CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1920, at 12 Noon.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.


The Right Hon. S. Shortt, K.C., IMP., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. G. Addison, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.


The Right Hon. T. J. Macnamara, LL.D., M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, M.P., President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries.


The following were also present:

Lieut.-Colonel Sir M.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary.
Mr R.B. Howorth, Assistant Secretary.
(1) With reference to his Note (Paper C.P.-1901) covering a letter from Sir John Bradbury with enclosure relative to the Spa Coal Advances, the Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the Cabinet that the French Government had now decided to confirm the arrangements unanimously reached by a Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission with Herr Bergmann, under which, inter alia, the bonds to be deposited by the German Government in respect of the advances made by the Allies upon coal deliveries were to be repayable on the 31st May, 1921, with permission to Germany to apply for two half-yearly renewals enabling her to defer actual repayment to the 1st May, 1922.

NOTE. Since the meeting of the Cabinet, fresh difficulties have arisen (see Telegrams which have passed between the Treasury and Sir John Bradbury - Appendix I).

(2) With reference to Cabinet 50 (20), Conclusion 17, the Cabinet had before them the following documents relating to the resumption of trade with Russia:

(a) Note by the Secretary, Cabinet (Paper C.P.-1880).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Paper C.P.-1897).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Paper C.P.-1898).
Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Paper C.P.-1899).

(b) Military Stores for Poland and Russia.
Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (Paper C.P.-1890).

The Cabinet decided to postpone the consideration of the questions raised in these Papers, but agreed --

That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should forthwith send a telegram to the Soviet Government demanding the immediate release of the British prisoners still retained in Russia, and stating that if the prisoners were not released no resumption of trade was possible, and that it would be necessary for the British Government to consider what further action must be taken.
The Cabinet were informed that it had been decided to present over 1,000 medals to persons in Allied and Neutral States in recognition of services of various kinds rendered by them during the war, including assistance to British prisoners and others. The Foreign Office, which had to distribute the medals, did not consider the design of the medal, which represented a nude male figure, as suitable for the purpose.

The Cabinet, after viewing the design for the medal, unanimously agreed —

That the design was quite unsuitable.

With reference to Cabinet 51 (20), Conclusion 5, the question was raised as to the expediency, in view of the recent revelations, of continuing to insert in the "Daily Herald" Government advertisements, particularly those of the National War Savings Committee.

It was explained that, in the view of the War Savings Committee, the advertisements resulted in money being invested in war savings which would not otherwise be obtained, and that to withdraw the advertisements might lead the Labour Party to take a hostile attitude towards the war savings movement.

It was agreed —

That the advertisements should be withdrawn after the existing contract has expired.
The Cabinet were informed by the President of the Board of Trade that he had no further information as to the probable outcome of the meeting between the Executive of the Miners' Federation and the Miners' Delegates this morning.

It was pointed out that the present attitude of the men amounted to a demand for the additional 2/- on the present rate of output, and that it was very desirable to get away from the expression "datum line," which was confusing to the public.

Attention was drawn to the fact that after the Executive of the Miners' Federation had requested that the normal practice should be followed of only publishing agreed statements, an ex parte version of what had taken place at the meetings with the owners had appeared in the Press.

It was agreed —

That the President of the Board of Trade would be justified in communicating, if he thought fit, with the Miners' Executive with a view to the publication of the documents relating to prices and output, which had been presented by the parties to the dispute.
(6) With reference to Cabinet 52 (20), Conclusion 3, the Cabinet had under consideration a Memorandum by the Minister of Labour (paper C.P.-100) respecting the very great hardship which the ex-Service men, who had exhausted their right to donation, will experience between now and the time when the various plans for the employment of ex-Service men, now being considered by the Housing Committee and the Unemployment Committee of the Cabinet, may be expected to become operative, and suggesting that, as public opinion would not support the Government in referring such men to the Poor Law, authority should be given for the prolongation of the 6 weeks of the third extension by a further period of 6 weeks, to be drawn not later than the 8th November, at an estimated cost to the Exchequer not exceeding £250,000.

On the one hand it was urged that, at the present time, when a great strike was threatened, it would be most undesirable that there should be a large number of ex-Service men in a destitute condition, forming a discontented nucleus which might be utilised by the extremists in any serious industrial troubles, and that pending the acceptance by the Government of the recommendations of the Housing and Unemployment Committees it was very desirable that provision should be made which would keep the men out of the workhouse.

On the other hand, the Cabinet were reminded that, on the last occasion when the matter was before them, it had been generally agreed that further extensions of donation were undesirable, and that if such extensions were found necessary they should be limited to men with satisfactory military records. To accept the Ministry of Labour proposals would create a new precedent, since the proposals involved giving the men an extension of benefit for the whole period. It was accordingly urged that any extension should be limited to the men with satisfactory military records, and, moreover, should be given at the rate of 15/-, which was the amount payable
under the new Insurance Act, and not at the 20/- rate.

After some further discussion, in which it appeared that the Ministry of Labour would not be in a position to distinguish between the deserving and undeserving ex-service men before the 8th November next, and that the Ministry were considering proposals for enabling the ex-service men who had been unemployed to obtain benefits on the lines of the Insurance Act from November 8th next, the Cabinet, in order to tide over the difficulties of the next few weeks, agreed—

(a) To accept the proposals contained in the Minister of Labour's Memorandum (Paper C.P.-1903) that the eight weeks of the third extension of Donation should be prolonged by a further period of six weeks, the Donation to be drawn not later than November 6th;

(b) That the Minister of Labour should submit his proposals for the special benefit as soon as possible, with a view to their early consideration by the Cabinet.

With reference to Cabinet 37 (20), Appendix I (7) (b), the Cabinet were informed that the question of the future of the Aaland Islands was under consideration by the League of Nations, which had decided that it was competent to investigate the matter and proposed that in the first instance the investigation should be entrusted to a Commission which would advise the Council of the League as to the decision. The Council was at present considering the personnel of the Commission, and the Secretary-General had made informal enquiries as to whether the British Government would have any objection to the nomination by the Council of a distinguished British statesman to the Commission.

It was pointed out that, to serve any useful purpose, the Commission must be a strong one, comprising representatives of several of the principal Powers, and that the representatives should be persons of very high authority. On the other hand, it was felt that it would be better if Great Britain was not mixed up in this highly contentious matter, and that such responsibility as this country had already incurred by urging that the question should be
Referring to the League of Nations, it would be increased if a leading part on the proposed Commission was taken by a British representative.

