CABINET

RHODESIA

Note by the Prime Minister

I will give my colleagues, at our next meeting, a full account of the discussions which the Commonwealth Secretary and I have had with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Mr. Ian Smith. Meanwhile, Ministers may like to have the attached copies of the records of my talks with Mr. Smith. I need not emphasise the secrecy of these records or the delicacy of the situation in which we now find ourselves - a situation in which we and the Rhodesians have failed to agree but they have not yet committed themselves to any illegal action and we have not, therefore, finally broken off relations with them. In these circumstances it is imperative that we should refrain from any public action or statement which they could regard as provocative; and I therefore ask all Ministers to abstain from any public reference to the Rhodesian problem in the immediate future.

H.W.

10, Downing Street, S.W.1.

11th October, 1965
AGREED NOTE of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1., at 3.00 p.m. on THURSDAY, 7th OCTOBER, 1965

PRESENT:

The Prime Minister

The Lord Chancellor

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations

The Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations

Sir Burke Trend

The Hon. I.D. Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia

The Hon. W.J. Harper, Minister of Internal Affairs

The Hon. D. Lardner-Burke, Minister of Justice

The Hon. J.J. Wrathall, Minister of Finance

Mr. G.E. Clarke, Secretary to the Cabinet

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it might be most convenient to begin by summarising the position which had been reached as a result of the discussions between Mr. Smith and the Commonwealth Secretary on 5th and 6th October.

MR. SMITH said that it was now essential to bring matters to the point of final decision, not least in view of the damaging impact of uncertainty on the Rhodesian economy. The Government of Southern Rhodesia, as it then was, had agreed to attend the Victoria Falls Conference two years before on the assumption that the question of Rhodesian independence would be settled as soon as, or perhaps even before, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. He understood that the United Kingdom Government did not accept this contention. But, however, that might be, the Rhodesian hopes had been disappointed; and the Rhodesian Government had now reached a point at which they could not afford to wait any longer.

The discussions which he and his colleagues had had with the Commonwealth Secretary on the previous two days appeared to have set things back rather than to have advanced them. For example, it seemed that the United Kingdom Government no longer regarded the 1961 constitution as an acceptable basis of Rhodesian independence - whereas it was widely assumed throughout Rhodesia that, when this constitution was negotiated in 1961, it constituted the basis on which the country would proceed to sovereign independence. Again, the Rhodesian Government had been allowed to believe
that the United Kingdom insistence on a blocking mechanism related to the entrenched clauses in the constitution (where it would replace the existing provision for a referendum); but it now appeared that this mechanism was required for the type of normal constitutional amendment which the Government could effect at present by means of a two-thirds majority in the Legislature. In other words, the United Kingdom Government appeared to be imposing, as conditions of independence, fresh stipulations in relation to the management of the internal affairs of Rhodesia as well as to the conduct of her external policy. Whether the 1961 constitution had implied sovereign independence or not, it had certainly implied that the Government of Rhodesia would be free to manage their own internal affairs as they saw fit; but the changes which were now being proposed would give them less internal freedom than they had at present.

The United Kingdom Government seemed to be concerned only with the Africans in Rhodesia, not with the Europeans. If so, they were proceeding on purely racial lines. The proposal for a blocking mechanism in the form now put forward was clearly tailored to African needs; and, since even the blocking third (if the Rhodesian Government were prepared to concede it) would provide only a narrow margin of safeguard, it must be increased African representation which was the United Kingdom Government's real objective. But this was a quite different matter.

As an alternative to the referendum for the entrenched clauses the Rhodesian Government had offered a Senate which, although they had originally conceived it as consisting partly of Africans and partly of Europeans, they were now prepared to envisage as composed wholly of Africans, provided that they were Chiefs. In the two Houses sitting together these twelve Chiefs, with the fifteen African 'B' Roll members of the Legislature, would constitute a blocking third.

In addition, the Rhodesian Government were prepared to concede virtually universal adult suffrage on the 'B' Roll itself, to the extent of adding about 1 million African voters to that Roll. These, from Rhodesia's side, were real concessions.

The United Kingdom Government had felt unable to accept any of these proposals; and the Rhodesian Government had now to ask themselves, therefore, how this gulf, which was widening rather than contracting, could be bridged. They could not go on as they were. They realised that unilateral action would constitute a very grave decision and they had analysed the consequences very carefully. But it could cut both ways; and, in any event, it would be better, whatever its implications than merely acquiescing in a progressive decline of European standards. This was a matter of life and death.
for the Europeans in Rhodesia since the only alternative they saw to
independence was their eventual departure. In this respect the decision
which they faced was not wholly unlike the decision which the United
Kingdom had faced in September, 1939.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked Mr. Smith for speaking so frankly. He
would try to be no less candid. It would be premature, however, to discuss
the implications of unilateral action at this point, since it was something
which we must all seek to avoid. But as regards the substance of the issues
involved the Commonwealth Secretary should now put the case as the United
Kingdom Government saw it.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that his discussions with Mr. Smith
and his colleagues had been conducted in a frank and cordial spirit on both
sides, but they had revealed two basic differences between the Governments:
1. On the constitutional issue the Rhodesian Government had maintained
their claim that the 1961 constitution was, in effect, an independence
constitution. But the facts contradicted this claim. It would be possible
to verify, by means of a referendum of the four racial groups as provided
for in the constitution, whether any particular set of constitutional
proposals was accepted by the people of Rhodesia as a basis for indepen­
dence; but the Government of Rhodesia were anxious to eliminate the
referendum procedure on the grounds that it was too cumbersome and laborious
and proposed, instead, to institute a Senate as an alternative safeguard for
the entrenched clauses of the constitution. It was clear to the United
Kingdom Government, however, that this Senate, in the form proposed, would
not suffice as a substitute for the protection afforded by the existing
machinery. In return for a transference of power they would require
adequate safeguards to ensure that the 1961 constitution would provide the
means of making that unimpeded progress to majority rule which was one of
the five principles on which the United Kingdom Government were bound to
insist. Moreover, ordinary changes in the constitution (as distinct from
any amendment of the entrenched clauses) would in their opinion require
adequate safeguards after independence; and it was in this context that he
had suggested a blocking third. But on this point, the Rhodesian Government
had felt unable to agree.

2. In addition, there was the difficult question of racial discrimination.
In one sense only full adult suffrage would solve that problem; in its
absence it was essential to be able to point not only to adequate constit­
tutional safeguards but also to some dramatic forward move in relation
to e.g. the Land Apportionment Act. But the Rhodesian Government had felt
unable to make any significant concession on this point.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that these were serious differences of view. The whole of the United Kingdom's record of de-colonisation illustrated and confirmed their insistence on majority rule as a condition of independence. In interpreting this, in the case of Rhodesia, as reasonably speedy progress towards majority rule they had already made a major concession to the Rhodesian Government; and they could have little hope of satisfying public opinion, not only in the House of Commons but also in the rest of the Commonwealth and in many foreign countries, unless they could demonstrate that the final settlement was consistent with the five principles in which they had sought to summarise the basic conditions of Rhodesian independence. It would be difficult enough to justify these principles to world opinion; but it should not be impossible to present them convincingly, provided that they were fully observed. How did we now stand in this respect? For example, the first principle required that "The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed". But how far ahead, in the opinion of the Rhodesian Government, did majority rule lie? And how long would it be before it was achieved?

