CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, 1st July, 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. HAROLD WILSON, M.P., Prime Minister
The Right Hon. GEORGE BROWN, M.P., First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Items 1-6)
The Right Hon. LORD GARDINER, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. DENIS HEALEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Defence
The Right Hon. ARTHUR BOTTOMLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
The Right Hon. ANTHONY GREENWOOD, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies
The Right Hon. THE EARL OF LONGFORD, Lord Privy Seal
The Right Hon. RICHARD CROSSMAN, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government (Items 1-4)
The Right Hon. R. J. GUNTER, M.P., Minister of Labour (Items 1-5)
The Right Hon. FREDERICK LEE, M.P., Minister of Power
The Right Hon. HERBERT BOWDEN, M.P., Lord President of the Council
The Right Hon. MICHAEL STEWART, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Right Hon. SIR FRANK SOKSHICE, Q.C., M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department
The Right Hon. JAMES GRIFFITHS, M.P., Secretary of State for Wales
The Right Hon. DOUGLAS JAY, M.P., President of the Board of Trade
The Right Hon. ANTHONY CROSSLAND, M.P., Secretary of State for Education and Science (Items 1-4)
The Right Hon. DOUGLAS HOUGHTON, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. FRED PeART, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
The Right Hon. BARBARA CASTLE, M.P., Minister of Overseas Development (Items 1-6)
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. JOHN DIAMOND, M.P., Chief Secretary, Treasury (Items 2-6)
Mr. GEORGE WILLIS, M.P., Minister of State, Scottish Office (Items 5-7)
The Right Hon. EDWARD SHORT, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

Secretariat:
SIR BURKE TREND
Mr. P. ROGERS
Miss J. J. NUNN
Mr. J. H. LOCKE
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The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

The Lord President said that, owing to the time occupied by debates on the Finance Bill, it would almost certainly be necessary for Parliament to sit during the first week in August. It was hoped so to arrange the business, however, that divisions on matters of importance would be avoided and there was no intention of prolonging the sitting into the second week of August. It should be possible to complete Government business by sitting for eight days in October, but this would mean that certain Bills would not receive Royal Assent until the autumn. These would probably be the Race Relations, Redundancy Payments, and Rent Bills, and possibly the Trade Disputes Bill. It was proposed to take the remaining stages of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill after 7 p.m. on 13th July, but there was no possibility of finding further time if the Bill failed to secure Third Reading on that occasion.

In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) The Government were liable to be embarrassed if the Trade Disputes Bill and the Control of Office and Industrial Development Bill were not passed until October, and arrangements should if possible be made to secure their passage before the Recess.

(b) It was desirable also to secure the passage of the Race Relations Bill, but, while the remaining stages of the Bill in the House of Commons were likely to be completed before the Recess, particularly if the Government's supporters refrained from moving amendments on Report, there could be no certainty of finding time for the consideration of Lords' amendments.

(c) Delay in passing the Rent Bill would not be inconvenient, since there would be advantage in bringing the Bill into operation soon after Royal Assent and some time was required to make the necessary administrative arrangements.

(d) It would be difficult for the House of Lords to sit longer or resume earlier than the House of Commons, but it should be possible for them to complete their business by sitting until 4th or 5th August and for a short period in October.

(e) On the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill, half a day should be sufficient to dispose of the amendments relating to the penalty for murder and, if the Speaker were prepared to accept the closure, to secure Third Reading by a reasonable hour; but there would be a serious risk of losing the Bill if time were spent on an amendment put down by the sponsor, Mr. Sidney Silverman, to remove the clause (clause 3) limiting the operation of the Bill to five years. Mr. Silverman should accordingly be informed that, while the Government were willing to provide a half day for the remaining stages of the Bill, they were not prepared to jeopardise their own legislation in order to secure its passage, and that this time would be made available only on condition that he withdrew his amendment. It should be impressed on the sponsors of the Bill that
they should confine their own speeches to the minimum, and representations might be made to the Speaker on the question of the closure.

The Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the arrangements which the Lord President proposed to make for securing the completion of the Government's business during the remainder of the Session.

