CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Thursday, 5th July, 1951, at 10 a.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., Minister of Local Government and Planning.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT JOWITT, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. E. SHINWELL, M.P., Minister of Defence.

The Right Hon. HECTOR McNEIL, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland.

The Right Hon. ALFRED ROBENS, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. LORD PAKENHAM, First Lord of the Admiralty (Item 5).


The Right Hon. WILLIAM WHITELEY, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 1–4).

The Right Hon. H. T. N. GAITSKELL, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The Right Hon. J. CHUTER EDE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.

The Right Hon. JAMES GRIFFITHS, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Right Hon. P. C. GORDON WALKER, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

The Right Hon. RICHARD STOKES, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. NESS EDWARDS, M.P., Postmaster-General (Item 4).

The Right Hon. JOHN WHEATLEY, K.C., M.P., Lord Advocate (Item 3).

Mr. A. G. BOTTOMLEY, M.P., Secretary for Overseas Trade.

Secretariat:

Sir NORMAN BROOK.

Mr. A. JOHNSTON.

Mr. O. C. MORLAND.
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1. The Cabinet were informed of the business to be taken in the House of Commons in the following week.

2. The Opposition were anxious that the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the decision to adopt a new type of rifle of .280-in. calibre as the standard small arms weapon of the British Army. It had been proposed that this debate should be held on 11th July.

The Cabinet were informed that, in pursuance of an agreement between the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada on the principle of standardisation of weapons, joint trials had been carried out in the United States in 1950 to choose a new type of automatic rifle. The joint report on these trials had recommended the adoption of an automatic rifle of British design of .280-in. calibre; but, although United States experts had subscribed to this report, the United States Department of Defence had not accepted the recommendation. There was no doubt that this was a better weapon than the existing British or American rifle, and the Defence Committee had decided on 19th March that it should be adopted as the standard small arms weapon of the British Army and put into production. This decision had been made known to the United States and Canadian Governments and to the delegates at the recent meeting of Commonwealth Defence Ministers, for whom a demonstration of the rifle had been arranged. Since then, however, representations had been received from the Canadian Minister of Defence and from General Eisenhower, both of whom had urged that further consultations should be held with the United States and Canadian Governments before orders were given for large-scale production of the new weapon. The Minister of Defence said that, on reflection, he was disposed to think that there would be advantage in holding further consultations, possibly between the Defence Ministers of the three countries, in the hope that the United States and Canada might even now be persuaded to adopt this new type of rifle.

The Prime Minister said that, if further consultations were to be held, it would be preferable that this should be announced before the matter was debated in the House of Commons. If the Opposition were informed that such an announcement was to be made, they might withdraw their request for a debate.

The Cabinet—

(1) Invited the Minister of Defence to arrange for the United States Government to be asked to join in further consultations with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada regarding the standard small arms weapon to be used by the Armed Forces of the three countries; and authorised him to announce that these further consultations were to be suggested.

(2) Invited the Chief Whip to inform the Opposition that such a statement was to be made, so that they might consider whether in those circumstances they still wished this question to be debated in the House of Commons on 11th July.

3. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Home Secretary (C.P. (51) 168) regarding a proposal by the Opposition that a Select Committee should be appointed to review the procedure for supervising delegated legislation.

The Home Secretary said that the Opposition had abandoned the tactics which they had followed before Easter in raising frequent debates on prayers for the annulment of statutory instruments, and the supervision of delegated legislation was not giving rise to any
current difficulties in the House of Commons. A case could be made out for an enquiry by a Select Committee into the working of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, but he was not sure that in present circumstances the Opposition were likely to press strongly for this. There would in any event be no advantage in appointing a Select Committee before the end of the present session.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) The appointment of a Select Committee would postpone the need for decisions about any major alteration in the present procedure for controlling delegated legislation, but the Select Committee might make proposals—for example, that Parliament should have power to amend statutory instruments—which would cause the Government great embarrassment at a later stage.

