horn when kemalists commit hostile action.
This would take severely days and would severely upset life
of community. Ferry service to islands is a special source
of anxiety as these craft would make excellent transports
and Kemalists have been seen in (corrupt) ferry steamers. I am
watching these steamers carefully. Black Sea which is not
mentioned in Admy message is a difficult matter. Two
destroyers are now watching Thracian coast as it is reported
that motor caiques are transporting small bodies troops from
Ineboli and other ports to Bulgaria. Situation in Chanak.
Your (b) At Chanak ships are stationed for affording support
to military and ground lends itself to this help. Navy can
prevent Kemalists crossing from Asia to Europe in Marmora and
Dardanelles provided that in the latter case military can keep
batteries back from the shore by counter battery work. Guns
in Gallipoli are the most urgent need of the moment. The
Turkish Medn. seaboard will be watched too when vessels
available but this route is improbable. Part two follows.

1750.
TELEGRAM.

From

To

R A 3rd L C Sq.

No. 436

DATE 21.9.22.

Sent 2320.

Cypher G.D.

436. Re your 2049 of 20th Sept. Request confirmation that Kemal is in fact permitting refugees except men of military age to be evacuated how and that evacuation can continue up to 30th Sept.

D O D

EGT
8. The Cabinet took note of the following:

(a) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Monday, September 18th, 1922 at 12 Noon. (Appendix I).

(b) Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers held on Monday, September 18th, 1922 at 5 p.m. (Appendix II).

(c) Conclusions reached by a Conference of Ministers on Tuesday, September 19th, 1922 at 11 a.m. (Appendix III).

(d) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on September 20th, 1922 at 6.30 p.m. (Appendix IV).

(e) Conclusions reached by a Conference of Ministers held on Wednesday, September 20th, 1922 at 9.30 p.m. (Appendix V).

(f) Conclusions reached at a Conference of Ministers held on Thursday, 21st September, 1922 at 12.45 p.m. (Appendix VI).

All the above Conferences have reference to the situation in the Near East.
REVISED DRAFT OF INVITATION TO ANGORA GOVERNMENT.

(As suggested to Lord Curzon by the Cabinet on 23rd September 1922).

British, and French Foreign Ministers and Italian Ambassador in Paris desire to invite Mustapha Kemal to come himself or the Grand National Assembly of Angora to send a representative with full powers to a meeting at Venice or elsewhere to which will also be invited plenipotentiary representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Greece. The meeting will be held as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made by Italian government and the other governments concerned. Its object will be to negotiate and draw up the final treaty of peace between the allied powers and Turkey and thus among other things to mediate a settlement of the outstanding points in dispute between Greece and Turkey.

The British, French and Italian governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of declaring that they are prepared at the coming conference to meet the desire of the government of Angora for the return of Eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkish sovereignty. These efforts will be directed in this matter only to secure guarantees for the protection of the interests of the neighbouring states, and the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority. It will be necessary, however, for the conference to reach agreement upon two further points: first, effective guarantees are indispensable for the security and protection for the enjoyment by all nations of the freedom of the waters between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea; secondly, adequate securities are necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities generally.
Both these objects are attainable under the League of Nations whose agency the government of Angora have already declared there willingness in principle to accept. The allied governments re-affirm the assurances which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople upon the entering into force of the treaty of peace.

The allied powers are prepared while the arrangements for the Venice conference are being made to use all their influence to the procure the withdrawal of Greek forces behind the line of the Maritsa provided always that the government of Angora undertake pending and during the peace conference not to enter the neutral zone or to attempt to cross the Sea of Marmora.

For the above purpose a meeting could be arranged without delay between the allied generals and Mustapha or Kemal at Mudania or Ismid.
The Conference agreed:

(a) That the Admiralty shall send a further telegram to the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, notifying him that the Navy is responsible for preventing, as far as lies within its power, the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces from Asia into Europe, and giving him authority to take all steps which he deems necessary for the fulfilment of this obligation.