After some discussion, in which it was suggested that Lord Puckraster would be a suitable British representative, it was agreed:

That the Secretary to the Cabinet should communicate with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, informing him that, in the view of the Cabinet, efforts should be made to persuade an American jurist to sit on the Commission, and that in any event the Cabinet were in favour of an English representative unless a French representative of equal distinction was also appointed.

With reference to Cabinet 51 (20), Conclusion 3, the Cabinet were informed that answers had now been received from Canada and Australia refusing to entertain the proposal that those Dominions should raise Battalions for foreign service, but that New Zealand had not only replied offering to provide a Battalion but also agreeing to pay for the troops so provided.

It was agreed that it would be undesirable to accept the New Zealand offer if the other Dominions took a different line.

The Cabinet agreed:

That, if the War Office concurred, the Secretary of State for the Colonies should send a very cordial message of thanks to the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand, adding that His Majesty's Government do not propose to pursue the matter further.

The attention of the Cabinet was drawn by the Prime Minister to a telegram which he had received from General Smuts saying that, if it would in any way assist in a solution of the difficulties in Ireland, he would be prepared to publish a suggestion that the responsible leaders of Irish opinion should make an appeal for the reference of the Irish Question to the Imperial Cabinet, and that, pending the next meeting of that body, a truce should be observed.
It was agreed —

That the Cabinet should consider the suggestion, with a view to early consideration of the reply which must be sent to General Smuts within a few days.

THE SITUATION IN IRELAND.

Reprisals.

PROPOSED PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

(10) The Cabinet were informed that the Irish Executive were coming to London on the following day to discuss the question of Reprisals.

(11) With reference to Cabinet 48 (20), Conclusion 1, the Cabinet had before them a Note by the Secretary (Paper C.F.-1902) covering a letter from the Foreign Office, dated September 20, 1920, relative to the draft scheme for the institution of a permanent Court of International Justice. In the view of the Foreign Office it was desirable that a small Committee should be appointed to consider and report upon the scheme and to advise whether or not it should be accepted by His Majesty's Government.

The Cabinet also had before them a Memorandum by the Attorney-General (Paper C.F.-1905) criticising the scheme in certain respects and expressing doubts whether the institution of the proposed Court, at all events at present, is in the interests of this country.

The question was adjourned, pending the result of the Lord Chancellor's Cabinet Committee appointed on August 18th.

CONFERENCES OF MINISTERS.

(12) The Cabinet took note of the Conclusions of the following Conferences of Ministers:

(a) Conference of Ministers held on June 17, 1920, at 11-30 a.m.:

(1) The Forthcoming Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Millerand.

(2) The Middle East.

(Appendix II).

(b) Conference of Ministers held on June 18, 1920, at 11 a.m.:

The Middle East.

(Appendix III).
(c) Conference of Ministers held on September 2, 1920, at 11 a.m.:

(1) Russian Trade Delegation.
(2) The Irish Situation.
(3) The Lord Mayor of Cork.

(Appendix IV.)

(d) Conference of Ministers held on September 6, 1920, at 3 p.m.:

(1) Russian Trade Delegation.
(2) The Coal Situation.
(3) The Irish Situation.
(4) Cork Prisoners.
(5) Labour Deputation to Riga.

(Appendix V.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
September 30, 1920.
APPENDIX I.

From Captain Elliot.

Copy of cablegram received from Paris, October 1st, 1920, 10 a.m.

5372. Following from Bradbury for Plackett.

No conclusion yet reached about coal advance due tomorrow. Difficulties of earmarking Reparation receipts to repayment have proved very formidable and French Government is now considering suggestion that bonds should be payable in cash by Germany in three equal instalments 1st May, 1922, 1st October, 1922, and 1st May, 1925. Germans will probably accept this which in the circumstances seems to me best solution. October advance will be fixed provisionally at sixty million gold marks as in case September. British share will be nine hundred and eighty two thousand eight hundred and sixty eight pounds one shilling and twopence (£982,868:1:2) but transfer should not be made pending further advice from me.

Following for Bradbury from Chancellor of Exchequer.

Your No. 5372 to Blackett. His Majesty's Government cannot agree to postponement of repayment by Germany of Coal advances beyond 1st May, 1921. Such postponement is contrary to agreement that these advances have absolute priority.

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SECRET.

CONSULTATIONS of a Conference of Ministers held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Thursday, 17th June, 1920 at 11.30 a.m.

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PRESENT.
The Prime Minister (In the Chair).

Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., C.C.S.I., C.I.E., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Right Hon. the Viscount Dufferin, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for War and Air.

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The following were also present.


Brigadier-General S.H. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G. Assistant Secretary.
(1) With reference to Conclusion 2 of a Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, on June 11, 1920, the conference had a short discussion as to the Ministers and Officials to accompany the Prime Minister at his forthcoming meeting with M. Millerand.

Information had been received that M. Millerand would be accompanied by M. Marsal, Marshal Foch, General Weygand and M. Berthelot, besides financial experts.

It was agreed:

(a) That the Prime Minister should be accompanied by Mr. Chamberlain, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir John Bradbury, Mr. Blyeckett and Sir Maurice Hankey.

(b) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be prepared to come at short notice for a Conference on Tuesday, June 22nd, if political discussions should appear likely to arise.

(2) With reference to the Conversation held at 10, Downing Street, on June 11, 1920, the conference began a full discussion in regard to the situation in the Middle East, in connection with which they had before them the following documents:

- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Paper C.P. 120).
- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Paper C.P. 707).
- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Paper 892).
- A Memorandum by the General Staff, War Office (Paper C.P. 1010).
- A Memorandum by the Secretary, Cabinet (Paper C.P. 1288).
- Note by the Secretary of State for War covering Memoranda (Paper C.P. 1320).
- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Paper C.P. 1337).
- A Copy of a Letter from Lord Winterton to the Secretary, Cabinet (Paper C.P. 1372).
- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (Paper C.P. 1402).
In view of the urgency of the question, the Conference commenced by an examination of the question of Mesopotamia, where recent telegrams had shown that a difficult situation exists. There was general agreement, in the view reached by the Ministers concerned as the result of a discussion at the Inter-Departmental Committee on Eastern Affairs, that Sir Percy Cox, who has left Teheran with a view to taking up a post at the head of the Administration in Mesopotamia, should be instructed, before returning home to consult with the British Government, to remain at Baghdad sufficiently long to place himself in possession of all the facts of the situation bearing on the question of how the policy of developing an Arab Government is to be applied. It was also agreed that Sir Arnold Wilson, notwithstanding his great services, should be withdrawn from Mesopotamia. It was suggested that he should be available for consultation with the British Government at the same time as Sir Percy Cox.

