CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Wednesday, 30th June 1920, at 12 Noon.

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.


The Right Hon. K.S. Montague, M.P., Secretary of State for India.


The Right Hon. R. Hanra, K.C., M.P., Secretary for Scotland.

The Right Hon. C. Addison, M.P., Minister of Health.


The Right Hon. Sir H. Lennox, K.C., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for War & Air.


The Right Hon. T. J. Moncure, LL.D., M.P., Minister of Labour.


The Right Hon. Sir L. Worthington Evans, Bart., M.P., President, Board of Education.

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

The Right Hon. Sir J. Hope, Minister of Shipping (for Conclusions 3 & 4).

Colonel Leslie Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, (for Conclusions 3 & 4).

Colonel Leslie Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, (for Conclusions 3 & 4).

Colonel Leslie Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, (for Conclusions 3 & 4).

Thomas Jones, Principal Assistant Secretary.
The Cabinet had before them copies of correspondence in regard to a proposed Military Agreement between Great Britain, France and Belgium, to provide against any future attack by Germany on France and Belgium (C.I.D. Papers Nos. 240-B and 244-B), together with a Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (C.I.D. Paper No. 246-B). The Secretary had also circulated in this connection a copy of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Paper P.-106).

The Cabinet were informed that there was no question of a Treaty at the present time, but that all that was asked was that a British soldier of distinction should be deputed to take part in purely technical discussions to decide what plan should be adopted if the emergency contemplated should arise.

It was suggested that once we had entered into technical military conversations it would be very difficult to avoid entering into a definite Military Agreement. Moreover, the experience of 1914 had shown that even military conversations were morally binding. The fact that such conversations had taken place was bound to become known, and would be represented in Parliament as the first step in a fresh entangling Alliance. It was particularly undesirable to take this step while the provisional Anglo-American guarantee to France was in a state of suspense and uncertainty owing to the failure of the United States of America to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Stress was also laid on the importance of reciprocity in any Agreement of this nature, and it was suggested that a British guarantee, which might some day become necessary, should only be given in return for some great reciprocal stipulation, such as, for example, the adoption of a reasonable attitude by France and Belgium towards the revival of Germany.
Such conversations were considered premature at the present time, when there is no military threat by Germany, and at the very moment when Germany was about to be disarmed. The risk was pointed out that arrangements which were nominally defensive might receive an offensive development.

The general principle that military conversations should follow and not precede discussions between Governments was not disputed.

The Cabinet agreed --

That the danger was not serious or imminent, and the proposed military conversations would be premature at the present time.
The Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Paper C.P.-1446) and the Secretary of State for War (Paper C.P.-1463) on the subject of the camp established at Baqubah, in Mesopotamia, for the maintenance of nearly 50,000 refugees, of whom 30,000 are Christian Assyrians from Kurdistan, and the remainder Armenians from other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

It was agreed—

That the Secretary of State for India should send instructions to the local Administration in Mesopotamia that the repatriation of these refugees is to be expedited to the utmost possible extent.
(3) The Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Ministry of Shipping pointing out that the main powers of the Shipping Controller expire on August 31 of this year; that the Ministry itself must, under Section 13 of the New Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916, cease to exist twelve months after the conclusion of the war, or at such earlier date as may be fixed by Order in Council; and enquiring whether the Cabinet desired to continue the powers of the Shipping Controller. (C.P. 1525)

It was agreed -

That the powers of the Shipping Controller should not be continued after the 31st August, 1920, the date authorised by the War Emergency Laws (Continuance) Act.

(4) With reference to Cabinet 37 (20) Conclusion 8, the Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Shipping Controller (C.P. 1525, Part ii) dealing with the allocation of ex-enemy shipping, and urging that the prices to be paid to the Reperation Commission should be the sale prices actually realised in this country, and that if this principle is departed from it may be anticipated that there will be a very heavy loss to the country. In view of a prospective heavy fall in values, it was imperative that the Shipping Controller should be put in a position to sell.

In the course of the discussion it was pointed out that the ton-for-ton policy would be stultified unless each country could secure the disposal to its own nationals of the ships allocated to it. This would be defeated by an international sale. On the other hand, it would be the duty of the Reperation Commission to secure the best possible value for Germany's assets, and that this could only be done by insisting on an open market for the sale of the ships.

