CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1. on TUESDAY, January 6th, 1920 at 4.30 p.m.

Present:
The Prime Minister (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P.,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. E. Shortt, K.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India.

The Right Hon. W. Long, M.P.,
First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. C. Addison, M.D., M.P.,
Minister of Health.

The Right Hon. H.A.L. Fisher, M.P.,
President, Board of Education.

The Right Hon. G.N. Barnes, M.P.,
The Right Hon. Lord Birkenshaw,
The Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. the Earl Surson of
Kedleston, K.C.G.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P.,
Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Robert Horne,
K.B.E., K.C., M.P., Minister of
Labour.

The Right Hon. Sir A.C. Geddes, K.C.B.,
M.P., President, Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. the Lord Lee of
Fareham, G.B.S., H.C.B., President,
Board of Agriculture & Fisheries.

The following were also present:

Lieutenant-Colonel I.C.M.S. Amery,
M.P., Acting Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl Beatty,
G.C.B., C.M., C.C.V.O., D.S.O., First
Sea Lord.

Field-Marshal Sir H.H. Wilson, Bart.,
G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the
Imperial General Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hankey, G.C.B.,
Secretary.
THE TURKISH PEACE TREATY.

With reference to War Cabinet 619, Minute 1, the Cabinet had before them the following documents in connection with the Turkish Peace Treaty, and more particularly the question of the future of Constantinople:

- Memoranda by the Secretary of State for India (Papers C.P.-326 and C.P.-382):
- A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (Paper C.P.-342):
- Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Papers C.P.-375 and C.P.-392):
- A French Note and Memoranda by the British Peace Delegation regarding the Turkish Settlement, December, 1919 (Paper C.P.-391):
- A Note by Sir Maurice Hankey, containing the record of various statements made by Mr Balfour during the Peace Conference, Paris, in regard to the future of Constantinople.

It was explained to the Cabinet that the question was one of great urgency, in view of the forthcoming Allied Conference in Paris. The subject had been discussed on the previous day at a preliminary Conference between the Ministers at the head of the Departments principally concerned. The question had then been recognised to be one of extraordinary difficulty, and a good deal of difference of opinion had arisen.

The Prime Minister gave the Cabinet a summary of the discussion at this Conference, the Minutes of which are attached in Appendix I. He explained that no decision had been reached, but the Secretary had been instructed to circulate Mr Balfour's statements, already referred to, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in conjunction with the First Sea Lord, had been asked to report on the following question:

"Assuming that the Turk remains in Constantinople, what force, Naval and Military, is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, and where should that force be placed; the alternative suppositions being that the enemy consisted of

- (i) Russians,
- (ii) Russians and Germans combined".

A Sir Maurice Hankey
A Naval Appreciation of the Turkish Situation, in reply to the question put on the previous day, was then read to the Cabinet (Appendix II).

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave a summary of the Military Appreciation. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson's document was subsequently handed to the Secretary, and is attached in Appendix III. The conclusions reached therein are as follows:

(i) Control of the Black Sea can only be assured by the maintenance of a superior Allied Fleet based on the Bosporus, but for the purposes of protecting the Straits against attack light Naval forces should provide a reasonable degree of security.

(ii) Assuming the frontiers of Turkey in Europe to extend to the Zonos-Midia line, and assuming that the Sultan and the Turkish Government remain in Constantinople, a total of two Allied Divisions should be sufficient for peace-time.

(iii) This force might be somewhat reduced if Turkey in Europe is limited to the area between the Bosporus and the Tchatalcha lines.

(iv) If, on the other hand, the Sultan and the Turkish Government were removed into Asia Minor, the whole military position would be altered to our disadvantage, for in peace we should lose both knowledge of his plans and power to check his preparations, and the powerful deterrent from evil-doing of our having the Sultan and the whole of his Government under our guns would have disappeared. If, therefore, the Sultan and his Government are removed from Constantinople, a much larger garrison would be required, and a more elaborate system of defence, especially on the Asia Minor side, where a veritable frontier with all its disadvantages and bickerings and constant aggravations would have to be set up.

In reply to various questions, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff explained that he had contemplated that the whole garrison of the area of Constantinople and the Straits would have to consist of Allied troops. He did not consider that forces raised from the local non-Turkish population of these regions could be relied on. This would apply whether the Sultan was kept in Constantinople or not. He amplified his reasons for thinking that the military position would be altered to our disadvantage if the Sultan was removed from...
Constantinople. In that event it would be much harder, in time of peace, to get to know what military movements were in progress in the territories of Asia Minor under the Sultan's control. In that event, if hostilities should arise, the Allies would have to deal with regular Turkish forces under the control of the Government of the Sultan, whereas if the Sultan and his Government were in Constantinople they would only have to deal with insurgent forces of the type of those raised by Mustapha Kemal. Finally, if the Sultan were removed from Constantinople, the International State would have a frontier coterminous with the Turkish State, and this would have to be guarded. In his view the proposal to reduce this frontier by drawing a line from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora across the Peninsula of Ismid, and from the Sea of Marmora to the Mediterranean to cover the Dardanelles, leaving the Turks on the littoral of the Sea of Marmora, was not a sound one from a military point of view. It would place the Turks between the two Allied positions, and put the Naval communications through the Sea of Marmora in jeopardy. When reminded that under the present proposals the Turks would be disarmed and the Turkish shore of the Sea of Marmora neutralised, he pointed out that if the Russians were hostile they might arm the Turks. He had not yet worked out the strength of the force required to hold the boundary between the International State and the Turkish State, but it would involve a force considerably in excess of the 30,000 men he estimated as necessary to maintain the freedom of the Straits with the Sultan and his Government in Constantinople. The Allied forces now in Turkey were quite insufficient to establish any boundary whatsoever with Mustapha Kemal. As regards the Balkan lines, he considered a single battalion sufficient. He had not contemplated that the Sultan would be allowed any military force within the area of Constantinople and the Straits.
In the course of the discussion it was pointed out that the burden on the Allies of maintaining 30,000 men at or about Constantinople would be very considerable, and the whole of this burden would fall on Great Britain, France, and Italy. If Italy stood out Great Britain and France would have to supply contingents of 15,000 men apiece. It was suggested that some part of this force might be raised locally, or that a foreign legion might be enrolled. It was pointed out, however, that any local contingent would probably consist largely of Greeks, who would busy themselves with Hellenistic propaganda. It was stated, however, that provided the Sultan was retained in Constantinople, Indian troops could furnish part of the British contingent.