It was clear at an early stage of the discussion that the military question must be considered as a whole. In
Persia, Northern Mesopotamia and the Isemid Peninsula and in the region of Constantinople, the situation was serious and, in order to carry out our existing policy, reinforce­ments were either required immediately or likely to be required in the near future. It was possible, also, that circumstances might arise necessitating reinforcements for Palestine and Egypt. In the present stage of our military development, however, when the war army has been completely demobilised and the post-war army is in its infancy, no general reserve exists, and reinforcements for one theatre could only be obtained by withdrawing troops from another. It was recognised that our military situation was such that it would hardly be possible to avoid asking Parliament for further appropriations, and it was suggested that a warning of this ought to be given at an early date.

The present situation in each of the disturbed theatres in the Middle East, as set forth in the Papers before the Conference, was carefully examined, and it was generally agreed to confer on the subject on the following day with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff. The most immediately menacing situation was in the Isemid Peninsula, where some minor fighting has already taken place.

In this connection attention was called to the possi­bilities of co-operation by Greece, and it was stated that K. Venizelos was prepared to take such action as might be desired of him without asking for military or financial support. The Greeks were now in occupation of Eastern Thrace and were prepared to advance into Eastern Thrace. They also had a large force in the Smyrna area, and were prepared to act against Mustapha Kemal.

The question of Greek co-operation gave rise to a dis­cussion as to the fundamental interests of British policy in the Near East, and it was suggested that it was to our interest definitely to support the Greeks.
It was generally agreed that, having regard to the very strong and even dramatic line of policy taken by the British plenipotentiaries in regard to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, to retire from Constantinople before a bandit like Mustapha Kemal would deal a shattering blow to our prestige in the East, and that this could not possibly be contemplated.

After some further discussion it was agreed —

(a) That the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff should be invited to attend a further meeting of the Conference at 11 a.m. on the following day:

(b) That the Secretary of State for War should, before the meeting, ask them to be prepared to express their opinions on the military aspects of a policy under the following heads:

1. Authorise Greeks to advance into Eastern Thrace at once.
2. Give them manoeuvring liberty in the Smyrna area, but warn them against getting involved deeply.
3. Bring a Greek Division to reinforce Constantinople area.
4. Evacuate Batum and transfer garrison to Ismid.
5. Reinforce Ismid Peninsula as far as our resources allow, and hold it and Constantinople as a British Command while (1) is being carried out.
6. Withdraw from Persia forthwith.
7. Contract to railheads in Mesopotamia, and develop air force there, and gradually re-occupy as our strength grows and circumstances allow in the next few years.

(c) That on the following day the Conference should consider the desirability of sending the following telegram to Air Vice-Marshal Cox:

DRAFT OF TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, TO CIVIL COMMISSIONER, MESOPOTAMIA.

ALMS. By telegram of 16th June. Please convey following message to Sir I. Cox. Begins. His Majesty's Government are most anxious to have your advice on present situation in Mesopotamia. They do not
accept Wilson's view that true alternative lies between extension of control as defined in his telegram no. 6948 and withdrawal to Basra. They are irrevocably committed to policy of creating an effective Arab State not a camouflaged British protectorate and they regard practical alternatives as being either to set to work at once on lines they have already indicated or completely to evacuate Mesopotamia. Preliminary steps proposed for carrying out policy of His Majesty's Government were indicated in my three telegrams to Wilson of 9th June which you have doubtless seen. The suggested announcement can be made as soon as you think fit. But if you do not regard it as helpful please refer to me again. Subsequent steps will not be elaborated until His Majesty's Government have had opportunity of personal consultation with yourself. But they are anxious that before proceeding to England for such consultation you should have opportunity of studying situation on spot and of satisfying yourself as to (1) measure of acceptance which proposals of His Majesty's Government are likely to obtain and (2) further steps best calculated to give effect to them. For this purpose you will doubtless wish to make yourself acquainted without delay with Mesopotamian opinion of every shade including if you think fit that of Baghdadies outside Mesopotamia, for whose inclusion in the scheme provision will have to be made. As regards latter you may at your discretion address Cairo direct, repeating to London. His Majesty's Government realise that your enquiries must take some time and they hope you will stay on at Baghdad as long as you deem desirable. Your investigations may perhaps remove all necessity for Mesopotamian deputation to England as recommended by Wilson which we are anxious to avoid if possible without prejudice to situation, but your advice on this point would be welcome. Ends. Addressed Baghdad repeated Viceroy.

2, Whitehall Gardens, L.t.d.

June 17, 1920.
CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held in Mr Bonar Law's Room at the House of Commons, S.W., on Friday, June 16th 1920 at 11 a.m.

PRESENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Rt. Hon. the Viscount Milner,
G.C.B., G.O.M., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for War and Air.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson, Bart.,
G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard,
Bt., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.

His Excellency M. Venizelos,
Prime Minister of Greece.

Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Beatty,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. P. A. A. Hankey, C.B., Secretary.

Brig-General S. H. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary.

These conclusions have been circulated only to those Ministers present.
Situation in the Middle East which had been begun on the previous day. They heard the views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and, more briefly, of the Chief of the Air Staff. These are summarised in Appendices I and II respectively.

The Conference at first turned their attention to the present situation in the area of Constantinople and the Straits, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave the Conference the verbal appreciation of the situation in this area, which is referred to above.

During the meeting, a telegram sent spontaneously by General Milne was received, which independently gave the same estimate as had been given by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the immediate reinforcements required in this area, viz., about one Division.

It was clear that the menacing situation in this area could only be adequately and immediately met by the employment of Greek troops, and the form of Greek co-operation which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff preferred was the immediate despatch of one Division to be at General Milne's disposal for use as he might think best in securing the Yalid Peninsula and the eastern side of the Dardanelles.

The Conference had the advantage of discussing this question with M. Venizelos, the Greek President of the Council, whose views are summarised in Appendix III.

As a result of this discussion the following action was concerted:

(a) M. Venizelos undertook to send instructions for all preliminary arrangements to be made for the concentration, on the receipt of further orders from M.E., at Bedecagatch, of one of the Greek Divisions in Western Thrace, with a view to its being placed at the disposal of General Milne:
(b) M. Venizelos, accompanied by such technical officers as he might desire, undertook to meet the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and a representative of the Admiralty at 5 p.m. the same afternoon in order to make preliminary arrangements for the transport of this Division, and to arrange other details:

(c) The Prime Minister undertook, at his forthcoming meeting, to notify M. Millerand and Count Sforza of the arrangements the British Government was making with M. Venizelos to meet the present emergency:

(d) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff undertook to give General Milne notice of the present stage of this negotiation:

(e) The First Lord of the Admiralty undertook to give the Naval Commander-in-Chief (Admiral de Robeck) notice of the present stage of this negotiation.