(b) Since the object would be to enquire into the means by which Parliament supervised the exercise of powers of delegated legislation, rather than the principles on which legislative powers should be delegated to Ministers, enquiry by a Select Committee would be more appropriate than enquiry by a Departmental Committee.

(c) The House of Lords might ask for a Joint Select Committee, but the balance of advantage seemed to lie in seeking to confine any enquiry at this stage to the procedure of the House of Commons, and accordingly any Select Committee should be appointed solely by that House.

It was the general view of the Cabinet that further consideration of this subject should, if possible, be deferred until the autumn.

The Cabinet—

Invited the Home Secretary to inform the Leader of the Opposition that the Government would prefer to postpone until the following session further consideration of the question whether a Select Committee should be appointed to enquire into the procedure for dealing with delegated legislation.

4. The Cabinet had before them the following memoranda on the report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949 (Cmd. 8116):—

C.P. (51) 183: by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Postmaster-General, covering the draft of a White Paper setting out the views of the Government on the report of the Broadcasting Committee;

C.P. (51) 187: by the Home Secretary, drawing attention to the difficulties which were likely to follow from rejection of the proposal made by the Broadcasting Committee that Broadcasting Commissions should be set up in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

C.P. (51) 185: by the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposing that for the next three years the British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.) should receive 80 per cent. of the net licence revenue, instead of 100 per cent., as proposed in C.P. (51) 183.

The Home Secretary said that Welsh opinion would not be content with the proposals for regional devolution which were put forward in the draft White Paper annexed to C.P. (51) 183. All the Welsh organisations which gave evidence before the Broadcasting Committee had pressed for an independent Broadcasting Corporation for Wales; though he thought, after discussions with the Council for Wales, that moderate opinion in Wales might accept a scheme on the lines of the proposal of the Broadcasting Committee. The objections against going as far as the Broadcasting Committee had suggested appeared to be purely administrative in character and did not take
sufficient account of the political pressure which would be exerted for wider power being given to a Welsh organisation which controlled some or all of the broadcasting in Wales.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said that he did not think that a practicable scheme could be put forward which would satisfy Welsh opinion. The proposal by the Broadcasting Committee that there should be Commissions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each including a B.B.C. Governor, which controlled the Home Service programme in these regions, was inconsistent with the general thesis advanced by the Committee that the B.B.C. Governors should collectively be in charge of the Corporation and that individual Governors should not give personal decisions. If Commissions were set up for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there would be difficulties in effecting interchanges of staffs and in determining what could be decided by these Commissions and what must be reserved for the Governors. On the powers of the three Commissions, the Committee had been vague, ambiguous and contradictory. The proposals in the draft White Paper represented a considerable concession to regional devolution. Since the Broadcasting Councils which were to be set up in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would be drawn wholly or largely from local authority representatives, they would not exhibit extreme nationalist tendencies and would be better able to interpret moderate opinion in the countries concerned. Since the Councils would have to act in conjunction with the B.B.C. Controller for the region, this would leave open a channel through which major issues could be brought before the B.B.C. Governors for final decision.

The Postmaster-General said that he had had many discussions with Welsh Members of Parliament and in particular with the Welsh Labour Group. The proposal in the White Paper that the Broadcasting Councils for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should be drawn from local authorities would be more acceptable to Welsh opinion than the Committee's proposal for a small Commission in each country appointed by the Government. If the Council consisted of elected representatives, it could not be argued against them that they were Government nominees, chosen in London. Elected representatives were more likely to give a cross section of public opinion in Wales, whereas it was frequently argued against the present B.B.C. administration in Wales that it was recruited from Welsh-speaking Welshmen who might hold rather extreme Nationalist views. As regards the powers of the Broadcasting Councils, his understanding was that each Council would be empowered to settle its Home Service programme, and that it should exercise advisory functions in regard to the Light and Third Programmes and on technical, engineering and financial matters. The fact that the Councils would be advisory over part of the field made it all the more necessary to emphasise that they would enjoy complete autonomy in regard to the Home Service programme. In practice, the money likely to be at the disposal of any Council made it certain that they would have to accept a good deal of the Home Service material sent out from London or from one of the English regions; but the Council would have the right to decide on the nature of the regional material to be broadcast and the times at which that material should be broadcast.