Attention was drawn to the very great military commitments already assumed by the British Empire in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Persia, &c. This was recognised as a strong argument against the adoption of any system that would increase the burden of forces to be maintained for Constantinople and the Straits.

It was pointed out that under the proposals worked out between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot, it had been contemplated that the Turkish State should be placed under a regime of strict control which would render the maintenance of any considerable Turkish military forces extremely difficult. On the other hand, the view was expressed that one of the objects of removing the Sultan from Constantinople was to give Turkey a greater measure of independence than would otherwise be possible, and it was suggested that the control now contemplated was too stringent. It was explained, however, that control was necessary partly for financial reasons, but also in order to secure the protection of Armenians and other subject-races. In this connection it was urged that if control was imperative it was not a good plan to have two systems, one for the control of Constantinople and the Straits, and another for the control of the Turks in Asia Minor. It would be better to combine them by a single control over a
Sultan and Government retained in Constantinople. This would have the additional advantage of meeting the Indian and Egyptian objections to the removal of the Sultan.

Among the arguments against the retention of the Sultan at Constantinople, which had been more fully stated at the Conference on the previous day (Appendix I), it was urged that one effect of maintaining the Sultan with his Government in Constantinople would be to reduce him to a mere puppet. He and his Ministers would have to rely for their protection on the allied garrison. The position of the Sultan would, therefore, be inferior to that of the Khedive of Egypt, who, at any rate, was surrounded by his own troops. The Turkish nation would be reduced to a mere vassal nation, and the Allies would virtually be assuming responsibility for the government of Anatolia. Would it really be possible, it was asked, for the Allied Powers to exercise effective control over Turkey through a Sultan and a Government in such a state of vassalage? How, it was asked, could pressure be applied? Supposing, for example, a Christian were murdered and the Sultan was unwilling or unable to punish the murderers, would it be necessary to remove him or his Government? What effect would that produce in India or Egypt? At the present time the Sultan was completely under the power of the Allies, but they were totally unable to control events in Asia Minor, and such movements as that of Mustapha Kemal. As regards the argument used that the Germans had not been deprived of Berlin, nor the Austrians of Vienna, it was pointed out that the analogy was not at all close. Berlin and Vienna were German and Austrian cities respectively, but in Constantinople only a minority of the population was Turkish. During the late war the Straits had been closed against the Allies, with the result that the War had been prolonged for years. Surely, it would be a serious weakness to leave the Sultan still master of the position, where he would be able to continue...
continue the old Turkish game of intrigue and playing off one Power against the other. History had taught us that the Turk was a danger to the peace of the world. If the Sultan were left in Constantinople, it was suggested that either Turkey would be reduced to the position of Egypt, or else Asia Minor would throw off the allegiance of the Sultan. It was urged that all the arguments in favour of retaining the Sultan at Constantinople were "short-range" arguments, and that, on a longer view of the situation, it would be found that British trade and British interests generally would be better served by taking advantage of the present opportunity which might never recur to get rid of Turkish rule there.

Attention was drawn to the statement made by the Prime Minister in his speech to the Trades Union leaders in January 1918, that it was proposed to leave the Sultan in the homelands of the Turkish race with his capital at Constantinople. It was recalled, however, that this statement had been made with a view to its effect on the War rather than on the eventual peace, and that it contained offers to other Governments besides the Turks which had not been fulfilled.

In regard to the objections to leaving the Sultan in Constantinople, it was suggested that he might be allowed a personal guard, and that the policing of Constantinople might be left to the Turkish Government. Pressure on the Sultan by removing him or his Ministers would have to be exercised with the utmost discretion, and such drastic steps would be reserved only for the most serious occasions.

While it was generally recognised that the question was one of the utmost difficulty, and that very great disadvantages were involved whether the Sultan were allowed to remain at Constantinople or not, on a balance of the various arguments, it was by a considerable majority agreed—

(a) That the Sultan and his Government should be allowed to remain at Constantinople without
any Turkish force in this region under his control beyond possibly a guard and a police force:

(b) That Constantinople and the region of the Straits should be garrisoned by an international force of which the British Empire would have to contribute a part:

(c) That in notifying to the forthcoming Conference in Paris this rejection of the provisional decision taken at the London Conference, the Prime Minister should have discretion to state that the premature disclosure of the previous decision in the French Press, and the numerous articles throwing the odium on to the British Government, had had great weight with the British Cabinet.