(b) That the War Office should take the following steps:

(i) Prepare for embarkation and order the necessary shipping transport for the experimental brigade at Aldershot, composed of two battalions of Guards, one Battalion Rifle Brigade, and one Battalion Royal Fusiliers. This should be subject to possible suspension of action by the Government if circumstances should render this desirable;

(ii) Subject to a favourable reply to a telegram already sent to Egypt, arrange for the early despatch to General Harington's Command of a brigade of field artillery from Egypt, as well as of two regiments of Cavalry, and two Batteries Pack Artillery;

(iii) Consult Lord Allenby as to whether he can permit two Battalions of infantry to proceed forthwith to Constantinople on the understanding that these battalions will be replaced at the earliest possible moment by Battalions on home service establishment;

(iv) Send 9·2" howitzers to General Harington for use at Gallipoli, if this is found to be feasible, and suggest to General Harington the immediate preparation of sites for their reception;

(v) Enquire from General Harington whether the Turkish guns and howitzers in the Gallipoli Peninsula have yet been destroyed, and invite him in the contrary event to consider whether they could be used to assist in maintaining the passage of the Straits or, alternatively, whether the guns and their ammunition should now be destroyed;

(vi) Send to General Harington's Command additional medium artillery (if any) that can be spared from Malta or Gibraltar.

(c) To take note of and approve the despatch at the end of the present week by the Admiralty to Constantinople of a force of 1,000 Royal Marines.
(d) That the Air Ministry should immediately prepare and arrange shipping for and, if General Harington desires it, should despatch a squadron of bombing aeroplanes from England to Constantinople, in addition to the two squadrons and the naval aircraft for which arrangements are already being made under Cabinet authority. Immediate steps to be taken to consult General Harington as to whether he requires this additional squadron.

(e) That the First Sea Lord, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff should meet at 3.0 p.m. the same afternoon, and report to the Conference at 5.0 p.m. on the following questions:

(i) The power of the Navy to secure the passage of warships, transports, and other shipping through the Dardanelles in the event of the loss by the Allies of the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, while they still hold the Gallipoli Peninsula. Special consideration to be given to the appreciation sent to the Admiralty in June, 1921 by Admiral de Roebuck after consultation with the military authorities at Constantinople.

(ii) The present position as to the reinforcement of the naval, military and aerial forces at the Dardanelles.
(f) That the Admiralty should ascertain as soon as possible from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, first, what reply has been given to Mustapha Kemal to the request of the Allied Senior Naval Officers at Smyrna, conveyed by the Italian Admiral, that Greek merchant shipping may be permitted to enter Smyrna for the purpose of taking away refugees; second, whether British shipping will be allowed to enter the port for this purpose; and third whether he knows of any British ships in the vicinity that could be utilised for the transport of refugees. This information, when received, to be passed on to the Board of Trade.

(g) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should inform the Greek Government that the British Government are concerned at the position of refugees at Smyrna; that the Allied Admirals are making the application referred to above in (f); that, if Greek ships are not allowed to proceed to Smyrna, the British Government propose to make arrangements for British ships to go there for the purpose of bringing away refugees, if permitted; and obtain assurances from the Greek Government that the refugees will be permitted to land on the mainland or islands of Greece.

(h) That the Board of Trade should make inquiries as to what British shipping can be made available for the transport of refugees from Smyrna and on what terms, in order that, if and when action is decided on, it may be taken as effectually and as economically as possible.

(i) To reserve the question of financial assistance to Smyrna refugees for further consideration. The Treasury to make inquiries as to what was done in the comparatively recent case of refugees from Russia.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.

16th September, 1922.
CONCLUSIONS OF A CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS
held on Monday, 18th September, 1922
at 5.0 p.m. in regard to the position
at Constantinople.

The Conference agreed :-

(a) That the Secretary of State for War should notify to General Harington particulars of the various reinforcements - naval, military, and aerial - which are being sent, together with the dates on which they should arrive.

(b) That the Secretary of State for War should send a personal telegram (whether as part of the telegram referred to in (a) or as a separate telegram) to General Harington, expressing high appreciation of the General's conduct and attitude in his present situation heartening him by reference to the reinforcements being sent out by the Government, and giving him discretion to make such propaganda at Constantinople as he thinks expedient regarding the anticipated reinforcements to the fleet, army and air force, bearing in mind the importance at the present moment of a demonstration designed to prevent fighting no less than of the actual increase in power.

(c) That the Admiralty should reinforce the fleet in the Mediterranean by :-

(i) three capital ships,
(ii) submarines.