(3) The Conference took note with satisfaction that the Army Council had already ordered to the Constantinople area one Battalion from Malta, and one Cavalry Regiment from Palestine, and that they hoped to be in a position to send two further Battalions from Palestine.

(4) The Conference accepted the view of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, for the present, Palestine was the most suitable theatre from which to draw reinforcements for the Constantinople area.

(5) The Conference authorised the Secretary of State for War to send a telegram to the General Officer Commanding Constantinople, stating that General Stokes' Mission was to be expedited in every way, but that if he considered it essential to the security of the position in the Constantinople area at once to withdraw the battalions now at Batum, he was authorised to do so.

(6) The Army Council were asked earnestly to consider the selection of some officer of the highest rank and war experience, whose name would have the confidence of all our Allies, to take general command of the operations in the whole of the Constantinople area, on the analogy of General Lord Rawlinson.
appointment to command in North Russia.

(7) The Conference then passed to the discussion of British policy in other parts of the Middle East, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff gave an expression of their views, which are included in Appendix II.

The Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff placed on record their view that the military forces at the disposal of Great Britain were insufficient to meet the requirements of the policies now being pursued in the various theatres. An immediate curtailment of British responsibilities was indispensable if grave risk of disaster was not to be incurred. Should the Cabinet decide to continue the attempt to maintain simultaneously our existing commitments at Constantinople, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, the possibility of disaster occurring in any or all of these theatres must be faced, and the likelihood of this will increase every day.

After an exhaustive discussion of the military and political situations in Mesopotamia and Persia, the Conference, without reaching final conclusions, agreed —

(a) That the Secretary of State for India should ask Sir Percy Cox to return home as soon as possible;

(b) That the Secretary of State for India should be empowered to authorise the announcement already suggested (Paper G.P. 1276, p.2) (See Appendix IV), subject to the agreement of Sir Percy Cox: all reference to the League of Nations being omitted;

(c) That further decisions in regard to Persia and Mesopotamia, and in regard to the related financial, military and air questions, should be postponed.

The Secretary of State for War obtained the Prime Minister's authority to forward to the Secretary a list of the decisions urgently required from a military point of view.
The attention of the Conference was called to the uncertainty, as revealed in the Parliamentary Debate of the previous day, as to the respective positions of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Council of the League of Nations, in regard to Mandates.

It was agreed —

That this question should be discussed by the Cabinet or a Conference of Ministers at an early date.

(The Conference rose at 3.30 p.m.)

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,
June 18, 1920.
APPENDIX I.

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that from the telegrams which had been received it would appear that the Turkish Nationalist Army was attacking the British position on the Ismid Peninsula. This position was of an extent of 35 miles and the 6 battalions which were available there were very weak in numbers. It was true that the Nationalist Army was composed of irregular troops who were not formidable as compared with the British and German troops who had been fighting in the late war, but there was great difficulty in preventing the emissaries from the opposing forces slipping through our lines and upsetting the population in the rear. Unless it was possible to reinforce the British troops holding this line he thought it quite possible they would have to fall back. If this had to be done General Milne would probably take up a line some ten to 15 miles Bosphorus from the which would be shorter than he was now holding. In order to ensure the troops at General Milne's disposal being able to hold on in their present position he thought it would be necessary to reinforce them with at least one Division to start with and further reinforcements would be necessary later on. He was very doubtful whether warships could assist in the operations as the ground was very broken. The Turkish Nationalist Army was in occupation of the southern coastline of the Sea of Marmara and on the southern side of the Dardanelles there were two British battalions and there was really no reason why these should not be driven into the sea if the forces under Mustapha Kemal chose to attack them. He felt, therefore, very uneasy about this isolated force and would very
much like to see it reinforced. On the Gallipoli Peninsula the French had one battalion. He thought the position of this French battalion was fairly secure, as the warships could prevent any of the Turkish Nationalist troops from crossing the Dardanelles or Sea of Marmora. He was a little uneasy as to the possible situation which might arise as to the feeding of the population of Constantinople, as he thought it was quite probable that the Nationalist forces might stop any supplies from reaching the town by the Anatolian Railway, and this might result in serious internal trouble. General Milne was of opinion that for the moment he could deal with the situation in Constantinople with the troops at his disposal—"together with the assistance of the Fleet—but he was decidedly of the opinion that he could not with the troops at his disposal carry out this work and at the same time ensure the security of the Ismid Peninsula and the southern side of the Dardanelles, and that was why he was asking to be allowed at once to have the battalions from Batoum. If the British forces lost the coast of the Ismid Peninsula it was hard to say what the position of Constantinople might be as it would be possible for the Nationalist forces to shell the town night and day. Moreover, the Bosphor would be closed and it would be more than likely that the population would get out of hand. If the Turkish Nationalist Army are by any chance to seize the Chanak side of the Dardanelles the situation would be even still more difficult. He saw no reason why Mustapha Kemal should not in about six weeks' time have some 40,000 troops at his disposal. If he (the C.I.G.S.) were in the position of Mustapha Kemal he would advance against Chanak at once. The whole situation depended on what the Commander of the Turkish Nationalist Army decided to do now and he would like to call serious
attention to the fact that unless the troops in the Constantinople area, at Chanak, and on the Ismid Peninsula were strongly reinforced it was quite possible that we might have a disaster. One battalion had already been ordered from Malta to General Milne's command and one cavalry regiment from Palestine. There were also two battalions which could be brought from Batoum and possibly two additional native battalions could be withdrawn from Palestine. He was not at all sure, however, that these reinforcements would be sufficient and he would not feel easy in his mind unless reinforcements of one Division could be sent to Constantinople and Ismid and one or two brigades to reinforce the troops on the southern side of the Dardanelles. If the French and Italians, or both, could be got to help so much the better. He did not think, however, there was any chance of getting French troops proper as they would not leave France.

The Greeks had 6 Divisions in the Smyrna area and three in the Maritza. He was a little doubtful, however, as to whether the Greeks were not a little optimistic as to what it was in their power to do. He had discussed the situation on the previous evening with M. Venizelos and he had asked him if the Greek forces in the Smyrna area were strong enough to advance to Panderma, as such a move would at any rate cover the forces holding the southern shore of the Dardanelles. M. Venizelos had replied that he could not say, but that he would consult the Greek General Staff.