(A note of dissent by Lord Curzon to these Conclusions has been circulated (C.P.407).

The Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggesting that the Cabinet should authorise, as a permanent arrangement, the addition to its Secretariat of a seconded member of the Treasury Staff (C.P.-332).

The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that, in former days, before any large question of policy involving expenditure was brought before the Cabinet, it had been customary for the Department concerned to thrash it out in its financial details with the Treasury. During the War, however, owing to the great pressure of business, this practice had gradually been dropped, and the custom had grown up of bringing such questions before the Cabinet without previous consultation with the Treasury. His proposals were made with the object of providing some check on this practice, and he appealed to his colleagues to avoid it in future as far as possible.

On the understanding that the constitutional right of a Minister to raise questions at the Cabinet, whether on the Agenda or not, was not prejudiced, the Cabinet agreed --

To approve the proposals in C.P.332.

Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1.
January 5, 1920.
CONCLUSIONS of a Conference held at 10 Downing Street, S.W., on MONDAY, JANUARY 5th, 1920, at 4-30 p.m.

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister (in the Chair)

The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. the Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. E. Montagu, M.P., Secretary of State for India.


The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.


The Right Hon. W.S. Churchill, M.P., Secretary of State for War & Air.

The Right Hon. Sir A. Geddes, K.C.B., M.P., President, Board of Trade.

The following were also present:-

Field Marshal Sir H.H. Wilson, Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Mr. Philip Kerr.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir M.P.A. Hamkey, G.C.B., Secretary.

Lieut.-Colonel L. Storr, C.B., Assistant Secretary.
ADRIATIC.
1. With reference to Cabinet 18(19) Minute 5, in view of the expected arrival the same evening of Signor Nitti and Signor Scialoja, the Italian President to the Council and Foreign Minister, the Conference had a short discussion on the subject of Fiume and the Adriatic, which was adjourned until the Prime Minister had seen Signor Nitti.

THE TURKISH PEACE TREATY.
2. The Conference had before them the following documents relating to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey:

   Memoranda by the Secretary of State for India, (C.P. 326 and C.P. 382).
   Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, (C.P. 342).
   Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (C.P. 375).

   General agreement was expressed with the following four principles set forth in M. Bertholot's note of the 12th December, 1919 (Page 5 of C.P. 375):

   (1) Turkish militarism, like Prussian militarism, must be crushed.

   (2) The custody of the Straits, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, to be entrusted to an international organisation which shall effectively secure their neutrality and free passage.

   (3) The Armenians to be freed from Turkish domination.

   (4) The Arab and Syrian populations not to be handed back to the domination of the Turk.

   The general line of negotiations between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Bertholot was criticised on the following grounds: although it had been understood that Lord Curzon and M. Bertholot were to prepare alternative plans, the report of their conference revealed only one plan which was to turn the Turk out of Constantinople. Further, the Khalif was not even to be granted a residence at Roum. Again, the suggestion which had been put forward
by the Secretary of State for India and concurred in by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the Turk should remain in nominal sovereignty over all the country which the Prime Minister in January 1913 declared should be his, but that we should compel him to leave the administration of Turkey in Europe to an International Commission governing on his behalf, had apparently been dismissed without any consideration. Great stress was laid upon the effect which the expulsion of the Turk would have in India. It was asserted that secret information had been received to the effect that, from the moment this Treaty was signed, we should have for the first time a movement, comparable to the Sinn Fein movement, breaking out in India, in favour of complete separation from England. The stigma and onus of such a Peace would be upon the British Empire, a fact of which the French would take the fullest advantage; the French papers were already saying that it was now up to the French to protect the interests of Mohammedans. Attention was drawn to the following extract from one of the discussions between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Berthelot (Page 19 of C.P. 375), "Lord Curzon said that on the assumption that something like the present proposals of the Peace Terms with Turkey were accepted by the other Allies, he hoped that the military difficulties of imposing them on Turkey would not be ignored; it would be disastrous to dictate a peace that the Allies had not the military strength to enforce;" and the Conference was urged to consider the importance of looking at the military aspect of the question and to consider what forces and what length of time would be required to impose such a Peace. Again, the proposed Peace would not be a fait accompli as it would inevitably involve further fighting/
fighting. From the point of view of India and of the position of the British Empire as a great Mohammedan power the present proposals were the worst that had yet been suggested as they leave no free Turkey at all, the "Sultan" disappears, and Santa Sofia is for the first time touched and was to become an international monument. The view was expressed that at a previous Conference it had been agreed that the Turk should be left at Constantinople with titular sovereignty, and with the Straits under an International Commission; this was precisely the kind of settlement mutatis mutandis which was put forward by the Conference itself for the administration of Adrianople and Smyrna; why then could it not be also adopted for Constantinople? Again, nothing was said in the Foreign Office document as to what would happen in Syria. There were rumours that the French had put certain propositions to Feisal which he had either rejected or opposed. It was not clear whether the French intended virtually to annex Syria, which would be contrary to our agreement with them of November, 1918; if so, Feisal might make common cause with the Turk and eventually with the Bolsheviks. This would mean that we should have trouble in Persia, then with Feisal, then with the Bolsheviks, and finally with the Turks, if we turned them out of their Capital. It was urged that our course should be to achieve the four points cited above, with as little disturbance of the map as possible. We had destroyed Austria which would cause endless trouble, and it was disastrous to destroy Turkey also. We should tell the Turks that we intended to keep them in order but we also intended to help them. If we raze every fort along the Straits, limit the Turkish army, control Constantinople with the Sultan there under our eye, set up an International Commission and an International Police Force, the Turk must be helpless. The Sultan and/
and his Government could be much more effectively con­
trolled if he remained at Constantinople than if he was
objected. It was stated that Sir George Lloyd, the
Governor of Bombay, who had before his departure for India
favoured turning the Turk out, was now of the opinion that
it would be the greatest possible mistake to do this. With
the exception of Colonel Wilson and Miss Bell, all Indian and
Mesopotamian experts including Sir George Roos-Keppel, Sir
M. O'Dwyer and Lord Willingdon, shared Sir George Lloyd's
view. The progressive boycott of British goods and a
general refusal of all Government measures had been organ­
ised in India to meet the contingency of this Treaty being
signed.