In further discussion attention was drawn to the risk that Broadcasting Councils set up to satisfy national aspirations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland might adopt policies which went further in the direction of giving a national flavour to Home Service programmes than was desired by the general body of people living in these areas. The Broadcasting Committee did not seem to have given the subject close consideration. Difficulties might arise in regard to the financing of Home Service programmes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and there were some matters, notably political broadcasts, in which any deviation from a policy agreed for
the United Kingdom by the main political Parties would cause serious difficulties. There was a risk that concessions to Nationalist feelings would be accepted grudgingly and become the basis from which further and more extreme claims would be advanced.

The general view of the Cabinet was that, in view of the extent to which the Broadcasting Committee had been prepared to devolve responsibility on Commissions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it would be difficult for the Government to restrict any concessions as narrowly as was proposed in the draft White Paper. There would clearly have to be restrictions, by way of a system of block grants or of approval of estimates, by which a financial limit would be placed on the work which could be undertaken by one of the proposed Broadcasting Councils, and subjects such as political broadcasts would probably have to be reserved for consideration in respect of the United Kingdom as a whole. If these matters were safeguarded no adequate grounds could be advanced against the grant of substantial autonomy to the Broadcasting Councils in respect of their Home Service programmes. The Broadcasting Committee of 1935 had reported in favour of substantial decentralisation and its recommendations had not been fully carried out. At a time when there appeared to be a growth of national feeling in Scotland and Wales which could not readily be met in the field of Government, it was expedient to go as far as practicable in giving a measure of autonomy in cultural matters. The draft White Paper should accordingly be amended to state more positively the powers of the proposed Broadcasting Councils over Home Service programmes. The suggestion that these powers must be exercised in conjunction with the Controller should be deleted.

The Cabinet then discussed the constitution and powers of the Advisory Councils for the English regions. The present machinery appeared to work reasonably well and the Broadcasting Committee had not suggested any fundamental alterations. It might be argued that some parts of England had pronounced regional characteristics which should be recognised by some change in the constitution of the Advisory Councils—for example, by providing that these Councils should be appointed by the Government. The balance of advantage appeared, however, to lie in leaving the appointment of members of the Councils with the B.B.C., in accordance with the existing arrangements.

The Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the Broadcasting Councils for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should be set up in the manner proposed in C.P. (51) 183, but that, subject to safeguards in regard to certain matters, including finance and political broadcasts, the complete autonomy of these Councils in respect of the policy and contents of their Home Service programmes should be stated more categorically than was proposed in the draft White Paper attached to C.P. (51) 183.

(2) Agreed that the members of the English Advisory Councils should continue to be appointed, as at present, by the B.B.C.

**Finance.**

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the statistics set out in C.P. (51) 185 showed the manner in which the income available to the B.B.C. for financing its Home and Television Services had risen in recent years, until it now stood at four times the pre-war figure. The B.B.C. had only recently been given 100 per cent. of the net licence revenue, and he was opposed to the suggestion that this arrangement should continue, since it was likely to lead to some extravagances in current expenditure and to pressure for a greater share in the national investment programme. It would be difficult for the Opposition to oppose a reduction in the percentage of the net licence revenue received by the B.B.C., since in the course of the recent Budget debate
Captain Waterhouse, M.P., speaking on behalf of the Opposition, had suggested as an economy measure that the B.B.C. grant should be reduced. After discussion, the Chancellor said that as a compromise he would be prepared to agree that for the next two or three years the B.B.C. should receive 85 per cent. (instead of 80 per cent., as proposed in his memorandum) of the net licence revenue, and he would accept the proposals in the report of the Broadcasting Committee regarding the borrowing powers of the Corporation.