MR. SMITH replied that the principle of progress towards majority rule was indeed enshrined in the 1961 constitution. The Rhodesian Government accepted this and did not wish to detract from it. But, if the Africans continued to boycott the constitution, it was impossible to say how long it would be before the principle was realised. Indeed, he was bound to say, speaking frankly, that this would be a lengthy process; it was something which it would be dangerous to rush. Nevertheless, if the Africans would embrace the opportunities which the 1961 constitution offered them, they would ultimately achieve majority rule.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if the Africans did co-operate in working the constitution, the rate of their political advance would presumably depend on the speed of their progress in acquiring the necessary educational and economic qualifications. Could Mr. Smith predict how quickly the educational and economic betterment of the Africans would yield majority rule?

MR. SMITH replied that several estimates on this point had been made, varying from fifteen to fifty years. No one could be dogmatic. He was not prepared to hazard an opinion. The Rhodesian Government would think it wrong to accelerate the educational advance of the Africans simply in order to improve their political status in the community. The question of their economic position was a different matter.
THE MINISTER OF STATE enquired about the facilities for the secondary education of Africans.

MR. SMITH replied that there was no problem here; indeed, there were more vacancies in African secondary schools than in their European counterparts.

MR. WRAITHALL added that it was untrue that the Rhodesian Treasury provided less finance for African than for European secondary education. It might not be possible to give either all that it asked for; but, insofar as abatements had to be made, there was no question of cutting the African provision more severely than the European.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it appeared to be clear that, on the basis of the 1961 constitution, the rate of African educational advance at present envisaged by the Rhodesian Government would not yield majority rule within the next few years.

MR. SMITH agreed; indeed, the Rhodesian Government would oppose any deliberate acceleration for this purpose.

MR. HARPER added that it was European enterprise which basically financed African education; and the type of constitutional change which would alarm the former would therefore harm the latter.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if this was so and if the same considerations applied as regards the economic qualifications which an African must acquire before being entitled to the vote, would the Rhodesian Government consider adopting a more direct route towards majority rule by means of a simple widening of the franchise?

MR. SMITH rejected this suggestion because it would imply reverting to the position which had obtained a few years ago when European sentiment had become thoroughly alarmed and Europeans had begun to leave the country in significant numbers. He must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule. They accepted that the 1961 constitution would eventually bring it about; but they would not take any action to hasten this process. The criterion of fitness for majority rule must be a criterion of merit, i.e. a criterion in terms of those standards of civilized behaviour which other independent African countries were not succeeding in observing.
THE PRIME MINISTER observed that the Rhodesian Government must not suppose that the United Kingdom Government were not as concerned to safeguard the Europeans as much as the Africans. But how did we stand as regards the second principle, namely that "There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution?"

MR. SMITH said that, as regards the entrenched clauses, the provision whereby an amendment could be approved by The Queen on the advice of the United Kingdom Government would, of course, lapse on independence. The alternative - i.e. amendment by referenda of all four races - was a clumsy procedure and was open to the further objection that it involved a highly invidious process of assigning individuals to different racial groups. Moreover, all four groups must vote in favour of any amendment; but, given the racial distribution within Rhodesia, this implied that 1 per cent of the population (e.g. the Asian group) could block an amendment which the other 99 per cent might regard as desirable. It was for these reasons that the Rhodesian Government had put forward the alternative suggestion of a Senate.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the Senate was envisaged as voting separately from the Legislature and, therefore, as exercising in some sense a veto.

MR. SMITH replied that it would be preferable that both Houses should vote together and that a two-thirds majority should be required for an amendment. The Senate of 12 Africans, together with the 15 African 'B' Roll members, would total 27, i.e. an effective blocking third.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the African members of the Senate would be elected.

MR. SMITH said that they would not. They would be Chiefs, appointed in accordance with the tribal system.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that, in that case, it could not be said that there would be any democratically elected block to prevent retrogressive amendment of the entrenched clauses. This was not something which the United Kingdom Government could justify either to the House of Commons or to international opinion.
MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that the Rhodesian Government had reached their conclusion about the size and composition of the proposed Senate after a very comprehensive review of Second Chambers, which they had carried out with the help of the Commonwealth Relations Office Legal Adviser. It had become clear that the functions to be exercised by the Senate would be relatively limited, partly because the constitution already provided a safeguard for normal constitutional amendments (by means of the two-thirds majority procedure) and partly because the Constitutional Council would remain as an active element in the constitution. It followed that the only function of the Senate would be to provide, with the 'B' Roll members, a blocking safeguard against retrogressive amendment of the entrenched clauses; and for this purpose a Senate of 12 Africans appeared sufficient.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that the British Government considered the entrenched clauses to be protected by the referenda of the four racial groups. They wanted the blocking third as an additional protection for other clauses.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if the Senate was envisaged as a balancing factor in relation to the Lower House, the extent to which the latter was itself democratically elected was very relevant. He appreciated the difficulties which the Rhodesian Government saw in the referendum procedure. But, if some other form of safeguard was to be substituted for it, everything would depend on the method by which the individuals who would constitute the blocking factor were selected.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR added that it would be impossible for the United Kingdom Government to accept for this purpose individuals who, like the Chiefs, were not elected but were paid servants of the Rhodesian Government. Why could not the Rhodesian Government accept, for ordinary constitutional amendments, a simple blocking third in the form of 26 'B' Roll seats - as they had appeared ready to during the visit which he and the Commonwealth Secretary had paid to Rhodesia earlier in the year?
MR. SMITH replied by pointing out that the existing constitution already required a two-thirds majority for ordinary constitutional amendments.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR agreed but emphasised that Rhodesia was not yet independent.

MR. SMITH asked why the United Kingdom Government could not accept a blocking quarter.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that the reason was that there must surely be some increase in African representation.

MR. SMITH said that that was a different question. The Africans had already rejected the opportunities of representation which the existing constitution provided; and there was therefore no ground for enlarging these opportunities.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the Rhodesian Government would change their view if the Africans were disposed to co-operate in working the 1961 constitution.

MR. SMITH said that the Africans would first have to prove that they were ready to do so; and this could only happen after independence when they had been given a chance.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could see some merit in the concept of a Senate; but it must be more elective in character.

MR. SMITH replied that, if so, it was for the United Kingdom Government to show how this was to be achieved.
THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that the Senate must be capable of being regarded as one element in a blocking safeguard which was essentially elective in character.

THE MINISTER OF STATE added that what was at issue was something which would replace the referendum. It must therefore be something which was at least as "strong" as the referendum itself.

MR. HARPER replied that the referendum was too cumbersome a procedure. The alternative must be something which essentially provided a basis of reasoned discussion among informed people and did not put at the mercy of political considerations changes in the constitution which might, on merits, be desirable.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that the concept of the Senate was an ingenious one; but, if it was to go forward at all, the Senate would have to be elected on something like the "B" Roll. He suggested that discussion should next turn to the third principle, namely that "There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population".

