



(c) crown copyright

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Cabinet. December 1964

C.C. (64)
14th Conclusions

Copy No. 36

CABINET

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Friday, 11th December, 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. HAROLD WILSON, M.P., Prime Minister

The Right Hon. GEORGE BROWN, M.P., First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs	The Right Hon. PATRICK GORDON WALKER, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Right Hon. HERBERT BOWDEN, M.P., Lord President of the Council	The Right Hon. LORD GARDINER, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. JAMES CALLAGHAN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer	The Right Hon. DENIS HEALEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Defence
The Right Hon. Sir FRANK SOSKICE, Q.C., M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department	The Right Hon. ARTHUR BOTTOMLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for Common- wealth Relations
The Right Hon. WILLIAM ROSS, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland	The Right Hon. JAMES GRIFFITHS, M.P., Secretary of State for Wales
The Right Hon. ANTHONY GREENWOOD, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (<i>Items 1 and 3</i>)	The Right Hon. DOUGLAS JAY, M.P., President of the Board of Trade
The Right Hon. THE EARL OF LONGFORD, Lord Privy Seal	The Right Hon. RICHARD CROSSMAN, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government
The Right Hon. DOUGLAS HOUGHTON, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	The Right Hon. R. J. GUNTER, M.P., Minister of Labour
The Right Hon. FRANK COUSINS, Minister of Technology	The Right Hon. FRED PEART, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
The Right Hon. FREDERICK LEE, M.P., Minister of Power	The Right Hon. TOM FRASER, M.P., Minister of Transport

The Right Hon. BARBARA CASTLE, M.P.,
Minister of Overseas Development

Also present:

The Right Hon. EDWARD SHORT, M.P.,
Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury

Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. P. ROGERS
Mr. D. S. LASKEY

SECRET

CONTENTS

<i>Minute No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i>
1	OVERSEA AFFAIRS Aden	3
2	PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA ...	3
3	SOUTHERN RHODESIA	7

SECRET

3

C.C. 14 (64)

Oversea
Affairs
Aden

1. *The Colonial Secretary* said that the primary purpose of his visit to Aden had been to create a favourable political climate rather than to discuss our military base, which had played only a subsidiary part in his discussions. He had therefore visited various parts of the Federation and had met leading personalities both in the Federal States and in Aden, including leaders of the political parties and trade unions and some of the individuals at present held in detention. He had reaffirmed that our policy was directed towards the establishment of a fully independent Arab State by 1968 at the latest and that, within the limits of our resources, we would continue to provide aid in order to promote stability and prosperity in the area. He had encouraged discussions between the Adeni and Federal Governments; and at the end of his visit they had issued a joint declaration looking to the creation of a unitary State on a democratic basis. He had welcomed this declaration and had undertaken that, in preparation for a new constitutional conference to be held at the beginning of March, we would assist the two Governments in studying the further problems which would need to be examined before a unitary State could be brought into being, particularly the necessary provisions guaranteeing human rights.

The Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of the statement by the Colonial Secretary.

Prime
Minister's
Visit to
Washington
and Ottawa

2. *The Prime Minister* informed the Cabinet of the outcome of the discussions which, together with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, he had conducted with the President of the United States, President Johnson, and other members of the United States Administration during his visit to Washington earlier in the week.

The visit had been conducted in a very cordial atmosphere; and there had been no attempt on the part of the United States Government to confront us with the need to take unacceptable decisions at short notice. As a result we had achieved our main purpose of making clear our basic policy on defence and of preparing the way for further and more detailed discussions.

President Johnson and his colleagues had been particularly insistent on the value of the world-wide military role played by the United Kingdom and on the importance of our continuing to discharge that role in collaboration with the other members of the Commonwealth whenever possible. They appreciated the burden which it imposed on our economy; and, since defence expenditure was imposing a similar strain on their own balance of payments, they had been particularly interested to be informed of the measures by which we hoped to reduce the cost of our defence programmes and

SECRET

to transfer resources from military to civil use. President Johnson had indicated his political sympathy with the steps which we had already taken to rectify our balance of payments; he had welcomed the prospect of close collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom on future economic policy; and he had willingly endorsed our suggestion that both countries might profit from a detailed examination of the possibilities of closer co-operation in defence research and development and in weapons production.