(2) Invited the Lord President—

(a) to inform the sponsors of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill that the Government were prepared to provide a half day for the discussion of the remaining stages of the Bill in the House of Commons, provided that their amendment to delete clause 3 were withdrawn; and

(b) to consider the advisability of making representations to the Speaker on the acceptance of the closure in the debate on the Report stage of the Bill.

2. The Foreign Secretary said that the régime under Colonel Boumedienne, which had assumed power in Algiers after the Government of President Ben Bella had been overthrown in the recent coup d'état, appeared to have established effective control over the country. It would therefore be appropriate that we should continue to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Algeria; but there should be no need at this stage to extend formal recognition to the new Government.

The Foreign Secretary said that at the recent meeting of Western European Union (WEU) which he had attended, the other member countries had responded favourably to the initiative which we had taken at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to seek to establish closer links between EFTA and the European Economic Community. It was clear, however, that they would expect to be given more detailed information at the next quarterly meeting of WEU and that they would watch developments closely.

The Prime Minister said that the project for a Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam which had emerged from the recent Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers had met with a varied reception from the countries concerned. The Governments of the United States and South Vietnam had expressed their willingness to receive the Mission; the Government of the People's Republic of China had rejected it without qualification; the Government of the Soviet Union had evaded a direct response by suggesting that the effective decision lay with the Government of North Vietnam; and the latter, who
were clearly subject to conflicting pressures from the Chinese and Soviet Governments, had so far maintained an ambiguous attitude. There had recently been some indication, however, that, although they might refuse to receive the Mission as a whole, they might be disposed to accept its Ghanaian and Nigerian members. A suggestion of this kind would probably be unacceptable to the Mission which had decided, before the end of the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, that the Mission should seek to act in unity in all its activities; and it would therefore be necessary to maintain the pressure which was now being exerted on the Government of North Vietnam to receive the Mission as a whole.

The Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

3. The Chief Secretary, Treasury, said that his recent discussions with the Federal German Government in Bonn about the future of the German Offset Agreement had reached a reasonably satisfactory conclusion. The Agreement currently in force, which would expire in March 1966 had bound the Federal Government to do no more than to offset "as far as possible" the foreign exchange costs of maintaining United Kingdom Forces in Germany. Our expenditure on this account was likely to run at the rate of £85 million a year; and, during the first 15 months of the period of the Agreement, the Federal Government had contributed no more than £30 million by way of offset. His objective in the discussions had therefore been, in effect, to negotiate payments of some £50-£60 million a year.

The new Agreement which had been finally concluded envisaged that the period in question would be extended for a further year to 31st March, 1967, in respect of which the Federal Government had accepted a reasonably firm commitment to contribute about £54 million. Moreover, they had undertaken to pay £42 million on account by the end of July which would increase the payment in respect of the second year of the three-year period as a whole to £50 million. This would be sufficient to enable the Frozen Arms Account, which was at present blocked, to be released; and it had been agreed that this account should provide finance, amounting to some £23 million, together with a similar sum from German merchant bankers, for additional United Kingdom exports.

In sum, therefore, we might hope that, if the new Agreement were honoured, we should receive about £170 million over the three-year period as a whole by way of offset to the foreign exchange costs of our Forces in Germany. This was not far short of our original objective; and the fact that the settlement had been reached either without any threats about removing our troops in Germany.
or on the other hand giving any commitment to maintain them there after the end of the three-year period was an additional reason for satisfaction.

In discussion it was noted that there would be discussion between the Treasury, the Ministry of Overseas Development and other Ministries concerned on the manner in which German finance for additional United Kingdom exports to developing countries might be utilised under the new Agreement.

The Cabinet—

Took note, with approval of this statement and congratulated the Chief Secretary, Treasury, on the successful outcome of his negotiations about the Anglo-German Offset Agreement.

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4. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Lord President of the Council (C (65) 85) to which was annexed a provisional legislative programme for 1965–66.