MR. SMITH said that the implementation of this principle depended on whether the Africans would take advantage of the opportunities already provided by the 1961 constitution. It was impossible to go further without a lowering of the franchise - although the Rhodesian Government would be prepared to put the "B" Roll virtually on the basis of "one man, one vote" by adding nearly a million Africans to the Roll.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that this would not give the Africans any more seats in the Legislature.

MR. SMITH said that, nevertheless, cross-voting, which the Rhodesian Government were no longer pressing to eliminate, would allow the increased "B" Roll element to influence "A" Roll voting, at least in marginal cases.

THE MINISTER OF STATE pointed out that the second and third principles should be considered together, in the sense that, if the Rhodesian Government were prepared both to envisage an increased number of African seats in the Legislature and to constitute the proposed Senate from elected Africans, the result would not merely be improved safeguards against retrogressive amendment of the constitution but also an increase in African representation as well.

MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government had considered these issues very carefully but could make no further concessions.
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY pointed out that the United Kingdom Government were prepared to contemplate the grant of independence before majority rule was actually achieved. This was a very major concession. Would not the Rhodesian Government make some parallel gesture?

MR. HARPER said that the United Kingdom concession was not new. It had been made not by the present Government but by their Conservative predecessors.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that this might be so; nevertheless, it was the present Government who would have to meet the domestic and international criticism if they conceded independence to Rhodesia on an indefensible basis.

He suggested that they should now consider the fourth principle, i.e. "There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination". In this context the future of the Land Apportionment Act was clearly a critical issue.

MR. SMITH said that, as regards this Act, things were moving continuously. Already 5 million acres of land which had formerly been European had been made available to the Africans; but only a small part had as yet been taken up by Africans. The Act was of value in protecting the Africans from exploitation. Africans were grateful for this, and its repeal would harm them more than the Europeans. As regards racial discrimination in the towns, the Rhodesian Government were presently considering several multi-racial areas. It was significant that the objection in one case had been made by a Coloured Rhodesian, not a European; nevertheless, the Government intended to go ahead.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that the Land Apportionment Act had been criticised by the Constitutional Council. Could not the Rhodesian Government at least admit publicly that its repeal was desirable in principle?

MR. SMITH replied that they had already said that they would be ready to consider withdrawing certain parts of it as and when it seemed desirable to do so.

THE MINISTER OF STATE asked whether more could be done to open Salisbury to the Africans?

MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government were currently examining whether that part of the Salisbury trading area which was adjacent to the Kopje could be made a multi-racial area.
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY asked whether the attitude of the Rhodesian Government in relation to e.g. the University, the Medical School, the private schools, etc. was defensible in terms of progress towards a multi-racial society.

MR. SMITH said that, as regards the schools, it had been brought to notice that they had been breaking the law in admitting African pupils without the permission of the Minister. The Government were now considering the position; and, in any event, there was evidence that this type of change made for a worsening of racial relations rather than for their improvement.

MR. HARTER added that it was up to those who wanted multi-racial education to provide it; nothing would be done to prevent them. But it was unreasonable that existing private schools for one race should be turned into multi-racial schools without the consent of the parents concerned.

MR. LARDKER-BURKE said the Rhodesian Government had just approved the creation of a multi-racial teachers' training college, run by a group of missions in Bulawayo.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, even so, the Rhodesian Government's attitude seemed to raise the same issues as those which had just been fought out in Alabama.

MR. SMITH replied that the circumstances were not the same. There were greater differences between European and African standards in Rhodesia than in the United States.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if so, this might perhaps be thought to be a reflection on the extent to which Rhodesian Governments had provided facilities for African education.

MR. SMITH replied that the Europeans had been in North America at least six times as long as they had been in Rhodesia. Even so, the standard of African education in Rhodesia was higher than in many other African countries.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United Kingdom had nevertheless felt justified in granting independence to those other African countries.

MR. SMITH replied that the consequences spoke for themselves. Tanzania was now little more than a Chinese puppet.
MR. LARDNER-BURKE asked whether, if the Rhodesian Government repealed the Land Apportionment Act, the United Kingdom Government would agree that they should also throw open the Tribal Trust Areas which had been entrenched in the 1961 constitution?

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that what mattered was that the general impression of racial discrimination within Rhodesia must be removed by some positive signs which would convince international opinion that discrimination was really being progressively reduced.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there remained the fifth principle, namely that "the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole". The Conservative Government had felt unable to accept the concept of an indaba, which Mr. Smith had proposed in September, 1964; and that concept was equally unacceptable to the present Government of the United Kingdom. Could the Rhodesian Government offer an alternative?

MR. SMITH suggested that it was necessary to settle the first four principles before dealing with the fifth, i.e. to decide the content of the proposals to be submitted to the people of Rhodesia before deciding how they should be consulted. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian Government continued to think that the proposals which they had made in 1964 were adequate; and there was some reason to believe that the Conservative Government would have accepted them if the Rhodesian Government had felt able to enlarge the scope of consultation to include not only the Chiefs and Headmen but also the Kraal heads of whom there were 30,000—a step which, on further consideration, they had felt unable to take on the grounds that it would tend to undermine the authority of the Chiefs themselves. What alternative could the United Kingdom Government suggest?

THE PRIME MINISTER asked why the referendum procedure in the constitution should not be used? If a referendum had been regarded, in the context of the 1961 constitution, as essential for the amendment of one entrenched clause, it was a little difficult to see why anything less should be thought to be adequate to ascertain the wishes of the people as regards the constitution as a whole.

MR. SMITH replied that the reason was simply that, as he had already pointed out, 1 per cent of the population could nullify a referendum. In addition, he must repeat that it was an extremely cumbersome process to implement; and the assignment of individuals to their racial groups was a most invidious business.
MR. HARPER added that the fact that the 1961 constitution had incorporated the concept of an appeal to The Queen as an alternative to a referendum was a tacit admission of the defects of the referendum procedure. It had had to be embodied in the constitution for political reasons; but the alternative of an appeal to The Queen had also had to be included, since everyone had known that a referendum was in fact unworkable.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, although a referendum might be difficult to work, it could not be literally unworkable since it had been accepted elsewhere in Africa in relation to constitutional advance and the same principle would shortly be put into effect in the case of the changes in the constitution of Mauritius. How could the United Kingdom Government justify conceding independence to Rhodesia on the basis not only of a constitution which was less liberal than other independence constitutions but also of a means of verifying its acceptability which was less liberal than the methods adopted in other cases?

MR. HARPER said that it must not be forgotten that all the citizens of Rhodesia were members of one community; and the fact that only some of them enjoyed the vote did not detract from this basic principle of unity, which was exemplified by a common voters' roll. Allowance had to be made for two distinct standards in Rhodesia.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it remained true that only some of them had the vote.

MR. HARPER said that the reason for this was simply that the Africans were not as advanced as the Europeans. But the Rhodesian Government were making great efforts to improve the status of Africans.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this merely meant that, although the country was alleged to be ready for independence, it was apparently not ready for democracy.

MR. SMITH replied that the United Kingdom did not have full democracy until the twentieth century; and by that time education was universal.

