



(c) crown copyright

## SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

*Printed for the Cabinet. September 1963*

C.C. (63)  
55th Conclusions

Copy No. 42

## CABINET

*CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at Admiralty House, S.W.1, on Friday, 20th September, 1963, at 10 a.m.*

## Present:

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., First Secretary of State	The Right Hon. THE EARL OF HOME, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, Q.C., Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science	The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. REGINALD MAUDLING, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer	The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department
The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	The Right Hon. PETER THORNEYCROFT, M.P., Minister of Defence
The Right Hon. JOHN HARE, M.P., Minister of Labour	The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Lord Privy Seal
The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P., Minister of Transport	The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General
The Right Hon. J. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., Minister of Health	The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs

The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P.,  
Minister without Portfolio

## The following were also present:

The Right Hon. JULIAN AMERY, M.P., Minister of Aviation	THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE, Minister of State, Commonwealth Relations Office ( <i>Item 1</i> )
The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury	Admiral Sir DAVID LUCE, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

## Secretariat:

Sir BURKE TREND  
Mr. A. L. M. CARY  
Mr. P. A. WILKINSON

SECRET

SECRET

## CONTENTS

<i>Minute No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i>
1	Rhodesia and Nyasaland ... ..	3
2	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ... .. The Multilateral Force	4

SECRET

SECRET

3

C.C. 55 (63)

Rhodesia and  
Nyasaland  
(Previous  
Reference:  
C.C. (63) 47th  
Conclusions,  
Minute 5)

1. The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the First Secretary of State on various issues arising in connection with the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (C. (63) 155, 156 and 159).

*The First Secretary of State* said that good progress had been made towards the dissolution of the Federation, particularly in relation to the terminal arrangements for Federal public servants and the identification of Federal functions to be transferred to the Territories. The allocation of the Public Debt and Federal assets and liabilities still awaited detailed discussion; but general agreement had been reached on joint arrangements for the Kariba hydro-electric station and for air and rail communications between the Territories.

Agreement had also been reached on the introduction of internal self-government in Northern Rhodesia; and it was proposed to hold general elections under the new Constitution in January 1964, in which Barotseland had agreed to participate. No date for the attainment of full independence by Northern Rhodesia had yet been settled.

It would be desirable that Nyasaland should be granted full independence in July 1964, a date which was acceptable to the Prime Minister, Dr. Banda. Both Dr. Banda and the Governor of the Territory hoped that Nyasaland might maintain allegiance to the Crown for the first six to twelve months of independence, only thereafter becoming a republic. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of retaining the stabilising influence of the Governor, even if in a different capacity, during the transitional period; and it would also avoid the risks implicit in an unduly hasty negotiation of a republican Constitution.

In discussion it was emphasised that the objections to an interim period of monarchy, particularly in relation to the dignity of the Crown itself, had recently been represented to the Government of Kenya, who had been thinking on the same lines as the Government of Nyasaland. If these objections were waived in the case of Nyasaland, it would be difficult to sustain them in the case of Kenya, where the Colonial Secretary regarded it as important that the transition to republican status should coincide with the attainment of independence. The question should be further considered when the Colonial Secretary returned from his current visit to the Far East.

*The First Secretary of State* said that the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston Field, had asked whether the United Kingdom Government were concerned that Southern Rhodesia should maintain defence forces at a level which would provide a contribution to Commonwealth defence; if so, whether they would make a financial contribution towards this purpose; and whether the United Kingdom required a military base in Southern Rhodesia. The embarrassment with which these enquiries confronted us had been somewhat reduced by the subsequent decision of the Government of Southern Rhodesia to curtail the strength of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. Even so, it appeared that, on military grounds, negative replies should be returned to all Mr. Field's questions. On the other hand quite apart from the assistance which the Rhodesian Armed Forces had given the United Kingdom in two world wars, they had recently co-operated with British forces in operations both in the Middle East and Swaziland; and there would undoubtedly be disappointment and resentment in Southern Rhodesia if it appeared that we no longer had any use for the loyalty and patriotism of the Colony's inhabitants.

SECRET

In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) The operational assistance which Rhodesian forces could offer to the United Kingdom was now of only marginal value, although there was no military objection to continuing to provide them with training facilities in the United Kingdom. On the other hand it would remain important that the Colony should continue to afford us the overflying and staging facilities which we enjoyed at present.

(b) Any assistance given to the Southern Rhodesian Government in maintaining its defence forces would be liable to provoke criticism from the African members of the Commonwealth, who might deny overflying facilities to aircraft of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force.

