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202 - Prime Minister's Meeting with President Roosevelt: Memorandum by the Prime Minister.

203 - Conference between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States: Telegrams exchanged between this country and the Prime Minister, or those forming part of the Delegation accompanying him, 8-17th August, 1942.

204 - Visit of General MacFarlane to the Russian Front: Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet covering telegram from General MacFarlane.

205 - Staff Conversations with the Turks: Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

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209 - The American Position: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

210 - Eastward Extension of the War in the Middle East: Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

211 - Supply from North America: Memorandum by the Prime Minister.

212 - The Far East: Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet covering Telegrams from the Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

213 - Detention of a Member of Parliament under Defence Regulation 18B: Memorandum by the Home Secretary.
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215 - Mexico: Resumption of Diplomatic Relations and Settlement of the Oil Dispute: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

216 - Extension of Food Rationing: Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council.

217 - Dominion Representation in the United Kingdom: Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet, covering Telegrams exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

218 - Naval, Military and Air Situation: Weekly Résumé.

219 - The Question whether we should declare war on Finland, Hungary and Roumania: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

220 - Far Eastern Policy: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

221 - Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and General de Gaulle on September 12, 1941.

222 - Report on the action of the 2nd Armoured Division: Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

223 - Naval, Military and Air Situation: Weekly Résumé.

224 - Caucasian Oil. Report by Lord Hankey's Committee on Preventing Oil from reaching Enemy Powers.

225 - Total Battle Casualties - Middle East (Western Desert, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete, Syria and Cyprus): Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

226 - Naval, Military and Air Situation: Weekly Résumé.

227 - Delivery of Lease-Lend Aircraft from India to China: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.

The proposal to announce that we shall leave to their fate the crews of enemy vessels which scuttle has previously been rejected on the ground that the inhumanity of such an act would be at variance with the traditions of the Royal Navy. We fully recognise the importance of preventing scuttling and that, by the issue of such an announcement we should probably prevent some ships from scuttling. The Admiralty are, however, of the opinion that in doing so we should have more to lose than to gain from the reprisals which the Germans would almost inevitably adopt.

2. German raiders invariably open fire without warning against British and Allied shipping, but they have, as a rule, and often at considerable inconvenience to themselves, rescued crews and passengers from the ships which they sink. If we leave crews of scuttled enemy ships to their fate it seems most probable that the German Government would order their raiders similarly to abandon the crews of British and Allied ships which they sink. This might well have a serious effect upon the morale of the Merchant Navy, particularly since raiders operate, as a rule, in open waters far removed from populous trade routes where the opportunities of rescuing those left in open boats are remote. Indeed the following extract from a captured German document suggests that the Germans have the possibility of such reprisals in mind.

"It is therefore safe to reason that England will not treat as pirates the crews of German merchant ships or transports which use armed force in self-defence. Should the enemy attempt anything of this kind this is to be answered with the warning that all the crews of English merchant vessels, who have used their weapons and are already in German hands, or will be captured in future, will be treated as pirates. Knowing that a large number of such crews is already in German hands, the English will be afraid of taking such steps."

3. The number of merchant ships, which have been sunk by raiders in the past, is large and there is no reason yet to suppose that this menace has been overcome. On the other hand, the number of enemy merchant ships which could be intercepted is likely to be comparatively small. It therefore seems abundantly clear that by adopting the policy under review we should stand to lose a large number of valuable Merchant Navy officers and seamen and at best save only a few enemy ships.

4. Moreover, we ourselves adopted certain scuttling measures. Our oilers have instructions to scuttle rather than be captured by enemy raiders and we have also issued instructions to the effect that armed guards in charge of French ships seized on the high seas are to scuttle rather than to allow their prize to be recaptured by French warships.

5. For the above reasons I do not recommend that an announcement on the lines suggested by the Cabinet should be made. We have recently issued to the Fleet fresh instructions which are designed to prevent enemy ships from scuttling. A copy of these is attached. It is not clear how far they have been successful, but reports are being called for from those Commands whose ships have intercepted enemy vessels within the last two months to obtain details concerning efficacy of these instructions. It has always been accepted that a Master who was determined to scuttle and had a determined crew would succeed. This determination must, however, vary from ship to ship, but I am hopeful that our new instructions authorising vigorous intimidatory action will offer a good chance of increasing our successes against the less determined scuttler, without incurring injurious reprisals.

A. V. A.
To "A" Message Home and Abroad 36A

Date 1.5.41.

Naval Code (J) PERMANENT.

From Admiralty.

NITE. NOTWT Home.

Admiralty message 834A dated November 23rd 1939 is cancelled.

1. Attention is again drawn to the great importance in the present shipping situation of preventing the scuttling of enemy merchant ships. The difficulty of frustrating a determined and well prepared attempt to scuttle is recognised, but not all attempts are determined or well prepared, and to prevent scuttling every effort must be made in accordance with the following revised instructions.

2. Commanding Officers are given full discretion to take such steps as the circumstances require.

3. Normally:
   (a) the main object should be to get the boarding party on board the enemy ships as quickly as possible;
   (b) to this end, until the boarding party can be sent, attention should be concentrated on hindering scuttling measures. In most cases this would be best achieved by rapid action to intimidate crew and to prevent them taking to boats. The following significance is therefore being broadcast given to group WBA in the International Code:

   "Stop - do not lower boats - do not use radio - do not scuttle - if you disobey I open fire".

4. The first consideration of Commanding Officers should be to save the ship and they have authority to use force to get this order obeyed.

5. Crews should not be left in open boats on high seas or to drown in ship as this would be contrary to dictates of humanity observed by Royal Navy.

6. Aircraft sighting a suspect ship should report and shadow endeavouring to remain unobserved. No repeat no attempt should be made to divert a ship unless surface vessels are unable to make contact in which case objects of aircraft should be:
   (i) to prevent crew scuttling and taking to boats.
   (ii) to divert ship to most suitable British or Allied Warship or most suitable British or Allied port.

7. In this case aircraft should be guided by 3 (b) and 4 above.

1943/1.

for Head of M. (Ex.808).

Approved by the Prime Minister.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 99)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 12 noon July 17th, to
12 noon July 24th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. Our shipping losses have been exceptionally light. Serious casualties have again been inflicted on enemy shipping by our aircraft. An important convoy from the United Kingdom has reached Malta. The Scharnhorst has arrived at La Pallice from Brest.

Home Waters.

2. Air reconnaissance on the morning of the 22nd showed that the German Battle-cruiser Scharnhorst had left Brest. She was located at La Pallice, port of La Rochelle, on the morning of the 23rd and later attacked by aircraft of Bomber Command.

During the night of the 17th/18th H.M. Submarine Umpire collided with one of H.M. Trawlers off Cromer and sank. The Commanding Officer and fourteen men were rescued, but two officers and fourteen ratings were lost.

A Focke-Wulf aircraft, while attacking an outward-bound convoy, was destroyed by the s.s. Pilar de Larringa (7,046 tons) about 240 miles west of Ireland (R) on the 18th.

A Heinkel III, which attacked a coastal convoy off Cromer on the night of the 22nd/23rd, was shot down by the fire of the convoy and escorts. H.M. Destroyer Garth was slightly damaged by a near miss.

During the week approximately 71,000 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk or seriously damaged by aircraft of the Coastal and Bomber Commands. Details are given in the Air Section.

Atlantic.

3. The Vichy French s.s. Isac (2,385 tons) was intercepted to the west of Gibraltar on the 19th. Her engines were sabotaged and she was towed into harbour.

The Vichy French s.s. Ville de Rouen (5,063 tons), from Madagascar for Dakar, was intercepted by H.M.S. Dunedin 700 miles south-west of St. Helena on the 22nd, and is being sent in to Simonstown under armed guard.

Mediterranean.

4. An important convoy carrying stores, provisions and reinforcements from the United Kingdom passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and arrived at Malta on the 24th. One ship of the convoy, the s.s. Sydney Star (12,696 tons), was hit by torpedo from an E-boat but reached Malta at reduced speed. Strong naval forces provided escort and cover. The Mediterranean Fleet also operated in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to create a diversion. In the course of continuous air attacks by bombers and torpedo-aircraft, H.M. Destroyer Fearless was sunk and H.M.S. Manchester and H.M. Destroyer Firedrake were damaged.

During air attacks on an Italian convoy to the south of Pantellaria about 25,000 tons of enemy shipping were destroyed or damaged. Naval aircraft obtained a torpedo hit on the stern of an escorting destroyer. Further details are given in the Air Section.

H.M. Submarine Unbeaten shelled two 500-ton schooners which were at anchor 40 miles west of Tripoli (L), sinking one and severely damaging the other. H.M. Submarine Union is overdue from patrol and must be considered lost.

The naval camp at Kabret, in the Canal Zone, was damaged in an air-raid on Suez during the night of the 21st/22nd.

During the week eight French merchant ships (upwards of 54,700 tons) westward, and seven (31,216 tons) eastward passed Gibraltar under escort.

Enemy Intelligence.

German.

5. Apart from the movement of the Scharnhorst there have been no important changes in the positions of the larger German units. The Pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer is believed to be carrying out trials in the western Baltic.
The three Italian battleships were still at Taranto on the 22nd July; three cruisers were at Messina and four or five at Palermo.

The convoy traffic from Sicily to North Africa, which had appeared to have diminished of late, has now resumed its former volume.

U-Boats.

6. About 24 or 25 German U-Boats have been operating during the week; of which four have been in the South Atlantic, three in the Azores area and the rest to the westward of Ireland (R). It is noteworthy that there are no signs at present of any submarines west of 25°W in latitudes north of Gibraltar, or in the vicinity of Iceland (C). There have been about six Italian U-boats in the area Azores-Madeira-Cape St. Vincent.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

7. Shipping casualties so far reported have been exceptionally light during the period under review. One ship is known to have been torpedoed and sunk south of Madeira. In the only other U-boat attack a ship was damaged by gunfire to the south-west of Ireland (R). Bombing of coastal convoys on six occasions resulted in damage to three ships. One ship was damaged by air attack 240 miles west of Ireland (R). Enemy coastal batteries ineffectively shelled a coastal convoy passing through the Straits of Dover.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

8. During the week ending the 23rd July, 1,187 ships, including 231 Allied and 18 neutral, were convoyed. One battleship, two cruisers, twelve armed merchant cruisers, four anti-aircraft ships, sixty-seven destroyers, three submarines and one hundred and five sloops, corvettes and fleet minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 19th July totalled 580,737 tons compared with 1,147,564 tons during the previous seven days and an average of 582,283 tons for the past ten weeks. Oil imports amounted to 134,439 tons in 13 tankers. Mineral imports were 144,525 tons, of which 97,097 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Timber and pulp imports were 29,157 tons and cereal imports 161,011 tons. Food imports totalled 72,163 tons, of which the principal commodities were: Sugar, 33,958 tons, refrigerated and tinned meat 17,491 tons, fruit 5,718 tons, cheese 2,585 tons. An oil refinery ship brought 7,225 tons of whale oil.

British Minelaying.

9. H.M.S. Teviot Bank laid 328 mines off North Rona on the 22nd and, on the following day, Motor Launches laid 14 mines off the French coast.

Minelaying by aircraft has been carried out off North Sea ports and French channel and Biscay ports.

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.

Home Waters.

10. There have been no casualties caused by mines during the week. Enemy aircraft, which may have been minelaying, have been reported off the East Coast on five nights, although none are suspected in the Thames Estuary south of Harwich. Aircraft have been reported off Land's End on one night, but otherwise the South and West Coasts have not been visited.

Two acoustic mines were detonated south of Plymouth Breakwater on the 21st July in an old declared area which had not been swept for some time. Seven other acoustic and two magnetic mines have been detonated during the week. The mine totals to date are: magnetic 1,259, acoustic 908, contact 934.

The Farn Islands inshore channel is still closed.

Foreign Waters.

11. The United States Naval Authorities have notified their intention to mine certain waters in the Philippine Islands.
MILITARY SITUATION.

[An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.]

Russo-German Campaign.
12. The general situation shows little change as compared with the advances in previous weeks, and the German leaders have been at pains to excuse themselves on the grounds of inevitable difficulties. There is no doubt that supply problems are considerable and that much fighting is still taking place behind the leading troops. It is probable, however, that when infantry formations have come up to relieve the mechanised troops, the advance will regain its impetus, subject possibly to some reftting for the armoured formations.

Finland.
13. The situation in the Murmansk area is satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. The only notable advance appears to be on the north-eastern shores of Lake Ladoga, where the Germans and Finns claim to have captured Pitkaranta, some 80 miles from the railway Leningrad–Murmansk.

Baltic Front.
14. In the German advance on Leningrad there has been heavy fighting in the area Pskov–Porkhov, where the resistance offered by the Russians seems so far to have been effective in preventing a rapid break-through. It is not clear to what extent the opposing forces will be able to bring up reinforcements to cover the heavy losses claimed by both sides. The advance in Estonia seems to have diminished in importance.

White Russia.
15. Of the two main eastward thrusts, the first, towards the Dnieper at Rogachev, has met with a stubborn resistance; the second, however, has now advanced beyond Vitebsk, and armoured elements are to the east of Smolensk. There is little doubt that the spearhead so formed has left behind it whole formations of Russians who are offering serious resistance to the consolidation of the advance.

Ukraine.
16. The German forces advancing in the direction of the Dnieper above Kiev have met with considerable opposition, but their progress constitutes a serious threat to this town. The thrust in this area has left the Russian defences on the Dniester far behind and must either force the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in Bessarabia or render their position extremely precarious.

Bessarabia.
17. The advance of the German and Roumanian forces on Kishinev was successful and continued towards the Dniester, where more than one bridgehead may now have been established. The Russians appear to be fighting vigorously to hold the river line, but a Russian withdrawal may be taking place in view of the German advance towards Kiev and may account for the German claim to be pursuing a beaten enemy.

Operations.
Libya and Egypt.
18. Operations have been notable for a series of successful sorties by the Tobruk Garrison. On four occasions patrols have carried out offensive raids on enemy positions, penetrating in some cases several miles within the enemy defences and attacking strong points and positions. The attacks have been pressed home with determination, and have been rewarded with excellent results—casualties inflicted on the enemy have been heavy, while our own have been negligible. The effect on enemy morale is beginning to be apparent.
Abyssinia.
19. Apart from an unsuccessful attempt by our forces to carry the Wolchehit position, north of Gondar, at the beginning of the week, little activity has taken place. Reports from deserters indicate that the supply position in Wolchehit is becoming desperate, but that the garrison has been ordered to hold out to the last.

Syria.
20. The Allied Forces are now taking up strategic positions in Syria and have reached the Turkish frontier in the north-east. Vichy French troops have moved to certain concentration areas in accordance with the terms of the Armistice.

Reinforcements.
21. The following have arrived at Suez:—
   Headquarters, X Corps.
   Four Heavy A.A. Batteries.
   69 Infantry Brigade (50 Division).
   161 Infantry Brigade (from West Africa) less one Battalion.
   Base and L. of C. troops, and drafts.

Intelligence.

Spain.
22. The continuance of German interest in Spain is shown by the recent visit of a German General to Madrid and the arrival of a mission in the Canary Islands to inspect the defences.
   At present the German troops between Bordeaux and the frontier consist of some five divisions, including one reserve, two Landwehr and two recently formed.

Yugoslavia.
23. Though spasmodic rioting continues in districts occupied by Italians and there is some guerilla activity in the hills, the Italian garrison should be quite adequate to prevent any serious disturbances.

Bulgaria.
24. The Bulgarian army remains mobilised, the greater part being concentrated in the region of the Turkish frontier, with garrisons in newly-acquired areas in Macedonia and Thrace. While the possibility of aggressive action against Turkey at some future date cannot be excluded, there are no signs of this at present.

Turkey.
25. While the Germans may be planning some offensive action, the only signs of such an intention are press reports that they are improving road and rail communications in Bulgaria, and that Italian and German garrisons on some of the Aegean islands have been, or soon will be, increased. There are at present no German troops in the area of the Turkish frontier.

Libya.
26. A report states that the movement of German troops southwards through Italy has been resumed, and that these are believed to be concentrating in Sicily or the extreme south of Italy.
   In the raiding activities around Tobruk the Italians have shown no substantial increase in determination, even when stiffened by the presence of Germans. Knowledge of the conditions enjoyed by Italian prisoners of war is believed to be widespread, and may have an increasingly adverse effect on morale.
Iran.

27. The Iranian Government continues to show signs of anxiety about the safety of their frontiers with the Soviet, either out of fear of a Russian attack or as a precaution against a mass incursion of refugees from the Soviet Union. German agents are intensifying this anxiety by spreading reports of an Anglo-Russian agreement to partition Iran and of other forms of Anglo-Russian collaboration, thus playing on the traditional fear of Russia which fills all Iranians. The size of the German colony at Tabriz has noticeably increased. The town is of strategic importance, since it lies at the junction of roads from Turkey, Iraq and Russia, as well as being the southern terminus of the railway entering Iran from Russia.

Iraq.

28. The Iraqi Government have reinforced the area of Sulaimaniya with the object of suppressing the rebel Shaikh Mahmud by threat of force. Martial Law is to be declared in Sulaimaniya Liwa, but will not be enforced until military operations begin. The Government are anxious to avoid hostilities, if possible, on account of the uncertain morale and discipline of the army, which has at the moment no stomach for further fighting.

Japan.

29. There have been a large number of Japanese troop and transport movements during the past week. Military preparations in Japan, Formosa and Hainan also continue.

30. In Japan itself reservists up to the age of 45 have been recalled to the colours, lorries, cars and horses have been requisitioned, large quantities of bridging equipment appear to have been moved to the west coast, and certain transport movements have taken place from Japan to destinations so far unknown.

31. Japanese forces in the Formosa-Hainan area now total some 10 divisions, sufficient both for the existing garrisons and for an overseas force. Recent transport movements indicate that an expeditionary force of two to three divisions might be launched from Hainan.

32. In Manchukuo the disposition of Japanese forces has been mainly defensive. Recent reinforcements and certain other indications tend to show that Japan may now be making the necessary preparations to attack should a favourable opportunity offer.

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

33. The Royal Air Force continued its offensive against industrial and communication targets in the Ruhr and in Occupied Territory. Heavy losses were inflicted on enemy shipping in Home Waters and in the Mediterranean.

Enemy air activity over this country remains at a very low level.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

General.

34. Bomber Command despatched 110 sorties by day and 638 by night, as compared with 160 and 663 respectively in the previous week. Fighter Command continued their offensive sweeps over Northern France, and during the week flew 155 squadron sorties, involving 1,960 aircraft.

Day.

35. On the 23rd July four Stirlings of Bomber Command attacked the battle-cruiser Scharnhorst, which had been located that morning at La Pallice.
In spite of intense anti-aircraft fire they succeeded in dropping a 2,000-lb. bomb on or near the stern of the vessel. They also shot down two out of eight Me. 109s which intercepted them. One Stirling was lost.

36. On the 21st, three Stirlings attacked the accumulator works at Lille and, although poor visibility prevented accurate bombing, one large and two small buildings were hit. On the following day the shipyard at Le Trait, near Rouen, was bombed by six Blenheims, and bursts were seen on the sheds and on a slipway. The power station and chemical factory at Mazingarbe, near Lille, were attacked on the 23rd, but results could not be observed because of heavy A.A. fire.

37. Fighter Command aircraft provided covering escorts for all these operations except that against the Scharnhorst. They also carried out several offensive sweeps over the Channel and Northern France. In the course of combats our fighters destroyed 41 enemy fighters, probably destroyed 14 and damaged 21. We lost 15 bombers and 33 fighters, but 6 fighter pilots are safe.

38. Successful attacks on enemy shipping are reported under Coastal Operations.

39. Enemy defensive fighter patrols reached the highest total for several weeks in the Pas de Calais area, the daily average for the week being nearly 400.

Night.

40. Bombing operations were carried out on six nights of the week, the programme for the remaining night being cancelled because of unfavourable weather. Over 670 tons of H.E. and over 58,000 incendiary bombs were dropped, and it is estimated that a large proportion of these fell in the target areas, though it was difficult to assess results because of cloud and thick haze. The principal targets were the industrial and railway centres at Frankfurt, Mannheim, Cologne and Hanover, the docks at Rotterdam, Dunkirk and Cherbourg, and the Scharnhorst at La Pallice.

41. At Cologne, which was attacked on two nights, and on which 160 tons of H.E. and 17,000 incendiaries were released, a large explosion was observed near the East Kalk railway station and a particularly large fire was started among the factories in the south-west of the city. At Frankfurt, which was attacked on three nights and on which 129 tons of H.E. and 14,200 incendiaries were dropped, several large fires were started, especially at the railway centres and near the post office. At Mannheim, which was bombed on three nights, many fires also were started, and at least one direct hit was made on the Daimler Benz Works. At Rotterdam, a fire which was started at the oil stores could be seen by aircraft a hundred miles away.

42. The enemy maintained his night fighter patrols over Holland and North-West Germany during the week, but on a smaller scale than of late.

United Kingdom.

43. Offensive sweeps, bomber escorts and shipping protection patrols again account for the bulk of our fighter effort. Fighter Command flew 999 patrols (3,801 sorties) by day, and 390 patrols (570 sorties) by night: the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations.

44. By day, only six enemy aircraft were plotted overland during the week and few interceptions took place, though two He. 111s were shot down off the Scillies on the 18th. No enemy fighters operated on this side of the Channel. Shipping and weather reconnaissance flights were on the same low scale as during the last few weeks.

45. By night, the total number of long-range bombers operating against this country was 170, of which 50 were employed on the 17th/18th, when an attack was made on Hull. This appears to have been an intensive effort by the forces
available, since subsequent sorties by the units engaged were on a much smaller scale. Shipping off the East Coast, and on one night in the Liverpool area, was the main objective on the remaining nights. Enemy night fighters operated over the eastern counties on the same scale as last week. About a dozen Royal Air Force stations were bombed without serious incident, probably by the night fighters. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed by A.A. during the week, but there were no night fighter interceptions. During the attack on Hull, the enemy, though based in some instances on Northern France, approached the target from the east, having flown coastwise along the Dutch Islands before crossing the North Sea.

46. During the five weeks ending on the 19th July, 97 Royal Air Force personnel and 17 Germans have been saved by the Royal Air Force Sea Rescue Service. Since its formation in February this service has rescued 329 officers and men.

Coastal Operations.

47. Coastal Command flew 252 patrols (364 sorties) and provided escorts for 94 convoys (264 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 704 (1,476 sorties).

48. Several attacks on enemy shipping were made during the week by aircraft of Bomber and Coastal Commands, which were highly successful in spite of intense A.A. fire from Flak ships. On the 18th July, three Blenheims attacked off Gravelines a 6,000 ton tanker, which was protected by six Flak ships. Direct hits were scored, with the result that the ship was beached in a sinking condition. On the following day, two more successful attacks took place. Eleven Blenheims bombed an enemy convoy of eight merchant vessels, escorted by six Flak ships, off the Hague, as a result of which four vessels, totalling 22,000 tons, were destroyed and one of 500 tons was damaged. A further eight Blenheims attacked another convoy of seven merchant vessels escorted by about six Flak ships off Norderney. Direct hits were obtained on a tanker of 10,000 tons and on three merchant vessels of 8,000, 6,000 and 2,000 tons respectively, all of which were sunk, while another merchant vessel of 3,000 tons was damaged.

49. On the 20th, six Blenheims hit a tanker of 6,000 tons off Le Touquet with three H.E. bombs and several incendiaries, causing terrific explosions and huge columns of black smoke. The vessel was beached later near Berck-sur-Mer. Other enemy casualties include a merchant vessel of 4,000 tons at St. Nazaire, another of 1,500 tons off Egersund, and a third of 2,000 tons off Borkum, all of which received direct hits. Other vessels were attacked with bombs and machine gun fire, but results could not be accurately observed.

50. On the 23rd, a Hudson on convoy escort shot down a Focke-Wulfe aircraft into the sea 107 miles W.S.W. of Achill Head. The crew of the aircraft were picked up by a naval unit.

51. A number of patrols were flown by aircraft of Coastal Command on the 22nd and on the morning of the 23rd to locate the Scharnhorst. At 0915 on the 23rd, a photographic reconnaissance showed her at La Pallice.

52. A total of 62 aircraft laid mines off Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, the Frisian Islands and in the mouths of the Elbe and Weser.

53. Mine-laying was carried out by about forty enemy aircraft off the East Coast. Enemy attacks on shipping were made on four nights of the week, and are referred to in the Naval Section.

Gibraltar.

54. The usual convoy escorts and anti-submarine patrols were flown. A search was made for a missing Blenheim which was located, burnt out, in Morocco. A Swordfish of the A.A. Co-operation Unit landed and rescued the crew under fire from the local Arabs.
Central Mediterranean.

55. The feature of the week has been a highly successful attack by Blenheims and Naval Swordfish on a convoy off Pantellaria on the 22nd. This convoy, consisting of four merchant ships and five destroyers, was located by air reconnaissance, and later four Blenheims were despatched to attack. Two ships of 6/7,000 tons were each hit twice and a third ship of about 5,000 tons, which was hit three times, blew up and disappeared. An hour later, a Maryland sighted a merchant ship of about 7,000 tons with only the stern above water, with two destroyers picking up survivors. At dusk, five Naval Swordfish followed up the attack on the convoy, which now consisted only of one tanker, one small merchant ship and one destroyer. Two torpedoes struck the tanker, which is claimed as a total loss, and the destroyer was severely damaged by a hit in the stern.

56. Wellingtons dropped 9 1/2 tons of bombs during the night of the 17th/18th on the dockyard at Palermo, where four cruisers and six destroyers were berthed. Owing to an effective smoke screen, the fall of bombs could not be pinpointed, but many bursts were seen round the estimated position of the ships. On the night of the 20th/21st, nine Wellingtons attacked the railway sidings at Naples, dropping a large number of incendiaries, followed by 7 1/2 tons of H.E. Large fires resulted, and subsequent photographs confirm hits on sheds in the railway yard, and show a row of trucks burnt out. Two Blenheims made a daylight attack on the power house at Tripoli (L), and hits were observed on the target; one of the Blenheims was shot down by an enemy fighter. The following night, four Swordfish bombed the harbour, narrowly missing a ship and starting a fire on the foreshore.

57. The usual areas have been covered by visual and photographic reconnaissance, and a Maryland so engaged shot down an Italian three-engined floatplane in flames off Syracuse.

58. The enemy have shown little inclination to approach Malta by day, though on one occasion a bomber escorted by twenty fighters reconnoitred the island. Attacks have been made on the island during most nights of the week by up to nine aircraft, but for the most part bombs have fallen harmlessly in fields; a wireless station was slightly damaged.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

59. There was little activity by day, apart from reconnaissance flights and fighter patrols covering our coastal shipping. Wellingtons have continued their nightly attacks on Benghazi, and bombs burst near the Government Offices, barracks, power station and M.T. workshops, and in the harbour district, where many fires broke out. A fire followed by a particularly violent explosion resulted from an attack on the mole at Derna, and Bomba and Bardia have also suffered damage.

60. Daylight attacks have been made by enemy aircraft on Tobruk, Maaten Bagush and Mersa Mattruh, but without serious consequences. Alexandria was attacked by about twenty aircraft on the night of the 18th/19th, but the harbour suffered no damage. A few nights later, the Canal Zone was bombed by five aircraft which slightly damaged four Wellingtons. Reference has been made under Naval Situation to naval damage and casualties.

Cyprus.

61. On the 18th, four Ju. 88s bombed the Nicosia area, but caused no service damage or casualties. One of the raiders was shot down by a Hurricane.

East Africa.

62. Bombing attacks were continued against the remaining Italian centres of resistance in the Gondar area. Royal Air Force Wellesleys, Free French Blenheims and South African Air Force Ju. 88s have taken part in these operations. Two Italian fighters, operating from Azazo, South of Gondar, twice attempted to interfere, and slightly damaged some of our aircraft, but were
themselves hit. Our fighters machine-gunned Azazo aerodrome, setting fire to hangars.

Russia.

63. Unfavourable weather conditions have interfered with operations on the Russian front to a considerable extent, with a consequent decrease in air reconnaissance of Russian troop movements and aerodromes which has formed a very important part of German Air Force activities.

64. The Germans have moved near enough to Moscow to give fighter protection to bombers, which have operated over the Capital in considerable numbers. Apart from these attacks, there have been few developments during the week.

65. Reports of damage during an attack by Russian Naval Aircraft on Ploesti oil refinery on the night of the 12th/13th have been confirmed by photographs. It appears that, in the Orion refinery area, tanks containing about 5,000 tons of oil were damaged or destroyed, while considerable damage was probably done to buildings. Up to 100 tank cars on the railway line adjacent to the refinery were apparently damaged or destroyed. There were fewer fires at the Astra plant, but there was one near the cracking plant and one close to the local power plant and boilers. Some small tanks and some railway cars were also destroyed. Another report states that bombs fell and destroyed most of the Unirea refinery. The fire caused by the bombing is said to have burned for 18 hours, and to have destroyed 20,000 tons of oil. It is thought that the refinery will be out of action for six months.

Air Intelligence.

Italy.

66. It is reported that a small force of Italian aircraft, including some squadrons of single-engined fighters and a few army co-operation aircraft, are to take part in the Russian campaign.

Spain.

67. It is learned that 120 Spanish fighter pilots have been accepted by the Germans for service on the Russian front. All of the pilots selected have been trained on Me. 109s in the Spanish Air Force. The total is estimated to represent about 30 per cent. of the fully-trained fighter pilots in the Spanish Air Force, and will aggravate the shortage of flying personnel which at present constitutes the most serious of the many factors militating against its efficiency.

Small bodies of ground personnel are also to be despatched to Germany, and both pilots and ground staff are to have the status of volunteers seconded from air force duties. Though its immediate significance is slight, the measure will provide the pilots concerned with a preliminary period of operational training in Germany and, perhaps ultimately, with experience of war conditions and of active collaboration with German units.

France.

It is claimed in the French press that a considerable number of aircraft were withdrawn from Syria to Metropolitan France before the signature of the agreement which terminated the Syrian campaign. Withdrawals are known to have involved a minimum of one fighter and two bomber groups.

Turkey.

It is reliably reported from Canakkale that Turkish A.A. guns shot down an Italian aeroplane on the 15th July in the Gulf of Enez, near the Greco-Turkish frontier.

Japan.

Although details are lacking, there is some evidence that a movement of aircraft from North and Central China to South China took place about the end of June.
HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

68. No bombs were dropped on land during the week.

By Night.

69. Bombing was again on a small scale except for an attack on Hull on the night of the 17th/18th July. This attack was the heaviest since that made on Birmingham and Nuneaton on the 16th/17th May. During the rest of the week bombing occurred in Scotland, Yorkshire, the Midlands, East Anglia and North-West England. Towns particularly affected were Aberdeen, Corby, Lowestoft, Yarmouth, Liverpool and its surrounding districts.

Damage.

Hull (17th/18th July).

70. The attack lasted for about two hours. 160 fires were started but only four became serious. Over 3,500 people were rendered temporarily homeless. Public utility services received considerable damage but repairs are well in hand. Several important factories were affected, the more important of which were:


Aberdeen (20th/21st July, 23rd/24th July).

71. Extensive damage was done to house property, the Fish market, Regents Quay and utility services.

Lowestoft (21st/22nd July).

72. Extensive damage to house property.

Birkenhead (23rd/24th July).

73. A public shelter was hit, causing several casualties. Damage was also done to utility services.

Casualties.

74. The casualties up to 0600 hours 23rd July are estimated at 132 killed and 122 seriously injured, of which 111 were killed and 108 seriously injured at Hull on the 17th/18th July.
APPENDICES I, II and III
will be published monthly.

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APPENDIX IV.

Merchant ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 21st July, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German</th>
<th></th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Together</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>405,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported  as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, &amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>677,000</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>437,000</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1,114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1,188,000</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>852,000</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>2,040,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1,489,000</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>3,649,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 51 ships of 94,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 53 ships, totalling 320,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

No casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported during the period under review.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: Killed 4, wounded 2, prisoners of war 2.
Ratings: Killed 27, wounded 11, prisoners of war 83, missing 74.

These figures include 2 officers and 14 ratings lost in H.M. Submarine *Umpire* and 72 ratings killed and 83 prisoners of war from H.M. Destroyer *Hereward*. 
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 17th July, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 24th July, 1941.

**Metropolitan Area.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 fighter pilots are known to be safe.

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

**Middle East.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Italian.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:—

Germany.

Münster.—Photographs taken on the 11th and 12th July show damage to have been heavy and widespread. The principal feature is the number of completely burnt out buildings, both industrial and private, in numerous different parts of the town. Two 4,000 lb. bombs have been plotted, the approximate areas of complete destruction resulting therefrom being 180 by 70 yards and 90 by 65 yards, but experience suggests that the total damage must extend over a much larger area. The works of Fabrik Stille on the west of the goods station, makers of agricultural implements, has been completely destroyed.

Aachen.—Photographs taken on the 14th July show the raid on the 10th/11th July to have been beyond question one of the most successful attacks yet made upon Germany. For the tonnage of bombs dropped the damage shown is the most extensive yet seen. There are three main areas of extensive fire damage—in the centre of the town affecting the principal municipal buildings, the business area and the shopping centre. These three areas comprise nearly 30 per cent, of the town, not taking into account the suburbs. The gas works was hit and warehouses and buildings in the goods station were damaged by fire.

It is said that 800 people were killed in this raid, and a traveller from Belgium on the 11th July stated that a delay of two hours occurred at Aachen, where damage and disorganisation were evident.

Osnabrück.—In the raid on the 5th/6th July the copper and wire works and warehouses at the station were hit. The lines to Bremen and Münster were closed to traffic on the 6th July.

Bremen.—In the middle of June repairs were being carried out to two of the slipways which had been badly damaged in the Vegesack Yard.

Bielefeld.—The Durkopp works (which in peacetime manufacture sewing machines) has been severely hit. Incendiary bombs fell on a military camp situated in some woods about 5 miles away and the camp was burnt out.

Krefeld.—Photographs taken on the 12th July show that the two Hampdens which attacked on the 7th/8th July caused an area of damage in the Deichlager Strasse and the Maria Strasse. These streets are in the centre of the town, and having regard to the small tonnage dropped the attack was most effective.

North-West Germany.—At Minden fuel storage tanks have been hit and houses destroyed. The stations at Soest and Unna have been hit, damage at the former being severe. Passing by train through Elberfeld, damage can be seen on each side of the line, and, thanks to temporary repairs, at Barmen the trains cross a bridge which has received a direct hit. Commercial buildings at Gutersloh and Opladen have been damaged, and at the latter place it was apparent that the track had recently been repaired.

Düsseldorf Area.—A works at Neuss making flame-throwers, and the main line to Benrath have been hit.

Cologne.—The Mulheim Bridge has been hit and warehouses of the Rhine Shipping Company to the south thereof have been burnt out or severely damaged.

General.—It is learnt that to aid the Germans in assessing damage from their photographs of London, Berlin was photographed after one or two of our raids from an equivalent height. It was found that the actual number of hits far exceeded those disclosed by the photographs.
Italy.

The raids on Palermo on the 6th July and on Naples on the 9th July were successful. At Palermo six ships were sunk. At Naples the attack coincided with a proposed departure of a convoy for Tripoli. The port area was damaged and a cruiser hit. The attack on Naples caused the air raid warning to be given in Rome.

Holland.

Shipping.—Photographs taken on the 14th July during an attack on a convoy off Ijmuiden show hits on a merchant vessel of about 6,000 tons. As a result of recent attacks off the Dutch Coast and at Rotterdam there is a growing desire amongst businessmen against routing their goods, especially for Scandinavia, through Dutch ports.
G.S.O.R. 5462
WESTERN U.S.S.R.
SCALE 1/6 M OR 63 MILES TO 1 INCH

REFERENCE
International Boundary
Railways

AXIS OPERATIONS
AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate
advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by
Axis Forces:
29th June
6th July
13th July
20th July

Pocket of Soviet resistance
Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note:
It is emphasized that in the
mobile warfare which has taken
place up to date there can be
no continuous front line. The
broken lines on the map there
fore indicate only the approximate
limits of advance of the foremost
Troops.
AXIS OPERATIONS
AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate
advances

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limits of advance of the foremost
troops.
LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:
- 29th June
- 6th July
- 13th July
- 20th July

Pockets of Soviet resistance

Main threats of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The broken lines on the map indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:

- 29th June
- 6th July
- 13th July
- 20th July

Pockets of Soviet resistance...

Main thrusts of Axis Forces...

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date, there can be no continuous front line. The broken lines on the map there indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
SECRET.
W.P. (41) 180.
26TH JULY, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

DEFENCE MEASURES IN MALAYA.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

On 7th July the War Cabinet approved the adoption of certain measures in the event of the acquisition by Japan of bases in southern Indo-China. One of these measures was the prohibition of the loading of iron ore etc. at night off the Malayan coast and of the arrival at anchorage of vessels over 1,000 tons between sunset and sunrise. This measure was put into force as soon as it became clear that Japan was making demands on Vichy.

2. The Commander-in-Chief Far East was subsequently asked whether there were any additional defence measures in Malaya or the Far East which could appropriately be enforced as counter measures demonstrating our reactions to the Japanese penetration of Indo-China. In reply he has suggested certain restrictions on the movement of Japanese ships and nationals in Hong Kong and Burma with which it is unnecessary for me to trouble my colleagues. As regards Malaya he has proposed:

(a) the removal of Japanese nationals from the defence areas in Kedah, Perlis, Province Wellesley, Penang, the northern part of Perak and in Kelantan; and

(b) the removal of Japanese nationals from certain parts of Johore which have been declared defence areas. This would remove observation over Johore Straits.

3. A subsidiary effect of these measures would be to close down a Japanese-owned iron mine in Kelantan. As my colleagues will be aware, one of the factors that had to be weighed when approving the defence measure in regard to the loading of ships at night off Malaya was the drastic curtailment which this would involve in the production of the Japanese-owned mines in the Malaya Peninsula. It was estimated that it would result in cutting down from approximately 2 million tons to 1 million tons a year the export of iron ore from these

-1-
mines. The further measures suggested above affecting Kelantan might reduce the figure of 1 million tons by approximately 11%.

4. The Commander-in-Chief China has suggested an even more drastic measure. The attached telegram shows that he considers that we are still accepting an unnecessary risk to our security in allowing Japanese lighters and tugs to ply, even by day, between harbours and ships lying up to five miles off the east coast of Malaya and the west coast of Johore. The proposal which he makes is that if the Japanese go into bases in southern Indo-China we should

(a) prohibit entirely all traffic of tugs and lighters between harbour mouths and foreign ships at anchor off the harbour; or

(b) prohibit the loading of foreign ships if more than one is either at anchor or in sight.

Of these two alternatives he considers the first very much preferable from the military point of view.

5. All these proposals have been considered by the Far Eastern Committee. The Committee appreciates that the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief China have the concurrence of the Governor of the Straits Settlements and the Commander-in-Chief Far East, but it feels bound to draw attention to the following considerations:

6. The complete or virtual stoppage of the export of iron ore, which the more drastic proposal involves, though justifiable on defence grounds, will almost certainly be taken by the Japanese as an economic measure directed against Japanese enterprises. Its result will be to cut down by about two-thirds the already seriously restricted production of iron and steel in Japan. It is therefore a measure which might conceivably precipitate Japanese action against Malaya and might on that ground be regarded unsympathetically by the United States Government as being unnecessarily provocative in present circumstances.

7. The Far Eastern Committee sees no reason why the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief Far East for the removal of Japanese nationals from certain areas in Malaya (paragraph 2 above) should not be approved, but, for the above reasons, it has felt bound to submit to higher authority a decision on the wider measures proposed by the Commander-in-Chief China.

8. My own recommendation and that of the Secretary of State for the Colonies is that action should be confined for the time being to the removal of Japanese nationals from areas in Malaya suggested by the Commander-in-Chief Far East, including the Kelantan iron mine, but that we should leave for later review any measures which might have a more drastic effect on the output of the Japanese mines in the Peninsula.

A.E.

Foreign Office,
26th July, 1941.
ANNEX.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM DATED 21ST JULY, 1941.
FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHINA,
TO THE ADMIRALTY.

X X X X X

928. I consider we are still accepting unnecessary risk to our security in allowing traffic even by day of Japanese lighters and tugs between harbours and ships lying up to 5 miles outside harbour mouth on East Coast Malaya and West Coast Johore. The risk is less since night traffic ceased, but it is still there and in view of difficulty of control and inspection combined with number of ships lying off Port, which total at time up to 7 off any one port, it (the (? risk)) is still more than we can accept with equanimity.

I suggest that if Japanese go into Indo China Southern Bases we should:

(a) Prohibit entirely all traffic of tugs and lighters between harbour mouths and foreign ships at anchor off harbour, or

(b) Prohibit loading of any foreign ship if more than one is either at anchor or in sight.

Of the two (a) is very much preferred from military point of view.

Governor and Commander in Chief Far East fully concur. The former is telegraphing separately to Secretary of State for Colonies.

X X X X X
WAR CABINET.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

THE attached confidential report on the political situation in the Union of South Africa, which has been prepared in the office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Pretoria and forwarded by Lord Harlech, will, I think, be of interest to my colleagues.

Dominions Office, July 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM.

THIS memorandum reviews the resumed session of Parliament, the 27th January–6th May, 1941, and is designed to follow up the memoranda of the 27th May and the 1st October, 1940.

2. The Prime Minister, in an address to the Transvaal Head Committee of the United Party a few days ago, declared that the recent session had been "the most successful ever held." Mr. Blackwell told his constituents that he doubted whether in any session since Union had so imposing an amount of legislation been put through by any Government in so short a time. The Government had secured votes for "colossal and hitherto undreamed-of" sums of money for war expenditure, and a vast volume of constructive and necessary legislation had been added to the Statute Book. Mr. Hofmeyr has stated that he was thoroughly satisfied with the session. The Government had succeeded in securing the passage of every Bill which it wished to have translated into law, and, for the first time, so far as he knew, in the history of the Union Parliament, there had been no "slaughtered innocents." Relations, moreover, between Government and Opposition members were much better than in the previous session; the normal pairing system had been re-established and there was close and fruitful co-operation between the Whips, with the result that the closure was applied far less often than in previous sessions and the guillotine was invoked sparingly. That this result was achieved was due to untiring work by the Speaker, Mr. Jansen, and the Clerk of the House, Mr. Kilpin. It will be recalled from previous memoranda that the latter had given much thought to the problem and had decided that co-operation between the parties provided the only hope. His views have now been justified, and he and Mr. Jansen are to be congratulated on the patience and energy they displayed.
3. If, however, the session was a great success from the point of view of the Government, it must be said that this success was won at the expense of an Opposition which had given the feeblest performance in the Union's Parliamentary history. There need be no magnanimous concern for the reputation of the Opposition Parliamentary party; but, as the success of Parliamentary institutions depends in a very real sense on the co-operation of Government and Opposition, the deplorable showing of the Nationalist Opposition in the recent session is not altogether a matter for rejoicing. Their failure was partly due to the fact that internal struggles for power absorbed the force of the party, but it is more ominous that for many members of the Opposition the democratic tradition has apparently lost its vitality. This is inevitably the result of the weakness displayed by many of the democracies in the present world conflict. A tendency towards totalitarianism would seem curious in a race which has throughout its history found it difficult to combine if it were not for the fact that this tendency has triumphed in countries formerly so torn by internal strife as Germany, Italy and Japan.

4. The principal features of the session will be discussed under the following headings:

(a) The Government;
(b) The Opposition; and
(c) Legislation.

(a) The Government.

5. One of the outstanding impressions of the session is the extent to which the personality of the Prime Minister imposed itself upon the House. This may be ascribed partly to the absence of General Hertzog, who, despite eccentricities of temperament and an outlook which has always suffered by contrast with the notable magnanimity of General Smuts, did contrive for a period of more than twenty years to give the conflict between these leaders, even when they were in fusion, something of a dramatic quality. In his stead were to be discerned the wintry features and ponderous form of Dr. Malan, who is completely lacking in the sympathetic qualities of his predecessor, and in the great personal qualities that have won for General Smuts not only the devotion of his own party, but the reluctant admiration of nearly every member of the Opposition as well. Man for man, Dr. Malan is hopelessly outclassed by the Prime Minister.

6. It is a sign of General Smuts's personal ascendancy that this session was disfigured by none of the disgraceful attacks which the Opposition permitted themselves to make upon him in the previous war sessions. Malice had left him unmoved; he was the recognised master of the country and the firmness and moderation of his actions had compelled the admiration even of his bitter opponents. He was assiduous in his attendance and went out of his way to show his respect for Parliamentary forms. As the war leader, he received an unquestioning obedience from his own followers, and there was never any indication of serious division in their ranks. In a coalition which draws its support from such normally conflicting elements as mine-owners and their workers and includes in its Cabinet representatives of Big Business as well as of Labour, there are bound to be clashes of interest; but these the Prime Minister controlled with the utmost firmness, and they were never allowed to get out of hand. Everyone, for example, expected trouble when a Bill setting up a State system of workmen's compensation insurance in place of a notoriously wasteful and inefficient private system was published. Enormous pressure was brought to bear on the Government by the interests concerned, and in the United Party caucus a minor revolt was led by Mr. Pocock, Mr. Hirsch and other members who were opposed to the principle of State intervention. General Smuts, in an indignant speech, intervened in the discussion and told the dissident members that they were mistaken if they thought the war was being fought to maintain the regime of big profits. Mr. Pocock and his friends capitulated. The United Party and its allies have too slender a majority in Parliament to be able to afford the luxury of cabals and division; but it is certain that the unanimous determination to see the war through to the end has done more than anything to hold the coalition together in an enthusiastic unity.
7. Next to General Smuts, in fact if not in title, comes Mr. Hofmeyr. Even more than in previous sessions it was he who discharged the functions of Leader of the House. Besides his departmental work, which included a comprehensive revision in the whole system of taxation, he carried on the business of the House with an efficiency that has added still further to his reputation. If he is to be criticised at all it is for the unaccustomed arrogance of his treatment of critics of his financial policy. This criticism was frequently inept, but by his asperity Mr. Hofmeyr went far to destroy the fund of goodwill which his tolerance and patience in previous sessions had built up to his credit. There is no doubt that this roughness was due, in increasing measure as the session proceeded, to the fatigue engendered by his immense labours. Mr. Hofmeyr is a much younger man than the Prime Minister and he keeps himself fit by violent and pertinacious exercise. No man, however, could bear the burden he shouldered throughout the session without coming dangerously close to the cracking point, and some alarm was felt by those who knew him best at the intense weariness which overtook him at the close. His recuperative powers are, however, great and he will be fit enough when Parliament reassembles. Mr. Hofmeyr’s labours are indicative of the weakness of the Cabinet as a whole; when Mr. Lawrence was absent on sick leave at the beginning of the session, it was Mr. Hofmeyr and not the unemployed Minister without Portfolio or any of the more lightly worked Ministers who took over the two departments of Interior and Public Health in addition to the two (Finance and Education) he normally handles.

8. On the broader question of Mr. Hofmeyr’s future, it is still difficult to form an opinion. Political commentators were much struck by a tribute which the Prime Minister paid at a recent party meeting to Mr. Hofmeyr’s work during the session. This tribute has been taken as an indication of the Prime Minister’s desire to encourage the country to think of Mr. Hofmeyr as the most likely successor to himself when the time comes, after the war, for General Smuts to devote himself to his declared intention of “going botanising in Africa.” When this difficult question of a successor to the Prime Minister is discussed it is customary for his supporters to throw up their hands in despair and bewilderment. Good party men assert vehemently that Mr. Hofmeyr “would never go down in the country.” They advance as reasons his failure to achieve any considerable following among the Afrikaans-speaking peoples and the less cogent statement that he is too “academic” to be a good leader. When, however, they are asked whether there is any alternative in prospect they look acutely embarrassed and, if pressed, admit in desperation that, perhaps after all, Mr. Hofmeyr would be elected leader for sheer lack of someone with all the necessary qualities. They usually add a dark allusion to the necessity of divine intervention if this should happen. This position is obviously unsatisfactory; but the fairest view may be that Mr. Hofmeyr has been too much overshadowed by the personality of General Smuts to be able to find scope for the qualities necessary for political leadership in this country. When the time comes he may well surprise the judges of political form by giving proof of hitherto unsuspected components in his make-up. This is a hope shared by many people concerned for the future of the Union.

9. After Mr. Hofmeyr in relative importance there comes Mr. Sturrock, a thorough Scot, whose reputation as a most capable administrator and man of excellent judgment, common sense and pleasant manners continues to grow. Mr. Sturrock’s reasonableness and moderation and his painstaking attempts to learn Afrikaans have made him perhaps the most popular of Ministers among the Opposition. This popularity is an asset the value of which was demonstrated by the remarkable ease with which he secured the passage through the House of a Bill providing pensions for casual workers on the railways. The Bill affected 48,000 non-European workers and only 7,000 Europeans; and it is probable that no other Minister could have smuggled it through without arousing the temporarily sleeping, dogs of race prejudice. His only lapse, from the point of view of the United Party, was a statement in the early stages of the session that he had no knowledge of the subversive activities of the Ossewa Brandwag in the Railways. This statement could hardly be true (for reports of such activities are frequently placed before the Minister, and several railwaymen have been dismissed or interned), but savoured of the malicious, even though most people must have felt
at the time that he was talking with his tongue in his cheek. It is well known that Mr. Sturrock, as the leader of the Moderates in the Cabinet, was opposed to the War Measures against the Ossewa Brandwag advocated by Mr. Lawrence. The Prime Minister finally came down, at any rate so far as concerned the taking of powers, on the side of the Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Sturrock has tended since then to adopt an attitude that can only be described as "naughty." The remark quoted above was typical of this, and while it did not, as has been rumoured, lead Mr. Lawrence to offer his resignation, it provoked severe criticism. Even now Mr. Sturrock is reluctant to face facts and is apt, for instance, to treat as merely humorous the presence at wayside stations of cheering crowds who extended a hearty welcome to train-loads of Italian prisoners of war. It never occurred to him to investigate the conduct of the station masters or other railway officials who divulged to the Ossewa Brandwag or their sympathisers the times when the special trains were due and his remedy was to arrange for the trains to pass the stations in question at inconvenient nocturnal hours. Events are, however, against Mr. Sturrock; he is a sensible man, and it may be expected that in time he will open his eyes to what is going on around him—while always preserving an attitude of moderation and compromise.

10. Mr. Lawrence, who holds one of the key posts in the Government, once again gave proof of no little Parliamentary capacity. He kept the Opposition admirably at bay in the debates on his two Bills to amend the Electoral Law—Bills which raised very delicate issues of party advantage; and he showed throughout the session a very thorough grasp of his departmental work. It is disappointing, however, that he suffers somewhat in the public estimation as a result of a flamboyancy of temperament which has got him more than once into a difficult position. For some months he carried on against the Ossewa Brandwag a vigorous campaign of threats and denunciations which were no doubt fully justified by the facts but which many, even of his friends, felt to be a mistake, in view of the split in the Cabinet as to the necessity for decisive action. This campaign aroused great resentment among the Opposition, who attributed the War Measures against the Ossewa Brandwag to Mr. Lawrence, and it led directly to the outrageous personal assault on him when he went to address a United Party meeting at Klerksdorp. There was some public indignation over this assault, as a result of which he was, indeed, hurt more seriously than had at first appeared; but it must be confessed that even among many Government supporters there was a feeling that Mr. Lawrence had in the past not been entirely innocent of provocation. While he was amply vindicated by the verdict of the subsequent trial, it must be said that such is the illogicality of human nature, his reputation has received a set-back; and the Opposition ever since have taken the rather damaging line that he is a "little Minister" who is unduly puffed up by the sense of his authority and had, in fact, only got what he deserved. He has now completely recovered from the effects of the assault on him, but throughout the session he was a sick man, which makes his capable handling of the House all the more meritorious.

11. Of the other Ministers there is not much to be said. Dr. Steyn, the son of ex-President Steyn of the Orange Free State, has a department which almost "runs itself"; and he is more concerned with the problems of political organisation than with the broader questions of policy. He was involved in some unpleasantness when the Nationalists severely criticised the appointment of his chief political organiser in the Free State to a post in the Lands Department, which will apparently involve a certain amount of inquisition into the political sympathies of settlers on the Government settlement scheme. The man concerned has a most unpleasant reputation, and while Senator Conroy as the Minister most concerned in the appointment had to bear the brunt of criticism, hardly anyone had any doubts as to who was really responsible. Criticism of the appointment was not confined to the Opposition, and even Cabinet Ministers have been heard to express the most violent views on the subject.

12. Mr. Madeley, as sponsor of two important items of social legislation, was much in the forefront. He struck heavy weather during the passage of his Factories Bill when he essayed the impossible task of convincing the Nationalists that the Bill had met their demands for a colour bar in the factories, while at the
same time persuading the Natives' representatives that no such discrimination was intended. His treatment of the Natives' representatives in negotiations outside the House was, to say the least, disingenuous, and in the House itself it verged on downright rudeness. The Minister succeeded, however, during the debates on his Workmen's Compensation Bill, in which virtual unanimity was achieved, in maintaining the affability which is normal to him in ordinary social intercourse. On the whole it must be said that as a result of this very substantial legislation to his credit he has emerged from the session with some increase of prestige. His inability to keep his temper remains, however, his greatest and most obvious weakness, and it was striking that on two occasions the Cape Times, usually the most subservient of papers, felt compelled to rebuke him for his unmanners. Undoubtedly, however, Mr. Madeley's labours during the session were far and away the most important from the point of view of maintaining the Government's position in the country. The majority of trades unionists in South Africa are now drawn from the Afrikaans-speaking section of the community, and there is a very real danger that they will, once the war issue, which cuts across the normal political alignment, is out of the way, either force their English-speaking leaders to co-operate with the Nationalists, or else jettison them in favour of leaders drawn from the left wing of the Nationalists. The former course has already been taken once when, after the Smuts Government had repressed riots on the Rand in 1922, Labour joined the Nationalists to put General Hertzog in power for fifteen years. The main effort of the Nationalists on the Rand since September 1939 has been concentrated on securing control of the Mineworkers' Union by means of the "Reformer" group within it led by Dr. Albert Hertzog, the son of General Hertzog. They narrowly failed in December and January last, and Mr. Madeley has seen the danger and concentrated on the passage of social legislation which enables the Labour Party to offer substantial achievement as a counter to the promises of the Nationalists. In a speech this month Dr. Malan has proclaimed that "the Afrikaner must conquer the cities if he wants to live," and he will eventually do so if the Government does not continue to implement the programme of its Labour wing. The latter numbers only four representatives in the House of Assembly, and their programme is contrary to the immediate interests of the Chamber of Mines and the most influential financial groups supporting the Government, but fortunately General Smuts is aware of the danger and took drastic action to crush an attempt by a number of Government Members of Parliament to wreck the Insurance Bill.