THE MINISTER OF STATE asked whether, if some 1 million Africans were added to the 'B' Roll, and 'A' and 'B' Rolls together might provide the basis of a referendum?

MR. SMITH said that he could not accept this proposal. The simple choice between two candidates, which was all that a voter had to exercise in an ordinary election, was one thing; and it was something which was within the compass of the average African. The decision on the complex issues of an independence constitution was a very different thing; it involved sophisticated judgments which the ordinary African could not comprehend.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, nevertheless, the ordinary African could surely say 'yes' or 'no'.

MR. SMITH replied that the ordinary African simply would not understand what he was being asked to decide. This fact had been tacitly recognised in the 1961 constitution, when the vote had been granted to the Chiefs but not to the other Africans.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United Kingdom Government could not accept this view. It was now clear, therefore, that the two sides were very far apart on all five principles. Only the concept of a Senate offered some possibility of advance, although even here there was still a great gulf between the opposing views.

MR. SMITH added that the United Kingdom Government’s effective decision could be argued to have been taken even earlier - in 1923, when they gave Southern Rhodesia the option (on the basis of the European vote alone) of becoming a self-governing Colony or joining an independent South Africa. But what was to be done now?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the position was now very critical - and its implications extended far beyond Rhodesia itself. He suggested that both sides should reflect on the exchanges of the day and resume the discussion tomorrow.

MR. SMITH said that he did not object but he would like to have the United Kingdom Government’s considered views and their proposals on how the situation should be resolved. It was clear that the two Governments were drifting apart rather than narrowing the gap between them; and there was no advantage in any further delay. The Rhodesian Government had learnt this lesson as a result of the Victoria Falls Conference; if they had refused to attend that Conference, they would have had their independence by now.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that we should avoid any unnecessary delay. Nevertheless, it would be wise for both sides to reflect on their positions before they considered what their respective attitudes should be if it proved impossible to reach agreement.

It was agreed that the discussion should be resumed at 2.30 p.m. on Friday, 8th October, 1965.

London, S.W.1.

October, 1965.
THE PRIME MINISTER opened the discussion by saying that there had, in his view, been at the previous meeting a very clear examination by both sides of the five principles. He wondered if, after further reflection Rhodesian Ministers had anything to add.

MR. SMITH said that he had been disturbed to read in the British Press reports which suggested that the Rhodesians were to blame for refusing to meet the British Government on any of the five principles. This was a distortion of the facts.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Press briefing on the British side had not gone further than an admission that the discussions had been cordial and frank but that the two sides were very far apart.

MR. SMITH said that he had not much to add about the substance of the discussions. The Rhodesian Ministers had made most of the running and he thought that their position was clear. He had hoped that, as a result of the adjournment, the Prime Minister for his part would be able to clarify his own position.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United Kingdom Government had made their position clear. They had spoken frankly on each of the five principles; and on each the gap was still very wide. He had said, in summing up on the previous day that a basis had not been found on which the United Kingdom Government could recommend Parliament to grant independence to Rhodesia. He had felt that the distance between the two sides might be a little less on the third principle (about racial discrimination) than on the others, since, although there was apparently no question of the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, Mr. Smith had indicated certain proposals which might offer the prospect of some progress. His impression, therefore, was that disagreement on this point was not as absolute as on the others, where the differences were very wide indeed.

There was clearly no early prospect of majority rule; and, in so far as the matter lay in the Rhodesian Government's hands, there was no intention to do anything to accelerate the education of the Africans for this purpose. Rhodesia might be pressing on with education for Africans generally; but this was not for political reasons but in recognition of the intrinsic desirability of education. The United Kingdom Government could not countenance a transfer of sovereignty on the basis of so slender a guarantee of early majority rule. So far as safeguards were concerned, the concept of the Senate was the result of a good deal of thought and reflection; but it did not incorporate the principle of a blocking safeguard constituted from elected representatives of the majority race. In order to satisfy this requirement all 12 members of the Senate would have to be elected. Without that guarantee the safeguard would be inadequate; and even on that basis it would be difficult to justify to the House of Commons and international opinion, including the rest of the Commonwealth (which did not mean, in this context, only the African members). At the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting there had been a long and serious discussion on this problem. The views expressed had been strongly and sincerely felt; and he had been pressed very hard by all members of the Commonwealth.
On the question of the political status of Africans the Rhodesian proposals were, again, insufficient. The suggestion which the Rhodesian Ministers had put forward for a considerable expansion of the 'B' Roll was helpful; but it was not decisive and would not provide any more seats for Africans. As regards the fifth principle it had to be recognised that what was in question was legislation to provide for independence which would not be on the basis of immediate majority rule. This made it all the more essential that the people of Rhodesia as a whole should be completely free to say whether they were content with the proposed basis of independence. In every case in which independence had been granted in recent years the views of the population as a whole had been ascertained on clearly-stated terms of independence; and in every case this had been on the basis of majority rule. When, in the unique case of Rhodesia, there was a proposition that independence should be granted before majority rule was achieved it was doubly necessary that the method employed should extend beyond the existing electorate, even if enlarged by the addition of one million African taxpayers to the 'B' Roll as had been suggested by Mr. Smith. But he had understood from Mr. Smith that it would be unacceptable even to extend the franchise as far as that for the purposes of a referendum. He did not believe that any British Government could recommend independence on the basis of the methods so far suggested. That, in summary, was the position as he saw it. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY and THE LORD CHANCELLOR indicated their agreement with the Prime Minister's summing up of the position.

MR. SMITH remarked that what the Prime Minister had said might be accurate in terms of a purely academic appreciation of the position; but the Rhodesians had to be practical and realistic. They looked at the countries to the north which had received their independence; and they saw that there was now no such thing as democracy. In Tanzania there had been only one candidate for President and only one political Party at the recent election. In Zambia, where the United Kingdom Government had thought that they had provided for the protection of European interests by the provision of 'reserved' seats for Europeans, those were now being called in question. Rhodesians were living cheek by jowl with situations of this kind. He understood the British Government's difficulties and problems; but, from what the Prime Minister had said, the two sides were further apart than ever. They now had to face up to the practical consequences of what lay before them. He felt that the United Kingdom Government were now not ready to go even as far as their predecessors had gone.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that this was not so. The previous Government had never accepted the method of consulting the population of Rhodesia as a whole which the Rhodesian Ministers had proposed.
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that, as regards the one method which had been suggested, namely the Indaba of Chiefs, and Headmen, the previous Government had said "no" and so had the present Administration.

MR. SMITH replied that at any rate the two sides were clearly as far apart as ever. When he and his colleagues returned to Rhodesia they could do nothing but face up to what they considered the only alternative. The question, therefore, was how this could be implemented in a way which would cause the least trouble to both parties.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be tragic if an irrevocable decision was taken without full realisation of all the facts. So many tragedies in world history had been caused by a failure fully to appreciate in advance the possible consequences of particular courses of action.