Attention was drawn to the larger aspect of the case.
The Bolsheviks had now a very powerful army, consisting of
all their best troops, which had been withdrawn from the
Kolchoch front in order to crush Denikin, down in South
Russia, and they would shortly be in touch with Turkish
Nationalists. They were probably already in possession
of Krasnovodsk. Every day they were making great strides
towards the East, in the direction of Bokhara and Afghan­
istan. They were carrying out a regular, scientific, and
comprehensive scheme of propaganda in Central Asia against
the British. We ourselves had no military forces wherewith
to oppose them; in fact, at the moment, our troops were at
their lowest ebb and we shortly should not have a single
friend from Constantinople to China. We could not, of course
stem all this by keeping the Sultan at Constantinople, but
to turn him out would be to add one more spark to the
spreading conflagration.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff expressed the
view that if we wished to retain power over the Turk we
should leave the Sultan in Constantinople. If we blew up
the forts in the Dardanelles there would be no further
danger, and a single policeman on shore with a Guard-ship in the harbour would suffice to secure the Straits. In reply to a question, General Wilson said that there were at present in Constantinople about 13,000 or 14,000 British troops and one French Division. With the collapse of Denikin the Caspian would fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks who could then land at Enzeli and create disturbance in North Persia. The unrest would spread to Afghanistan, which was already very unsettled, and also to India which was reported to be in a more dangerous state to-day than it had been for the last thirty years. We had enough troops on the spot to hold Mesopotamia and Constantinople but only just enough, and if the Kurds joined the Bolsheviks our position would be precarious. It was very difficult to decide where best to defend India. One line of defence might be Batoum-Baku, but this would only be possible if the Turks were friendly to us. All military opinion was opposed to ejecting the Turk from Constantinople.

It was suggested that the Naval and Military Authorities should be asked to consider how we could make the Dardanelles and the entrance to the Black Sea secure, and whether the Turk could, or could not improvise fortifications on the islands to prevent this.

It was stated that, in respect of the Naval and Military measures to be taken to secure the Dardanelles, in the opinion of the Naval Authorities it would not make much difference whether the Sultan were or were not at Constantinople.
In reply to these criticisms it was pointed out:—

(a) That it was not our fault that alternative plans were not submitted. M. Clemenceau had thought it best that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Berthelot should meet and state the views of their respective Governments. Before they met M. Berthelot had handed to Lord Curzon a paper which, to the latter's surprise, was not a basis of discussion but a complete surrender to our view;

(b) That, as regards the Vatican solution, this had been put forward for discussion at the recent Anglo-French Conference, but it had been absolutely ruled out by M. Clemenceau who declared that one "Papa" was enough;

(c) In regard to Santa Sofia, there was no great objection to leaving this as a Mosque, although the 470 years it had been a Mosque were more than balanced by the 920 years of Christian occupation;

(d) Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot had not been authorised to discuss Syria. Officially we had not been informed of what had passed in Paris; but we had received unofficial reports that the French proposed a virtually French protectorate, which was strongly opposed by Feisal, who had consulted Lord Curzon as to the line he should take and had been advised by him to consult the Peace Conference. Feisal had given innumerable assurances to us that in no case would he intrigue with the Turk, but that he would accept whatever solution we suggested that was consistent with his honour.

