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7th Conclusions

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CABINET

*CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1,
on Tuesday, 28th January, 1964, at 12 noon*

Present:

The Right Hon. Sir ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	The Right Hon. QUINTIN HOGG, Q.C., M.P., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science
The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor	The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer
The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department	The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies (Items 1-3)
The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development and President of the Board of Trade	The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT, M.P., Minister of Defence
The Right Hon. SELWYN LLOYD, Q.C., M.P., Lord Privy Seal (Item 1)	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. CHRISTOPHER SOAMES, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport
The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General	The Right Hon. MICHAEL NOBLE, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland
The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of Education	The Right Hon. JOSEPH GODBER, M.P., Minister of Labour
The Right Hon. ANTHONY BARBER, M.P., Minister of Health	The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL, M.P., Minister of Power
The Right Hon. GEOFFREY RIPPON, M.P., Minister of Public Building and Works	The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P., Minister without Portfolio
The Right Hon. LORD CARRINGTON, Minister without Portfolio (Item 1)	

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P., Minister of Aviation (Item 1)	The Right Hon. HUGH FRASER, M.P., Secretary of State for Air (Item 1)
The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury	

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In attendance:

General Sir RICHARD HULL, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (*Items 1-3*) (representing the Chief of the Defence Staff)

Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND
Mr. A. L. M. CARY
Mr. P. A. WILKINSON

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Cyprus

(Previous
Reference :
C.M. (64) 6th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

1. *The Commonwealth Secretary* informed the Cabinet that his current discussions with the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus continued to show little prospect of a successful outcome. Meanwhile the situation in the Island itself remained critical; and there was a continuing risk that a deadlock in the London negotiations would precipitate a renewal of communal fighting, which the Turkish Government might seek to use as a pretext for invading the Island. In those circumstances it would become impossible for us to carry single-handed the responsibility for the peace-keeping operation which we had initially undertaken; and we should need to transfer this responsibility, if possible, to an international force. We were therefore seeking to arrange with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) the creation of a force which, though not explicitly a NATO force, would consist of contributions from various members of the Organisation. The United States Government, who had initially been reluctant to contribute to this enterprise, now appeared to be less unwilling to be associated with it. Their participation would be particularly valuable in persuading Archbishop Makarios to accept a force of this nature as a guarantee of whatever political solution ultimately emerged.

In discussion some doubt was expressed whether, if communal violence in Cyprus were renewed, public opinion would acquiesce in our transferring responsibility to an international force. On the other hand if we attempted to continue to carry the whole of the responsibility for keeping the peace, we should have to reinforce our troops in Cyprus on an unacceptably large scale, particularly if the only political solution which appeared feasible was some form of physical separation of the two communities and a partition of the Island. It was known that a solution of this nature would be unacceptable to Archbishop Makarios; and, if it had to be adopted, it might have to be imposed. The task of enforcing it, therefore, was not one which we should shoulder alone; but we could reasonably look for assistance to certain members of NATO, who should be anxious to do all that they could to avert the risk of war between two members of the Organisation. It was for consideration whether the United States Government could contribute to this purpose by appropriate deployment of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

If it proved impracticable to create a force drawn from member countries of NATO, it might become necessary to move the United Nations to establish a military presence in the Island, in order to maintain law and order and to enforce the political solution, whatever it might prove to be. This course, however, was open to certain objections. Once the United Nations were formally involved in the problems of Cyprus our own right to retain our Sovereign Base Areas might well be called in question. Moreover, the Soviet Union would be entitled to take part in both the military measures and the political settlement promoted by the United Nations; and if, in an attempt to avoid Soviet participation, we agreed that both we and the United States would similarly stand aside, the fate of the Island might well be decided by the Afro-Asian group. Bearing in mind the precedent of the United Nations force in the Congo and the known desire of Archbishop Makarios to enlist Afro-Asian support, we might be wise to avoid any appeal to the United Nations, if possible.

In further discussion it was suggested that the situation in Cyprus might soon compel the Commander, British Forces, to exercise his delegated authority to arrange for the emergency evacuation of British families to the Sovereign Base Areas. For this purpose he would require the use of Nicosia Airport; and, since this airport might well become the scene of conflict between Greek and Turkish forces, it was desirable that the Commander should be given authority to seize control of it, a step which we were entitled to take under

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the 1960 Treaty. In these circumstances it might be impossible to avoid the use of force by British troops, which had hitherto been one of our main objectives.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Agreed in principle that it would be desirable to seek to transfer our responsibility for maintaining law and order in Cyprus to an international force, which would preferably be constituted by contributions from certain member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
- (2) Approved the issue to the Commander, British Forces, of an instruction empowering him to take control of Nicosia Airport if he judged this to be essential in order to secure the evacuation of the families and dependents of United Kingdom personnel in Cyprus.

East Africa
(Previous
Reference :
C.M. (64) 6th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

2. *The Prime Minister* informed the Cabinet that it had become necessary during the previous weekend to implement our undertaking to the Government of Kenya to assist them in quelling a mutiny of their armed forces and to respond to a similar request for assistance from the Government of Tanganyika. British forces had accordingly entered both countries and had succeeded in restoring order. There had been no doubt that our intervention had been necessary; and the speed and efficiency with which it had been carried out reflected great credit upon all who had been concerned. But we could not carry indefinitely the responsibility of maintaining order in territories over which we no longer exercised any political control; and we must therefore review our policy in East and Southern Africa as a matter of urgency.