MR. SMITH said that his Government were not unmindful of the implications for Rhodesia. It was unnecessary to rehearse them again or to embark on an argument about which side could do more harm to the other. He was anxious to avoid bitterness.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that there was no need to exchange threats and that he need not go in detail through all the statements which had been made by the United Kingdom Government; but it was essential that the Rhodesian Government should realise that they had been made not merely for the record but in all seriousness. Last October's statement still represented, clearly and categorically, the position of the United Kingdom Government. But it was not merely a question of the action which the United Kingdom Government might take in circumstances in which a Rhodesian Government was purporting to rule without legal authority; it was also a question of the consequences in a wider international context, which the United Kingdom Government might be powerless to prevent. These might be far graver than anyone realised. The United Kingdom Government had maintained in the United Nations that they were responsible for Rhodesia (despite the fact that the country had had internal self-government since 1923); but, if the Rhodesian Government took action which implied that they were purporting to govern the country illegally, there was no saying what other Governments and the United Nations might do, regardless of the
United Kingdom attitude. The Rhodesian Government might set relatively little store by the United Nations; but they must reckon with the fact that, in the present state of feeling, that Organisation might take immediate action, which might not be confined to economic measures. The United Kingdom Government had their own views as regards the admissibility of the use of military force by the United Nations. Nevertheless this possibility could not be ruled out; nor would it necessarily be merely a matter of the Afro/Asian reaction. In that event other countries might also become involved. Efforts might, and no doubt would, be made to prevent this from happening. But we could not be sure that these would succeed, however much we might deplore it. He begged Mr. Smith to consider the situation which might develop if pressures for military action proved irresistible. Mr. Smith had no doubt formed his own assessment of what might happen in Rhodesia. He had seen Mr. Smith's television broadcast on the previous evening; but he had also seen the Lord Chancellor's broadcast, in the course of which the Africans taking part had said that they would fight. No doubt Mr. Smith had considered this possibility; but such action might eventually set the whole of southern Africa, and even a wider area, ablaze. The Rhodesian Government might not desire this; but there might be no means of preventing it. Moreover, the passions which might be aroused might imperil the position of Europeans in other African countries. The British people had kith and kin in those countries; and the terrible things which might happen to them in a situation which might become one of genocidal strife were a matter of very grave concern. The United Kingdom Government would be bound to throw their whole weight against anybody who provoked a situation of this kind. This was not merely his view; all his colleagues shared it strongly. It was a dangerous illusion to think that the situation could be contained within the borders of Rhodesia, whether or not there was violence in the country itself. Mr. Smith had perhaps been right in saying that the United Kingdom Government were remote from realities of the position in Rhodesia; but perhaps the Rhodesian Government themselves were not as closely in touch with international opinion as the United Kingdom. They did not seem to realise the irresistible passions
which might be aroused, whether as the result of that might be described as an orderly intervention by the United Nations or otherwise. The Rhodesian Government had no doubt considered the position in which they would find themselves if they were denied recognition by some ninety nations; but had they considered the more indefinable consequences if wide areas of Africa were opened up to conflict? The situation in the Congo had been dangerous; but at least the United Nations had been able to prevent the country from becoming a cockpit for the major Powers. But would this be true a second time? Mr. Smith would be aware of the determined attempts being made by China to penetrate Africa. It had been realised at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting that a great struggle was in progress between the Soviet Union and China for influence in Africa. Both these countries would be under strong temptation to intervene in Rhodesia with incalculable consequences. Here lay a great danger - almost, perhaps, a probability. He feared a terrible conflict and bloodshed. And, however much we might hope to prevent it, there could be no guarantee that we should succeed. He apologised for having to speak so frankly; but it was better to speak now than to wish later that he had.

MR. SMITH said that he was grateful to the Prime Minister for being so frank; and he appreciated the Prime Minister's concern for Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Government had, of course, considered every aspect of the situation, even if the worst should happen; but they had concluded that there was no other alternative for them. Their country and their lives were at stake. If Britain had considered all that might happen to her in 1939, she might not have gone to war. Rhodesia might be relatively insignificant; but the issues were just as important for her people. If they did not obtain independence, they would have to leave Rhodesia. They would rather fight it out than go voluntarily. The consequences to which the Prime Minister had referred might, or might not, happen. The Rhodesian Government would take the chance. They had analysed the situation over and over again and always reached the same answer. It was quite simple; they had no option.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that, when Britain had decided to fight in 1939, and to fight on alone in 1940, she had not been without friends and the whole of the rest of the world had not been against her. This was the difference from the Rhodesian situation. They would find that they were opposed not only by those who disagreed with them but by friendly countries, including members of the old Commonwealth, who would be in sympathy with them in many other respects.
MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that surely the consequences which the Prime Minister had described would stem from the action taken by the United Kingdom; it would be the United Kingdom whose lead would be followed. If the United Kingdom did not take action of the kind in question, the adverse reactions would be unlikely.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not agree. Even if we were to take no action of the kind which we nevertheless thought it inevitable that we should have to take, he feared that others would and that the demands for some form of sanctions would be overwhelming. We were on record against the use of economic sanctions by the United Nations in the case of South Africa; but this situation would be regarded differently in the United Nations. Proposals for military intervention might become equally irresistible, regardless of the United Kingdom's attitude. He was in close personal touch with the Foreign Secretary, who was now in New York and had formed his own estimate of the feeling in the United Nations.

MR. SMITH said that, if it were proved that any such action by the United Nations would do more harm to Africans than to Europeans, logic and commonsense would surely prevail. THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was not a question of logical proof. However eloquently the case was argued or however strong the evidence, the sovereign nations who were the members of the United Nations would take their own decisions. They would take the same view as the Europeans in Rhodesia in the sense that they would regard it as a choice between two evils. He asked Mr. Smith to consider the possible effect on Europeans in Africa outside Rhodesia, whatever might, or might not, happen in Rhodesia itself. He hoped he was wrong but he feared that there might be many innocent victims.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that the right way to look at the problem was to maintain that the time for action against Rhodesia would come only if, and when, retrogressive laws were actually enacted. Such action should not be taken on the mere assumption that this would happen. MR. SMITH added that the Rhodesian people were being denied independence because the United Kingdom Government thought that they might adopt policies harmful to the Africans, not because they had actually taken such steps. Would it not therefore be logical to reserve action against Rhodesia until some damage was in fact done to African interests? He believed that the action of the United Kingdom would give a lead to the rest of the world. It must be obvious that, if pressure were brought to bear on the Rhodesian Government, they might have to do unpleasant things. If economic measures created a recession, they would first get rid of the half million alien Africans in the country. In such circumstances Europeans could pull in their belts; but Africans would lose their livelihood and might even be without food. External opinion should consider these harmful effects which might follow action against Rhodesia. He wondered whether the United Kingdom Government had asked themselves whether what they were proposing to do was right.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that action by the United Kingdom would be dictated by the fact that the Rhodesian Government would have seized power illegally. But the United Kingdom could not control what action might be taken by others, including the United Nations. Indeed, if the United Kingdom did not react the rest of the world would probably react more strongly. The situation would be explosive; and the results would not depend on United Kingdom action. If there was violence in Rhodesia, it would spread. Measures taken to suppress violence in Rhodesia might themselves trigger off external action against Rhodesia.

MR. SMITH said that there would be no violence. There might be other problems; but there would be no violence.