As regards the future nuclear role of the Atlantic Alliance there had been complete agreement on the objectives involved, namely, to satisfy the nuclear aspirations of the Federal German Republic, to prevent the further proliferation of national nuclear capabilities and to open the way for further initiatives towards disarmament. On the means to be adopted in order to realise these objectives, however, there remained some difference of view, at least in so far as the United States Government had not abandoned their advocacy of a mixed-manned surface fleet. On the other hand, they had shown a welcome degree of readiness to consider our own alternative concept of an Atlantic Nuclear Force (A.N.F.); and it should now be possible for this project to go forward for discussion in greater detail with the other members of the Alliance. The United States Government had admittedly indicated that any force of the kind which we had in mind should, in their view, comprise not only national contributions by both the United Kingdom and the United States but also a mixed-manned surface fleet element, to which the United Kingdom should contribute. We had made it clear that our position on this issue was wholly reserved. At the same time we had secured a very valuable recognition by the United States Government that there would be no question of their waiving their veto in relation to such a fleet, whether now or at any time in the future; and this vital assurance had been publicly reflected in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the discussions.

President Johnson had also shown a lively awareness of the risks of a proliferation of nuclear capabilities elsewhere than in Europe, particularly in India as a result of the recent detonation of a nuclear device by the Communist Government of China. He had therefore endorsed our tentative suggestion that it might be necessary, at some point in the future, to seek to establish, in relation to the Indian Ocean and the Far East, some kind of arrangement for nuclear interdependence corresponding to the concept which we were trying to promote in relation to Europe.

The United States Government had been anxious that we should make some positive contribution to their operations in Vietnam by way of a limited military presence on Vietnamese territory. In reply we had emphasised the heavy burden which we were already carrying in assisting the Government of Malaysia to resist Indonesian aggression and subversion; and we had also warned the United States Government of the potentially embarrassing situation which might arise if they took any action to force the issue in Vietnam and so compelled us to activate our role as co-Chairman of the 1954 Conference. We had therefore continued to resist their pressure for

a United Kingdom military presence in Vietnam and had merely undertaken to increase slightly the various types of support facility which we already provided in the form of training facilities for South Vietnamese troops, etc.

President Johnson had shown interest in our policy towards British Guiana in the light of the recent election which had resulted in the fall of Dr. Jagan's Government. We had therefore informed him, as we had already informed Dr. Jagan himself, that, regardless of the result of the election, we were not prepared to concede independence to the Colony until the racial communities had shown that they could live and work together in peace.

The discussions had ended with a communique which revealed a welcome measure of agreement on all the main issues concerned. In particular, its concluding reference to "continuing discussions at all levels, both within the Alliance and in wider international associations, in pursuit of nuclear and conventional disarmament and all measures to reduce world tension" should be of considerable political value to the Government in so far as it clearly implied that the United States Government recognised that our right to participate in all major international negotiations must be accepted on its merits and did not derive solely from our possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.

The Foreign Secretary said that future progress in negotiating a greater degree of interdependence within the North Atlantic Alliance might be eased by the fact that the United States Government were no longer as unanimously in favour of the concept of the mixed-manned surface fleet as they had been only a few months before; but it would still depend mainly on the reactions of the Federal German Government to our project for an A.N.F., in the form in which it had emerged from the Washington discussions. The German Government were themselves divided on the issues involved; and they were acutely aware that, if the French Government, in the person of General de Gaulle, sought to compel them to choose between some new and closer form of Atlantic nuclear interdependence and an independent Franco-German nuclear force, they might be exposed to serious political embarrassment in the months immediately preceding the forthcoming Federal election. They might well prefer, therefore, to evade this unpalatable choice; and in that event it might be possible to postpone a final decision on the form of an A.N.F. until the late autumn of 1965. Meanwhile, we should proceed to promote multilateral discussion of the issues involved by means of appropriate international negotiations in the near future; and it was satisfactory that the United States Government, although apparently still anxious to ensure that any A.N.F. would comprise a mixed-manned surface fleet element, had assured us that during these further negotiations they would be content to sponsor this concept on their own responsibility and would not seek to influence the Federal German Government to support it against their better judgment.

The Secretary of State for Defence said that his own discussions with the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, had

convinced him that the United States Government were genuinely prepared to explore, rapidly and in detail, the possibilities of closer co-operation with the United Kingdom in relation to defence research and development and weapons production; and, although measures for this purpose could not be expected to produce substantial economies in the near future, they should yield very significant savings in the longer term, particularly if they could be supplemented by arrangements for shared logistic support. Moreover, the United States Government had shown themselves not unsympathetic to our desire to reduce the level of our ground forces in Germany. They wished to achieve a similar economy themselves; and, although it was unlikely that the susceptibilities of the Federal German Government would allow either the United States or the United Kingdom to withdraw troops from German territory in the near future, this would remain the agreed objective of both Governments, which they would hope to pursue in the context of wider efforts to secure a relaxation of East-West tension by a progressive reduction in the European force levels of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact. The United States Government agreed with us in regarding the contribution which we made to peace and stability outside Europe as more important than our European role; and we could look to them to support in principle any measures which we might seek to adopt in accordance with these priorities, whether in relation to our oversea bases or otherwise.