13. Of the other Ministers there seems no reason to modify the views expressed in the memorandum of the 27th May, 1940.

14. Among private members on the Government side no one had much opportunity to add to his reputation. Mr. Blackwell, an Australian-born lawyer in Johannesburg, as usual proved to be a pugnacious debater whose effectiveness is diminished by the provocative flaunting of rather jingoistic convictions. This is true despite the fact that his jingoism is of a milder order than the opposing jingoism of the Nationalist extremists. Mr. Leif Egeland, who, as a former Oxford don, has claims to mental distinction, proved a serious disappointment to the Cabinet, some of whom had high hopes of him. He is not lacking in intelligence, but is conventional in outlook, and most unlikely to be the future leader whom the English-speaking section has so far failed to produce. The little group of Dominionites, with the exception of their leader, Colonel Stallard, once again showed themselves utterly unable to adapt themselves emotionally or intellectually (if the word is not out of place in this context) to a changing political climate. Mr. Marwick, who is particularly purblind, wasted a great deal of the time of the House in futile motions and muck-raking enquiries, and did his best to wreck what reputation for political sense he may ever have had.

15. The two Natives' representatives had an effectiveness much beyond their numerical strength. (The third was absent through illness.) Committed to a whole-hearted support of the Government on the war issue, they had nevertheless ample opportunity for constructive criticism of the Government's policy in social questions. Mrs. Ballinger emerged as the most successful of the private members usually counted amongst the Government's supporters. Her Parliamentary ability has notably increased since her entry into the House four years ago; she speaks lucidly and attractively, has a firm grasp of principle and an expert
knowledge of economic and social matters. Few people realise the extent of her influence on Government departments or her substantial record of achievement behind the scenes. (Mr. Sturrock's inclusion of non-Europeans in his Bill to establish a pension scheme for casual labourers on the Railways was the direct result of a memorandum which she drafted.) Mr. Molteno has increased in confidence and is sound on economic matters affecting the natives, but he fails as yet to make any great impression on the House, partly, perhaps, because he is unduly sensitive to Opposition gibes, to which, of course, his position renders him particularly subject.

(b) The Opposition.

16. If the Government and its supporters gave throughout the session a striking demonstration of unity in the prosecution of the war, the Opposition have never been so torn by dissensions and personal rivalries. The beginning of the session saw the revolt and secession of ten Hertzogite Members of Parliament, who could stomach no longer the racial intolerance and political extremism of their Malanite allies. Henceforth this rather forlorn little group, lacking a leader of any consequence or a policy of any wide appeal, fought a rancorous guerrilla action against the Nationalist Party's flank while maintaining nothing more than a formal attitude of opposition to the Government's war policy. It was insistent in its exposure of the hollowness of the Nationalists' claim to represent a united Afrikanerdom. It attacked the Ossewa Brandwag as nothing but a "big bluff," and went out of its way to compare General Smuts's chivalrous attitude towards General Hertzog with the scandalous treatment accorded General Hertzog by Mr. Swart and his gang of saboteurs. The Nationalists professed indifference to these attacks, but in their retorts betrayed every symptom of an uneasy conscience. They have since appealed to the Afrikaner Party to return to the fold, but without success; and the party has now held a congress at which a Transvaal party was formed in addition to the Free State party established some months ago and Mr. Havenga has been elected leader. It is a thousand pities that he cannot be induced to re-enter the House, where his wide experience and liberal attitude of mind could hardly fail to exercise a beneficial effect. The present leader of the party, General Conroy, is so inept that it may be expected that the greatest pressure will be put on Mr. Havenga to return to the Parliamentary arena. It is to be feared, however, that his loyalty to his old leader will prevent him from acceding to the wishes of his followers, unless perhaps General Hertzog should die.

17. Mr. Pirow throughout the session proved a source of extreme embarrassment to his nominal leader and of some malicious satisfaction to the Nationalist Party's opponents. On the few occasions on which he deigned to find time from his strenuous evangel in the platteland to attend Parliament he adopted the patronising pose of the man of destiny summoned from serious things to watch the little innocents at play. He spoke hardly at all, and did not even, as in the previous session, lead the attack in the Defence debate. He was frequently to be seen in the lobbies and the refreshment rooms engaged in earnest cabal; and as news of German victories arrived he did not trouble to conceal his satisfaction. As the session advanced the opposition to Mr. Pirow threw up a leader in Mr. Strydom, the able leader of the party in the Transvaal, who found an unaccustomed weapon in the struggle against his rival in a public defence of democracy and the plain statement that the Afrikaner people would have no truck with imported systems of personal dictatorship. Mr. Pirow is clearly entirely under the influence of Nazi philosophy and Hitler's conception of a "new order" in the world.

18. The party is torn within by dissensions between those who frankly desire a German victory and the imposition of a Nazi system upon this country and the section of orthodox Republicans who still fondly hope that a victorious Germany would leave them with their national freedom, inspired by Voortrekkers' traditions. This internal conflict by itself would have been enough to stretch Dr. Malan's capacity for compromise to the breaking point. It was aggravated by the growing power of the Ossewa Brandwag, which cast its shadow across the party and insolently threatened to use the sjambok on politicians who could not maintain the semblance of unity. Thus rent by strife within and weakened from
without, the party could not be expected to cut a very effective figure in its parliamentary opposition to the Government. It was significant that Dr. Malan, in moving his motion of no confidence, was induced, no doubt by lack of material, to place the chief emphasis of his indictment on the Rand riots, which had taken place after he had given notice of his motion. So feeble, in fact, was his bill of complaint that he laid himself open to the Prime Minister's devastating retort that in a farrago of criticism and denunciations not one solid reason for lack of confidence in the Government had been advanced and that, in fact, it was only too apparent that the Nationalists were not in a position to provide the country with an alternative administration.

19. It should be said that the poor showing of the Nationalist Party during the session was not entirely due to lack of ability on the part of its members. Mr. Strydom, who has taken the place of Mr. Havenga as chief financial expert on the Opposition benches, displayed, it is true, surprising ineptitude in his criticisms of Mr. Hofmeyr's policy; he was plainly the wrong man for the job, but there are others which he could do very well. The Opposition paid little attention to purely military matters and Mr. Erasmus delivered himself of a few rather inconsequent pronouncements on the subject; but in the debates on the Government's electoral and census Bills he proved to be a penetrating and ingenious critic. Mr. B. J. Schoeman, as prospective Minister of Labour in a Nationalist Government, gave Mr. Madeley many awkward moments in the debate on the Factories Bill and succeeded in establishing his party as a serious candidate for the workers' vote on the Rand. Mr. Strydom, Nationalist leader in the Transvaal, confirmed his claim to be the strong man of the Party. He is a fanatical republican, impatient of compromise, firmly set upon his course and possessed of considerable ability. Mr. Eric Louw has a sharp tongue and a clear brain; he once again gave proof of that bitter dislike of the English which he nurtured during his sojourns in London and Paris. (It is an unfortunate fact that there are among Afrikaner Nationalists some who, because of self-mistrustful natures and a morbid sensitivity to anything which can be interpreted as a personal slight, are proof against the mellowing and liberalising influence of life in London. Mr. Louw is one of these.)

20. In general, it must be admitted that, excluding the Cabinet on the one side and the Opposition "shadow cabinet" on the other, private members of all parties display, with but few exceptions, an appalling spectacle of ineptitude. Even the present Cabinet is burdened with more "dead wood" than is desirable or even necessary, and in this respect the opposition "shadow cabinet" is as a whole superior in personal ability.

21. Before leaving personalities, mention must be made of the Speaker. Once again he played his difficult rôle consummately. To him and to the Clerk of the House must go, as has already been said, most of the credit for the delicate flowering of party co-operation. Unfortunately, Mr. Jansen's health gives rise to the gravest anxiety. Late last year he was found unconscious outside his house in Pretoria and, though he withstood the fatigue of the earlier portion of the Session, his physical condition deteriorated sadly towards the end and on one occasion he actually fainted in the chair, though his recovery was so swift that it is doubtful whether any of the members noticed the attack. Mr. Kilpin had grave fears that Mr. Jansen would not be able to finish the Session, but though the emergency passed, the future gives cause for alarm. Should Mr. Jansen's health fail completely, he will be most difficult to replace, indeed there seems to be an almost complete dearth of suitable candidates on either side of the House. The present Chairman of Committees, Major G. B. van Zyl, has for long demonstrated his complete inability to handle the House and would be entirely unsuitable.

22. This has been dealt with in telegrams and despatches and only a brief summary is required.

(i) Financial.

23. The main interest of Mr. Hofmeyr's budget lay in his proposals to raise an additional £3,000,000 in taxation and in the comprehensive reforms
which he introduced into a taxation system that had remained fundamentally unchanged since 1926. Even so, the burden borne by the South African income-tax payer would be amazingly light in peace-time and in time of war is absurdly disproportionate to comparable taxes in other belligerent countries. Not even the Nationalists could protest over much. Taxation of the gold mines was increased, but even when the very large proportion of the Union's revenue already derived from direct or indirect taxes on the gold mines is taken into account, there was hardly anyone in the House who did not think that Mr. Hofmeyr had let them off lightly. Mr. Hofmeyr has made provision for a war expenditure of about £72,000,000. It is generally believed that this figure will have to be raised considerably before the end of the financial year.

(ii) Social.

24. The Government, at Mr. Madeley's instance, sponsored two Bills which introduce useful improvements in the conditions of employment of many thousands of (almost exclusively European) workers. The first was the Factories Bill, which prescribes a maximum of a 46-hour week and conditions relating to over-time and other matters. The Opposition turned the second reading debate into a demonstration in favour of an industrial colour bar and a minimum wage of 10/- a day for European workers in industry (excluding agriculture). Mr. Schoeman, who led the Opposition attack, made a series of apparently electioneering speeches addressed more to the workers in the large towns than to the House.

25. The Workmen's Compensation Bill, which had its second reading without a division, was strongly opposed by the insurance companies: Mr. Madeley complained in Parliament about "the inordinate amount of lobbying, canvassing and intrigue" that had taken place. As has already been said, Mr. Pocock and others on the Government side made no secret of their distrust of the principle of State insurance, but they did not press their opposition. Certain members opposite who represent the growing power of Afrikaner capitalism were also known to be opposed to the Bill, but discreetly followed the Party in its support of the measure.

(iii) Electoral.

26. Mr. Lawrence secured the passage of two Bills which made provision for the enumeration in the census and registration as voters of persons on active service; and for soldiers to vote in the field when general elections for Parliament or the Provincial Councils are held. The significance of these measures is that South African soldiers, whether in or outside the Union, will be able to vote in the Provincial Council elections which take place next February, and which will be fought mainly on the war issue, and in the Parliamentary election which is due in two years' time. The Opposition not inaptly complained that the Government was turning the army into "a voting factory for the United Party." They were specially perturbed about the prospect of large numbers of coloured men now in military service obtaining the necessary financial qualifications to vote as a result of their military pay. An interesting constitutional innovation is that soldiers will vote, not for individual candidates (whose names they might not even know), but for parties.

(iv) Asiatic Land Tenure.

27. The Government, after many years' delay, secured the passage of the Feetham Resolutions, which exempt certain areas in the Transvaal from the restrictions imposed by the Gold Law upon occupation and ownership of land by Asians.

28. Parliament has been prorogued until August 27th. This date will probably be changed to one rather later in the year. General Smuts recently expressed the view that the session would be resumed towards the end of September.

United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office,
Pretoria, May 29, 1941.
W.P. (41) 182.
July 30, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

THE DIVE BOMBER.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF THE WAR CABINET.

The annexed Minute by the Air Staff is circulated, for the information of the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee, by direction of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

(Signed) E. E. BRIDGES.

Great George Street, S.W. 1,
July 30, 1941.

ANNEX.

IN the view of the Air Staff, the Dive Bomber is an efficient weapon only when—

(a) it operates with a high degree of air superiority or without fighter opposition, and
(b) it is not opposed by a heavy scale of light anti-aircraft defence at the target.

2. The only true dive bomber which has been used in this War is the Ju. 87. Experience with this aircraft has confirmed the above view. It has operated successfully against sea targets which could not be provided with effective defence by land-based fighters. On the other hand, it was a complete failure in the Battle of Britain and General Wavell said that, although undisturbed by fighter attack, it did little damage against our retiring columns in Greece.

3. The above conditions are never likely to be fulfilled in any operations against the German Forces on land, but will probably only be found when attacking ships out of reach of land-based fighter defences.

4. The R.A.F., like the other Services, was starved before the War. It was necessary to concentrate on the provision of necessities for the War as we foresaw it. These were:

(a) An adequate fighter force.
(b) A bomber force capable of reaching Germany if necessary without violating Holland or Belgium.
(c) A general reconnaissance force for co-operation with the Navy in the protection of trade.
(d) A reconnaissance force for the Army.

A dive bomber which of necessity would be inadequate for any of these roles was a luxury which we could not afford.

5. In the autumn of 1940 the War Office asked the Air Staff to provide dive bombers. In spite of the doubts which the Air Staff felt of their ability to operate dive bombers in support of land operations, they agreed to provide them. Since it would have taken 2½ years to design and produce a British type, it was agreed to order in quantity two existing American types, the Vengeance and the Bermuda. These will begin to arrive in the autumn, and it is planned to re-equip ten Army Co-operation Squadrons with them as early as possible.

(Signed)  W. R. FREEMAN
(for C.A.S.).

July 16, 1941.
ATTACKS ON CROPS AND FORESTS.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air.

1. The War Cabinet may wish to be informed of our intentions in regard to the burning of German crops and forests.

   (A) CROPS.

   2. The burning of crops by incendiary bomb attacks is a difficult operation. The essential weather conditions are a high wind following a prolonged spell of dry weather. Even under these conditions experiments carried out in this country have shown that it is extremely difficult to achieve satisfactory results.

   3. Daylight attacks on German crops would also be necessary since the effect of night attacks would be greatly restricted by dew. Day attacks on the scale necessary to achieve results must, however, be ruled out owing to the impracticability of providing fighter escort at the distances involved.

   4. A further objection to such attacks is the extremely small proportion of the 90 million acres under crop in Germany which lies within range of our bombers. Even if effective fires could be produced it would not be possible to produce a marked effect on the food situation in Germany next winter.

   5. In these circumstances, it is not intended that the Royal Air Force should undertake incendiary attacks on German crops.

   6. The foregoing arguments do not eliminate the possibility of German attacks against British crops. Large areas of East Anglia and Lincolnshire, where a considerable proportion of our corn is grown, are well within range of German bombers with fighter escort. The precautions which have been taken in this country to establish a force of watchers and fire fighters in country districts are therefore considered to be justified.

   (B) FORESTS.

   7. The best time for forest burning is from March to May according to statistics on the incidence of forest fires. Attacks on German forests could not, however, be undertaken earlier this year, as Bomber Command could not spare the necessary effort from their other commitments, notably the Battle of the Atlantic.

   8. The most profitable targets would be dense firwoods and heath planted with firs. The former are much used for concealment of military objectives, and the latter for military training. The best areas within reach are the Thuringer Wald, the Harz Mountains, and the Luneburger Heide. In August we could reach the fir forests near Berlin and Leipzig.

   9. For effective results it would be necessary to employ about 200 bombers on each area in order to swamp the local fire-fighting arrangements. As with crop burning, the necessary weather conditions are high wind, following a spell of dry weather.
10. Any attack on forests must of course involve a corresponding diversion from industrial and other targets. Nevertheless, the Air Staff consider the effort would be justified, provided the weather is favourable and the circumstances at the time enable the effort to be spared. Subject to these conditions, the A.O.C.-in-C. has accordingly been instructed to take the first good opportunity that presents itself for a heavy attack.

A.H.M.S.

AIR MINISTRY.
21st July, 1941.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ

(No. 100)

of the

NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION

from 12 noon July 24th, to

12 noon July 31st,

1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. Shipping losses were higher than last week, though still below the average.

Naval aircraft have attacked the harbours of Petsamo and Kirkenes.

An attack on Malta by Italian light torpedo craft was beaten off with heavy losses to the enemy.

Home Waters.

2. The twelfth Canadian troop convoy has arrived safely in Home Waters.

Three M.T.Bs. attacked an enemy tanker which was in tow off Boulogne on the night of the 23rd/24th. Heavy opposition from the escorts prevented all but one M.T.B. firing torpedoes, and the result of this attack is doubtful.

H.M. Destroyers Verity and Broke were damaged in collision off the Bloody Foreland on the 20th.

Arctic.

3. The ports of Petsamo and Kirkenes were attacked by naval aircraft on the 30th. At Petsamo, aircraft from H.M.S. Furious torpedoed jetties and set on fire an oil cistern and a warehouse. One Me. 109 was shot down, our casualties being two fighters and one torpedo aircraft.

At Kirkenes, aircraft from H.M.S. Victorious made two hits on the German Bremse (1,460 tons, 4 5-inch guns), and at least 4 merchant ships were hit. Two Me. 109s and one Ju. 87 were shot down, our losses being 11 torpedo aircraft and two fighters.

Atlantic.

4. H.M. Destroyer Achates was damaged by mine 40 miles to the south-east of Iceland (C) on the 25th, and was towed to Seydisfjord.

The German s.s. Erlangen, which left Mar del Plata (Argentine) on the 23rd, scuttled herself about 400 miles to the south-eastward when intercepted by H.M.S. Newcastle on the 25th.

On the 19th H.M. Submarine Tuna obtained 2 torpedo hits on a large merchant ship in the Bay of Biscay.

Mediterranean.

5. During the attacks on the convoy which arrived at Malta on the 24th, 12 enemy aircraft were shot down; two more were probably destroyed and two were damaged; our losses were 6 aircraft, of which four crews were rescued. An E-boat was sunk and another probably damaged, and a U-boat, whose torpedoes narrowly missed the Renown, was attacked and possibly sunk by H.M. Destroyer Nestor. In the Eastern Mediterranean the fleet was shadowed but was not attacked.

On the 26th the Grand Harbour, Valletta, was heavily but unsuccessfully attacked by E-boats and two-man submarines. Five E-boats and 8 submarines were destroyed by the harbour defences, the greater part of which are manned by the Royal Malta Artillery. In addition, 4 E-boats were sunk and 2 were damaged by Hurricanes. Three officers and 15 ratings were taken prisoner.

H.M. Submarine Upright attacked a floating dock, which was proceeding in tow round Cape Spartivento to the westward on the 24th. On the 28th, H.M. Submarine Upholder hit with 2 torpedoes an Italian 6-inch cruiser of the Condottieri class (7,000 tons, built in 1935-36).

During the week 8 French merchant ships (upward of 18,000 tons) have passed Gibraltar east-bound, and 2 (8,300 tons) west-bound.
Anti-Submarine Operations.

6. There were ten attacks on U-boats during the week, five by aircraft and five by surface ships, without visible result. One attack by aircraft was made in the Heligoland Bight, and one by surface craft to the westward of Algiers; the others took place on the Atlantic seaboard between the latitudes of Finisterre and Northern Ireland.

Enemy Intelligence.

Main Units.

7. The *Scharnhorst* had returned to Brest by the 26th July and was in the dry dock there on the following day. She was reported to be down by the stern and listing on arrival. Apart from this there have been no changes in the positions of the German and Italian main units.

U-Boats.

8. About 20 German and 5 Italian U-boats have been working in the Eastern Atlantic between the latitudes of the north of Scotland and Gibraltar, and in addition 5 German U-boats have been in the Cape Verde Islands area.

Raiders.

9. There have been no recent reports of raiders, but there are indications of one in the Southern Indian Ocean, and one is suspected in the southern part of the North Atlantic.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

10. Shipping casualties have increased this week owing to losses inflicted by U-boats, which sank at least 7 ships of an outward-bound convoy to the west of Spain, and one in an outward-bound convoy off the Bloody Foreland. Weather conditions have been unfavourable for air attack; one ship was sunk off the Tyne.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

11. During the week ending the 30th July, 1,021 ships, including 177 Allied and 28 neutral, were convoyed. Six anti-aircraft ships, ten armed merchant cruisers, two submarines, sixty destroyers and ninety-nine sloops, corvettes and fleet minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 26th July totalled 615,475 tons compared with 550,737 tons during the previous seven days and an average of 836,668 tons during the past ten weeks. Oil imports were 177,247 tons compared with 139,439 tons during the week ending the 19th July. Mineral imports were 145,756 tons, of which 145,845 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Timber and pulp imports were 35,056 tons and cellular imports 131,966 tons. Other food imports totalled 71,899 tons, the principal commodities being sugar 26,420 tons, refrigerated and tinned meat, bacon and ham 10,521 tons, fruit 4,213 tons, cheese 1,503 tons and tea 1,594 tons. Imports of motor lorries, aircraft and war stores were very satisfactory.

British Minelaying.

12. H.M.S. *Port Quebec* laid 556 mines to the north of North Rona, and motor launches laid 48 off the French Channel ports. Minelaying by aircraft was concentrated in the Western Baltic, though some mines were laid off the enemy North Sea, Channel and Bay of Biscay ports.

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.

13. No casualties have been caused by mines during the week. Aircraft laid mines in the Thames Estuary on one night. A number of mines have been located during the period, but the majority were not laid recently. The mine total to date is: magnetic 1,308, acoustic 912, contact 1,029.
Enemy Merchant Shipping.

14. About the 19th July fire broke out in the Italian Cape Faro whilst loading, and much damage was done to part of the cargo.

The Italian tankers Albaro (3,706 tons) and Mayo (3,667 tons) and the Bulgarian Bourgos (2,940 tons) are reported to have passed into the Black Sea.

A survey of enemy shipping, including ships under enemy control, on the 30th June indicates that there was a maximum of four million tons for work in Northern European waters from Murmansk to the Straits of Gibraltar. An estimate of shipping required for the Baltic and the full-scale resumption of the Scandinavian ore trade suggests that 3½ million tons would be required for these purposes.

Russian Intelligence.

15. The movement of German forces across the Dniester has necessitated the evacuation of the naval establishment at Odessa.

MILITARY SITUATION.

Russo-German Campaign.

16. There have been no developments of decisive importance during the past week, though German forces have advanced in varying degree on all fronts.

Finland:

17. In the area north of Lake Ladoga, Finnish and German troops have advanced to within a short distance of Olonets on the eastern shore of the lake and 22 miles from the Leningrad–Murmansk Railway. No progress has been attempted in the Karelian Isthmus. At Hango artillery activity continues.

Baltic Front.

18. Little progress has been made by German forces. Soviet forces appear to be withdrawing from Northern Estonia, but the German occupation of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland is not yet confirmed. Further east the German line runs roughly from south-east of Narva–Luga–Dno (65 miles east of Pskov). The area east of Lake Peipus has been cleared of Soviet forces. The drive towards Leningrad is apparently held up by considerable Soviet forces, but there are indications of the possibility of a German drive due eastwards, south of Lake Ilmen, to cut the Leningrad–Moscow railway.

White Russia.

19. The severest fighting is taking place on this front. Fighting west of Smolensk has ceased, so that the German claim to have cleared up this pocket of Soviet resistance appears to be true. German progress east of Smolensk is being impeded by considerable Soviet counter-attacks, and the position is very confused. To the southward German forces have crossed the River Dnieper down to Rogachev, where considerable Soviet counter-attacks are proceeding.

Ukraine–Bessarabia.

20. The German advance towards Kiev has not progressed. The main effort on this front seems to be south-eastwards from Berdichev and north-eastwards from Balta. The Dniester defences are virtually enveloped, the Germans having crossed the river at all points to within some 30 miles north-west of Tiraspol. The position of Soviet forces in that part of Bessarabia which still remains in Soviet hands is obscure, but the German claim to have “liberated” the whole of Bessarabia is virtually correct.
Operations.

Libya and Egypt.

Tobruk.

21. During the week under review our patrolling activities have continued. On the night of 23rd/24th July six fighting patrols were sent out. On the 25th/26th July a patrol of two Indian officers and 16 other ranks attacked four enemy positions west of the perimeter, killing 25 of the enemy, mostly with the bayonet. During this week enemy raids have been carried out on Tobruk, with little success.

Frontier Area.

22. There has been a certain amount of activity by enemy ground patrols. The most notable incident occurred on the 27th July, when two strong enemy offensive patrols operating in this area were engaged by our mobile columns and forced to withdraw. On the 28th July there was an increase in enemy activity, and we captured a few prisoners.

Syria.

23. Vichy French garrison in Suweida, in the Jebel Druze Area, has been relieved by our forces.

Reinforcements.

24. Reinforcements of 10,000 Australian and 4,000 New Zealand troops have arrived at Suez. The 2nd South African Division, less one brigade group, is completing its concentration in Egypt.

Intelligence.

German Activities.

25. The number of divisions in the whole of the Low Countries and France is now believed to have been reduced to about 35, of which two are in the Netherlands and three in Belgium. Only two of the total are active divisions and one may be motorised.

Norway.

26. The number of German divisions in Norway is still estimated at eight, but it may have been reduced recently. The quality of the troops is probably lower than before.

Spain.

27. Reports are still being received of improvements in communications in south-west France towards the Spanish Frontier. Coast and anti-aircraft defences in the Bayonne area are also being developed. The number of German divisions south of Bordeaux has fallen from seven to five, all of which are of poor quality. While there is no indication of an immediate threat to Spain, the necessary troops (including armoured divisions) for an advance into Spain, in face of resistance, could probably be assembled in some seven weeks after the end of the Russian campaign. If, on the other hand, Spain acquiesced in the passage of German troops, the force required could be assembled in little over a week.

Balkans.

28. It is estimated that there are not more than five German Divisions in the Balkan area, one being based on Crete, one in Salonica and the other three in Greece and Serbia.

Bulgaria.

29. The Bulgarian Army remains fully mobilised at seventeen divisions and work on existing aerodromes continues with German assistance. There has been no confirmation, however, of any unusual military activity during the past week.
Turkey.

30. The Turks are displaying great activity in the construction of the new works in the Catalca Lines and appear to be making every effort to complete them before the winter.

Libya.

31. Army General Ettore Bastico, lately Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Islands in the Aegian, has replaced General Gariboldi as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Libya. He is a strong Fascist and an energetic commander, and has had considerable experience with mechanized forces. He may be expected to adopt more aggressive tactics than those which have recently characterised the Italian Army in Libya.

French Africa.

32. The total number of troops in French North Africa is estimated to be about 120,000, as approved by the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden. Some 55,000 are in Morocco, 45,000 in Algeria and the balance in Tunisia. Vichy forces in West Africa total approximately 35,000.

Japan.

33. The Japanese army has been very active during the past week, particularly in Southern Indo-China, where sea and air bases are being occupied, and in Manchukuo, where military preparations are continuing.

In North China there are indications that two or more divisions have been withdrawn to Manchukuo, while the withdrawal of some troops from Central China has also been reported.

In Japan itself partial mobilization of over 13 classes of reservists is taking place, with the probable object of bringing up to war strength the divisions in, or destined for, Manchuria.

Present indications suggest that in the immediate future Japan will consolidate her position in Indo-China, whilst taking measures to increase her control over Thailand and preparing for possible action against U.S.S.R. from Manchukuo.

Manchukuo.

34. There have been several reports to show that troop concentrations are taking place on the eastern boundary of Manchukuo, and that the number of troops in the country is being considerably increased. At the same time the transport of supplies and stores from Japan has continued and there have been reports of railway congestion on the Korean and Manchukuo railways owing to the volume of military traffic passing over them.

Southern Indo-China.

35. The occupation of Southern Indo-China by Japanese forces began on the 27th July with a landing at Nhatrang and subsequently at Cap St. Jacques and Saigon. The Japanese forces so far involved amount to about two Divisions.

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

36. In the early part of the week, a successful attack was made in daylight against enemy warships at Brest and La Pallice, and, at night, industrial objectives in Berlin, German shipyards and railway centres were attacked. Later the weather deteriorated, and on three nights no bombing was possible. Offensive operations by Fighter Command were also curtailed.

Enemy activity over this country was on a very small scale. Aircraft from Malta successfully attacked aircraft on Sicilian aerodromes. They also co-operated in repelling the enemy naval raid on the Grand Harbour.
Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

37. Bomber Command despatched 206 sorties (compared with 110 last week), and 160 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped by day. Fighter Command flew sorties involving 709 aircraft.

38. The attack on the Scharnhorst at La Pallice on the night 23rd/24th July was followed the next afternoon by a raid by Halifax bombers on the same target. Twenty-five tons of H.E. bombs were dropped and at least one bomb hit the ship, which subsequently returned to Brest, where she was dry-docked.

39. While this attack was in progress at La Pallice, strong forces of bombers, including Fortresses, were despatched, with fighter cover, to attack the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen at Brest, and to carry out a diversionary raid on Cherbourg. These operations involved the largest number of sorties by Bomber Command that has been despatched during daylight on any day since the outbreak of war, a total of 149 aircraft being employed.

Our bombing forces carried out their tasks with great success in the face of strong defence by enemy fighters and A.A. fire. The Gneisenau was hit seven times and the Prinz Eugen and a large tanker were probably damaged. Apart from these hits, many bursts were observed on and around the docks at Brest, and severe damage was inflicted upon barracks and buildings adjacent to the targets. At Cherbourg, bombs fell in the town and dock area and a warehouse was set on fire. On the same afternoon, 9 Blenheims of Coastal Command, with fighter protection, attacked the railway centre at Hazebrouck; several fires were started.

During the day our bombers destroyed 21 enemy fighters, probably destroyed 7 and damaged 9. Sixteen of our bombers failed to return. Our escorting fighters inflicted additional casualties, totalling 12 destroyed, 5 probables and 5 damaged; we lost 8 fighters (one pilot being rescued) out of 529 aircraft despatched by Fighter Command during these operations.

Night.

40. On the night 23rd/24th, 25 Whitleys and 7 Beauforts attacked the Scharnhorst at La Pallice; several fires were started but searchlight dazzle impeded observation. (This attack was omitted from last week’s Résumé).

41. This week Bomber Command despatched 454 night sorties, compared with 638 last week. A total of 335 tons of H.E. bombs and 25,200 incendiaries were dropped. The principal targets were shipyards at Kiel and Emden, railway centres at Hanover, Hamburg and Cologne, and the industrial centre of Berlin. Night offensive patrols by fighters were continued over enemy territory.

42. At Kiel, visibility was good and very satisfactory results were seen at both the Deutsche and Krupp shipyards; a large explosion, believed to be at the Main Railway Station, was also observed.

At Emden, which was the most heavily attacked objective (58 tons of H.E. bombs and 6,120 incendiaries), many large and small fires were started, which merged into one large blaze. A fast-running fire, possibly from burning petrol, was reported.

Good results were obtained at Hanover and Hamburg, bursts, with resultant fires, being observed in the target areas in each city.

Very bad weather, with much cloud, was encountered at Cologne. Some fires were, however, started in the estimated target area. A number of our aircraft were forced by thunderstorms and severe icing to abandon their task; others located and attacked Aachen as an alternative target, two of the heaviest bombs being dropped.

Seven Stirlings and 2 Halifax bombers were despatched to attack Berlin, and 14 tons of H.E. bombs were released. These included one of the heaviest bombs, and it is believed to have fallen between the Tiergarten and Tempelhof Aerodrome.
United Kingdom.

43. Fighter Command flew 863 patrols, involving 2,409 sorties, by day, and 276 patrols, involving 419 sorties, by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. These figures show a decrease over those of the previous week. Enemy activity continued on a small scale, and during daylight very few hostile aircraft penetrated inland; three Ju. 88s were destroyed and another was damaged.

44. On the night 27th/28th July, an attack was made on London, but it was neither heavy nor concentrated; it was announced as a reprisal for the raid on Berlin on the 25th/26th. Ju. 88 night fighters took part in this attack, carrying their normal load of eight to ten 50-kilo. bombs; this affords some indication of the depleted strength of the German bomber force on the Western Front. During this raid four enemy aircraft were destroyed. On other nights scattered bombs were dropped in Scotland, Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Yorkshire and in East Anglia, but the total number of long-range night bombers employed amounted only to 95.

Coastal Operations.

45. Coastal Command flew 234 patrols (339 sorties) and provided escorts for 72 patrols (245 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 674 (1,409 sorties).

46. Aircraft from Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Commands were extensively engaged in searches for enemy shipping. On one day, during operations by 43 Blenheims of Bomber Command, five merchant vessels, totalling about 6,000 tons, are claimed as destroyed. On other days, Fighter Command carried out promising attacks, several ships being hit with machine-gun and cannon fire.

47. A total of 100 aircraft were employed in laying sea mines in the Western Baltic and off Kiel, Lorient, Havre, Rouen and the Frisian Islands.

48. Enemy reconnaissance of shipping was not on a heavy scale, and the only attack on a convoy was made off the Tyne on the night 29th/30th. On one night, fifteen enemy aircraft laid mines in the Thames Estuary, but, during the remainder of the week, no mining operations were undertaken off our coasts.

Central Mediterranean.

49. In daylight on the 23rd July, four Blenheims operating from Malta made a successful attack on shipping at Trapani (N.W. Coast of Sicily). A merchant vessel of 7,000 tons was hit, and left in flames, and another vessel of 3,000 tons was hit twice and is believed to have sunk. The aircraft then raided an enemy aerodrome and destroyed three S.79s and damaged others. On the 28th two direct hits were made on a laden schooner west of Pantellaria, which later probably sank.

50. Beaufighters based on Malta took a heavy toll of Italian aircraft. On the 28th July, eight of these fighters split into pairs and attacked aircraft on the ground or moored seaplanes at Catania, Borizzo, Syracuse and Marsala. As a result of this raid they claimed to have destroyed 15 S.79s, 14 Cant. Z.501s and 4 Macchi 200s, in addition to which about 25 of the ground staff were killed at Borizzo. Photographs taken the following day indicate that these figures are probably an underestimate of the actual damage caused.

51. Two days later, six Beaufighters carried out a similar attack on Elmas aerodrome and seaplane base in Sardinia. Five aircraft and seaplanes were destroyed and seven others seriously damaged, while many other aircraft were sprayed with cannon and machine-gun fire. A large fire was started in a seaplane hangar, and all the crew of a heavy A.A. gun were believed to have been killed. On the return journey, a four-engined transport aircraft was probably destroyed south of Pantellaria. Beaufighters on escort duty on the 24th July shot down two Ju.87s. From these operations all the Beaufighters returned safely.

52. On the 25th July, 2 Italian bombers, escorted by about 40 fighters, attempted a reconnaissance of Malta; Hurricanes intercepted and shot down
the 2 bombers and 3 of the fighters. On the following day, our Hurricanes co-operated with the coast defences in repelling an attempted attack on Grand Harbour by enemy light forces. These fighters sank 4 "E" boats and damaged others, and also shot down 3 of the enemy fighter escort. The enemy carried out three small night attacks on Malta, without causing any damage of consequence.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

53. Daylight activity continued to be on a small scale. Covering patrols were maintained for protection of our shipping, and on the 29th July a large number of Ju. 88s, escorted by Me. 109s, made an attack on one of our convoys; a patrol of Tomahawks and Hurricanes intercepted the attackers and shot down 4 Ju. 88s; two other Ju. 88s were probably destroyed and 10 Ju. 88s and 2 Me. 109s damaged. Two of our Tomahawks are missing, and a lighter was sunk. Nightly attacks on the harbour of Benghazi were again carried out by Wellingtons, and many hits were made and fires started.

54. The enemy made several small daylight raids on Tobruk; on one occasion the lighting installation was put out of action, but, in general, very little damage was caused and many of the bombs fell in the sea. Bombs were also dropped at Matruh, in the Sofia area and south of Solium, but no serious damage resulted.

55. At night, attacks were carried out, by forces which did not exceed ten aircraft on any one occasion, on Alexandria, Port Said and in the Delta area. At Alexandria, some parachute mines were dropped, and damage was caused to house property, to cables and water mains, and to a Royal Air Force base. The objects of these raids is largely political. They are intended to weaken Egyptian morale and to stimulate a demand for the withdrawal of British forces from certain areas.

Russia.

General.

56. There is no comprehensive information of Russian air operations, but some reports are available from Finland and Rumania. There are full accounts of attacks on Moscow.

Finland.

57. About fifteen Finnish towns have been bombed. Twenty-nine Russian bombers dropped bombs on both sides of the Naval Barracks at Abo, where there are Germans stationed. Windows were broken, but the barrack's were not hit. Twenty aircraft raided Borga, five of which were shot down by eight Finnish fighters. There have been reports of Russians being dropped by parachute, some in civilian dress, but almost all of them have been rounded up. Most of these parachutists were dropped in the Helsinki-Hyvinkaa-Borga area.

58. Up to the 12th July, 1941, 94 Russian aircraft are reported to have been shot down by the Finns, 79 by fighter aircraft, 15 by anti-aircraft fire. Fifteen Russian aircraft were brought down over Finland on the 22nd July, 7 in the south and 8 in the north. The Finnish Air Staff report the loss of 11 Finnish aircraft since operations against Russia began. The Russians are said to be using mostly I. 15 and I. 15 (3) fighter aircraft over the Finnish frontier. Some I. 18 aircraft have been seen over Finland and are much feared by the Finnish pilots.

Rumania.

59. A further report has been received indicating that the Russian bombing of the oil fields at Ploesti has been effective, though the statement that the production has been reduced by about one-third may be exaggerated. The Soviet Air Force made an attack on Giurgiu on the 23rd July and attempted to drop incendiary bombs on oil installations, but it is thought that the raid was not a success.
German Air Operations.

60. There is little doubt that in spite of the absence of movement the German Air Force has maintained a steady pressure against the Russians on the whole front; at the same time it has had time to consolidate its more advanced positions and it is likely that the immediate problems of supply and maintenance on the field may by now have been somewhat eased, thus facilitating the development of the next phase of operations.

61. There was an air raid on Moscow on the 21st July which lasted about six hours and was on a fairly heavy scale. The main objectives were apparently the railway station, industrial areas and aerodromes. Several large fires were caused by enemy aircraft which flew over at a medium height. The Soviet A.A. defences, of which a large proportion were light anti-aircraft guns, put up what was described as 'an impressive show.' The searchlights frequently held the attacking aircraft quite well. Incendiary bombs fell on the roof of the British Embassy but the fire was tackled immediately by the Embassy staff, both Russian and English, and by the Moscow fire brigade.

62. Another raid was made on Moscow on the 22nd July and was directed against the morale of the citizens. It is stated that the morale of the Muscovites was not affected any more by this raid than by the one on the previous night. On the night of the 23rd/24th July there was an attempted mass raid by about 150 German bombers, of which only 5 to 6 per cent, pierced the defences. Five aircraft are said to have been shot down but no military objectives were damaged. Some dwelling houses were set on fire but they were soon put out by the fire brigades and by the people. A small daylight attack appears to have been made in the vicinity of Moscow on the 25th July by a formation of six bombers, of which five were shot down. There is no report of any damage.

63. The latest raid of which reports have been received is the raid of the 28th July, which lasted from midnight on the 28th to 0230 hours on the 29th. The raid finished earlier than usual, no doubt due to the German casualties suffered during the approach to and the return from the city in daylight. Nearly all the German aircraft approached from the south and east, but very few flew over the centre of the city. All bombing took place at a high altitude, and incendiary bombs were dropped only at the beginning of the raid. By 0030 hours a large fire had been started in the southern outskirts of the city and German aircraft concentrated their attacks on this. At least two and possibly more mines were dropped, but bombs are stated to have been dropped singly and not in sticks. All were of large size. The Germans used many more parachute flares than in the earlier raids, and the Russians wasted much ammunition trying to shoot them down. Owing to the height at which the bombers flew, the Russian searchlights had little success in picking up the attacking aircraft, and both heavy and light A.A. guns put a heavy barrage throughout the whole raid. At one time 107 searchlights were in action on the Moscow perimeter. It is estimated that the scale of attack was about 40 per cent. less than the raids on the first two nights.

Air Intelligence.

Turkey.

64. The Turks have further reduced their aerodrome programme from 14 to 5 owing to their heavy commitments in aerodrome construction. The area of the runways has also been reduced in all cases. Work has apparently not yet been started on this programme, and, although scheduled for completion by the end of October, it is extremely unlikely that it will be completed by that date.

65. The Chief of the Turkish Air Force has directed that all flying training at Eskishehir is to be under British control. The first batch of 20 of a total party of 80 cadets to be sent to England for training has now left Turkey. The remainder will leave in August and September.

Iran (Persia).

66. Nine Tomahawks have arrived at Bandar Shahpur from the United States. A test pilot and riggers have passed through Karachi on their way to
Iran. Only six British technicians now remain in Tehran. Eight more will be required if Hurricanes are to be produced.

The Germans are reported to be taking photographs and obtaining details of landing grounds, particularly in Southern Iran and Kuzistan, in addition to other similar activities.

Japan.

67. As a result of the agreement with Vichy, the Japanese have secured the right to use and garrison at least eight aerodromes in Indo-China. Thirty T. 96 naval heavy bombers are reported to have arrived at Saigon on the 26th July.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

68. The only bombs, on land, during the week were dropped harmlessly at Cleethorpes on the 29th July.

By Night.

69. Except on one night, bombing was confined to minor incidents, mostly near the East Coast.

On the night 27th/28th July there was a raid of light intensity, lasting for 24 hours, on London, with minor incidents in adjoining counties. This was the first time bombs had dropped in the London Region since 21st/22nd June, and the first raid on London of any magnitude since 10th/11th June.

Damage.

70. London (27th/28th July).—There were only two medium fires and five small outbreaks. A high proportion of bombs were of light weight but damage, although mostly confined to house property, was somewhat heavy, especially in Bethnal Green, Poplar, Islington, Wandsworth and Surbiton. Two large gas mains were hit in Poplar and two large water mains north of the river. Railway damage was all repaired by 1800 hours the following evening.

J. Pain and Sons, Ltd., Mitcham (Armament and Explosive production), suffered slight damage.

Casualties were also high in proportion to the bombs dropped, but at least 30 deaths, out of the region's total of 90, were due to bombs which hit a public shelter and two surface shelters in Poplar.

Casualties.

71. The casualties for the week ending 0600, the 30th July, are estimated at 104 killed and 139 seriously injured, of which 90 killed and 111 seriously injured were in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III

will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 28th July, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German</th>
<th></th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th></th>
<th>Together</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>488,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>322,000</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>556,000</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,248,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, etc. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1,194,000</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>792,000</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>1,986,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2,158,000</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,488,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3,052,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 54 ships of 100,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.
Also some 59 ships, totalling 820,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.
The enemy losses have been re-surveyed in the light of considerable additional information which has recently become available and as a result this return presents some appreciable alterations from the figures given in last week's report.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

No casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported during the period under review.
The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:—

Officers: killed 11, missing 9, wounded 2.

Ratings: killed 59, missing 676, wounded 21.

These figures include 4 officers and 28 ratings missing in H.M. Submarine Union, and 638 ratings missing in H.M.S. Gloucester.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0800 hours, Thursday, 24th July, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 31st July, 1941.

Metropolitan Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers...</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters...</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 fighter pilot is safe.

German.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers...</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters...</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

Of the above totals, 1 bomber and 1 "miscellaneous" aircraft were destroyed, and 1 "miscellaneous" aircraft was probably destroyed by A.A. fire.

Middle East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>...</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

German.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers...</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total...</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Italian.

| Bombers...       | 20         | 25         | 12      |
| Fighters...      | 9          | ...        | 4       |
| Miscellaneous... | ...        | ...        | ...     |
| Total...         | 29         | 25         | 16      |
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

**Germany.**

Cologne.—On the night of the 7th/8th July over 100 goods wagons were destroyed. Two reports tell of the severe damage to the main station and adjoining buildings on the night of the 10th/11th July. It appears that the post and mail sorting office at the main station was destroyed, with severe casualties, especially among railway personnel.

(Note.—The platforms of Cologne station are above street level. The post office is on street level below the station master's office, which is on platform 1.)

Aachen.—In the raid on the 9th/10th July a large military depot between the main station and the goods station was demolished. The technical college, which housed a motorised artillery unit, was heavily damaged. The breakdown of the fire-fighting services added to the damage caused by fire.

Emden.—The Boeing that attacked on the 26th July took photographs from 32,000 ft. These show the four bombs dropped bursting well in the town. Debris having been cleared, the large area of damage caused by the two 4,000-lb. bombs on the 31st March/1st April shows clearly in these photographs.

Duisburg.—The harbour area for traffic on the Rhine–Herne Canal has been severely damaged and work there is almost at a standstill. The Demag Works (makers of machinery), the copper works and a soda manufacturing plant have all suffered damage.

**France.**

Le Trait.—Photographs taken during the daylight attack on the 22nd July show:

(a) Two bombs bursting on or very close to a large merchant vessel under construction and a workshop alongside the vessel;

(b) A salvo of five bombs bursting on or very close to the bows of two submarines under construction;

(c) At least two bombs bursting on a large building believed to be workshops; and

(d) A burst close to rolling stock on the railway siding.

Brest.—The damage caused to the *Prinz Eugen* is reported to necessitate repairs which will take many months.

Lille Area.—Several reports tell of the dislocation to industry caused by our successful attacks upon power stations supplying the area, and of the workers refusing to return to work for some time and giving a further possible raid as an excuse.
1. The Air Ministry require more aerodromes. They must of course have sufficient land to provide them. The question is not how much land they should have but which land.

2. Machinery is required to decide this. In my view the present liaison procedure has broken down. I am entitled to raise objections but the Secretary of State for Air reserves the final decision.

3. I only raise objection in cases where land is of outstanding productivity.

4. The Air Ministry naturally prefer good agricultural land because it is flat and well drained. They object to sites which involve:
   (i) road diversion
   (ii) diversion of the Grid
   (iii) land over the 600 ft. contour line
   (iv) removal of trees or scrub on any considerable scale
   (v) levelling of undulating land or drainage of wet land.

5. Where for their own operational reasons aerodromes have to be located at sites where all these requirements cannot be met, the Air Ministry have in some cases abandoned their objections. In analogous cases where I urge modification to avoid removal from food production of really good agricultural land there is at present no means of ensuring that agricultural considerations are given proper weight.

6. The amount of first-class agricultural land in this country is very limited. I understand the Air Ministry now have their eye on some of the very best in the world.

7. To avoid waste and ensure that the best use is made of our land for our war effort I request that machinery should be set up to determine priorities in the event of Departmental disagreement.

8. I suggest that these questions should be submitted for settlement to a War Cabinet Minister, whose decision should be final.

(intld.) R.S.H.

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

1st August, 1941.
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR.

I CIRCULATE for the information of the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee copies of a minute from the Prime Minister and of my reply on the defence of Royal Air Force Aerodromes.

Air Ministry, August 1, 1941.

A. H. M. S.

Minute from the Prime Minister dated June 29, 1941.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR.

1. Further to my Minute of the 20th June about the responsibility of the Air Force for the local and static defence of aerodromes. Every man in Air Force uniform ought to be armed with something, a rifle, a Tommy gun, a pistol, a pike or a mace; and every one, without exception, should do at least one hour's drill and practice every day. Every airman should have his place in the defence scheme. At least once a week an alarm should be given as an exercise (stated clearly beforehand in the signal that it is an exercise) and every man should be at his post. 90 per cent, should be at their fighting stations in five minutes at the most. It must be understood by all ranks that they are expected to fight and die in the defence of their airfields. Every building which fits in with the scheme of defence should be prepared, so that each has to be conquered one by one by the enemy's parachute or glider troops. Each of these posts should have its leader appointed. In two or three hours the troops will arrive, meanwhile every post should resist them and must be maintained—be it only a cottage or a mess—so that the enemy has to master each one. This is a slow and expensive process for him.

2. The enormous mass of non-combatant personnel who look after the very few heroic pilots who alone in ordinary circumstances do all the fighting, is an inherent difficulty in the organisation of the Air Force. Here is the chance for this great mass to add a fighting quality to the necessary services they perform. Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers.
3. In order that I may study this matter in detail let me have the exact field state of Northolt aerodrome, showing every class of airman, the work he does, the weapons he has, and his part in the scheme of defence. We simply cannot afford to have the best part of half a million uniformed men, with all the prestige of the Royal Air Force attaching to them, who have not got a definite fighting value quite apart from the indispensable services they perform for the pilots.

June 29, 1941.

W. S. C.

Minute from Secretary of State for Air in reply.

Prime Minister.

Your Minute M. 681/1, about the Defence of Aerodromes, of the 29th June has been the subject of more than one discussion at which you have been present. You will now expect to receive some report of the action taken in accordance with the decisions reached at these meetings, and also answers to the questions, of detail, which you raised in your Minute.

We are as determined as you that aerodrome defences shall be brought to the highest pitch of efficiency, that every airman must have a definite place in the scheme of defence, that as many as possible shall be equipped with weapons, however rudimentary, and that all should be imbued with a fighting spirit.

Air Marshal Peck has already had two meetings with representatives of Home Commands to discuss detailed suggestions for giving effect to these principles. Further meetings are to be held so that experience can be pooled, plans co-ordinated, and decisions followed up and implemented swiftly. The following main points were dealt with in your minute:—

1. Provision of arms.

We are very short of modern weapons but the Findlater Stewart Committee recommended large additional supplies, particularly for the most vulnerable stations, and these are now coming through.

All Commands were instructed to carry out an immediate stock-taking on the lines you suggested for Northolt to determine the exact position and to define the size of the problem of ensuring that every man should carry a weapon of some kind. The results show that there are about 170,000 men on aerodromes without arms of any kind. Grenades are being provided for all men who are neither otherwise armed nor destined for employment on specific non-combatant duties—stretcher bearers, telephone operators, &c, on a scale of 5 per man. Our Station Commanders have been urged to make up supplies of weapons where necessary by exercising their ingenuity on the lines laid down in your Minute, and we shall apply ourselves energetically to this task. The War Office are allocating to us 20,000 of a new form of bayonet pike.

Various other useful ideas emerged from these meetings. For example:—

(i) The possibility of using the turrets of dispersed aircraft and training turrets where these are available in tactical positions to cover certain vital areas with their fire;

(ii) The provision of increased local financial powers to enable more rapid provision and construction of defence works and weapons;

(iii) The provision of bicycles and motor-bicycles to increase the mobility of the defence forces, &c.

2. Training.

This is necessarily restricted in the first place by a shortage of weapons and ammunition, and in the second place by the heavy pressure of work imposed by current operations. Even, however, if we cannot reach your standard of an hour's training a day, we shall do as much as we possibly can. Station Commanders will be impressed with the importance of frequent practices, a special allocation of arms—Tommy guns particularly—will be made immediately for training purposes and every man will be taught his place in the defence scheme; and the use of the weapon with which he is to be supplied. An intensive drive is to be put behind this training in the next few weeks.
3. **Provision of works to form station buildings into strong points.**

The construction of reinforcements for station buildings, and dispersal pens, the construction of strong points and the making of slit trenches in positions covering the landing area will be pressed forward with maximum speed.

4. **Morale.**

The vital importance of the defence of their aerodromes will continue to be impressed upon ground crews, clerks, cooks and mechanics, and they will respond. I attach a copy of a letter which the C.A.S. has addressed to all Commanders-in-Chief on this subject.

A. H. M. S.

*July 28, 1941.*

Letter from C.A.S. to all R.A.F. Commanders-in-Chief at Home and the Air Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland.

*July 5, 1941.*

The Chiefs of Staff have recently considered how the general strategical situation affects the threat of invasion of this country. This review has shown that all forms of offence and defence to resist invasion must be brought to the highest pitch of efficiency by the 1st September.

I am therefore writing to each Commander-in-Chief asking him to re-examine at once all his anti-invasion plans and to take all possible steps to perfect anti-invasion measures by that date, while taking care that vigilance in the meanwhile is in no way relaxed.

I would ask you to see that all preparations are thoroughly overhauled, and that the need for devoting redoubled energy to them is made as widely known as possible.

Above all, it must be impressed on all ranks that the first effort of the Germans, if they invade, will be directed against our aerodromes, and that upon the result of this attack will depend, in all probability, the success or failure of the invasion and the result of the war. The attack can be made to fail if, and only if, every man in R.A.F. uniform is determined to use every possible means in resisting it and is prepared to die in defence of his Station. Every available man must have some weapon, be it only a mace or pike made in R.A.F. workshops, which he is trained to use and prepared to fight with to the last. No one must be allowed to rely on others for protection; all must realise that their duty is to kill the attacking Germans by every means in their power and to hold on to their Station, to the death if necessary. Invasion will give to the Service as a whole an opportunity to show that the fighting spirit of the Air Force is not confined to the small number whose duty takes them into the air. It must be a point of honour that no armed and unwounded man will ever surrender to the German airborne forces.

The Prime Minister has recently emphasised these points and has given definite instructions about the training in aerodrome defence which must be given to ground personnel. Air Marshal Peck is at present considering how best to implement these instructions, and, as you will be aware, held a conference on the 3rd July to discuss the whole question.