(c) On financial as well as political grounds it would be difficult to justify a contribution to the maintenance of Southern Rhodesian defence forces; but the possibility of some degree of subvention need not be entirely excluded, particularly if, after the assets and liabilities of the Federation had been apportioned, the question of future financial assistance to the Territories arose and it appeared reasonable in that context to have some regard to the contribution which Southern Rhodesian defence forces might make to Commonwealth defence.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Took note of C. (63) 155, 156 and 159 and of the points made in discussion.
- (2) Agreed that Northern Rhodesia should attain internal self-government on the basis of elections next January.
- (3) Agreed that Nyasaland should be accorded independence in July 1964.
- (4) Invited the First Secretary of State, in consultation with the Commonwealth Secretary, to give further consideration to the desirability of maintaining monarchical rule in Nyasaland for a period after independence.
- (5) Invited the First Secretary of State, in consultation with the Commonwealth Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, to give further consideration to the reply to be given to the request by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia for guidance on the future position of Southern Rhodesian defence forces in relation to Commonwealth defence.

North  
Atlantic  
Treaty  
Organisation  
Multilateral  
Force

(Previous  
Reference:  
C.C. (63) 54th  
Conclusions,  
Minute 3)

2. The Cabinet resumed their consideration of the suggestion that the United Kingdom might take part in the forthcoming discussions in Washington and Paris of the technical and political aspects of the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). They had before them drafts of the terms in which a decision to participate in, or to abstain from, these discussions might be announced.

It was agreed that, since the terms of reference of the discussions appeared to confine them to countries seriously interested in establishing a multilateral force, participation by the United Kingdom would lead inevitably to an implied commitment on our part to subscribe to the multilateral force itself and to charges of bad faith if, in the event, we declined to do so. It was unlikely that the United States Government would be prepared at this stage to amend the terms of reference. Moreover, even if they were willing to do so, we should then be under an obligation to play a

SECRET

5

C.C. 55 (63)

full part in the discussions; and this might make it even more difficult for us to avoid a commitment to contribute to the force itself. But, if the Government accepted any commitment, explicit or implied, to contribute to a multilateral force, the political repercussions in this country would be serious.

Nevertheless, in terms of our relations with the United States Government and the Federal Government of Germany, the effects of an unqualified refusal to take any part in the forthcoming discussions would be equally, if not more, damaging. We had never committed ourselves to participate in the force itself; but we had at various times given the United States Government encouragement in their efforts to establish the force and they would have some grounds for accusing us of a breach of faith if we were now to withdraw completely from the enterprise. We should therefore seek to find an intermediate course, which would enable us to give the United States Government the degree of support to which they could reasonably regard themselves as entitled and to exert some influence on the development of the project but to avoid any commitment to contribute to the force itself otherwise than by the provision of facilities in this country.

*The Prime Minister* suggested that, for this purpose, the Foreign Secretary, at his forthcoming meeting with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, should recapitulate the earlier history of the project. At Nassau we had discussed with the United States Government the creation of unified NATO nuclear forces containing certain defined elements, which were to include a United States national contribution, a United Kingdom national contribution and, possibly, a mixed-manned contribution (which had at that time been considered in terms of a Polaris submarine fleet). We had discharged our obligation as regards our national contribution by assigning our V-bomber forces to NATO and by undertaking similarly to assign our Polaris submarines when they came into service. But we had not undertaken to contribute to the mixed-manned force as well; and in the subsequent discussions with the President of the United States, in which we had agreed to continue discussions with our allies on possible means of establishing a closer association of NATO countries with the deterrent forces of the West, we had merely recognised that a mixed-manned force would be one possible means of securing this objective. Against this background the proposal to arrange for detailed discussion of various aspects of the multilateral force on the basis of the suggested terms of reference placed the United Kingdom Government in a dilemma. On the one hand, we could not at this stage accept the implied commitment to contribute to the multilateral force itself, since we regarded ourselves as having discharged in full the only obligation which we had assumed under the Nassau Agreement. On the other hand, we were anxious not to let it be supposed that a difference of opinion had developed between the United Kingdom and United States Governments or that we were failing to give the United States the help and support which they had a right to expect from their closest ally. We should therefore be prepared to be represented at the forthcoming discussions as observers and to give in that capacity such help and advice as we could. But our participation in the discussions on this basis must be clearly recognised as not involving us in any commitment to contribute to the force itself, if it were eventually established.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the preparation of a memorandum, on the lines indicated

SECRET

**SECRET**

in his summing up, which might serve as a directive to the Foreign Secretary for his forthcoming discussion with the United States Government of the projected multilateral nuclear force.

- (2) Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.

*Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,  
21st September, 1963.*

**SECRET**

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference CAB 128/37

FOLIO NUMBERS 363 & 364 DO NOT EXIST