MR. HARPER said that, basically, both sides were facing the same difficulty in relation to one course of action or another. People wanted to protect themselves in advance against something which they thought might happen. But it was wrong to try to meet a problem before it had arisen. If Rhodesia failed to fulfill its promises the position would be different. Given independence, the checks and balances within Rhodesia would ensure that the Rhodesian people would behave well. It was wrong to assume in advance that they would not and so prejudge the issue.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that, even if this view were accepted, what was at issue was not what people's motives were, but what action they would take. On Mr. Harper's argument it could equally well be maintained that the actions of the Rhodesian Government were dictated not by any current threat to the Rhodesian way of life but by their belief that such a threat might arise in the future. Similarly, other nations would take action, even if only as a result of fears which the Rhodesian Government believed to be ill-founded. Events might then evolve in ways beyond the capacity of either side to control; and the repercussions might extend even beyond Southern Africa.

MR. HARPER said that the Rhodesian Government were seeking independence because of the increasing pressures on the economy. Development and further investment in Rhodesia would be withheld until independence was granted.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR replied that the reason why further investment was not taking place now was because of the threat of a unilateral declaration of independence.
MR. SMITH said that, so far from the threat of independence constituting a deterrent to investment, the facts were that since his Party came to power three years before and began to campaign for independence, investment had substantially increased, even though it was still insufficient.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR replied that investment might have increased when there was a prospect of independence on an agreed basis but that the uncertainty which would inevitably arise from any unilateral declaration would deter investors.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that the City of London were historically friends of Rhodesia but unsettled conditions would not reassure them.

MR. SMITH said the rate of expansion in Rhodesia was still not adequate for the expanding population. The more his Government had pressed the case for independence, the more business confidence had increased. Rhodesia had great resources and the Rhodesian Government had evidence that substantial capital would flow to the country when investors were certain of the future. Many who were deterred from establishing themselves in Rhodesia at present would come after independence.

Moreover, independence was needed not only for economic reasons but also for political reasons. There would never be unity in Rhodesia until after independence. At present the African Nationalist leaders looked to the United Kingdom, since the Government of the United Kingdom still had some say in Rhodesian affairs. But after independence they would realise that they could not appeal to any external support but must seek a solution with the Government of the country. The present political situation was unhealthy, with some African leaders under restriction; only independence would enable this to be resolved.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that it had been the uncertain future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which had deterred investment in the period before Mr. Smith's Party came to power; similarly business confidence would now be adversely affected by the threat of a unilateral declaration.

MR. SMITH said that his Government had hitherto assumed that independence was the only possible outcome of their negotiations, whether by agreement or by unilateral declaration. Was this correct or did the United Kingdom Government believe that an alternative lay in the maintenance of the status quo?
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he certainly did not believe that, if
terms could not be immediately agreed for independence, the only other course
of action was a unilateral declaration. He and his colleagues would be
happy to discuss means by which it would be possible to move forward from the
status quo. For example, while the proposals for a Senate put forward by
Mr. Smith were not acceptable in their present form, the United Kingdom
Government would be ready to consider them further, even though the gulf to
be bridged was a wide one. Moreover, they recognised the difficulties with
which the Rhodesian Government were faced as a result of the attitude of
African extremists. The United Kingdom Government, for their part, would do
anything in their power to induce African Nationalist leadership to accept
that their future depended on political co-operation. It might perhaps be
possible to contemplate an arrangement whereby African Nationalists, who were
able to show that they enjoyed popular support, would be brought into the
Government in a junior capacity, perhaps as Parliamentary Secretaries and so
obtain over a period experience of the responsibilities of administration. At the same time there might be a further drive, in which the United Kingdom
Government would be ready to help, to expand African education in its
widest sense; and Africans of a suitable standard of education might receive special training in administration. The United Kingdom Government
would be ready to seek to persuade other African Governments to provide
similar assistance. By such means as these it might be possible to foster
a genuinely multi-racial approach to political affairs more rapidly than
would be possible on the basis of the operation of the 1961 Constitution on
existing lines. These proposals might seem visionary at present; but it
was no less visionary to contemplate a successful outcome to a unilateral
declaration of independence.

MR. SMITH replied that it would not be possible for the Rhodesian
Government to contemplate an agreement on the terms which the Prime Minister
had suggested. They believed that they had been promised independence on
the basis of the 1961 Constitution; and they had been misled. The only
alternative to independence was that the Europeans would seek to entrench
themselves in their present position. For himself rather than adopt this
alternative, he would probably not remain in public life and might leave
Rhodesia. Those who stayed would be driven to pursue other policies
leading to increasing hostility between the races. A unilateral declaration
of independence would be better than this.
THE PRIME MINISTER asked that Mr. Smith and his colleagues should consider further what he had said and should bear in mind that the views which he had just put forward were those which he had also expressed at the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers earlier that year. Having regard to the serious consequences which might stem from a unilateral declaration of independence, would it not be preferable, despite the difficulties, to consider calling a Constitutional Conference? While its outcome might not be wholly palatable to Mr. Smith and his Party, neither was it likely to be wholly palatable to those who desired a constitution based on immediate universal suffrage.

MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government was not prepared to contemplate such a Conference. If Rhodesia could not obtain independence, he would not seek to remain; and there were many like him. He felt that they now had no option but to take their independence; and there might be advantage in discussing how a unilateral declaration might be implemented. If the United Kingdom Government felt bound to take certain action, the Rhodesian Government would have to place themselves in the most favourable possible position to counter it. The extent of their action would depend on the extent of the action taken by the United Kingdom Government; and they were ready to discuss those questions now.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was not possible for the United Kingdom Government to discuss how an illegal act might be carried out.

MR. SMITH said that he had expected such a reply but had felt it right to make the offer.

THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY asked whether the Rhodesian Government must finally reject the proposals put forward by the Prime Minister. Was there not some advantage at least in trying this course?

MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government had given the matter very careful thought and did not now feel able to change their mind.
MR. HARPER said that it must be borne in mind that, just as the United Kingdom Government had their own political and Parliamentary difficulties, so had the Rhodesian Government on their side. If they went too far to meet the United Kingdom view, they would not be able to carry their own Parliament and public opinion with them. It was the Rhodesian Government who had the very much more vital difficulties and should therefore be given the benefit of the doubt. It was their misfortune that they had forfeited earlier opportunities to gain their independence; and, even if they now appeared to be something of an anachronism, it should not be held against them that they could not change their way of life at short notice to adapt themselves to the views and beliefs of other countries.

The Prime Minister interjected that it was not a matter of his Government being unwilling to face criticism, with which they would, indeed, inevitably be faced both from the Opposition and to some extent from within their own Party. But they were not prepared to face Parliament with proposals which they did not believe to be right.

MR. HARPER said that the proposals which the Rhodesian Ministers had put forward had exceeded the mandate which they had been given in Rhodesia. Yet they had not found that these brought them any closer to the views of the United Kingdom Government. The objections which United Kingdom Ministers had expressed did not derive from their own independent convictions but appeared to have been inherited from the previous Administration.