(Signed) C. PORTAL.

*NOTE.—The field state of Northolt prepared in reply to paragraph 3 of the Prime Minister's minute is not circulated.*
WAR CABINET.

6TH AUGUST, 1941.

SECRE'T.

W.P.(41) 187.

COPY NO. 29.


W.R. (41) 187.

WAR CABINET.

SITES FOR FUTURE AERODROMES.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air.

By the spring of 1943, we require for the Royal Air Force, 622 aerodromes in the United Kingdom. The number completed or under construction is 496. We therefore need another 126 and if the United States were to enter the war and send squadrons here, we should want still more.

2. The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries agrees that the Air Ministry must have sufficient land to provide the aerodromes it requires and says that the question is not how much land it should have, but which land.

3. The location of aerodromes is largely determined by operational considerations. Already we are approaching saturation point for aerodromes in many areas. Our freedom of choice is becoming more and more limited and all land which is suitable for aerodromes may have to be used for this purpose.

4. The programme for the expansion of the Royal Air Force is a phased programme and delay in any one of its parts means delay in the whole.

5. I am, therefore, bound to have regard in selecting sites to the time likely to be required to prepare them. The longer the time, the fewer the aerodromes that can be taken in hand with the labour available. Sites which require the diversion of the grid, extensive levelling and other similar work have, therefore, serious drawbacks.

6. The existing liaison procedure is actively functioning and ensures that agricultural interests are fully consulted.

7. The preliminaries already take up a good deal of precious time and I cannot afford to lose more.

8. I submit that Ministerial arbitration is unnecessary. I doubt if it is practicable. It is certainly undesirable since it would spin out the preliminaries and hinder me in discharging my obligation to provide an air force of decisive strength at the earliest possible moment.

9. Aircraft, aircrews and grain are coming from overseas; aerodromes can only be found here.

Air Ministry.

6th August, 1941.

A. H. M. S.
WAR CABINET.

Supply of Technicians to Foreign Countries.

Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service.

1. Arrangements are being made to recruit as quickly as possible the technicians for Turkey referred to in the memorandum (W.P.(41)177) by the Foreign Secretary which was considered by the War Cabinet at its 73rd meeting, and I hope soon to be able to report considerable progress. We are looking to industry to make a substantial contribution, although the Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply will, it is hoped, be able to supply some men from their industrial establishments.

2. The Foreign Secretary referred to the possibility of similar demands for technicians from Iran, and there may be other countries who may ask for such help or to whom we ought to offer it, but I must warn my colleagues that if such demands do mature in any appreciable number, I can hold out no hope of taking the men required from the industrial field. We are already seriously short of technical, managerial and supervisory staff for our own war industries not to mention the demands made upon us for the war production of India and the Dominions.

3. The only alternative source of supply is I suggest to be found in the Armed Forces, and if we are to take, as the Foreign Secretary suggests, a leaf out of the Germans' book in applying the policy of infiltration, there are obvious military advantages in making use of technicians drawn from this source.

4. If, therefore, we may expect to have to meet more demands for technicians, I suggest it would be wise to make a search in the Armed Forces for the kinds of people likely to be asked for and build up a register upon which to draw in case of need. The Foreign Office would, without specifically raising the issue in the countries concerned, no doubt be able to discover the probable requirements, both in numbers and types of technicians, of those countries to which it would be of advantage to apply the policy of infiltration on the German model.

5. I do not, of course, rule out a contribution from industry but for the reasons I have indicated it must necessarily be small.

(Intl.) E.B.

7th August, 1941.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ

(No. 101)

of the

NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION

from 12 noon July 31st, to

12 noon August 7th,

1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. In spite of a concentrated attack on a home-bound convoy, shipping losses are still below the average. Reinforcements and stores have arrived at Malta.

Home Waters.

2. On the 3rd an aircraft catapulted from H.M.S. Maplin shot down a Focke-Wulf aircraft which was shadowing a convoy 500 miles west of Land's End. H.M. Trawler Norland shot down an enemy bomber off the Suffolk coast on the 4th.

During heavy weather off the Norfolk coast on the 6th, six ships of a coastal convoy and an escorting trawler went ashore and all but one, a total of 8,757 tons, are believed to be a total loss.

The Longstone Lighthouse has been seriously damaged by two direct hits from aircraft.

Mediterranean.

3. A force of cruisers and destroyers delivered reinforcements and stores at Malta on the 2nd August. While this operation was in progress the main Gibraltar force proceeded to the westward of Sardinia. H.M. Destroyer Maori bombarded the seaplane slipway and buildings at Porto Conte, Sardinia, and H.M. Destroyer Cossack entered the roadstead of Alghero but found no shipping. Naval aircraft attacked the aerodrome.

H.M. Submarines Upholder and Utmost and the Netherlands Submarine O.21 have each sunk a large enemy merchant vessel in the Central Mediterranean. H.M. Submarines Utmost and Unique have made successful forays on railway communications in Southern Italy.

H.M. Submarine Cachalot is considerably overdue and must be presumed lost; the Italians claim to have rammed and sunk her and taken the crew prisoner.

4. During the week 9 French merchant ships (21,000 tons) have passed Gibraltar in convoy westbound and 7 (14,000 tons) eastbound.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

5. H.M.S. Hermione rammed a U-boat in the Sicilian Channel on the 2nd August.

U-Boats attacking a homebound convoy west of Ireland have been continuously counter-attacked. On the afternoon of the 3rd August H.M. Destroyer Wanderer and the Norwegian Destroyer St. Albans made a promising attack, later the same evening a U-boat surfaced in approximately the same position and was probably destroyed by H.M. Corvettes Hydrangea and Campanula. Three attacks were made by covering aircraft on the 4th, two of which may have obtained hits. On the 5th an attack by H.M. Corvette Zinnia and gunfire from the convoy probably accounted for another U-boat.

Six other attacks were made without visible result, one by surface craft off the Hebrides and five by aircraft. Of the latter, two were off Ushant and the others off the Straits of Gibraltar, West Ireland and the Naze.

Enemy Intelligence.

German.

6. The positions of the German main units have not materially altered in the past week except that Tirpitz, which had left the floating dock at Kiel, has now been seen berthed at the entrance to the Inner Dockyard Basin. It is
believed that this battleship may be ready within a month. The battlecruisers and *Prinz Eugen* now at Brest are at present all in dry dock.

Four or five destroyers and three or four submarines are still in Northern Norwegian waters, though they may have altered their stations since the recent British operations in those waters.

**Italian.**

7. The two *Littorio* class battleships and one *Cavour* are still at Taranto.

**U-boats.**

8. About twenty-five German U-boats are operating off the seaboard of Western Europe and six or seven Italians off the Straits of Gibraltar. One German U-boat is working in the Cape Verde area.

**Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.**

9. There have been eight attacks by enemy aircraft on convoys and shipping on the East Coast during the week; one ship was sunk off Blyth and others damaged.

A homeward bound convoy from Sierra Leone has been subjected to sustained U-boat and aircraft attacks to the West of Ireland, and six ships have been sunk.

In an enemy air attack on Suez on the night 3rd /4th August, one British and one Belgian tanker were torpedoed and a small Belgian ship was torpedoed and sunk.

**Protection of Seaborne Trade.**

10. During the week ending 6th August, 951 ships, including 167 Allied and 21 neutral, were convoyed. Four anti-aircraft ships, 13 armed merchant cruisers, 56 destroyers and 97 sloops, corvettes and fleet minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 2nd August were 1,177,422 tons compared with 613,475 tons in the previous week and an average of 887,937 tons for the past ten weeks. Oil imports amounted to 427,575 tons, compared with 177,247 tons during the preceding seven days. Mineral imports were 260,452 tons, of which 174,611 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Timber and pulp imports were 44,131 tons. Cereal imports were 223,477 tons. Other food imports amounted to 153,442 tons, of which 65,315 tons were sugar and molasses. Other food-stuffs included tinned and refrigerated meat, bacon and hams, 20,254 tons, cheese 5,782 tons, tea 3,078 tons, cocoa 2,852 tons, butter 1,453 tons and dried fruit 917 tons. There were also a large quantity of unspecified tinned foods. Two consignments of wine from Lisbon amounted to 590 tons; there were 283 tons of rum from the West Indies and 2,802 of tobacco. There were large quantities of war stores, aircraft and aircraft parts, lorries machinery, including 1,134 tons of machine tools.

**British Minelaying.**

11. M.T.B.s laid 8 mines off the Belgian coast. Minelaying by aircraft has been on a very small scale and confined to the Western Baltic.

**Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.**

**Home Waters.**

12. Enemy minelaying aircraft have not been very active round our coasts during the past week, and there were no casualties due to mines.

Eight magnetic mines and two acoustic mines have been swept during the week, including one magnetic swept at Tobruk. The totals now are: magnetic 1,316, acoustic 914, contact mines 1,021.
Foreign Stations.

13. The Suez Canal has been raided twice during the past week, but was closed to traffic only temporarily.

The report of minesweeping in Alexandria for the three months ending the 31st July shows that 63 mines were accounted for, 25 of which fell on land. There were 14 minelaying raids during this period. Only one shipping casualty occurred.

Enemy Merchant Shipping.

14. The Frankfurt (5,522 tons), which sailed from Rio de Janeiro on the 27th June, was intercepted by H.M.S. Carina (Ocean boarding vessel) about 540 miles south-south-west of the Azores on the 4th August. She was scuttled and sank. Twenty-six of the crew were taken prisoner; twenty are missing.

It has been reported that on the 25th July the following ships were at Genoa: the Roma (30,631 tons) in dry dock, the Augustus (30,418 tons) alongside, and the Virgilio (6,750 tons) and a ship thought to be the Oceania (19,507 tons), both of which were undergoing repairs for bomb damage.

The Capo Arma (3,175 tons) sailed from Istanbul for the Aegean on the 2nd August, and on the 7th August Reuter quoted a report that she had been sunk by a British submarine in the Aegean. This has not yet been confirmed.

The sinking of the Ernani (4,113 tons) has been confirmed. The Spanish press states that she was sunk by a British submarine, and the Greek Legation in Madrid has confirmed her loss.

Intelligence.

Russian.

15. The following claims have been made as to enemy losses in northern waters:

On the 15th July a transport (4,000 tons) was torpedoed by submarine off Honningsvag (North Norway). In addition a minesweeper was sunk by a submarine to the westward of North Cape (Norway), and an enemy submarine was sunk by a destroyer in the northern approaches to the White Sea.

Far Eastern.

16. The Japanese Combined Fleet was last reported in the Van Diemen Straits (under the southernmost point of Japan) on the 16th July. It is believed to be based on Ariake Bay in the south-east of Kyushu. The naval forces now in Indo-Chinese waters are the normal South China Fleet with an additional Destroyer Flotilla and the Local Defence Flotilla from Bako, Pescadores. The South China Fleet consists of 1—8-inch cruiser, Ashigara, 2 small 5-inch cruisers and 2 Flotillas of Destroyers.

MILITARY SITUATION.

(An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.)

Russo-German Campaign.

17. Although the Germans still hold the initiative and have made some progress, notably in the Ukraine sector and to a lesser extent in their thrust towards Leningrad, the Russians are resisting strongly and show no signs of collapse.

Finland.

18. In the Lake Ladoga area the threat to the Murmansk railway in the direction of Petrozavodsk southwards has made some headway against strong opposition.
Baltic Front.
19. No advance seems to have been made in the Luga area, which was reached about a fortnight ago, but the German line north-east of Lake Peipus has been advanced to within some 50 miles of Leningrad. It is probable that Russian troops in Northern Estonia will retire eastwards to avoid being cut off, leaving a garrison to hold Tallinn.
20. German attacks eastwards across the main Leningrad–Nevel railway have made progress, and two considerable salients have been formed east of Dno and Opochka respectively. The German official news agency claims the capture of Kholm.

White Russia.
21. Heavy fighting has continued in the Smolensk area, where strong Russian counter-attacks against the apex of the salient have made German progress extremely slow. The Germans are still between 180 and 200 miles from Moscow. Their main effort now seems to have been transferred from this sector to the Ukraine.

Ukraine.
22. After their first thrust on Kiev had proved unsuccessful, the Germans launched an attack south-eastwards between the Dnieper and the Dniester. They have advanced in this direction beyond Uman, although pockets of Russian resistance doubtless exist behind the advanced German elements.
23. A serious threat is developing to the Kiev–Odessa railway, and the Russians are withdrawing eastwards from the lower reaches of the Dniester to avoid being cut off by the drive from the north-west.

Casualties.
24. A conservative estimate of German casualties up to the 1st August, based on information from various sources, is 750,000.

Reactions in Germany.
25. There is abundant evidence to show that the German High Command has been surprised and considerably troubled by the degree of Russian resistance. It may be significant of German expectations with regard to the duration of the Russian campaign that the opening of the autumn fair at Konigsberg has been postponed from the 17th August to the 12th October. In any case, the German time-table for the campaign has certainly been upset.

Operations.
Libya—Tobruk.
26. Further successful patrolling has been carried out by our troops. On the 28th and the 29th July, a strong fighting patrol attacked a large party of Italians, causing them to disperse and enabling our forces to occupy their position.

Abyssinia.
27. An attack on our troops on the 2nd August in the Wolchefit area was repulsed and our counter-attack drove the enemy from high ground, killing 26 Italians and taking 13 prisoners. Our casualties were slight.

Intelligence.
Spain.
28. There appears to be some increase of military activity in Southern Spain, Spanish Morocco and the Canaries. Four heavy guns have recently been shipped to Ceuta (Spanish Morocco) and changes are being made in the dispositions of Coast Defence batteries. There is evidence that petrol dumps are

[22795]
being assembled at various points in Spanish Morocco pending the completion of underground stores, and that stocks of essential foodstuffs are being accumulated.

29. It is also reported that considerable quantities of ammunition, harbour defence gear and other war material are being shipped from the Balearic Islands to the mainland. Spanish Morocco and the Canaries.

Yugoslavia.

30. Guerilla activity in Yugoslavia is increasing and many reports have been received lately of attacks on sentries and small garrisons, of acts of sabotage and of raids from the hills. Outbreaks have been most frequent in Montenegro, where the Italian garrison has had to summon reinforcements.

31. There are at present some thirteen Italian divisions in Montenegro, Croatia and the puppet province of Ljubljana, one German division centred in Belgrade, and Hungarian troops in the Banat. These troops were thought adequate to maintain order, but such is the spirit of the Montenegrans and the Serbs that it is possible that the Italian garrison will have to be reinforced.

Bulgaria.

32. There is no news of any unusual military activity, though the army remains fully mobilized. There are probably not more than seven or eight divisions on the Turkish frontier. Reports suggest that, so far from adding to this concentration, recent moves have tended to be towards the Black Sea coastal area rather than the Turkish land frontier.

Far East.

33. During the last week, whilst the Japanese army has been occupying sea and air bases of Southern Indo-China, military preparations of a considerable scale have been taking place in Manchukuo. It has been reported that 500,000 reservists have recently been called up in Japan and that the majority of these have been sent to Korea and Manchukuo. It is also reported that a further 200,000 men of older category are in process of being called up for lines of communications duties.

34. The present distribution of Japanese Divisions is believed to be as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo and North Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central China</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South China and Hainan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-China</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

35. The Royal Air Force continued its attacks on industrial and communication targets in Germany and in Occupied Territory, in spite of unfavourable weather. Successful attacks were also made on shipping in Home Waters and in the Mediterranean.

Enemy activity over this country was on a small scale.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

36. Bomber Command despatched 103 sorties, compared with 206 last week, and dropped 19 tons of H.E. bombs by day. Fighter Command flew sorties involving 1,352 aircraft.
37. On the 2nd August, in good weather, a Fortress bomber attacked Kiel from a height of 32,500 feet, dropping four 1,100 lb. bombs on the southern end of the town, where the main railway line enters the dock area. Another Fortress attacked Borkum, but results could not be observed because of cloud. On the same day three Blenheimls destroyed a gun emplacement on Ameland.

38. Aircraft of Fighter Command carried out many offensive operations against objectives in Northern France. Whirlwinds, operating in pairs and escorted by Spitfires, scored hits on aircraft on the ground at Querqueville and Maupertus aerodromes, near Cherbourg, on oil tanks, barrack huts, troops and motor transport near the aerodromes, and on wireless stations at Querqueville and Cap de la Hague.

39. Spitfires and Hurricanes also attacked targets in Northern France. Goods trains near Boulogne, St. Omer, Le Treport and Abbeville, factories at St. Omer and near Berek, military barracks at Le Crotou and Abbeville, troop formations near Hazebrouck, and aircraft on the ground at Berek and Samer were all raked with machine gun and cannon fire.

40. Attacks on enemy shipping are reported under Coastal Operations.

41. Enemy defensive fighter patrols over the French Coast operated on a small scale only.

Night.

42. Bomber Command despatched 736 sorties by night, as compared with 454 in the previous week. Operations were carried out on four nights only, the programmes for the remaining three being cancelled because of unfavourable weather. The principal targets were the industrial and railway centres of Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfort, Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen, the shipyards at Kiel and the docks at Calais and Cherbourg. Over 700 tons of H.E. bombs, including several of the heaviest type, and 70,000 incendiaries were dropped on these and other enemy targets.

43. Berlin was attacked on the night 2nd/3rd August by thirty-six aircraft, including eight Halifaxes and three Stirlings. Visibility was poor because of ground haze, but four 4,000-lb. bombs were seen to burst, two near the Air Ministry, causing terrific explosions followed by large fires. Other bombs fell near the Friedrichstrasse and Tempelhof railway stations and in the Steglitz area.

44. Frankfort was bombed on three nights of the week by a total of 121 aircraft, including eight Halifaxes and three Stirlings. Visibility was poor because of ground haze, but several fires were seen, including a very large one near the main railway station. At Mannheim, which was bombed on two nights, a 4,000-lb. bomb was seen to burst between the main railway station and the river, causing a huge explosion followed by a blinding flash and a shower of sparks. Other big explosions were seen at the southern end of the Chemical works at Ludwigshafen, on the opposite bank of the river, and in the dock area. At Karlsruhe, which was also attacked on two nights, several bombs, including two of the largest type, fell in the town and in the railway centre; many large fires were started, two of enormous size.

45. At Hamburg, bombs fell on the railway centre and in the dock area; at Kiel bursts were observed in the shipyards and on warehouses, and at Hanover, after two 4,000-lb. bombs had fallen on the main railway station, all searchlight and A.A. activity over a wide area ceased for five minutes. The docks at Calais and Cherbourg were also successfully attacked, bombs falling on dock buildings at the former and on the quays of the tidal and No. 6 Basins at the latter.

46. The night defensive fighters of the enemy operated on a reduced scale during the week.

United Kingdom.

47. Fighter Command flew 940 patrols, involving 2,230 sorties, by day, and 216 patrols, involving 522 sorties, by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. The total sorties, which include the operations mentioned in paragraphs 36, 38, 39, 50 and 53, were somewhat fewer than those of last week.
48. Enemy activity remained at a low level, and during daylight only 10 aircraft were plotted overland. The remainder, totalling about 150, were engaged in weather and shipping reconnaissance flights round the coast. Our fighters destroyed three of the latter and damaged a fourth.

49. At night shipping, and the coastal districts were the principal objectives, and though some bombs were dropped inland no attacks developed against any particular target. The total enemy effort at night was approximately 150 aircraft of which 65 were night fighters which operated over our bomber aerodromes, but met with no success. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed at night during the week.

Coastal Operations.

50. Coastal Command flew 250 patrols (362 sorties) and provided escorts for 79 convoys (257 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 667 (1,385 sorties).

51. In spite of unfavourable weather on most days of the week, aircraft of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands made several successful attacks on enemy shipping. On the 1st August, three Blenheims attacked two merchant vessels of 1,500 and 500 tons off the Belgian Coast. Bombs straddled both ships, and the larger was seen to be burning and in a sinking condition. On the 2nd, three Blenheims sank a patrol vessel of 2,000 tons west of Den Helder and a Beaufort torpedoed a laden tanker of 2,000 tons off Ostend. The vessel burst into flames and three minutes later it was seen to be sinking rapidly.

52. On the 5th, three Blenheims, in a low level attack, registered two hits on a medium-sized merchant vessel off the Hook of Holland. Three other Blenheims scored hits on three reporting vessels north of Borkum. All three vessels were destroyed. On the following day, a Beaufort scored hits on the bow and stern of a large supply ship in the port of Nantes, and Blenheims bombed a small convoy, escorted by a destroyer, off the coast of Holland. After the attack one of the ships was seen to be down by the stern with smoke pouring from it. On the night 6th/7th, a Beaufort torpedoed a medium-sized merchant vessel off the Alsboen Light.

53. Aircraft of Fighter Command were also active against shipping off the French Coast. Hurricanes attacked "R" Boats, a naval escort vessel, and several small merchant vessels, motor launches and mine sweepers, most of which were hit. Attacks were also made by Whirlwinds on other "E" Boats, one of which was left in a sinking condition, and on two tankers off Cherbourg, from one of which smoke was issuing when it was last seen.

54. Ten aircraft laid mines in Kiel Harbour, Langeland Belt, Little Belt and Flensburg Fiord.

55. No minelaying by enemy aircraft was reported during the week. Eight enemy attacks were made on shipping off the East Coast and are referred to in the Naval Section.

Central Mediterranean.

56. Blenheims and Beaufighters from Malta continued their offensive against enemy shipping and aerodromes. A ship of about 8,000 tons in Tripoli (L) harbour received a hit which was followed by a violent explosion, and a ship of about 5,000 tons alongside was set on fire. During this attack two hits were made on a building believed to be Air Headquarters. Two ships in Lampedusa harbour were also hit, and a schooner of about 800 tons was sunk off Misurata. A convoy consisting of 6 merchant ships and 6 destroyers was attacked off Lampedusa by 7 Naval Swordfish from Malta. Two ships (8,000 and 6,000 tons) were sunk and, on the following morning, 8 Blenheims hit two similar ships, probably sinking one and severely damaging the other. It is possible that a destroyer was also damaged.
57. Beaufighters attacked the aerodromes at Borizzo, Sicily, and Reggio Calabria, Southern Italy, destroying two bombers and about ten fighters, and damaging many others. Naval Swordfish obtained ten direct hits on the submarine base at Augusta, Sicily, on the night 5th/6th. Large fires were caused on the submarine jetty. Our reconnaissance aircraft have maintained a constant watch on enemy shipping and aerodromes, and in the course of their patrols have bombed Messina, where a cruiser was narrowly missed, and machine-gunned enemy bombers at Zuara, destroying one and severely damaging at least three others.

58. The enemy have shown no inclination to approach Malta by day, but four night attacks were made, though no serious damage resulted. On the night 5th/6th August three of the ten raiders were destroyed by Hurricanes, and on the following night, when three aircraft approached the Island, one of them was shot down.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

59. During the week under review, our bombers made two successful daylight raids. On the 1st August, nine Blenheims, escorted by Hurricanes, attacked a concentration of enemy M.T. vehicles at Sidi Omar and inflicted severe damage and, on the 3rd, twenty-one Marylands bombed enemy gun positions in the Tobruk area, while our fighters carried out a covering sweep over enemy forward aerodromes. In neither of these operations did we suffer any casualties. Our fighters maintained patrols over our coastal shipping and, on the 2nd, broke up a heavy enemy dive bomb attack on a convoy off the Libyan coast, destroying at least three Ju.88s and one or more Me.109s, with the loss of three Hurricanes.

60. Heavy night attacks have been maintained by Wellingtons against the harbours of Benghazi and Derna and many fires and heavy explosions were observed. Other targets successfully attacked at night by Wellingtons, Blenheims and Marylands include repair shops at Derna and Bardia, and enemy landing grounds at Gazala, Martuba and El Tmimi. Shipping off Apollonia was also attacked and two merchant ships probably hit. Mines were also laid off Benghazi. From a total of 100 night sorties our losses were one Wellington and one Maryland.

61. The enemy have made several daylight attacks on Tobruk, on one occasion damaging a jetty and an oil refuelling line. Three night raids were made on Port Said and the Suez Canal area by formations of ten, twenty and thirty bombers respectively, some of which, at least, operated from the Piraeus. No service property was seriously damaged ashore. Casualties at Ismailia included 96 civilians and 4 service personnel killed and, at Suez, a fire broke out at an oil storage cistern but was brought under control.

East Africa.

62. Bombing and machine-gun attacks were maintained against enemy positions at Wolchefit and Debarech in the Gondar area, and Gondar itself was bombed on five occasions. Aircraft of the South African and Free French Air Forces assisted the Royal Air Force in these operations. A few Italian fighters were encountered, one of which was damaged by one of our reconnaissance aircraft.

Ægean.

63. After a photographic reconnaissance of Crete, Melos and the Piraeus on the 1st August, seven Wellingtons bombed the aerodromes at Heraklion and Maleme, in Crete, on the following night, and explosions and fires which broke out in the dispersal areas point to destruction of aircraft and stores. On the night 4th/5th August, an enemy aircraft bombed the Nicosia district of Cyprus without causing damage or casualties.
Russia.

64. There is again little detailed information of the air situation on the Russian battlefront. Since the German advance into Estonia, raids on Helsinki and Southern Finland have decreased considerably, and the Russian bomber effort in that sector appears to have been concentrated against troops between Narva and Lake Peipus. Elsewhere, the Russian Air Force is continuing its co-operation with the army. There have been reports of dive-bombing attacks by Russian fighters carrying single bombs.

65. There have been no developments of importance in the Russian campaign during the past week in operations by the German Air Force, except such as may have accompanied the drives by the army in the direction of Kiev and Odessa. The German effort against Moscow has shown a marked decline.

66. There has been a reinforcement by some German long-range bombers to the extreme north of Norway and Finland. This may be connected with heavier attacks on the Russians in the Murmansk area and with the recent British naval operations in the Arctic Ocean. The German Air Force is making use of the Finnish aerodromes at Petsamo, Rovaniemi and Helsinki.

67. While the exact measure of assistance given to Germany by the combined air forces of those countries participating in the Russian campaign remains obscure, there is every reason to suppose that it is very slight. Hungarian and Roumanian aircraft, however, have been active in their respective sectors of the front. On the 16th July, it was announced in the Italian press that a reconnaissance regiment of the Croatian Air Force (a body which seems to have been formed from remnants of the Jugoslav Air Force) had left Zagreb for Germany. In Spain unexpected obstacles appear to have arisen, for of the 120 fighter pilots and 380 ground personnel who were to have left Madrid for Germany on the 24th July, only 12 pilots and 50 mechanics ultimately left the railway station. The Danes are finding difficulty in providing their quota of volunteers.

Air Intelligence.

German Air Force.

68. K.G. 40 (the Condor Unit), which to-day has an establishment of 27 F.W. 200s. and 9 He. 111s., is being expanded to a strength of 3 Gruppen (90 aircraft), probably with the object of undertaking general anti-shipping activities. The expansion of this Unit is at the expense wholly or in part of another long-range bomber unit. The equipment of the new Gruppen is not known, but it is thought likely that they will be equipped at least in part with a new type, possibly the Do. 217, a twin-engined bomber of which reliable details are lacking.

French Air Force.

69. Many of the units which operated in Syria have now returned to their bases in North Africa and unoccupied France, bringing the estimated first-line strength of the French Air Force in France and French North and West Africa to a total of 837 aircraft.

With the conclusion of operations in Syria it is possible for the first time to form some impression of the probable operational strength of the French Air Force in other theatres. A better developed ground organisation in North Africa and a less well developed ground organisation in West Africa make it likely that the resistance offered to an attack in the one area would be greater and in the other smaller than in the Levant. Certain features of the Syrian campaign are, none the less, liable to recur in future French defensive operations.

Indo-China.

70. An official Japanese statement made in Saigon on the 4th August claimed that the occupation of the ceded bases had been completed. Although up to the 31st July only 20 fighters and 40 bombers, the latter mostly heavy bombers, had been reported on these bases, sufficient aircraft are available in South China to make full use of the available accommodation.
As it now appears clear that the Tan Son Nhut aerodrome at Saigon is also to be granted to the Japanese, the bases so far mentioned will provide room for some 20 squadrons, say, 250 aircraft of all types. There are, however, sufficient additional aerodromes in South Indo-China capable of accommodating a further 100 aircraft, which the Japanese would have no difficulty in acquiring.

China.

71. Starting on the 27th July the Japanese carried out intensive air action, lasting four days, over the province of Szechuan, including Chungking, where, however, the weight of attack was not large. These raids were carried out by Naval heavy bomber squadrons operating from Hankow, one of which was shot down by Chinese fighters.

Whilst the intensification of bombing activity on these back areas suggests that the Japanese may, despite previous failures, still cherish the hope of crushing Chinese resistance by this means, there is the possibility that these raids, especially the heavy one on Chengtu (Szechuan Province) on the 29th July, may have been an effort to locate and damage some of the Curtiss Tomahawk fighters recently arrived from America.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

72. Very few bombs were dropped by day, but in the afternoon of the 1st August the engine room and turret of Longstone Lighthouse (the Farne Islands) were seriously damaged, and on the 3rd August considerable damage was done to shops and house property in the centre of Broadstairs. The main fire station suffered a direct hit, but there was only one fatal casualty.

Five shells fell in Dover on the 6th August causing a few slight casualties.

By Night.

73. Only minor bombing has occurred chiefly along the north-east, east and Cornish coasts, and in some of the Eastern Counties. Four aerodromes were also bombed without effect. The most serious incident was at Aberdeen on the night of the 5th/6th August, when buildings and motor vehicles in the Corporation garages were damaged, and a UXB interfered with the delivery of meat and fish from cold storage in the harbour area.

Casualties.

74. Casualties for the week ending 0600 on the 6th August were 11 killed and 4 seriously wounded. No casualties occurred in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III

will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the Enemy up to 5th August, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Together</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>289,000</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>967,000</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1,260,000</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>510</td>
<td>2,245,000</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 58 ships of 106,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 58 ships, totalling 320,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported during the period under review:

6th August.—M/S Trawler Marjorie M. Hastie grounded at the entrance to Hartlepool and capsized.
A/S Trawler Agate grounded off the Haisborough and may be a total loss.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: killed 0, prisoners 6.
Ratings: killed 17, missing 14, wounded 3.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 31st July, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 7th August, 1941.

Metropolitan Area.

Royal Air Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of fighter pilots "known to be safe"—1.

German.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.
Of the above totals, no aircraft were destroyed by A.A. fire.

Middle East.

Royal Air Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

German.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above totals, no aircraft were destroyed by A.A. fire.

Italian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, 18 Italian aircraft were destroyed and 14 damaged on the ground.
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

Germany.

Mannheim.—The raid on the night of the 21st/22nd July was a complete surprise, and the sirens sounded after the attack had begun. On the afternoon of the 22nd fires were still burning in the Rhine harbour area and in Ludwigshafen.

Munchen Gladbach.—The works of the “Schlaforst” (makers of textile machinery) have been very severely damaged. There were casualties among firemen engaged in extinguishing a fire in the adjoining building.

France.

Brest.—When the Scharnhorst returned to Brest she had a heavy list. As preparations for pumping operations on her arrival had been made it seems that the report that she was hit by bombs whilst in La Pallice was probably correct. Photographs have shown this battle cruiser to be in a dry dock at Brest, and judging from the length of time she has been there, it may well be that she has suffered considerable damage. Subsequent to the above information a report was received that she was holed near the starboard propeller shaft, and that the hole was nearly a yard across. She was also said to have been hit near the bridge, and it is likely she will be out of action for six weeks at least. This damage would certainly account for the previous reports that she was down at the stern and that pumping assistance would be necessary on her return to Brest. It is probable that the hole mentioned was the result of the dusk attack on the 23rd July at La Pallice when the crew of a Stirling estimated a hit on the stern with a 2,000 lb. A.P. bomb.

Photographs taken on the 24th July show that work is now proceeding on the Gneisenau. Superstructure, which was in position on the 29th June, has been removed and it is considered that this battle cruiser is undergoing extensive repairs to her engines which have been previously reported to have been damaged. The Germans are said to believe that the Gneisenau will be in service again in October. The Prinz Eugen is reported to have been damaged by a third bomb on the night of the 1st/2nd July, the bomb falling between the hull and the quayside, opposite the bridge, which was damaged.

On the 24th July a submarine under repair was hit and seriously damaged and a small tanker was sunk.

La Pallice.—In the raid on the night of the 10th/11th May, oil tanks at the depot of the Compagnie Industrielle were damaged and dislocation caused by the destruction of the main points at the railway siding nearby.

Le Trait.—One of the submarines under construction has been damaged beyond repair, and work must start afresh.

Lille.—In the attack on the steel works at Fives, near Lille, the record office was destroyed, and the workshop, the boiler-house and administrative offices were hit.
AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:
6th July
20th July
3rd Aug...

Pockets of Soviet resistance
Main thrusts of Axis Forces...

Note: it is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The broken lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R. - showing approximate advances

LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:
- 6th July
- 20th July
- 3rd Aug.

Pockets of Soviet resistance
Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The broken lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:
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Pockets of Soviet resistance
Main thrusts of Axis Forces

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Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:

- 6th July
- 20th July
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Pockets of Soviet resistance

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The broken lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
SECRET.
W.P. (41) 190.
August 11, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

GENERAL WEGAND'S POSITION.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I CIRCULATE to my colleagues, for their information, a copy of a letter which I have received from the United States Ambassador giving further information about the position of General Weygand vis-à-vis the Vichy Government and Admiral Darlan in particular.

A. E.

Foreign Office, August 11, 1941.

ANNEX.

United States Ambassador to Mr. Eden.

(Confidential.)

Embassy of the United States of America,

London, August 8, 1941.

IN accordance with your desire, I enquired of the Department of State in regard to the newspaper reports in London that Pétain had appointed Admiral Darlan to control French North Africa and that General Weygand would report to Admiral Darlan.

A reply has come saying that information which has reached the Department of State is that General Weygand, as Governor-General of Algiers, would normally report to the Minister of the Interior, while, as High Commissioner of French North Africa, he reports to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was announced, however, that henceforth General Weygand would report only to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Darlan, in order that his reports concerning these areas should go to the same Ministry.

Sincerely,

JOHN S. WINANT.
ITalian Morale.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I circulate to my colleagues a memorandum on the state of Italian morale as revealed by recent reports received in this Department. The conclusion to be drawn from this memorandum is that apathy and war-weariness are the salient characteristics of the prevailing mood in Italy. Chances of knocking Italy out of the war (i.e., forcing her to a separate peace) can now be discounted, since the Germans would certainly forestall any such move in Italy by converting the present moral occupation into a physical occupation of the country. But the more depressed and restless the Italians become, the less effective is the Fascist Government's contribution to the German effort, and the greater do Germany's policing responsibilities in Italy become.

The moral of this is that, even though we cannot now hope to knock Italy out, we should not relax efforts to hit metropolitan Italy by air and from the sea whenever opportunity offers. Each blow against Italy is a blow against Germany.

A. E.

Foreign Office, August 11, 1941.

(Most Secret.)

ITALIAN MORALE.

Background.

(from the capitulation of the Duke of Aosta to the armistice in Syria.)

1. This period has afforded little real satisfaction to the Italian people and fighting forces. The glamour of the "Axis" victories in Libya, Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete was already wearing off, while the German stranglehold on the whole life of the nation remained, and produced at the best acquiescence, in the hope of sharing in the final German victory which is still generally believed in. The "crusade against communism," otherwise Hitler's unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, is arousing considerable and no doubt genuine enthusiasm in Italy, particularly among the upper and middle classes and also among the devout generally. But at the same time, we have had indications of the alarm caused by the risks and uncertainties of so colossal an undertaking, by the fact that the longed-for end of the war seems in consequence more remote than ever, and by Germany's callous abandonment of Italy to the tender mercies of our navy and air force in the Mediterranean.
The Civilian Population.

2. None of the reports received indicates any marked elevation of popular morale in consequence of the last of the series of "Axis" victories in the Mediterranean, the occupation of Crete, though the Italians made out that they had played an important part in the operations. A Swiss report suggests that the Italian people "contemplate the rude vicissitudes of the Italian struggle with a stoicism proportionate to the distance at which they are from the scene of war." The report adds that "Italian public opinion reveals itself more spontaneously in the provinces than in the capital, but even here, in spite of spies, it is very easy to get on to discussion and criticism." From an excellent American source we learn that, while aristocratic and high military circles outside the Fascist Party secretly hope that Britain will win, the majority of the population believe that Germany has already won the war for them and look forward to peace even under German domination; all Italians, according to the same source, are much ashamed of the poor showing their army put up in Greece and Libya, of the failure of their air force, and of the reluctance of their fleet to fight a battle; and a depressing effect is produced on all sides by the thought of the necessity for a second conquest of Abyssinia immediately after the victorious peace is signed. The Rome correspondent of a Scandinavian paper, after painting a bright picture of Italian morale (silent everyday heroism, firm resolve to hold out, no defeatism, &c.), goes on to say that there are nevertheless two shadows. One is the fate of Abyssinia. Even if the collapse of Italy's young Empire is hoped to be temporary, it has made a painful impression even on the average citizen; and the entry of the Negus into Addis Ababa under the aegis of the British was bitterly resented and regarded as an intentional humiliation. The second great shadow is the United States of America. The people are sceptical, says the correspondent, about the reassuring attempts of certain newspapers to show that America's entry into the war cannot snatch victory from Italy's and Germany's grasp. Great respect is felt for America's riches and power, and there is no illusion regarding the consequences of her placing her mighty resources on Britain's side of the scale. Finally, that even since the "Axis" victories all is not well with Italian morale is clearly shown by an article in the Messaggero, in which the following sentences occur: "The call for discipline must not be undermined. Everyone must face up to the limitations of the hour. Every speech and every gesture which might disaffect the public spirit is criminal. There must be no speaking against the governing classes, nor spreading of false news, nor criticism of any sort." A Swiss banker who was in Italy in mid-June went so far as to say that his Fascist friends were more depressed than they were last November, notwithstanding the recent military successes, and the desire for peace seemed universal.

The Army.

3. A good Italian source with Vatican connexions has stated that the regular army as a whole is opposed to the doctrines and leaders of the régime, and that the treatment of Badoglio by Mussolini was largely responsible for the existing tension. No movement of revolt is, however, to be expected from the army, for, apart from the fact of the German occupation, (1) it is contrary to Italian military tradition to take part in political movements, and (2) the Fascist régime has dissipated the strength and unity of the army by the creation of "political" generals, who act as policemen in the ranks. The army is incensed against the spectacular figure of General Cavallero, "a thoroughly experienced robber," who is in favour with the régime because of his daughter's relations with Ciano.

Other reports go to show that the morale of the army at home is very poor on the whole, and that there is a shortage of uniforms and equipment. Officers try to cheer the men with talk of a big effort to end the war before the winter. Food shortage, aggravated by the occupation of Greece, is now affecting the army also.

The Navy.

4. The only report received which deals with the Navy says it has lost all its former prestige. German officers are now on every ship from destroyers upwards. Most of them are ex-Austrians who speak Italian. The submarine service is the best part of the Navy.
The Air Force.

5. A reliable informant describes the Italian Air Force as being in a "fairly poor state," and adds that it is not unusual for pilots to ask to be employed on ground duties on the excuse of nervous breakdown which is really seldom genuine.

Mussolini and the Regime.

6. According to the excellent American source already quoted, Mussolini had lost much prestige at the end of the first year of the Anglo-Italian war; the short war he had promised still dragged on, and he was being blamed on all sides for accepting Croatia in return for the surrender of Italian claims to Corseca, Nice, &c.

The latest Fascist chief to fall from grace is Starace, a former secretary of the Fascist party, who, to quote a Rome message, "is no longer a member of the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations." At the same time he "ceased to occupy the post of Chief of Staff of the Fascist Militia." He has been succeeded in each capacity by Lieutenant-General Enzo Galbiati. Nothing is known for certain of the reasons for Starace's dismissal, but the popular version is that he had a violent quarrel with General Guzzoni about the situation in Albania; Mussolini liquidated them both, whereupon Starace appealed to the King, as a result of which Mussolini sent him to "confino." Sebastiani, the Duce's private secretary, recently resigned "for private reasons," and was somewhat frigidly thanked by his chief.

A young American who had been studying in Milan stated that he had been greatly impressed by the fact that everyone he knew talked politics frequently and openly, and did not hesitate to criticise bitterly both the Government, and the Fascist regime. He had not a single friend who had any Fascist sympathies, and was frightened to eat in certain restaurants, such was the open nature of the attacks heard. He was of opinion that 99 per cent. of the Milanese were anti-Fascist and anti-war. A Swiss visitor to Milan said the Government was highly unpopular and Ciano cordially hated. A French Canadian priest on his way back from Rome expressed the belief that fascism would disappear, as it had little support in Italy.

The Royal Family.

7. An Italian who recently left Italy, and who is stated to be anti-Fascist in sentiment but objective, expressed himself in the following sense: It would be a serious mistake to count on any eventual liberating action on the part of the House of Savoy. The Royal Family is in fact indissolubly bound up with the fate of fascism. The Italian people are well aware of this and make no secret of their lack of confidence in the reigning House. Neither the King nor the Crown Prince will take any action against the Fascist régime. The Crown Prince is generally regarded as a man of neither moral nor intellectual worth. The Royal Family has never ceased to show its solidarity with the régime, and certain leanings on the part of the Crown Prince definitely ceased at the time of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.

Feeling towards the Germans.

8. The young American quoted above said that he had heard a lot of anti-German feelings expressed; a great many Milanese whom he knew had been under "German" (i.e., Austrian) rule during the last war, and objected to the Germans as allies. Another American informant said that the feeling between the Italian and German armed forces was very bad. The German Headquarters had planned all Axis activities in connexion with the North African and Cretan campaigns without consulting the Italian Ministry of War. This caused dissatisfaction, as did the use of Italian troops in advance contact in North Africa and the resulting disproportionate Italian casualties. Italian prisoners stated that General Rommel had had high Italian officers shot, and had been given complete control by Mussolini; while disagreement between Germans and Italians was said to exist from commanders downwards. A traveller has declared that the coolness between German and Italian soldiers in Occupied France was obvious to all; Italian and German soldiers never fraternised, and their officers were never seen together. The German "Hausfrau" is now a familiar and unpopular sight in Rome, where large numbers of them are to be seen resolutely buying up
food and clothing. Finally, according to a Berlin source, there is bad blood between German and Italian labourers in Germany. Incidentally, the latter are said to arrive at the Italian frontier stations under armed German escort.

Feeling towards Great Britain.

9. The American student from Milan, already quoted more than once, reported that he had never heard any expression of criticism or dislike of Great Britain. A Swiss, just returned from a visit to Milan, said there was practically no feeling against England in Northern Italy. There is evidence that propaganda against Great Britain on the ground that she is supporting the Soviet Union is having some effect, "but not nearly so much as might have been expected, as the people long to be liberated from the Germans." An American source in Rome states: "Everyone we know listens to the English radio, and in a little country town everyone, including the police and carabinieri, listens eagerly to it in Italian every afternoon, gathered together in a crowd in the street by the open door of the room where the radio is." In pro-British circles in Rome it was being said, according to a Polish source, that British propaganda, promising that a British victory would not be disastrous for Italy, should be prepared against the proper time, which had not, however, yet come.

The Food Situation.

10. From the numerous reports received we learn that rations have seriously deteriorated in quantity and in quality, and that the cost of food keeps rising. Butter is unobtainable, even in the best hotels, and pork is very scarce, 1,000 pigs weekly being exported to Germany. Rice and macaroni are reserved exclusively for Italian consumption, yet the quotas are far below normal. The rich can satisfy all their needs when stocks are available, and it is thought that unless this can be stopped conditions will be intolerable next winter. For the present real hunger is only felt in some hill villages, and is due to bad distribution. There is a serious shortage of fats and vegetable oils, causing great discontent; and, in the larger towns, a complete lack of many food-stuffs. Meat is allowed only one day a week. Shortage of bread led to the breaking of bakers' windows in Milan. At the same time, we are told that money is plentiful and that restaurants and theatres are constantly crowded.

That the food situation must indeed be serious is clear from Mussolini's speech on the first anniversary of Italy's entry into the war. He told his Italian hearers, what they certainly already knew, that with the continuation of the war the spiritual and material tension of the people was increasing and life was becoming harder for them; the recent critical period in the food situation had been due to the exhaustion of the country's resources and to the increase of population consequent on the acquisition of the new territories; these food problems would, however, be solved, and the war profiteers would be punished severely.

Conclusion.

11. Italian morale has undergone no marked change during the period under review. It is neither very bad nor very good, much less good than might have been expected as a result of the long succession of "Axis" victories, the acquisition of Slovenia and Dalmatia, the setting up of Croatia under an Italian king, the occupation of most of Greece, and the opportunity given by the German attack on the Soviet Union to indulge in the emotions of an anti-Communist crusade. It is clear that none of these things has been able to dissipate the depression caused by the continuance of the war, with its increasing hardships and bereavements, the reinforced tyranny of the party agents, the unremitting strangle-hold of the occupying Germans, and the lurking fear of what the future may hold in store, whether or not the Axis wins the final victory.

Foreign Office, July 18, 1941.
I THINK the War Cabinet ought to be aware of the facts and considerations relating to the control of the border between Northern Ireland and Eire, and I submit this memorandum for information:—

1. The land frontier is about 180 miles long and has been drawn without any regard to strategical considerations or the question of the control of traffic. It is crossed by a large number of roads, and in some places it goes through farms and villages, so that persons resident near the border cross it in the course of their work, for purposes of shopping, and so on. The close business and social relations and family connection between people living in Northern Ireland and people living in Eire results in substantial traffic across the border by foot passengers, vehicular traffic and the railways. There is no possibility of putting a completely effective control on the border by means of any physical obstacles or by closely spaced patrols.

2. Under Customs Regulations, merchandise may cross the border only by approved roads during specified hours or by rail. Persons not carrying merchandise and farmers carrying their own produce may cross the border at any point and at any time. There are 16 approved roads and 10 railway crossings. The term "approved roads" are roads approved for the carriage of merchandise. There are customs posts on each side of the border. The specified hours for merchandise traffic by these roads are from 9 A.M. to 5 P.M. on ordinary weekdays, during which hours customs officers are in attendance at the posts. To deter smuggling by unapproved routes and also by approved roads outside the hours of customs attendance and on Sundays and public holidays, the customs rely on 100 or so R.U.C. officers who patrol the border. There are censorship officers at the more important customs posts and railway crossings while customs officers are in attendance.

3. By an order of the Northern Ireland Government under their own Special Powers Act it is provided that every person who had entered Northern Ireland after the 15th July shall, if so required by a Police Officer, satisfy the Police Authorities that his presence in Northern Ireland is not for any purpose detrimental for the preservation of peace and maintenance of order, and that every person of 14 years of age and upwards must have in his possession an approved document of identity. As regards these documents of identity, there are frequent checks on passengers on trains crossing the border and occasional checks on persons entering by road.

4. All telegrams and nearly 10 per cent. of the letters passing between Northern Ireland and Eire are secretly examined and between 15 and 20 per cent. of the cross telephone calls are monitored. The letters selected for examination do not include those passing to and from respectable and known persons or firms and probably as many as 50 per cent. of letters liable to contain suspicious matter.
are examined. Complete arrangements are in force for controlling all forms of
communication between Great Britain and Ireland, including Northern Ireland,
but it has been thought useless to expand the open censorship arrangements on
mails between Northern Ireland and Eire, seeing that (a) the present arrange­
ments give a good cross check of the traffic, and so far no evidence has been
obtained that this means of communication is being used for passing information
of importance, and (b) that an expansion of the censorship staff for the purpose
of imposing a more complete check would be a waste of man power if anybody
can cross the border carrying a letter in his pocket. Moreover, Postal and Tele­
graph Censorship have taken the view, endorsed by the Home Defence (Security)
Executive, that the imposition of a censorship without a complete and effective
control of the frontier to stop all illicit communication might be an actual source
of danger.

5. It is obvious that these arrangements, and particularly the existence of
the secret censorship, make it easy for uninformed critics to say that there is
nothing to prevent ill-disposed persons coming into Northern Ireland from Eire,
collecting information of use to the enemy and taking it back to the German
Embassy in Dublin, and there is nothing to prevent ill-disposed persons resident
in Northern Ireland from carrying such information to Dublin. In fact, however,
the Service representatives and representatives of the Security and Censorship
Departments think that the dangers are more apparent than real. Little, if any,
information of value can be picked up by casual observers. The Royal Ulster
Constabulary have a very good knowledge of the dangerous individuals in
Northern Ireland, and the Inspector-General is of the opinion that his men are
much better employed in keeping a watch on all suspicious characters who may
live in or may enter a particular district than in attempting to control traffic
across the border. This view is supported by the general experience of the Security
Service, which shows that the concentration of special measures at particular
points directed by intelligence information is far more effective than general
measures of a more or less mechanical nature such as would be involved in any
system of control on border traffic. Moreover, the Inspector-General of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary believes that the police and secret service of Eire is good
and that, in fact, he would get adequate information about espionage activities
by persons trying to enter Northern Ireland from Eire.

6. The Home Defence (Security) Executive have been concentrating their
attention on the question of what types of information it is particularly desirable
to keep secret and what measures are necessary for this purpose. One of the
steps taken has been to devise methods of cutting off private telephone communi­
cation between Northern Ireland and Eire during an air raid. There are also
special measures to safeguard special service operations.

7. At the time of my visit to Northern Ireland there was discussion with
Northern Ireland Ministers and officials on the question whether there would be
advantages in instituting a system by which persons who are not resident in
Northern Ireland should be required to obtain a permit for entry into Northern
Ireland and persons resident in Northern Ireland should be required to obtain
a permit for leaving Northern Ireland via the border. It was recognised that
such a scheme would only be partially effective, since it would still be possible
for persons to cross the border surreptitiously without permits, but it was
suggested that, if such persons were liable to prosecution for an offence, a permit
scheme would at any rate act as a deterrent and make unauthorised crossings of
the border more difficult.

8. After my return to London there was a preliminary discussion of this
scheme at the Home Defence (Security) Executive. It appeared that similar
proposals had been previously explored and that in view of the Home Defence
(Security) Executive there are objections to such a scheme (a) because it would
not prevent really dangerous persons from crossing surreptitiously; (b) because it
would require a large expenditure of man-power and a diversion of trained officers
from more useful to less useful work; and (c) because it would create a false
impression of security. The Home Defence (Security) Executive, however,
decided to consider the matter further on the receipt of detailed proposals from
Northern Ireland.
9. I have now received from Northern Ireland a letter which makes it clear that the Northern Ireland Ministers, on further examination of the problem, have come to the conclusion that such a permit scheme cannot be recommended.

In view, therefore, of the fact that the experts on the Home Defence (Security) Executive, representing the Service Departments, the Censorship Department and the Security Service, do not support a permit scheme and that the Northern Ireland Ministers do not now ask for it, I feel that such a suggestion must be abandoned.

10. It has been suggested by the Northern Ireland Government that the existing control, which is entirely a customs control, should be reinforced for security purposes, and I propose to discuss this matter with the Departments concerned. The Northern Ireland Ministry also ask that the military should be requested to co-operate by the provision of mobile patrols along the border and say that the General Officer Commanding would be prepared to consider the provision of such assistance as part of their training programme, on the understanding that these patrols would be liable to be withdrawn in the event of a serious emergency arising.

11. The Northern Ireland Government would also like an open censorship enforced on letters between Northern Ireland and Eire similar to the censorship on letters between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is obviously difficult for them to explain to their supporters why there should be a full censorship on letters between Belfast and Liverpool but no similar censorship on letters between Belfast and Dublin. The reasons, however, against increasing the censorship staff for this purpose are strong—see paragraph 4 above—and there is the further consideration that the imposition of censorship between Northern Ireland and Eire might well lead to a move on the part of Northern Ireland for the withdrawal of the censorship between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This would mean exchanging the substance for the shadow, and would be most strongly opposed by the Home Defence (Security) Executive. In the circumstances, I do not feel able to support their request.

Home Office, August 15, 1941.

H. M.
WAR CABINET.

OIL DENIAL SCHEME – Miri (Sarawak) and Seria (Brunei).

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

1. With reference to my memorandum of the 24th of February, W.P. (41)42, I have to inform the War Cabinet that the original scheme has now been revised on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and the Oversea Defence Committee, and in consultation with the C. in C. Far East, C. in C. China, and the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

2. The original scheme was framed on the assumption that the recapture of the oilfields, if they were seized by Japan, would not be long delayed. In the present circumstances it is felt that our action in the event of a Japanese attempt to seize the oilfields should not be hampered by any desire to retain them essentially intact for our eventual reoccupation. It has therefore been decided that the character of the scheme should be changed and that it should become a thorough-going scheme of demolition of the oilfields, refinery, pipe-lines, etc., designed to prevent the Japanese drawing any oil from the fields for an indefinite period. The local authorities have accordingly been instructed to draw up the necessary revised plans forthwith, to give effect to the changed policy. The Oversea Defence Committee have been informed that the best method of putting the wells out of action is to plug them, and it is understood that this is already being done in Iraq. Technical experts are being sent to advise the local authorities on this at Miri. In Sarawak and Brunei this process is likely to take about a month, and it is felt, therefore, that a start should be made as soon as possible after the advice of the experts has been obtained.

3. The methods of authorising the execution of the demolition scheme have also been revised as follows:

   The scheme will not be put into force automatically on receipt of the "Warning telegram" initiating the "Precautionary Stage" against Japan.

   A separate and special message will be sent by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Commander-in-Chief, China, through the Governor, Straits Settlements, giving the necessary authority, either before or after the issue of the "Warning telegram".

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WAR CABINET.

SECRET.

W.P.(41)193.

16th AUGUST, 1941.