The Cabinet agreed -

To request Sir L. Worthington Evans to take up and decide the matter with Sir J. Bradbury during the forthcoming Conferences at Brussels and Spa.
(5) The Cabinet had before them the draft of a Bill to be introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Monteagle on the following day, entitled "The Dominion of Ireland Bill", drawn up with the intention of granting a Constitution to Ireland broadly on the lines of the Constitutions of the Self-Governing Dominions (Paper C.P. -1539).

After a short discussion, the Cabinet agreed—

That the House of Lords should be invited to defer its consideration of this subject until the Government's Home Rule Bill comes before that House.
With reference to Cabinet 36 (20), Conclusion 3, the Cabinet were informed that, in the course of the negotiations arising out of the Cabinet's recent decision, it had been found that there would be very great opposition from the Labour Party to the amendment incorporating the Friendly Societies and also to the proposal to increase the weekly contributions of employers and employed (but without any increase in the State contribution) so as to secure 18/- for men and 15/- for women with a reduced waiting period of 3 days.

The opponents pointed out that under the existing scheme the State contribution was one-fourth and the new scheme suggested by the Cabinet made the contribution of the State one-sixth.

The Cabinet were informed that much opposition would probably be removed if the benefits were allowed to remain as they are in the original Bill and if the contributions of employers and men were raised from 3d to 4d and of women from 2½d to 3d and of women's employers from 2½d to 3½d, leaving the State contribution at the original rate. On the other hand, to meet this the waiting period should be reduced to 3 days.

The Cabinet agreed:

1. That the amendments dealing with the Friendly Societies should be left to a free vote of the House.

2. That the Minister of Labour should be authorised to agree to the other suggestions outlined above, provided that no increased cost to the Exchequer was involved.
(7) The Cabinet took note of, and referred to the Housing Committee, the Report of the Committee on Building Programme of Government Departments (Paper C.P.-1531).

(8) The Cabinet took note of the Conclusion of a Conference of Ministers held on June 18, 1920, at 11 a.m., on the Report of the Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee. (See Appendix I).
CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held in Mr Bonar Law's Room at the House of Commons, S.W., on Friday, June 18th 1920 at 11 a.m.

PRESENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Anson, K.G.,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt. Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for War and Air.

These conclusions have been circulated only to those Ministers present.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Viscount Marshal Sir W.H.Wilson, Bart.,
G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.


His Excellency M. Venizelos,
Prime Minister of Greece.

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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B. Secretary.

Brig-General S.H. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., Principal Assistant Secretary.
Final Copy No.

CONCLUSIONS of a Conference of Ministers held in Mr Bonar Law's Room at the House of Commons, S.W., on Friday, June 18th 1920 at 11 a.m.

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PRESENT.

THE PRIME MINISTER (in the Chair)

The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Rt. Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Rt. Hon. the Viscount Milner,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Rt. Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for War and Air.

Those conclusions have been circulated only.

to those Ministers present.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Field Marshal Sir H. Wilson, Bart.,
G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir H. Trenchard,
Bart., K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.

His Excellency N. Venizelos,
Prime Minister of Greece.

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Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. A. Hankey, G.C.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secretary.

Brig-General S. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., . . . . . . . . . . . . . Principal Assistant Secretary.
The Conference resumed the examination of the situation in the Middle East which had been begun on the previous day. They heard the views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and, more briefly, of the Chief of the Air Staff. These are summarised in Appendices I and II, respectively.

The Conference at first turned their attention to the present situation in the area of Constantinople and the Straits, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave the Conference the verbal appreciation of the situation in this area, which is referred to above.

During the meeting, a telegram sent spontaneously by General Milne was received, which independently gave the same estimate as had been given by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the immediate reinforcements required in this area, viz., about one Division.

It was clear that the menacing situation in this area could only be adequately and immediately met by the employment of Greek troops, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff preferred was the immediate despatch of one Division to be at General Milne's disposal for use as he might think best in securing the Ismid Peninsula and the eastern side of the Dardanelles.