As regards the possibility of a move from Smyrna to the Anatolian Railway this would entail a big operation and he doubted if they could carry it out at all and in any case it would take three to four months as the transport facilities in the country in question were most primitive, and it would be
necessary to form dumps of ammunition, food etc. all along the line of advance. It had to be borne in mind that 40 or 50 French battalions had just suffered a serious reverse. The Turkish troops might not be regarded as formidable if compared with the English and German troops fighting in the recent war, but operating in their own rough country he would like to say that they were in his opinion difficult opponents to deal with. If the Greeks contemplated an operation against Vandera it might be possible to land some of them there by sea. He doubted, however, if they would be able to withdraw very many troops either from the Smyrna area or from those on the Maritza and any reinforcements which they would require to carry out such an operation would, he thought, have to come from Greece. The Turkish Nationalist Army were not in possession of any artillery that could be regarded as really serious and most of their guns were, he thought, of a light type. Still, they could shell small steamers passing up the Straits, if they were in possession of the southern approach.

He did not think that there was any doubt the Greeks could advance to the Chatalja starting from the Maritza line; this would take, no doubt, a little time but if it was carried out it would certainly be a great help. He would like to raise the question of further reinforcements since if a Division was moved to Constantinople it would practically mean in his opinion starting another war with Turkey and possibly Russia later on. Moreover, it might lead to further fighting in Mesopotamia. The result of doing this might therefore be to commit ourselves to a heavy charge in the way of soldiers both for occupying the demilitarized zone in Turkey and also operations in Mesopotamia and Persia, and might eventually require a great number of Divisions. Whether eventually the
the situation which he had in mind would lead or not to a war with Afghanistan he could not say, but if this did happen at least another 3 to 5 Divisions would be required. What he wanted to explain was that the more reinforcements were to send into the theatre of operations the more the fighting was likely to extend, and to give a small illustration he would like to point out that 12 months ago one Italian battalion had remained with no difficulty at Konia whereas two British battalions were being hard pressed on the Ismid Peninsula. His own opinion was that the operations would continue for several years and although it would be a great help to get the Greeks to come to our assistance now he did not think that such a move would really solve the problem. He thought Palestine was undoubtedly the best place from which to draw on for British reinforcements at the moment. He thought that it would be safe to use the Indian troops who were serving in Palestine.

As regards Mesopotamia he did not think that it would be possible to continue holding the area which we at present occupied with the number of troops at our disposal. It was not that he expected an actual attack but he foresaw the country getting very unsettled, the railways would be cut and everyone would have to move about under escorts, and for these reasons he did not think that with the troops at present available it would be possible to continue to hold Mozur and if it was intended to do this reinforcements would be necessary.

As regards withdrawing, it was very difficult to say what effect any retirement would have as everyone knew what a retirement meant when carried out in front of a native enemy. The whole problem really ought to be treated as one that he did not think with the forces at present in Mesopotamia it would be possible to carry out an offensive operation with
a view to gaining a success as all the different formations there were very weak and immobile. He thought that in order to secure the territory now held in Mesopotamia at least another division would be necessary and this division would have to be a mobile one. If such forces were available it would be possible roughly to handle the Arabs and Kurds. There was, however, no place from which such a division could be obtained except from Persia and there was there roughly a division and a large number of motor cars which could be made available. If these forces were transferred to Mesopotamia he thought there would be no difficulty in dealing with the situation, but that would mean leaving Persia entirely. Again, as regards the latter country, if we were to remain on there in our present position it would be necessary to reinforce troops already there. Broadly the situation was, our forces were too weak in the Constantinople area and also too weak in Mesopotamia, and there was really no place from which reinforcements could be drawn for Mesopotamia except Persia. We did not think that with the troops at present available it would be possible to hold on in either Mesopotamia or Persia for another 6 months, even if the situation were only viewed from the point of view of the soldiers themselves, and from a military point of view his own personal opinion was that all the troops should be withdrawn from Persia and sent to Mesopotamia.
APPENDIX II.

VIEWS EXPRESSED BY AIR MARSHAL SIR H.M. TRENCHARD,
Bart. K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of Air Staff.

AIR MARSHAL SIR H.M. TRENCHARD said that he viewed with no little uneasiness the situation from an Air point of view. For example, if the squadron asked for by General Milne was to be provided, this could only be done by taking more than one Squadron away from Egypt. The situation in Egypt appeared rather more quiet than a few months ago, but he thought that nevertheless the War Office would be unwilling to release any Air units from the Egyptian garrison, as these were the minimum considered necessary until the situation became more defined. Out of the two Squadrons in Mesopotamia and Persia one could only regard about one third of the aeroplanes as being available for operations. This is due to the fact that the squadrons are split up into small detachments and in keeping a Flight at Khair and 300 miles from its base, out of the 6 machines probably only two would be available. The allotment of aeroplanes under the new organisation was now being carried out, and those for Mesopotamia were on their way there now. Ireland was asking for more aeroplanes at the moment, and it was not possible to find them. Again, there was the possibility of trouble in India. The establishment of the Air Force in that place at the present time was only the absolute minimum for normal purposes, and in the event of any trouble arising aerial reinforcements up to five Squadrons might be demanded. These could not be found from Egypt, and there were no other Reserves which could be drawn upon. In order to provide a Reserve of Squadrons during the next 12 to 18 months it would be necessary to know at once what additional number of squadrons was going to be authorised, and it was for this reason that the authorisation of a minimum Royal Air Force Reserve of five Squadrons had already been suggested. He was of opinion that the two flights now available in Persia should be transferred to Mesopotamia, as the best use of them could be made in the latter place, and very little use could be made of them in Persia.
N. Venizelos said that a Greek Division could at once be put at the disposal of General Milne if His Majesty's Government so desired. It could be taken from the troops who were in Western Thrace. In addition to these troops his Government had six divisions in Asia Minor. As regards the question which had been asked him by the Secretary of State for War on the previous evening about a possible advance towards Panderman, he had telegraphed to the Greek General Staff in order to find out their views. In doing so he had suggested stopping the proposed operations in Eastern Thrace and reinforcing the troops in the Smyrna area from those now in Thrace. Of course if one Greek Division were now sent to Constantinople and Chanak this division would not be available. There appeared to him to be two alternatives, the first of which was to send one Greek Division to reinforce General Milne's troops in Constantinople and at Chanak, and at the same time to consider the possibility of carrying out a small operation in the Smyrna area in order to relieve pressure elsewhere, and the other was to reinforce the troops in the Smyrna area with a view to carrying out a big operation towards Panderman. He did not think there was any use in asking his General Staff whether it was possible to send a division to Constantinople and at the same time carry out the big operation. He was quite ready to arrange for the division which it was proposed to send to Constantinople being handed over to General Milne to do what he liked with. If it was agreed that this division should go, orders should
be issued at once in order that they might start their preparations and that transport should be obtained. If they could have British aid in obtaining transports it would mean that the troops could get quicker to their destination. The Greeks had altogether, in organised units, some 130,000 men and of these 90,000 were in the Smyrna area and 40,000 in Thrace. In addition there were some 50,000 or 60,000 in depots. Any proposal to mobilise additional troops raised a big question and in order to take any measures of this description he would have to consult his country. He did not anticipate, however, any difficulty in getting the support of the Greek people if it was put to them that it was a question of enforcing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and especially if it were known that the British Government were behind them. He thought in such circumstances it would be possible to raise an additional 4 divisions who would number about 50,000 men, making the total number of men available 230,000. He had no information as to what guns and ammunition were in the possession of the Turkish Nationalist Army. He was quite sure that the Greek troops would be able to operate with success against the Turks but in saying this he did not contemplate following the enemy up into the mountain regions, and the only danger to Greece was the prolongation of the existing state of affairs with its economic results. He thought that in the event of trouble with the Bulgarians the Serbians would adhere to their Treaty with Greece and give them their moral support, but he doubted if they could expect any support from Serbia in the way of actual men.
APPENDIX IV.

From Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
7th, June, 1920.
(Repeated to Viceroy).

From immediately preceding telegram. Mesopotamian constitution. You are authorised to make immediate announcement on following lines:

"(R). His Majesty's Government, having agreed to accept mandate for Mesopotamia, await the formal definition of its terms by the League of Nations. They anticipate that the mandate will lay upon them responsibility for maintaining internal peace and external security and will require them to formulate within a fixed period, which will probably not exceed two years, an organic law, to be framed in consultation with the native authorities and with due regard to rights, interests and wishes of all populations of mandated territory.

His Majesty's Government, having regard to expressed wishes of people of Mesopotamia for return of Sir P. Cox, have decided to entrust to him task of framing organic law. He will accordingly return to Baghdad next autumn, and will reAssume position, on termination of existing military administration, of chief British representative in Mesopotamia.

Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being (1) a predominantly Arab Council of State under an Arab President, and (2) a General Assembly representative of the peoples of Mesopotamia as a whole, and it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with these provisional bodies, a permanent organic law to be submitted by His Majesty's Government for the approval of the League of Nations". (End of R.)

The above indicates lines which your announcement should follow. You need not consider yourself tied down to exact form of words.
CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. on Thursday, September 2nd, 1920 at 11 a.m.

PRESENT:


The following were also present:


Colonel Sir James Craig, Bart., M.P., Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, Admiralty.

Mr. Philip Kerr, O.E.

Mr. J. G. C. Davidson, C.B., Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal.

Mr. Thomas Jones .......... Acting Secretary, Cabinet.
(1) The Conference was informed that a Soviet Delegation was waiting at Reval for permission to travel to Great Britain to take part in the Trade Union Congress to be held next week, and that the President of the Congress was pressing the Foreign Office to give the necessary facilities. It had been suggested that the deputation should be allowed to proceed on condition that the members gave a pledge to abstain from propaganda during their visit.

It was agreed:

(1) That the President of the Trade Union Congress should be informed that the Prime Minister was being consulted in the matter and that a reply from him could hardly be received before Sunday.

(2) That the deputation ought not to be admitted and that the Prime Minister should be advised in this sense.
(2) Mr Balfour gave the Conference an account of
the communications which had passed between him and
the Prime Minister with reference to the relations
of Russia with Poland and with this country.

The attention of the Conference was then called
to the telegrams exchanged between Moscow and M.Kameneff
which had been intercepted and deciphered. These
telegrams showed that whereas M.K. Government was
genuinely endeavouring to re-establish trading relations
with the Soviet Government, the Russian Trade Delegation
had in fact been actively engaged during their visit
in propaganda aimed at undermining the present economic
organisation of society.

The President of the Board of Trade stated that the
damage which was being done by the Russian agitators
was of so grave a nature that it was most important
to get them out of the country immediately. In order
to justify this step to the Labour movement it would be
essential to make a complete exposure of their trickery
by the publication of the deciphered telegrams.

It was agreed:–

(1) That the time had now come to request
the Russian Trade Delegation to leave this
country and a complete exposure of their
conduct be made in the Press:

(2) That a dossier of the documents from about
the time of the arrival in this country of
M.Kameneff should be prepared immediately
by Sir Basil Thomson, together with the
draft of a covering note for publication
in the newspapers:

(3) That Mr Bonar Law should communicate these
documents to the Prime Minister with a view
to obtaining his concurrence in their
publication.
Sir James Craig read to the Conference a detailed appreciation of the situation in Ulster which he had prepared, from which it appeared that the position was developing unfavourably with great rapidity: that the Loyalists were losing faith in the Government's determination to protect them, and were threatening an immediate recourse to arms, which would precipitate Civil War.

Sir James Craig proceeded to ask the Government to approve the following proposals:

(a) The immediate appointment of a Government Authority, e.g., an Under-Secretary, in Belfast, to represent the Government in the six counties;

(b) This Authority should have direct access to the Chief Secretary, and should be the civil authority responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the six counties;

(c) Moreover, in order to arrange for the transfer later of the administration of the six Counties under the Government of Ireland Bill, he should have a staff whose duty it would be to make all the necessary preparations in conjunction with Committees to be appointed locally:

(d) A Commissioner of the Royal Irish Constabulary should be appointed for the control of the Constabulary in the six Counties, and for the complete control and organisation of a Special Constabulary Force in that area, and to make arrangements for the future Constabulary Force.

(e) The Commander in Chief in Ireland should devolve such of his powers to the Local Military Authority in Belfast as would enable the latter to deal with any local developments, and to act in co-operation with the Ulster Civil Authority and with the Commissioner without reference to Dublin Castle.

(f) A Force of Special Constables should be raised to assist the Government Forces in the maintenance of law and order, and should be sufficiently numerous to ensure that adequate Police posts are re-established throughout the six Counties, and that any new measures ordered by the Government are properly enacted. This force must be armed, and detailed for general duty within the six Counties only. As far as possible the organisation should be on military lines. Probably a strength of 2,000 would suffice for the six Counties unless any of the troops now in Ulster were withdrawn, or unless a general rising takes place.
(g) A reserve force of Special Constabulary should be raised from the loyal population, which would only be called out for duty in case of emergency. Arms should be issued to certain members of this force who, when called out for duty, would be properly paid and indemnified by the State. Possibly, it would be well to swear in a very much larger number of persons than would be required for duty at one time. This would enable reliefs to be formed, and would also ensure that a large proportion of the population is brought under discipline. A Special Constabulary Reserve should be organized by the Royal Irish Constabulary Commissioner mentioned in para. 4., but should be commanded by their own local leaders, and they should obtain authority to drill and to do musketry. They should also be required to perform duty within the vicinity of their homes.