The Lord President said that the proposed main programme for the next Session was devoted largely to Bills to implement the Government's social policies, but time must also be allowed for Bills which it had not been possible to pass in the present Session and for others which might become necessary either for economic reasons or as policy in other fields developed. Some Bills at present included in the programme might not in the event come forward and others might be delayed, in which case it would be convenient to draw on the Bills which had been placed in the reserve list (List C). It was proposed that a small number of uncontentious Bills should be introduced with a view to being referred to the Second Reading Committee which the House of Commons was expected to establish following the report of the Select Committee on Procedure, but this would be on the understanding that if objection were taken to the reference of a particular Bill to the Second Reading Committee the Government would not necessarily find time for it in their main programme.

In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) Additional Bills might be required on The Gambia (on becoming a Republic); on the Constitution of Canada (to deal with the problem of Quebec); on Government Contracts (arising out of Sir John Lang's report); and, if current negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion, to establish a free trade area with the Irish Republic. Time should also be found, if possible, for a short Bill enabling the Crown to dissolve Convocations otherwise than on the dissolution of Parliament.

(b) If it were decided to reorganise the Army and Air Force Reserves, the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces Bill would have to be brought into the main programme. It would be necessary to continue the Army and Air Force Acts by legislation before 31st December, 1966.
It would be important, in view of the Government's pledges, to introduce early in the Session the Agriculture Bill; and measures on Leasehold Enfranchisement, Commonwealth Immigration, Commonwealth Secretariat and Slum Clearance (Compensation). The Bill on Local Government Finance should at least receive its Second Reading before Christmas in order that local authorities might take its provisions into account in fixing their rate demands for the succeeding year. The Government should hesitate, however, before committing themselves to a measure on Pirate Broadcasting.

It would also be desirable to provide time for a Law Reform Bill arising from the work of the Law Commission.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the proposed programme was a balanced and attractive one and had the additional merit of being composed in the main of Bills which would have fairly wide support so that the intensity of debate might be reduced in the next Session. It would be necessary to consider the programme again in the autumn, but meanwhile the Ministers concerned should press forward with the preparation of the Bills in the main lists. Priority, both in seeking approval of policy and in drafting, should be given to Steel; Land Commission; Local Government Finance and Housing (Financial Provisions)—including the corresponding Scottish Bills; Income Guarantee (subject to the outcome of the review of public expenditure); and Earnings-Related Benefits.

The Cabinet—

(1) Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the provisional legislative programme for 1965-66.

(2) Invited the Ministers concerned to proceed as a matter of urgency with the preparation of Bills included in Lists A.1 and B, giving priority to those mentioned by the Prime Minister in his summing up of their discussion.

5. The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (C (65) 87) and by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (C (65) 89) on proposals for improving the financial position of the National Coal Board (NCB) and in particular for a capital reorganisation.

The First Secretary of State said that the financial position of the NCB was deteriorating seriously, largely because it had planned during the 1950s for an annual production of at least 220 million tons whereas demand was now down to 190 million tons and would undoubtedly decline still further in the next few years. Their deficit for 1965-66 was likely to be of the order of £50 million and urgent action was required. The Ministerial Committee on Economic Development had agreed that a substantial part of the NCB's liabilities should be written off at least to the extent of £250 million,
representing about £90 million of accumulated losses and some £150 million representing assets which are no longer of any economic value to the Board. It was also clear that further assets of the order of £150 million would become valueless over the next few years. With the exception of the Treasury, the Committee had considered that it would be better to write off this amount immediately rather than at later intervals.

The Committee had also considered the possibility of giving to the NCB a specific subsidy for a limited period to cover the costs of operating and ultimately closing uneconomic pits, provided that the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) were prepared to commit themselves to a definite scheme for speeding up closures of such pits. The subsidy might begin at £15 million a year and be tapered off to nothing by 1970 when the run-down was completed. It was important to maintain the willingness of the NUM to co-operate in closures, and such a subsidy would also avoid the necessity for a price increase this year of more than 1 per cent overall. Such an increase might also be selective in its incidence, so reducing its general impact in the context of the prices and incomes policy.