The Postmaster-General said that the extent of the resources available to the Corporation in relation to their commitments should not be exaggerated. The present estimates were based on 1949 figures and costs had gone up considerably since that date. He was, however, prepared to accept the compromise of 85 per cent. proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Cabinet—

(3) Agreed that in the next few years the B.B.C. should receive 85 per cent. of the net licence revenue and that the draft White Paper should be amended accordingly.

The Ministry of Labour said that discussions were in progress between the B.B.C. and the General Council of the Trades Union Congress about trade union recognition. He thought that a further paragraph should be introduced after paragraph 48 of the draft White Paper, to the effect that the Government appreciated the importance which the trade union movement attached to trade union recognition and that consultations on the subject were still proceeding.

The Cabinet—

(4) Agreed that a paragraph should be added to the draft White Paper on the lines proposed by the Minister of Labour.

In further discussion the following points were also made:

(a) Nothing should be said which would prevent sympathetic consideration of any suggestions which might be made in the course of the forthcoming Parliamentary debates for improving the administrative organisation of the Corporation. For example, suggestions were made from time to time that the present concentration of authority in the Director-General should be reduced and that the heads of some of the sections should have direct access to the Governors.

(b) In view of the decisions which had been taken about the salaries of part-time members of the Boards of nationalised industries, it would be undesirable to accept the proposal of the Beveridge Committee that the salaries of B.B.C. Governors should be increased.

(c) It was contemplated that the Commons debate on the report of the Broadcasting Committee should take place on 18th July. The Government’s White Paper should be available at least a week before the debate.

The Cabinet—

(5) Approved the proposals in C.P. (51) 183, subject to Conclusions (1) to (4) above.

(6) Invited the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Postmaster-General to amend the draft White Paper annexed to C.P. (51) 183, in the light of the Cabinet’s discussion, and to arrange for its publication at an early date.
Spain.

(Previous Reference: C.M. (50) 73rd Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Closer association with Spain.

5. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P. (51) 184) on the effect upon our policy towards Spain of the more sympathetic attitude that had recently been adopted by the United States.

The Foreign Secretary said that in discussions in March General Franco had proposed to the United States Ambassador in Madrid a direct agreement between Spain, Portugal and the United States to facilitate the acquisition of military bases, and the development of Spain’s military potential, by the United States. The United States Government were now awaiting our reactions to this proposal. From the military angle alone there would be advantages in securing closer relations with Spain, for the reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff in the report annexed to his paper. Politically, however, there were strong objections to our associating ourselves in any way with these proposals, and he had come to the conclusion that we must do all we could to induce the United States to abandon this policy, or at least urge them to develop it slowly and make it clear that we were not prepared to associate ourselves with it. It would probably be possible to persuade the French Government to take the same line. Spanish association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whether as a full member or indirectly through a bilateral agreement with the United States would seriously prejudice the reputation of that Organisation.

The Minister of Defence said that he agreed with the Foreign Secretary, both on the purely military advantages, and on the overriding political disadvantages, of closer association with Spain. Moreover, a decision to provide the Spanish forces with military equipment would mean that the equipment was not available for the more urgent needs of other Western European countries. As a matter of tactics, however, it might be preferable to invite the United States Government to put their proposals forward for consideration by the North Atlantic Council.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he was himself in favour of associating Spain more closely with Western European defence. The military arguments were very strong, and the political objections could be over-estimated. In war we should need Spanish support, and this would be more effective if preparations had been co-ordinated in advance.

It was the general view of the Cabinet, however, that no time should be lost in making it clear to the United States Government that we were strongly opposed to closer association with Spain, and in making every effort to induce them to abandon this policy. If we urged them merely to develop it slowly, they would tend to believe that our opposition would gradually lessen and they might be encouraged thereby to proceed with further discussions.