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A separate and special message will be sent by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Commander-in-Chief, China, through the Governor, Straits Settlements, giving the necessary authority, either before or after the issue of the "Warning telegram".
Complete discretion has, however, been given to the Commander-in-Chief, China, to put the scheme into effect on his own responsibility at any time if, in his opinion, Japanese actions in the neighbourhood make it advisable.

4. In the event of it being considered necessary to authorise the demolition scheme to be put into force before the issue of the Warning telegram, I propose (after obtaining the concurrence of the Admiralty) to seek the authority of the Prime Minister in accordance with the decision arrived at on the 27th of February, 1941 (W.M. (41) 21st Conclusions).

5. If the necessity to send instructions from London for the scheme to be put into operation arises after the issue of the Warning telegram, I propose to issue these instructions without further reference to the War Cabinet or the Prime Minister, but with the concurrence of the Admiralty. (The Service Departments agree to this proposal).

6. Meanwhile, in view of the length of time required for the plugging of wells, I consider that this should be put in hand at once in accordance with such advice as may be tendered by the experts. Moreover, I recommend that approval should be given, without further reference to the War Cabinet or Prime Minister, for any preparatory measures which, on the advice of the technical experts, the Commander-in-Chief, China, may recommend as necessary in order to ensure that the refinery and other plant is ready for instant demolition, even to the extent of closing down the refinery forthwith and withdrawing the technicians who are at present working there.

7. I should be grateful for approval of the course of action proposed in this paper.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 102)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 12 noon August 7th, to
12 noon August 14th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. There have been no outstanding events at sea during the period. Allied submarines continue to harass enemy communications in the Mediterranean. Shipping losses have been light in spite of the large number of U-boats at sea.

Home Waters.

2. On the 9th, civil aircraft reported sighting a suspected merchant raider 220 miles south-west of Brest steering west. A search was made by air and surface craft without result, and patrols were established to intercept her should she break out to the south.

H.M. Trawler Withernsea shot down a Heinkel III in the Humber on the 9th and another enemy aircraft was damaged by H.M. Trawler Liberator off Aldeburgh on the 13th.

Two of our motor gunboats were in collision off the Dutch coast on the night the 10th/11th, one being sunk and the other severely damaged.

Mediterranean.

3. On the 31st July, H.M. Submarine Regent sank by gunfire a large schooner laden with petrol and stores to the southward of Benghazi and bombarded Apolonia (Libya) at dusk on the 6th August. The Netherlands Submarine 024, while on patrol in the Central Mediterranean, sank a laden supply ship of 5,000 tons and a sailing vessel of 1,000 tons.

On the 11th, H.M. Netlayer Protector, 60 miles northward of Port Said, was hit by a torpedo from an aircraft, but reached harbour safely.

During the week 12 French merchant ships (66,000 tons) have passed Gibraltar in convoy eastbound and 5 (19,000 tons) westbound.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

4. H.M. Submarine Severn probably torpedoed a U-boat 250 miles south-west of Cape St. Vincent and aircraft from H.M.S. London, on patrol north-west of the Azores, bombèd and probably damaged a U-boat which was on the surface. Attacks by surface craft were carried out in the vicinity of Start Point and off Cape St. Vincent without definite result. Eight attacks were made by aircraft, six in the Western Approaches and two to the westward of Lisbon. One of the latter possibly damaged a U-boat, but the remainder were without definite result.

Enemy Intelligence.

5. The Pocket Battleship Admiral Scheer was reported to be back in Kiel Bay on 4th August. Otherwise no change has been reported in the positions of the main German and Italian units. The Italian Fleet Auxiliary tanker Tarvisio arrived at Chanak from the Aegean on 10th August, and is said to have been detained for the present by the Turkish authorities.

U-Boats.

6. About 30 German U-Boats and six or more Italians have been operating in the Atlantic. About one-third of the total have been in the area westward of Gibraltar, and of the remainder four or five have been south of Iceland (C), between 15° and 20° West.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

7. According to the information at present available, shipping casualties during the week have been exceptionally light. No losses by U-boat action or mine have been reported. Casualties from bombing have taken place off the Faroes and Cape St. Vincent. One ship was damaged in an air attack on Alexandria. One ship was sunk and three were damaged in bombing attacks on East coast convoy's. One ship in a Channel convoy was sunk by E-boat.
The shipping losses in July (details of which are given in Appendix I) were 28 ships and 10 small craft totalling 136,067 tons, of which 19 ships and 10 small craft (109,780 tons) were British. This total is 199,529 tons lower than the previous month, and the British tonnage lost is the lowest since May of last year. Twenty-one ships (91,723 tons) were sunk by U-boats, five ships and six small craft (26,894 tons) by aircraft and two ships and four small craft (7,450 tons) by mines. Of the losses from U-boats, twenty ships, including nine in one convoy, were sunk in the Azores–Cape Verde area, only one ship was lost in the North-West Approaches and none in the Freetown area.

In addition, 12 ships and 6 small craft totalling 49,083 tons, which are included in Appendix I, were reported in July but lost in previous months.

**Protection of Seaborne Trade.**

8. During the week ending 13th August, 953 ships, including 162 Allied and 22 neutral, were convoyed. 9 armed merchant cruisers, 72 destroyers and 86 sloops, minesweepers and corvettes were employed on escort duties. 4,420 ships in convoy arrived during July, of which 10 ships were lost by enemy action. Since the beginning of the war 74,638 ships have been convoyed, of which 369 have been lost.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending 9th August totalled 818,859 tons, compared with 1,177,422 during the previous week, and an average of 875,274 tons during the past ten weeks. Oil imports totalled 294,134 tons. Mineral imports were 215,746 tons, of which 154,014 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig ore and iron ore. Timber and pulp imports amounted to 41,365 tons, and there were 6,921 tons of newsprint. Cereal imports amounted to 116,517 tons. Other food imports totalled 146,945, of which 75,420 tons were sugar and molasses. Among other foodstuffs there were bacon, ham and refrigerated meat 8,003 tons, cheese 4,470 tons, cocoa 4,423 tons, fish 1,936 tons, dried fruit 1,727 tons, tea 1,261 tons, jam and honey 650 tons and unspecified tinned food 4,661 tons. There was also 1,615 tons of tobacco. General cargoes included large consignments of motor trucks, aircraft, ammunition and machinery.

**British Minelaying.**

9. Two minelaying operations have been carried out by surface craft in the course of the week. On the 9th August, M.T.B’s. laid eight mines off the Belgian coast, and on the 11th H.M.S. Port Quebec laid a further 484 off North Rona. There has been some minelaying by aircraft chiefly in the Western Baltic and off the Norwegian coast.

**Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.**

**Home Waters.**

10. Enemy aircraft have dropped mines in the Thames Estuary on three nights during the past week, and once off Harwich. Eleven magnetic and twelve acoustic mines have been swept during the week. The totals now are:—Acoustic, 992; magnetic, 1,325; contact, 1,021; including those accounted for in Foreign Waters.

**Foreign Waters.**

11. Enemy aircraft raided the Suez Canal on the nights of 6th/7th and 10th/11th August. On each occasion mines were dropped in or near the Canal and, in the first raid, off Port Ibrahim as well. The Canal was not, however, closed.

Early on 11th August four mines were dropped in the western part of Tobruk Harbour.

**Enemy Merchant Shipping.**

**German.**

12. It has been reported that on 1st August forty German ships were discharging military stores at Mantylaoto, in Finland.
The Norderney (3,067 tons) sailed from Para, Brazil, on the 9th August. She is believed to have a valuable cargo of rubber, castor seeds, castor oil and hides.

Italian.

Two tankers, the Maya (3,867 tons) and Albara (2,104 tons) called at Istanbul on 8th August on passage from the Black Sea to the Aegean; they were fully loaded. The Abbazia (3,716 tons) passed Chanak on 9th August, bound for the Aegean.

Intelligence.

French Merchant Shipping.

13. The British Navy’s recent successes in intercepting French ships, combined with recent political events, have led to the temporary suspension of sailings on the France—Antilles and France—Indo-China services. Information has been received that these routes are now considered dangerous by the Armistice Commissions, who are refusing to sanction any further voyages at present. It seems probable that in future efforts will be made for ships on these routes to sail in convoy under naval escort.

Black Sea.

14. A report states that the Russian air raids on Constanza during the first week in August caused considerable damage to the port and town, but that the grain silos were undamaged. The same report, however, states that considerable damage was done to the petroleum basin and that tankers have experienced difficulty in loading.

Persian Gulf.

15. The Persian Navy at present consists of two sloops armed with two 4-inch and two 3-inch guns and having a speed of 14 to 17 knots, and four small patrol ships mounting two 3-inch guns and having a speed of 15 knots. There is also a minesweeper and floating dock at Bandar Shahpur. The engineers in practically all the ships in the Persian Navy are Italian.

Japan.

16. A good authority states that it is the intention of the Japanese Fleet to remain at Ariake Bay until the end of this month and then to proceed to the Yokohama area in time for the large-scale manoeuvres which are under contemplation.

MILITARY SITUATION.

Russo-German Campaign.

17. During the past week no appreciable advance has been made except in the Ukraine, where the main German effort has been exerted.

Finland.

18. Little news has been received, but in the far north the front appears to be stabilised and there is no sign of an immediate German threat to Murmansk. Fighting continues on the Salla front. North-east of Lake Ladoga, German and Finnish forces have made little progress towards Petrozavodsk, and the Murmansk—Leningrad Railway is still in Russian hands along its whole length.

Baltic Front.

19. German forces have reached the south coast of the Gulf of Finland between Tallinn and Narva. Tallinn and Baltic Port are thus cut off, but are still in Russian hands.

20. To the east of Lake Peipus no serious attempt seems to have been made to advance on Leningrad. Fighting has taken place further south in the Kholm area, but so far no drive towards the Leningrad—Moscow Railway has developed.
White Russia.

21. In the last few days there has been activity in the Roslavl area. On the 9th August, the Germans claimed to have surrounded Soviet formations in this area and to have taken 38,000 prisoners. No mention of this was made by the Soviet. If it is true, it may indicate a south-easterly drive on the Bryansk-Gomel railway. There have been no further reports of resistance in this area by isolated pockets of Russians.

Ukraine.

22. The attack on Kiev is continuing, and on the 12th August the Germans claimed the capture of Vasilkov, 30 miles south of the city.

23. Another attack, south-eastwards and southwards, has achieved a considerable measure of success, the left flank having advanced parallel with the Dnieper and reached the vicinity of Kremenchug, which is on the Dnieper some 160 miles south-east of Kiev. Further to the west, armoured and motorised forces are driving southwards towards Nikolaev, and their advanced elements are believed to be within 30 or 40 miles of the port.

24. Further west, German infantry are advancing eastwards and south-eastwards roughly from the area Birsula-Tiraspol.

25. Russian sources claim that the armoured thrusts have far outstripped the infantry, and the Russian communiqué claimed, up to the 11th August, that there was still heavy fighting “in the direction” of Uman. It may be, therefore, that another large pocket of Russians is still holding out south of that place.

26. The situation in the Ukraine is undoubtedly very serious. With the capture of Odessa and Nikolaev the whole of the Ukraine to the west of the Dnieper from Kiev to its mouth would fall into German hands. This appears to be the immediate German objective.

Operations.

Egypt and Libya.

27. In the Tobruk area, on the 3rd August, we attacked posts on both flanks of the enemy’s position in the Medawa salient. Heavy fighting resulted and considerable enemy mortar fire was experienced. After fierce fighting our troops entered the post. An accurate estimate of enemy casualties was not possible, but they were known to be heavy. We lost 28 killed and 104 wounded.

28. Apart from this there is little to report from this area with the exception of intermittent enemy shelling and bombing of the town and harbour, none of which has apparently caused much damage.

29. In the Frontier area, Jarabub has now been occupied by our troops and there has been normal artillery activity by our columns against small parties of enemy M.T.

Abyssinia.

30. There was a serious fire at Massawa on 7th/8th August, which destroyed the ordnance ammunition dump, the customs dump and the larger part of a nearby native village. There were no military casualties.

Intelligence.

Germany.

31. There is evidence that the number of German divisions in existence exceeds the figure of 250 divisions hitherto accepted. The motorisation of infantry divisions continues, and it is believed that 25 of these may now exist, of which 21 (including one light armoured division) have been identified. In addition, an S.S. Cavalry division has recently been identified.
32. It is considered that a total of 260 divisions may now be accepted. Of these, some 30-40 divisions are of low category, intended primarily for L. of C. or similar employment. It is probable that many of these divisions are now employed behind the Eastern Front.

33. There is evidence that some of the divisions in the West and in Norway have sent drafts of trained men to the East, receiving considerable numbers of recruits and of elderly reservists as replacements, so that the fighting efficiency of these divisions must have been markedly reduced.

Italy.

34. There has been a tendency to reinforce gradually southern Italy and the islands. There are now six divisions stationed on the mainland south of Rome and three, or possibly four, divisions in Sardinia; the garrison of Sicily remains at two divisions, though there are indications that one Sicilian division which took part in the Greek campaign may be returning. Taken in conjunction with efforts to raise “territorial battalions” (home defence units composed of older men for coast defence, guarding of vulnerable points, &c.), this movement probably denotes increasing Italian awareness of the vulnerability of their great length of coast line.

Roumania.

35. The Vega refinery at Ploesti was bombed by the Russians on the 28th July and 400 car-loads of unspecified products are believed to have been destroyed. Numerous reports confirm that severe damage was caused to the Orion refineries in the raid of the 13th July, and it is believed that the adjoining Shell, Astra Romana and Lumina plants suffered minor damage in the same raid. These raids will not immediately affect production, as there are large surplus stocks of refined products in the country, and the refining capacity in Roumania is considerably in excess of crude output.

36. More immediately serious to the enemy is the damage to oil-loading facilities at Constanza, which will probably prevent the resumption of oil exports from this port for two months even if the port’s extremely vulnerable land communications remain intact.

Yugoslavia.

37. Guerrilla activity continues and the area of disturbance has spread through Bosnia to Croatia and Slovenia. Material destruction and loss of life is probably small, but even in districts where no outbreaks have occurred the constant threat of violence must be having a very disturbing effect on an Administration which is by no means sure of itself.

North and West Africa.

38. Several sources report that the Germans are again pressing for the cession of bases in Africa, and General Weygand’s visit to Vichy is no doubt connected with this. There may well be some truth in the suggestion that the reason underlying this demand, in the case of North Africa, is not so much the difficult supply situation in Libya as the desire to control French action in Tunisia in the event of a British offensive in Libya. In the case of Dakar, the Germans and their French satellites may wish to forestall any possible action by the United States or Britain.

Far East.

39. The chief areas of Japanese military activity continue to be Manchukuo and Indo-China. It is evident that the Japanese intend assembling the maximum concentration possible in the Northern Zone, while retaining sufficient forces in the South for any further southward operations they may contemplate.

40. It is estimated that approximately 35,000 Japanese troops have landed in Southern Indo-China. Of these, about 4,000 are believed to have been moved to the Thai (Siamese) frontier. The disembarkation of troops continues, but it is reported that it will shortly be completed.
AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

41. The main feature of the week was a combined operation during daylight by aircraft of Bomber and Fighter Commands, in which power stations at Cologne were attacked, apparently with complete success. Bombing by night of a wide selection of industrial targets in Germany was continued when weather permitted.

Several enemy attacks were made on the Suez Canal area.

Enemy activity over this country was on a small scale.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

42. Bomber Command despatched 102 sorties, compared with 103 last week, and dropped 48 tons of H.E. bombs and 200 incendiaries by day. Fighter Command flew 1,182 aircraft sorties.

43. The heaviest daylight bombing raid against Germany since the outbreak of war was carried out with considerable success on the 12th August. In this major operation 78 bombers and 485 fighters were employed; the targets were two of the main power stations in the Rhineland—the Goldenburg at Cologne-Knapsack and the Quadrath Fortuna at Cologne.

The day's operations began with a sweep by 84 fighters escorting 6 Hampdens in an attack on St. Omer aerodrome, the object being to draw off the enemy force based in the district; it is estimated that 150 Me. 109s were engaged in the combat which ensued. While this operation was in progress 54 Blenheims, escorted by Whirlwinds of Fighter Command, left the coast and, flying low over the sea, penetrated through the mouth of the Scheldt to Antwerp, where the covering Whirlwinds returned to base. Simultaneously, a Fortress bombèd De Kooy aerodrome from 32,000 feet, to keep enemy fighters in that area employed. Meanwhile the Blenheims, flying close to the ground, located and attacked, under unfavourable weather conditions, the two power stations at Cologne. From reports received, both power stations appear to have been severely damaged in most determined attacks; 24 tons of bombs were dropped on the turbine and boiler houses and the targets were left with fires blazing. Heavy A.A. fire was encountered, but only three Me. 109s were seen; further diversions by Fortresses over Cologne and the naval base at Emden assisted in drawing off enemy fighters, which might otherwise have attacked. These Fortresses released their bombs from 35,000 and 37,000 feet respectively.

The Blenheims were met at Antwerp on their homeward journey by formations of Spitfires and, during this withdrawal, a further diversion was carried out by 144 fighters escorting 6 Hampdens to attack Gosnay Power Station, near Bethune; bursts were seen on or around the target. Later, 4 Blenheims with fighter escort bombed the shipyards at Le Trait, near Rouen, hits being obtained on slipways and on a ship alongside.

In this series of co-ordinated operations we lost 12 Blenheims and 10 fighters. Four enemy aircraft were destroyed, 5 probably destroyed and 10 damaged.

44. On two other days during the week, offensive sweeps over Northern France resulted in the destruction of 20 further enemy aircraft; 13 were probably destroyed and 14 damaged. We lost 11 fighters. No important offensive operations were possible on three days owing to unsuitable weather conditions and, on another day, a large-scale sweep proved uneventful.

Night.

45. Bomber Command despatched 675 sorties by night, compared with 736 the previous week. Operations were restricted by bad weather to four nights, and during two of these conditions became rapidly unfavourable while the attacks were in progress. The main objectives were industrial and railway centres and shipyards in Germany; a total of 762 tons of H.E. bombs and over 50,000 incendiaries were dropped.
46. On the first night of the period (7th/8th August), visibility was good. Eighty-four aircraft attacked Krupp's coke oven batteries at Essen, a total of 108 tons of H.E. bombs and 5,720 incendiaries being released, causing numerous large and small fires in the target area and in the city itself. Very satisfactory results were achieved by 31 bombers in an attack on Hamm; bursts were seen on and around the marshalling yard and several aircraft reported an immense fire (probably an oil cistern) from which smoke ascended to 11,000 feet and spread for ten miles. Many large fires also resulted at Dortmund after an attack carried out by 32 aircraft.

47. Excellent weather over Kiel on the following night enabled 88 aircraft accurately to bomb the Deutsche Werke Shipyards. Of the 104 tons of H.E. bombs and 4,596 incendiaries released, a number fell directly in the centre of the target, starting many fires; a particularly large fire was also observed on the south side of the city. At Hamburg, however, on the same night, weather was bad and identification of objectives was almost impossible; except for bomb-bursts and fires, no results were observed.

48. After an interval of two nights, the railway centres at München-Gladbach and Krefeld and the docks at Rotterdam were attacked by smaller forces of bombers; heavy cloud over the aiming points prevented observation of any noteworthy results apart from a few fires.

49. The heaviest effort of the week was made the following night, a total of 234 aircraft being despatched. Weather conditions again proved extremely difficult. A number of aircraft failed to locate their targets, which, in some instances, were completely obscured by heavy cloud and severe thunderstorms. At Havre, conditions were more favourable and good fires were started on and near the docks as the result of a raid by eleven aircraft. Elsewhere the effect of our attacks could not be assessed, though fires were reported at the following primary targets: Hanover, attacked by 69 aircraft, Berlin by 42, Essen by 28 and Magdeburg by 20. Bombs were dropped on a number of alternative targets in widely-separated areas by single aircraft. We lost 7 medium and 6 heavy bombers on this night's operations.

50. Havocs and Spitfires carried out 18 sorties against aerodromes in enemy occupied territory, five aerodromes being bombed and a number of fires started. Over Gilze Rijen, a Havoc on patrol sighted 20 enemy aircraft near the aerodrome; seven of these were attacked and five are claimed to have been damaged.

51. Fighter Command flew 780 patrols, involving 3,086 sorties, by day, and 306 patrols, involving 434 sorties, by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. The sorties flown, in particular those flown by day, show an increase over those of last week.

52. Enemy activity was on a small scale, and in general the German Air Force made little attempt to maintain an air offensive on this front.

Coastal Operations.

53. Coastal Command flew 151 patrols (259 sorties) and provided escorts for 68 convoys (183 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 633 (1,295 sorties).

54. Searches were continued for enemy shipping. A number of vessels were attacked by aircraft from the three Commands. The results of some attacks were not seen; near misses were reported in others. Reports of successful attacks were received from Hampdens, which, returning from laying sea-mines, hit an enemy vessel in the Little Belt and another off the Frisian Islands, from Blenheims, which twice hit a 1,500-ton tanker off Gravelines causing a fire amidships and from Hurricanes, escorting the Blenheims, which set two A.A. ships on fire. The tanker is believed to have sunk later.

55. Twenty-one aircraft were despatched to lay sea-mines in Kiel Harbour, in the Western Baltic and off the South-West Coast of Norway.
56. Enemy minelaying was on a small scale. Two shipping attacks were made in daylight, eight by night, the majority being unsuccessful.

Central Mediterranean.

57. Wellingtons operating from Malta made six successful night attacks on Tripoli (L), during which they dropped 42 tons of H.E. bombs and over 7 tons of incendiaries. Many large fires were reported in the town and near the power station; a direct hit on the power station during one raid caused a big explosion which was visible from a very long distance. Government offices, the Governor’s Palace and a heavy A.A. position were amongst other objectives hit. A railway station was destroyed and M.T. vehicles on the Benghazi road were attacked with machine-guns.

58. During daylight on the 9th, six Blenheims made many direct hits on blockhouses and barrack at Misurata, and on ammunition and supply dumps at Beirut; these targets were either completely destroyed or blown up. Several lorries attacked on the main road were destroyed or overturned.

59. Our effective attacks on Sicilian bases may have obliged the Italians to strengthen their fighter defences in that theatre. On the 8th August, four Blenheims despatched to attack shipping in Catania harbour were met by a patrol of 30 C.R. 42s and were obliged to abandon their task.

60. Naval aircraft, operating under A.O.C., Malta, attacked Augusta on the 9th August and hit the gasometer. On the night the 10th/11th, these aircraft hit the merchant vessel California (13,000 tons) at Syracuse with two torpedoes, as a result of which she was observed to have sunk in the harbour. Another night attack by Swordfish was made on the submarine base at Augusta, resulting in a large fire on a quay; other aircraft caused a big fire in the barracks at Syracuse. Blenheims attacked and hit a French collier of 700 tons off Lampedusa, which is believed to have sunk.

61. On the 11th August, three Blenheims attacked a chemical works at Crotone (95 miles south of Taranto); direct hits were made on tanks and containers, and the target was left in a mass of flames. Three other Blenheims destroyed buildings at Cariati, thirty miles north of Crotone.

62. Small formations of Italian long-range bombers operated over Malta on two nights during the week. On the 11th/12th August, nine aircraft were reported, two of which were shot down into the sea by Hurricane night fighters.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

63. On the night 10th/11th August a heavy attack was made on Benghazi by thirty-six Wellingtons. Large bombs were used, and these were seen to fall on motor transport repair sections, railway sidings and in the dock area; large fires were observed on the quays and in the area behind the Central and Cathedral moles. All these aircraft returned safely. On six occasions medium and heavy bombers carried out day or night raids on Bardia. Six Marylands attacked a petrol tanker in the harbour, obtaining near misses; M.T. and gun repair shops received direct hits causing large fires and explosions in the workshops. Bombs also fell among barrack buildings and the officers’ quarters, while hits were made on the loaf-house and on harbour buildings. It is also believed that a bomb fell on a medium-sized ship.

64. Fighters continued to provide patrols over our coastal shipping; two attacks by Me. 110s were driven off and one Messerschmitt was destroyed.

65. On the Libyan Front, Tobruk continued to be the main target of the enemy, and Italian fighters and Ju. 87s co-operated on several occasions. Mines were dropped in the harbour, and some of the bombing attacks were of a sustained nature; damage was caused to the ordnance clearance store, and an ammunition dump and 1,100 gallons of petrol were destroyed.

66. Night operations by German long-range bombers based in Greece and the Aegean against the Suez Canal area, were a prominent feature of the week’s activity. Attacks were carried out on six nights by forces varying from ten to twenty-five aircraft, but the damage caused was relatively slight. Civilian damage and casualties in Alexandria as a result of an attack on the 7th/8th
August were, however, quite considerable. Two attacks were made on the Royal Air Force station at Abu Sueir, as a result of which several buildings and the filtration plant were hit, and four aircraft on the ground were destroyed and eight others damaged. On the night of the 10th/11th August, the main attack was directed against American shipping in Suez Bay; three ships sustained nine near-misses, but no appreciable damage was reported.

**Egean.**

67. On the night 8th/9th August, thirty-three Wellingtons from Egypt attacked the Corinth Canal with bombs and mines and the canal will be closed for a considerable time. As a diversion, two Wellingtons bombed Eleusis aerodrome.

68. On both the 7th and 12th August, three Italian aircraft attacked Famagusta (Cyprus) and damaged a schooner laden with benzine and also some dock buildings; on the same day, the aerodrome at Nicosia (Cyprus) was bombed by five enemy aircraft, but no serious damage resulted.

**East Africa.**

69. Bombing and machine-gun attacks were maintained against Gondar and enemy positions at Wolcheft. Large fires were reported at Gondar, where direct hits were observed on the military head-quarters, and on large buildings and military stores. Aircraft of the South African Air Force took a prominent part, in co-operation with the Royal Air Force, in these operations.

**Russia.**

General.

70. There is still little information of Russian air operations. Russian aircraft dropped eighteen parachutists over Helsinki on the night 23rd/24th July; fifteen are reported to have been captured. It is learnt that the recent British air attack on Petsamo caused considerable damage to quays, cranes and other harbour equipment.

**German Air Operations.**

71. Operations in the Northern and Central sectors of the front appear to have been on a limited scale, accompanying the lull in land operations. Long range bombing attacks on Moscow, however, have been carried out on several nights with moderate forces.

72. Fighters and dive-bombers have been active in the above area round Kiev and in support of the deep advance into the Ukraine, bombers and bomber reconnaissance aircraft being employed on harassing attacks on the harbour and shipping at Odessa and Nikolaiev.

73. There has been little activity to report from Northern Norway apart from routine reconnaissance over the sea areas north of the Cape; in the Baltic, shipping and anti-submarine patrols have been continued.

**Air Raids on Moscow.**

74. A report on air raids on Moscow has now been received from an observer who was in Moscow between the 22nd July and the 1st August. He was accommodated in a building from which a good view could be obtained of the air raids over part of the city. He confirms that the German air attacks seemed to be, at that time, on a small scale, and that comparatively few aircraft reached the centre of the city. During one raid which lasted from about 2300 hours to about 0230 hours the following morning, the raiders seemed to arrive singly at five-minute intervals, and the observer thinks that the Russian assertion that only five aircraft flew over the city may be correct. He, himself, would have estimated the number at between 12 and 15 aircraft. The Germans declared that on another raid they sent 500 aircraft against Moscow, but the observer saw no raider appear on that occasion.

75. After another raid the Russians claimed to have brought down 15 aircraft, and as the members of the British Air Mission actually saw five aircraft
falling, it is considered that, because of their restricted view of the raid, the
Russian figure may be a very likely total. German aircraft were seen to have
been caught in searchlight beams and the A.A. fire from the Russian guns was
very intense. Guns of every calibre, including machine-guns, were fired
continuously, so that there must have been a considerable waste of ammunition.

76. When air raid warnings are sounded in Moscow everybody, except
fire-watchers, police, &c., has to go to the shelters, which are of a basement or
trench type. Nevertheless, there are, apparently, plenty of people ready to deal
with fires, which confirms the statement in the Russian communiqués that the
population have put out fires very quickly. Incendiary bombs are extinguished
with sand as no stirrup pumps are available. The observer estimated that during
his stay nothing larger than a 500-kilogramme bomb had been used.

German Estimate of Russian First-Line Air Strength.

77. In a recent article in the Kolnische Zeitung, entitled "Air Supremacy
on the Eastern Front," General der Flieger (Air-Marshal) Quade writes as
follows:—
"Germany knew (when attacking Russia) that she had to deal with a
numerically very much superior opponent. The last published estimate set
the number of first-line aircraft in the U.S.S.R. in 1939 at 6,000. What has
been added since then is not known."

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

78. On the evening of the 8th August ineffective machine-gunning occurred
over Skegness. On the morning of the 13th August bombs dropped at Horden
Colliery (Durham) caused damage and a temporary loss of production, and
some damage to utility services and house property was caused at Sunderland.
A few fatal casualties were reported as a result of these incidents.

By Night.

79. Raiding by night has again been on a small scale, but on the night of
the 12th/13th scattered bombing occurred in the Midlands and Eastern Counties.
Forty incidents were reported and there was some concentration on aerodromes.
On the whole, the attack was singularly ineffective, but at Bassingbourne the
R.A.F. Station received 2 direct hits on the Barracks, which caused seven fatal
casualties.

80. At Aberdeen on the night of the 7th/8th extensive damage to houses
and ships in the harbour area was caused by blast. Damage was also done at
John Lewis Engineering Works which resulted in temporary suspension of work
in two sections.

Casualties.

81. The casualties for the week ending 0600 hours the 13th August are
estimated at 20 killed and 31 seriously injured. No casualties occurred in
London.
APPENDIX I.

SECTION A.—Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of all tonnages reported lost during the month of July 1941 by enemy action.

(Note.—Tonnages are gross and vessels are of S.S. Cargo type unless otherwise stated.)

By Submarine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Auditor (5,441)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Beira</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>600 miles W. by S. Canaries</td>
<td>All saved except 1 lascar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td>S/S Transport Auselm (5,945)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>310 miles N. of Azores</td>
<td>94 saved, 4 missing, 2 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td>Designer (5,945)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>270 miles N.W. of Azores</td>
<td>Crew 77, 1 gunner and 8 lascars saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td>Inverness (4,897)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>250 miles N.W. of Azores</td>
<td>36 saved, 6 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14</td>
<td>Import de Larrinaga (6,289)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Las Palmas</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>190 miles S.E. of Azores</td>
<td>No casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14</td>
<td>Nikoklis (5,575)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Pepel</td>
<td>Clyde</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Approx. 105 miles S.W. Azores</td>
<td>13 saved, 2 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>Guelma (4,102)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>110 miles N. of Palma l, Canaries</td>
<td>All crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19</td>
<td>Holmead (3,438)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Oban</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>270 miles S.W. of Cape Blanco</td>
<td>16 saved, 21 missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Ida Knudsen (6,913)</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Oil or spirit</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>150 miles N.E. of Madeira</td>
<td>31 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24</td>
<td>Macon (6,135)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Port Hart court</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>465 miles W. of Madeira</td>
<td>19 picked up, 27 adrift in boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26</td>
<td>Dotway (3,106)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Mersey</td>
<td>Port Sulphur</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>68 miles W.N.W. of Bloody Foreland</td>
<td>Crew of 53 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td>Kelloggs (1,459)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>400 miles W.N.W. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td>9 saved, 11 crew, 3 gunners killed or missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td>Blackings (2,475)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>400 miles W. by N. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td>17 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Tonnage</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>From—</td>
<td>To—</td>
<td>How sunk</td>
<td>In convoy or not</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Fate of Crew and Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td><em>Sharistan</em> (6,935)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Busreh</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>180 miles S.E. of Azores</td>
<td>76 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27</td>
<td><em>Horn Shell</em> (8,272)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>tanker</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Curaçao</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>265 miles W. by N. of Madeira</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td><em>Eratu</em> (1,393)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Oporto</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>340 miles W. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td>Survivors landed Gibraltar (including Commodore and staff, 9 missing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td><em>Wrotham</em> (1,881)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Ardrossan</td>
<td>Huelva</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Approx 500 miles W. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td>All crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td><em>Lapland</em> (1,393)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Tin plate</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>350 miles W. N.W. of Cape St. Vincent</td>
<td>Crew 37, 10 saved, 3 lost, rest missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td><em>Inga I</em> (1,394)</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>340 miles W. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td>17 saved, 2 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td><em>Meritia</em> (1,516)</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>Huelva</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>300 miles S.W. of Cape Finisterre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30</td>
<td><em>Siloebondoso</em> (7,950)</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>250 miles N.W. of Madeira</td>
<td>58 saved, 19 missing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By Mine.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td><em>S/Trawler Strathgairn</em> (211)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>20 miles S.W. of Barra Head</td>
<td>6 saved, 5 or 6 killed. Hauled in mine in trawl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2</td>
<td><em>Ernik</em> (277)</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>Crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td><em>Lunan</em> (303)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>Gravesend</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Penarth Dock</td>
<td>1 saved, 6 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td><em>Spritsail Barge Roone</em> (82)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>Gravesend</td>
<td>Ipswich</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Barrow Deep,</td>
<td>Crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td><em>Bencruachan</em> (5,920)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal and general</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Thames Estuary</td>
<td>3 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9</td>
<td><em>Spritsail Barge Blue Mermaid</em> (87)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Alexandria</td>
<td>3 lost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td><em>Homefires</em> (1,862)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Wear</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off Cromer</td>
<td>2 of crew of 17 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td><em>Balfron</em> (302)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Moulded sand</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Grange-mouth</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>15 miles N. of Scarborough</td>
<td>7 saved, 4 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5</td>
<td><em>Power Rose</em> (470)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Stone</td>
<td>Holyhead</td>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>6 miles W of St. David's Head</td>
<td>Crew 10 and 1 gunner. 3 saved, 8 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>S/Trawler <em>Isabella Fowlie</em> (196)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>For fishing</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>7 miles E.N.E. of Longstones</td>
<td>Crew 9. 3 lost, 1 wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td><em>Swint</em> (1,174)</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Workington</td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Trevose Head</td>
<td>16 saved, 1 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12</td>
<td><em>Patron</em> (1,977)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14</td>
<td>M/V Passenger and Cargo <em>Georgia</em> (27,659)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Suez Bay</td>
<td>2 gunners presumed killed; 1 of crew killed, 4 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15</td>
<td><em>Farfield</em> (499)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Stone</td>
<td>Penmaen-mawr</td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>S.W. of Holyhead</td>
<td>1 survivor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28</td>
<td>S/Trawler <em>Strathlocky</em> (212)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>180 miles N.W. of Orkneys</td>
<td>Crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30</td>
<td><em>Adam's Beck</em> (2,816)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off Tyne</td>
<td>19 crew and 8 gunners: 1 killed, 7 injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of all tonnages reported lost during the month of July 1941, but relating to June 1941, or previous, by enemy action.

(Note.—Tonnages are gross and vessels are of S.S. Cargo type unless otherwise stated.)

### By Submarine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How Sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Sangara (5,445)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>At Accra</td>
<td>No casualties. Vessel now C.T.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>Panias... (4,381)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Coal and Govt. Stores</td>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>600 miles W. of Freetown</td>
<td>Master arrived Freetown from French Guinea, states 7 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Cathrine (2,727)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Concentrates</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Barrow</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Approx. 400 miles W. by S. of Land's End 9 saved, 13 lost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>Rio Azul... (4,088)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>Pepel</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Approx 560 miles W. of the Canaries</td>
<td>9 saved, 2 others died at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>Helka... (1,213)</td>
<td>Icelandic</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>600 miles N. by S. of Cape Farewell</td>
<td>6 saved, 1 died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>Kalypso Forgett (5,890)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>Pepel</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Approx 560 miles W. of the Canaries</td>
<td>No details known.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Mine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How Sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 9</td>
<td>Agnes Ellen (299)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Holyhead</td>
<td>Workington</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>J.A.C. award.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 21</td>
<td>Dakotian... (6,426)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Tin plates</td>
<td>Milford</td>
<td>St. John's N.P.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Milford Haven</td>
<td>Crew saved. Vessel now stated to be a C.T.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Gas Fire (5,601)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>10 miles East of Southwold</td>
<td>No casualties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### By Surface Craft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 12</td>
<td><em>Nicolaos D.L.</em> (5,486)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Cape via Trinidad</td>
<td>Raider</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>300 miles S.W. of Ascension Island</td>
<td>No details known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26</td>
<td><em>Marecha</em> (3,472)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>Raider</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>300 miles W. of Nicobars</td>
<td>No details known.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td><em>Antje</em> (187)</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td></td>
<td>London Docks</td>
<td>Sunk during air raids. Vessel now a C.T.L.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By other Causes or Cause unknown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 17</td>
<td><em>El Sonador</em> (1,406)</td>
<td>Panamanian</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No details known. Joint Arbitration Committee awards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 10</td>
<td><em>S/Trawler Louise</em> (216)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td><em>S/Trawler Respondo</em> (209)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About  June 1</td>
<td><em>Motor F/V Holmstein</em> (16)</td>
<td>Icelandic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wreckage found June 5 indicating vessel sunk by S/M.G. Crew presumed lost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION B.—Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of 500 gross tons and over REPORTED damaged during the month of July 1941 by Enemy Action. Vessels suffering superficial or minor damage are excluded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Extent of Damage</th>
<th>Casualties to Crew. Other Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Highwood (1,177)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Starboard side set in and fractured in several places. Deck structure and accommodation destroyed</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6</td>
<td>North Devon (3,658)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Ipswich</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off Sheringham</td>
<td>Arrived Immingham with damage to E.R. and 3, 4 and 5 holds</td>
<td>27 saved, 5 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6-9</td>
<td>Antiklia... (951)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td>Tobruk</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Presumed Alexandria</td>
<td>Damage by near misses, which will take 21 days to repair</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12</td>
<td>Alphard... (5,643)</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>Calcutta via Port Said</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Port Said</td>
<td>Vessel set on fire, stern resting on bottom, being lightened preparatory to dry docking.</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>Collingdoc (1,781)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>Off Southend Pier</td>
<td>Arrival Gravesend in tow 21/7 with considerable E.R. and stokehold damage and water in No. 2 hold</td>
<td>Crew 21 and 3 gunners; 1 killed, 1 missing, 1 injured.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13</td>
<td>Scovtton (4,512)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Smith's Knoll</td>
<td>Engine damage by 2 direct hits. Ship arrived Tyne in tow 25/7</td>
<td>1 wounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td>S/S Tanker San Roberto (5,890)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Purfleet</td>
<td>Grangemouth</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Off Sheringham</td>
<td>Steering damaged UXB on board, later removed, vessel arrived Humber 21/7</td>
<td>No casualties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Tonnage</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>In Convoy or not</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Extent of Damage</td>
<td>Casualties to Crew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
<td><em>Unnurna</em> (4,419)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off Sheringham</td>
<td>Arrived Humber with steering gear and engines damaged</td>
<td>No casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23-27</td>
<td><em>M/V Tanker</em></td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Temporary repairs being carried out at Gibraltar</td>
<td>No casualties reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Hough Hood</em> (9,851)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24</td>
<td><em>S/S Passenger</em></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>E-boat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>W. Mediterranean</td>
<td>Arrived Malta with hole from torpedo in No. 8 hold</td>
<td>No casualties reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>and Cargo</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Sydney Star</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12,806)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26</td>
<td><em>M/V Cargo</em></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal and Govt. stores</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>S/M</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>68 miles N.W. Bloody Foreland</td>
<td>Damage not stated, presumed fairly extensive</td>
<td>No casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Atlantic City</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5,133)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following vessels previously shown as damaged are now known to be total losses and are included in Section 1 (A):

*Sangara, Dakotian* (British), *Antje* (Dutch).
## APPENDIX II.

**Merchant Ships (all sizes) other than Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, reported lost by Enemy Action up to 31st July, 1941.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Allied</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Together</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>2,670,000</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>544,000</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Craft</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>629,000</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>767,000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other causes or cause unknown</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,115</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,744,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>346</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,547,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.*—"Allied" figures include Polish; all French up to June 25, 1940; "Free" French from June 25, 1940; Norwegian from April 9, 1940; Dutch and Belgian from May 10, 1940; Greek from October 28, 1940; and Yugo-Slavian from April 6, 1941. "Neutral" figures include Italian up to June 10, 1940; "Vichy" French from June 25, 1940; and Yugo-Slavian to April 6, 1941.

## APPENDIX III.

(1) **Additions to and deductions from British Sea-going Merchant Tonnage (ships of 500 gross tons and over), including Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, from 2nd September, 1939, to 10th August, 1941.**

### Tankers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British ships on September 2, 1939</th>
<th>Additions</th>
<th>Deductions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New ships</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy ships captured</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships transferred from other flags</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roumanian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total additions</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>479,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deductions—**

Ships sunk by the enemy—

(i) Merchant ships commissioned for Naval Service—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>565,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Others—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>729,000</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>3,245,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ships captured by the enemy—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ships detained in French ports—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>59,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other deductions (including Marine Risk)—

(i) Commissioned for Naval Service—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Others—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>547,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total deductions—**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>861,000</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>4,014,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Net additions (+) or deductions (−)—**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>−40</td>
<td>−822,000</td>
<td>−275</td>
<td>−1,506,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**British ships on August 10, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>477</td>
<td>2,888,000</td>
<td>3,805</td>
<td>14,086,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the total Non-Tanker tonnage, vessels representing about 4 million gross tons are engaged on Naval, Military or R.A.F. Services (including some commissioned for Naval Service), some of which bring cargoes to the United Kingdom on their homeward voyage. After allowing for vessels (1) trading permanently abroad and (2) undergoing or awaiting repair, including the fitting of defensive protection, the balance is about 6½ million gross tons, some part of which is engaged in the coasting trade of the United Kingdom and Eire.
(2) Total losses of, and other deductions from, British Sea-going Merchant Ships of 500 gross tons and over, including Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, expressed as approximate annual rates of loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total losses sunk or captured by the enemy, and other deductions in the period</th>
<th>Approximate annual loss if column (2) losses continued for a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First 9 months of war</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e., from September 3, 1939, to May 31, 1940</td>
<td>1,095,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e., from June 1, 1940, to August 31, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month of September, 1940</td>
<td>1,061,000</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1940</td>
<td>945,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 1940</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1940</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January, 1941</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 1941</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1941</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1941</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1941</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1941</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1941</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures relate to losses so far notified, and may be increased by late notifications.

(3) Merchant Ships (100 gross tons and over) under construction in British Yards in the United Kingdom and abroad as at 1st August, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Gross Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colliers and coasting ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>162</td>
<td>897,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>334,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>919,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including 6 vessels (39,000 gross tons) building abroad, 2 merchant ships (18,000 gross tons) taken over by the Navy during construction and 6 ships (10,000 gross tons) of merchant type intended for Naval use.

In addition, there are 106 merchant ships, totalling 1,149,000 gross tons, on order or proposed to order in the United Kingdom and abroad (including 21 tankers of 145,000 gross tons).
APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the Enemy up to 12th August, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Finnish</th>
<th>Together</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>607,000</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>544,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1,322,000</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>776,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>518</td>
<td>2,277,000</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>1,620,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 58 ships of 109,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.
Also some 53 ships, totalling 320,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported during the period under review:

7th August. — Motor M/S 39 mined and sunk in the Thames Estuary.
9th August. — M.G.B. 62 sunk in collision in North Sea.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: Killed 6, Wounded 3, Missing 8, Prisoners 25.
Ratings: Killed 42, Wounded 4, Missing 4, Prisoners 3.
OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT BATTLE CASUALTIES.

0600 hours, Thursday, 7th August, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 14th August, 1941.

**Metropolitan Area.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 fighter pilots are safe.

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed.</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed.</th>
<th>Damaged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Italian.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed.</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed.</th>
<th>Damaged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Middle East.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed.</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed.</th>
<th>Damaged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Italian.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed.</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed.</th>
<th>Damaged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

**Germany.**

*Kiel.*—As a result of attacks up to May submarine construction has been greatly retarded owing to the heavy damage to the yards and docks.

*Cologne.*—Attacks in June and the first half of July have resulted in five main areas of damage to the city.

(i) The main station and cathedral square where, in addition to damage previously reported, the upper floors of the Hotel Baslerhof have been wrecked and the Deichmann House (which contained the agricultural office and the office of the local command) was completely destroyed. It appears that platforms 1 to 5 were all affected in the damage caused to the main station.

(ii) An area to the north of the main station bounded by the Dom Strasse, Maximinen Strasse, Johannis Strasse and the Dagobert Strasse, comprising a business and professional district.

(iii) The Breite and Hertzog Strassen, a shopping and entertainment centre, where the Scala and Agrippina Cinemas were among the buildings ruined.

(iv) The Sionstal district in the south of the city near the Rhine Harbour, which, owing to damage to the local gas works and water-pumping station, was without such facilities for a week.

(v) The Aachener Strasse and the residential suburb of Lindenthalguertel in the west of the city.

*Frankfurt.*—In attacks in the third week of July the East Railway Station and property in the Beethoven Strasse was damaged.

*Bremen.*—In the daylight raid on the 4th July five bombs hit the Weser Flugzeugbau aircraft factory and warehouses Nos. 14 and 18 in the Oberseehafen were completely destroyed.

*Hamburg.*—In recent attacks a refrigerator works in south-west Hamburg was damaged and eight bombs which fell in the Ditmar Koel Strasse (one of the main streets leading away from the landing stage) caused considerable damage.

*Emden.*—On the 26th/27th June a tramway depot was severely damaged and four adjoining houses destroyed.

*Mannheim.*—In the raid on the 21st/22nd July 400 persons are said to have been killed.
BRITISH (RED) AND FOREIGN (BLACK) MERCHANT SHIPPING LOSSES BY DIFFERENT FORMS OF ENEMY ACTION

Note: Includes vessels of all tonnages (but excludes Commissioned Ships). Italian losses are included up to June 10, 1940.

By Submarine
By Mine
By Surface Craft
By Aircraft
By other causes or cause unknown

AUG

This graph is based on information received in the Admiralty up to 1200 on Aug 11th 1941.
BRITISH (RED) AND FOREIGN (BLACK) MERCHANT SHIPPING LOSSES BY DIFFERENT FORMS OF ENEMY ACTION

Note: Includes vessels of all tonnages (but excludes Commissioned Ships). Italian losses are included up to June 10, 1940.

- By Submarine
- By Mine
- By Surface Craft
- By Aircraft
- By other causes or cause unknown

Naval Intelligence Division July 1941

This graph is based on information received at the Admiralty up to 1200 on Aug 11th, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

POST-WAR EUROPEAN NEEDS: PROPOSED ALLIED MEETING.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

At the close of the inter-Allied meeting on the 12th June I said: "It is not possible to hold such meetings continuously, but I hope that this meeting may represent the inauguration of a new phase of collaboration and that it may form part of the machinery through which victory will be won and by which peace will be maintained after victory."

Considerable interest has been shown in the possibility of holding further inter-Allied meetings as a symbol of Allied co-operation and for the discussion of specific problems. As His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had already announced their intention to promote measures for the supply of food and raw materials to Europe as soon as it has been freed from German domination, it seemed appropriate that the next inter-Allied meeting should discuss this question, which is of particular interest to the Allied Governments now in London and to their oppressed populations at home.

Last autumn, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, with the assistance of a Committee of officials and reporting to a Ministerial Committee under the Chairmanship of the Minister without Portfolio, was entrusted with organising the work in connexion with surplus commodities. This covered immediate action to assist producing countries and plans for the supply of post-war European needs. Sir F. Leith-Ross has been in consultation informally with certain of the Allied authorities concerned, but it is desirable to put these consultations on a more formal footing and to arrange for the future co-ordination of inter-Allied activities. It is therefore proposed to hold an inter-Allied meeting for this purpose.

Preliminary consultations with regard to such a meeting have taken place between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Dominion Governments, who are directly interested as suppliers, and also with the United States Government through the United States Ambassador in London. The Dominion Governments have agreed to be represented at the proposed meeting and to associate themselves with the Resolution, which it is intended to submit for adoption. The draft of the proposed Resolution is attached as Annex A.

The United States Government have expressed the view that "the undertaking is of great prospective usefulness," and that they are "ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects they can co-operate in accomplishing the aims in view." They have asked to be kept fully informed of the course of the inter-Allied discussions at the meeting and arising out of the meeting.

The United States Ambassador has been informed that we have in mind that, if the proposed Allied meeting produces satisfactory results, we hope to
approach the United States Government in due course with a view to establishing jointly with His Majesty's Government, and later with the other producing or stockholding countries, an organisation to examine the problem of the reprovisioning of Europe from the point of view of arranging for supplies to be made available. We also hoped that eventually information and views might be exchanged between this organisation and the Allied Bureau to be set up in accordance with section 6 of the draft Resolution (Annex A). The Ambassador was also informed that we had not overlooked the needs of neutral and enemy countries, which might well require consideration, and also the needs of countries outside Europe, such, for instance, as China.

Finally, they have authorised the British representative at the meeting to make a statement on behalf of the United States Government, the text of which is attached as Annex B. Section (5) of the draft Resolution regarding shipping has been amended to meet certain U.S. suggestions, and the concurrence of the United States Government in the amended text is now awaited before approaching the Allied Governments. The latter are, however, already aware of the general outline of our proposals.

It is proposed to invite to the meeting representatives of all the Allies, including the U.S.S.R. and the Free French. The meeting will be opened by an explanation of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the action they have already set on foot; the Allied representatives will then be invited to state their views, and, finally, the Resolution, which will have been agreed beforehand, will be submitted for formal approval. I would suggest that I should preside at the first meeting, and that the Minister without Portfolio should then be entrusted with any further discussions arising out of the meeting. The Secretaries of State for India and Burma, for the Dominions and for the Colonies should also be invited to the first meeting.

In my speech at Leeds on the 5th July, in my speech to the Foreign Press Association on the 29th July and in reply to a parliamentary question on the 6th August, I have already referred to the intention to hold another inter-Allied meeting in the near future. Preliminary arrangements have taken rather longer than was anticipated and, in view of the public interest aroused and the curiosity already displayed by some of the Allies, it is desirable to hold the proposed meeting as soon as possible. The 27th August is the date at present proposed, provided the American reply is received in time to enable the preliminary discussions to be completed with the Allies.

Foreign Office, August 16, 1941.

A. E.
ANNEX A

Draft Resolution.

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, and the Representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, agree—

1. That it is their common aim to secure that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available for the post-war needs of their territories.

2. That while each of the Allied Governments and authorities will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own territories, their respective plans should be co-ordinated, in a spirit of collaboration, for the successful achievement of the common aim.

3. That they welcome the preparatory measures which have already been undertaken for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of their power in pursuing the action required.

4. That accordingly, each of the Allied Governments and authorities should prepare estimates of the kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for the reprovisioning of its territories and the order of priority in which it would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as circumstances permit.

5. That the reprovisioning of Europe will require the most efficient employment after the war of the shipping resources controlled by each Government and of Allied resources as a whole, as well as of those belonging to other European countries, and that plans to this end should be worked out as soon as possible between the Allied Governments and authorities, in consultation as and when appropriate with other Governments concerned.

6. That a bureau shall be established by the Government of the United Kingdom under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, which they could consult in framing estimates of their requirements and which would collate and co-ordinate these estimates.

ANNEX B

The Government of the United States has been advised of the purpose of this meeting and acquainted with the terms of the draft note which has been distributed and of the draft resolution which is to be presented for consideration. It has requested my Government to state to this meeting its opinion that the undertaking is of great prospective usefulness. It understands that the present discussions will be of an exploratory nature, and states that its stands ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects it can co-operate in accomplishing the aims in view.

It has pointed out that any plans that may be worked out are of great potential interest to the United States for various reasons. They might affect the current American defence effort. According to their substance, form and method they might also affect commercial policies and relationships and even broader post-war arrangements. For these reasons it makes the request that it be kept fully advised regarding the course of these exploratory discussions, and that it be consulted regarding any plans which might emerge therefrom.
POST-WAR EUROPEAN NEEDS: PROPOSED ALLIED MEETING.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

As a result of the discussion on the 18th August of my memorandum of the 16th August (W.P. (41) 195), I circulate to my colleagues herewith the following revised draft of section 1 of the draft resolution (Annex A in the above paper) which it is proposed to submit for approval at the inter-Allied meeting:

"1. That it is their common aim that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available for the post-war needs of the countries liberated from Nazi oppression."

This revised draft has received the concurrence of the Minister without Portfolio.

The following changes have also been made in the draft resolution:

(a) The word "people" has been substituted for "territories" in the third line of section 2.

(b) The words "for the reprovisioning of its territories" have been omitted from section 4, line 3.

I now propose to communicate to the Allied Governments the revised resolution and to invite them to the proposed meeting, as suggested in my memorandum of the 16th August. I intend to approach the Soviet Government in the first place.

A. E.

Foreign Office, August 19, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

LORD HANKEY'S COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING OIL FROM REACHING ENEMY POWERS.

CAUCASIAN OIL.

1. It will be recalled that on the 22nd July, 1941, our Ambassador in Moscow reported a conversation with M. Stalin in which the latter expressed his intention to order the destruction of the Caucasian oil industry rather than allow it to fall intact into the hands of the Germans and accepted the principle of co-operation with us for the planning of oil demolition generally. Such co-operation, however, was only to be initiated at a moment considered suitable to M. Stalin who did not think that the time had yet arrived to enter into this exchange of information.

2. As a result of the serious view taken by the Chiefs of Staff of the menace to the Caucasus which may soon develop from the present position in the Ukraine, a telegram was despatched on 15th August, 1941, to our Ambassador urging him to enquire of M. Stalin how matters stand as to the demolition plans and whether the moment for consultation with our experts has not arrived.