The Conference had the advantage of discussing this question with M. Venizelos, the Greek President of the Council, whose views are summarised in Appendix III.

As a result of this discussion the following action was concerted:

(a) M. Venizelos undertook to send instructions for all preliminary arrangements to be made for the concentration, on the receipt of further orders from him, at Dedeagatch, of one of the Greek Divisions in Western Thrace, with a view to its being placed at the disposal of General Milne.
(b) M. Venizelos, accompanied by such technical officers as he might desire, undertook to meet the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and a representative of the Admiralty at 5 p.m. the same afternoon in order to make preliminary arrangements for the transport of this Division, and to arrange other details:

(c) The Prime Minister undertook, at his forthcoming meeting, to notify M. Millerand and Count Sforza of the arrangements the British Government was making with M. Venizelos to meet the present emergency:

(d) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff undertook to give General Milne notice of the present stage of this negotiation:

(e) The First Lord of the Admiralty undertook to give the Naval Commander-in-Chief (Admiral de Robeck) notice of the present stage of this negotiation.

(3) The Conference took note with satisfaction that the British Army Council had already ordered to the Constantinople area, one Battalion from Malta, and one Cavalry Regiment from Palestine, and that they hoped to be in a position to send two further Battalions from Palestine.

(4) The Conference accepted the view of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, for the present, Palestine was the most suitable theatre from which to draw reinforcements for the Constantinople area.

(5) The Conference authorised the Secretary of State for War to send a telegram to the General Officer Commanding Constantinople, stating that General Stokes' Mission was to be expedited in every way, but that if he considered it essential to the security of the position in the Constantinople area at once to withdraw the Battalions now at Batum, he was authorised to do so.

(6) The Army Council were asked earnestly to consider the selection of some officer of the highest rank and war experience, whose name would have the confidence of all our Allies to take general command of the operations in the whole of the Constantinople area, on the analogy of General Lord Rawlinson.
The Conference then passed to the discussion of British policy in other parts of the Middle East, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff gave an expression of their views, which are included in Appendix III.

The Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff placed on record their view that the military forces at the disposal of Great Britain were insufficient to meet the requirements of the policies now being pursued in the various theatres. An immediate curtailment of British responsibilities was indispensable if grave risk of disaster was not to be incurred. Should the Cabinet decide to continue the attempt to maintain simultaneously our existing commitments at Constantinople, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, the possibility of disaster occurring in any or all of these theatres must be faced, and the likelihood of this will increase every day.

After an exhaustive discussion of the military and political situations in Mesopotamia and Persia, the Conference, without reaching final conclusions, agreed —

(a) That the Secretary of State for India should ask Sir Percy Cox to return home as soon as possible:

(b) That the Secretary of State for India should be empowered to authorise the announcement already suggested (Paper C.P.-1475, p.2) (See Appendix IV), subject to the agreement of Sir Percy Cox; all reference to the League of Nations being omitted:

(c) That further decisions in regard to Persia and Mesopotamia, and in regard to the related financial, military and air questions, should be postponed.

The Secretary of State for War obtained the Prime Minister's authority to forward to the Secretary a list of the decisions urgently required from a military point of view.
The attention of the Conference was called to the uncertainty, as revealed in the Parliamentary Debate of the previous day, as to the respective positions of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Council of the League of Nations, in regard to Mandates.

It was agreed —

That this question should be discussed by the Cabinet or a Conference of Ministers at an early date.