(e) It was not correct to say that we propose to abolish a free Turkey in Asia Minor and place the Turks in manacles. The proposal of the Conference was to give the Turk Anatolia as far as Cilicia in the South, and up to the boundaries of Armenia to the North-East. Moreover it was hoped to get the Greeks out of Smyrna by giving them compensation in Thrace. The Turkish exasperation was mainly due to this Greek occupation of Smyrna, and the desire of Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot was that Anatolia, free from any mandate and free/
free from Greeks and Italians—should be in Turkish hands. It was pointed out that there were good reasons for the much criticised financial control; there were the interests to be considered of the bond-holders of the pre-war Ottoman debt; even after allowing for the portion of the interest to be paid by the occupied territories, £3 million sterling would have to be received annually from Turkey. Unless we took control of the Turkish finances, how would we possibly maintain the cost of the armies of occupation? Moreover the trade of the British empire would be lost if Turkey fell into chaos. Our trade before the war with Turkey was 26% as against Germany's 14% and France's 12%; in other words, British commercial interests had been nearly twice those of any other Power. Loss of trade in Anatolia meant thousands out of work in Manchester. It was suggested that although there might be considerable agitation in India over the Turkish Treaty, this agitation was a fictitious one, was organised by familiar methods and would be short-lived. As regards the various experts quoted it was pointed out that, besides Col. Wilson and Miss Bell, two ex-Viceroys, Lord Curzon and Lord Hardinge with the combined experience of twelve years of India, were of the opposite view; and they were supported by Admirals Calthorpe and de Robeck, who had represented this country at Constantinople, and had repeatedly expressed their considered opinion that the Turk should go. This was also the view of the two Foreign Office officials, now at Constantinople, Mr. Hohler and Mr. Ryan (dragoman 30 years in Turkey and suspected of pro-Turk sympathy) and an extract from a dispatch from Mr. Hohler was read to the Conference in which the following words occurred: "a certain lesson to be derived from history is that the Turk is incapable of governing himself much less other nations .... There is a great risk of over estimating Moslem feeling." The Turk is a born hereditary intriguer, and for centuries had been a blight and curse to Europe; and it was urged that a unique opportunity now presented itself for removing a festering sore. Egyptian expert opinion was also stated to be divided.
(Col. Wilson's telegram No. 341 of the 23rd January, 1919 was read to the Conference, emphasising the importance of ejecting the Ottoman Government from Constantinople. It was pointed out that the then Commander-in-Chief, General Marshall had concurred in this view, and it was stated that Col. Wilson adhered to-day to the opinion he then expressed.)

In respect of the military arguments, it was pointed out that the Military problem might be reduced in proportion, but it would not be solved by leaving the Turk in Constantinople. The problem was Mustapha Kemal, who was a nationalist and snapped his fingers at the Sultan. What had to be faced in the future was a nationalist movement. Was that menace made greater or less by leaving the Turk in Constantinople? This was a disputable point. If he were left there, the whole Moslem world would say that he had triumphed after all. Twice had the Allies come to a decision to eject the Turk. First early in the war when Russia was to go there. This, when published by Kerensky did not raise a flutter. The second occasion was in 1917 at an International Conference when Mr. Balfour wrote a dispatch to the United States restating the whole position, and urging the ejection of the Turk.

(In regard to the reference which had been made to the Prime Minister's statement on war aims, the following extract was read out from the Minutes of the Meeting of the War Cabinet held on January 3rd 1918, War Cabinet 313, Minute 3.

"The Prime Minister urged that the War Cabinet should not neglect to consider the drafts from the point of view of their value as a counter offensive to the German peace move ..... It was essential that this statement should be regarded rather as a war move than as a peace move..... What kept the Turks fighting was the fear of dismemberment and of losing Constantinople. If they knew they would retain the Turkish part of their empire, they might be much less inclined to fight .....")
It was suggested that if the Turks were left at Constantinople there would be a potential head of the Pan-Turanian movement in the old sacred city, that that movement would be thereby invested with a high significance and the dangers envisaged by the C.I.G.S. would be accentuated.

On the other hand the importance of having Turkey under control was again strongly urged. It was pointed out that the Foreign Office document would leave no Turkey at all. However, if we decided to accept it we should be in a much better position to enforce it if we had the Turk under supervision at Constantinople. It was suggested that Clemenceau had in mind, if there were International control of the Straits, the other Powers would gradually get tired of it and the French would take the opportunity to pose as the friends of Islam while we should appear as the enemies of Turkey. The control of the Straits was absolutely necessary and this would be easier if we had Constantinople. The present Government of India was unanimous that it would be disastrous to remove the Sultan. The same view was held in Egypt and Field Marshal Allenby had stated that his position would be rendered most difficult if the Turk were ejected from his Capital. Similarly, in Mesopotamia if we alienated the Turk our work would become impossible.

It was suggested that it was not correct to ensure that official opinion was unanimous on this question, as many Egyptian officials were known to advocate turning the Turk out. It was recalled that Balfour had never swerved from the view that the Turk ought to go. Supposing the Turk were left in Constantinople with a Guard-ship permanently stationed there, it was possible that some power would be easier if we had Constantinople. The present Government of India was unanimous that it would be disastrous to remove the Sultan. The same view was held in Egypt and Field Marshal Allenby had stated that his position would be rendered most difficult if the Turk were ejected from his
start intriguing. The contingency of a hostile Russia could not be ignored, particularly in view of the probable victory of the Bolshevists, and we had certainly done our best to estrange the Bolshevists who had greater reason to hate us than any other Power; but a victorious Bolshevist Russia would be infinitely more powerful with the Turk at Constantinople. In the event of war with Russia and an attack on India and Persia the first effort would be to block the Bosphorus. Surely a Russia in alliance with Turkey and perhaps Germany would find some means to achieve this. By sending Marshal von Bieberstein, a clever diplomatist, to Turkey Germany had before the war entirely superseded British influence at Constantinople. This did not support the view that any permanent and reliable friendship could be made with the Turks. Who were the Turks? Often indifferent and unreliable people like Tallat and Enver who had somehow forced their way to the top. The Allies would be regarded as rather "soft" for after being so severely let down by the Turks we said "We will trust you now and allow you to remain." If the Sultan were removed from Constantinople it was pointed out that there would be an International Army which would command the Straits. It was suggested, however, that if the Turk were turned out of Constantinople he should be given a greater measure of independence than was contemplated at present; and that the proper policy was to leave the Turk the same measure of freedom and independence as Persia now enjoyed.