(d) That the War Office should send a Field Company R.E., and additional medical personnel in addition to the reinforcements already approved. The War Office to consider whether this Company can be ready to sail with the detachment of 1,000 Royal Marines to be despatched on Friday next, September 22nd.

(e) That the Air Ministry should prepare a fourth squadron of aeroplanes, which should be ready to follow, within a few days, the third of the squadrons already under orders.
(f) That in view of reports received at the Admiralty that Bolshevik submarines and submarine chasers and mine-layers are to be placed at the disposal of the Turkish Nationalists, the Admiralty should inform the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that any such craft appearing in the Straits should be attacked; that any such craft approaching the Straits on the surface from the Black Sea under the Russian flag, should be warned off; and that, in the event of risk to any Allied ship from the approach of any such craft encountered in the Black Sea or Straits, it should be sunk. It was not deemed expedient to warn the Soviet Government at present of these intentions.
That in order to ensure that there is no ambiguity regarding the right of the Allied Military Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople to take action in the event of the violation of the neutral zone by Mustapha Kenan's forces, so that the delaying action of the Navy and Air Forces on a force approaching the Allied positions at Chanak and Mal Tepe may be utilised to the full, the following measures should be taken:

(i) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople to enquire as to whether and when and in what terms the joint declaration was made by the Allied High Commissioner warning Mustapha Kenal that the neutral zone of the Straits must be respected by his troops (Cabinet 49 (22) (j)).

(ii) That the High Commissioner should also be instructed to confer with General Harington as to whether any further communication is necessary.

(iii) That the War Office should inform General Harington of the above communications to Sir Horace Rumbold and should give him corresponding instructions to confer with the High Commissioner as to what further communication is necessary in order to warn Mustapha Kenal that his forces will be liable to attack if they cross the neutral zone. The War Office should explain to General Harington that the First Sea Lord has advised the Cabinet that the Navy in conjunction with the Air Force, can probably deter and delay, though not prevent, the approach to the Allied positions of heavy artillery along roads within reach of the coast, and that it is desired that there should be no ambiguity as to the circumstances in which this power can be utilised.
(b) That the War Office (G.M.G.) should be authorised to purchase the shipping stores required for the troops to be moved to the Near East.

(1) To take note that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was leaving on the following day for Paris to visit M. Poincare.

(i) That Sir Edward Grigg should see the representatives of the Press on the subject of developments in the Near East, and should be careful -

(i) to make it clear that he was not issuing an official communiqué, and

(ii) to avoid any statement which might in any way make difficulties for Lord Carson at Paris.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
18th September, 1922.
The Conference agreed:

(a) That the reply of the Newfoundland Government indicating their support to the attitude taken up by the British Government should be published.

(b) That the Secretary of State for the Colonies should draft for the Prime Minister a telegram to be sent by the latter to the Prime Minister of Canada in reply to a telegram received from him. The reply should be to the effect that the British Government has not itself yet judged the situation to be sufficiently serious to justify the summoning of Parliament, and therefore cannot advise the Canadian Government to do so, but that, if the necessity should arise to summon the British Parliament, the Canadian Government will at once be notified in order that they may consider whether they should do the same. The telegram should give the Canadian Government information as to the situation, and should invite them to consider whether, without offering a detachment, they could issue a statement associating themselves generally with the policy of the British Government in regard to the crisis in the Near East.

(c) To take note with deep satisfaction of the telegram from the New Zealand Government offering to send a force to Gallipoli, and asking for specific instructions.

(d) To take note that the warning of the High Commissioners to Mustapha Kemal against violating the neutral zone of the Straits will be sent to-day.

(e) That the arrangement of a definite Peace Conference for the reconsideration of the Treaty of Sevres is preferable to the holding of a preliminary Conference, though this is subject to what may result from Lord Curzon's forthcoming conversation with M. Poincaré.

(f) That the Foreign Office should at once ask the British Ambassador in Paris to ascertain whether there is any truth in the following reports which have appeared in the British press:

(i) that the French Government have ordered their troops to evacuate Chanak, if not the Ismid Peninsula also;

(ii) that Mustapha Kemal has replied that he has no intention of attacking any neutral zone occupied by Allied forces.