The Minister of Power said that it would be desirable to make some distinction between the write off of the first £250 million and that of £150 million in view of the fact that the latter represented assets still of some economic value to the Board. He was, however, opposed to a policy involving subsidies. There could be no guarantee that these would in practice be gradually reduced; on the contrary there would be great pressure on the Government by the miners to maintain them and to use them to prolong the life of uneconomic pits. The NCB themselves did not want subsidies. The run down in the labour force in mining was now so fast that the problem was really one of regrouping the available labour force and of providing of alternative employment in certain areas. A price increase was necessary this year and even with a write off of £400 million it would need to be of the order of 2 to 3 per cent.

The Chief Secretary, Treasury, said that there were objections to writing off assets which were still of economic value to the NCB. Nevertheless, it seemed realistic to assume that such assets, to a value of some £150 million, would soon become worthless; and on balance it would be preferable to write off the whole sum now rather than do so by instalments. He was, however, strongly opposed to the introduction of subsidies which would distort the pattern of the industry, lead to pressure to keep pits open rather than facilitate earlier closure and were not in any case wanted by the NCB.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) There would be great difficulty in persuading the miners to accept a reduction in coal output to 175 million tons a year and the NCB were most anxious not to publicise a long-term closure programme because of its effect in the industry.
The introduction of subsidies would in effect transfer from the NCB to the Government responsibility for phasing the closure programme.

Further financial assistance was required to provide additional employment in the mining areas concerned in Scotland, Wales and the North-East. The capital reorganisation might well be criticised as merely the acceptance of a failure by a nationalised industry to direct its investment properly, and the statement on Government policy should include some positive measure.

The regional price surcharge should be reconsidered whatever decision was taken about the introduction of subsidies.

If coal prices were increased substantially this would accelerate the fall in demand and increase the difficulties of the industry.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there was general agreement with the proposal to write off this year £400 million of the NCB's liabilities and to announce this immediately. There was, however, considerable objection to seeking to facilitate earlier closures by the provision of subsidies and it would be preferable to provide assistance for alternative means of employment in the areas concerned. The Minister of Power should therefore include in his statement an indication that the Government was prepared to enter into discussions with the industry about the establishment of a coal industry fund to deal with the social and economic problems caused by the need to speed up the closure of uneconomic pits. The main expenditure from such a fund would be on expanding new industrial development in certain areas by the Board of Trade, although it might also be possible to meet other direct social costs of the closure programme from the fund. Its establishment must be conditional on the acceptance by the coal industry, including the mineworkers, of the need for a rapid further closure programme. This would be a positive proposal even though it would not assist in keeping down the price of coal. The Minister of Power should agree the text of his statement in the House of Commons with the First Secretary of State and the Chief Secretary, Treasury and with himself. The question of the regional surcharge should be further considered by the Minister of Power, with the Secretary of State for Scotland and other Ministers concerned, as a separate issue.

The Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that a capital reorganisation of the National Coal Board, involving the immediate writing off of £400 million to cover liabilities, should be undertaken.

(2) Agreed that the Minister of Power should offer to discuss with the coal industry the establishment of a coal industry fund on the lines indicated in the Prime Minister's summing up.
(3) Invited the Minister of Power to announce these decisions in the House of Commons later that day and to seek the agreement of the Prime Minister, the First Secretary of State and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, to the terms of the statement.

(4) Invited the Minister of Power to arrange for a review of the regional surcharge.

6. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Home Secretary (C (65) 86) about home defence and the Territorial Army.

The Home Secretary said that in their review of the home defence measures required up to 1971–72 the Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence had reviewed the usefulness of the reserve army for home defence. The Ministry of Defence were considering in parallel their future requirement for reserve forces. The reserve army would provide about 161,000 men for home defence on mobilisation, including 84,000 reservists, who under the Army Reserves Act, 1964, would only be available until 1969. Of this total, about 152,000 were in units at the disposal of the civil authorities, but not earmarked for specific tasks. Their primary role would be to help the police in maintaining public order in circumstances which might involve a widespread breakdown of civil authority. The Territorial Army (TA) cost about £35 million a year and the Army Emergency Reserve a further £3 million. If the reserve army were reorganised on the basis that no units were retained for home defence purposes, there would be a saving of about £20 million a year.