As regards the suggestion that the Turks might refuse to sign the Treaty, it was pointed out that the Allies, in order to enforce the Treaty, had no necessity to advance into Turkey, since they were already in occupation of all the districts to be wrested from the Turk, e.g. Constantinople, Smyrna, Cilicia, Syria, etc. They could even, moreover, occupy Brusa or refuse to evacuate Konia. It was suggested that the Moslems were not likely to play the Bolshevist game as their mentality was entirely different. In any event, he was not more likely to unite with the Bolshevists because the Turk remained in Constantinople.
On the contrary, with the Turk in Constantinople, the Bolshevist would have an overwhelming inducement to conquer that city. If the Turks were relegated to Anatolia, the Bolshevists would get little by attempting to co-operate with them, owing to the indifferent communications. A suggestion was made that whether the Sultan was at Constantinople or not, there would be an international force guarding the Straits, and it would be better that the Sultan should be allowed to stay in Constantinople where he would be more immediately under the control of that force.

The Conference was reminded that the policy of the British delegates in Paris had always been to get the United States to undertake the policing and control of the Straits and Constantinople. If the United States now joined the proposed International Commission, it would mean that Russia would not attack unless she intended to wage reckless war upon the whole world.

The view was put forward that at the time when Lord Curzon was Viceroy of India, and in the early days of Lord Hardinge's tenure it would have been most unlikely that to eject the Turk from Constantinople would have raised any really formidable agitation. Since those days, however, an ominous change of feeling had come over the inhabitants of India largely owing to the reversal of Lord Curzon's policy. We could no longer rely upon India's public opinion and support. The weak policy of the Indian Government in the early days of the war had had a bad effect. The feeling of unrest and hostility to Great Britain in India could, however, be mitigated by letting the Sultan remain in Constantinople with an international force controlling the Straits.
It was agreed that it was desirable that the Military and Naval Experts should examine without delay what military and naval forces would be required to keep the Straits open. After some discussion as to the terms of reference to the Experts it was decided:

(a) That the C.I.G.S. in conjunction with the First Sea Lord assuming that the Turk remains in Constantinople should consider and report with the least possible delay what force naval and military is necessary to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, and where that force should be placed, the alternative suppositions being that the enemy consisted of

(i) Russians.
(ii) Russians and Germans combined.
(The First Lord undertook to notify the First Sea Lord of the above decision).

(b) That the Secretary should circulate to the Cabinet, copies of the Memorandum which Mr. Balfour prepared for the United States on the subject of the Turkish Peace.

2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

6th January, 1925.
APPENDIX II.

NAVAL APPRECIATION OF TURKISH SITUATION IN REPLY
TO QUESTION PUT BY THE CABINET.

(a) Black Sea.

If a reconstituted Russia maintains a big Fleet in the Black Sea it would be necessary to keep a corresponding Naval force at Constantinople if the assured command of the Black Sea were required.

A lesser degree of control could be ensured by a force of submarines and aircraft based on Constantinople. Such a force would act as a strong deterrent to an enemy in the Black Sea who contemplated landing a large force anywhere in the vicinity of Constantinople, either on the European or Asiatic shores.

In expressing the foregoing views, the assumptions are made:

Firstly: that Constantinople would be a safe Naval Base, i.e. that both sides of Bosphorus would be held by Allied Forces.

Secondly: that the Turkish Naval Forces in the Aegean Sea, Sea of Marmora, and Black Sea, are limited to mere police work.

(b) Sea lines of Communication between Great Britain and Constantinople.

With the safety of the passage through the Dardanelles guaranteed from the land side, the Admiralty can guarantee sea lines of communication between home ports and Black Sea. Germany has no Mediterranean base, and any Naval Forces Germany may possess will be contained by British forces in home ports and in the Mediterranean.
NOTE BY THE NAVAL AND GENERAL STAFF ON
THE NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE
THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS ON THE SUPPOSITIONS THAT
THE ENEMY CONSISTS OF (a) THE RUSSIANS, AND (b) THE
RUSSIANS AND GERMANS COMBINED.

1. Assumptions.
   (a) That the Greeks are in occupation of Thrace at least
   as far East as the Enos-Eidia line and are friendly to us.
   (b) That the security of the Allied communications in the
   Mediterranean up to the J创始人elles can be assured by the Allied
   Navies.
   (c) That the Turks are only partially armed, and their
   fleet limited to police forces.

2. In the circumstances given in the problem it seems reasonable
   to suppose that our possible enemies might be increased by the
   addition of Bulgaria and Turkey. Prompt action by the former
   in the direction of Constantinople would not be easy, firstly,
   because it would be necessary to penetrate the buffer State of
   Grecian Thrace and secondly, because she would have to be certain
   that Roumania and Serbia were neutral or effectively neutralised.

3. The early intervention by Russia depends mainly on her
   power to transport troops across the Black Sea. The Naval Staff
   is of opinion that if a reconstituted Russia maintains a big
   Fleet in the Black Sea, it would be necessary to keep a corresponding
   naval force at Constantinople if the assured command of the
   Black Sea were required.