The Cabinet—

(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to inform the United States Government of our strong opposition to the closer association of Spain in the defence of Western Europe and to urge them to abandon their policy of promoting the association of Spain with the Western democracies.

(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to request the French Government to make similar representations to the United States.

(3) Authorized the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to inform other Commonwealth Governments of our attitude towards this question.

The Cabinet then considered a memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (C.P. (51) 188) suggesting that in view of the revocation of the United Nations resolution inviting Member States to withdraw their diplomatic representatives from Madrid the Government should now remove the restriction which prevented His
Majesty's ships from paying courtesy visits to Spanish ports in the course of their periodical cruises.

In favour of this proposal it was argued that United States and Dutch naval vessels had paid courtesy visits to Spanish ports since the revocation of the United Nations resolution. Visits by His Majesty's ships might have some useful effect on public opinion in Spain: if we were given an opportunity to send His Majesty's ships on courtesy visits to ports in the Soviet Union, we should not be slow to take advantage of it. The Royal Navy would find it convenient, for training purposes, to have this occasional use of Spanish ports and anchorages; and it might also be valuable in any future war that officers and men of the Royal Navy should have had practical experience in these waters. Such visits could be regarded as a normal incident in Fleet movements. A start could be made by one or two small visits which should not attract much publicity; but it was hoped that later on more and larger ships might visit these ports.

It was the general view of the Cabinet that, despite these arguments, there were overriding political objections to allowing any of His Majesty's ships to pay courtesy visits to Spanish ports. Among large sections of public opinion in this country such visits would be regarded as an unwarrantable compliment to the existing political régime in Spain.

The Cabinet—

(4) Decided to maintain for the time being the restriction preventing His Majesty's ships from paying courtesy visits to Spanish ports.

6. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (C.P. (51) 182) on the results of the Prime Minister's request (C.P. (51) 36) that Ministers in charge of Departments should consider to what extent they could discontinue or retard the peacetime activities of their Departments in order that staff might be made available for defence work.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the response to this request had been most unsatisfactory. Further efforts must clearly be made to ensure a substantial transfer of existing staff to defence work. The Departments concerned had already initiated a joint review to ensure that the technical and professional staff engaged on works services were employed to the best advantage. He recommended that a similar review of scientific staff should now be initiated. In his paper he had suggested that this should be undertaken by Sir Henry Tizard; but he wished now to propose that the Lord President and the Minister of Defence should arrange for this review to be initiated by the Scientific Advisory Council and the Defence Research Policy Committee. In stating that it should be the aim of this review to release scientific staff for the defence programme, he had not meant to imply that scientific staff should necessarily be transferred to the Defence Departments: it would be equally effective if defence work were undertaken by scientific staff in civil Departments. On the curtailment of existing Departmental activities, the Treasury would pursue the proposals which had been put forward by Departments; but, in addition, he suggested that independent investigators should undertake ad hoc enquiries into any branches of Departmental work whose urgency and importance seemed open to question. He asked for the co-operation of his colleagues in making these enquiries effective.

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) The Minister of Local Government asked whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer was satisfied that there was effective
machinery for transferring to defence work such staff as the Department had offered to make available for this purpose. He had himself offered to transfer about 15 per cent. of the staff of his Department; but, according to his information, none of those whom he had offered to make available had yet been transferred to defence work. The Chancellor of the Exchequer undertook to look further into this point.

(b) The Minister of Defence said that in his opinion the proposals put forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer were not likely to secure the results required. He was himself formulating more drastic proposals, including powers of compulsory transfer, and he hoped shortly to be in a position to put these before his colleagues.

c) The Prime Minister said that Departments were naturally reluctant to abandon any of their current activities. Ministers must therefore satisfy themselves personally that their officials had made a real effort to find ways and means of releasing staff for defence work. He asked all Ministers in charge of Departments to take a close personal interest in this matter, and to give their full support to the efforts which the Chancellor of the Exchequer was making to provide the staff required for defence work without any substantial increase in the total of Civil Service manpower.