3. The Ambassador feels that complete reliance cannot be placed in M. Stalin's declared intention to destroy the Caucasian oil industry in view of the resultant economic, and therefore political dependence on the Western Powers to which it would lead during, and more especially, after the cessation of hostilities. To overcome any last minute hesitation our Ambassador is anxious to be able to give assurances to the Soviet Government as to supplies of oil and equipment until Russian production can be restored.

Moscow Telegram No. 835 dated 22nd July, 1941.

F.O. Telegram No. 1050 dated 15th August, 1941.
4. We therefore propose that the Ambassador be authorised, at his discretion, to make a declaration in the following terms, if in his opinion the orders to destroy the Caucasian oil industry are likely to be dangerously delayed in the absence of some such declaration:

"(a) If the Soviet Government carry out their intention to destroy the Caucasian oil industry and require as a result to import oil both for their war purposes and during the period of postwar reconstruction, His Majesty's Government will assist the Soviet Union by every means in their power to obtain such supplies. To this end His Majesty's Government undertake in respect of oil supplies available within the sterling area, to accord to the Soviet Union both prior to the cessation of hostilities and, if necessary, for a period of two years thereafter, equality of treatment with Great Britain for essential requirements of equal importance.

(b) Conditions of purchase and payment for the oil to be agreed between the two Governments.

(c) For postwar requirements of oil the Soviet Union to receive in regard to ocean tanker tonnage and freight rates equality of treatment with Great Britain for essential requirements of equal importance.

(d) Replacement of drilling and refining equipment necessitated by the destruction of the Soviet Union of the Caucasian oil industry will, insofar as such equipment is available from within the sterling area, be dealt with by His Majesty's Government in accordance with the same principles as those laid down in this agreement for oil.

(e) The above undertakings are given on the basis that in such a case it is right for Governments which are allied during and after the war to assist one another as regards postwar reconstruction."

U.S.A. CO-OPERATION

5. The value to the Russians of our declaration will be greatly enhanced if it is supported by a similar declaration by the United States Government. In the particular case of tanker assistance during the war United States concurrence is essential and is, we think, likely to be forthcoming. We therefore propose that the United States Government be approached as soon as possible.

6. If, however, circumstances demand a declaration on our part before the attitude of the United States has been clarified, we recommend that the declaration referred to in paragraph 4 above be made unilaterally accompanied by a verbal statement to the effect that we are in communication with the Government of the U.S.A. with a view to acquiring their co-operation.
ALLIED TANKER CO-OPERATION.

7. The Minister of War Transport attaches great importance to relating the proposed British declaration to other existing and future arrangements affecting the use of Allied tonnage for common purposes both during and after the war. In view of the importance of avoiding delay and of having in readiness a self-contained and unequivocal British undertaking we have not inserted any reference to the Allied governments in the text of the declaration.

We consider it essential, however, that the Minister of War Transport should be free in the event of the undertaking being given to the Soviet Government, at his discretion, to inform the Allied Governments concerned that such an undertaking has been given and to enlist their co-operation.

FINANCIAL COMMITMENT.

8. From the information submitted to us it would appear that the financial commitments resulting from our declaration might, if the war lasts for two years after demolition, amount to about £100,000,000. It is, however impossible to make any accurate estimates. It is intended that the Soviet Government should repay in full, over a period of years, the value of any oil and equipment supplied as a result of our undertaking.

CONCLUSION.

9. We are anxious that Mr. Berthoud, oil adviser to the Moscow Missions, who is now in London, should return to Moscow as soon as possible with full instructions.

10. In view of this and the serious view taken by the Chiefs of Staff of the military situation in the Ukraine we invite the Cabinet as a matter of urgency to give their authorisation to the proposals outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 and to the procedure recommended in paragraph 6 above.

Signed on behalf of the Committee.

HANKEY.

Chairman.

Great George Street, S.W.1.
19TH AUGUST, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The attached despatch from the Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner at Canberra about the political situation in the Commonwealth of Australia will, I think, be of interest to members of the War Cabinet.

Dominions Office, August 21, 1941.

Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom,
Canberra, July 14, 1941.

My Lord,

I have the honour to report on the proceedings of the late meeting of the Federal Parliament, which reassembled on the 25th June and adjourned on the 4th July till the end of August, when the Budget will be submitted.

The House of Representatives about a third of the time was devoted to a debate on the international situation. The debate was opened by a speech by Mr. Curtin reaffirming the Labour Party’s full support of the war and generally endorsing the Prime Minister’s “prospectus of an unlimited war effort,” subject to a mild and cautiously worded reservation as to the Prime Minister’s reference to “the vexed question of the rights and obligations of labour in war time,” or, in other words, to the proposed prohibition of strikes in war industries. Mr. Curtin also accepted the view that “the battle in the Middle East is of crucial importance to Great Britain and Australia,” but emphasised that Australia “cannot afford that battle to go against it in circumstances that precluded the subsequent movement of the Mediterranean Fleet into the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic Ocean”; for, in that event, Singapore, “instead of being a bastion for Australia, would become merely a service station for an enemy.” Similarly, while recognising that, “as things now stand, the Middle East and Singapore can be regarded as outer bastions of Australia,” Mr. Curtin submitted that “no nation completely denudes its last line of defence, which is its own territory, in order to resist the enemy at an outpost,” and that “there must be some assessment between the manhood required for production in Australia and for defence within Australia, and the number of men we can use for service overseas.” Finally, referring to the equipment of air support of the forces in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Mr. Curtin said:—

“A certain amount of thinking is going on throughout Australia in respect of what are now known to be the reasons why we were driven out of Greece and Crete. It is only reasonable to say that the Government of this country, and I hope also the Government of the United Kingdom, will have regard to what I believe to be the undoubted public feeling on this matter. I shall not attempt to put it into words.”
3. Mr. Curtin’s restraint was not imitated by his followers, and the rest of the debate largely consisted of a series of speeches by Labour members, mainly from New South Wales, accusing the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Governments of “cold-blooded murder” in sending inadequately equipped troops to be “butchered” in Greece and Crete. Among these speakers, Mr. Beasley, a member of the Advisory War Council, was particularly vehement, declaring that “when our troops were thrown into battle in Greece they lacked almost all essential equipment”; demanding that the United Kingdom Government should be told in unambiguous language “that never again will Australian soldiers be allowed to fight in such unfavourable circumstances”; and declaring that the responsibility fell on Mr. Churchill, who was “not entitled to the tributes that have been paid to him” and did not “adorn his high office.” The impression created by the speeches, in at any rate some quarters of the House, was expressed towards the close of the debate by a Government member, General Rankin. After referring to General Wavell’s initial victories, he said, amidst loud applause:—

“Honourable members opposite were prepared to bask in the reflected glory of the Australians at that time. But when we met reverses... honourable members opposite began to squeal. It was not squealers who made the name of the A.I.F. in the last war, and it is not squealers who will win this war. There are some members of the Opposition whom I admire. Some of them took their part in the last war, and others...”

4. Before the debate was concluded the behaviour or remarks of members had twice made it necessary to apply the censorship. On the second day some provocative remarks by a youthful Labour member led to an exchange of challenges and counter-challenges to join the army, and on the following morning to further incidents in the Hall of Parliament House of so undignified a character that the Government decided to prohibit the publication of a report of them in order to prevent the discrediting of Parliament. On the last day of the debate a Labour member disclosed that the Minister for the Army had stated in secret session that one hostile armoured division would be sufficient to conquer Australia. Owing to a blunder by a censorship official, the instructions issued by the Government that this remark should be censored, was applied to the whole of the debate, including not merely Mr. Beasley’s speech, but the Minister for the Army’s reply to it. It is characteristic that, though it was at once explained that the Government had not intended that the censorship of the debate should go beyond one particular statement, not only Labour politicians, but the Sydney press, including the Sydney Morning Herald, treated the incident as if it had been a deliberate attempt by the Government to muzzle Parliament and stifle criticism.

5. Shortly before Parliament adjourned, the Prime Minister, in response to an appeal by Mr. Curtin, agreed to postpone the introduction of a Bill for the purpose of giving effect to a decision which he had announced in his broadcast of the 17th June, in the following terms:—

“The time has passed for merely protesting against strikes and lockouts in war and allied industries. We propose to prohibit them, and to accompany that prohibition by giving to the Courts full powers to take the most vigorous action against those who counsel or encourage them.”

Mr. Curtin’s appeal was, in effect, that the Government, before proceeding to “disciplinary action,” should give those concerned one more chance to see whether industrial peace could not be secured by consultation and negotiation; and in responding to it the Prime Minister was actuated by the desire to go as far as possible to meet and co-operate with the moderate elements in the Labour Party. Nevertheless, this fresh and glaring example of the Government’s practice of announcing a decision to make a stand and then hastily withdrawing was bound to have a most damaging effect on their prestige both in Parliament and the country. The effects were accentuated by the return which the Government met for this concession on the following day, when, in the absence of Mr. Curtin, they were defeated three times by the combined votes of the Labour Party and Mr. Wilson, the independent member who held the balance.
6. In my telegram No. 227 of the 5th July I reported the Prime Minister's reaction to these political developments, and in my telegram No. 230 of the 7th July I reported the immediate sequel, namely, the calling off of the Sydney Waterside Workers' strike under pressure from Federal Labour politicians, including Mr. Beasley, on the ground that if it went on the Government would use it to precipitate a general election on the industrial issue. Though this particular incident has been closed, there is a possibility that the Government may be presented with a further opportunity by the New South Wales engineers, who have called a stop work meeting on the 28th July to discuss plans for a strike of engineering shops, ammunition annexes and aircraft plant if their demands for increased wages and improved working conditions have not been previously conceded. In the meantime the Prime Minister has declared that a recent stoppage at the Broken Hill Pty. Co.'s works at Newcastle has caused damage to the war effort which was "deliberate and could hardly have been improved upon by an open enemy of the country." Mr. Curtin, on the other hand, has delivered a most conciliatory speech re-emphasising his party's determination not to use their parliamentary numbers merely to embarrass the Government, and holding up the new system of parliamentary committees as indicating that "political partisanship is giving way to national well-being."

7. The present position, therefore, seems to be that the Prime Minister remains in favour of fighting, on the industrial issue, and would take the opportunity of a serious strike in the war industries to bring matters to a head, e.g., by reintroducing the Bill for prohibiting strikes and lockouts in war industries. The section of the Labour Party represented by Mr. Beasley and Dr. Evatt, while reluctant to fight on this issue, would be prepared to turn the Government out on the issue of broadening the base of taxation which will be raised by the forthcoming Budget. Mr. Curtin, on the other hand, who still remains the most powerful influence in the Parliamentary Labour Party, would prefer the maintenance of the status quo. In these circumstances the immediate political future is likely to depend upon whether the Labour leaders can avoid any serious industrial disturbance before Parliament reassembles, and, if so, upon whether it will be possible for Mr. Curtin and the moderate elements in the party to arrange a repetition of the compromise reached between the Government and the Labour Caucus on the Budget proposals submitted last December.

8. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

(Signed) R. R. SEDGWICK,

Acting High Commissioner.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RESUMÉ
(No. 103)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 12 noon August 14th, to
0700 August 21st,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. Our shipping losses have again been light. Destructive raids by our aircraft have caused serious casualties to enemy shipping in the Mediterranean.

Home Waters.

2. On the 18th August H.M.S. Prince of Wales arrived in Home Waters on completion of the Prime Minister’s visit to President Roosevelt.

On the 18th an enemy aircraft, which attacked a group of minesweepers off the East Coast, was destroyed.

H.M. Destroyer Quorn was damaged off Cromer by a mine. War Nizam (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) sustained damage in an air attack off the East Coast.

During an air raid on Lowestoft the naval stores, offices and canteen were demolished and a tug was sunk in the harbour.

During the week approximately 9,000 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk or seriously damaged by aircraft of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands. A number of small ships were also successfully attacked.

North Atlantic.

3. Early on the 19th the Norwegian Destroyer Bath, while escorting an outward-bound convoy to Gibraltar, was torpedoed and sunk by a U-Boat 520 miles west of Ushant. There were forty-six survivors, two of whom subsequently died.

H.M. Corvette Picotee is overdue and must be presumed lost. She was on convoy duty to Iceland (C) when last reported.

South Atlantic.

4. H.M.S. Despatch intercepted the German s.s. Norderney (3,667 tons) which scuttled herself and subsequently sank. She sailed from Para, Brazil, on the 9th August. The Italian s.s. Stella (4,272 tons), which sailed from Pernambuco on the 30th July, was intercepted by H.M. Armed Merchant Cruiser Circassia, and is being taken into Bermuda.

Mediterranean.

5. On the 13th August H.M. Schooner Kephalonia foundered while on passage from Alexandria to Tobruk.

During the week under review Blenheim and Swordfish aircraft from Malta have sunk or seriously damaged 44,600 tons of enemy shipping between Sicily and the African coast, details of which are given in the Air Section. A destroyer, which was escorting a convoy, was torpedoed by Swordfish aircraft and probably sunk.

The Spanish s.s. Berga (804 tons), bound for Genoa with a cargo of pyrites for Frankfort, was intercepted off Almeria and brought into Gibraltar by an armed guard. Interception was made possible by the connivance of the Basque captain and the first officer, who navigated their ship outside territorial waters. This ship had recently been purchased by the German trade organisation in Madrid.

The Netherlands Submarine O. 23, operating in the Central Mediterranean, attacked a convoy escorted by four destroyers and probably hit two ships.

During the week ten French merchant ships (44,242 tons) eastward, and four (17,769 tons) westward have passed Gibraltar under escort.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

6. H.M. Canadian Corvette Alberni, escorting an outward bound convoy to Canada, claims to have destroyed a U-boat 500 miles north-east of St. John’s, Newfoundland. H.M. Trawler Stella Capella made an attack off Wick and five attacks were made by aircraft without definite results; two in the Bay of Biscay.
one south-west of Iceland (C), one in the Western Approaches, and one off Cape Wrath.

In the Mediterranean our aircraft have twice attacked a U-boat in Bardia Harbour.

**Enemy Intelligence.**

7. No change has been reported in the positions of the main German and Italian units.

The Turkish Government has given permission for the Italian Fleet Auxiliary tanker *Paresio* to proceed into the Black Sea.

**U-Boats.**

8. Over thirty German U-boats and six Italians have been operating in the Atlantic. It is estimated that some of the Germans have been operating in a central area of the North Atlantic to the southward of Iceland (C). Six or seven are known to be on the convoy route to the westward of Finisterre.

On the 18th August air reconnaissance located thirteen U-boats in Norwegian waters.

**Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.**

9. According to the information at present available, shipping casualties during the week have again been light. An outward-bound convoy to Gibraltar, which had previously been located by enemy aircraft, was attacked by U-boats in the Western Approaches to the westward of Ushant, and three ships were sunk. One ship on passage from Gibraltar to Canada was sunk 400 miles west of Oporto. One ship was sunk and another seriously damaged by E-boat attack off Cromer. A north-bound convoy was repeatedly attacked by aircraft on the East Coast, but only one ship was damaged; the first attack was carried out by at least six aircraft, one of which was destroyed and two others damaged by gun-fire from the ships in convoy and their escort. A British tanker was damaged by a torpedo from aircraft north of Port Said.

**Protection of Seaborne Trade.**

10. During the week ending the 20th August, 790 ships, including 141 Allied and 16 neutral, were convoyed. Two anti-aircraft ships, ten armed merchant cruisers, seventy-three destroyers and ninety-two sloops, corvettes and minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 16th August totalled 618,817 tons, compared with 881,859 tons during the previous seven days and an average of 855,938 tons during the past ten weeks. Oil imports totalled 216,512 tons. Mineral imports amounted to 151,745 tons, of which 103,978 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Timber and wood pulp imports were 14,257 tons; copra and palm oil 18,729 tons and cereals 50,851 tons. Other food imports amounted to 134,633 tons, of which the principal commodities were: sugar 66,208 tons; cocoa 7,036 tons; fruit 3,205 tons; cheese 2,805 tons; eggs 1,460 tons; tea 733 tons. There were also 2,145 tons of unspecified tinned goods. Tobacco imports were 3,200 tons. There were also large quantities of machinery, high explosives and other war material.

**British Minelaying.**

11. No minelaying by surface craft has been carried out during the week under review.

Aircraft have laid mines in the Baltic, and off the Dutch, Belgian and French Atlantic coasts.

**Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping**

12. Minelaying by enemy aircraft has been confined to the East Coast, between the Humber and the Farne Islands, with one night only of slight activity.
in the Thames Estuary. Seven magnetic and six acoustic mines have been destroyed during the week. The totals now are: magnetic 1,335, acoustic 938, contact 1,021.

In the Mediterranean, Mersa Matruh was raided by minelaying aircraft on one night during the week, and the port is closed.

**Enemy Merchant Shipping.**

**German.**

13. It has been reported that five transports loaded with artillery, motor transport and troops left Trondheim between the 12th and 14th August.

**Italian.**

14. The press report that the *Cape Arma* (3,175 tons) had been sunk by one of our submarines is incorrect. This ship has arrived at Trieste. The tanker *Giove* (5,211 tons), which had been scuttled at Massawa, has now been raised and taken in prize.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**

**Russo-German Campaign.**

15. During the past week the main and most successful German effort has continued to be in the Ukraine, although an advance has also been made eastward of Lake Peipus on the Baltic Front and there are indications of a thrust southwards from the Smolensk sector.

**Finland.**

16. The only developments of importance on the Finnish front have occurred on the north-west shore of Lake Ladoga. As the German-Finnish claim to have taken the towns of Sortavala, at the extreme north corner of the lake, and Hittola, at the western corner, is probably true, it should not be long before the enemy holds the whole of the north-western shore.

**The Baltic Front.**

17. The German effort on this front has been intensified. Their forces have probably joined hands north of Lake Peipus, but Tallinn and Baltisk, and possibly also Narva, appear still to be holding out. The Germans have advanced beyond Kingisepp, 12 miles east of Narva, along the railway towards Leningrad, and east of Lake Peipus a drive towards Novgorod appears to be developing favourably.

**White Russia.**

18. A south-easterly drive is developing in the direction of the Bryansk-Gomel railway. The reference in the Soviet Communiqué to heavy fighting about Gomel suggests that the advance has made some progress. Its continuance may be designed to take in flank the defences on the River Dnieper about Kiev and further south.

**Ukraine.**

19. In the Kiev sector, the Russians appear to be continuing their successful resistance to German pressure.

20. South of Kiev, however, German forces have reached the Dnieper at Kremenchug, and have captured Krivoi Rog, 70 miles due south. In the southern part of this sector they are advancing successfully and rapidly on the Lower Dnieper as the Russians withdraw, and, with the capture of Nikolaev, have completed the encirclement of the Odessa area.

**Operations.**

**Egypt and Libya.**

21. Operations around Tobruk and in the frontier area have been chiefly confined to patrol activity and artillery duels. On the 15th August three
companies of enemy motorised infantry attempted an advance in the coastal sector east of the frontier, but were held up by our minefields and later withdrew.

22. On the 16th August an increase of 600 enemy M.T. in the frontier area was observed. Recent arrivals of Italian troops have consisted mainly of drafts for units already in Libya.

Abyssinia.

23. Pressure on the enemy garrisons at Gondar and Wolchoffit is being maintained.

Convoys.

24. The following have arrived at Suez by convoy:
- 1st/5th Essex Regiment (161 Inf. Bde.).
- 4th Northumberland Fusiliers (Recce. Bn. 50th Division).
- One Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery.

Intelligence.

Italy.

25. There are indications that the garrison of Sicily, which during the Greek war was reduced to two divisions, has been reinforced. No certain identifications have yet been made, but the fact of reinforcement may be accepted, and the present strength of the garrison is provisionally estimated at 3–4 divisions.

Roumania.

26. The Danube bridge at Cernavoda was bombed on the 10th August and one end of the bridge was severely damaged by fire. Railway communication between Constanza and Bucharest is being carried on by the use of a temporary structure by which passengers and goods are transferred to another train. It is estimated locally that repairs to the bridge will take three weeks. The pipeline to Constanza, which crosses the Danube by this bridge, was cut by the bombing, but it is believed that repairs to this can be quickly carried out.

Yugoslavia.

27. Reports of guerrilla fighting and sabotage continue and are believed to be widely distributed. The Italians in Montenegro have been harassed by bands from the Sandjak and from Southern Herzegovina, an area which has been proclaimed as "Free Unoccupied Yugoslavia." The capture by these guerrillas of several villages in Bosnia is reported, while the railway between Split and Zagreb has been the subject of repeated acts of sabotage. Drastic punishments, according to official German announcements, continue to be inflicted on the "Communist rebels," but the insurgents are clearly gaining confidence.

Manchukuo.

28. It is estimated that the total Japanese strength in Manchukuo and N.E. Korea is—
- 19 Divisions (includes 2 in N.E. Korea).
- 2 Cavalry Bdes.
- 4 Tank Regiments.

In addition, there are approximately 250,000 troops of the local Manchukuoan Army which can be used for garrison duties, and so release the majority of the Japanese first-line troops for offensive operations.

The main Japanese concentration is taking place in Eastern Manchukuo and North-Eastern Korea, whilst a strategic reserve seems to be forming in the area along the railway Dairen–Mukden–Harbin. There are subsidiary concentrations in the Hailar–Sulun and Heiho areas.

A considerable amount of material and stores have been landed at Dairen, which appears to be the main base port for the Japanese forces in Manchukuo.
Indo-China.

29. It is believed that the majority of the 40,000 Japanese troops destined to garrison Indo-China have now arrived. The main dispositions of these troops appear to be in accordance with the agreement with Vichy, i.e., in the vicinity of the air and naval bases—the bulk being located in the Saigon area. There is no confirmation of press reports that the Japanese are massing troops on the Thai frontier, though it is probable that small detachments have been reconnoitring at various points in Central and Northern Indo-China opposite that frontier. A likely inference is that Japan contemplates a more complete control over Indo-China than the official agreement with Vichy envisaged. From the point of view of military operations against Thailand, Japan would get no advantage from stationing troops in Northern and Central Indo-China, in view of the absence of communications leading therefrom to vital objectives in Thailand. Should, however, the Japanese take over aerodromes in the most westerly province of Indo-China, they would acquire air bases within 400 miles of Rangoon.

30. It is believed that the French are proposing to withdraw all their troops from the south to the north of Indo-China, with the exception of a “token” force at Cap St. Jacques, guarding the entrance to Saigon.

General Review.

31. Attacks on industrial and other targets in Germany and in Occupied Territory were on a heavier scale than in the previous week. A particularly heavy raid was made on Hanover.

German activity over this country remained at a low level.

Aircraft from Malta inflicted heavy losses on enemy shipping in the Mediterranean.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

32. Bomber Command despatched 157 sorties compared with 102 last week, and dropped 44 tons of H.E. bombs and 124 incendiaries by day. Fighter Command flew 2,270 aircraft sorties.

33. Blenheims, escorted by fighters, successfully attacked several targets in Northern France and in Holland. A shell factory in Marquise, near Boulogne, was bombed on two occasions by a total of eleven Blenheims; bombs fell close to the factory and on a nearby railway junction where much traffic had been previously observed. The docks at Boulogne were attacked by eleven Blenheims, which scored hits on buildings on the east side of No. 5 Dock. The Fives Steel and Engineering Works at Lille were bombed by nine aircraft which, in spite of heavy A.A. fire, dropped bombs across the northern end of the works. Six aircraft scored several hits on the railway centre at Hazebrouck, where A.A. fire was intense and accurate. Among other targets attacked were the aerodromes at Alkmaar in Holland, and at Longueness, near St. Omer; bursts were seen on both aerodromes, and on a hangar at Alkmaar.

34. Two Fortress bombers attacked the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest. Results were difficult to observe owing to heavy A.A. fire, but one of the eight 1,100-lb. bombs which were released was seen to burst in the dock area, and it is believed that the others fell in the town.

35. In addition to providing escorts for bombers, Fighter Command aircraft carried out offensive sweeps over Northern France and attacked objectives in Brittany. During these operations we lost thirty fighters, but three pilots were rescued; casualties inflicted on the enemy totalled 61 fighters destroyed, 18 probably destroyed and 35 damaged.

Night.

36. Bomber Command despatched 878 sorties compared with 675 in the previous week. Operations were carried out on five nights only, the programmes
for the other two being cancelled as a result of unfavourable weather. The main objectives were industrial and railway centres and dockyards in Germany, and docks in the Low Countries and in Northern France. Nearly 900 tons of H.E. bombs, including several of the heaviest type, and 65,000 incendiaries were dropped. Our aircraft encountered intense A.A. fire and exceptional searchlight activity.

37. Duisburg was attacked on three nights by a total of eighty-two aircraft, which dropped 110 tons of H.E. bombs and nearly 10,000 incendiaries. Several large fires were started, including a large oil fire on the west bank of the river, and two in the railway yards. Cologne, which was attacked on two nights, received 135 tons of H.E. bombs and 12,000 incendiaries. Hits were obtained on factories, and on the main railway station, on or near which fell two heavy bombs, one of 4,000 lbs. and one of 2,000 lbs. Several large fires were seen.

38. The heaviest weight of bombs was released on Hanover, on which over 192 tons of H.E. bombs and 16,500 incendiaries were dropped. In spite of a heavy A.A. barrage and exceptional searchlight activity, hits were obtained on the goods station and on a factory. Two large areas were on fire in the middle of the town, and the woods to the east of the town were also set alight.

39. An attack on Kiel took place in extremely bad weather and only a few of the sixty-eight aircraft despatched were able to identify their targets. Eighty-two tons of H.E. bombs were dropped and several fires were observed.

40. Other targets hit included the railway centre and Focke-Wulf airframe factory at Bremen and the railway station at Brunswick. A large factory was set on fire at Düsseldorf.

41. Successful attacks were also made on docks in the occupied territories. Bursts were observed across the docks at Rotterdam and three fires were started in the Waalhaven. At Dunkirk incendiaries started several large fires, which merged into one large conflagration which was visible many miles out to sea, while at Havre the Basin Vauban was hit several times.

42. Havocs of Fighter Command and Blenheims and Hudsons of Coastal Command attacked aerodromes in Northern France and in Holland. Results were generally unobserved except at Soesterburg, where bombs were seen to fall on the flare-path.

United Kingdom.

43. Fighter Command flew 844 patrols (3,450 sorties) by day, and 438 patrols (517 sorties) by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. Shipping patrols and cross-channel offensive operations again account for the bulk of our effort.

44. Enemy activity by day has been negligible, only nine aircraft having been plotted over the coast. Shipping reconnaissance aircraft and night fighters have operated each night, but on the same small scale as during the last few weeks. Apart from Hull, which was attacked on one night, no concentration was made on any target.

Coastal Operations.

45. Coastal Command flew 238 patrols (350 sorties) and provided escorts for 85 convoys (301 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 638 (1,445 sorties).

46. Aircraft of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands have continued their successful attacks on enemy shipping. A merchant vessel of 2,000 tons which was attacked off Heligoland from 50 feet by three Blenheims received two direct hits and was left in flames and in a sinking condition. A tanker of 6,000 tons off Le Touquet was attacked by a Beaufort and probably torpedoed. A Hudson on patrol off the Southern Coast of Norway hit a 1,000-ton merchant vessel, and a Blenheim machine-gunned two merchant vessels of 4,000 tons each and two of 800 tons off the Alshoean Light.
47. Several trawlers were also attacked and three of about 300 tons each were sunk off the Dutch Coast. Another was hit by incendiaries and set on fire, and others were machine-gunned. Two reporting vessels were bombed north of Nordeney, and a third was set on fire north-west of Ijmuiden.

48. Aircraft of Fighter Command scored several hits on barges and armed drifters off Ostend, and one vessel was left sinking. "E" boats off Calais and Le Touquet were also attacked, and a Whirlwind scored hits on a trawler leaving Cherbourg.

49. Twenty-three aircraft layed mines in the Baltic, off the Frisian Islands, Boulogne, Brest, St. Nazaire, Lorient and in the Maas Estuary.

50. No enemy minelaying was reported during the week. Attacks by aircraft on our shipping off the East Coast are referred to in the Naval Section.

Central Mediterranean.

51. Blenheim and Swordfish aircraft from Malta have continued their day and night offensive against enemy shipping between Sicily and the African coast, with the following results:

- Destroyer torpedoed, almost certainly sunk.
- 4,000-ton Tanker bombed and seen to explode.
- 4,000-ton Tanker bombed and left on fire.
- 800-ton Schooner bombed and left on fire.
- 800-ton Schooner bombed and left with a heavy list.
- 6,000-ton Merchant Vessel torpedoed and almost certainly sunk.
- 3,000-ton Merchant Vessel torpedoed and almost certainly sunk.
- 3,000-ton Merchant Vessel torpedoed.
- 8,000-ton Merchant Vessel sunk by bombs and torpedo.
- 9,000-ton Merchant Vessel torpedoed, beached and subsequently set on fire by bombs.
- 6,000-ton Tanker torpedoed, left on fire.

On one occasion enemy fighters successfully prevented a day attack on a convoy, but during the night a successful torpedo attack was made by Swordfish.

52. Three heavy night attacks were made on the harbour at Catania. The Central and Port Railway Stations were hit, and a fire, apparently oil fed, was visible 70 miles away. Shipping was almost certainly damaged, and photographs show a large burnt out area among trucks and cargo on the Central Quay. Barracks at Passero were also bombed and left on fire. Fighters carried out high and low level sweeps over Southern Sicily, but no fighter opposition was encountered. Seven seaplanes were destroyed or severely damaged at Syracuse, where oil cisterns were attacked with cannon fire and three balloons were shot down in flames.

53. Tripoli (L) was attacked on two nights by a total of nine Wellingtons, but, though bursts and fires were seen on the Spanish Mole, accurate observation was hampered by a smoke screen. A Maryland engaged in leaflet dropping over Tunisia was shot down by French fighters.

54. The enemy made a few ineffective night raids on Malta. On the 19th August twelve enemy fighters approached the Island, but were chased back to Sicily, where three of them were destroyed. On the 21st at dawn three fighters with nine others as high cover attempted a low flying attack on two aerodromes, but caused no damage. Our fighters were unable to engage them owing to bad visibility.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

55. Wellingtons made two heavy night attacks, totalling 53 sorties, on Benghazi and on enemy aerodromes at Beren and Benina. Bombs were seen to burst among hangars and dispersed aircraft, and the control office at Benina was set on fire. At Benghazi bursts were seen on the Central and Cathedral Moles.
and on railway sidings. An attack was also made on Bardia, where a submarine was reported to be lying, but, apart from a fire near the mole, no results could be observed.

56. No important offensive operations were undertaken by day except on the 16th and 20th August, when a total of 30 Marylands bombed gun positions east of Tobruk and tank concentrations near Bardia. During these operations our fighters provided escort and attacked enemy advanced landing grounds. Tomahawks and Hurricanes made several daylight sweeps without encountering opposition, and covered our coast-wise shipping. An attack on one of our convoys by 3 Me. 110s escorted by 13 Me. 109s was broken up, and the enemy jettisoned his bombs. Two Marylands returning from a shipping reconnaissance between Derna and Crete bombed an enemy camp near Bardia, obtaining hits among tents and M.T. vehicles.

57. The enemy has continued his attacks on Tobruk and Mersa Matruh, principally by night. Slight material damage was done, and there were a few casualties. Mines were also dropped, resulting in the temporary closure of the harbour at Mersa Matruh. Attacks were made on the camp at Moascar and on the R.A.F. Station at Ismailia. Four aircraft and a small oil dump were destroyed, and buildings were slightly damaged. On the night of the 18th/19th, and on two following nights, bombs and mines were dropped in Alexandria and the Canal Zone, but without causing serious damage or casualties.

Greece and Eastern Mediterranean.

58. On the night of the 13th/14th the Corinth Canal was attacked by 32 Wellingtons, four of which also bombed Heraklion Aerodrome, Crete. There is good reason to believe that, as a result of these attacks, the canal is blocked. Reconnaissance flights were made from Egypt over Crete and Greece, and shipping searches were made between Crete and Bardia.

On the 14th, eight enemy aircraft bombed Larnaca and Limassol in Cyprus, damaging two factories, and on the 21st Famagusta was attacked by three Italian aircraft. Bombs fell on A.A. gun positions, in the town and in the sea, and there were some military and civilian casualties.

East Africa.

59. A total of 96 sorties were flown by Royal Air Force and South African Air Force aircraft against enemy positions in the Gondar, Wolchefit and Debarech areas. Hits were observed on the fort at Debarech, the depot at Gondar, and on hangars at Azozo Aerodrome. No enemy aircraft were encountered.

Russia.

Air Operations.

60. The continuation of air activity on an intensive scale is undoubtedly having its effect on the German Air Force. It is proving impossible to provide close support, particularly fighter protection, on the scale that is required. There is little doubt that concentrations of effort can at the present time only be made at a limited number of points and that the transfer of close support units from one sector of the front to another is being found necessary. Apart from the above, which arises largely from the enormous length of the front, it must be expected that units will have to be withdrawn for re-forming. This will probably be done on a gradual scale, but nevertheless will have an appreciable effect on the scale of operations that can be carried out.

61. The very considerable long-range bomber force on the Russian front is being largely employed for tactical bombing, as opposed to its normal role. This may be due in part to the continued resistance of the Russian Air Force, which limits the range of bombers during daylight to that of the fighters. Generally, the German Air Force has been able to provide very adequate support to the army during the whole campaign. On the other hand, it is clear that the
resistance of the Soviet Air Force has been far more formidable than was anticipated, and the Russian air raids on Berlin seem to have come as a complete surprise to the Germans.

**Russian Air Defence System.**

62. Members of the British Military Mission in Moscow recently paid a visit at night to a mobile A.A. battery, consisting of four 76 mm. guns stationed about 11 miles north-west of Moscow in the neighbourhood of Tushino. Single enemy aircraft were raiding Mosco sporadically on that evening. The guns put up a barrage fire at a height of 16,000 ft. The barrages are fired at varying heights by order of the regimental H.Q. The instruments at the gun position included a height and range-finder predictor of Russian make and illuminated dials on the guns electrically connected to the predictor. The guns and instruments were in shallow pits, with the guns in a semi-circle around the predictor, about 25 yards away. A few Russian night fighters were up most of the time. In normal circumstances they seem to operate outside the barrage zone, but if chasing an enemy aircraft they can penetrate it, relying on the very distinctive sound of their engines or on recognition signals to avoid being shot at.

63. The members of the Mission were impressed by the density of the guns and lights. The main ring of guns and lights seems to be about 15 miles from the centre of the city. The lights are occasionally grouped, but are not worked as clusters. One enemy aircraft was picked up by lights on that night and held for a long time by about fifteen searchlights.

64. It seems that the principle on which the Russians have based their ground defence from air attack is a thick light and barrage hedge with a radius of some 15 miles, backed up by inlying batteries, which include a large number of light A.A. guns, sited to guard vulnerable points. The expenditure on ammunition is very great.

**Soviet Raids on Roumanian Targets.**

65. It has now been possible for members of the British Air Mission in Moscow to study an air photograph of the Ploesti refineries of the Astra and Unirea Companies taken on the afternoon of the 13th July, 1941, following two raids which were made on the previous night. Many fires were plainly visible, mostly in the area of the Unirea refinery. Details of the damage are as follows:

(a) Many tank cars were hit in the Unirea Refinery. Four tanks containing between 2,500 and 5,000 tons each were hit and the escaping oil was burning over the surrounding area. The main line railway tracks had been hit in the vicinity of the refinery, while in another part of the installation two tanks containing approximately 2,500 tons of oil had been hit and several smaller ones damaged.

(b) In the Astra refinery area, six small and three medium (up to 5,000 tons) tanks were hit in the north-west corner of the refinery area close to the cracking units. The escaped oil had spread the fire. A direct hit on a tank of about 5,000 tons was registered in another part of the plant and three smaller tanks were also destroyed.

Three bombs landed nearer to the centre of the plant and a fire could be distinguished in or close to the boiler station and electric power house, while adjoining buildings of lesser importance appear to be damaged. A tank car train was cut in two and many cars damaged or destroyed.

The Russians claim that they damaged or destroyed 200 tank cars and 10 medium (up to 5,000 tons) tanks and 25 small (up to 1,000 tons) tanks. Excluding damage by splinters, and other minor damage, it is thought that the Russians only destroyed or damaged 100 tank cars, while about 25 or 26 tanks were damaged or destroyed.
HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

66. Bombs were dropped on three days of the week only. The 16th August produced the most noteworthy incidents. In the early afternoon the Montrose-South Esk Viaduct was hit and several nearby houses demolished. The main east coast line was blocked probably for two weeks, but a satisfactory diversion is in use. Later in the day a distillery at Banff was hit, and set on fire, and 60,000 gallons of whisky were destroyed.

Next day the main Edinburgh-Newcastle line was closed for seven hours by a U.X.B. at Innerwick, near Dunbar, and one of a repair gang was killed by machine-gun fire.

By Night.

67. Bombing attacks, very similar in character to the previous week, took place each night of the week. The east coast counties of England and Scotland were mostly affected, and a large proportion of bombs in these scattered attacks were of an anti-personnel type.

The most serious attack took place at Hull on 17th/18th August, when nearly 200 houses and shops were demolished or seriously damaged and 20 people killed, but the attack was neither long nor heavy.

The following night 19 people were killed in a smaller attack on West Hartlepool, and there was some bombing in the Tyneside and Tees-side areas. At Middlesbrough, the slag disposal plant of Dorman Long's Steel Works was extensively damaged, and it is thought that production will be reduced for a time to one-third.

On 17th/18th, the Duke of York's Military School at Dover was damaged by shell fire, and on 19th/20th workshops of the Southern Railway boatyard in Dover harbour were seriously damaged by bombs, whilst others damaged the quayside at Wellington dockhead.

Casualties.

68. During the week ending 0600 on the 20th August, 66 people were killed and 42 seriously injured.

No casualties occurred in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III
will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the Enemy up to 18th August, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>827,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>712,000</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>554,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,376,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>2,022,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reported as sunk or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>destroyed by S/M, A/C,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>523</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>1,561,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>3,865,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 61 ships of 119,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 54 ships, totalling 324,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels have been reported during the period under review:

15th August.—M/S Trawler Adam slightly damaged in Dover Straits by enemy coastal batteries. One casualty.

16th August.—Armed Boarding Trawler Northern Sky damaged by aircraft south-east of the Faroes.

Night 15th/16th August.—Tug Ness Point sunk in Lowestoft during air raid.

19th August.—A/S Trawler Thorbyrn bombed and sunk off Tobruk.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: killed 9, wounded 8, missing 13.

Ratings: killed 24, wounded 20, missing 103.

Seven of the officers and 62 of the ratings reported missing are believed to be prisoners of war from H.M. Submarine Cachalot.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 14th August, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 21st August, 1941.

Metropolitan Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 fighter pilots are safe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

Of the above totals, 1 aircraft was destroyed by A.A. fire.

Middle East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italian.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and intelligence sources:—

Germany.

Berlin.—On the night of the 2nd/3rd August members of the Hitler Youth were called out to assist the civil and fire defence services, whose personnel was not at full strength owing to holidays. Damage was mainly in the suburbs, and was most severe in the districts of Ruhleben, Charlottenburg, Moabit and Neubabelsberg near Potsdam. In order to make ambulances less conspicuous a regulation has been issued prohibiting the ringing of bells on ambulances called out during and after air raids.

Cologne.—The German papers, both national and local, have always been most carefully censored so as to give no information of damage caused in raids. It is therefore of considerable interest that for the first time some evidence of damage at Cologne has been obtained from this source, and it is thought this is indication of the severe dislocation that must have been caused in this city in recent raids.

France.

Lorient.—In the raid of the 4th/5th July the torpedo section at the Arsenal was damaged and the main railway line between Lorient and Hennebont station was destroyed in several places by direct hits. The Germans themselves caused further damage to these tracks with their dynamite charges in attempting unsuccessfully to destroy a bomb that had failed to explode.

Le Trait.—Photographs taken during the daylight attack on the 12th August show six bomb bursts in the target area and a believed direct hit on a merchant vessel under construction. The damage caused in the previous raid on the 22nd July is clearly shown on these photographs.

Brest.—In the raid of the 4th/5th July considerable damage was caused to railway property in the port area. There were five direct hits on the tracks to Paris just outside the main station.

Italy.

Further reports of the last two attacks on Naples state that two tramp steamers were sunk and the cruisers Giuseppe Garibaldi and Duca Degli Abruzzi each received a hit on the stern. The Giornale d'Italia of the 13th June states that in the previous year there were 70 air raids in which bombs were dropped and three naval bombardments. The total damage to private and public buildings (excluding damage to railway and industrial property, furniture and fittings) amounts to about £1,250,000 at pre-war rate of exchange.
Revision of Submarine Programme.

Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

1. The 1940 supplementary programme and the 1941 new construction programme together provided for the laying down of the following submarines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>S Class</th>
<th>T Class</th>
<th>U Class</th>
<th>Mine Layers</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the 1941 programme was approved by the War Cabinet on the 24th April (W.M.(41) 43rd Conclusions, Item 5) the development of the war has made it necessary to review the whole of our plans of submarine construction.

2. On the one hand the increasing scale of enemy attacks on our shipping have inevitably thrown a greater burden on repairs on the west coast where the principal submarine building yards are situated, and the needs of our import programmes have made it necessary to give precedence to repairs over new construction. At the same time, the German Air Force launched a number of heavy attacks on the west coast shipbuilding centres, and two of the yards specialising in submarines, at Barrow and Greenock, suffered considerable damage. Much dislocation was also caused by widespread damage to the homes of the workers. Consequently, it became apparent that the resources on which we had been relying would not be able to achieve the full submarine programme in spite of the vigorous efforts made to maintain production. It was estimated that within the period covered by the 1940 supplementary and 1941 programmes, the number of submarines which could be laid down if existing plans remained unaltered, would be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>S Class</th>
<th>T Class</th>
<th>U Class</th>
<th>Mine Layers</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Need for Expansion of Submarine Strength.

3. While enemy action was reducing our capacity at home, enemy strategy in other spheres, - and especially the Mediterranean - was increasing his dependence on sea-borne supplies, with a corresponding need - to which the Prime Minister drew attention - for the expansion of our own submarine strength in order to exploit these new possibilities of striking at the enemy.

4. Exceptional steps to this end were therefore clearly called for, and the Admiralty, at the request of the Prime Minister, have just completed an investigation designed to discover new resources for submarine building and to obtain greater numbers of submarines from existing capacity.

Expansion of Capacity.

5. It will be appreciated that it is not easy to find new capacity, partly because of the heavy strain already imposed on our whole shipbuilding resources by Mercantile and Naval work, and partly because submarine construction is a highly specialised business requiring ......
requiring, for success, special technique and unusual experience. It has, however, been possible to bring into this field a yard of the Tyne which was engaged on submarine construction during the last war. This yard, which will undertake the smaller U Class vessels, will be helped by Barrow, and fitting-out will be accelerated by using men at Elswick who will become available from heavy gun mountings. It is also proposed to transfer from Barrow to other yards material prepared for seven S Class submarines of the 1940 supplementary programme. This will enable Barrow to concentrate on two types, the T. Class and U. Class. Furthermore, two of the Royal Dockyards, not previously engaged in submarine construction, will each undertake two T. Class vessels.

Review of Composition of Existing Programmes.

6. Simultaneously the layout of existing programmes has been reviewed in order to obtain greater numbers by reducing the more difficult types and increasing those which can be built more quickly. The mine-laying submarines will not be built at all.

Revised Programme.

7. As a result of these measures, it is now proposed to substitute, for the submarines of the 1940 supplementary and the 1941 programmes shown in paragraph 1 above, the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>Class.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>T.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>Layers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition it is proposed to proceed with engines for three S. Class submarines to form a reserve.

Effect of Revised Programme.

8. It will be seen that by these changes we shall not merely offset the loss of production due to enemy attack, but shall even lay down two more submarines than were contemplated in the original programmes. Moreover, by increasing the proportion of smaller and more easily constructed vessels, we shall, in many cases, obtain earlier delivery varying between three to twelve months. The Admiralty are, of course, doing their best at the same time to speed up work on all submarines, and once INDOMITABLE is completed at Barrow, we hope to be able to put more men on to submarines.

Financial Effect.

9. These changes, for which I ask Cabinet approval, will also lead to a saving of about £870,000 although the money will, of course, be spent more quickly. It will also be possible, in later programmes, to order more submarines than would have been the case had the original intentions been followed.

Submarines from U.S.A.

10. I should add that we have also been trying to obtain submarines quickly from America. I doubt, however, whether any considerable reinforcement will be available from this source, as the only submarines which the Americans have agreed to provide are so old that it is doubtful whether it would be economical to employ highly trained and valuable personnel in order to use them for operational purposes.

Admiralty, S.W.1.
August 22, 1941.

A.V.A.
REPORT ON THE ACTION OF THE 2ND ARMoured DIVISION.

THE attached Report by Brigadier A. F. Harding, C.B.E., M.C., and Air Commodore L. O. Brown, D.S.C., A.F.C., on certain aspects of the G.H.Q., M.E., Report (circulated under cover of W.P. (41) 159) on the action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March–April 1941, is circulated by the direction of the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E. E. BRIDGES,
Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W. 1,
August 22, 1941.

REPORT.

BRIGADIER HARDING was the B.G.S. to H.Q., Cyrenaica Command, and Air Commodore Brown was commanding the R.A.F. in Cyrenaica at the time of the withdrawal.

2. On instructions from the A.O.C.-in-C. and the C.G.S. the report was examined with a view to determining the extent to which the statements in paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 in Appendix “B” of the G.H.Q., M.E., report was justified. These paragraphs read as follows:—

(i) The false air reports on the 3rd April, about the enemy being at Msus.
(ii) The frequent changes of orders and regrouping consequent on these air reports, which resulted in the disintegration of formations and units.
(iii) Lack of tactical Reconnaissances, particularly in the latter stages.

3. With regard to paragraphs (3) and (4), the air reports concerned are:

(i) A tactical reconnaissance carried out at 1400 hours on the 3rd April by a No. 6 (A.C.) Squadron operating from Msus landing ground. The pilot reported enemy A.F.V.'s and M.T. moving towards Msus.
(ii) Strategical reconnaissance carried out by a pilot of No. 55 Squadron, which reported that at 1530 hours on the 3rd April, 1941, there was a force of 100 tanks and M.T. in Msus. (Paragraph 19 of the G.H.Q. report refers to both these reconnaissances.) As a result of the first reconnaissance report the Commander, 2nd Armoured Division, made a change in plan.

[22831]
4. It is agreed that the reports were made, and there is nothing to disprove that forces were, in fact, there. The question as to whether they were enemy or friendly must have been appreciated at the time of the report. It is not known how it was established that the forces reported were enemy.

5. The facts surrounding the circumstances leading up to the first reconnaissance have been supplied by Flying Officer Fletcher, and are as follows:—

The flight was under the command of the 2nd Armoured Division from the time that Division took over the front South of Agedabia prior to the German advance.

At the commencement of the enemy advance Squadron-Leader R. E. Weld, Commanding No. 6 Squadron, was sent forward to command the detached flight in view of the impending operations.

(i) The Flight was ordered by Div. H.Q. to move from Agedabia to Antelat, which it did at 0400 hours on the 2nd April. The flight operated from Antelat on the 2nd April under orders of Div. H.Q., which was then situated at Antelat.

(ii) On the morning of the 3rd April the Flight discovered that Div. H.Q. had left Antelat during the night without their knowledge, and no information was forthcoming until later regarding the new position of the H.Q. A reconnaissance was, however, ordered by Squadron-Leader Weld in the area of Agedabia, and this reconnaissance reported the movement of forces from Agedabia N.E. towards Antelat. At this time there were none of our own troops in the Antelat area. In the absence of orders from Div. H.Q., and in view of the situation, the Flight moved to Msus at about 0700 hours. On arrival at Msus, the only troops in the vicinity were a few Free French troops in the Msus Fort, about 2 miles north of the landing ground. These Free French troops were unable to give any information concerning the position of our own troops in the area, nor were they able to say where Div. H.Q. was situated. It was not until noon that a message was received from Div. H.Q. giving their position as just North of Es Sceleidima, about 30 miles West of Msus.

(iii) At about 1330 hours of the 3rd April a tank recovery party with unserviceable tanks in tow passed through Msus aerodrome, and the officer i/c stated that he was the last party of our own troops to come back from the Antelat area, and that they were going further back as they had no idea of the position on the ground, nor did they know where Div. H.Q. was situated.

(iv) No orders were received from Div. H.Q. for their requirements in Tactical Reconnaissance, but Squadron-Leader Weld ordered a quick reconnaissance to be carried out along the track between Msus and Antelat at about 1400 hours. The pilot of this reconnaissance was Flying Officer Fletcher. On this reconnaissance he observed a column consisting of a few armoured cars and between 50 and 60 large Italian lorries filled with troops. The head of the column was 5 miles South of Msus. The personnel in the lorries opened fire on the reconnaissance aircraft. The pilot carried out a low-flying attack on the column, and on his return to Msus found that the aerodrome had been evacuated. The pilot observed the C.O.'s car near the Msus fort and dropped his report near the car, after which he flew his aircraft back to the base aerodrome at Barce. On arrival at Barce, a report was submitted through the A.I.L.O. to Force H.Q. It was subsequently ascertained from Squadron-Leader Weld that he ordered the evacuation of Msus aerodrome, as he had observed the approach of the column from the ground. The ground party of this Flight had considerable difficulty in rejoining its Squadron, and during its retreat it caught up with Div. H.Q. at the Er Regina Pass east of Benina. This ground party eventually rejoined the Squadron at Maraua on the 5th April.
6. At the time the Msus landing ground was evacuated the Free French were still in the Fort. Although we have no confirmation, it seems probable that the information concerning the column approaching Msus reached the Free French from ground observation, or as a result of the Tactical Reconnaissance message which was dropped on Officer Commanding No. 6 Squadron, and, acting on their own initiative, they destroyed the dump. The destruction of this dump was not ordered by Command H.Q. It is understood that Captain Hore-Ruthven, K.R.R.C., was with the Free French at Msus at the time, and a report will be obtained from this officer, who is in Syria, and forwarded later.

7. Although it is stated that the first report on this day led the Commander, 2nd Armoured Division, to change his plan with the object of securing the dump at Msus before the arrival of the enemy force, consideration of time and space would have shown that this was impossible, and it can only be assumed, therefore, that the 3rd Armoured Brigade was allowed to proceed for other reasons.

8. With regard to the second reconnaissance report the same day, no further information is available. It is agreed that the report was based on the presence of some forces in Msus at the time. It seems most likely that the Free French had evacuated Msus by the time of this report, i.e., 1830 hours, and the 3rd Armoured Brigade did not leave for Msus until first light on the 4th April. The inference, therefore, is that the force observed in Msus at 1830 hours was the enemy, and may have been the force that later appeared at Mechili. The fact that the 3rd Armoured Brigade found Msus unoccupied on the 4th April does not prove that there were no enemy there on the previous evening, and the enemy column reported South of Msus might have halted there on its way to Mechili.

9. Further, with regard to the Recovery Section mentioned in the G.H.Q., M.E., Report having gone through Msus, it will be seen from Flying Officer Fletcher's report that a Recovery Section passed through Msus before the first reconnaissance was carried out. We have been unable to trace the source of the report that L.R.D.G. might have been mistaken for an enemy column moving on Msus. The composition of this unit does not in any way tally with Flying Officer Fletcher's report of what he saw. Moreover, Major Mitford, who commanded the L.R.D.G., states that his party went through Msus between 1630 and 1700 hours on the 3rd April.

10. The above facts show that neither of the two reports can therefore be clearly classified as 'False Air Reports.'

11. The reference to 'Frequent changes of orders and regrouping consequent on these air reports' is not understood. There appears to have been only one change in orders, namely, the diversion of the 3rd Armoured Brigade from the Scaleidima Escarpment to Msus.

12. With regard to paragraph 7 of the G.H.Q. report, i.e., 'Lack of Tactical Reconnaissance, particularly in the later stages,' in our appointments as O.C., R.A.F., Cyrenaica, and B.G.S., H.Q., Cyrenaica Command, we were personally responsible for the co-ordination and provision of all air reconnaissances, both Tactical and Strategical. Detailed orders for Tac/R carried out by the detached Flight were the responsibility of the 2nd Armoured Division, under whose control the Flight was operating.

13. During the period prior to the main German advance the full requirements of the 2nd Armoured Division for Tac/R could not be met owing to the shortage of suitable aircraft, and it was necessary at times to lend aircraft from fighter squadrons for the purpose.

14. As a result of representation made by General Neame, the detached Flight had been made up in strength in aircraft by the time the main German advance began. Thereafter all Tactical Reconnaissance requirements were met. It is agreed, however, that the general standard of efficiency of No. 6 Squadron pilots in Army Co-operation work was not of the high standard of the Army Co-operation Squadron that had co-operated with Western Desert Force and XIII Corps during the advance into Cyrenaica. This was due to the general inexperience of the terrain over which the pilots were operating, as they only took over in March.
15. With regard to Strategical Reconnaissances, these were provided by the Bomber Squadron, and all demands from Command H.Q. were met, in addition to Strategical Reconnaissances required for R.A.F. purposes.

16. There is nothing in the body of the G.H.Q., M.E., report that supports the statement made in paragraph 7 of Appendix "B." It does not correspond with our knowledge of the facts, and we do not know on whose reports or statements it was made.

17. Although not referred to in Appendix "B.," another "False Air Report" is referred to in paragraph 29 of the G.H.Q., M.E., Report, which reads as follows:

"Another false air report occurred on the evening of the 5th April, when Tactical Reconnaissance reported an enemy move northward from Mans. Cycom was deceived into ordering an immediate renewal of the general withdrawal, but, on being informed by Divisional H.Q. of the true facts, they withdrew the order."