The Prime Minister said that he must make it clear that the attitude which the United Kingdom Government had maintained was not a matter of Party politics; nor was it inherited from the Conservative Government. When in opposition his Party had supported the action taken by the previous Administration in respect of Rhodesia at the 1964 Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers; and they adhered to that view now because they believed it to be right.

Mr. Smith said that in these circumstances there was no prospect of agreement and the discussions would have to be broken off. Presumably there should be an agreed communique, which would make this clear.
Mr. Harper said that it must be borne in mind that, just as the United Kingdom Government had their own political and Parliamentary difficulties, so had the Rhodesian Government on their side. If they went too far to meet the United Kingdom view, they would not be able to carry their own Parliament and public opinion with them. It was the Rhodesian Government who had the very much more vital difficulties and should therefore be given the benefit of the doubt. It was their misfortune that they had forfeited earlier opportunities to gain their independence; and, even if they now appeared to be something of an anachronism, it should not be held against them that they could not change their way of life at short notice to adapt themselves to the views and beliefs of other countries.

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Mr. Smith said that in these circumstances there was no prospect of agreement and the discussions would have to be broken off. Presumably there should be an agreed communique, which would make this clear.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and suggested that the communiqué might frankly describe the scope of the discussions and indicate what had been said by each side on the five principles. Beyond that each side would be free to explain publicly the line which they had taken.

MR. SMITH said that a lengthy communiqué of this kind would take a considerable time to draft; and it would therefore be preferable to confine it to a short statement to the effect that the two Governments had been unable to reconcile their differences on the conditions of independence.

The meeting then adjourned while a communiqué was drafted. When the meeting reassembled - THE PRIME MINISTER proposed, and MR. SMITH agreed, that it would be preferable to omit the reference in the draft communiqué to the consideration which had been given to the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence.

Certain textual amendments were agreed, and the communiqué was approved in the form annexed to this record.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was agreed that the discussions would now no longer be regarded as confidential and that each side would henceforward be free to report to Parliament and to the public on the views which had been expressed and to give a full account of the negotiations.

MR. SMITH agreed.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that the Rhodesian Government would probably wish to publish as a White Paper the correspondence which had passed between the two Governments since the previous Rhodesian White Paper, which had carried the exchanges to June, 1963.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if it were proposed to publish the correspondence which the Rhodesian Government had had with the previous Administration, it would be in accordance with constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom that he should seek the agreement of his predecessors who had been the Prime Ministers of the day. This he would now do.
MR. SMITH proposed that there should be no publication of any record of confidential exchanges during the negotiations, principally his own oral exchanges since February with United Kingdom Ministers through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that short of any unilateral declaration of independence such records should remain confidential.

In further discussion it was agreed that the White Papers should be confined to the relevant correspondence. It would be preferable that the same correspondence should be published in White Papers in each country and that this should be done simultaneously. There would be consultation between the two Governments to that end. Subject to this understanding, each side would be free to comment publicly on the course of the discussions which had been held during that week, provided there was no attribution of statements to individuals or direct quotation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he much regretted the outcome of the discussions; but he wished to thank Mr. Smith and his colleagues for the frankness and courtesy with which they had expressed their views.

MR. SMITH replied that he also was grateful to the Prime Minister and the other United Kingdom Ministers for the frank and straightforward manner in which they had conducted the discussions. He, too, regretted that they had failed in the purpose for which they had come to London.

London, 3.7.46
October, 1965
AGREED COMMUNIQUÉ

The Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary have held during this week a series of discussions with the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Rhodesia, during which they have examined frankly and thoroughly all aspects of the question of Rhodesia's independence. The British Ministers have described the constitutional principles which the British Government would regard as the essential basis on which they could recommend to Parliament the grant of sovereign independence to Rhodesia; and the Rhodesian Ministers have indicated the reasons for which they feel unable to accept these principles in the measure required by the British Government. Despite intensive discussion, no means have been found of reconciling the opposing views. No further meeting has been arranged.
AGREED NOTE of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1., on MONDAY, 11th OCTOBER, 1965 at 10.45 a.m.

PRESENT

The Prime Minister
The Hon. I.D. Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia

The Lord Chancellor
The Hon. D. Lardner-Burke, Minister of Justice

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
Mr. G.B. Clarke, Secretary to the Cabinet

Sir Burke Trend
Mr. P. Rogers
Mr. K.J. Neale

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to clear up any possible misunderstandings on either side before Mr. Smith and his colleagues returned to Rhodesia. The previous evening he had had discussions with the leaders of the Opposition, from which it emerged that there might be one misunderstanding relating to the fifth of the five principles i.e. the need to satisfy the United Kingdom Government that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. At a previous meeting it had appeared that Mr. Smith was concerned lest a referendum on the basis of four separate electoral rolls would enable a small minority of the population to veto a change; and he had explained that the Rhodesian Government therefore wished to seek an alternative blocking safeguard for the entrenched clauses (i.e. other than the final approval of The Queen, as at present, or what would amount to four separate referenda). The Prime Minister wished to make it clear that the United Kingdom Government had not so far expressed a view on the question of separate referenda and that they did not in fact contemplate what might amount to four separate electoral colleges. They had not pursued the issue in discussion because they recognised that Mr. Smith was in any event opposed to procedure by referendum. But, in case there was a misunderstanding, he wished Mr. Smith and his colleagues to know where the United Kingdom Government stood on this point, namely that, on the whole, they would be inclined to support a single referendum.
MR. SMITH said that he recognized the position of the United Kingdom Government in this matter. It appeared that there might have been some misunderstanding about what he had said to the leaders of the Opposition. He had made it clear to them that he could not accept four separate referenda; but he had never supposed that this was what the United Kingdom Government were proposing. He understood that they believed that a referendum on what would be virtually "one man one vote" would be appropriate. In their earlier discussions the Prime Minister had referred to the procedure in relation to the grant of independence in the countries to the north of Rhodesia, where the United Kingdom Government had insisted on what amounted to a referendum on the basis of universal suffrage even for the achievement of independence on the basis of majority government. It followed that they must be all the more insistent on a similar safeguard for the achievement of independence on the basis of minority government.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this procedure was not confined to other countries in Africa but represented the general practice of the United Kingdom in all previously dependent territories when they achieved independence. He wanted to be quite sure that the view of the United Kingdom Government on this issue was fully understood, since in their discussions on a blocking safeguard they had confined themselves to considering the proposal for a Senate.

MR. SMITH replied that he too was concerned that there should be no misunderstandings. He had been completely frank in his talk with the leaders of the Opposition and had made the same points to them as he had made in his discussions with the Government and, subsequently, in his Press Conferences. He recognized the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government's views; but he must nevertheless make it clear that he and his colleagues believed that the United Kingdom Government had moved away from their original position and that the two sides were now further apart than when they started.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was not the case that the United Kingdom Government had moved away from their original position; but it was true that they had now been more precise than their predecessors about the way in which the general principles of a settlement should be put into effect.

One further point had emerged from his own discussions with the leaders of the Opposition on the previous evening. This was that there had been some reference, when Mr. Smith saw them, to an alternative way of instituting guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, namely that there might be a solemn treaty between the United Kingdom Government and the Rhodesian Government which would be registered with the United Nations, and, perhaps, subject to adjudication by the Privy Council.