(h) The organization of the Ulster Volunteer Force should be used for this purpose, as was done for raising the 36th (Ulster) Division when the war broke out.

(i) The Government should announce forthwith that, in the event of a general rising by the rebels, with which the existing forces might be unable to cope, or if there should be any withdrawal of the military forces by the Government, then the Ulster Volunteer Force should be armed with their own weapons, which are now under military control, the members of that force who have already joined the Special Constabulary Force being armed first, if the arms provided by the State are insufficient for the whole force. Meanwhile, these arms should be more distributed among the different military centres in the six counties, so as to be available for local issue, and the U.V.F. should be permitted to drill.

(j) Government regulations dealing with motor traffic, restriction of movements by night, and reprisals for destruction of government property, should be put into force as soon as it can be done effectively, but it should not be applied to the loyal portions of Ulster until they can also be made effective in the more disaffected part of the six Counties.

(k) Steps should be taken to remove all Government officials from their appointments if they refuse to take the Oath of Allegiance, and local authorities should be instructed to give notice to all their employees who decline to pass this test.

Mr Balfour (who had to leave before the close of the Conference) stated that while he could offer an opinion on details he considered that in face of the terms of the Home Rule Bill the Government would be justified in separating Ulster administratively at once from the rest of Ireland. He was, however, doubtful about the proposal to place the Belfast military command directly under the War Office.
Sir Robert Horne considered it to be desirable to enrol a body of Special Constables in Ireland at once.

The discussion was adjourned until the Chief Secretary could be present.
[4] Mr Balfour informed the Conference that in view of the strong representations which had been made for the release of the Lord Mayor of Cork from Brixton Gaol, he had conferred with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for War. In the view of the Home Office the detention of a prisoner during a protracted hunger strike until his death was subversive of prison discipline and administration. It could also be urged on behalf of the Lord Mayor that he was a political prisoner and that it was impossible in his case to feed him forcibly as had been done with success with other hunger strikers. On the other hand to release him would in effect be equivalent to giving up the Coercion Act recently passed.

The Conference were reminded that the Cabinet had decided against the release of hunger strikers and that this decision had been announced and defended by the Prime Minister in his published letter to the Lord Mayor's sister.

It was agreed to recommend no change in the Cabinet decision.
CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers
held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1 on Wednesday,
September 8th, 1920, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT.

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood,
Bart., K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary
for Ireland.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Horne,
G.C.E., K.C., M.P., President,
Board of Trade.
The Rt. Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P.,
President, Board of Education.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K.C.,
P.C., C.C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., C.I.E.,
G.S.V.O., I.S.O., Permanent Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A. Mankey, C.C.B., Secretary.
Mr. Thomas Jones, Principal Assistant Secretary.
Mr. J.C.C. Davidson, C.B.
With reference to Conclusion 2 of Conference of Ministers held on September 2nd 1930,

the conference had under consideration certain reported breaches of the Russian Trade Delegation agreement to abstain from propaganda and other hostile action during their stay in this country.

The question was considered as to whether they should be asked to leave.

The matter was postponed until the issue of the threatened miners' strike had become clearer.
with reference to Cabinet 49 (20) Conclusion 6, the President of the Board of Trade stated that with a view to removing all possible misunderstandings he had invited the Executive of the Miners' Federation to meet him at the Board of Trade on the following morning. He proposed to adhere to the position hitherto taken up by the Government and to state that no raiding of the export profits fund would be allowed; that in the interests of the general body of consumers it was preferable that the fund should be paid into the Treasury and in any case this question had already been decided by Parliament. On the question of wages he would state that in the opinion of the Government no case had been made out for an advance, but that if the miners believed that they had a good claim it should be submitted to the Industrial Court. In any event it might be possible for the miners to make certain wage adjustments with the owners in the direction of absorbing the recent flat rate advance in the tonnage rates and in this way directly relating the recent advances with the output of coal.

The Conference approved the course which the President of the Board of Trade proposed to take.
3. With reference to the Conference of Ministers held on the 2nd September 1920 it was agreed:

1. That the Chief Secretary should take the necessary steps, through the Divisional Commissioner of Police, to organize a force of Special Constables in Ireland.

2. That the Chief Secretary should appoint an Assistant Under Secretary for the six counties of the North East of Ireland.
4. The Conference approved a draft reply to a telegram received by the Prime Minister with reference to the eleven untried prisoners in Cork Gaol who were hunger-striking.

(Appendix)

It was agreed:

That the reply, together with particulars of each of the cases, should be issued by the Irish Office to the Press.
5. The Conference were informed that a telephonic message had been received at the Foreign Office from Mr. T. Adamson, M.P., asking that he and Mr. Purcell should be granted passports to proceed to Riga in order that they might hold a watching brief over the peace negotiations between the Russians and Poles. It had not been made clear in the message whether the application was on behalf of the Trade Union Congress or on behalf of the Council of Action, but the Conference were informed that a Resolution of the Council of Action appointing Messrs. Adamson and Purcell to this mission had appeared in the Press.

It was agreed:

That Mr. J.T. Davies should write to Mr. Adamson asking that a written application for passports should be made setting out the purpose of the mission and by whom it had been appointed.
The Prime Minister has received the following telegram from Mr. F. A. Barry, ex High Sheriff of Co. Cork:

"Prime Minister, 10 Downing Street, London,
I impress most strongly on you eleven untried and unconvicted men dying in Cork Gaol. Even Mr. Bonar Law's letter in answer to Labour Party's appeal does not attempt to justify the detention of untried and unconvicted men. Issues at stake so far reaching inevitable result of delay disastrous. Immediate action imperative."

to which the following reply has been sent:

The Government have given careful consideration to the appeal contained in your telegram of September 6th on behalf of the 11 untried prisoners now on hunger-strike in Cork prison. These men, all of whom are awaiting trial, were arrested either in the act of making murderous attacks upon police or soldiers, or upon direct and clear evidence of complicity in such attacks, or for other very serious offences. It is clear that they are engaged in a combined effort to make their trials impossible, as all of them, though arrested on various dates, commenced to hunger-strike simultaneously on the 11th August. By this means they have reduced themselves to a physical condition which renders them unfit for trial, and the Government are advised that it is legally impossible to try them for the grave offences with which they are charged in their absence or until they are certified to be fit to undergo trial. But for their refusal to take food they would now all have been tried and would be tried forthwith if they consented to take food as soon as they had sufficiently recovered.