18. We have no recollection of this report, and the order to continue the general withdrawal was given on receipt of an air report of the advance of an enemy column of considerable force on the El Charruba. Subsequent reports from K.R.R.C. patrols stated that this column consisted of elements of the 2nd Armoured Division; this led to the cancellation of the order for a further general withdrawal that night.

19. From ground and air reports received the following day it transpired that this column was, in fact, elements of the 2nd Armoured Division being followed by German forces, and orders were given for the general withdrawal to be resumed that night (the 6th/7th April) in consequence.

(Signed) L. O. BROWN, A. F. HARDING,
Air Commodore, Brigadier, General Staff.
August 20, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

MEMORANDUM:

I give below, for the information of the Cabinet, some account of the conversations which took place at my recent meeting with President Roosevelt. This indicates, in broad outline, the course of the discussions and the final results achieved under the various headings. To it is appended, in Annex III, a report on the conversations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff.

I also attach (Annex IV) a diary and record of the personnel of the Mission. I would draw special attention to the holding of Divine Service on the quarter-deck of H.M.S. Prince of Wales, attended by President Roosevelt, with his staff of officers and representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy, and Marines. All were impressed with this episode.

W. S. C.

August 20, 1941.
JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

At one of our first conversations, the President told me that he thought it would be good if we could draw up a joint declaration laying down certain broad principles which guide our policies along the same road.

Wishing to follow up this most hopeful suggestion, I gave him, on August 10, a tentative outline of such a declaration. The text was as follows:—

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of Speech and Thought, without which such choice must be illusory;
Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce, not only within their territorial boundaries, but between the nations of the world;
Fifth, they seek a Peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective international organisation will afford to all States and Peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds, and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or the need of maintaining burdensome armaments.

At our meeting on the morning of August 11 the President gave me a revised draft (Annex I), which we took as a basis of discussion.

Before examining this document the President explained that his idea was that there should be issued simultaneously in Washington and London, perhaps on the 14th August, a short statement to the effect that the President and the Prime Minister had held conversations at sea, that they had been accompanied by members of their respective staffs; that the latter had discussed the working out of aid to the democracies in the Lease and Lend Act; that these naval and military conversations had in no way been concerned with future commitments other than as authorised by Act of Congress.
The statement would proceed to say that the Prime Minister and the President had discussed certain principles relating to the civilisation of the world and had agreed on a statement of them.

I deprecated the emphasis which a statement on these lines would lay on the absence of commitments. This would be seized on by Germany and would be a source of profound discouragement to the neutrals and to the vanquished. I very much hoped, therefore, that the President could confine the statement to the positive portion which dealt with the question of aid to the democracies, more especially as the President had guarded himself by the reference to the Lease-and-Lend Act.

The President accepted this. There followed a detailed discussion of the revised text of the declaration. Several minor alterations were easily agreed.

The chief difficulties were presented by Points 4 and 7, especially the former. With regard to this, I pointed out that the words “without discrimination” might be held to call in question the Ottawa agreements, and I was in no position to accept them. This text would certainly have to be referred to the Government at home and, if it was desired to maintain the present wording, to the Governments in the Dominions. I should have little hope that it would be accepted. Mr. Sumner Welles indicated that this was the core of the matter, and that this paragraph embodied the ideal for which the Administration had striven for the past nine years. I mentioned the British experience in adhering to Free Trade for eighty years. I said that, if the words “with due respect for their existing obligations” could be inserted, and if the words “without discrimination” could disappear, and “trade” be substituted for “markets,” I should be able to refer the text to His Majesty’s Government with some hope that they would be able to accept it.

As regards Point 7, I pointed out that while I accepted this text, opinion in England would be disappointed at the absence of any intention to establish an international organization of peace after the war. I promised to try to find a suitable modification, and later in the day I suggested to the President the addition to the second sentence of the words “pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security.”

I telegraphed these amendments for immediate submission to the Cabinet. I had not finished dictating the telegram much before 2 p.m., and that I should have had in my hands within the next 12 hours the Cabinet’s most helpful reply reflects the utmost credit on all concerned.

The Cabinet, in their reply, suggested a further variant of Point 4, and desired the insertion of a new paragraph between Points 4 and 5.

Meanwhile, I had heard that the President had accepted all the amendments which I had submitted to him on 11th August.

On 12th August, about noon, I went to see the President, to agree with him the final form of the Declaration. I was accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook, who had arrived that morning. I put to the President the Cabinet’s revised version of Point 4, but he preferred to adhere to the phrasing already agreed,
and I did not like to press him further on the point. He readily accepted the insertion of the new paragraph desired by the Cabinet. A number of verbal alterations were agreed, and the Declaration was then in its final shape (Annex II).

It was only after this that I received the telegram (Abbey 35) giving the results of the further meeting of the Cabinet on the morning of 12th August. This telegram made clear the reasons for the misgivings which the Cabinet felt on the subject of Point 4. But I feel that the final text with the words "with due respect for their existing obligations" governing, as they do, the whole paragraph, sufficiently safeguards our position.

The profound and far-reaching importance of this Joint Declaration is apparent.

The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a Declaration is astonishing.

The inclusion in it of a reference to "the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny" (this was based on a phrase appearing in my original draft) amounts to a challenge which in ordinary times would imply warlike action.

Finally, not the least striking feature is the realism of the last paragraph, where there is a plain and bold intimation that, after the war, the United States will join with us in policing the world until the establishment of a better order.

FAR EAST.

Our hope had been to induce the President to give a strong warning to Japan against any further encroachment in the South-West Pacific, and to give to us and the Dutch an assurance that we should have the armed support of the United States in the event of our being attacked by the Japanese.

Accordingly on the 10th August I handed to the President the following short memorandum proposing a system of "parallel" communications to the Japanese Government:

**Declaration by United States Government that**—

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South-West Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter-measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

**Declaration by His Majesty’s Government.**

Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading:—

"... their support of them, His Majesty’s Government would give all possible aid to such Power."
Declaration by Dutch Government.

Same as that by His Majesty’s Government.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

On the following morning, the 11th August, I discussed these proposals with the President.

It was clear at once that, on consideration, the President had decided that he would be unable to give an assurance that he would go to Congress for authority to give armed support.

He referred to certain negotiations that had been proceeding with the Japanese Government, culminating in a set of proposals by the latter. The Cabinet will have already seen the telegram in which I summarised these proposals. It is true that they included an assurance that Japan would station no further troops in the South-Western Pacific area except French Indo-China, and a contingent promise of ultimate withdrawal from the latter. But a number of the conditions attached were obviously wholly unacceptable.

The President declared that he was under no illusion as to the value or the sincerity of these proposals, but he thought it would be useful to pursue a discussion of them, if only for the sake of gaining, say, a month’s time.

He assured me that the economic measures against Japan would meanwhile be maintained in full force, and he seemed to think that this was the most that he could do. He did not offer to give any further warning to Japan, and I think that in this he may have been under the influence of Mr. Sumner Welles, who seemed to be of the opinion that the time for warnings was past.

I pointed out that the Japanese promise to withdraw from Indo-China was conditional on “the settlement of the China incident.” This plainly indicated that the Japanese intention was to attack Yunnan northward from Indo-China and to cut the Burma Road. It would, therefore, be essential to make it clear that a condition of continuing discussions with the Japanese would be that they should not use Indo-China as a base for operations against China.

The President readily agreed to this. He explained that, when the discussions were resumed, he would renew his proposals for the neutralisation of both Siam and Indo-China.

Most important of all, he finally agreed to end his communication to the Japanese Ambassador with a warning, in the words which I had given him on the previous day, that any further encroachment by Japan “would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.” He proposed to add that it was, of course, obvious that, the Soviet being a friendly Power, the United States Government would be similarly interested in any conflict in the North-West Pacific area.

I authorised the President to inform Japan that in this matter His Majesty’s Government were in accord with the United States Government and would co-operate fully with them.
The President said that he would at once telegraph to Mr. Cordell Hull to arrange for the Japanese Ambassador to call upon him on his return to Washington, and to tell his Excellency that he would have an important message to deliver. He would see the Ambassador as soon as possible, and would give him the message in writing.

I later asked for a copy of this message, but I was told, at the time of our departure, that it had not yet been drafted.

The President, however, assured me, on more than one occasion, that he would include in it the final words which I have quoted above. Evidently this is the crucial part of the message, and I am confident that the President will not tone it down. He has a copy of the record of our conversation in which this wording is reproduced. Mr. Sumner Welles undertook that a copy of the draft of the message would be given as soon as possible to His Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington.

Even taken by itself this warning should have a considerable deterrent effect on Japan. And when we remember that the Japanese will already have suffered the shock of the Anglo-American joint declaration, I think we may hope that they will pause before proceeding to further outrage.

**ATLANTIC ISLANDS.**

The President stated that he had indications from certain quarters that a German move might be made into the Peninsula about the 15th September. It would be possible for his forces, destined for the Azores, to be ready by approximately the same date; that is to say, it would take three weeks to embark them and five to six days to get the ships there. The President had received a note from Doctor Salazar, dated the 29th July, acknowledging his own communication, in which he had given assurances concerning respect for Portuguese Sovereignty over the islands. From a passage in this note, the President had inferred that Portugal would be ready to invoke the aid of the United States if, in certain circumstances, His Majesty’s Government were unable to assist. The President said that in his view the way to proceed would be for His Majesty’s Government to intimate to Doctor Salazar that they, owing to their preoccupation elsewhere, would be unable to send him the assistance promised, and to ask whether he would therefore accept the assistance of the United States. If Doctor Salazar agreed, he would have to inform the United States that he would accept their assistance, together with a token contingent from Brazil. The President explained that it was essential for his own purposes that he should have a direct request from Doctor Salazar.

I said that we must recognise that the Operation "Pilgrim" might fire the whole train in the Peninsula. We must therefore have simultaneously a naval force to protect the Azores against forestalling German action pending the entry of American forces. The President pointed out that the United States
Government would be unable to send forces to the Azores and to the Cape Verde Islands simultaneously. Moreover, there was this difference, that the former were in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the latter were east of 26 degrees. He might be able to work them into a scheme, but would make no definite promise here and now. He added that, unlike Operation “Pilgrim,” the occupation of the Azores could be done in any month of the year.

It was agreed that the first step would be for His Majesty's Government to inform the United States Government that they had warned Doctor Salazar of the possibility that they would be precluded from giving Portugal the assistance promised.

**WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENCE PLAN No. 4.**

A Plan for early assistance by the United States Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic had previously been worked out and, as the President now stated that the United States were ready to implement this plan, the necessary steps to put it into force were agreed upon.

At an early date (it is hoped by the 1st September) the United States Navy will take over the responsibility for the safety of our North Atlantic Convos to the West of 26° West. They will be assisted by units of the Royal Canadian Navy. With the exception of the occasional escorts necessary for our troop convoys, we shall thereby be enabled to withdraw the majority of the units of the Royal Navy now in the Western Atlantic for employment in other areas.

This unparalleled gesture of friendship by a neutral Power is to be made under the guise of protection for United States communications with Iceland (C). The measures taken will continue to be guided by our own experienced Officers. All details were worked out and agreed in detail by the Naval authorities.

W. S. C.
Annex I.

Joint Declaration.

(Revised draft handed to the Prime Minister by President Roosevelt, August 11, 1941.)

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see self-government restored to those from whom it has been forcibly removed.

Fourth, they will endeavour to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they hope to see established a peace, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in security within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance to all peoples that they may live out their lives in freedom from fear.

Sixth, they desire such a peace to establish for all safety on the high seas and oceans.

Seventh, they believe that all of the nations of the world must be guided in spirit to the abandonment of the use of force. Because no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, to use force outside of their frontiers, they believe that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will further the adoption of all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Annex II.

Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister.

August 12, 1941.

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other. Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.*

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ANNEX III.

BRITISH-AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STAFF DISCUSSIONS.

The following is a summary of the ground covered by the Chiefs of Staff discussions with the Americans:—

General Points.

2. During the three days at Placentia Bay, three joint and a number of individual discussions were held between the First Sea Lord, C.I.G.S., and V.C.A.S. on our side, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, C.-in-C., Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval War Plans, General Marshall, Chief of Staff, and Major-General Arnold, Army Air Corps, on the American side.

* The text of the Joint Declaration was subsequently agreed by telephone with His Majesty's Embassy at Washington (Telegram 3798 from Washington) and a number of alterations made. These were all verbal, except the omission of the word "more" in line 5 of paragraph 8.
3. The discussions were conducted in a frank and friendly atmosphere. The Americans, while ready to listen to our point of view, took every opportunity of impressing upon us the many problems and difficulties which confronted them. These may be summarised as follows:

(i) America is as yet far from being prepared for active operations on a war footing. While the American Navy is in a more advanced state of readiness, the building up, training and equipping of the American army and air corps is still in embryo and the shortage of equipment is acute.

(ii) American public opinion, as well as their Chiefs of Staff, will insist upon a considerable measure of new equipment being allotted to their new army and air forces.

(iii) Subject to (i) and (ii) above, the Americans will in time give us much material.

(iv) We are not, however, the only claimants. The Russian demands and, to a lesser degree, the demands of other friends, e.g., China, cannot be set aside.

Strategical Discussions.

4. In their present non-belligerent state the American Chiefs of Staff are primarily concerned with questions of supply and organisation. They have, however, taken away with them, and will shortly comment on, a Review of general strategy which we had prepared for them. We think that their main comment will be that we attach too much importance to the bombing offensive and that we have given the production of heavy bombers an unduly high priority. We found that they had only vague ideas as to the employment of their forces if they came into the war.

5. We were successful in convincing the Americans of the correctness of our policy to fight in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in accepting this policy as sound, the Americans felt that we should not over-allot equipment to the Middle East at the expense of other vital theatres. The quantities of equipment available from the United States would be limited by (a) shipping, and (b) the rival claims of the United States rearmament and of other countries besides ourselves. Consequently, they think that we should be careful not to embark on a major extension of our effort in the Middle East which it might be impossible to sustain.

Atlantic Islands.

6.—(i) The President favours operation "Pilgrim" either in anticipation of, or after, a German move.

(ii) The President has interpreted a communication which he received from Dr. Salazar as meaning that, if the Germans move into the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese Government would make a token resistance in Portugal and then transfer to the Azores. On the assumption that we were too pre-occupied elsewhere, they would then be prepared to accept American protection for these
Islands. The President has said that he is prepared for American forces to look after the Azores, if invited to do so, and that the necessary forces could be ready to move at fairly short notice, i.e., in about three weeks.

(iii) The Cape de Verde Islands are our responsibility.

(iv) The Americans would like us to leave sufficient of our troops in Iceland (C) to enable the United States Marine Brigade to be withdrawn and held in readiness for operations elsewhere. On the other hand we, who are fighting, are anxious to release all our troops from Iceland (C) so as to avoid divided control and to free them for use elsewhere.

( NOTE.—The Americans make the point that Iceland (C) and the Azores are technically within the Western Hemisphere: the Cape de Verde Islands and the Canaries are not. )

**North and West Africa.**

7. The Americans think that the Germans can, and will, move down through Spain to North and West Africa whenever they wish. The Americans have only made a preliminary study of possible operations against Dakar, and they will have no forces available for many months.

Staff studies, which we had prepared on possible operations in Morocco and against Dakar, were given to the Americans.

**South America.**

8. The Americans showed concern, to an extent which we had not previously realised, at the possibility of Axis penetration into South American countries, particularly Brazil, in most of which active German organizations already exist. They are holding forces in readiness to occupy key points in South America and are negotiating with Brazil for a leased base.

**Far East.**

9. American Military planning is at present concerned almost entirely with the Western Hemisphere. Discussions about the Far East were, therefore, mainly confined to the naval aspect. The defences of the Philippines are weak, e.g., the A.A. defences of Manila have recently been increased from 2 to 4 guns. A squadron of flying fortresses (9 aircraft) and a few tanks have been sent there. The Americans have, we think, rather exaggerated hopes of the effect of operations, particularly air, from the Philippines against a Japanese expedition to the South China Sea.

**Production and Equipment.**

10. As explained above, the American Chiefs of Staff are very naturally obsessed with the shortage of equipment for their new forces. They are much exercised to arrive at a correct order of priority for our requirements and a fair allocation of new production.
11. They complain about our present methods of stating our requirements. They say that the Joint Staff Mission and the British purchasing commissions do not work hand in glove. As a result, the American authorities receive requests for material through more than one channel and these often conflict. Furthermore, they are not given a clear indication of the relative importance of the requirements of each Service, nor are the items on any one list given an order of priority.

12. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the allocation of war material between the various claimants should be done on the basis of strategical requirements. They think that our lists should come to them through the Joint Staff Mission, with whom there could be free and frank discussion of the military grounds for our demands, which could be weighed up along with their own and those of other friendly countries and an agreed allocation made. They would prefer this as an alternative to the present arrangement whereby they receive demands through civilian organizations who are not in a position to state the military case.

13. We are in sympathy with the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff in this matter, particularly as, to an increasing degree, our supplies of American equipment will be under lease-lend arrangements and not from our own contracts. We earnestly hope that our machinery can be adjusted to fit in with their methods, as otherwise we do not feel that we shall get sympathetic consideration for our demands.

14. It is possible that a solution to this problem would be to appoint a prominent man as head of our Mission in the United States with the virtual status of a Minister of State. Under him the Joint Staff Mission would be responsible for discussing strategy and for putting forward our proposals for the allocation of war equipment; while a civil staff would be responsible for dealing with the supply of raw materials, food, shipping, &c.

**Naval Points.**

15.—(i) *Plan No. 4.*—This is referred to in the Prime Minister’s report.

(ii) *A.B.C.* 1.—This is a report of the British-American Conference held in Washington in January 1941 and is looked upon by the Americans as their Bible. A number of minor points came to light during the discussion and were adjusted.

(iii) *A.B.D. Report.*—This is the report of the American, British and Dutch Conference at Singapore. The American Chiefs of Staff had previously expressed their disagreement with certain points, and these were cleared up in discussion with the exception of the initial dispositions of British Naval forces, and a fresh document is being prepared for the concurrence of the Americans.

**Army Points.**

16.—(i) The army discussions took the form of a general exchange of information.
(ii) The Americans aim at a first expansion programme amounting to a total, including army air arm, of about 1,700,000 men to provide primarily for the needs of home defence, garrisons overseas and forces to support Canada; also to occupy strategic points in South America to protect the Panama Canal. The programme allows for 35 Divisions in all, including 6 armoured Divisions. Two Marine Divisions, well trained and equipped, are the only forces ready for war at the present time.

(iii) Equipment and trained personnel for the new formations are still lacking, and there is a grave ammunition shortage, particularly of 37mm., .50-inch and .30-inch. No jump in production is likely before November.

(iv) The President has released a further 150,000 .30-inch rifles to us. Additional .30-inch ammunition could be rushed over if signs of invasion become evident.

(v) The Americans propose to release to us 760 light and 700 medium tanks between now and the end of December. They also hope to give us a number of Garand semi-automatic rifles.

Air Points.

17. (i) The discussions were mainly about the production and allocation of heavy bombers. It became evident, although they did not state this officially, that the Americans do not intend to ratify the agreement arrived at during the United States-British Staff conversations, under which the major part of the American heavy bomber production was to be allocated to the United Kingdom. All that we can definitely count on between now and June 1943 is some 1,100 aircraft out of a total production of about 4,600, whereas we require during this period some 6,000 heavy bombers in addition to British production.

(ii) Mr. Harriman and Major-General Arnold are examining the possibility of turning over capacity at present allocated to the production of medium bombers to producing heavy bombers, but this would not necessarily mean an increased allocation to us.

(iii) The various forms of technical assistance which we should like were discussed, and also the question of the ferrying of aircraft across the North and South Atlantic by the United States. In general the Americans appeared willing to afford us the assistance we asked for, particularly in the Middle East. An Officer is being sent forthwith to consult on the spot with the A.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.

Summary.

18. To sum up, we neither expected nor achieved startling results. The American Chiefs of Staff are quite clearly thinking in terms of the defence of the Western Hemisphere and have so far not formulated any joint strategy for the defeat of Germany in the event of their entry into the war. Nevertheless, the personal contacts with our American colleagues will prove of the greatest value for our future collaboration. We have, we think, convinced the Americans that
our policy in the Middle East is sound. They, in turn, have made us understand their difficulties. A most distressing revelation is the reduction in heavy bomber and Catalina allocation to us. This we consider a serious matter. We are also concerned at the small number of Catalinas allocated to the United Kingdom during the next few months.

(Signed)  
DUDLEY POUND.  
J. G. DILL.  
W. R. FREEMAN, V.C.A.S.

H.M.S. Prince of Wales, August 15, 1941.

ANNEX IV.

I SAILED from Scapa on Monday, the 4th August, in H.M.S. Prince of Wales (Captain J. C. Leach, M.V.O.), accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, G.C.B., G.C.V.O. (First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff), General Sir John Dill, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (Chief of Imperial General Staff), Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (Vice-Chief of Air Staff), Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G.C.M.G., C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Lord Cherwell, Commander C. R. Thompson, O.B.E. (Personal Assistant), and Mr. J. M. Martin (Principal Private Secretary). My party also included Colonel L. C. Hollis, C.B.E., and Lieutenant-Colonel E. I. C. Jacob of the Office of the Minister of Defence, and the following Officers of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force: Captain B. B. Schofield, Director of Trade Division, Admiralty; Commander M. G. Goodenough, D.S.O., Plans Division, Admiralty; Paymaster-Captain R. V. Brockman; Brigadier V. Dykes, C.B.E., Director of Plans, War Office; Captain A. R. S. Nutting, M.C., Military Assistant to the C.I.G.S.; and Group Captain W. M. Yool, C.B.E., Staff Officer to the Vice-Chief of Air Staff.

2. H.M.S. Prince of Wales arrived at our rendezvous with the flagship of the President of the United States (U.S.S. Augusta) in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, at 9 A.M. on Saturday, the 9th August. As soon as the customary naval courtesies had been exchanged, I went aboard the U.S.S. Augusta and greeted President Roosevelt, handing him a letter from His Majesty the King and presenting the members of my party. Conversations were then begun between the President and myself, Mr. Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan and the staff officers on both sides, which proceeded more or less continuously for the remaining days of our visit, sometimes tête-à-tête and sometimes in larger conferences.
3. On Sunday morning, the 10th August, Mr. Roosevelt came aboard H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* and, with his staff officers and several hundred representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and Marines, attended Divine Service on the quarterdeck, conducted by the ship's chaplain, Rev. W. G. Parker, and Rev. R. W. Shrum, Chaplain, United States Navy. This Service was felt by us all to be a deeply moving expression of the unity of faith of our two peoples, and none who saw it will forget the spectacle presented that sunlit morning on the crowded quarterdeck—the symbolism of the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes draped side by side on the pulpit; the American and British chaplains sharing in the reading of the prayers; the highest naval and military officers of Britain and the United States grouped in one body behind the President and myself; the close packed ranks of British and American sailors, completely intermingled, sharing the same books and joining heartily together in the prayers and hymns familiar to both.

4. The President remained for a luncheon party to which I had invited some 30 British and American guests. Afterwards short but cordial speeches were made by Mr. Roosevelt and myself.

5. Our conferences continued throughout Sunday and Monday. On Monday afternoon I telegraphed to the Lord Privy Seal, for consideration by the Cabinet, the draft of the Joint Declaration further described in my main report. The remarkable speed with which my colleagues considered this telegram (at a midnight session) and telegraphed their comments enabled me to come to a final agreement with the President on Tuesday morning, the 12th August, and to take leave of him and sail for Iceland, on my way home, that afternoon. The voyage was uneventful, although at one point it became necessary to alter course owing to the reported presence of U-Boats in the vicinity. On this portion of the journey our escort included two United States destroyers, in one of which was Ensign Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jnr., the President's son, who acted as Liaison Officer during our visit to Iceland.

6. H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* reached the island on Saturday morning, the 16th August, and anchored at Hvals Fiord, from which we travelled to Reykjavik in a destroyer. On arrival at the port, I received a remarkably warm and vociferous welcome from a large crowd, whose friendly greetings were repeated whenever our presence was recognised during our stay, culminating in scenes of great enthusiasm on our departure in the afternoon, to the accompaniment of such cheers and hand-clapping as have, I was assured, seldom been heard in the streets of Reykjavik.

7. I was greeted on the quay by His Majesty's Minister, Mr. C. Howard Smith, C.M.G., the General Officer Commanding Iceland Force, Major-General H. O. Curtis, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., and other British and American Officers. After a short visit to the Althinghau, to pay my respects to the Regent and the members of the Icelandic Cabinet, I proceeded to inspect a joint review of the
British and American Forces. I took the salute with the President's son standing beside me, and the parade provided another remarkable demonstration of Anglo-American solidarity.

8. On return to Hvals Fiord, I visited H.M.S. Ramillies (and addressed representatives of the crews of the British and American ships in the anchorage), H.M.S. Hecla and H.M.S. Churchill. H.M.S. Prince of Wales sailed from Iceland that evening, and reached Scapa on Monday morning, the 18th August. I arrived back in London on the following day.

W. S. C.
August 18, 1941.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET

CONFERENCE BETWEEN

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

AND

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Telegram exchanged between this country and the Prime Minister, or those forming part of the Delegation accompanying him, 8-17 August, 1941
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The First Lord of the Admiralty to the Prime Minister.

(Abbey No. 19, despatched 4.2 P.M., 8th August.)

Following from First Lord:—

1. From recent attacks on Gibraltar and Sierra Leone convoys it appears that the enemy is concentrating his submarines on these routes.
2. This is very probably due to the interest now displayed by the U.S.A. in the Trans-Atlantic convoys when in Western part of the Atlantic and the fact that Germans are very reluctant even to risk an incident with the U.S.A.
3. These convoys must now be escorted throughout their route and we cannot provide adequate escort, particularly destroyer escort, until some of our forces are released from the Western Ocean.
4. The above considerations point to the importance of the U.S.A. putting Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 4 into full operation as soon as possible.

1602B/8.

The Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister.

(Abbey No. 20, despatched 8.50 P.M., 8th August.)

Following from Menzies:—

Delighted to know this meeting between yourself and Roosevelt is taking place. It will have a stimulating effect all over the world. You will, I think, have a great opportunity of influencing his mind in the direction of dramatic action. My own impression in America was that the natural process of developing public opinion had gone about as far as it would, and that the next stage depended on Roosevelt whose personal prestige would give him a majority for any vigorous course. If this is right, you of all men can give him what he needs. I hope that you will seize the opportunity not only to deal with the Atlantic and European problems, but also clarify the Far East position. I do not think that there is any doubt that a firm and unequivocal attitude by the United States is the one thing that will deter Japan from continuing on a course leading to war. If Japan enters the war or by threats to our vital interests compels the British Empire into war, the effect upon the disposition of Australian forces of all arms may be far-reaching, and certainly you would have a naval problem of the gravest character. The Far East position is thus seen not as a remote incidentally matter, but as crucial and intimate. On this matter also I found Roosevelt extremely sympathetic but reluctant to be too precise. And yet, precision and firmness are the real antidote to Japan. I am sure that you have these matters in mind, but I just want you to know that in Australia and no doubt New Zealand these aspects of your decisions will be closely watched and the outcome most anxiously awaited. Kindest regards and good wishes.

2050B/8.

The Prime Minister to the First Lord of the Admiralty, in reply to telegram No. (1).

(Tudor No. 10, despatched 11.1 A.M., 9th August, received 6.37 P.M., 9th August.)

Following from Prime Minister for First Lord:—

Your Abbey No. 19 O.K.

1101Z/9.
August.

The Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister.

(This telegram was despatched as a result of D.O. (41), 56th Meeting, Minute 3.)

(Abbey No. 23, despatched 6.15 p.m., 9th August.)

Following from Deputy Chairman, Defence Committee:—

Defence Committee have had under consideration situation in Siam.

2. It is possible that in consequence of U.S. and British reactions to move into Indo-China and to present threats to Siam, Japan may now pause to consolidate in Indo-China before taking next step, and that during interval she may content herself with economic penetration in Siam. But there is growing feeling here that only hope of preventing Siam from ultimately sharing fate of Indo-China, is plain warning by ourselves, and a fortiori by ourselves and the U.S.A. together, that this will lead to war. Neither U.S. nor we have yet gone further than to indicate that Japanese move into Siam would be a menace to security of our respective possessions.

3. Blunt warning that we would regard further Japanese move into Siam as casus belli might in itself be too challenging, and obviously goes beyond what U.S. Government could constitutionally say. Moreover we ourselves should not necessarily regard Japanese move into North or East Siam as constituting such a direct threat to our own interests as Japanese attempt to occupy Kra Isthmus.

4. Defence Committee are unanimous in the view that situation would best be met by parallel warnings by U.S. and ourselves delivered strictly privately to the Japanese Government through the diplomatic channel to the effect that any incursion by Japanese forces into Siam would produce a situation in which we should be compelled to take counter-measures likely to lead to war between our respective countries and Japan.

5. We greatly hope that you will approve and be able to obtain President Roosevelt's agreement to this course of action. Japanese have one eye on the North and are unlikely to take further steps southwards if it is clear that these will lead to war with U.S. as well as ourselves.

6. There remains the question whether, if U.S. find themselves unable to deliver warning of this nature, it should be given by ourselves alone (in concert, of course, with Dominions). Discussion on this point in Defence Committee has shown that question of warning turns on fundamental question whether we should, or should not, immediately fight Japan if she were to attempt to occupy the Kra Isthmus. On this major question opinion in Defence Committee is at present divided. On the one hand it is argued that inadequacy of our forces, more particularly naval, makes it necessary to avoid war with Japan for as long as possible unless we are certain of U.S. support. This is the view of the Chiefs of Staff. According to this view, even if Japan forestalled us in the Kra Peninsula, we should in the absence of U.S. support be wise to accept position without going to war for the time being. Any warning to Japan would, therefore, be bluff.

7. Against this it is argued that it does not lie with us whether war can be averted; initiative is with Japan, and we can only do our best to deter her by warning. But whether we warn her or not, we cannot afford to let Japan establish herself without opposition in Kra Isthmus, where she would have best jumping off ground for heavy attack on Singapore at moment most favourable to herself. Occupation of the Kra Isthmus could, in fact, have no other object than ultimate attack on Singapore, and threat would be so plain that we should have no choice but to fight. Opinion in this country and in Australia and New Zealand would accept no other course, and our prestige in the East would not survive refusal. A sharp and bold reaction to Japanese move would, moreover, win sympathy in the U.S. and would be more likely to bring U.S. to our aid than anything else.

8. Whether a warning is issued or not, Defence Committee is agreed that if Japanese advance is confined to Northern Siam, we should at once advance to Singora without starting hostilities.

9. We should be grateful for your guidance, in order that we may be in a position to act before your return if the situation should demand it.
Meanwhile, Chiefs of Staff are instructing Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to complete his preparations for a rapid move to Singora:—

(a) In the event of the entry of Japanese forces into Northern Siam; or
(b) To forestall an attempt by the Japanese to occupy the Kra Isthmus.

He is being specifically warned that he should not attack Japanese forces approaching Siam, or cross Siamese frontier, without authority from home.

1815B/9.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee to the First Sea Lord, with reference to telegram No. (5).

(Sloane No. 6, despatched 6:12 p.m., 9th August.)

Following from Chiefs of Staff for First Sea Lord:—

Reference paragraphs 4 and 10 of telegram No. Abbey 23 from Defence Committee.

If this is discussed we suggest question might be raised whether United States, even if they had not felt able to join us in any warning, would in this event support British resistance to any attempt on the part of Japan to occupy Kra Isthmus.

1812B/9.

Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Foreign Office.

(Tudor No. 14, despatched 8:31 p.m., 10th August, received 3:49 a.m., 11th August.)

Following for Foreign Office from Sir A. Cadogan:—

In the course of conversations yesterday Mr. Sumner Welles said just before leaving Washington he was approached by Brazilian Ambassador, who complained most bitterly regarding our attitude on the question of enemy shipping in Brazilian control. Mr. Welles begged us to avoid as far as possible further antagonising Brazil, in which he saw grave danger.

He is particularly careful of Brazilian susceptibilities at this moment as U.S. and Brazilian Staff are having talks on Hemisphere Defence, involving use by Brazil of a base in Surinam and employment of a Token Brazilian force, in case of need, for defence of Azores if that would make it easier for Portuguese Government.

Can I say anything to reassure him.

2031Z/10.

The First Sea Lord to the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, with reference to telegrams Nos. (1) and (3).

(Avenue No. 17, despatched 12:47 a.m., 11th August, received 10:57 a.m., 12th August.)

Personal following for First Lord and V.C.N.S.:—

(a) It has been decided that plan No. 4 will be fully executed as soon as United States and Iceland (C) Flagships can be collected, loaded and distributed in order that British convoys can (? join) them. It is estimated that full plan will be in operation about 1st September.
(b) C.N.O. will inform C.N.S. when various units of British escort ships can be withdrawn from Western Atlantic area.
(c) From now onwards, U.S. ships will protect convoy routes from North America against surface raiders, and H.M.S. Revenge should be withdrawn as soon as practicable.
(d) Please give copy of this to Admiral Ghormley.

0047Z/11.
11th August.

(Sloane No. 18, despatched 3:42 p.m., 11th August.)

Following for Sir A. Cadogan from Foreign Office:—

Your telegram No. 14, Tudor (11th August: Enemy ships in Brazilian ports).

1. My two immediately following telegrams Sloane Nos. 19 and 20* are repeats of telegrams from and to Rio de Janeiro, which show the latest position. They have both been repeated to Washington.

2. As background you will remember that we have agreed with the U.S. to waive our belligerent rights to capture ex-enemy ships taken over by the U.S. and transferred to a neutral flag. This we did in view of fact that this action was taken for our ultimate benefit. We have also let Mr. Welles know that we will similarly waive our rights with respect to vessels in S. American ports as soon as Mr. Welles' Inter-American Financial Committee has agreed upon a joint American scheme for their use. (It is anticipated that such a scheme would provide for the use of the ships in inter-American trade, thus freeing a smaller number of other vessels for trade in Anglo-U.S. interest.)

3. In the above circumstances we do not see how we can go much further to meet the Brazilians. Mr. Welles' Committee has been six weeks without producing their anticipated resolution and we are only waiting for them, but it would be fatal to our whole position in this matter to make a unilateral waiver to the Brazilians without any face-saving concession by them whatever. We should be most pleased to consider any solution which Mr. Welles can suggest which will maintain our position. It may be, however, that concession in our telegram No. 371 to Rio will already have reassured Brazilian Government as to our intentions.

4. As regards latter telegram it should be explained that British firms have embargoed various of these ships for debt. We are making no difficulties about this as you see.

5. As regards Norderney this ship has a large cargo of rubber, and it is of the utmost importance that she should not succeed in running the blockade. State Department have joined with us in representing strongly to the Brazilian Government that she should not be allowed to sail.

1542A/11.

(Sloane No. 19, despatched 3:45 p.m., 11th August.)

Following for Sir A. Cadogan from Foreign Office:—

Following is repeat of telegram No. 357 from Rio de Janeiro, dated 31st July:—

"My telegram No. 354. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that he has reached agreement on the lines of British desiderata expressed to Washington Committee for the purchase of two of the five German ships, and that the Germans have referred to Berlin willingness to buy the Montevideo by payment into a blocked account of balance of price after the ship's British debt has been paid in free currency. The Windhuk would be detained (as also Montevideo if agreement on the above lines were not reached) until the two other ships had been handed over to the Brazilians. Minister for Foreign Affairs was confident that the President would then agree to the final detention of these ships and intern their crews. Quid pro quo would be to allow Norderney to sail, which, in accordance with his promise to me, he had always hitherto refused on the grounds that some of the crew had taken illegal flight. He asked my views. I told him His Majesty's
Government attached the greatest importance to the Norderney's valuable cargo not reaching the enemy, that our naval dispositions had no doubt been influenced by the assurances he had given to me, and that withdrawal from these would create painful impression. I added that with the increasing shortage of tonnage it was in Brazil's best interests as well as our own to keep as many ships afloat and in use as possible.

I told him also that once the Norderney was allowed to sail I could see no assurance that the Germans would not slip out of their bargain or simply sabotage the ships.

He said that they would take measures to provide against these contingencies, and once the question of German ships was out of the way they would immediately intern Italian ones. He had now dropped negotiations for the purchase of these as Italians were trying to trick him at every turn.

I said I would ascertain your views.

Perhaps we might suggest to him in reply that the Norderney be allowed to sail only after the two German ships have been delivered to the Brazilian Government, and that time limit be given to her within which to leave.
August 11th

should, of course, associate ourselves and presumably the Dutch Government will do the same. The notification to Japan would be secret.

Fourthly, the President wishes to issue at moment general release of meeting story, probably 14th or 15th, a joint declaration signed by himself and me, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, of broad principles which animate the U.S. and Great Britain at this fateful time. I send you herewith his draft of statement (my immediately following telegram) which you will see is not free from difficulty attaching to all such declarations. The fourth condition would evidently have to be amended to safeguard our obligations contracted in Ottawa and not prejudice the future of imperial preference. This might fall into its place after war in a general economic settlement with decisive lowering of tariffs and trade barrier throughout the world. But we cannot settle it now. For sake of speedy agreement I have little doubt he will accept following amendments:

After word "endeavour" insert "With due respect to their existing obligations."
And after word "access" omit words "Without discrimination and."
Also, leave out word "markets" and insert word "trade."

The seventh para, is most remarkable for its realism. The President undoubtedly contemplates the disarmament of the guilty nations, coupled with maintenance of strong united British and American armament, both by sea and air, for a long indefinite period.

Having regard to our views about League of Nations or other international organizations, I would suggest following amendment after word "essential":
"Pending establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security." He will not like this very much, but he attaches so much importance to the joint declaration, which he believes will affect whole movement of U.S. opinion, that I think he will agree.

It would be most imprudent on our part to raise unnecessary difficulties. We must regard this as an interim and partial statement of war aims designed to reassure all countries of our righteous purpose and not the complete structure which we should (group missing) after victory.

You should summon the full War Cabinet, with any others you may think necessary, to meet to-night, and please let me have your views without the slightest delay. Meanwhile, immediately full accounts are being sent you on the other points, together with Cadogan's report of conversation. I fear President will be very much upset if no joint statement can be issued, and grave and vital interests might be affected.

I had purposed to leave afternoon 12th, but we have both now postponed departure 24 hours. Please let me have your views about the joint declaration in advance of those on other points which I have mentioned to you in this skeleton form, and on which I am sending you separate telegram.

† Telegram No. (12)

The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal, further to telegram No. (11).

(Tudor No. 16, despatched 1.51 P.M., 11th August, received 10.26 P.M., 11th August.)

My Tudor No. 15. Following is draft of joint declaration as submitted to me by President:

The President of U.S.A. and Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.
Third, they respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see self-government restored to those from whom it has been forcibly removed.
11th August.

Fourth, they will endeavour to further enjoyment by all peoples of access without discrimination and on equal terms to markets and to raw materials of world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they hope to see established a peace, after final destruction of Nazi tyranny, which will afford all nations the means of dwelling in security within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance to all peoples that they may live out their lives in freedom from fear.

Sixth, they desire such a peace to establish for all safety on the high seas and oceans.

Seventh, they believe all of the nations of the world must be guided in spirit to the abandonment of the use of force. Because no further peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armament continues to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, at once to use force outside of their frontiers; they believe that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will further the adoption of all other practicable means which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.

1351Z/11.

(Note.—The Cabinet met at 1.45 a.m. on Tuesday, the 12th August, 1941, (W.M. (41) 80th Conclusions), to consider telegrams Nos. (11) and (12). As a result of this Meeting, telegram No. (15) below was despatched.)

(13)

The Prime Minister to the Foreign Office.

(Tudor No. 18, despatched 6.52 P.M., 11th August, received 12th August.)

Following from Prime Minister, addressed Foreign Office:—

1. The President has received a letter from Dr. Salazar, in which it is made clear that he is looking to Azores as a place of retreat for him and his Government in event of German aggression upon Portugal, and that his age-long alliance with England leads him to count on British protection during his enforced stay in these islands. If, however, British were too much occupied elsewhere he would willingly accept assistance of U.S. instead. The President would be well disposed to respond to such an appeal, and would like British, in circumstances foreseen, to propose Dr. Salazar the transference of responsibility. The above would also apply to Cape de Verdes.

I told President that we contemplate operation known as Pilgrim; that we might be forced to act before a German violation of peninsula has occurred, and that while this was going on we should be very busy. I pointed out that Pilgrim would almost, though not absolutely certainly, provoke crisis in peninsula, and asked whether our having set events in train by Pilgrim would be any bar to his acceptance of responsibility indicated in paragraph 1. He replied as Pilgrim did not affect Portugal it made no difference to his actions.

He would feel justified in taking action if Portuguese Islands were endangered, and we agree that they would certainly be endangered, if Pilgrim were to take place, as Germans would have all the more need to forestall us there.

In these circumstances he would none the less be ready to come to the aid of Portugal in the Atlantic Islands, and was holding destroyer forces available for that purpose.

I have shown foregoing to President, who agreed that it was a correct representation of the facts.

1852Z/11.

(14)

The Prime Minister to the Foreign Office.

(Tudor No. 19, despatched 8.11 P.M., 11th August, received 3.45 A.M., 12th August.)

From Prime Minister for Foreign Office:—

The position about Japan is as follows:—

President proposed to Japan some time ago neutralisation of Indo-China and Siam under joint guarantee of U.S., Japan, Britain, China and others. Japanese reply, which will be cabled to you fully as soon as more urgent messages
The Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister, in reply to telegrams Nos. (11) and (12).

(Abbey No. 31, despatched 4.10 A.M., 12th August.)

Following for Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal:—

1. Cabinet welcome proposal* in respect of Japan, particularly warning against further encroachment, and congratulate you warmly upon this notable advance.

2. Cabinet has considered draft of joint declaration in your Tudor No. 16 and have only a few suggestions to make. The general lines which these suggestions will take are as follows:—

3. Paragraph 4 to read as follows:—

"Fourth. They will endeavour to further enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to raw materials of the

* Telegram No. (11).
world which are needed for their economic prosperity, and to promote 
greatest possible expansion of markets for the interchange of goods and 
services throughout the world."

This amendment has not yet been discussed with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer or President of the Board of Trade.

4. Between paragraphs 4 and 5 insert a new paragraph on the following 
lines:—

"Fifth. They support the fullest collaboration between nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing for all peoples freedom from want, 
improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security."

5. Cabinet concur in your amendment to paragraph 7.

6. I will telegraph considered form of words for the two amendments 
proposed early to-morrow morning.

0410A/12.

The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal.

(Tudor No. 20, despatched 1-3 A.M., 12th August, received 7-35 A.M., 
12th August.)

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal:—

President has accepted all my amendments to joint declaration* and is most 
insistent that it should be issued simultaneously with announcement of meeting. 
Therefore there may not be time for consultation with Dominions, and if Cabinet 
see no objection I should hope they might agree that I could anticipate Dominion 
concurrency.

0103Z/12.

* Telegram No. (11)

(Note.—The Cabinet met at 10 a.m. on 12th August, 1941, to resume consideration of 
telegrams Nos. (11) and (12). By this time telegrams Nos. (13), (14) and (16) had 
arrived. As a result of this meeting telegram No. (18) was despatched (W.M. (41) 
81st Conclusions).)

The Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister.

(Abbey No. 34, despatched 10:34 A.M., 12th August.)

Following has been received addressed to Prime Minister from Mr. Menzies 
and repeated to Prime Ministers, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand and to 
Washington:—

"My colleagues and I have given anxious consideration to the Far East 
position. We have, as you know, always regarded Singapore and Malaya as our 
vital outpost, and have at all times, as I indicated to the Foreign Office when in 
London, been prepared to join in a guarantee to the Netherlands East Indies.

"We have also assumed that, in the event of war with Japan, naval reinforce­
ments as discussed in London with a nucleus of five capital ships would be sent 
to the Far East. We now say and emphasise that an early despatch of the 
capital ships East of Suez would itself be the most powerful deterrent and the 
first step.

"We also once more urge that, having regard to the grave tension at present 
existing, air and military reinforcements to Malaya should be vigorously 
expedited. The position of Thailand now comes up for early decision, for events 
appear to be moving rapidly. Two urgent questions emerge:—

"1. Should we, the British countries, be prepared to make it clear to 
Thailand and to Japan that any attack upon Thailand by Japan will 
be regarded by us as a casus belli.

[22816]
2. Should we announce this to the countries concerned independently of the United States action, or should we make it conditional upon American concurrence and active participation.

We are of opinion as the Government of one of the two British Dominions which are most directly affected, that the first question should be answered "Yes," and that, while every pressure should be maintained upon the United States, it would be an error to condition our action upon American action, though actual objection by the United States of America would, of course, be fatal.

Thailand’s strategic position and resources are such that Japan’s occupation of them would gravely imperil the safety of Singapore, effective control of the waters around the Malay Peninsula, Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, and the maintenance of the Chinese supplies along the Burma Road.

Having regard to reality in the Far East, we do not believe Japan wants Thailand merely as an end in itself. Its capture or control would be plainly the first step that counts. In this connection, we have noted with regret that Mr. Sumner Welles’ warning to Japan seemed to indicate that the objectionable matter would not be occupation of Thailand, but only what might happen subsequently.

Attitude of the United States, while constitutionally and politically understandable, is disappointing. We have throughout this period felt that clear and unequivocal (warning omitted) to Japan by the United States would have stopped aggression. Up to the time of the coup in Indo-China it had not been made. Later on, Sumner Welles made much more vigorous statement to the Japanese representative, though it is subject to the criticism mentioned above. But the Japanese have still not been given firm warning. Indications of postponed resistance to aggression are merely encouragement.

We feel that if we are prepared to fight, America will not, in fact, desert us. Bold course might change the whole outlook.

Naturally, in all this we are assuming that whatever we do will be done in the closest consultation and agreement with the Netherlands East Indies. Subject to the above, our view can be summed up as being that, if Thailand is abandoned and we delay our action, we will be one country nearer to war and that, in that war and in particular in the defence of Singapore, Japan will be relatively stronger and we relatively weaker than at present.

We express these views frankly and with the realisation of their implications, so that you may see the supreme importance which we attach to them.

1034A/12

The Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister, in reply to telegram No. (16).

(Abbey No. 35, despatched 1.41 P.M., 12th August.)

Following for Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal:—

Your Tudor No. 20.

1. The Cabinet held further meeting this morning. On paragraph 4 of the draft declaration our considered view is that we should greatly prefer the revised draft in Abbey 31,* subject to the addition before "promote" of the words "with due respect to their existing obligations." Our main reasons for preferring this form of words are as follows:

2. We desire to draw a distinction between raw materials and trade (or markets). We support giving access on equal terms to raw materials, and we see no reason for qualifying this by reserving our existing obligations. We are, however, bound to make this reservation in dealing with trade in order to safeguard Imperial preference, and, e.g., to prevent our markets from being undercut by countries with a low standard of life like Japan.

3. We also think that we should be pressed to interpret the phrase "access on equal terms to trade" and might find ourselves involved in difficulties. It might be interpreted in terms of extreme laissez faire. For your information, we cannot accept any formula which might be held to prevent us continuing

* Telegram No. (16).
exchange control after the war. We fear that the President’s formula, even as amended by you, might be interpreted as limiting our essential freedom of action in this respect.

4. More generally our view is that our formula is more in harmony with present-day economic conceptions and tendencies and is more likely to be acceptable to public opinion in the Dominions. If, however, you would find great difficulty in getting it accepted, the Cabinet are prepared to accept the President’s draft, subject to your amendments.

5. The Cabinet attach great importance to the new paragraph proposed in Abbey 31* for insertion between paragraphs 4 and 5. The substance of this paragraph has figured in a number of previous declarations, notably President Roosevelt’s speech and the Resolutions of the Inter-Allied Meeting at St. James’s on 12th June. The omission of a paragraph on these lines would be most marked and would have an unfortunate effect on public opinion in this country and the Dominions and on the Allied Governments. The Cabinet think that the new paragraph suggested in Abbey No. 31 will do as drafted.

6. As regards the Dominions, we think that the Declaration must be signed by yourself, as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It will, however, clearly be necessary to let the Dominion Prime Ministers see the text as quickly as possible and to give them an opportunity of expressing their concurrence and of publishing it simultaneously.

7. We are, accordingly, telegraphing to the Dominion Prime Ministers informing them that a short statement, declaratory of the attitude of the two Governments, is being prepared and will probably be signed and released shortly. We are telling them that we shall forward a copy of the text as soon as available. Please, therefore, send us a copy of the text as finally agreed as quickly as possible.

* Telegram No. (15).

1341 A/12.

Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Foreign Office, in amplification of telegram No. (13).

(Avenue No. 23, despatched 11 p.m., 12th August, received 6.39 p.m., 12th August.)

From Sir Alexander Cadogan to Foreign Office:—

Reference Tudor No. 18. Following is summary of Dr. Salazar’s note to President:—

After gratefully acknowledging President’s communication, it states although Portugal did not share fear of an attack on Azores by Germany as long as latter did not control Atlantic, Portuguese Government have made every effort to keep Azores and Cape Verde Is. in a state of efficient complement.

“We believe that Military Forces and material accumulated in islands and also other aeronautical and A.A. material which British Government have pledged themselves to furnish immediately, will put islands in a state which would render successful attack impossible.

“England has received this assurance, and we gave it to Brazil as well in so far our effective dominion over of Atlantic islands may concern their defence. Yet if England were to meet with difficulties in regard to delivery of above-mentioned supplies, or others considered necessary, I would be thankful to find on part of U.S. Government facilities for realization of an end in which they are also particularly interested thus.”

Note proceeds to say this is written on assumption of continuance of neutral policy adopted by Portugal since beginning of war. “Should this policy be changed by a violation of our neutrality, the situation which would arise should be examined and our policy reshaped accordingly. I do not wish to contemplate such an event, but I fully appraise the whole meaning and value of Your
12th August.

Excellency’s declaration, and taking into consideration our close relations with Brazil I believe Portugal would also openly rely in such an emergency on their solid and full support.”

Note ends with (corrupt group) gratitude to President.

Above summary is made from translation English furnished by Portuguese, and wording is in some places obscure.

1301Z/12.

(20)

Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Foreign Office, in amplification of telegram No. (14).

(Avenue No. 24, despatched 12th August, received 10-5 P.M., 12th August.)

Following from Sir Alexander Cadogan to Foreign Office. Reference Tudor telegram No. 19:—

Japanese proposals to U.S. Government are accompanied by covering note which protests that measures taken by naval authorities are entirely peaceful in character and for self-defence only.

Present proposals are intended as reply to the suggestion made by the President on the 24th July in conversations with Japanese Ambassador and "to provide fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding on which informal conversations have been carried on during past month.”

Japanese Government are convinced of necessity of examining all causes of strained relations between Japan and U.S. and of endeavouring to remove such causes as will affect Military, Political and Economic equilibrium that should normally exist between the two countries.

Following is summary of proposals that (? would probably be) arranged:—

1.—(a) To remove menace of military character to U.S., Japan will not further station troops in South-Western Pacific except Indo-China, and Japanese troops now in Indo-China "will be withdrawn also on settlement of the China incident."

(b) To remove menace of political and military character to Philippine Islands, Japan will guarantee neutrality of islands "at an opportune time" on conditions of no discrimination against Japan and Japanese subjects.

(c) To remove causes of instability of economic relations between Japan and U.S., Japan will co-operate with U.S. in production and procurement of such natural resources as are required by U.S.

2.—(a) To remove menace of military character to Japan, U.S. will suspend their military measures in South-Western Pacific and, upon successful conclusion of present conversations, will advise Governments of Great Britain and Netherlands to take similar steps.

(b) To remove causes of military, political and economic friction, U.S. will co-operate with Japan in production and procurement of natural resources required by Japan in South-Western Pacific, especially in Netherlands East Indies.

(c) In conjunction with building under (b) above, U.S. will restore normal relations of trade and commerce which have hitherto existed between Japan and U.S.

(d) In view of undertaking by Japanese Government in 1 (a) above, U.S. will use its good offices for initiation of direct negotiations between Japanese Government and Chiang Kai-shek régime for speedy settlement of China incidents, and U.S. "will recognise a special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area.”

1312Z/12.
The Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister, in reply to telegram No. (14).

(Abbey No. 36, despatched 6:36 p.m., 12th August.)

Following from Lord Privy Seal:—

1. Your Tudor 19 was considered this morning by Cabinet, who warmly applaud the course of action outlined, and congratulate you on what you have achieved.

2. We are sending to the Dominion Prime Ministers the first four paragraphs of Tudor 19. This will in effect answer the main point in Menzies' telegram of 11th August, repeated to you in Abbey No. 34.*

3. We do not propose to make any immediate approach to the Dutch Government, or the Soviet Government, in this matter.

* Telegram No. (17).

The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal.

(Tudor No. 21, despatched 2:57 p.m., 12th August, received 12:55 A.M., 13th August.)

President and I have agreed on following joint (message) to M. Stalin.

Please instruct H.M. Ambassador in Moscow to arrange with his U.S. colleague to communicate it to M. Stalin as soon as convenient. We propose to publish it in American and British morning papers Saturday, the 16th August:—

"We have taken opportunity afforded by consideration of report of Mr. Harry Hopkins on his return from Moscow to consult together as to how best our two countries can help your country in the splendid defence that you are making against Nazi attack. We are at the moment co-operating to provide you with very maximum supplies that you most urgently need. Already many shiploads have left our shores and more will leave in immediate future.

"The needs and demands of your and our armed services can only be determined in the light of the full knowledge of the many factors which must be taken into consideration in conjectures that we make. In order that all of us may be in a position to arrive at speedy decisions as to apportionment of our joint resources, we suggest that we prepare a meeting to be held at Moscow to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you. If this conference appeals to you, we want you to know that pending decisions of that conference we shall continue to send supplies and material as rapidly as possible.