The Cabinet—

Approved the proposals in C.P. (51) 182 for accelerating the transfer of Departmental staffs to defence work.

The Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet of the latest developments in the Persian situation. The United States Ambassador in Teheran had been unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade the Persian Government to modify their attitude about tanker receipts. His Majesty's Ambassador in Teheran had suggested that he should once more draw the attention of the Persian Government to the prospect that as a result of their actions the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A.I.O.C.) in Persia would shortly be brought to a complete standstill. The Foreign Secretary felt that on the whole such a communication should not yet be made, but he proposed to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to make a further strong protest against Persian interference with the Company's operations. This interference had increased: the house of the Company's Manager in Teheran had been searched and documents impounded; at Abadan the Acting General Manager had been dismissed, the Company's authority was not recognised, and there had been further interference with their property and the movement of their aircraft.

In this deteriorating situation the Foreign Secretary said that there were three possible courses which might be taken with regard to the withdrawal of the Company's British staff from the oilfields: the decision to keep them at their posts could be maintained, the policy of a phased withdrawal could be resumed, or a general evacuation could be carried out. His view was that for the time being there was no sufficient reason to depart from the decision reached by the Cabinet on 2nd July, but that it might be necessary to reconsider this very shortly if Persian interference with the Company was not modified, in view of its increasing influence on the morale of the British staff.

The Cabinet—

(1) Agreed to maintain for the time being the decision that the British staff of the A.I.O.C. should not be withdrawn from the oilfields.
The Foreign Secretary said that His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington had been informed in confidence by the United States Secretary of State that the United States Government were now considering the possibility that President Truman might appoint a personal representative to discuss a settlement of the dispute with both parties. There might be the basis for a settlement on the lines that the Persian oil industry would be nationalised but operated by a British company as managing agent with remuneration related to the past profits of the A.I.O.C. Mr. Acheson had asked for our views on this, and had assured Sir Oliver Franks that if, with our agreement, an attempt was made to find a solution in this way the United States would not make the negotiations a starting point for further concessions to Persian demands if the Persian Government refused to accept their proposals.

It was the view of the Cabinet that mediation on these lines would not be acceptable. Like the earlier United States suggestion of an approach to the Persian Government through their Ambassador in Tehran, it suggested that the United States, in the role of a neutral third party, hoped to find a compromise between the views held by the two parties to the dispute, and not that they wished to support our case. The basis of settlement proposed appeared not to differ substantially from that put forward in Tehran by the Company's delegation, which had been rejected out of hand by the Persian Government. It was encouraging to see that the United States Government were now taking a very serious view of the situation, but further action by them could only be useful if they ranged themselves clearly on our side and made it evident to the Persians that they were being asked to reconsider their refusal of our reasonable conditions for a settlement.

The Cabinet—

(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to reply on these lines to the United States Government's suggestion for further mediation in the dispute.

The Foreign Secretary read the draft of a statement on the present situation in Persia which he would make later in the day in the House of Commons if it proved necessary to do so.

It was the general view of the Cabinet that a lengthy statement should not be made at this time. The decision of the International Court would probably be announced that day, and a further statement taking this into account could be made early in the following week. If the Court rejected our interim application it would probably be on the ground that they considered the dispute not to fall within their jurisdiction, and we must make it clear that such a decision would not relate in any way to the merits of our case. It was agreed that the statement should include a brief account of the further obstacles placed by the Persian Government in the way of the Company's operations, as illustrations of their intransigent attitude, and that it should repeat the Government's determination to take all practicable measures to protect British lives. We should also say once more that we remained ready to enter into negotiations. Certain minor amendments to the statement were also suggested.

The Cabinet—

(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to be guided by these views if he found it necessary to make a statement that day in the House of Commons on the situation in Persia.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1,
5th July, 1951.