(The Conference rose at 3.30 p.m.)
STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL
GENERAL STAFF.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that from the telegrams which had been received it would appear that the Turkish Nationalist Army was attacking the British position on the Ismid Peninsula. This position was of an extent of 35 miles and the 6 battalions which were available there were very weak in numbers. It was true that the Nationalist Army was composed of irregular troops who were not formidable as compared with the British and German troops who had been fighting in the late war, but there was great difficulty in preventing the emissaries from the opposing forces slipping through our lines and upsetting the population in the rear. Unless it was possible to reinforce the British troops holding this line he thought it quite possible they would have to fall back. If this had to be done General Milne would probably take up a line some ten to 15 miles from the Bosporus which would be shorter than he was now holding. In order to ensure the troops at General Milne's disposal being able to hold on in their present position he thought it would be necessary to reinforce them with at least one Division to start with and further reinforcements would be necessary later on. He was very doubtful whether warships could assist in the operations as the ground was very broken. The Turkish Nationalist Army was in occupation of the southern coastline of the Sea of Marmara and on the southern side of the Dardanelles there were two British battalions and there was really no reason why these should not be driven into the sea if the forces under Mustapha Kemal chose to attack them. He felt, therefore, very uneasy about this isolated force and would very
much like to see it reinforced. On the Gallipoli Peninsula, the French had one battalion. He thought the position of this French battalion was fairly secure, as the warships could prevent any of the Turkish Nationalist troops from crossing the Dardanelles or Sea of Marmora. He was a little uneasy as to the possible situation which might arise as to the feeding of the population of Constantinople, as he thought it was quite probable that the Nationalist forces might stop any supplies from reaching the town by the Anatolian Railway, and this might result in serious internal trouble. General Milne was of opinion that for the moment he could deal with the situation in Constantinople with the troops at his disposal together with the assistance of the Fleet, but he was decidedly of the opinion that he could not with the troops at his disposal carry out this work and at the same time ensure the security of the Izzmid Peninsula and the southern side of the Dardanelles, and that was why he was asking to be allowed at once to have the battalions from Batoum. If the British forces lost the coast of the Izzmid Peninsula it was hard to say what the position of Constantinople might be as it would be possible for the Nationalist forces to shell the town night and day. Moreover, the Bosporus would be closed and it would be more than likely that the population would get out of hand. If the Turkish Nationalist Army were by any chance to seize the Chunuk side of the Dardanelles the situation would be even still more difficult. He saw no reason why Mustapha Kemal should not in about six weeks' time have some 40,000 troops at his disposal. If he (the C.I.G.S.) were in the position of Mustapha Kemal he would advance against Chanak at once. The whole situation depended on what the Commander of the Turkish Nationalist Army decided to do now and he would like to call serious
attention to the fact that unless the troops in the Constantinople area, at Chanak, and on the Ismid Peninsula were strongly reinforced it was quite possible that we might have a disaster. One battalion had already been ordered from Malta to General Milne's command and one cavalry regiment from Palestine. There were also two battalions which could be brought from Batoum and possibly two additional native battalions could be withdrawn from Palestine. He was not at all sure, however, that these reinforcements would be sufficient and he would not feel easy in his mind unless reinforcements of one division could be sent to Constantinople and Ismid and one or two brigades to reinforce the troops on the southern side of the Dardanelles. If the French and Italians, or both, could be got to help so much the better. He did not think, however, there was any chance of getting French troops proper as they would not leave France.

The Greeks had 6 divisions in the Smyrna area and three in the Maritza. He was a little doubtful, however, as to whether the Greeks were not a little optimistic as to what it was in their power to do. He had discussed the situation on the previous evening with M. Venizelos and he had asked him if the Greek forces in the Smyrna area were strong enough to advance to Panderma, as such a move would at any rate cover the forces holding the southern shore of the Dardanelles. M. Venizelos had replied that he could not say, but that he would consult the Greek General Staff.

As regards the possibility of a move from Smyrna to the Anatolian Railway this would entail a big operation and he doubted if they could carry it out at all and in any case it would take three to four months as the transport facilities in the country in question were most primitive, and it would be
necessary to form dumps of ammunition, food etc. all
along the line of advance. It had to be borne in mind
that 40 or 50 French battalions had just suffered a serious
reverse. The Turkish troops might not be regarded as formid-
able if compared with the English and German troops fighting
in the recent war, but operating in their own rough country
he would like to say that they were in his opinion difficult
opponents to deal with. If the Greeks contemplated an
operation against Panderma it might be possible to land
some of them there by sea. He doubted, however, if they
would be able to withdraw very many troops either from the
Smyrna area or from those on the Maritza and any reinforce-
ments which they would require to carry out such an opera-
tion would, he thought, have to come from Greece. The
Turkish Nationalist Army were not in possession of any artillery
that could be regarded as really serious and most of their
guns were, he thought, of a light type. Still, they could
shell small steamers passing up the Straits, if they were
in possession of the southern approach.