"We must now turn our minds to the consideration of a more long-term policy, since there is still a long and hard path to be traversed before there can be won that complete victory without which our efforts and sacrifices would be wasted.

"The war goes on upon many fronts and before it is over there may be yet further fighting on fronts that will be developed. Our resources though immense are limited, and it must become a question as to where and when those resources can best be used to further to principal extent our common effort. This applies equally to manufactured war supplies and to raw materials.

"We realise fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of Soviet Union, and we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter of planning the programme for the future allocation of our joint resources."

1457Z/12.
The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal.

(Tudor No. 22, despatched 3.29 P.M., 12th August, received 3.42 A.M., 13th August.)

President and I this morning agreed that following statement should be broadcast on Thursday, the 14th August, at 3 P.M. (It should not be released before then to press):

The President of the United States and Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in United Kingdom, have met at sea. They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval and air services.

The whole problem of supply of munitions of war, as provided by Lease-Lend Act, for armed forces of United States and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression has been further examined.

Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of United States Government. These conferences will also cover supply problem of Soviet Union.

The President and Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from policy of military domination by conquest upon which Hitlerite Government of Germany and other Governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in facing these dangers.

They have agreed upon following joint declaration:

The President of the United States and Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other. Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Third, they respect right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. Fifth, they desire to bring about fullest collaboration between all nations in economic field, with object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security. Sixth, after final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance. Eighth, they believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to abandonment of use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armament continues to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.
The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal.

(Tudor No. 23, despatched 4.39 P.M., 12th August, received 4.29 A.M., 13th August.)

Following for Lord Privy Seal:—

Please thank Cabinet for amazingly swift reply,* I put your alternative clause 4 to President, but he preferred to stick to phrasing already agreed. I do not myself see any real difference. Phrase about 'respect for existing obligations' safeguards our relations with Dominions. We could not see how competition of cheap labour would come in, as all countries preserve right of retaining or imposing national tariffs as they think fit pending better solutions.

2. The President cordially accepted your new paragraph 5, but you will see that reference 'want(ed)' comes in where President originally wished it—at end of paragraph 6. A few verbal flourishes not affecting substance have been added.

3. We have laid special stress on warning to (1 Japan), which constitutes teeth of President's communication. One would always fear State Department trying to tone it down; but President has promised definitely to use hard language.

4. Arrival of Russia as a welcome guest at hungry table and need of large supplementary programme both for ourselves and U.S. forces makes review and expansion of U.S. production imperative. President proposes shortly to ask Congress for another 5 billion dollar loan-lease Bill.

President welcomes Beaverbrook's arrival at Washington, and I am convinced this is needful practical step. See also the Roosevelt-Churchill message to dear old Joe. I think they will send Harriman to represent them, and I should propose Beaverbrook should go for us to Moscow or wherever Russian Government is. We do not wish conference in Russia to start before latter part of September, by when it is hoped we shall know where Russian Front will lie for winter.

5. They are sending us immediately 150,000 more rifles, and I look for improved allocations of merchant shipping, bombers and tanks. I hope they will take over whole ferry service and delivering both in England and in West Africa by American pilots, many of whom may stay for war training purposes with us.

6. Your promptness has enabled me to start home to-day, 12th. President is sending two American destroyers with us, who are not considered escort but will chip in if any trouble occurs. Franklin Junior is serving on one of them and has been appointed liaison officer to me during my days in Iceland (C), where there will be a joint review of British and American forces.

7. Lord Beaverbrook is now proceeding with Harriman by air to United States. The joint telegram to Stalin comes out 48 hours after main story.

8. I trust that my colleagues will feel that my mission has been fruitful. I am sure I have established warm and deep personal relations with our great friend.

* Telegram No. (15).

1639Z/12.

The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal, in reply to telegram No. (18).

(Tudor No. 24, despatched 7.41 P.M., 12th August, received 2.21 A.M., 13th August.)

Following from Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal:—

Your Abbey No. 35 reached me only after final agreement on text of declaration and leave takings. In circumstances I felt it was impossible to reopen the discussion.

1941Z/12.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee to the First Sea Lord.

(Sloane No. 26, despatched 1:55 p.m., 13th August.)

Following for First Sea Lord from Chiefs of Staff:—

We have considered the pros and cons of replacing six of the ships held for
Pilgrim by others equally suitable for the Operation. The advantages which we
should derive are considerable, namely:—

(a) The addition of 10,000 troops to Convoy W.S. 11 for Middle East.
(b) The release of 1½ million cubic feet of refrigerated space to trade.

2. The disadvantages are:—

(a) We should be unable to launch Pilgrim before 8th September.
(b) We should lose the experience gained in recent exercises by the crews
of three ships.

3. We consider that, in view of our present information about affairs in
Spain, including talks with M. A., Madrid, now home, the pros outweigh the cons,
and we therefore propose to change the ships. But before doing so we wish
to know whether any developments arising out of Riviera make this course
inadvisable.

First Sea Lord to Chiefs of Staff Committee, in reply to telegram No. (26).

(Avenue No. 32, despatched 9:19 p.m., 13th August, received 1:54 a.m.,
14th August.)

Following for Chiefs of Staff from First Sea Lord. Your Sloane 26.
No objection to proposed replacement of ships.

The Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister.

(Abbey No. 46, despatched 4:56 p.m., 14th August.)

1. Cabinet this morning considered question of an early meeting of four
Dominion Prime Ministers in London in the following circumstances:—

2. Mr. MacDonald telegraphed yesterday that Mr. Mackenzie King, who
has now postponed his arrival in England until 21st August, had suggested that
it might be possible to hold such a meeting at the end of August.

3. Mr. Menzies has announced publicly that provided he can secure con­
currence of Labour party in Australia he proposes, at the request of his Cabinet
colleagues, to proceed to London at a very early date to deal with the major
questions of Empire policy and strategy, with particular reference apparently
to the Far East.

4. Mr. Fraser had intended to return very shortly to New Zealand having
regard to Far Eastern situation and to impending General Election there, but has
stated that if there is good prospect of arranging meeting with all four Prime
Ministers he would be prepared to stay here a little longer notwithstanding the
great inconvenience which this would cause him. He was emphatic that meeting
should not exceed two or three days.

5. General Smuts arrived Cairo 12th August, and is due to return to South
Africa in a few days' time.

6. As two Dominion Prime Ministers have suggested Conference, Cabinet
felt that possibility must again be considered notwithstanding the practical
difficulties.

7. View of Cabinet was that while time has not come for a full Conference
to discuss especially post-war problems, there is something to be said for a brief
meeting for purposes of general consultation as to the war position with particular reference to Far East. Important effect on public opinion here and in Dominions of such a meeting following on your return from meeting with President Roosevelt needs no emphasis.

8. Practical difficulty exists in the time factor. You are acquainted with local difficulties in South Africa which prevent General Smuts from being away from there for long. Mr. Menzies could not hope to arrive in England before end of August, so that General Smuts’s return to South Africa would in effect be delayed for at least three weeks.

9. Notwithstanding these difficulties the Cabinet thought that it would be right to put the matter before you and to obtain your views as to whether an approach should at once be made to General Smuts in Cairo, whose position is clearly the determining factor. Cabinet favour an immediate telegram being despatched to him explaining the situation and asking whether he could see his way to attend such a meeting towards the end of the month without, however, putting undue pressure on him to attend against his better judgment.

1656A/14.

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The Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal, in reply to telegram No. (28).

(Tudor No. 36, despatched 1:57 P.M., 15th August, received 2:5 P.M., 15th August.)

Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal. Reference Abbey 46.

1. Menzies has only recently returned Australia, and I cannot think we should be justified in summoning him half round the world by air for only 3 or 4 days’ conference in a fortnight’s time. He would no doubt like invitation to join War Cabinet, but this raises many complications about other Dominions and size of the War Cabinet.

Although he is unhappy in Australia, there is no other man of comparable eminence and knowledge there.

2. I doubt whether Smuts can be away from South Africa for so long, and also whether we should press him to dangers of flight through Mediterranean.

3. I hope to see Fraser before he leaves, but I do not think he should be pressed to stay till end of month.

4. Is it not much better to let Mackenzie King come alone, treating him with all the ceremony extended to Menzies and Fraser?

5. Delay in answer due to difficulty of breaking W/T silence with many U-Boats.

1357/15.

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The Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(Tudor No. 32, despatched 1:47 P.M., 15th August, received 12:29 P.M., 16th August.)

From Prime Minister for Foreign Secretary:

If you think well, please send message in my immediately following telegram to Menzies through Dominions Office and take any preliminary action you may think necessary. When time comes I should propose myself to tell Japanese Charge d’Affaires that, if Japan disregards American warning and becomes involved in war with U.S., we shall range ourselves instantly by the side of Americans. This might be Tuesday night or Wednesday morning.

2. I told President about our plans in Persia and he seemed to be quite content with them. I presume you are going-ahead as arranged.

3. I read your wind-up of session with much pleasure.

1347Z/15.
The Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(Tudor No. 33 despatched 1.49 P.M., 15th August, received P.M., 16th August.)

Following is message for Menzies referred to in my immediately preceding telegram* to Foreign Secretary:

Many thanks for your telegram (Abbey 20).† You have no doubt seen relevant cables about meeting. I trust you approve what was accomplished. President promised me to give the warning to Japan in terms agreed.

Once we know this has been done, we should range ourselves beside him and make it clear that, if Japan becomes involved in war with U.S., she will also be at war with Britain and British Commonwealth. I am arranging this with Eden and you will be advised through regular channels.

You should note that the President's warning covers an attack upon Russia so that perhaps Stalin will line up, too, and, of course, the Dutch. If this combined front can be established, including China, I feel confident that Japan will lie quiet for a while. It is, however, essential to use firmest language and strongest combination.

U.S. Navy is effectively taking over U.S.A.—Iceland stretch of Atlantic, thus giving us relief equal to over fifty destroyers and corvettes soon to be available in home waters and South Atlantic.

* Telegram No. (30).
† Telegram No. (2).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, in reply to telegrams Nos. (30) and (31).

(Abbey No. 59, despatched 8.24 P.M., 17th August.)

Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary:

Your telegram Tudor No. 32.

I have sent the telegram to Menzies, omitting words in paragraph 2 of message from “ and make it clear ” to “ British Commonwealth.”

2. The first sentence of that paragraph will now read: “Once we know this has been done, we should range ourselves beside him.”

3. Reason for omission is that we had contemplated that we should give Japan a parallel warning to that which U.S. Government propose to give, i.e., that any further encroachment on her part will compel us to take counter measures even if these may lead to war.

4. Intention was that Dutch should say the same, and from Menzies' earlier telegrams I have no doubt that he will expect such action. There is much to be said for adding to this warning action you now propose, but effect on Japan will clearly be less than parallel warning on same lines as U.S. Government. I have no doubt that Japan already regards it as axiomatic that if she becomes involved in war with the United States, the British Empire and the Dutch will join in.

5. This and other aspects of Far Eastern situation I would like to discuss early on your return. Meanwhile, telegram to Menzies contains all immediate essentials.

1349A/15.

* Telegram No. (32).
† Telegram No. (32).
ANNEX.

(33)

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the United Kingdom High Commissioners in Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

(Z No. 256, despatched 8.15 P.M., 6th August.)

Please give following message from Mr. Churchill to Prime Minister immediately for his most secret and personal information:—

(Strictly Personal and Secret.)

A little while ago I received an invitation, through Mr. Hopkins, from President Roosevelt to meet him somewhere in Newfoundland. With the approval of The King and the War Cabinet, I thought it my duty to accept, and have accordingly started. The President has expressed lively pleasure, and after the meeting has taken place full publicity will be given at a moment to be fixed by mutual agreement. Till then all is evidently most secret. Although we have long been in intimate correspondence and have spoken over the telephone, I have never had the pleasure of meeting President Roosevelt. I am taking the First Sea Lord, the C.I.G.S. and the V.C.A.S., Sir Alexander Cadogan of the Foreign Office, together with various technical officers; and Mr. Hopkins, on his way back from Russia, is also coming with me. The President is bringing Mr. Sumner Welles, Admiral Stark, and the opposite numbers of the Army and Air Chiefs. We expect the meeting will last about three days, during which time the whole field of future action can be explored. I can return at short notice by Air if necessary. I hope you will approve of this action, which may be productive of important benefits and can hardly be harmful. Naturally, I hope that the President would not have wished for this meeting unless he contemplated some further forward step. I shall keep you informed of what happens. Kindest regards.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

SECRET

W.P. (41) 204.

24TH AUGUST, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

VISIT OF GENERAL MACFARLANE TO THE RUSSIAN FRONT.

The attached telegrams from General Macfarlane are circulated by direction of the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W.1.,

24TH AUGUST, 1941.
From:- No. 30 Military Mission, Moscow.

To:- The War Office.

Desp. 2320  21/8/41.
Recd. 0400  22/8/41.

MUST IMMEDIATE

MIL 475 cipher 21/8.

Part One.

To D.M.I. from Macfarlane. Please pass to Chiefs of Staff.

Absoulute priority. At 0130 hours 20th was invited visit from starting at 0500. Travelled by car. Wanted to take Collier. Was not allowed to take R.A.F. Officer. Took Greer. Was met at Vyasma by Colonel representing Timoshenko. Went on along Smolensk road as far as bridge over Dnieper. Turned North off main road and after detour of about 110 kilometres reached Headquarters 50th Division of 19th Army at the V in River Vop in 1 over 300,000 Russian map Zakaz 40-237 published 26th Nov. 1940 copies of which you have had from Military Attache.

(Continued) The Division had taken part in an attack on the 19th in which it had forced the passage of the Vop and had advanced about 15 (or 18) kilometres on a front of 5 Axis of attack was due West. Attack was still proceeding having been renewed at 1300 hours 20th with limited further objective. It took ten hours to reach Division. Timoshenko had ordered that I must be clear of forward Area by dark so only got three hours with Division. Very heavy rain started at 1800 converting forest roads into marmalade. Bogged. Benighted. Took 21 hours on return trip hence delay in report. Major impressions in part two following immediately. Details in part three by less immediate.

Part Two.

Make allowance where necessary for fact that I was shown a good doing successful action. General impression of all I saw on outward and return trips as well as with Division was good. Division had had hard fight on preceding day. It had captured at least 4 German Field Batteries three of which I saw. Clearing of battlefield methodical and quick. Most dead already buried but samples of Germans left for me to see. Co-operation of tanks and air with other Arms close and effective. Morale high with universal hatred of Fascisti which is term by which Germans are always known. Relations between all ranks excellent. Russian Air Force operating with the Russian Army is allotted to Armies. It is only suballotted to Corps and Divisions for specific operations but Air Force Staff Officer is permanently on divisional Staff. (Continued).
Part Two.

First Continuation.

Saw several German Stukas operating against Russian advanced elements. Also several sorties Russian medium bombers in flights of about six with objectives in rear of battlefield. Considerable air activity but saw no actual combats numbers of German and Russian aircraft seen operating in area about equal. Russians stated Germans had been reinforced in the air since first day of Russian attack. Battlefield like Salisbury Plain but with a great deal of thick scrub some ten feet high. Russians most adept at concealment. A good deal of sporadic shelling both sides during my visit. Russians very steady under shell fire and very good at taking cover or freezing when enemy aircraft appear. Was taken round by Divisional Headquarters Commissar as Divisional Commander naturally occupied with his battle was not allowed in forward O.P. area as Divisional Commander had been told that he would be liquidated if I got into trouble. Inspected one medium howitzer battery in action. Entire layout was normal and appeared to be functioning smoothly and efficiently.

Second Continuation.

Could not get precise information but I think that South of Road Smolensk-Vyasma Germans are considerably further East than North of it. We gathered from conversations that a Russian attack to retake Smolensk from North-East may be made very shortly. Very considerable motor transport activity on road Moscow-Smolensk as far as Dnieper Bridge and on our route to the River Vop. Driving road discipline and traffic control were all good. Proportion of breakdowns or cases of ditching seemed abnormally low. Saw no accidents. Apart from a few infantry units saw no reinforcements moving up but several roads were full of very well concealed troops nature of which we could not determine. Several individual tanks and support weapons seen going up presumably as replacements. Saw one railway train carrying 23 medium tanks steaming West from Moscow. There can be no acute tank shortage in this area as in addition to divisional tank battalions operating with right forward battalion I saw at least one unit of some 20 medium tanks hidden in reserve in battery position area.

Third Continuation.

Germans have not yet bombed Moscow-Smolensk Road East of Dnieper Bridge anywhere except at Bridge over railway North of Vyasma. Large numbers near bridges with big bombs all round this but so far no hits. Vyasma has been heavily bombed. Russian daytime traffic density surprisingly high. Normally 50 to 40 V.T.M. I estimated normal M.P.H. to be 20 on main roads and 8 to 10 on others Russian troops obviously well fed and fit.
Horses small wiry and hard. Supply arrangements seemed to be working well. Battle in progress but field cookers all pulling out in orderly manner to go up after dark as I was leaving. No sign of a single refugee from start to finish of my trip. Work on harvest proceeding vigorously by inhabitants right up into rear of battery position area. A lot of it is already in.

**Part Two.**

**Fourth Continuation.**

Proportion of duds among German artillery shells very high. Divisional Commander put it at as much as 50%. My own estimate after 3 hours of it was at least 25%. Russians also state German aircraft have been dropping bags of stones and bits of scrap owing presumably to shortage of bombs. This division confirms my previous reports that German close support by infantry guns mortars and dive bombers is excellent and the biggest menace the Russians Infantry have to face. On this front the Germans have several times brigaded their medium mortars and used them for a quick burst of concentrated fire, moving them to a fresh position directly afterwards. Much the same tactics as we use for our Livens projectors. The Divisional Commander described this procedure as quote panic making unquote. This is significant as I think this is one respect in which the Russians are apt to fail. Under violent surprise especially in some novel guise they are given to herd panic. Much of the above is most satisfactory information from our point of view. I repeat my opening caveat, but it can hardly apply outside the divisional area with the short notice of my visit. Part 3 follows.

**Part Three.**

1. Russian defences in depth. I cannot say how or how far the Defence Works I saw on each side of road Moscow–Smolensk extend. The main ones were as follows.

(a) At kilometer 232 from Moscow. Strong line along River Dnieper. River itself backed by very good water anti tank obstacle dug in marshy ground. About 30 feet of strong wire behind this. Trenches and weapon pits and a little concrete under construction.

(b) At kilometer 276 from Moscow. Good anti tank obstacles with weapon pits and trenches. As yet no wire.

(c) About kilometer 230 from Moscow. As in (b). I think Vyasma is included as strong locality in this line. I saw Commander of the Army Artillery doing a reconnaissance of this line.

(d) At kilometer 174.

(e) About kilometer 130.

(f) About kilometer 60. In those three work is as in (b) and (c) but little has been done beyond anti tank obstacle in case of (e) and (f) all anti tank obstacles look adequate. Both faces are vertical and minimum depth of about 6 to 8 feet. No revetting as soil stands well. I saw no trace of mines but could
get no information on this. Russians use tree trunks in the same way as we use plain iron rails. There are normally not more than three or four rows. Tree trunks are minimum diameter of about 10 inches and maximum up to 15 inches. They are either set in the ground vertically or are inclined towards enemy at about 60 degrees with ground.

2. Relations with party. The Divisional Commissar who took me round obviously had authority over all ranks. He was most (?voluble) but was clearly on excellent terms with everyone and we were told he was generally in the forefront of the battle. My personal G.P.U. Escort came with me and got a very friendly reception everywhere. Order and I finished up as Tovarishes instead of Gaspasins.

3. Communications. As far as I could see and ascertain both wireless and line communications were ample and working well. All batteries had both line and T/T to their Ops.

4. Motor transport. Rather a medley of types and a lot of it no longer young but functioning with obvious reliability. The bulk of it is of about 30 cwt. standard. A fair proportion of whole track or semi track general purpose vehicles. No lights at all are allowed in the forward area which has considerable depth. Ballisage would help enormously in the forests. May I suggest it to them and can we provide any.

5. Tanks. Practically all the tanks we saw were of type T26 which appears to be giving a very good account of itself.

6. Horse transport. Nearly all of standard Central European two horse light four wheel type. There appears to be an almost unlimited supply. This will be just as well when the rains come if the affect of one nights rain on the country roads can be gauged by our experience last night.

7. The Divisional Commander was very pleased that one Heavy A.A. Battery had just been added to the Establishment of his Division.

8. Methods of fire. I was not allowed far enough forward to see the close support weapons functioning. Artillery support during the period of my visit was nearly entirely observed fire by salvos or bursts of gunfire without ranging.

9. Ammunition. I was very struck with the H.E. shell for the 152 m.m. Howitzer. A beautifully finished streamlined job. I also saw the cratering produced by the Field Artillery bombardment of enemy bank of the River Vop during the previous days attack. The depth of this shoot on the River Bank was about 100 yards and a high density of shallow instantaneous fuse craters had resulted.

10. Attack on battery positions by Russian Tanks. In most cases the Medium Tanks in the heat of the fight had actually run the guns down. In one battery three 105 m.m.
gaps had been treated in this way, the fourth had blown the turret off a tank to pieces at about 10 yards range before being captured.

11. German Field Artillery equipment. All Field Batteries captured were the standard 105s except one battery of the 105 L.F.H. 16.

12. Employment of women. We found the Russian Equivalent of our A.T.S. in standard Russian Uniform blouses dark blue skirts and high boots, attached to Units as far forward as advanced Divisional H.Q. as medical assistants telegraphists motor drivers etc.

13. Commander 50th Russian Division. Divisional Commander was Colonel Boroyko. Quite a number of Russian Divisions are being commanded by Colonels. He appeared to be about 45 and was clearly a strong personality and a good Commander who knew his job and was running a good show. He said quite openly that his Division were not bothering to take many prisoners. He also said that when the Russians attacked they rarely got to close quarters with a German Officer. The rear parties that they mopped up were usually Commanded by Junior N.C.O.'s.
WAR CABINET.

STAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TURKS.

Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

In accordance with the instructions of the War Cabinet, we have considered the suggestion made by the Foreign Secretary that we should be rather more specific than had been contemplated in the previous instructions as to the extent of the fighter force which we could make available to Turkey.

It is not possible to give the Turks any positive assurance as to the maximum scale of the support we could afford them. Subject however, to the agreement of the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East, to whom we have already telegraphed, we suggest that the following should be added to paragraph 3(f) of the instructions which we have sent for the conduct of these Conversations:

"Preparations should be made to receive a force of
2 Heavy Bomber Squadrons
6 Medium Bomber Squadrons
8 Fighter Squadrons
1 A.C. Squadron
1 G.R. Squadron
1 Squadron Torpedo Bombers

which we intend to send to support Turkey provided situation in the Western Desert permits.

Plans should be made to receive a first contingent of
4 Fighter Squadrons which will be sent on zero day whatever the situation elsewhere may be."

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND.

"JOHN G. DILL."

"WILFRID FREEMAN.

(V.C.A.S.)

Great George Street, S.W.1.

27th August, 1941.

W.M.(41)86th Conclusions; Minute 4.
+ Annex.
ANNEX.

TELEGRAM TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST.

Following from Chiefs of Staff No. 154.

C. in C. Middle East's Telegram No. 0/87686 of 2/8 to War Office and 0/88281 of 3/8 to Military Attaché, Ankara.

Paragraph 1.

We are in general agreement with your proposed agenda for forthcoming Staff Conversations with Turks subject to the following amendment. We suggest Item (g) should be amended to read -

Quote Area of operation and disposition of British forces in concerted plan of defence including spheres of activity of British and Turkish Air Forces unquote.

Paragraph 2.

The character and extent of the assistance we will offer has been carefully examined by the Chiefs of Staff with the Prime Minister in the Chair. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Supply also attended the meeting. It was agreed that general line to be taken by our delegation in talks with Turks should be as follows -

(a) If you are pressed by Germany and resist by force of arms, we will make common cause with you, and come to your help at once with substantial forces. You will become a partner in the immense resources of the British Empire and the United States of America.

(b) Our essential object in the Middle East is the destruction of the German Africa Corps, and the reconquest of Cyrenaica. Once we have accomplished this, we can shift nearly the whole of our weight to your front.

(c) It seems to us extremely unlikely that Germany could stage a full-scale attack on you before the 1st November, and probably not till the Spring of 1942. To be on the safe side, let us take 1st November, 1941, as zero day.

(d) By that date we should be able to send you if you are attacked four divisions and at least one Armoured Brigade. All of these formations would be complete with all modern equipment, including A.T. Artillery.
(e) The precise extent and character of our air support must depend on the general situation, particularly in the Western Desert, when the call comes. But you may rest assured that it will be considerable. We are building up very powerful air forces in the Middle East. Before the end of this year we should have 1000 first-line aircraft in regular action backed by considerable reserves; and maintained continuously from Britain and America; and this number will rise to 1250 first line in action during 1942.

(f) Our air forces will however be totally unable to operate effectively in your support, unless you give us immediate facilities for preparing the necessary aerodromes, and establishing the necessary ground organisation. If you will let us take a leaf out of the German book in Bulgaria, and send in the necessary technical personnel in plain clothes to get to work on the aerodromes at once, the considerable air forces which we will send to you will be able to operate with maximum effect from the outset. Without these facilities they will be relatively useless.

(g) We will provide anti-aircraft artillery on a considerable scale for the defence of our own formations, and of the aerodromes which you allot to us.

(h) We will increase and accelerate the despatch to you of equipment and other war material, and you shall have a share of the considerable supplies which are already being shipped direct to the Middle East from the U.S.A. As an immediate and special consignment, we are sending you 100 3.7 A.A. guns from England.

Paragraph 3.

Offer of A.A. guns referred to in paragraph 2 (h) above should not be volunteered in first place, but Delegation should keep it up their sleeves as bargaining counter.

Paragraph 4.

Conversations should not take place until General Auchinleck and Air Marshal Tedder have returned to Cairo and have explained above instructions to our Delegation. Later date suggested in paragraph 2 of your Telegram No. 0/88231 therefore appears suitable.
Paragraph 5.

Foreign Secretary suggests that one way of bringing about improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey would be for our representatives during Staff Conversations to take opportunity of preaching to their Turkish opposite numbers importance of political rapprochement with Soviet Union. They should assure the Turks that they have nothing to fear from imperialistic claims by Russians in respect of Dardanelles or Caucasian Frontier. At same time they should do all they can to convince Turks that in recommending rapprochement between Turks and Soviet it is not our intention or wish to push Turks into war prematurely or against their better judgment. Our only object is to see Turkish political and military position strengthened as it will be by mere fact that she is on intimate terms with her Northern neighbour.

Paragraph 6.

Please pass to Minister of State.
August 28, 1941.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

BLOCKADE POLICY: MILK FOR CHILDREN IN VICHY FRANCE.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ANNEXED is a copy of a message which Lord Halifax has received from President Roosevelt advocating the admission through the blockade of further supplies of milk for children in unoccupied France.

2. My colleagues will recollect that we reaffirmed as recently as the 28th July (Cabinet Conclusions 75 (41) 9) the policy which we have hitherto followed in regard to food for the occupied countries, namely, that the Germans must be held responsible for the peoples of the countries which they have overrun. We also had in mind that the new harvest would now be meeting the immediate necessities.

3. In January of this year, when we agreed to a former request of the President to allow the entry of some milk and vitamins for the children of unoccupied France, we did so largely because it was felt that a distinction could be drawn between unoccupied France and the occupied countries. In May, however, when we learnt that the Vichy Government had concluded a barter deal in food on a very large scale with the Germans, we refused to sanction further shipments under this scheme, and we understood that the United States Government were in sympathy with our decision. Since then Admiral Darlan’s policy of collaboration has gone to much greater lengths, and we are entitled to regard the unoccupied territory as having come increasingly under the control of the Axis.

4. In these circumstances I do not myself feel able to recommend that we should make this concession to Vichy while continuing to deny the many and powerful requests which we are receiving from the Governments of the Allied countries, Belgium, Greece and Norway in particular. The situation in the two former is certainly much worse than in unoccupied France, and I consider that a concession to the latter would not only raise most serious difficulties for us with the Allied Governments, but would also be vigorously attacked at home.

5. At the same time we must recognise the difficulty of returning an uncompromising negative to the President. There are reasons to believe that the American Red Cross has a very special influence with him, and we on our side cannot but agree that it is a genuine humanitarian body against which no such accusations of anti-British sentiment can be brought as against Mr. Hoover’s organisation.

6. On the whole I am disposed to suggest that in reply to the President we should point out the grave political difficulty in which his request in favour of Vichy France has placed us, and should offer, if he considers that humanitarian
opinion in America must be given some outlet for its beneficence, to permit limited quantities of milk to be distributed by the American Red Cross in the Allied countries as well as in Vichy France.

7. I realise the departure from our existing policy which this proposal involves. I am impressed, however, by the necessity of our making some gesture which may help to stay the demoralization which the shortage of food, and in particular of food for children, will almost certainly create in the occupied territories during the coming winter. It would not be practicable to allow the despatch of food-stuffs generally; but there is a special case in favour of milk for children. I am well aware that the supply of milk in the United States, even for ourselves, is short; but I should have thought that the sacrifice of a small allocation for occupied countries would be worth making, both as a means of maintaining morale in those territories and as a concession to opinion in the United States.

A. E.

Foreign Office, August 28, 1941.

ANNEX.

Message from the President to Lord Halifax.

I FORGOT to speak to you about milk for unoccupied France. Norman Davis informs me that you understand the matter.

Since the American Red Cross has its supervisory organization there and the distribution of supplies previously sent was completed the 1st August, they must either withdraw entirely or send further supplies at once. I feel that, in order to maintain morale, it is advisable to continue, at least for the present, limited shipments of milk and clothing for children through the American Red Cross. Please take this up with Winston and advise.

ROOSEVELT.

August 21, 1941.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 104)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 0700 August 21st, to
0700 August 28th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

Shipping losses have been moderate and well below the weekly average for the war.

Successful operations have been carried out by H.M. ships in the Western Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The number of attacks on U-Boats by aircraft in the North-Western Approaches has been exceptionally high.

Home Waters.

2. The Free French Submarine Rubis torpedoed a Finnish merchant ship off Norway, on the 21st, at close range. The Rubis was damaged by the explosions, and forced to return on the surface escorted by H.M. Ships and our aircraft. H.M.S. Southern Prince (minelayer) was torpedoed 70 miles west of the Faroes, but was able to return to port at reduced speed.

H.M. Netlayer Tonbridge was sunk by bombs off Yarmouth. H.M. Sloop Black Swan, while escorting a coastal convoy, was damaged by a near miss off Milford Haven, and returned to port with two unexploded bombs on board; these were successfully removed. The lighthouse at Myggenæs, Faroes, was bombed and the wireless station damaged during the afternoon of the 24th.

An enemy aircraft was shot down by H.M. Trawler Brabant off the Northumbrian coast.

Approximately 23,900 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk or seriously damaged during the week by aircraft of the Bomber and Coastal Commands.

Northern Waters.

3. H.M. Submarine Tigris torpedoed and sank a merchant ship of 3,000 tons off the Norwegian coast.

A laden ammunition ship of 5,000 tons and a 2,000-ton merchant vessel were sunk in Petsamo harbour by a Russian submarine.

North Atlantic.

4. During the night of the 23rd/24th, H.M. Corvette Zinnia, while escorting an outward-bound Gibraltar convoy, was torpedoed and sunk to the westward of Oporto. Details of the attack on the convoy are given in Paragraph 11.

H.M. Canadian Armed Merchant Cruiser Prince David reported on the 21st that she had sighted and lost touch with an unknown enemy ship, which she believed to be a heavy cruiser, 700 miles E.N.E. of Bermuda.

Mediterranean.

5. The Gibraltar Force, comprising H.M. Ships Nelson, Ark Royal, Hermione, Manxman (minelayer) and five destroyers, carried out operations in the Western Mediterranean during the week. Early on the 24th aircraft from H.M.S. Ark Royal set on fire the cork forests and successfully attacked factories in the neighbourhood of Tempio, Northern Sardinia. During the day submarine and aircraft reports indicated that Italian forces totalling three battleships, six cruisers and numerous destroyers were at sea between Sardinia and Sicily. The Gibraltar Force proceeded to the southward, but was unable to make contact, as air reconnaissance failed to locate the enemy. A report received about nightfall showed the enemy to be too far to the eastward for air attack, and the Gibraltar Force returned to port. A Cant floatplane, which was shadowing on the afternoon of the 24th, was damaged by naval fighters and a Ju. 52 was shot down. Some of the Italian forces were reported on the 26th entering the Straits of Messina from the northward, and all are believed to have returned to harbour.
H.M. Submarine Torbay has reached Alexandria with 130 British and Allied troops on board from Crete. Previous to embarking these troops she sank a large Italian schooner off Cape Matapan. H.M. Submarine Unbeaten, on the 19th, attacked a southbound convoy of four fast liners to the south-west of Mazzara, Sicily, and obtained one hit with a torpedo. On the following day H.M. Submarine Unique, off Tripoli, also attacked four liners escorted by destroyers, and claimed three hits on the Italian S.S. Esperia (11,398 tons). H.M. Submarine Upholder sank a laden 2,000-ton merchant ship and obtained two torpedo hits on the Italian Fleet Oiler Torrepin (5,664 tons) off the north-west of Sicily.

H.M. Submarines P.32 and P.33 are overdue from patrol, and P.33 must be considered lost.

H.M.S. Phoebus was torpedoed by an aircraft north of Bardia on the 27th and returned to port at reduced speed. Earlier in the week H.M. Destroyer Nizwa was bombed and stopped by a near miss when returning to base from Tobruk, but was able to proceed.

During the week nine French merchant ships (upwards of 24,400 tons) eastward and four (17,947 tons) westward have passed Gibraltar under escort.

Persian Gulf.

6. A military force was landed on the Persian coast from H.M. Ships on the 25th August. In the course of the operations, two Persian sloops, Babr and Palang (560 tons, built 1931, three 4-inch) were sunk, and four gunboats, a depot ship, two tugs and a floating dock of 6,000 tons capacity were captured. One merchant ship was sunk and seven were captured, of which the German Hohenfels (7,862 tons) and the Sturmfels (6,288 tons) were undamaged, and five others, though sabotaged, can be repaired. Admiral Bayender, the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces in South Persia, was killed. British naval casualties were one officer and three ratings wounded.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

7. There were eighteen attacks on U-boats during the week, fourteen by aircraft and four by surface ships. One attack by a destroyer was made west of Cape Finisterre and one by aircraft to the westward of Lisbon. All the remainder took place in the North-Western Approaches between the latitudes of Galway and the Faroes. One U-boat is believed to have been severely damaged and an attack by H.M. Trawler Vascoa appeared promising. Hits were claimed on two other occasions, but there was no definite evidence of destruction.

Enemy Intelligence.

German.

8. No changes have been reported in the positions of the main German units. Analysis of air photographs shows that there have been considerable delays in building in some shipyards, particularly in the completion of U-boats.

Raiders.

9. It is estimated that there are four surface raiders at large, one each in the Pacific, Indian and South Atlantic Oceans and the fourth in either the North or South Atlantic.

U-boats.

10. About thirty German U-boats and six or seven Italians have been operating in the Atlantic. Most of the Germans have operated in the area between the north-western coast of Ireland (R) and the south of Iceland (C). Others were to the westward of Portugal and two or three are believed to be in the South Atlantic.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

11. Shipping casualties so far reported have again been well below the average, in spite of attacks on two convoys. U-boats continued their concentrated attacks on the outward-bound convoy to Gibraltar mentioned in last week's
Résumé, and it is estimated that at one time there were as many as nine U-boats in the vicinity. They sank three more ships and a tug, making a total of eight vessels, in addition to the Norwegian Destroyer Bath and H.M. Corvette Zinnia. An outward Atlantic convoy was attacked by U-boats to the westward of Ireland (I) and at least four ships were sunk. One ship, dispersed from an outward convoy, was torpedoed and sunk in the North-Western Approaches. One ship was damaged by a mine off Pantelleria and another was shelled by a U-boat on passage from Malta to Gibraltar. One ship was mined and sunk in the River Orwell. A raider sank a Dutch ship off the Galapagos Islands on the 17th and probably a second vessel two days later.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

12. During the week ending the 27th August 1,070 ships, including 214 Allied and 32 neutral, were convoyed. Four anti-aircraft ships, nine armed merchant cruisers, sixty destroyers and ninety sloops, corvettes and minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 23rd August totalled 1,373,683 tons, compared with 618,817 tons during the previous week and an average of 892,743 tons during the past 10 weeks. Oil imports amounted to 492,992 tons in 43 tankers. Mineral imports were 344,120 tons, of which 218,116 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Wood and pulp imports were 51,121 tons and cereal imports were 216,342 tons, of which 11,140 tons were rice. Twenty-six ships were fully laden with grain. Other food imports totalled 201,816 tons, the principal commodities being: sugar and molasses, 88,619 tons; refrigerated and tinned meat, bacon and hams, 38,899 tons; evaporated and tinned milk, 11,016 tons; dried, tinned and fresh fruit, 8,883 tons; cheese, 6,116 tons; dried, tinned and fresh fruit, 8,883 tons. Imports of machinery, aircraft, motor lorries, ammunition and aircraft were satisfactory.

British Minelaying.

13. On the 21st August the Free French submarine Rubis laid 18 mines off the Norwegian coast and on the following day M.T.B.s. laid 8 off the Belgian coast and H.M.S. Agamemnon laid 624 off North Rona. On the 25th August H.M.S. Ships Southern Prince, Port Quebec and Adventure laid 1,390 in the Iceland (C)-Faroes Channel. There has been considerable minelaying by aircraft off the French Biscay ports, the German North Sea coast and in the Western Baltic. In the Mediterranean H.M.S. Manxman laid 156 mines on the 24th August.

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.

Home Waters.

14. Minelaying by aircraft was again on a small scale and was carried out only on alternative nights. On four nights during the week minelaying was suspected off the East coast from the North Foreland to the Firth of Forth and off Milford Haven.

Twenty-one ground mines have been destroyed during the week. The mine totals are: magnetic 1,345, acoustic 849, and contact 1,022.

Foreign Waters.

Two dangerous areas have been declared and a searched channel established at Beyrouut. New searched channels have been established at Rangoon and Penang.

Enemy Merchant Shipping.

15. Finnish broadcasts have stated that the Finnish Hogland (4,360 tons), with a cargo of iron ore for a German port, was torpedoed and sunk off the coast of Norway on the 17th August.

The German Government has offered to sell the Montevideo (6,675 tons) and the Windhuk (16,662 tons), both in-Brazilian ports, to the Brazilian Government.
The Italian *Barbarigo* (5,295 tons) is reliably reported to have been sunk. The purchase by the Argentine Government of the sixteen Italian ships in Argentine ports was completed on the 25th August.

Intelligence.

Russia.

16. Odessa is being supplied from Sebastopol by about one ship per day. It is reported that minesweepers and other small craft have been collected by the enemy in Bessarabian ports.

U.S.A.

17. The two German and twenty-seven Italian merchant ships taken over by the United States Government are being transferred to the Panamanian flag, although they will be kept under the control of the Maritime Commission. The thirty-seven Danish ships in the U.S.A. are to be requisitioned by the Maritime Commission.

MILITARY SITUATION.

(An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.)

Russo-German Campaign.

18. Outstanding events of the week were an advance by the Finns to within a few miles of Viipuri, a German advance in the Baltic area threatening the Moscow—Leningrad railway and Leningrad itself, and a serious drive south-eastwards near Gomel combined with an attempt to outflank Kiev from the north by an advance north-eastward from the Korosten—Kiev railway.

Except for Odessa and a few bridgeheads held by Soviet forces west of the Dnieper, the area of the Ukraine within the bend of this river, from just below Kiev southwards, is in German hands.

Finland.

19. The Finns now claim to be holding the eastern bank of the River Vuoksi from Enso to Kiyinnemi. This implies that the Russians in the east of the Isthmus have retired south of the water defences of the former Mannerheim Line.

A big-scale attack on Viipuri has developed from the west and north. The River Vuoksi has been forded at Autrea and Finnish forces claim to be within a few miles of Viipuri.

The Baltic Front.

20. The German effort during the past week has been concentrated on the drive eastwards north of Lake Ilmen which has resulted in a further advance east of the River Luga and the fall of Novgorod. These constitute a very serious threat to the Moscow—Leningrad railway and Leningrad itself.

South of Lake Ilmen there has been little appreciable change.

White Russia.

21. There has been no eastward advance on this front.

Ukraine.

22. During the past week the most serious development on this front has been the south-easterly advance of strong German armoured and motorised forces through Gomel. This drive is believed already to have penetrated into the extreme northern districts of the Ukraine.

23. Simultaneously with this drive from the north, German forces have advanced north-eastwards north of Kiev, and there are indications that the crossing of the River Dnieper, near the confluence of the River Priep, has been effected. Thus, both Kiev itself and the Soviet forces between Gomel and Kiev are threatened simultaneously with envelopment from the north and from the
south, and the continued advance from the north would turn the line of the Dnieper.

24. Operations within the bend of the Dnieper, aimed at eliminating all bridgeheads held by Soviet forces on the right bank, are believed to have been very largely successful. At the same time there is no confirmation of the Germans having secured bridgeheads on the left bank, though a strong effort is being made to do so near Dneipropetrovsk, which the Germans claimed on the 26th August to have taken.

Odessa remains in Russian hands.

Operations.

Libya and Egypt.

25. During the earlier part of the week patrolling activity in the Western Desert was curtailed by a heavy sandstorm. The usual minor activity on both sides, including daily and nightly bombing of Tobruk, has been maintained.

Abyssinia.

26. A serious explosion took place on the 22nd August in the Naval barracks at Assab, causing the death of four Europeans and wounding several others. There was some suspicion of a delayed-action mine, and a court of enquiry is being held.

East Africa.

27. It has been decided to form a new command in East Africa, to come into effect on the 15th September. This command will comprise all territories south of the Sudan border and north of the Southern Rhodesian border, and will be commanded by Lieut.-General Sir W. Platt.

Persia.

28. Successful military operations, combined with a Russian invasion from the north, culminated in an order from the Shah that all resistance should cease.

29. In the early morning of the 25th August our forces crossed the Persian frontier. The attack was carried out by two columns:

(a) The Southern Column operating from Basra in co-operation with the Royal Navy, consisted of:
   - 8 Indian Division.
   - 13 D.C.O. Lancers.

(b) The Northern Column operating from Khanaquin, consisted of:
   - 14/20 Hussars.
   - 1/5 Gurkha Rifles.
   - 2/7 Gurkha Rifles.
   - 21 Indian Inf. Bde. (less one bn.) and supporting arms.

By the end of the first day the Southern Column had captured the oil refinery at Abadan, which was undamaged, and the town of Khurramshahr. The port of Bandar Shahpur surrendered to two companies of 3/10 Baluch Regt. co-operating with the Royal Navy.

One company of 3/10 Baluch Regt. was landed by air in the oilfields area for the protection of British employees.

The Northern Column had captured the oilfield at Naft-i-Shah and the town of Qasr-i-Shirin, after meeting some opposition. Our casualties were not severe.

30. By the end of the second day the 24th Indian Infantry Brigade, in the South, had advanced forty miles towards Ahwaz. In the North, our forces had occupied Gilan (South of the Pai-Tak pass) and were continuing the advance in the direction of Shanabad.
Intelligence.

Germany.

31. It is believed that there are still 26 German divisions in France and an analysis of the identified divisions has led to the following deductions:

32. This garrison consists of Reserve, Landwehr, Ersatz and Landes­schatzen divisions which are composed generally of elderly reservists, men of low medical category and raw recruits. These formations are not of high fighting value and probably lack modern equipment.

It appears, therefore, that the total of 26 divisions includes a considerable number which are of value only for internal security purposes, and that the effective field force seems unlikely to exceed 10-15 divisions.

33. There are probably now four tank battalions in France, recently formed and still completing training; two each in the areas Bordeaux-Bayonne and Paris; those in the Paris area are certainly equipped with French tanks.

Spain.

34. The Germans are still improving communications and establishing dumps near the Franco-Spanish frontier. In addition to these long-term preparations, it is reported that the French coast from Biarritz southwards to the Spanish frontier has been declared a forbidden zone and is to be completely evacuated of its civilian population. The marked increase in heavy coast defence artillery along that coast revealed by air reconnaissance suggests that this measure may be due to fear of an attempted British landing, rather than an indication of early German action against Spain.

Far East.

35. The present distribution of Japanese Divisions is believed to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. China</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. China</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. China (Canton Area)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indo-China (South)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. No confirmation has been received that the Japanese troops in Southern Indo-China exceed the two divisions which it is known have been sent there, and their strength is probably approximately 50,000.

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

37. The results of our night operations against Germany were difficult to observe owing to poor visibility, and there is little of importance to record from the Home Front.

German activity over this country was again on a small scale.

Our aircraft co-operated with other forces in the operations in Persia.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

38. Bomber Command despatched 110 sorties, compared with 157 last week, and dropped 23 tons of H.E. bombs and 86 incendiaries by day. Fighter Command flew 1,071 aircraft sorties in the course of offensive operations over Northern France and the Netherlands and against shipping.
Twelve Blenheims, escorted by long-range fighters, successfully attacked Ijmuiden Iron and Steel Works; all bombs hit the target and bursts were seen on the rolling mill, warehouse, cooling tower and other buildings.

39. An attack by Whirlwind fighters on aerodromes at Maupertus and Lannion resulted in the destruction on the ground of 13 enemy bombers. A further four bombers were damaged and six fighters, also on the ground, were attacked with cannon fire.

40. Aircraft of Fighter Command, in addition to providing escorts, carried out a number of offensive sweeps over enemy territory, involving a total of 89 squadron sorties. In most cases, German fighter formations seemed unwilling to give combat except under very favourable circumstances. On the occasions when combats took place, our fighters destroyed 14 of them, probably destroyed 15 and damaged 15. Considerable A.A. fire was encountered and, during the week, we lost 31 fighters, four pilots being rescued. (These casualties include those incurred during attacks on shipping; see Coastal Operations.)

Night.

41. Bomber Command despatched 554 sorties, compared with 878 in the previous week. Operations were considerably hampered throughout the week by persistent bad weather and on two nights had to be cancelled. The main weight of our offensive was again concentrated on industrial and railway centres in Germany. The total of 525 tons of H.E. bombs and 44,545 incendiaries released during the period under review shows a considerable reduction, due to the prevailing weather, below the previous week. A number of the heaviest type bombs were employed and in all the major attacks numerous large fires were left burning.

42. Mannheim was raided on three occasions, during which a total of 187 tons of H.E. bombs and 13,650 incendiaries were dropped; two 4,000 lb. bombs which fell near the industrial district created huge explosions followed by enormous fires. A series of continued explosions elsewhere in the same area was also reported. Cologne was heavily attacked on one night (90 tons of H.E. bombs and 6,500 incendiaries). Lighter scale attacks were carried out against Düsseldorf, Karlsruhe and on the docks at Havre.

United Kingdom.

43. Fighter Command flew a total of 2,534 sorties (719 patrols) by day and 476 sorties (313 patrols) by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. Cross-Channel offensive operations and shipping patrols account for the bulk of our effort.

44. The operations carried out by the German Air Force units based on the Western Front were on a small scale and without any special feature. The bombing of land targets at night was very ineffective. Most of the incidents occurred in the Eastern Counties and were mainly the work of long-range night fighters.

Coastal Operations.

45. Coastal Command flew 204 patrols (852 sorties) and provided escorts for 49 convoys (219 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 529 (1,176 sorties).

46. Aircraft of Bomber Command, sometimes with fighter protection, searched for and attacked enemy shipping. Off Ijmuiden, Blenheims sank a 7,500-ton merchant vessel in convoy and a 500-ton reporting vessel, and scored hits on five other vessels of a total tonnage of about 14,500 tons. A 3,500-ton merchant vessel in convoy off Norderney and two 700-ton trawlers near Calais were also hit.

47. Forty-two aircraft were engaged in laying sea-mines off Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire and the Frisian Islands and in the Western Baltic.
German operations during daylight were almost wholly confined to oversea reconnaissance. The Condor unit operating from Bordeaux was active over the Atlantic west of Eire, due west from Bordeaux and to the south-west, off the coast of Portugal. Few shipping attacks were carried out during the week, although most of the offensive effort was directed to this phase of operations. One daylight attack was made off the Faroes, and five were made at dusk off East Anglia, St. David’s Head, Holy Island, the Smalls and East Scotland.

Central Mediterranean.

Attacks were made on Tripoli (L) on five nights; Wellingsons operating from Malta made a total of 52 sorties and dropped over 86 tons of H.E. and incendiary bombs. These attacks, which were most successful, were concentrated on the harbour area, and on military stores and supply dumps. Direct hits were made on quay warehouses, which were probably destroyed, and some very extensive fires were reported in the harbour and in military supply dump area; damage was also caused to shipping and harbour installations, and one merchant vessel was subsequently revealed to have a broken back and to be sunk alongside the Spanish Quay.

Some successful attacks were again carried out against shipping plying between Sicily and the African Coast. Two Blenheims made three hits on a 4,000-ton merchant vessel north-east of Kerkena, which was claimed to be sunk; unfortunately, one of these aircraft hit the mast and crashed in flames. Two schooners with an escort vessel were attacked and destroyed by four Blenheims in the Gulf of Sidra. On another occasion a bomb exploded on the deck of a merchant vessel of 1,000 tons, and a schooner was machine-gunned and left sinking. Other Blenheims, unable to locate any enemy shipping, made an attack on lorries travelling on the Tripoli (L)—Benghazi road. A night attack on the 27th/28th August by naval Swordfish resulted in one hit on a vessel of 8,000 tons; this was followed by flashes and a red glow.

The enemy made two minor attacks on Malta by night. On the second of these two aircraft believed to be Ju.88s were seriously damaged by Hurricanes. During daylight on the 26th August, nine Macchi 200s were intercepted by Hurricanes 50 miles from the island; three were shot down, one falling on to a village in Sicily, and two others were probably destroyed, for the loss of one of our aircraft.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

Four night attacks were made on Benghazai; these were effective, although they were on a small scale. During daylight on the 21st August, 12 Marylands accompanied by fighters bombed Gambut and Menastir; on the return journey they were intercepted over Sidi Barrani and two Marylands were shot down. Two raids by a total of 11 Marylands were carried out on a concentration of A.F.V.s near Ras Uenna (46 miles East of Tobruk) and many direct hits were made on the target. Another good attack was made by nine Marylands on a large enemy dump near Bardia.

Fighters continued to provide shipping protection patrols. On the 21st August a series of attacks were attempted by a total of 50 to 60 German aircraft, including fighters. These were intercepted by Tomahawks and Hurricanes, who destroyed two Me. 110s, probably destroyed four Me. 110s and damaged eight others; two Hurricanes are missing and one Tomahawk was shot down. On other occasions, whilst patrolling over naval units off Sidi Barrani, Tomahawks destroyed two Ju. 88s, three Me. 109s, and probably destroyed a third Ju. 88.

The enemy carried out one night attack against Alexandria and some slight damage was caused in the native quarter south of the harbour, but most of the bombs fell in the sea. Small and unsuccessful raids were also made on Port Said, Ismailia and Mersa Matruh. The aerodrome at Ismailia was bombed on the 26th/27th August, and one aircraft was destroyed on the ground, and damage was caused to air force property.
55. The enemy daylight activity was varied and more extensive than of late. Machine-gunning attacks were made by single aircraft on our forward positions, and high-level attacks by Ju.88s, and dive-bombing attacks by Ju.87s were made on Tobruk and on shipping in the harbour; seven long-range bombers attacked Alexandria, and to the north of Port Said a hit was made on a tanker with a torpedo. A trawler and a tanker were sunk in Tobruk harbour, and a tanker was damaged, but the aggregate amount of damage during these attacks was not serious.

56. Experience has shown that periods of activity by the German Air Force such as that under review are invariably preceded and followed by spells of comparative quiet, and it is considered that difficulties of supply and the maintenance of serviceability of aircraft make it impossible for intensive operations to be carried out by the Mediterranean force for more than a short time. While the work of the Italian Air Force continues to be rather unenterprising, it is of considerable value to the German Air Force in the Mediterranean and would be a big factor in event of major operations in the Mediterranean.

Persia.
57. On the 25th August, Hurricanes and Gladiators covered the advance of our troops, and attacked Ahwaz aerodrome; this target was also bombed by six Blenheim. At least five enemy aircraft were destroyed and two others damaged, and hangars were hit with bombs and set on fire. On the following day a further machine-gun attack was made by fighters and six other enemy aircraft were damaged.

58. Blenheim operating from Iraq released pamphlets on Teheran, Kaswin and other localities. Airborne troops were successfully landed for the protection of British families of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On the 26th August 11 Blenheim attacked enemy gun positions on the Pai-Tak Pass, where all bombs fell in the target area. Vincents carried out tactical reconnaissances.

East Africa.
59. Aircraft of the Royal Air Force and South African Air Force continued to attack military targets in the Wolchest and Debarech areas, and many direct hits were observed. Bombs were also dropped on buildings and M.T. vehicles at Azozo aerodrome.

Russia.
Russian Air Operations.
60. The Russian Air Force continues to offer strong opposition to the Germans in all sectors.

61. The Head of the British Military Mission to Moscow visited the battle area around Smolensk on the 20th August. Several German dive-bombers were seen operating against advanced elements, and a number of sorties of Russian bombers in flights of about six were seen operating against objectives in the rear of the enemy. A considerable amount of air activity was taking place, although no actual combats were witnessed, and there appeared to be as many Russian aircraft operating in the area as German.

62. The Russian air attack on the railway bridge at Cernovoda, in Roumania, on the 11th August was very successful. Not only was the bridge hit, but also the pipe-line supplying oil to the port of Constanza. Reports of the serviceability of the damaged bridge vary, but the most optimistic one received states that only one train per day can cross it in each direction. All traffic from Bucharest and the rest of Roumania to the important Black Sea port of Constanza must pass over this bridge.