The evidence in each case has received most careful individual consideration. It is impossible for the Government to allow men charged with such grave offences to escape trial by their own act. If this were permitted there would be an end to any possibility of the enforcement of law and the administration of justice.
A list is enclosed of the men in question and particulars of the offences for which they are awaiting trial.

Michael Fitzgerald is charged with having murdered Private Jones at Fermoy on September 7th, 1919. He was arrested in September 1919 and at Cork Assizes on July 23rd a true bill was found against him, but it was impossible, owing to the non-attendance of jurors, to proceed with the trial. In consequence of his hunger-strike it was impossible to bring him before the Court constituted under the authority of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act.

John Power. On the night of the 6th August a military patrol from Fethard alleges that it found three men, of whom John Power was one, lying behind a hedge with two guns and cartridges from which the shot had been extracted and replaced by heavy lead slugs. He is awaiting trial by Court Martial, but his condition at the moment is such that he is not certified as fit for trial.

Thomas Donovan, Matthew Reilly, John Crowley, Peter Browley, Christopher Upton. On the night of the 16th July a party of Police entering Ballylanders were heavily fired upon from several houses. A patrol of military and police attracted by the firing came to their assistance, entering the houses from which it is alleged the police were being fired upon, and arrested several men, one of whom was seriously wounded. These men are awaiting trial by Court Martial in connection with the occurrence.

Michael Burke. Arrested on August 9th under charge of being found in possession of an automatic revolver which had been taken from Constable Maloney, who was in company with Sgt. Tobin when Tobin was murdered. Burke lives about three miles from the scene of the murder. He is awaiting trial by Court Martial.

John Hennessy. Arrested on 26th July and charged in connection with an attack by a party of armed men on a detachment of troops in charge of a military lorry at Inchinore on the 26th July last. The lorry was captured and burned.

Joseph Murphy. Arrested on 15th July and charged with being in possession of a bomb. Awaiting trial by Court Martial.

Joseph Kenny. Arrested on 15th July and charged with being in possession of service rifle and revolver ammunition. Awaiting trial by Court Martial.
NOTES of a CONFERENCE held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1920, at 3-30 p.m.

PRESENT:-

The Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Bart., K.C.; M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.


General Bird, Chief of the General Staff in Ireland.

The Right Hon. Sir John Anderson, K.C.B.

General Tudor, Chief of the Royal Irish Constabulary.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B., Secretary, Cabinet.

(1) THE CHIEF SECRETARY reported a great increase in the efficiency of both the Military and Police sides of the Irish Executive. He was confident that the Irish Government could restore order and bring about peaceful conditions, provided they continued to have the support of the Government.
(2) The question of reprisals was discussed in considerable detail.

The Conference were informed that the Irish Executive had held a Conference on this subject and had issued appropriate orders to the Military and to the Police. The worst case was the incident at Balbriggan, and a Police investigation was being held in regard to this.

(3) There was complete agreement that reprisals by burning must be put a stop to at the earliest possible moment.

Confidence was expressed that reprisals by burning would generally be put a stop to, although in the exceptional conditions prevailing in Ireland it could not be guaranteed that occasional and spasmodic incidents of the kind would not occur.

(4) It was hard to stop, in the prevailing conditions in Ireland, reprisals in hot blood within a short time of the murder of a Police officer or constable. When the Police living in small isolated detachments witnessed the murder of a comrade, it was difficult to prevent them from taking reprisals against the local Sinn Fein leaders, who were perfectly well known to them as the heads of local murder gangs.

The question was then discussed as to whether it would not be advisable to enforce some form of martial law in Ireland. It was pointed out that under martial law, when assassinations occurred, appropriate steps could be taken in accordance with official warnings issued beforehand, and in this way reprisals could be kept under official control.

The War of 1670 and the recent War afforded many instances of the success of reprisals in this form.

In the course of the discussion it transpired that even the unauthorised reprisals had unquestionably had a visible effect both in enabling the Executive to obtain
information about ambushes and plots, and in driving a wedge between the moderates and the extremists in the Sinn Fein camp.

The Conference were informed that the orders for checking reprisals included instructions that when a murder was committed every possible step was to be taken for hunting down the murderer.

THE CHIEF SECRETARY reported that he was having compiled a complete list of all the reprisals that had been undertaken, with full particulars.

(5) The Chief Secretary was asked to consider a proposal which had been made in a letter received by the Prime Minister that some of the Police should be put into plain clothes, since at present they were recognised a long distance off, and miscreants at once rode off.

(6) It was explained to the Conference that one of the most difficult problems which the Irish Executive had to deal with was the control of motor cars. The majority of the murders were undertaken not by persons arrested from the localities in which they occurred, but by persons conveyed from a long distance in motor cars. It was not advisable to stop private motor traffic altogether, as the Sinn Feiners would then know that the only motor cars met on the road belonged to the Military and the Police, and mines and traps would be laid. The same objection applied to stopping supplies of petrol. A proposal was under consideration for the establishment of barricades and controls on the roads, but the numbers of the Military and Police were not sufficient to cover all the roads.
(7) THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he had received a telegram from the Dublin Conference of Conciliation, asking if he would receive a deputation. He wished to consult his colleagues on the subject.

It was agreed —

(a) That there would be advantages in the Prime Minister's receiving a deputation during the week commencing October 10th;

(b) That a meeting of the Cabinet to consider Irish Policy generally should be held before that date.

(8) The Conference had a short discussion with regard to the Chief Secretary's Memorandum (Paper C.P. -1801) on the refusal of railwaymen to carry Police, Military and munitions.

The Conference generally concurred that the Chief Secretary's view was right in principle, that it was absurd that the Government should continue to subsidise, at the expense of the general body of tax-payers, the shareholders of a Railway Company that refuses to carry Government traffic, or to provide funds whereby to pay increased wages to the very men who refused to handle the traffic.

The Chief Secretary was asked to see the Minister of Transport in order to ascertain the precise position in regard to the powers of the Government on this question.

(9) THE CHIEF SECRETARY pointed out that whatever settlement was made in Ireland, the men of the Royal Irish Constabulary had to continue to live there. He considered the provision in the Government of Ireland Bill, under which the men of the Royal Irish Constabulary would have 10 years added to the time they had served for pension if compulsorily retired, and 5 years in the event of voluntary retirement, was inadequate. He considered that every man should have 15 years added.
This led to a short discussion on the general financial arrangements for the Bill.

(10) In reply to the Chief Secretary, who expressed the hope that the Irish Executive had the British Government entirely behind them in their efforts, THE PRIME MINISTER stated that there was no doubt of this. The British Government considered that the Irish Executive was tackling a very difficult task with great courage.

2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

October 1, 1920.