He did not think
that
there was any doubt the Greeks could advance to the Chatalja
starting from the Maritza
line; this would take, no doubt, a little time but if it was
carried out it would certainly be a great help. He would like
to raise the question of further reinforcements since if a
Division was moved to Constantinople it would practically mean
in his opinion starting another war with Turkey and possibly
Russia later on. Moreover, it might lead to further fighting
in Mesopotamia. The result of doing this might therefore be
the commit ourselves to a heavy charge in the way of sol-
diers both for occupying the demilitarized zone in Turkey and
also operations in Mesopotamia and Persia, and might eventually
require a great number of Divisions. Whether eventually the
the situation which he had in mind would lead or not to a war with Afghanistan he could not say, but if this did happen at least another 3 to 5 Divisions would be required. What he wanted to explain was that the more reinforcements we were to send into the theatre of operations the more the fighting was likely to extend, and to give a small illustration he would like to point out that 12 months ago one Italian battalion had remained with no difficulty at Konia whereas six British battalions were being hard pressed on the Ismid Peninsula. His own opinion was that the operations would continue for several years and although it would be great help to get the Greeks to come to our assistance now he did not think that such a move would really solve the problem. He thought Palestine was undoubtedly the best place from which to draw on for British reinforcements at the moment. He thought that it would be safe to use the Indian troops who were serving in Palestine.

As regards Mesopotamia he did not think that it would be possible to continue holding the area which we at present occupied with the number of troops at our disposal. It was not that he expected an actual attack but he foresaw the country getting very unsettled, the railways would be cut and everyone would have to move about under escorts, and for these reasons he did not think that with the troops at present available it would be possible to continue to hold Mozu and if it was intended to do this reinforcements would be necessary.

As regards withdrawing, it was very difficult to say what effect any retirement would have as everyone knew what a retirement meant when carried out in front of a native enemy. The whole problem really ought to be treated as one that He did not think with the forces at present in Mesopotamia it would be possible to carry out an offensive operation with
a view to gaining a success as all the different formations there were very weak and immobile. He thought that in order to secure the territory newly held in Mesopotamia at least another division would be necessary and this division would have to be a mobile one. If such forces were available it would be possible roughly to handle the Arabs and Kurds. There was, however, no place from which such a division could be obtained except from Persia and there was there roughly a division and a large number of motor cars which could be made available. If these forces were transferred to Mesopotamia he thought there would be no difficulty in dealing with the situation, but that would mean leaving Persia entirely. Again, as regards the latter country if we were to remain on there in our present position it would be necessary to reinforce troops already there. Broadly the situation was, our forces were too weak in the Constantinople area and also too weak in Mesopotamia, and there was really no place from which reinforcements could be drawn for Mesopotamia except Persia. He did not think that with the troops at present available it would be possible to hold on in either Mesopotamia or Persia for another 6 months, even if the situation were only viewed from the point of view of the soldiers themselves, and from a military point of view his own personal opinion was that all the troops should be withdrawn from Persia and sent to Mesopotamia.
AIR MARSHAL SIR H.M. TRENCHARD said that he viewed with no little uneasiness the situation from an Air point of view. For example, if the squadron asked for by General Milne was to be provided, this could only be done by taking more than one Squadron away from Egypt. The situation in Egypt appeared rather more quiet than a few months ago, but he thought that nevertheless the War Office would be unwilling to release any Air units from the Egyptian garrison, as these were the minimum considered necessary until the situation became more defined. Out of the two Squadrons in Mesopotamia and Persia one could only regard about one third of the aeroplanes as being available for operations. This is due to the fact that the Squadrons are split up into small detachments and in keeping a Flight at Kasvin, 300 miles from its base, out of the 6 machines probably only two would be available. The allotment of aeroplanes under the new organisation was now being carried out, and those for Mesopotamia were on their way there now. Ireland was asking for more aeroplanes at the moment, and it was not possible to find them. Again, there was the possibility of trouble in India. The establishment of the Air Force in that place at the present time was only the absolute minimum for normal purposes, and in the event of any trouble arising aerial reinforcements up to five Squadrons might be demanded. These could not be found from Egypt, and there were no other Reserves which could be drawn upon. In order to provide a Reserve of Squadrons during the next 12 to 18 months it would be necessary to know at once what additional number of Squadrons was going to be authorised, and it was for this reason that the authorisation of a minimum Royal Air Force Reserve of five Squadrons had already been suggested. He was of opinion that the two Flights now available in Persia should be transferred to Mesopotamia, as the best use of them could be made in the latter place, and very little use could be made of them in Persia.
APPENDIX III.

