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C.C. (60)  
32nd Conclusions

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## CABINET

*CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room,  
House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 20th May, 1960, at 10 a.m.*

## Present:

The Right Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT KILMUIR, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. SELWYN LLOYD, Q.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	The Right Hon. JOHN MACLAY, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, Q.C., Lord Privy Seal and Minister for Science	The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Minister of Aviation
The Right Hon. IAIN MACLEOD, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies	The Right Hon. HAROLD WATKINSON, M.P., Minister of Defence
The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs	The Right Hon. Sir DAVID ECCLES, M.P., Minister of Education
The Right Hon. JOHN HARE, M.P., Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	The Right Hon. EDWARD HEATH, M.P., Minister of Labour

The Right Hon. ERNEST MARPLES, M.P.,  
Minister of Transport

## Also present:

The Right Hon. MARTIN REDMAYNE,  
M.P., Parliamentary Secretary,  
Treasury

*Secretariat:*

Mr. F. A. BISHOP  
Mr. M. REED

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**Interception of Communications.**  
 Professions Supplementary to Medicine Bill.  
 (Previous References: C.C. (60) 28th Conclusions, Minute 1 and C.C. (59) 63rd Conclusions, Minute 2.)

1. *The Home Secretary* said that the report of the Committee under Lord Simonds on the powers of *subpoena* of disciplinary tribunals had been published on the previous day. The report recommended that disciplinary tribunals established by statute for the various professions should be empowered to secure the issue of writs of *subpoena* for the production, subject to all proper exceptions, of evidence obtained by police officers in the course of their duty. These recommendations were to be considered later that day by the Home Affairs Committee. If they were accepted, this would involve further amendment in the House of Lords of the Professions Supplementary to Medicine Bill, which had previously been amended to deprive the tribunals established under it of the statutory power of *subpoena*.

The Cabinet—

Took note of this statement by the Home Secretary.

**Meeting of Heads of Government, 1960.**  
 (Previous Reference: C.C. (60) 31st Conclusions, Minute 1.)

2. *The Prime Minister* informed the Cabinet of the statement which he proposed to make to Parliament that day about the Summit meeting. This described briefly the discussions and events which had taken place in Paris, which were fully set out in a White Paper to be laid before Parliament, and it explained that it was too early to decide whether the Soviet Government had deliberately decided to pursue a more aggressive policy. In this situation it was necessary for the West to continue to work for satisfactory settlements of international problems by negotiation, but at the same time to be ready to meet new threats with firmness. The purpose of the statement was to try to keep a balance between unjustified optimism and extreme cynicism as regards the prospects for any future negotiations with the Soviet Government.

It had to be admitted that the reconnaissance flights by United States aircraft over Soviet territory, and the United States Government's public endorsement of this policy, had created difficulties for the Soviet Government. It was at present impossible to say to what extent Mr. Khrushchev's attitude in Paris had been due to internal criticism, particularly on account of the implications of the American flights for Soviet defence policy. It seemed likely that Mr. Khrushchev had not taken a final decision until the eve of the meeting, but it then became clear that he was determined to avoid genuine negotiations. He must have known that the conditions which he had put forward could not be accepted by President Eisenhower. In a sense this had been fortunate, since President Eisenhower would have been put in a difficult position if Mr. Khrushchev had asked only for a vague expression of regret.

It could be argued that, in the difficult atmosphere which had developed in Paris, it would not in any case have been possible to make satisfactory progress in any negotiations, and that the West might have been led in consequence into taking up an unnecessarily rigid position about the Berlin question. In fact, if the Soviet Government still entertained the possibility of negotiations at some future date, they might not bring the Berlin issue to a head; in that event we should in practice have secured some period of delay over this issue, which was what we wanted. On the other hand, we had to face the possibility that the Soviet Government might sign an early peace treaty with East Germany, and that there might be interference with the Allies' rights in West Berlin.

One good result of the meetings in Paris was that there had been a further improvement in relations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and France. Also, the three Western Governments were becoming considerably more realistic in their attitude towards the Berlin problem, and this had been achieved without the United

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Kingdom's coming under suspicion of weakness on this issue. Furthermore, the need to consolidate the Western Alliance might provide a better opportunity for a satisfactory settlement of the problem of our economic relations with Europe. Arrangements were to be made for closer consultation between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France; and this might lead the French Government to be more favourable towards an accommodation between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. In certain respects, therefore, the outcome might be helpful. Nevertheless, the failure of the Summit meeting was a serious setback to the Government's policy and was bound to be a shock to public opinion.

*The Foreign Secretary* said that it was due to the Prime Minister's personal efforts that the meetings in Paris had ended without damage to the Western Alliance. It had been necessary, from the point of view of public opinion, for President Eisenhower to give an assurance that there would be no further reconnaissance flights by United States aircraft over Soviet territory, and this had been achieved by the Prime Minister's persuasion. It had also been necessary to resist the intention of the United States and French Governments to bring the meetings to an end prematurely.

The plan which Mr. Khrushchev had pursued in Paris had enabled him to leave it open either to revert to the settlement of international problems by negotiation, or to pursue a more aggressive policy in the future, as he thought fit. In these circumstances we should not take any action to intensify the cold war atmosphere and we should be ready to take any opportunity of resuming or continuing genuine negotiations. Although, from his discussions with Mr. Gromyko, it looked as though the Soviet Government no longer hoped for any progress in the disarmament meetings, there were still reasonably good prospects for the conference at Geneva on nuclear tests. The meeting on the previous day of the Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had taken place in a spirit of consolidation. In this connexion it was satisfactory that it had now been established that any decisions which the three Western Governments might take in response to a threat against their rights in West Berlin would be the subject of full consultation with the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Discussion showed that it was the unanimous view of the Cabinet that the immediate aim should be to seek to keep a balance between pessimism at the failure of the Summit meeting and optimism about the possibility of resuming negotiations.

In further discussion it was pointed out that we had not yet been able to work out a satisfactory plan for an economic accommodation between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. The present circumstances, however, might make it possible to consider solutions which would not otherwise have been acceptable to the United States. It was also suggested that it might be preferable to establish closer economic relations with Europe on the basis of specific projects, such as co-operation in civil aviation or in atomic energy. *The Foreign Secretary* said that the French Foreign Minister had expressed the view that both the Community and the Association might agree to make mutual tariff concessions affecting sensitive items, and in this way might move towards some kind of industrial common market covering both groups.

The Cabinet—

Took note with approval of these statements by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

*Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,  
20th May, 1960.*