   A lesser degree of control could be ensured by a force of
   submarines and aircraft based on Constantinople. Such a force
   would act as a strong deterrent to an enemy in the Black Sea who
   contemplated landing a large force anywhere in the vicinity of
   Constantinople, either on the European or Asiatic shores.
The accession of Germany would not affect the military problem in the early stages since she could not intervene for a considerable time, whilst from the naval point of view her action could only be directed towards improving the efficiency of the Russian fleet.

4. From the above it is reasonable to suppose that the Allies could reinforce Constantinople by sea via the Dardanelles considerably quicker than any of our enemies could concentrate for its attack and the problem therefore is reduced to providing a peace garrison which can secure both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus against attack by the Turks alone, and this again is qualified by assumption (c). Another factor bearing on the problem is the extent of territory left to the Turks in Europe. The area up to the Enos-Midia line contains a population of 1½ millions and although in the time of peace it should be possible to maintain the comparatively effective control of arms in this area, the fact remains that on the outbreak of war some 60 miles of coast line on the Black Sea would be left in possibly hostile hands. Further, a certain number of Allied troops would be swallowed up in watching the Tehataltcha lines and the Bulair Isthmus. These could be dispensed with if the Greek occupation stretched down to the Tehataltcha lines. A description of these two positions is attached in Annex A. Taking into consideration the fact that we shall be acting on interior lines, with complete control of the Sea of Marmora, and supported on all flanks by the Navy, with the possible exception of that resting on the Black Sea, it is considered that two Brigades should be sufficient in the first instance to secure the Tehataltcha lines against a coup de main, whilst if all fixed defences on the Gallipoli Peninsula are destroyed a maximum of one Battalion in the Bulair lines should be ample so long as the Greeks maintain their position in Thrace; this Battalion would not of course be necessary if Grecian Thrace was brought as far East as the Tehataltcha lines.
5. On the Asiatic side we must cover the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The determining feature in both cases is the capacity of the communications available for a hostile attack. Taking the Dardanelles first, a description is given in Annex B, from which it will be seen that the country is unfavourable for the movement of large bodies of troops and particularly for heavy artillery, although the extent of front to be covered is considerable. Assuming, however, that our intelligence is good, it should be very difficult for the enemy to concentrate sufficient forces, and particularly the heavy artillery necessary to close the Straits against the passage of our ships, it being assumed, of course, that all fixed seaward defences have been destroyed. In peace time it is considered, therefore, that one Brigade in the neighbourhood of Chanak and a second Brigade at Kum Kale should be sufficient, provided that the Turks are debarred from maintaining or bringing any armed men across the Chan Chai-Mender Chai line (20 miles east of the Dardanelles).


This is the most dangerous line of advance, since it is approached by the Anatolian Railway, though otherwise the communications are not particularly favourable. The railway, from between Ishmid and Scutari, is, however, in several places exposed to fire from the sea, and it is thought that the addition of two Brigades to those already detailed for the Toncaltcha lines should be a sufficient insurance in the first instance. This would give a total in the Bosphorus area of one Division, plus one Brigade, capable of acting on either side of the Straits. The question of naval control in the Black Sea would, however, have an important bearing on this question, and it would be necessary for the Navy to ensure that Russian troops could not be landed within striking distance of the Bosphorus at an early stage.
The Naval Staff is of opinion that even in the face of a superior Russian Fleet the adequate provision of Allied light naval forces (submarines, seaplanes, etc.) should render such an operation exceedingly hazardous.

7. The strengths of garrisons required must always depend very largely on the extent to which Turkish forces can be prevented from arming and on receipt of timely information of an impending attack in order that necessary reinforcements can be provided in time. It is considered that both these objects would be served if the Sultan and the Turkish Government can be maintained in Constantinople. Apart from the fact that a gradual change in the orientation of Turkish policy in favour of the Allies might thereby result, it is considered that the task of preparing and launching a surprise attack against the Allies would be extremely difficult so long as the Turkish Government remained under our military control.

6. Conclusions.
(i) Control of the Black Sea can only be assured by the maintenance of a superior Allied fleet based on the Bosphorus, but for the purposes of protecting the Straits against attack light naval forces should provide a reasonable degree of security.

(ii) Assuming the frontiers of Turkey in Europe to extend to the Enos - Midia line, and assuming that the Sultan and the Turkish Government remain in Constantinople a total of two Allied divisions should be a sufficient insurance in peace time.

(iii) This force might be somewhat reduced if Turkey in Europe is limited to the area between the Bosphorus and the Tchal-Altcha lines.

(iv) If on the other hand the Sultan and the Turkish Government were removed into Asia Minor the whole military position would
would be altered to our disadvantage, for in peace we should lose both knowledge of his plans and power to check his preparations and the powerful deterrent from evil doing of our having the Sultan and the whole of his Government under our guns would have disappeared. If, therefore, the Sultan and his Government are removed from Constantinople a much larger garrison would be required, and a more elaborate system of defence, especially on the Asia Minor side, where a veritable frontier with all its disadvantages and bickerings and constant aggravations would have to be set up.

(Inter) H.W.
C.I.G.S. F.W.

DEFENSIVE LINES IN THRACE.