The Prime Minister said that the visit which, together with the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary, he had subsequently paid to Canada had been very rewarding. They had received a very warm welcome from the Canadian Government and had held useful discussions both with the Cabinet as a whole and with individual Ministers. Largely as a result of their current preoccupation with the political tension in French Canada the Canadian Government were particularly sensitive to the probable reactions of the French Government to our project for an A.N.F. Nevertheless, they had expressed great interest in this concept and had undertaken to examine it with an open mind. They had been no less aware than the United States Government of the risk of a further proliferation of nuclear weapons which was inherent in the recent Chinese detonation of a nuclear device; and we could count on their support in any attempt which we might eventually make to promote the concept of nuclear interdependence in areas outside Europe.

The discussions in Ottawa had also comprised a useful exchange of views on the economic situation and on the prospects for United Kingdom exports to Canada, which remained at a disappointing low level. It was urgently necessary to improve our competitive position in the Canadian market.

The Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of these statements and congratulated the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Commonwealth Secretary on the successful outcome of their discussions in Washington and Ottawa.

Southern Rhodesia (Previous Reference : C.C. (64) 3rd Conclusions, Minute 2)

3. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C. (64) 25), proposing that a parliamentary mission should visit Southern Rhodesia.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that there would be advantage in sending a parliamentary mission to visit Southern Rhodesia in an attempt to conciliate the extreme views held by Europeans and Africans. A mission of this kind might help to resolve the deadlock if the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Smith, continued to be reluctant to visit the United Kingdom for further discussions; it would represent a useful new initiative, with considerable presentational value both in the United Kingdom and in the United Nations; and it would emphasise the bi-partisan approach to the problem in this country. It would be undesirable to stipulate that other members of the Commonwealth should be represented on the mission, since it was unlikely that this would be acceptable to Mr. Smith. The mission should therefore be composed of two Labour Members of Parliament (not in the Cabinet), one Conservative and one Liberal; and at least the chairman should be a Privy Councillor. The mission should preferably not be given specific terms of reference; and its purpose might be described as being simply "to visit Southern Rhodesia". There should be no advance commitment that it would present a public report to Parliament. If the proposal were agreed and were acceptable to the Leader of the Opposition and the Leader of the Liberal Party, it would be communicated confidentially to Mr. Smith. He might seek to stipulate in advance that the mission should not have access to the African nationalists who were at present in detention. If so, it would be preferable that the mission should resolve this issue for itself after its arrival in Southern Rhodesia.

In discussion there was general agreement in principle with this proposal. The following main points were made:

(a) It could be argued that there would be advantage in including one or more representatives of other Commonwealth countries in the mission. This proposal might be put forward if Mr. Smith rejected the concept of a purely United Kingdom mission, since, if he also refused a mission with Commonwealth membership, the intransigence of his attitude would have been made doubly clear.

(b) The experience of earlier missions of this kind in relation to Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland suggested that it would be preferable not to seek to make precise stipulations about the individuals to whom the mission should have access, since it was probable that the mission itself, once it had arrived in Southern Rhodesia, would achieve agreement to a wider range of discussions than might be acceptable in advance. For the same reasons there would be advantage in not handicapping the mission by precise terms of reference. On the other hand it might prove impossible to persuade the Government of Southern Rhodesia to accept the mission without greater precision on these points.

(c) The composition of the mission might be further considered, in consultation with the Leaders of the other two parties, when the reactions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia to the proposal in principle were known.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there was general agreement that a proposal on the lines indicated in C. (64) 25 should be made to Mr. Smith at an appropriate moment. If he rejected it or sought to stipulate unacceptable conditions for its operation, it would be necessary for the Cabinet to consider the matter further. In any event we should reserve our right to publish the proposal, if necessary.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Approved in principle the proposals in C. (64) 25 for the despatch of a parliamentary mission to Southern Rhodesia.
- (2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to bring the matter before them again in the light of the reactions of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Smith.

*Cabinet Office, S.W.I.,
11th December, 1964.*