In discussion there was general agreement with this view. It was clearly desirable that British troops should be withdrawn from East Africa as soon as possible; at the same time it would not be in our interest to leave the countries concerned to the mercy of whatever subversive forces had prompted the recent mutinies. There were some indications that the East African Governments themselves were now beginning to think of organising their security on some kind of collective or federal basis; and it would be to our advantage discreetly to encourage this tendency and to seek to promote a pattern of regional co-operation by such practical assistance as we could reasonably provide.

The Cabinet—

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for further consideration to be given to United Kingdom policy in East and Southern Africa.

Indonesia
(Previous
Reference :
C.M. (64) 6th
Conclusions,
Minute 3)

3. *The Prime Minister* said that he had impressed on the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, during his recent visit to the United Kingdom, that, while we fully accepted the importance of preventing Indonesia from adopting a Communist régime, we were no less concerned to promote the stability and independence of Malaysia, which would in themselves constitute a barrier against the advance of Communist influence. He had therefore emphasised to Mr. Kennedy that, although we endorsed the proposed conference between the Heads of Government of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, we could not agree to withdraw our troops from the Borneo Territories until we were fully satisfied of Indonesian good faith and we were anxious that the United States should avoid

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lending themselves to manoeuvres by President Sukarno which would undoubtedly have this objective. Mr. Kennedy had appeared to appreciate our views and had promised that, if President Sukarno did not effectively abandon his present aggressive policy towards Malaysia, the United States Government would cease to supply aid to Indonesia. But the terms of his mission had not empowered him to give us an assurance that the United States Government would support us in any action which might have to be taken if the tripartite discussions failed to reach satisfactory agreement.

Mr. Kennedy had also suggested that we should make renewed efforts to explain our policy to South-East Asian countries. Arrangements for this purpose were already in hand. Meanwhile, it remained our immediate aim to seek to ensure that as little damage as possible to our position in South-East Asia resulted from the proposed tripartite discussions.

The Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of the statement by the Prime Minister.

**Future
Agricultural
Policy :
Cereals**

(Previous
Reference :
C.M. (63) 14th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)

4. *The Minister of Agriculture* said that it had not yet been possible to secure the co-operation of our main oversea suppliers in arrangements for regulating the United Kingdom cereals market. The proposals which we had put forward for discussion comprised restraints on home production by the establishment of standard quantities, combined with safeguards against excessive imports at uneconomic prices; and, in return for the acceptance of arrangements on these lines, we should have been prepared to give exporting countries assurances about continued access to the United Kingdom market and to undertake to put remedial action in hand if the proposed measures to restrain home production proved ineffective and imports therefore fell significantly below the agreed levels.

In the present negotiations the level of the standard quantity for domestic production had proved to be the chief obstacle to agreement. The representatives of our own producers had made it clear that they would object to any standard quantity below 10 million tons, although they might reluctantly accept a figure of 9½ million tons. Their argument was based largely on the fact that, given average weather, the harvest for 1964 would be likely to amount to 10·2 million tons on the basis of the acreage already sown. The exporters, on the other hand, had been unwilling to contemplate a figure in excess of 9·3 million tons, although 9·5 million tons might be acceptable to them as an upper limit. In these circumstances it was necessary to decide whether we should continue to seek a solution which would be acceptable to the exporting countries, even if we had to impose it on our own farmers, or whether, alternatively, we should refuse to consider any solution which our own farmers were not prepared to accept voluntarily. In the latter case the negotiations might well break down.

In discussion there was general agreement that it would be unwise to enter into an agreement which would have to be imposed on the home producer. If the negotiations were to fail, it was better that they should be seen to have done so as the result of a refusal by the exporting countries to accept conditions which were not only reasonable in themselves but also compared favourably with arrangements already in force in other Western European countries. The failure of the negotiations, however, was not yet inevitable. It appeared that a standard quantity either at, or centred on, a level of 9½ million tons might be accepted by the oversea suppliers and would

be unlikely to be rejected by our own farmers. It would be desirable, therefore, that the Prime Minister should personally emphasise to the Heads of the other Governments concerned the importance which we attached to reaching agreement with their exporters, if possible, on this basis.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Reaffirmed the importance of concluding with our main oversea suppliers an agreement for the regulation of the United Kingdom cereals market.
- (2) Authorised the Minister of Agriculture, in the course of negotiations, to offer to set the standard quantity for the domestic production of cereals in 1964 at a level of 9.75 million tons or the equivalent thereof.
- (3) Took note that the Prime Minister would communicate with the President of the United States and with the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia and the Argentine, impressing upon them the importance which we attached to a successful outcome to the current negotiations.

**White Paper
on Gaming**

5. *The Chancellor of the Exchequer* said that, as a result of the decision, announced in the Budget speech of 1963, to require the registration of gaming establishments, a considerable amount of factual and statistical information about gaming activities in the United Kingdom had become available. He sought the authority of the Cabinet to publish this information as a White Paper.

The Cabinet—

Authorised the Chancellor of the Exchequer to publish a White Paper containing certain factual material about gaming activities in the United Kingdom.

*Cabinet Office, S.W.1,
28th January, 1964.*