The CHATALJA lines form the principal lines of defence of CONSTANTINOPLE against attack by land from the west. The peninsula of CHATALJA is about 45 miles in length and 25 miles in breadth. The CHATALJA lines extend right across this peninsula at a distance of about 20 miles from CONSTANTINOPLE. They consist of a line of detached forts along a prominent ridge which crosses the peninsula at right angles at a point where it has been narrowed by lakes on either flank, the whole forming a position of exceptional strength.

The only road from ADRIANOPLE, the only metal road entering CONSTANTINOPLE from the west, crosses the lines on the extreme left of the defences.

The best and most probable lines of advance on CONSTANTINOPLE are along the railway and the LULEBURGAS - CHORLU road. A secondary line of advance lies through KIRK KLISSA, SERAI and CHERKESSEKIUI. There are no roads through the wooded hilly districts along the BLACK SEA coast.

THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.

The GALLIPOLI peninsula is protected by the BULAIR lines which face north east at the head of the peninsula, 7 miles north of GALLIPOLI town. Before the War, these lines consisted of three separate systems which, during the War have been considerably strengthened, and provide complete protection against invasion from the mainland for the DARDANELLES forts. The total length from sea to sea is about 7,000 yards, and in the hands of a Power commanding the sea on both flanks is an extremely strong position.

The only metal road in the peninsula runs from GALLIPOLI town through the BULAIR lines to KAVAK and thence to ADRIANOPLE and RODOSTO.

Apart from a landing at RODOSTO or some other point on the Sea of MARMORA, any advance on the BULAIR lines would be made from the general direction of ADRIANOPLE and would be confined to the one metalled road from UZUN KEUPRI to KESHAN and KAVAK.

The nearest Railhead to the peninsula is at KESIAN, which is 30 to 40 miles north west of the BULAIR lines. This is a branch of the main CONSTANTINOPLE - ADRIANOPLE line.
ANNEX "B".

DEFENCES ON THE ASIATIC SHORE OF THE BOSPHORUS.

The total length of the BOSPHORUS, including numerous windings, is 17 miles, the breadth averages 1½ miles but is only 700 yards at its narrowest part opposite KAVITLI.

The country on the Asiatic shore is much more difficult for military operations than that on the European side.

The ALEM BAGH and its minor ramifications are steep and difficult with numerous small ravines and few cart tracks. This range is some 8 to 10 miles east of the BOSPHORUS.

The objective of an enemy advance from the east would be this crest which overlooks all the forts of the defences.

The principal line of communications is by the ANATOLIAN Railway from ESKISHEHR and ISKID, and this would appear to be the only feasible line of advance, but beyond ISKID it is commanded from the sea.

DEFENCES ON THE ASIATIC SHORE OF THE DARDANELLES.

The length of the DARDANELLES STRAITS from the entrance (KUM KALE) to GALLIPOLI is about 40 miles. The country on the Asiatic shore would be extremely difficult for military operations. The only possible lines of advance appear to be:

(1) The partially metalled road from BRUSA and PANTELEIMA via BIGHA. This line could be cut from the sea at PANTERIMA.

(2) From BRUSA, via BALEKHISSAR and HREMID to EZILE and CHANAK, but this line is vulnerable from the sea for a considerable distance between HREMID and CHANAK.

The other routes in the BIGHA peninsula are cart tracks, in places very rough and bad, e.g., from TERZILER to BIYUK-TEPHOBUI and BIGHA.

The nearest railway is the PANTELEIMA - SMYRNA Railway (on an average 90 to 100 miles east of the Straits).

To safeguard the Asiatic shore it would seem desirable to hold UM KALE, CHANAK, BERGEZ and possibly CHARDAK, whilst a garrison at BIGHA would command the most likely line of approach.
I ASK to place on record my earnest and emphatic dissent from the decision arrived at by the majority of the Cabinet yesterday—in opposition to the advice of the Prime Minister and two successive Foreign Secretaries—to retain the Turk in Constantinople. I believe this to be a short-sighted and, in the long run, a most unfortunate decision.

In order to avoid trouble in India—largely manufactured and in any case ephemeral—and to render our task in Egypt less difficult—its difficulty being in reality almost entirely independent of what we may do or not do at Constantinople—we are losing an opportunity for which Europe has waited for nearly five centuries, and which may not recur. The idea of a respectable and docile Turkish Government at Constantinople, preserved from its hereditary vices by a military cordon of the Powers—including, be it remembered, a permanent British garrison of 10,000-15,000 men—is in my judgment a chimera.

Nor will it be found that the decision, if carried into effect in Paris, will either solve the Turkish problem or calm the Eastern world.

The Turk at Constantinople must have very different measure meted out to him from the Turk at Konia. He will retain a sovereignty which will have to be a mere simulacrum, and those who have saved him will, unless I am mistaken, presently discover that his rescue has neither satisfied him nor pacified Islam.

But beyond all I regret that the main object for which the war in the East was fought and the sacrifice of Gallipoli endured—namely, the liberation of Europe from the Ottoman Turk—has after an almost incredible expenditure of life and treasure been thrown away in the very hour when it had been obtained, and that we shall have left to our descendants—who knows after how much further sacrifice and suffering?—a task from which we have flinched.

I may add that the refusal of the Cabinet to endorse the scheme prepared by M. Berthelot and myself was resolved upon without any consideration by them of what the rival scheme will be, i.e., a Turkish State still centred at Constantinople but under international supervision. When produced it may cause some surprise.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.