(Orderes were given by Lord Curzon during the Meeting for a message to this effect to be sent by telephone.)
That Lord Curzon in Paris should do his utmost to induce the French Government to co-operate in holding the neutral zone on the Asiatic side of the Straits until the Conference meets.

That the War Office should telegraph to General Harington with reference to Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram drawing attention to the rumours that the French will not co-operate in forcibly opposing the violation of the neutral zone on the Asiatic side of the Straits by Mustapha Kemal, and inviting the General to state what dispositions he contemplated in the event of our finding it impossible to change the French attitude. The War Office were asked to invite General Harington to bear in mind that the command of the Dardanelles is vital, and in addition that reinforcements are on their way.

To take note that the instructions already sent by the Admiralty to the naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean already answer in the affirmative the question raised by the latter (in a telegram which crossed the latest instructions), as to whether he is to prevent the occupation by the Turkish Nationalists of the islands in the Sea of Marmora.

That the Admiralty should inform the naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean in reply to his request for instructions, that it would be premature at present to establish a partial blockade, or otherwise to control shipping to ports in Asia Minor for the purpose of intercepting possible supplies of war material to the Turkish nationalist forces.

To take note that, according to Admiralty information, dispositions have already been made by the naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean for watching the Pandara coast roads leading to Chanak. (No information was given as to the roads on the Mediterranean side of Chanak (Gulf of Adramyti)).

To take note of a statement by the First Sea Lord to the effect that, if given carte blanche in sufficient time to control all transport (not overlooking possible Russian transport) and thus to prevent any movement by water, the navy could command the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, Bosporus and Black Sea, and prevent the Turkish Nationalists crossing into Europe, even though the Ismid Peninsula or Chanak was no longer held by the Allies.

That Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, should accompany Lord Curzon to Paris.
The Conference agreed:

(a) That the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff should meet at once and report later in the evening to the Conference their views as to the military policy to be adopted in regard to the defence of Chanak and Ismid.

(b) That, in view of the critical military situation at Chanak, the arrangements for shipping from Egypt the reinforcements in that country under orders for the Constantinople area should be expedited, and that with this object, the Secretary should summon representatives of the Shipping Department of the Board of Trade to attend a meeting to be held later the same evening.

(c) That there is no immediate necessity for issuing the emergency proclamation for the requisitioning of shipping (C.P. 4199). The arrangement concerted between the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Board of Trade, whereby the emergency proclamation has been sent to Lord Stamfordham, to be kept with other emergency proclamations which accompany the King wherever he goes, was approved.

(d) That in regard to Lord Balfour's telegram (Geneva No. 37) stating that Dr. Nansen proposed in accordance with Art. 11 of the Covenant that the Council of the League of Nations should consider the feasibility of offering its good offices to the belligerents, with a view to the cessation of hostilities, the Foreign Office should telephone at once to Lord Curzon in Paris that the Cabinet considered it essential that a communication should be made to Lord Balfour that there was no objection to Dr. Nansen's resolution.

(e) That in reply to a further telegram (No. 370) from the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean requesting definite permission to sink the Goeben and the Turkish warships in the Golden Horn as soon as reliable information is received that the Kemalist forces have entered the neutral zone, or taken hostile action against the British forces, the Admiralty should reply to the effect that the Cabinet's intention, as previously notified, was that the Goeben should be dealt with if necessary, so as to prevent her from moving her position or undertaking hostile action; that the Cabinet had again examined the question and considered that the Goeben should not be sunk unless this was unavoidable; but the Commander-in-Chief was, of course, authorised to sink the
Goeben if he considered it the only step to prevent her becoming a naval menace; and that the same applied to all other Turkish warships.

(f) That Sir Edward Grigg should publish the gist of information already furnished to Lord Curzon by the Secretary of State for War, contradicting the statements of Turkish Nationalists that Chanak had been occupied by the Greeks and giving the full facts as to its occupation by forces representing the Allies since the armistice.

(g) That the First Lord of the Admiralty should immediately place himself in communication with the Chiefs of Staff of the three services (who had already left the meeting in accordance with Conclusion (e) above) with a view to reporting to the Conference of Ministers later in the evening as to the practicability and political expediency of naval action for hampering the approach of Turkish Nationalist forces (more especially artillery) to the position held by the British forces at Chanak.