Under present plans about 150,000 personnel from the Regular Forces would be available to support the civil authorities after an attack, although home defence would not be their primary role and there were large areas of the United Kingdom where none were located. Having regard to the reduced threat of attack, the Home Defence Review Committee considered that while the reserve forces could give much valuable assistance to the civil authorities after an attack, the expenditure of a large annual sum on an organisation which did not appear to them to be of first importance for national survival could not be supported on home defence grounds. There was considerable support for this view in the Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence and it had been suggested that if further steps were necessary for the preservation of order in an emergency, the best course might be to put further emphasis on police plans and perhaps to procure the support of other regular peace time services, including the assumption by the Post Office of the duties of 1,000 Territorials allocated to signals work. The Ministry of Defence supported the conclusion of the Home Defence Review Committee and was considering a reorganisation of the reserve army for military duties overseas on the assumption that no units were retained for home defence. The maintenance of a home defence role for the reserve army would require the recasting of these plans with a substantial

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reduction of the saving involved to about £8-£10 million. Moreover it would be difficult to secure the primary advantage of military forces for home defence purposes, namely discipline in a cohesive organisation, if reserve units were raised solely for assistance to the civil defence services and the Ministry of Defence would see serious objection to raising a force of this nature since it might adversely affect volunteering for the reserve army units required for purely military duties. Nevertheless, some members of the Ministerial Committee urged that the TA should be retained primarily for home defence purposes on the ground that the preservation of order after nuclear attack would be seriously imperilled if it were disbanded. The alternative courses were thus either:

(i) to accept that expenditure on the reserve forces could not be justified solely on home defence grounds and to examine other arrangements for assisting the police in the event of nuclear attack; or

(ii) to retain the home defence role of the reserve forces with a consequent loss of saving of up to £20 million a year depending on the scale of forces to be provided.

His own view was that the requirements of civil defence made it necessary to retain the home defence role. Other issues of policy relating to our future home defence policy were being considered separately and would be brought before the Cabinet at a later stage.

The Secretary of State for Defence said that the requirements for the maintenance of government after nuclear attack must necessarily be speculative. It was impossible to be sure what forces would be available in case of need, or whether there would have been time to call up the TA before the attack was made. The Government could not prepare for every contingency and the present risk of nuclear war was not such as to justify an expenditure of £20 million a year on the civil defence role of the TA. Moreover, the TA had never been informed that its main function would be to aid the police in the maintenance of order after attack. Such an announcement would seriously damage recruitment and would hamper the reorganisation of the reserve forces for their military role. Nor would it be practicable to recruit a force exclusively for a civil defence role. A decision was urgently required, since it would be necessary to put proposals to Ministers on the reorganisation of the reserve forces and make a statement in Parliament before the Recess if consultations with the Territorial Associations were to be completed in time for a Bill introduced in the next Session.

In discussion there was some support for the view that the home defence role of the TA should be retained. Without such forces it would be impracticable for the police to maintain order, or safeguard stocks of food, particularly in substantial areas of Great Britain such as Scotland and Wales, where no Regular Forces were normally stationed. The balance of view was, however, that the saving that would be obtained by the reorganisation of the reserve forces to
exclude a home defence role was essential if the necessary economies in defence expenditure were to be obtained. Moreover, on defence grounds alone some reorganisation of these forces was required and this could not satisfactorily be carried out if the TA were to retain their present role. In addition, there might, even from the home defence view, be advantage in considering alternative means more directly associated with the local authorities for preserving public order after attack, since it was doubtful whether in the event it would be practicable to call out the TA in time to enable it to assume its civil defence function.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of opinion was that expenditure on the reserve forces could not be justified solely on home defence grounds. The Secretary of State for Defence should consider the reorganisation of the forces accordingly and circulate proposals to the Ministers concerned for their consideration. It would also be necessary to examine other arrangements for assisting the police to maintain order in the event of nuclear attack. The implications of this decision for our future civil defence policy would in the first instance be the task of the Home Defence Review Committee and subsequently for consideration by the Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence. Meanwhile, it was of great importance that secrecy should be maintained on the conclusions which had been reached on the future of the reserve forces until such time as a public statement could be made.