MR. SMITH said that he would be prepared to accept such a treaty as an additional guarantee (i.e., additional to the guarantees in the Constitution itself) that the Rhodesian Government would honour the spirit of the 1961 Constitution. They had no intention of going back on this; but it would not be acceptable to them that the treaty should incorporate reservations going further than the Constitution itself. If it were simply to reinforce the Constitution, they would be happy to accept it.

THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether this was not a new suggestion, which had not previously been put forward in their discussions.

MR. LAWNER-BURKE replied that there might have been some general reference to it in previous discussions with the Commonwealth Secretary, although possibly not in the form of a precise proposal for a treaty. The idea was conceived as a way of meeting the fear of the United Kingdom Government that the Rhodesian Government might, after independence, go back on their undertakings. He had suggested in the earlier discussions that it would be more appropriate that the United Kingdom Government should wait until the Rhodesian Government defaulted on their obligations than that they should try to anticipate misbehaviour of this kind. The concept of the treaty was consistent with this thought.
THE PRIME MINISTER asked what sanctions might be provided in such a treaty.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE replied that these might be whatever the United Kingdom Government wished. For example, it might be the action contemplated in their statements of October, 1964, and April, 1965.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the action contemplated in those statements was appropriate as the immediate response to an illegal act; but it would not necessarily be appropriate as a sanction for a treaty, where alleged breaches of the treaty some years hence (if referred to the Privy Council) would be a justiciable issue, which could involve a lengthy process of argument.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE replied that, nevertheless, what would be in question would be a legal issue (on which, therefore, the Privy Council could appropriately adjudicate), just as it would be if the Rhodesian Government made a unilateral declaration of independence.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR agreed that the proposal for a treaty might deserve further consideration since it had not previously been put forward in the discussions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the only former British territory where the United Kingdom Government had entered into a treaty of guarantee as part of the process of granting independence was Cyprus; and the precedent was not entirely a happy one. Nevertheless, the idea might merit further discussion.

MR. SMITH said that, even so, the treaty would represent a possible means of meeting the difficulties in relation to only one of the United Kingdom Government's five principles. The difficulties in relation to the other four principles would remain.

THE PRIME MINISTER accepted this but said that further examination of the proposal for a treaty might enable progress to be made on at least one of the five points. He enquired whether there were any other issues on which there might be misunderstanding.

MR. SMITH replied that he did not think so.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that there was one point relating to the proposal for a Senate which might call for elaboration. He understood that the United Kingdom Government had felt that there was objection to the proposal...
put forward by the Rhodesian Government for the African representation on
the Senate to be selected from the Chiefs, on the score that these Chiefs
were not elected. It might be possible to meet this difficulty by arranging
that a panel of candidates for six of the twelve seats might be nominated by
the Chiefs while a panel of candidates for the remaining six seats might be
put forward by the electoral college for the Constitutional
Council. The actual elections might then be made by the electorate on the
'B' Roll or, perhaps, by the combined electorate on the 'A' and 'B'
Rolls. This procedure would ensure — and this was what mattered — that candidates
for the Senate would be responsible individuals.

The Prime Minister enquired whether Mr. Lardner-Burke contemplated this
proposal as representing a blocking safeguard but one which would depend
ultimately on the 'B' Roll electorate rather than on nomination by the Chiefs.
The United Kingdom Government were more concerned with questions of substance
than of form and would be prepared to examine this proposal.

Mr. Lardner-Burke observed that, even if further discussion led to
agreement on this question, it would not remove the difficulties in relation
to the other principles. Mr. Smith added that the proposal was a safeguard
for the entrenched clauses of the Constitution; it would not overcome the
difficulty about the blocking mechanism in relation to normal constitutional
changes. This latter point represented a serious stumbling block and one
which the United Kingdom Government had only introduced at a late stage of
the discussions.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that, in his earlier discussions with
Mr. Smith in the previous February, he had raised the question of a blocking
third for normal constitutional changes and had understood that Mr. Smith
had accepted the principle involved but had suggested that it should be
satisfied by a blocking quarter. Mr. Lardner-Burke said that the idea of
a blocking quarter had been explored in the discussions; but it was not a
specific offer by Rhodesian Ministers since they had no mandate to present
it as such.

Mr. Smith added that one of the objections put forward by the
Commonwealth Secretary to the proposal had been that the additional seats
should be filled by Chiefs but he understood that this proposal was less
acceptable to the United Kingdom Government than the idea of a Senate.

The Prime Minister said that in his discussions with leaders of the
Opposition he had mentioned the proposal that a White Paper might be published,
which would include all the relevant recent correspondence between the
United Kingdom and Rhodesian Ministers. Sir Alec Douglas-Home had accepted
this proposal so far as his Administration was concerned; but the Prime Minister had not yet spoken to Mr. Macmillan whose concurrence would have to be obtained in respect of correspondence exchanged during his administration. In considering this question of publication it appeared that the correspondence by itself would not be meaningful unless it was linked by a brief historical narrative summarising developments between successive stages in the correspondence. He proposed, therefore, that the White Paper should include a record of this kind, on the understanding that it would give no indication of the content of the exchanges which might have taken place between one letter and the next but would merely refer to their having taken place.

MR. SMITH agreed that this would be acceptable. He enquired whether the Prime Minister contemplated that the minutes of the current discussions might be published.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in certain circumstances (e.g. if there were a unilateral declaration of independence) the United Kingdom Government would feel free to publish them.

MR. SMITH said that he had been disturbed that morning to see a statement in the Press of what the Foreign Secretary had said in New York when he had been asked why Rhodesia wanted independence. Mr. Stewart was reported as having answered that this was because the Rhodesian Government wished to perpetuate white domination. This was an unfortunate and provocative statement. On the contrary, the Rhodesian Government accepted the principle of the 1961 Constitution which ensured an ultimate African majority; and they were willing to agree to safeguards for its continuation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, before commenting, he would wish to see the precise text of what the Foreign Secretary had said, since a misquotation or a much abbreviated version of what had been said frequently led to misunderstanding. He accepted that the differences between the United Kingdom and Rhodesian Governments related not to the question whether there should be perpetual minority rule but to the question how quickly minority rule might come to an end. But, if Mr. Smith contemplated - as he had said in public - that minority rule should last for at least as long as his own lifetime, this would amount to a difference of principle rather than of timing and might justify what the Foreign Secretary had said.
MR. SMITH said that he could not accept this view and hoped that the Prime Minister would examine the text of what the Foreign Secretary had said. He agreed, however, that misunderstanding could arise as a result of incorrect quotation by the Press. Indeed, the Rhodesian Government had themselves suffered in this respect in that there had been a Press statement that Mr. Harper, on his return through Johannesburg to Southern Rhodesia, had said that a unilateral declaration of independence was inevitable. In fact, what he had said was that such a declaration was not inevitable.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that at least the United Kingdom Press had not given an incorrect impression of what had been said by both sides during the recent discussions.

MR. SMITH agreed that the position was quite clear and that one thing which had emerged from the discussions was that both sides now knew where they stood.

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