VIEWS EXPRESSED BY M. VENIZELOS.

M. Venizelos said that a Greek Division could at once be put at the disposal of General Milne if H.E. Government so desired. It could be taken from the troops who were in Western Thrace. In addition to these troops his Government had six divisions in Asia Minor. As regards the question which had been asked him by the Secretary of State for War on the previous evening about a possible advance towards Panderma, he had telegraphed to the Greek General Staff in order to find out their views. In doing so he had suggested stopping the proposed operations in Eastern Thrace and reinforcing the troops in the Smyrna area from those now in Thrace. Of course if one Greek Division were now sent to Constantinople and Chanak this division would not be available. There appeared to him to be two alternatives, the first of which was to send one Greek Division to reinforce General Milne's troops in Constantinople and at Chanak, and at the same time to consider the possibility of carrying out a small operation in the Smyrna area in order to relieve pressure elsewhere, and the other was to reinforce the troops in the Smyrna area with a view to carrying out a big operation towards Panderma. He did not think there was any use in asking his General Staff whether it was possible to send a division to Constantinople and at the same time carry out the big operation. He was quite ready to arrange for the division which it was proposed to send to Constantinople being handed over to General Milne to do what he liked with. If it was agreed that this division should go, orders should...
be issued at once in order that they might start their preparations and that transport should be obtained. If they could have British aid in obtaining transports it would mean that the troops could get quicker to their destination. The Greeks had altogether, in organised units, some 130,000 men and of these 90,000 were in the Smyrna area and 40,000 in Thrace. In addition there were some 50,000 or 60,000 in depots. Any proposal to mobilise additional troops raised a big question and in order to take any measures of this description he would have to consult his country. He did not anticipate, however, any difficulty in getting the support of the Greek people if it was put to them that it was a question of enforcing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and especially if it were known that the British Government were behind them. He thought in such circumstances it would be possible to raise an additional 4 divisions who would number about 50,000 men, making the total number of men available 230,000. He had no information as to what guns and ammunition were in the possession of the Turkish Nationalist Army. He was quite sure that the Greek troops would be able to operate with success against the Turks but in saying this he did not contemplate following the enemy up into the mountain regions; and the only danger to Greece was the prolongation of the existing state of affairs with its economic results. He thought that in the event of trouble with the Bulgarians the Serbians would adhere to their Treaty with Greece and give them their moral support, but he doubted if they could expect any support from Serbia in the way of actual men.
APPENDIX IV.

From Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad,
7th June, 1920.
(Repeated to Viceroy).

P. 4213 (3). By immediately preceding telegram, Mesopotamian constitution. You are authorised to make immediate announcement on following lines:-

"(R). His Majesty's Government, having agreed to accept mandate for Mesopotamia, await the formal definition of its terms by the League of Nations. They anticipate that the mandate will lay upon them responsibility for maintaining internal peace and external security and will require them to formulate within a fixed period, which will probably not exceed two years, an organic law, to be framed in consultation with the native authorities and with due regard to rights, interests and wishes of all populations of mandated territory. His Majesty's Government, having regard to expressed wishes of people of Mesopotamia for return of Sir P. Cox, have decided to entrust to him task of framing organic law. He will accordingly return to Baghdad next autumn, and will reassume position, on termination of existing military administration, of chief British representative in Mesopotamia.

Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being (1) a predominantly Arab Council of State under an Arab President, and (2) a General Assembly representative of the peoples of Mesopotamia as a whole, and it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with these provisional bodies, a permanent organic law to be submitted by His Majesty's Government for the approval of the League of Nations." (End of R.)

The above indicates lines which your announcement should follow. You need not consider yourself tied down to exact form of words.

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