The Cabinet—

(1) Approved alternative (a) in paragraph 12 of C (65) 86.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Defence to circulate to the Ministers concerned his proposals for the consequential reorganisation of the reserve forces.

(3) Invited the Home Secretary, in the light of the Prime Minister's summing up, to arrange for the Ministerial Committee on Civil Defence to consider the possibility of making other arrangements for assisting the police in the preservation of order in the event of nuclear attack.

7. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Home Secretary (C (65) 84) on Sunday Observance.

The Home Secretary said that the report of the departmental committee on the Law on Sunday Observance had been published in December and subsequently debated in both Houses of Parliament. In debate, speedy action on the report had been urged and assurances given that it would not be disregarded. The Committee's recommendations fell under three heads, relating respectively to entertainment and sport, trading and conditions of employment. Those on trading were being considered in conjunction with a possible amendment of the law relating to week-day shop closing hours. It would be appropriate to have a separate Bill on Sunday entertainment and sport and his proposals related solely to these aspects.
Some of the Committee’s recommendations, relating to the hours of opening public places of entertainment and to the arrange­ments for sports matches had in debate attracted some criticism. There was also strong feeling, particularly in Wales, against the removal of restrictions. Nevertheless, the Government would be subject to criticism if they failed to introduce legislation. The Home Affairs Committee had concluded that the best course would be for the Government to introduce a Bill to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations on entertainment and sport, but in doing so to make it clear that the Government were not putting forward their own conclusions, but merely giving Parliament an opportunity to pronounce upon them. All decisions would be left to a free vote. Recommendation 31 of the Committee’s report proposed restrictions on the employment of persons on Sundays in connection with certain entertainments. While this was essentially a matter of the protection of workers’ interests it seemed clear that any legislation on Sunday observance would be expected to include provisions on this subject and he proposed to consult the Minister of Labour on this recommendation and include appropriate provision in the proposed Bill. It would be desirable for him to make an early announcement of the Government’s intentions.

The Secretary of State for Wales said that while he did not oppose a statement on the lines advocated by the Home Secretary it would be preferable that this should follow rather than precede an announcement of the Government’s decision on the introduction of a Bill for Leasehold Enfranchisement.

In discussion there was some support for the view that it would be inadvisable for the Government to give any indication at the present time that it would take action on the lines proposed by the Home Secretary. Government sponsorship of a Bill, even in the manner proposed, would be productive of political embarrassment and would also reduce the Parliamentary time available for the passage of the Government’s own measures. On the other hand it was argued that since there had been public and Parliamentary pressure for the appointment of the Committee, and since debate in both Houses had shown Parliamentary support for early action to be taken, it was the duty of the Government of the day to provide Parliamentary opportunity for this to be done.

In further discussion on the manner in which such opportunity might best be provided, it was suggested that as an alternative to the Home Secretary’s proposal, Parliamentary time might be provided for a motion by a Private Member proposing that a Bill be introduced to carry out the recommendations of the Report. If the motion were carried the Government could then provide assistance in drafting the Bill, but still maintain an attitude of neutrality to the Committee’s recommendations. If the motion were lost, the issue would not then arise. Alternatively, it might be preferable for the Bill to be introduced by a Private Member in Private Members’ time. In any event, it would be important to the Government’s legislative
programme that no commitment should be made by the Government to finding Parliamentary time for the introduction of such a Bill in the next Session.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of opinion was that some facilities should be provided by the Government to enable Parliament to take a decision on the recommendations of the Committee's report, and that this could best be achieved by arranging for the Bill to be introduced in Private Members' time by a Member successful in the Ballot. In that event, the Government could offer facilities for the drafting of the Bill while maintaining its attitude of neutrality to the Committee's recommendations. In any event there should be no suggestion that the Government would be able to provide Parliamentary time for such a Bill in the next Session. The Home Secretary might make a statement in Parliament accordingly on the next convenient opportunity.

The Cabinet—

Invited the Home Secretary to make a Parliamentary statement on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister in his summing up.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1,