(h) To meet again at 9.30 p.m. the same evening when it was hoped that the situation would be enlightened by the receipt of further information from Lord Curzon and when the joint report of the Chiefs of Staff would be available. Sir William Tyrrell was instructed to do his best to obtain a report from Paris.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1
21st September, 1922
CONCLUSIONS reached by a Conference of Ministers 
held on Wednesday, September 20th, 1922  
at 9.30 p.m.  
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The Conference agreed:-

(a) That Sir William Tyrrell should send on their behalf a telegram to Lord Curzon in Paris expressing their gratification with the results of his conversations that day with M. Poincaré, as reported at the outset of the meeting, and more especially with the firm language in which he had expressed the views of the Cabinet;

(b) That the progress reported by Lord Curzon did not diminish the importance of continuing the exertions of the Conference and of the appropriate Departments to expedite the transport of the reinforcements to General Harington already decided on;

(c) That the representatives of the Board of Trade (to whom the situation was personally explained during the meeting) should at once consult their experts and report as soon as possible as to what steps would be taken to expedite the transport of the land and air forces under orders to proceed from Egypt to General Harington's command; These forces consisted of:

- 2 battalions of infantry,
- 2 pack batteries (120 guns per battery)
- 2 medium batteries,
- 1 regiment of Cavalry.

The Conference desired that the infantry and the guns should be despatched without being delayed for horses which should follow as soon as possible, though the mules of the pack batteries were to be sent with the guns if possible,

(d) To approve the action already taken by the Secretary of State for War in chartering a special ship in order to expedite by several days the despatch of one of the battalions under orders to proceed from Great Britain to General Harington's command.

(e) That, in regard to the offer made to General Harington of 20,000 Greeks, inhabitants of Constantinople, to assist in defence, and his intention to take everyone who might come to his side if an outbreak occurs (General Harington's telegram No. 2323 last part), the War Office should inform the General of the Cabinet's view that, if circumstances render the acceptance of this assistance desirable, the services of these men should not be utilised as Greeks, but as citizens of Constantinople and that the services of as many citizens of other nationalities as can be obtained, should be utilised at the same time, in order to give a civic character to any such force.
(f) That in view of the report made by the First Lord after consultation with and in the presence of the Chiefs of Staffs of the three Services regarding the extent to which the Navy and the Air Force can hamper, within the neutral zone on the Chanak side of the Dardanelles, the approach of the nationalist forces to Chanak, and in view of Lord Curzon's undertaking that no provocative steps should be taken, the Admiralty should instruct the naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean that, pending an actual state of hostilities with the Turkish Nationalists, they should not be fired on outside the neutral zone and, though the road along the Gulf of Adramyti can be watched, no hostile action should be taken against any Turkish forces there.

(g) That the Foreign Office should immediately transmit to Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, particulars of the results of Lord Curzon's conversations in Paris;

(h) That, in regard to the portion of Lord Balfour's telegram of September 19th (Geneva telegram No. 37) dealing with the question of Greek refugees from Smyrna, the Foreign Office should reply to the following effect:

(i) That in the present state of affairs at Constantinople, no Greeks refugees should be allowed to proceed to that city, where there is no room for their accommodation, where their arrival might be regarded as provocative and might cause an outbreak. The proper country for their reception is Greece and the Greek islands;

(ii) Recapitulating the steps already taken by the British Government with a view to the transport of the Smyrna refugees to Greece and the Greek islands, preferably in Greek ships, or if permission for this is refused by the Turkish Nationalists, in British ships, as well as the representations made to the Greek Government to ensure their reception;

(iii) Concurring in the preliminary recommendations of the fifth Committee of the Assembly to recommend that the Council should place 100,000 gold francs at Dr. Nansen's disposal for administrative measures, and empowering Lord Balfour to co-operate in larger relief expenditure, not exceeding a maximum of £50,000, on condition that other Powers will incur an equal expenditure with Great Britain.
That full information as to the development of the situation in the Near East must be sent daily to the Dominions. That the Secretary of State for the Colonies should organise the necessary staff arrangements for ensuring this and that in particular, he should prepare a suitable reply to the telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia dated 20th September, No.17, C.P.1230.

