



(c) crown copyright

Printed for the Cabinet. November 1952

129/56

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 67

C. (52) 395

6th November, 1952

CABINET

ANZUS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

My colleagues may be interested to read the attached letter from the Minister of State recording his conversations in New York with the Australian and New Zealand Ministers of External Affairs and the United States Secretary of State about the ANZUS Pact.

A. E.

*Foreign Office, S.W. 1,
6th November, 1952.*

It has been impossible for me to avoid some discussion on ANZUS. Casey constantly reverts to it, Webb has mentioned it more than once and Acheson has discussed it once. I have endeavoured to avoid any argument, on the ground that you would be talking to them about it when you came, preparatory to the discussions during the Commonwealth Conference in London. I have, however, mentioned the following points:—

- (1) Our exclusion was felt to impair our Commonwealth ties with Australia and New Zealand and also to impair our relations with the United States.
- (2) We are in a completely different position from France and the Philippines in the Pacific. We will go to war if Australia and New Zealand are attacked, whereas neither France nor the Philippines would necessarily do so.
- (3) We are a great naval power with possessions in the Pacific and have a great deal to contribute.
- (4) Any defence planning nowadays must be affected by global considerations. In the Atlantic the United States plan with us within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In the Middle East, we hope to have an organisation in which the United States, Australia and New Zealand will plan with us. Any South-East Asian planning obviously involves the four of us. Therefore, it seemed to me illogical that we should be excluded from defence planning in the Pacific. Of course, we knew that they would tell us what they had planned after they had planned it, but that was quite different from us being in on the planning.

I want to make it quite clear that I have not put forward these ideas as if they were the official presentation of Her Majesty's Government's case, but merely the way in which I myself see the matter.

Casey is obviously much worried, and says that this controversy is more dangerous to relations between Australia and the United Kingdom than any other that he has known.

The history of the matter, according to him, is that when in January 1950 the need for a Pacific Pact was first mooted by Australia at the Colombo Conference, no support was given by the United Kingdom. Throughout 1950 Australia

on a number of occasions reverted to the idea. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom gave any support. In the autumn of 1950 Australia made it clear to the United States that she would not sign the Japanese Peace Treaty unless she was given a guarantee against possible future aggression.

The United States Government then began to consider some arrangement to which the United Kingdom would be a partner. Mr. Dulles came to Tokyo to discuss it. The United Kingdom Government refused to have any part; therefore the idea of a pact limited to the United States, Australia and New Zealand was put forward at Canberra by Mr. Dulles. From February to September 1951 the United Kingdom Government were kept informed of the negotiations and at no time suggested that the United Kingdom should become a party. Casey added that in his view the United Kingdom Government were perfectly correct in that attitude. It was not necessary for all the members of the Commonwealth to be parties to all the treaties made by other members. He said that he could not understand the United Kingdom attitude and why we were "making a fuss." No one was keener than he upon the Empire and it was wounding to be accused of being lukewarm towards the British connection.

He further said that this treaty was essential for Australian security. It helped the United Kingdom because it relieved them of anxiety in the Pacific. If there was a war, it was unlikely that we would be able to send forces to the Pacific. It was geographically more appropriate that the Far East should be a United States responsibility.

If the United Kingdom persisted in its present actions the consequences would be either that the treaty would become a dead letter or that the United States would withdraw altogether. Australia could not afford to allow either of these contingencies to arise. The United States were determined not to have the United Kingdom in as observers, because they have been told that if they did, France and the Philippines would at once request similar status. The United States felt that if the United Kingdom came in, it was impossible to stop France and the Philippines. Under no circumstances would the United States have either France or the Philippines present at any realistic military discussions. Therefore the United States must refuse our request.

Casey thought that the United States were correct in this attitude because for security reasons it was impossible to have military talks of any value with the French and Philippines present. If the United Kingdom attended without the Philippines, it would be represented as a white man's pact, i.e., a pact with a colour bar.

Webb has been much less definite about the matter. As you know, he combines the Ministry of External Affairs with the Ministry for Island Territories and the Attorney-Generalship. I would guess that up to now, his other responsibilities have taken up most of his time. His attitude, putting it crudely, is that New Zealand is very sorry that there should be this trouble between friends. He regards ANZUS not as a substitute in any way for the Commonwealth Association, but simply as complementary to it.

Acheson wants us to appreciate the difficulty of his position *vis-à-vis* the French and the Philippines. He said that in his view both the French cyphers and the Quai d'Orsay were hopelessly insecure and therefore realistic military planning could not take place at present. So far as the Philippines were concerned they had objected strongly to their exclusion from ANZUS and had only been placated on the ground that the United Kingdom and France were also excluded. Then there were the recent Five-Power (ANZUS plus United Kingdom and France) discussions on South-East Asian defence. When that was announced, Romulo, of the Philippines, had come to Acheson's office and had wept and said that no Government friendly to the West could now survive in the Philippines. Acheson felt that if the United Kingdom came in any capacity to the ANZUS meetings it would seriously weaken the position of the present Philippines Government and turn the Asians even more against the United States. He just could not do it.

It may be that what is really worrying the Americans is the feeling that our participation will imply their automatic involvement in South-East Asia, but that point has not been stressed to me. In fact, Casey has said that Admiral Radford is all the time telling the United States authorities that any Pacific planning which does not include South-East Asia is a waste of time.