That the War Office should send to General Harington as from the Cabinet, a telegram to the following effect:

Informing him that a summary of the political situation as disclosed by Lord Curzon's discussions at Paris was being telegraphed separately to Sir Horace Rumbold; that this would indicate the importance of any action which might unnecessarily precipitate hostilities; that a revised programme of troop movements, showing the earliest possible date at which the reinforcements, which the Government were expediting, could arrive, was being telegraphed; that both these telegrams should be borne in mind in considering this message. That the Cabinet thought it desirable for General Harington's guidance, and subject to his better judgement, to set forth the relative importance that was attached to the various positions committed to his charge. That the foundation of British policy in that region was the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. It was of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively for this. Apart from its military importance, Chanak had now become a point of great moral significance to the prestige of the Empire. It would be regarded as a valuable achievement if it could be held. A blow at Chanak would be a blow at Great Britain alone, whereas, Constantinople and Ismid were of international consequence, affecting the whole of the Allies. In comparison with Chanak, the Cabinet regarded Constantinople as second and Ismid as third. The Kemalists would probably not attack the Ismid position. Should they do so and reach the Bosphorus, the Admiralty had declared that they could still prevent the transport into Europe of the Nationalist army. If they bombarded Pera, the Navy could retaliate on some convenient Turkish area. The Ismid Peninsula was regarded by the Cabinet as at once the most difficult to hold and if lost, as the least fatal. At the proper moment it might be well that General Harington should withdraw his troops from Ismid and even from Constantinople to Chanak, thus securing the latter position on an adequate front and in good time. The Cabinet had sufficient confidence in the General's judgment as to whether and when such a concentration at Chanak should be made. Should he decide on the above considerations
"(1) That the Admiralty should be authorised to notify the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that measures to prevent the transport of Turkish Nationalist forces to the Marmara Islands or to the European Shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmara should not be regarded as provocative action."
and in all the circumstances that there was a good chance of holding Chanak for two or three weeks, the Cabinet would cordially approve such a decision. The decision in regard to mobilisation of the two Divisions at home was being deferred until the development of the next phase in the situation. General Harington was authorised through the High Commissioner to make to Mustapha Kemal any notification that might be necessary with the object of securing Chanak. For example, he could warn him against entering the neutral zone in this region, and that, should he do so, he would be fired on if he used the roads along the sea coast to approach the positions held by General Harington's troops. The form and scope of such warning was left to the General. General Harington was to take all the above as a guide rather than as an instruction as the Cabinet had the utmost confidence in his comprehension of the whole position. He was instructed to show a copy of the telegram to the Naval Commander-in-Chief. (Paraphrase of telegram actually sent).

(x) The Foreign Office were instructed to transmit the above telegram immediately to Lord Curzon in Paris.

2, Whitehall Gardens,  S.W.1
21st September, 1922.
CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT A CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS held on THURSDAY, 21st September, 1922, at 12:45 p.m.

The Conference agreed:

(a) That in reply to the telephone message of even date from Lord Curzon (CP.4203) giving his views as to the position he should take up in regard to the Conference, the Foreign Office should send a telegram which was drawn up and approved at the meeting and which was to the following effect:

The Cabinet would give Lord Curzon full latitude to approach the questions of Thrace and Constantinople on the lines of his telegram, subject to the following considerations in regard to the Straits. The Cabinet considered the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles to be an integral part of the problem of the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits. The same regime, therefore, as is adopted in the case of Gallipoli should also be adopted in the case of an agreed zone on the Asiatic side of the Straits. The Cabinet did not consider sufficient demilitarisation combined with occasional visits. The Cabinet would not object to the presence of Russia at the Conference if desired by the Kemalists.

(b) That in reply to Lord Balfour’s telegrams regarding the proposed intervention of the League of Nations in the Eastern question, the Foreign Office should send a telegram to Lord Balfour to the effect that Lord Curzon’s telegram the previous day approving the resolution to be moved at the Sixth Commission was being sent in consultation with and with the full approval of the Cabinet; that the Cabinet would cordially welcome the assistance of the League of Nations in securing a peaceful settlement and that they therefore hoped that Lord Balfour would support the resolution to be moved. The Foreign Office should repeat this telegram to Lord Curzon in Paris.

(c) To take note of a letter from His Majesty The King to the Prime Minister which gave much pleasure to his Ministers.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

21st September, 1922.