63. Test pilots working at the Central Aero Hydro Dynamical Institute are employed at night on night fighter defence duties flying M.I.G. aircraft. They operate in special night fighter sectors. The aircraft are not controlled from the ground, but find their way back to their own aerodromes by observation of the searchlight layout, of which they are previously informed. These pilots have accounted for a considerable proportion of the German aircraft brought down in night raids over Moscow.
German Air Operations.

64. On the southern Sector of the front, following the occupation of most of the area west of the Dnieper bend with the exception of Odessa and limited areas at certain bridgeheads, it is thought that the German Air Force is now mainly engaged in establishing itself at new forward bases preparatory to the next phase of operations. These are likely to be either the attempted crossing of the Dnieper or possibly an attack on the Crimea, which, if left intact, would provide a powerful Russian base in the flank of any further progress across the river.

65. In the Kiev area little progress has been made and the strength of the Russian Air Force has been effective in harassing the German troops. The advance in the Gomel sector, on the other hand, has been strongly supported by dive-bomber and fighter units; the latter are known to be acting also as fighter-bombers carrying bombs up to 50 Kg.

66. Leningrad has become the immediate objective on the northern part of the front and it is estimated that in this Sector the German Air Force has a strength of approximately 1,000 aircraft, half of which consist of bomber and bomber-reconnaissance types.

Visit to Aircraft Factory at Moscow.

67. Members of the British Air and Economic Mission paid a visit to No. 1 Aeroplane Factory at Moscow on the 5th August, 1941. When the Mission inspected the factory it was working at full output, despite the fact that the Germans claim that it has been severely bombed in recent air raids.

One member of the Mission who had previously visited this factory in 1933, 1935 and 1936, was greatly impressed with the vastly improved organisation which was evident. There was an air of orderliness and efficiency which had been lacking on previous visits. It is in this factory that the M.I.G. 3, the fastest Russian single-seater fighter, is built.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

68. On only two days during the week were any bombs dropped on land in daylight.

On the 24th August bombs were dropped at Caister in Norfolk and on a R.A.F. site at Great Bromley in Essex, but damage was negligible.

On the 25th August some slight damage was done when bombs fell at Ashington, in the Tyne area, at Whitley Bay, at Hornsea and at Cleethorpes.

By Night.

69. Bombing has again been on a very small scale, and only slight damage has been done. Twelve R.A.F. Stations were attacked during the week without any appreciable damage being caused.

On the 22nd/23rd August the railway track and some trucks at Roudham Junction in Norfolk and private property at Spalding were damaged.

Slight damage was done to houses at Retford on the 24th/25th and near Pembroke and at Hayle in Cornwall on the 25th/26th.

On the 26th/27th August slight damage was caused to property at Milford Haven and in the surrounding districts, and shops, houses and mains were damaged at Margate. The railway station at Westgate was hit and both lines blocked by debris. At St. Mary's in the Scilly Isles several houses were damaged and two people were killed, the only fatal casualties reported during the week.

Casualties.

70. The casualties for the week ending 0600 on the 27th August are estimated at 2 killed and 9 seriously injured. There were no casualties in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III
will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 25th August, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>907,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>218,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>588,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, etc. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>326 1,004,000</td>
<td>144 792,000</td>
<td>... 792,000</td>
<td>470 2,096,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>527 2,981,000</td>
<td>880 1,900,000</td>
<td>13 88,000</td>
<td>870 3,905,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 65 ships of 135,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.
Also some 54 ships, totalling 324,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republucs.
The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.
The following casualties have occurred to H.M. auxiliary vessels during the period under review:—

August 22.—M.G.B. 70 slightly damaged by air attack off Lowestoft; One officer and 3 ratings wounded.
August 23.—Norwegian M/S Trawler Kos XVI sunk after collision with H.M. Destroyer Wolseley off the Yorkshire coast.
August 23.—A/P Trawler Morgan Jones slightly damaged by near-misses and machine-gun fire in air attack off the Tyne.
August 25.—M.L. 195 damaged by mine in entrance to Humber.

The following casualties to naval officers and men have been reported:—
Officers: Killed 9, Wounded 2, Missing 8.

These include 5 officers and 62 ratings lost in H.M. Canadian Corvette Picotte.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 21st August, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 28th August, 1941.

Metropolitan Area.

**Royal Air Force.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 fighter pilots are safe.

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

**Middle East.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above totals, 1 bomber and 1 "miscellaneous" aircraft were destroyed, 2 "miscellaneous" aircraft were probably destroyed, and 1 "miscellaneous" aircraft was damaged by A.A. fire.

**Italian.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[22857]
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:—

Germany.

Hanover.—As a result of the attack on the 3rd/4th August, railway communication to Wunstorf and Bremen was severely dislocated for two days and in the Hainholz Goods Station 140 loaded wagons were destroyed and damage was severe.

Karlsruhe.—In the raid on the 5th/6th August the main station and the goods station were damaged and several blocks of houses near the main station were destroyed. The largest brewery suffered heavily, the town barracks was hit and fires were caused in the industrial part of the town.

Hamburg.—In the raid on the 2nd/3rd August considerable damage was caused in the Reeperbahn Strasse, one of the main streets in the St. Pauli district. An informant who has recently visited the city confirms previous reports of damage in the heart thereof. He states that the inhabitants had been most impressed by the amount of destruction caused to the Deutscherwerft by a single bomb.

Cologne.—In photographs taken on the 21st August considerable parts of the city are obliterated by cloud. It is not possible therefore to obtain any idea of the real success of recent attacks. The photographs show, however, a severely damaged area in the Dom Strasse (to the north of the main station), believed to have been caused by a 4,000-lb. bomb, a heavily damaged area to the south of the city library caused in the main by fire, and a further such area in the Hertzog Strasse near by.

Mannheim.—In the raid on the 22nd/23rd July, Brown Boveri (electrical engineers), the Lanz Works (agricultural equipment) and two rayon fibre factories were all hit.

Industrial.—Coal production in Germany is said to have declined by a third, and a considerable part of this decline is attributable to R.A.F. activity.

General.—The German press, speaking of the summer holiday traffic in 1940, states that a shifting to districts in the east of Germany which are far removed from the front line and not endangered by air raids has become very noticeable. A comparison of the number of nights spent by tourists in various districts with the summer of 1939 reveals the following changes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.E. Germany</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudetenland</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Germany</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Germany</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Germany</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Germany</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On several occasions recently the German press has specifically drawn attention to the increase in casualties caused in air raids by persons not having gone to shelter, and these articles end with an exhortation to all people to go to shelter as soon as the warning sounds.
France.

Lille Area.—Several reports tell of the damage and effect of our raids in North France. Owing to lack of power only half of the pit-heads at Lens were working in the first week of August, those at Moules were stopped on the 27th July for twelve days and factories in the Lille district are stated to be operating at about 50 per cent. capacity. The Germans have appreciated this stoppage to industry caused by our successful attacks on power stations, and are erecting high tension cables to enable the power resources of Central France to be brought into play.

Photographs taken during the daylight attack on the Fives Steel and Engineering Works on the 18th August show direct hits in the north and northeastern parts of the works. The photographs show the damage to the south part of the works caused in previous raids.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY № 106 (27-8-41)

G.S.O.R. 5462
WESTERN U.S.S.R.

SCALE 1/40 OR 65 MILES TO 1 INCH

REFERENCE
international Boundary
Railways

AXIS OPERATIONS
AGAINST U.S.S.R.-
showing approximate
advances

MOSCOW

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by
Axis Forces:
- - - - - - - - - -
6th July
20th July
3rd Aug.
24th Aug.

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 106 (27-8-41)

G.S.O.R. 5462
WESTERN U.S.S.R.
SCALE 1/4 M OR 63 MILES TO 1 INCH

REFERENCE
International Boundary
Railways

AXIS OPERATIONS
AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate
advances

LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by
Axis Forces:
6th July
20th July
3rd Aug.
24th Aug.

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the
mobile warfare which has taken
place up to date there can be
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lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate
limits of advance of the foremost
troops.
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SECRET.

W.P.(41) 208.

29th August, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

DOMINION REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Telegram from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

The attached telegram from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet, by direction of the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W.1.,

29th August, 1941.
CYPHET TELEGRAM.

From Dominions Office.

To Prime Minister of Commonwealth of Australia.

Sent 9.15 a.m. 29th August, 1941.

IMMEDIATE.

No. 607 SECRET. Following from PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER begins:

SECRET.

1. Now that you have taken up your great Office I send you my most cordial good wishes for success, and assure you that I and my colleagues will do everything in our power to work with you in the same spirit of comradeship and goodwill as we worked with Mr. Menzies, who we are so glad to see is serving under you as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.

2. We have followed attentively the difficulties which have arisen in Australia about your representation over here, and perhaps it will be a help if I let you see our side of the question and how we are situated.

3. Since the declarations of the Imperial Conference of 1926 embodied in the Statute of Westminster all Dominion Governments are equal in status to that of the Mother Country, and all have direct access to the Crown. The Cabinet of His Majesty's Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of which at present I have the honour to be the head, is responsible to our own Parliament and is appointed by the King because they possess a majority in the House of Commons. It would not be possible therefore without organic changes, about which all the Dominions would have to be consulted, to make an Australian Minister who is responsible to the
Commonwealth Legislature a member of our body. The precedent of General Smuts in the last war does not apply, because he was an integral member of the War Cabinet of those days appointed by The King because of his personal aptitudes and not because he represented the South African or Dominions point of view.

4. In practice, however, whenever a Dominion Prime Minister visits this country — and they cannot visit it too often or too long — he is always invited to sit with us and take a full part in our deliberations. This is because he is the head of the Government of one of our sister Dominions, engaged with us in the common struggle, and has presumably the power to speak with the authority of the Dominion concerned not only on instructions from home but upon many issues which may arise in the course of discussion. This is a great advantage to us, and speeds up business.

5. The position of a Dominion Minister other than Prime Minister would be very different, as he would not be a principal but only an envoy. Many Dominions, Ministers other than Prime Ministers have visited us from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa during the present war, and I am always ready to confer with them or put them in the closest touch with the Ministers of the various Departments with which they are concerned. In the normal course the Secretary of State for the Dominions and the High Commissioner for the Dominion concerned look after them, and secure them every facility for doing any work they may have to do. This arrangement has given satisfaction, so far as I am aware, to all concerned.
6. I have considered the suggestion that each of the Dominions should have a Minister other than the Prime Minister sitting with us in the Cabinet of the United Kingdom during this time of war. I have learnt from the Prime Ministers of the Dominions of Canada, South Africa and New Zealand that they do not desire such representation and are well content with our present arrangements. Some of the Dominion Prime Ministers have indeed taken a very strongly adverse view, holding that no one but the Prime Minister can speak for their Governments except as specifically instructed, and that they might find their own liberty of action prejudiced by any decisions, some of which have to be made very quickly in wartime, to which their Minister became a party.

7. From our domestic point of view as His Majesty's Servants in the United Kingdom, there are many difficulties. We number at present eight, and there has been considerable argument that we should not be more than five. The addition of four Dominion representatives would involve the retirement from the War Cabinet of at least an equal number of British Ministers. Dwelling within a parliamentary and democratic system we rest like you do upon a political basis. I should not myself feel able, as at present advised, to recommend to His Majesty either the addition of four Dominions Ministers to the Cabinet of the United Kingdom, which would make our numbers too large for business, or the exclusion of a number of my present colleagues who are the leading men in the political parties to which they belong.
8. If of course you desire to send anyone from Australia as a special envoy to discuss any particular aspect of our common war effort, we should of course welcome him with the utmost consideration and honour, but he would not be and could not be a responsible partner in the daily work of our Government.

9. His relationship with the existing High Commissioner for Australia and with the Secretary of State for the Dominions would be for you to decide. It would seem, however, if such an envoy remained here as a regular institution, that the existing functions of the High Commissioner would to some extent be duplicated, and the relations of the Secretary of State with the High Commissioners generally might be affected. Such difficulties are not insuperable, but they may as well be faced. The whole system of the work of the High Commissioners in daily contact with the Secretary of State for the Dominions, has worked well, and I am assured that the three other Dominions would be opposed to any change.

10. We should of course welcome a meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers if that could be arranged, but the difficulties of distance and occasion are as you know very great. We are also quite ready to consider, if you desire it, the question of the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet. So far-reaching a change could not however be brought about piecemeal, but only by the general wish of all the Governments now serving His Majesty. Winston Churchill. Ends.

29th August, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

THE AMERICAN POSITION.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

I CIRCULATE, for the information of the War Cabinet, a letter from the Union High Commissioner in London, forwarding a telegram from General Smuts in regard to the American position.

C.

Dominions Office, August 30, 1941.

South Africa House,
Trafalgar Square, W.C. 2,
August 29, 1941.

My dear Secretary of State,

THE following is an extract from a telegram which I have just received from General Smuts in regard to the American position:

"As regards America, the position is clearly far from being satisfactory. I have all along felt that our propaganda there should have been prosecuted more strenuously in favor of active participation in the war, and not merely greater war supplies. We shall not win this war without active American assistance and our propaganda should be based on that assumption. America will come into the war, but it may be only after disastrous losses have been suffered. Russia's present contribution is most valuable, but will not last, as the Russians are never good stayers. In the end the British Commonwealth may have to face the Axis plus Japan alone. When, this winter, the Germans have stabilised their occupation of Western Russia, including its main centres of production, they will be able to release very large forces for attack not only on Great Britain, but also in the whole Mediterranean basin, while Japan will look upon this as their opportunity in the East.

"I place little reliance on Turkey, which may now be still more frightened by Russia being on her Eastern frontier in Iran than by the reported Bulgarian activities in Thrace. We may have to face a German occupation of North-West Africa and a new menace on the vital Atlantic route, the Libyan position, if not then already liquidated, may become far more difficult, while the main enemy attack on Egypt may be launched through Turkey with or without her passive assistance. With our difficult lines of supply in the Middle East and our shipping shortage added to our man-power difficulties, we may be hard put to hold our own in the Mediterranean area. Meanwhile, our main forces will have to be prepared to deal with a possible attack on Great Britain. We could not possibly do all this alone and American opinion has to be hastened to the inevitable decision
by intensive propaganda in addition to diplomatic pressure. I fear that we are all relying too much on continued Russian resistance, and disillusion may overtake us when America is still out of the war and unprepared and we have to face the storm alone. Our own preparations have to be accelerated, but not less so all possible steps to get the United States into the war.”

I have been asked by General Smuts to inform you of his views on this question, as he considers action on the above lines most desirable.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) SIDNEY F. WATERSO

The Right Honourable Viscount Cranborne,
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
EASTWARD EXTENSION OF THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

We have recently examined the measures which should be taken to meet an extension of the war in the Middle East, with particular regard to the building up of the facilities necessary to enable adequate land and air forces to operate against German forces attacking through Anatolia and/or the Caucasus.

2. We have reached the conclusion that in order to meet this threat we should be prepared ultimately to operate in Iraq forces of the order of 10 divisions and 30 squadrons. This entails:

(a) the provision of the air facilities required to enable the air forces to operate.

(b) the development of communications and base facilities in Iraq, including the urgent development of alternative ports to Basra.

3. The preparation of facilities under (a) is in hand.

With regard to (b), a preliminary examination of the problem of developing base facilities to this extent has been carried out in consultation with C.-in-C., India. A very considerable amount of development will be necessary, and in our view it is important to press on with the work as early as possible.

4. Authority however exists only for development for a force of three divisions and we therefore seek the approval of the War Cabinet to proceed with the larger scheme as a matter of urgency, including the provision of the air facilities for 30 squadrons.

5. We have been unable, in the time available, to obtain a firm estimate of the cost, but it is likely to be at least 20 million pounds.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND,
J.G. DILL.
C.F.A. PORTAL.

Great George Street, S.W.1.
13TH SEPTEMBER, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

SUPPLY FROM NORTH AMERICA.

Memorandum by the Prime Minister.

I HAVE had under consideration, in consultation with some of my colleagues, the arrangements in regard to the organisation and personnel of the British Supply Council in North America. (The present arrangements, as approved by the War Cabinet on the 12th December, 1940, are set out in the Appendix to this Note.)

2. I have accepted the recommendation of Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook that Mr. Morris Wilson, at present Deputy Chairman of the Council, should now be appointed Chairman, in succession to Mr. Arthur Purvis. As Chairman he will preside at the Council which will determine general policy.

3. I have also approved the proposal that, in order to provide for the increasingly heavy responsibilities falling upon the chief officers of the Council, a new officer should be appointed who will bear the title of Vice-Chairman and President, the latter title being in common use on the American continent.

The Vice-Chairman and President will be the chief executive officer of the Council, and will be responsible for the day-to-day business relating to supplies.

Mr. E. P. Taylor, who at present represents the Canadian Government in Washington in respect of the Supply Agreement between the two countries, has been appointed to the new post of Vice-Chairman and President.
4. Advantage is said to lie in appointing another Canadian to this post. Mr. Taylor, who has been most successful in his present post, is expected to be a forceful and effective representative of our interests to the United States authorities.

5. Experience has shown that, while representations to the United States authorities should continue to be made by the Council, there is need for closer co-ordination between the Council and the heads of the Joint Staff Mission. For this purpose the following arrangements will take effect:—

(i) The Council will look to the heads of the Joint Staff Mission in Washington for advice on all technical and military matters.

(ii) The heads of the Joint Staff Mission will be responsible for making such representations as may be necessary to the War Department and the Navy Department on the strategical aspects of our supply needs.

(iii) The heads of the Joint Staff Mission will not initiate representations on supply matters without prior consultation with the Council.

6. Nothing in the above will, of course, affect the position of the heads of the Joint Staff Mission as the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff. They will continue to discuss strategical questions with the War Department or the Navy Department without reference to the Supply Council.

7. Communications from Great Britain with the Supply Council will continue to be directed through the North American Supply Committee; but, in order to ensure that the instructions given to our representatives in North America are based on strategic as well as supply considerations, it will be necessary that the Service Ministers should become members of the North American Supply Committee, which will be responsible for all requisitions submitted to the United States Government.

September 1, 1941.

W. S. C.
APPENDIX.

W.P. (G) (40) 318 Revise, as amended by the War Cabinet on December 12, 1940 (W.M. (40) 304th Conclusions, Minute 6).

AS a result of a discussion between the three Supply Ministers and Mr. Arthur Purvis the following agreed proposals are put forward:—

1. Set up in the United States a Committee called the British Supply Council in North America.

2. The Chairman should be Mr. Purvis, and the Deputy Chairman Mr. Morris Wilson.

3. The Council, in harmony with the Ambassador, should deal with all issues of policy concerning Supply, including, of course, all representations made to the United States Administration.

4. The three Ministries shall retain separate organisations for the purpose of dealing with their supply requirements. The head of each of these organisations will be a member of the British Supply Council in North America.

5. The Supply Ministries will communicate with their Representatives directly, and complete information about these communications will be at the disposal of the Council.

6. The communications with the Supply Council will be directed through a Supply Committee in London domiciled at the Ministry of Supply. Sir Andrew Duncan will be Chairman of the Committee, and the First Lord and the Minister of Aircraft Production will be the members of it. The Committee will be convened by Sir Andrew Duncan, or at the request of the First Lord or the Minister of Aircraft Production.

7. The Treasury and the Dominions Office and other Departments shall have access to all records, and their Ministers shall have a right to attend meetings whenever they consider their interests are involved.
SECRET.
W.P.'(41) 818.
2nd September, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

THE FAR EAST.

Telegram from the Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

The attached telegram from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of New Zealand is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet by direction of the Prime Minister.

An identical message has been sent by the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Great George Street, S.W.1.
CYPHER TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND.

No. 340. SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Following is personal and secret message from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins. Events about Japan seem to have taken a favourable turn in the last month. The Japanese were then threatening to invade Siam as well as to make jumping-off grounds in Indo-China on the approaches to Singapore. However, as you will have seen from the telegrams sent you about our Atlantic conference, I persuaded the President to take a hard line against further Japanese encroachments in the South Pacific, and he was also willing to add the North-Western Pacific. You will have seen the notes delivered by the United States Government to Japan. The President and State Department think it a good thing to gain time, be it 30 days or 90 days, so long as there are no further encroachments, and the Japanese seem disposed to parley on this basis. Our interests are served by a standstill, and the Japanese for their part want to know what is going to happen to Russia.

2. As soon as the President had made these declarations I made the statement in my broadcast which conformed to all we had agreed upon with you and other Dominions beforehand and has since been endorsed by all. Encouraged by this, Russia comes along with a very stiff answer to the Japanese complaint about American supplies entering Vladivostock. The Russia Siberian Army has been very little diminished so far, and their Air Force is capable of heavy and much-dreaded bombing of Japan. We have thus got very heavy forces, to wit Great Britain and Russia coming into line with the United States in the Van, and in addition Japan is sprawled in China. They would thus have about three-quarters of the human race against them, and I do not wonder they are plunged in deep anxiety and hesitation. I cannot believe the Japanese will face the combination now developing around them. We may therefore regard the situation not only as more favourable, but as less tense.

3. Nevertheless the growth of our battleship strength, the ravages made in the German Navy, which is now reduced, apart from TIRPITZ and the U-boats, to very modest proportions, and the measure we now have of the Italian Navy, will make it possible in the near future for us to place heavy ships in the Indian Ocean. The Admiralty are carefully considering what is the best disposition to make. But I should like to let you know that as they become available we contemplate placing a force of capital ships, including first-class units, in the triangle Aden - Singapore - Simonstown before the end of the year. All this will be without prejudice to our control of the Eastern Mediterranean. I can assure you we are giving constant attention to all this, and you may be sure we shall never let you down if real danger comes.

CHURCHILL. Ends.
WAR CABINET.

Detention of a Member of Parliament under Defence Regulation 18B.

Should a Member of Parliament be given a right to have his case examined by a Committee of the House?

Memorandum by the Home Secretary.

Some Members of Parliament have represented to me that while the several discussions and Parliamentary statements on the subject of Defence Regulation 18B have disposed of most of the doubts and difficulties felt by the House with regard to this Regulation, there is still a strong feeling that if a Member is detained under this Regulation he should be given a right to have his case investigated by a Committee of the House rather than by the existing Advisory Committee. Much importance of course attaches to the principle that Members of Parliament should be protected against any risk of arbitrary action by the Executive Government, but in my view this proposal must be rejected for the following reasons:

1. By accepting the report of the Committee of Privileges on the case of Captain Ramsay the House of Commons has recognised that the privileges of a Member of Parliament do not entitle him to immunity from arrest and detention under Defence Regulation 18B. They have therefore, recognised that it is the duty of the Home Secretary to use the Regulation against a Member of Parliament in the same way as he would use it against anyone else, if detention is necessary for purposes of public security. It follows that the Home Secretary exercising, of course, great care and judgment, must take the responsibility for deciding whether a Member of Parliament who has been detained shall remain in detention after his case has been investigated by a Committee of enquiry in the manner provided for in the Regulation.

The suggestion of the Members of Parliament who have made representations to me is that the case of any Member who is detained should be investigated by a Committee of the House which would present a report giving advice to the Home Secretary, but that the responsibility for coming to a decision on that report should still rest on the Home Secretary.

To place the Home Secretary in the position in which it may be his duty to reject the advice of a Committee of the House of Commons would create most serious difficulties. Ministers are answerable to the House for their actions, and if the Home Secretary were to reject the advice of a Committee of the House of Commons, he could not resist a demand that he should explain his reason to the House and accept the right of the House to debate the case. Such a debate might take place in secret session, but it would
necessitate a full disclosure to the House of the Home Secretary's information, however confidential that information might be.

Under the present system the Home Secretary is not under any obligation to tell the House what is the effect of the report of the Advisory Committee in any particular case. He is required by paragraph 6 of Regulation 18B to make a monthly report to Parliament as to the action taken under the Regulation and "as to the number of cases, if any, in which he has declined to follow the advice of" the Advisory Committee; but he is not required to specify by name the individuals with regard to whom he has rejected the advice of the Advisory Committee, and it is not the practice to give such information.

If however the case of a Member of Parliament were investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons, it would be impossible for the Home Secretary to decline to tell the House whether his decision on the case was or was not in accordance with the advice tendered to him by the Committee, and if he were to inform the House that he had rejected the advice of the Committee of the House it would be incumbent upon him to explain to the House why he had come to a conclusion different from that of a Committee representing the House. For the Home Secretary to reject the advice of such a Committee without giving the House an opportunity of debate and without setting before the House full information as to the reasons for his decision would be inconsistent with the constitutional relation of a Minister to Parliament.

2. It was represented to me that a Committee of the House would take a judicial view of such cases, and that the competence and suitability of such a Committee was illustrated by the recent Committee on the case of Mr. Boothby. Comparison with the Boothby Committee however, seems to me entirely mistaken. The question which the Boothby Committee had to decide was whether the conduct of the Member transgressed the standards expected of Members of Parliament. This is a question for Parliament itself to decide. The question whether the detention of an individual is necessary for the security of the State is an entirely different problem. The decision in such a case ought to be taken by the Minister who is charged with the responsibility for internal security. For the purpose of exercising that responsibility the Minister must obtain information from the police and the Security Services which is often highly confidential and the action taken as a result of such information cannot properly be made the subject of Parliamentary discussion.

3. There is a further consideration that the appointment of a special tribunal to investigate the case of any Member of Parliament who is detained under Regulation 18B must give rise to the suggestion that the existing Advisory Committee is not a completely satisfactory body. The necessary inference from the appointment of such a special tribunal would be that Parliament regards the existing Advisory Committee as a sufficient protection when the liberty of an ordinary member of the public is at stake but as not sufficient when the liberty of a Member of Parliament is at stake. If it is admitted that the existing Advisory Committee is not a satisfactory body to deal with every type of case, it would be extremely hard to resist the argument that it is
not a satisfactory body to deal with any type of case involving the liberty of the subject. In this connection attention may be called to a reply by the Prime Minister to a Parliamentary Question on the 21st January, 1941. A copy of the question and answer is attached.

4. It is no doubt arguable that in time of war, if in some acute emergency political controversy became extremely tense, a Minister might abuse the power conferred upon him by Regulation 18B, and that if the Government were in danger from some powerful political opponent, he might come to the conclusion that the detention of such political opponent was necessary under Regulation 18B on grounds of national security, when in fact the motive was preservation of the Government’s position rather than the safety of the State. If, however, such a situation should ever arise, it is doubtful whether investigation of the case by a Committee of the House of Commons would in fact act as a corrective to any such misuse of power. In such a situation it is to be expected that political passions would be strong on the Committee, and there is no reason to suppose that such a Committee would be likely to take a more judicial view than the Minister.

5. It must be remembered that this question affects the position not only of Members of the House of Commons, but also of Members of the House of Lords, and that if the proposition were admitted that the case of a detained Member of Parliament should go before a Committee of the House of Commons it would follow that the case of a detained Peer should go before a Committee of the House of Lords.

6. The position of Members of the Parliament of Northern Ireland must also be considered. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, conferred on Members of the Parliament of Northern Ireland the same privileges as are possessed by Members of the British Parliament. At the present time Mr. Cahir Healy, a Member of the House of Commons of Northern Ireland, is detained under Regulation 18B. If it were agreed that a Member of the United Kingdom Parliament should be entitled to have his case investigated by a Committee of that Parliament, the question would arise whether a Member of the Northern Ireland Parliament should not be entitled to have his case investigated by a Committee of that Parliament; but no one, I imagine, would hold that a Committee of the House of Commons in Northern Ireland is a suitable body to investigate such a case as that of Mr. Cahir Healy or to give advice on such a case to the Home Secretary.

H.M.

HOME OFFICE.

4th September, 1941.
Mr. MANDER asked the Prime Minister whether he will consider making immediate arrangements to secure that, in the event of any further hon. Member being detained under Regulation 18B, the Advisory Committee to consider his case shall be composed of his colleagues of this House, with a view to safeguarding him against any possible misuse of the powers conferred?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am most anxious that there shall be full safeguards against any possible abuse of these powers, not only in the exceptional case of a Member of Parliament, but in every case where a citizen is detained under this Regulation, and I cannot accept the suggestion that the existing procedure does not provide adequate safeguards.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 105)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 0700 August 28th, to
0700 September 4th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.
1. Only one merchant ship has been reported sunk.
Heavy casualties have been inflicted on enemy shipping by our aircraft and submarines.

Home Waters.
2. The Twelfth Canadian troop convoy and one of the largest mercantile convoys to cross the Atlantic, consisting of 83 ships, have both arrived safely in the United Kingdom.
Three captured Norwegian vessels loaded with 8,700 tons of coal and with 65 volunteers on board have arrived in Iceland (C).
Three of H.M. destroyers have been damaged during the week: the St. Marys was in collision with a merchant ship in the North-Western Approaches, the Ripley ran ashore off Flamborough Head in a fog and the Wolfhound was damaged by a near miss mine off Sheringham; the latter's bows broke off and sank but she was towed to harbour.
Approximately 17,500 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk or seriously damaged during the week by aircraft of the Bomber and Coastal Commands.

Northern Waters.
3. H.M. Submarine Trident, on the 19th August, damaged a merchant ship by shell fire south-west of Trondheim, and three days later attacked a convoy in the North Cape area and sank the German S.S. Ostpreussen (3,030 tons). On the 30th she attacked another convoy in this area, and probably sank a 1,500-ton ship and severely damaged one of 3,000 tons. After this attack 56 depth charges were dropped in her vicinity by the escort, but she escaped damage.

Mediterranean.
4. H.M. Submarines have reported many successes in the central Mediterranean and in Greek waters. The Thrasher sank a schooner laden with oil off Cape Malea by gunfire, and five days previously she possibly torpedoed a merchant ship to the eastward of Athens. The Rorqual sank a motor vessel (believed about 10,000 tons) to the west of Crete on the 25th August. She suffered some damage from collision with a second merchant ship, but returned safely to her base.
The Tetrarch possibly torpedoed a merchant ship off Benghazi on the 19th and a few days later sank 2 schooners of a small convoy proceeding close inshore between Tripoli and Benghazi. On the 24th the Upholder attacked three 6-in. gun cruisers north of Cape St. Vito (northwest point of Sicily) and possibly obtained one hit. On the 26th August the Triumph attacked a battleship and two cruisers, escorted by destroyers, which were entering the Straits of Messina from the north (these were the ships mentioned in paragraph 5 of last week's Resume). She reports a possible hit, and a Naval officer who was being repatriated to Beirut in a French convoy states that he saw a cruiser of the Pola class (10,000 tons, eight 8-in. guns) down by the stern, with a list to starboard, being beached at Messina on this day. The Triumph also demolished a railway bridge near Palermo. The Urge damaged a 5,000 ton ship and sank a tanker in a southbound convoy off the west of Sicily on the 26th, and two days later hit and probably sank a liner believed to be of the Duilio class (23,800). The Utmost damaged a railway bridge on the west coast of the Gulf of Taranto.
The s.s. Deucalion (7,518 tons) on arrival at Gibraltar from Malta reports that she was twice unsuccessfully attacked on passage by two torpedo bombers, one of which she shot down.
A destroyer was sunk off Tripoli on the night of the 3rd/4th and over 65,000 tons of enemy shipping have been damaged or destroyed by our aircraft in the Mediterranean.
Other Foreign Stations.

5. H.M. Australian Sloop *Yarra* captured the Italian S.S. *Hilda* (4,901 tons) off Banda Abbas. The *Hilda* was slightly damaged, but has arrived in harbour.

Search has been made for the unknown enemy ship sighted on 21st to the eastward of Bermuda (last week's *Résumé*, para. 4) but without result.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

6. Ten attacks on U-boats, seven of which were made by aircraft, have been reported during the period. These all took place in the Western and North-Western Approaches. In no instance was there any definite evidence of destruction.

Enemy Intelligence.

U-boats.

7. There have been, on the average, thirty-five German U-boats in the North Atlantic during the week. They were working in three main groups: the largest in an area to the south-westward of Iceland (C) and the two others about 300 miles to the north-westward and to the south-westward of Ireland. In addition, single U-boats have been seen on patrol to the north-west of the Butt of Lewis and the Bloody Foreland. Four or five U-boats are also believed to be in the Atlantic south of the latitude of the Canary Islands.

There has been no evidence of Italian U-boats in the past week.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

8. A ship proceeding independently was sunk by U-boat 400 miles west of Ireland: she had been attacked and slightly damaged by a Focke-Wulf a few hours previously. A tanker was damaged by air attack off Milford Haven and aircraft have also unsuccessfully attacked convoys in the Bristol Channel and off the Durham coast. A ship was bombed in the Gulf of Suez, but details are not yet available.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

9. During the week ending the 3rd September, 1,034 ships, including 159 Allied and 18 neutral, were convoyed. Eight anti-aircraft ships, four armed merchant cruisers, sixty-one destroyers, and ninety-six sloops, corvettes and Fleet minesweepers were employed on convoy duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 30th August totalled 819,275 tons. Oil imports were 218,863 tons, mineral imports were 207,562 tons, of which 105,439 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. Wood and wood pulp imports were well above average at 70,683 tons and copra and palm oil imports were 33,474 tons and cereals 108,431 tons. Other food imports amounted to 106,819 tons, the principal commodities being, in tons: Refrigerated and tinned meat, bacon and hams, 21,497; sugar, 20,195; fruit, 9,251; lard and fats, 8,565; cocoa, 6,805; tea, 3,857; evaporated and tinned milk, 3,109; jam and honey, 2,652; and cheese, 908. There were also large consignments of motor lorries, machinery and high explosives.

British Minelaying.

10. There was very little minelaying to report in the past week. M.T.B.'s laid a few mines off the Belgian coast and there has been some aircraft minelaying in the western Baltic, along the German North Sea coast, and off French Biscay ports.

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.

Home Waters.

11. Aircraft minelaying occurred mainly off the East Coast, particularly between Flamborough Head and Blyth, but the Bristol Channel was visited on one night by a small number of aircraft.
Twenty magnetic and 21 acoustic mines have been destroyed during the week, the majority of them in the Thames Estuary.
The corrected mines totals are now:—
  Magnetic, 1,367; acoustic, 969; and contact, 1,024.

Foreign Waters.
12. Mines have been reported in the entrance to the White Sea and a dangerous area has been declared there.
   Of the mines supposed to have been laid by a U-boat off West African ports, four have now been destroyed off Lagos and three off Takoradi.

Enemy Merchant Shipping.

German.
13. Traffic along the Bilbao–Bayonne route started on the 20th June, and by the 30th July over 20,000 tons of ore had been shipped from Spain to France. By the 20th August 2 German, 8 Dutch, 4 French and 4 Spanish coasters were being employed on this work, and it is thought that the traffic will probably increase, there is plenty of shipping available for it.

Italian.
The auxiliary tanker *Tarvisio* is reported to have sailed from Chanak for the Ægean, as she would not risk the passage into the Black Sea without a pilot, the services of which were refused her.

British Contraband Control.
14. During the month of August 13,370 tons of cargo destined for the enemy were seized in prize. The main items were 7,133 tons of foodstuffs and beverages, almost entirely from Finnish ships, 3,740 tons of hides, skins and leather, all from Dutch ships, and 1,071 tons of base metals taken from Spanish ships. Among individual commodities seized were 1,018 tons of pyrites, 6,097 tons of sugar, 1,006 tons of wheat.
   The total seizures since the beginning of the war amount to 799,519 tons.

MILITARY SITUATION.
(An outline map showing Axis Operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.)

Russo-German Campaign.
15. Leningrad is seriously threatened by strong German armoured and motorised forces attacking from the south, and the city is in imminent danger of encirclement. In the Ukraine a serious position is developing as a result of the German advance south-east of Gomel. The rest of the Ukrainian front has remained comparatively quiet during the past week, except for the Dniepropetrovsk sector where strong German forces are endeavouring to enlarge the bridgehead which they have secured in this area.

Finland.
16. The 1919 Finnish-Soviet frontier has now been reached all along the front. There is no information of the operations in the far north. The Murmansk–Leningrad railway has not yet been cut.
17. During the past week the only advance of note in this sector has been in the Karelian Isthmus, where Finnish troops have advanced as far as the old Mannerheim Line, which extends from Taipale on Lake Ladoga to Summa, 25 miles south-east of Viborg.
18. In the central and south-central sectors it is reported that two German divisions in the Salla area and a third in the area north of Lake Ladoga have been withdrawn for training under Finnish instructors, owing to the high rate of casualties due to lack of experience of fighting in wooded country.

Estonia.

19. Tallinn has been evacuated by Soviet troops and the Germans are now in control of the whole of Estonia. The islands of Oesel and Dago, situated off the western Estonian coast and commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, are, however, still held by the Russians.

Leningrad Front.

20. During the past week operations by strong German armoured and motorised forces, aimed at encircling Leningrad from the south, have achieved considerable success in spite of strong Soviet resistance and of difficult conditions resulting from heavy rainfall in the area. There are indications that all railway communications between Leningrad and Moscow have now been cut and that the Germans are approaching the River Neva, 20 miles east of Leningrad.

21. Farther to the south, in the region of Lake Ilmen, German infantry divisions are operating approximately along the line of the River Lovat which runs due north from Kholm. No progress has been reported from this sector and the German News Agency admits that rain is severely impeding the advance.

Central Front.

22. This section has been very quiet and there has been no attempt by the Germans to continue their advance on Moscow. North-east of Smolensk there has been a successful local Russian counter-attack. The situation has not, however, materially altered.

Ukraine.

23. The south-easterly thrust from the southern flank of the Smolensk salient continues to make progress and the Germans have succeeded in cutting rail communications between Bryansk and Kiev. The threat to envelop Kiev and to outflank all the Russian defences on the line of the River Dnieper below that town has therefore been intensified.

24. Secondly, the Germans have obtained a bridgehead over the River Dnieper at Dnipropetrovsk and have succeeded in widening this bridgehead despite fierce Russian resistance. German efforts to obtain other bridgeheads south of Dnipropetrovsk have so far failed. Odessa is still in Russian hands and continues to resist stubbornly.

Operations.

Persia.

25. The advance continued in the Khanaqin area during 26th August against some opposition, whilst our forces in the South were engaged in mopping up operations and reconnoitring the Persian position South of Ahwaz. On the 27th one of our columns from Khanaqin occupied Shahabad (60 miles inside the Persian frontier). Another column advanced through the Pai-Tak Pass and occupied Karind.

26. On the 28th August the advance continued. Ahwaz in the South and Zibri (25 miles West of Kermanshah) were both captured. Later a Persian envoy informed our Commander that all resistance had ceased.

27. Contact was made with advance elements of the Russian forces at Senna on 31st August and in the area of the Aveh Pass on 1st September.

28. In less than three days our forces operating from Khanaqin had advanced about 100 miles through difficult country. The infantry engaged were entirely Indian, to whom great credit is due. Our casualties were not severe.
29. The inhabitants are friendly everywhere and our forces are now engaged in minor operations against independent bands of armed soldiers and in restoring order generally.

Intelligence.

Finland.

30. The majority of the Finnish people would undoubtedly welcome peace on the basis of the restoration of the former frontier, provided they were satisfied that that line would be permanent.

31. The Finns have sustained severe losses both in this and the previous war with the U.S.S.R., and are now faced with the choice of continuing the struggle for the expansion of their territories at the risk of being involved in the defeat of Germany; or of making peace with the U.S.S.R. which would ensure a fair settlement in the event of an Allied victory.

Turkey.

32. Rumours regarding German troop movements into Bulgaria, which continue to persist, may possibly be a means of maintaining pressure on Turkey. It is thought that at the most the number of German divisions in the country is two.

Syria.

33. The embarkation of the Vichy troops who elected to be repatriated should now have been completed, as the last convoy was due to sail on 29th August. The total number of these troops is about 12,900.

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

34. Attacks on Germany and Occupied Territory were on a heavier scale than in the previous week, and were directed mainly on industrial targets, railway centres and docks.

Many successful attacks were made on enemy shipping in Home Waters and in the Mediterranean.

Enemy activity over this country remained at a low level.

35. For the last three months our bombing offensive has been mainly directed against transportation and morale in Western Germany. Some of the most important objectives in the system of communications serving the Ruhr and Rhineland are precision targets which can only be attacked under favourable weather conditions on moonlight nights, and, since the offensive started, the number of suitable nights has been very small indeed. On dark nights, and in comparatively unfavourable weather, our aircraft have attacked other transportation objectives in key towns on the system of communications. No spectacular success has been recorded, and few can be expected, since the disruption of communications can only be achieved by the cumulative effect of attacks delivered over a considerable period. Moreover, it is often difficult to observe the results of attacks and to assess their effect, and damage to communications is easy to conceal. However, in spite of the comparatively short time covered by the present offensive, and the unusually unfavourable weather encountered, reliable reports are now coming in, in increasing numbers, to show that the effect of our attacks is being felt.

36. Concurrently, the attack of targets likely to influence the Battle of the Atlantic is undertaken when necessary and attacks on other objectives in Germany are carried out as tactical and other considerations dictate. A complement to our offensive against land communications is provided by attacks on ports and by those of our light bombers on shipping: the considerable measure of success achieved has undoubtedly increased the pressure on Germany's inland communication system, and so enhanced the value of our main offensive. A valuable factor in the dislocation of communications in Germany is the interference with supplies for the Eastern Front, and our offensive is, therefore, an important contribution to Russian resistance.
37. Our daylight attacks on industrial objectives in France and daily fighter sweeps over French territory have been undertaken with the dual object of reducing the number of enemy fighter units available to reinforce the Russian front, and of reducing the output of French industries working for the enemy. Our daylight offensive has undoubtedly succeeded in containing considerable German fighter forces in France, and there is evidence that the effect of the attacks on French industries is by no means negligible and may have an important influence on French industrial "collaboration."

38. The principal aim of our air operations in the Central Mediterranean and Middle East has been the reduction of the rate of supply to Cyrenaica, combined with the interference of traffic from the Black Sea to the Central Mediterranean. The attacks maintained from Malta on shipping in the Central Mediterranean and on Tripoli, and from Egypt on Benghazi and the Corinth Canal, have achieved considerable success in the pursuit of this policy.

**Germany and Occupied Territory.**

**Day.**

39. Bomber Command despatched 103 sorties, compared with 110 last week, and dropped 28 tons of H.E. bombs and a few incendiaries by day. Fighter Command flew 1,134 aircraft sorties in the course of offensive operations over Northern France and the Netherlands and against shipping.

40. Seventeen Blenheims, escorted by fighters, made a low-level attack on Rotterdam Docks, and, in spite of heavy A.A. fire, hit two merchant vessels of 10,000 and 8,000 tons respectively and dockside warehouses. Bombs were also dropped on other merchant vessels and on ships under construction, but results were not observed.

41. Industrial targets in Lille were attacked by 11 Blenheims and bombs were seen to hit several factories, including a large chemical works. A particularly successful attack was made by a force of six Blenheims on the shipyards at Le Trait; many bombs being seen to burst on workshops, and on ships and submarines on the slipways. Bremen was attacked on two occasions by a Fortress Bomber and five 1,100-lb. bombs are reported to have burst in the town. Among other targets attacked were railway communications near Dunkirk and St. Omer and the aerodrome at Lannion in Brittany.

42. Aircraft of Fighter Command, in addition to providing escorts for bombers, carried out a number of offensive sweeps over enemy territory, involving 87 squadron sorties. During these operations, 13 enemy fighters were destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and 14 damaged. We lost 18 fighters but one pilot was rescued. (These casualties include those incurred during attacks on shipping, see Coastal Operations.)

**Night.**

43. Bomber Command despatched 894 sorties compared with 554 in the previous week. Operations were restricted on three nights of the week by unfavourable weather. The main objectives were again industrial and railway centres in Germany, and docks and harbours in Belgium and Northern France. The total of 914 tons of H.E. bombs and 95,000 incendiaries released is a considerable increase on that of the previous week.

44. On Frankfurt and Cologne, which were attacked on two nights, a total of 320 tons of H.E. bombs and 35,000 incendiaries was released. At Frankfurt, many bursts were seen in and around the industrial and railway centres and near the inland docks. Cloud and haze over Cologne made observation of results difficult, but bursts were seen near two of the principal railway centres and on the inland docks. Duisburg also received a heavy weight of attack, over 134 tons of bombs being dropped. Several hits were scored on the railway station, and large explosions were seen on both banks of the river.

45. Nearly fifty tons of H.E. bombs and 1,850 incendiaries were dropped on Berlin. The objectives in the city were clearly identified, and bursts followed
by fires were seen at various points within a radius of one mile of the Alexander Platz. Attacks on a lighter scale were made on Mannheim and Essen, but bad weather precluded observation of results.

46. Successful attacks were made on docks in occupied territory. Over 85 tons of H.E. bombs were dropped on the docks at Brest, in which the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenaau are lying. Although a smoke screen covered the targets it is estimated that bombs burst in the area. At Ostend, Dunkirk, Boulogne, Havre and Cherbourg, fires were started in dock areas.

47. Havoc and Blenheim aircraft attacked aerodromes in Northern France and in Holland.

United Kingdom.

48. Fighter Command flew a total of 2,453 sorties (676 patrols) by day and 622 sorties (307 patrols) by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. Cross-channel offensive operations and shipping patrols again account for the bulk of our effort.

49. German Air Force activity has continued on the same small scale as in recent weeks. By day only five aircraft crossed our coast, three being fighters on an offensive sweep over Kent. At night, attacks were made on two East coast towns but not on a heavy scale. Twin-engined night fighters operated in the usual areas, and shot down one of our returning bombers. They also bombed a number of aerodromes but without causing serious damage or casualties. Four enemy aircraft were destroyed at night during the week, three by fighters and the fourth by the Humber balloon barrage.

Coastal Operation.

50. Coastal Command flew 209 patrols (397 sorties) and provided escorts for 46 convoys (231 additional sorties). Shipping-protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 545 (1,128 sorties).

51. Aircraft of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands continued their successful attacks on enemy shipping. Three Blenheims, escorted by fighters, made a low-level attack on a 4,000-ton merchant vessel off Dunkirk. The vessel, which was closely protected by six flak ships and four "E"-boats, was hit three times and left in flames and enveloped in smoke, while some of the escorting vessels were set on fire by our fighters. Off Stavanger, three Beauforts attacked two merchant vessels of 7,000 and 2,500 tons respectively and an escort vessel. The larger merchant vessel was hit by two torpedoes and was soon ablaze, and the escort vessel was hit on the stern. A Hudson on patrol off the Norwegian coast scored a direct hit on a 3,000-ton merchant vessel off Kristiansand.

52. Ten Spitfires of Fighter Command attacked a 5,000-ton merchant vessel escorted by two destroyers and two flak ships off Barfleur. In spite of intense A.A. fire, both flak ships were set on fire and the merchant vessel was hit. Other vessels attacked by Spitfires include an "R"-boat, which was left in a sinking condition off Dunkirk, a large minesweeper entering Dieppe Harbour, which was hit several times, and a 1,000-ton cargo vessel off Alderney, on the bridge of which several explosions were seen.

53. Forty-four aircraft laid mines off Brest, La Pallice and Kiel, and off the Danish and Norwegian Coasts.

54. Minelaying by enemy aircraft was on a small scale. Only three attacks were made by enemy aircraft on shipping off our coasts during the week.

Central Mediterranean.

55. A series of successful attacks were made by Blenheims, Wellingtons and naval Swordfish aircraft operating from Malta against enemy shipping on passage to the African Coast and in harbour in Sicily and Tripoli (L). In addition to a
destroyer which was torpedoed and sunk, the following merchant ships were sunk or seriously damaged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Sunk, hit by torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Bombed, blew up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Bombed, on fire from stern to funnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Torpedoed, left stationary and with a heavy list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Bombed, on fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Bombed, believed sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Bombed, blazing from stern to stern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5,000</td>
<td>Sunk, hit by torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/9,000</td>
<td>Torpedoed, blow up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Torpedoed amidships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Torpedoed, seriously damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Torpedoed, seriously damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/10,000</td>
<td>Probable hit with torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Hit by bomb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. During the week a total of 40 Wellingtons were despatched against Tripoli (L), and at least six ships in the harbour were hit and a petrol dump exploded, while extensive fires were caused on the unloading quays and M.T. dispersal areas. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance showed that ships and stores were still burning. On the night of the 1st/2nd September the power station was attacked, two sticks of bombs falling across the target, and many others in the vicinity. Subsequent daylight reconnaissance showed that ships and stores were still burning. On the night of the 1st/2nd September the power station was attacked, two sticks of bombs falling across the target, and many others in the vicinity.

57. A night attack by Swordfish on a convoy off Cape Spartivento achieved complete surprise and resulted in at least four ships being hit. Such confusion resulted that the escorting destroyers fired on their own ships and several ships narrowly escaped collision.

58. Hurricanes and Blenheims made daylight attacks on targets in Italy and Sicily. The power houses of two munition factories at Licata, Sicily, were hit by six bombs, and at Crotone, Italy, large explosions and fires followed hits on buildings in a munition factory, which subsequent photographs show to have been severely damaged. In addition, a ship in harbour was hit three times, and ground targets were machine-gunned. During a night attack on two Sicilian aerodromes naval Swordfish shot down an Italian bomber in flames.

59. A few high-flying enemy aircraft crossed the coast of Malta by day, and there were two ineffective night attacks by about six aircraft.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

60. Benghazi harbour was attacked on three nights by a total of twenty-one aircraft. During these attacks one ship is believed to have been hit, and other near misses were reported. Night attacks were also made on Derna, where officers’ quarters were hit, and on a stores dump at Gambut, where many fires broke out. Landing grounds at Berca and Gazala were bombed and machine-gunned. By day, an attack was made on a stores dump near Bardia by nine Marylands. Reconnaissance flights and shipping protection patrols were also flown.

61. Tobruk was twice attacked by a force of about 40 bombers with fighter escort. On the first occasion the harbour was the objective, and on the second A.A. sites and a gun position appeared to be the target. A few vehicles and a small quantity of ammunition were destroyed. The bombing was, however, notably inaccurate, and some bombs even fell in the Italian lines. In the course of these attacks two bombers were destroyed and six probably destroyed. Several other attacks were made on Tobruk, but were even less effective. Daylight attacks were also made on Mersa Matruh and on Jarabub, where the Senussi mosque was slightly damaged. An attack by enemy fighters on our forward landing grounds was intercepted by fighters of the South African Air Force, who shot down five of the enemy without loss to themselves.

62. Both Port Said and Alexandria have suffered night attacks. Three night raids were made on Port Said by a total of about 30 aircraft. A quay was hit and a warehouse set on fire, but with these exceptions the attacks were
ineffective. At Alexandria some damage was done to workshops and civilian property, and there were a few service casualties. The aerodrome at Abu Sueir was also attacked by about 12 aircraft, but little damage resulted.

Greece and the Ægean.

63. Following an extensive reconnaissance which disclosed the presence of thirty aircraft, including a number of four-engined types, 26 Wellingtons attacked the aerodromes at Eleusis and Menidi. At the former, five hangars were hit, two of which caught fire, and many dispersed aircraft are believed to have been burnt out. At Menidi several hangars were destroyed, and fires were started in adjacent woods, believed to contain stores and equipment. Two aircraft also bombed Heraklion aerodrome, Crete.

64. Sixteen Wellingtons attacked aerodromes in Rhodes, dropping 18 tons of H.E. among hangars and dispersed aircraft. At Maritza there were two explosions and five fires broke out in the dispersal area.

East Africa.

65. Air operations in support of the military campaign have continued.

Russia.

66. Over the greater part of the front there has been little change in the situation except in the Leningrad area. The fall of Tallinn and the elimination of Russian resistance in Northern Estonia must seriously jeopardise the Russian Air Force bases in the Island of Oesel, at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga, which are now within easy range of German fighter and bomber attacks. The continued advance on Leningrad has exposed the defences of the city and the remaining communications to the east and south-east to heavy air attack.

67. Enemy reconnaissance and anti-shipping patrols have been carried out over the Black Sea and Crimea with the object of cutting off supplies and reinforcements for the garrison at Odessa. Both the Russian and German Air Forces have been engaged in fierce fighting over bridgeheads across the Dnieper from Dniepropetrovsk to the sea, and Italian and Roumanian units have co-operated with the German Air Force in this sector.

68. The efficiency of German Air Force units in all sectors remains good and indicates that fuel supplies and field maintenance difficulties have been overcome, thus enabling an intensive effort to be maintained after two and a half months of heavy fighting.

Loss of Leading German Fighter Commanders in Russia.

69. At least three of the best known and most capable Gruppe Kommandeure of the German fighter force have recently been lost, including Hauptmann Joppeln, a Gruppe Kommandeur of the Moelders Geschwader (J.G.51). The German communiqué of the 29th August reported him missing and assumed lost after his seventieth victory.

HOME SECURITY.

General.

By Day.

70. No bombs have been dropped on land in daylight during the week.

By Night.

71. Bombing was not on a heavy scale. On three nights of the week some serious damage and casualties were caused. The remaining four nights passed off with only minor bombing in East Anglia and along the east and north-east coasts.

72. On the 31st August/1st September there was a sharp attack upon Hull, where 41 people were killed, mostly as the result of a direct hit on a communal shelter. Six domestic shelters were also hit.
73. On the 1st/2nd September Newcastle was attacked and several fires were started; 42 people were killed. Bombs were also dropped at Blaydon, Gateshead, Tynemouth, Dudley, Wallsend and other places in the neighbourhood. Six R.A.F. stations were bombed without serious effect.

Damage.

74. On the 1st/2nd September at Newcastle over 100 houses were demolished. The New Bridge Street goods station was burnt out, when about 1,500 tons of flour, 100 tons of sugar and 20 tons of bacon were destroyed. The L.N.E.R. station at Jesmond was blocked by debris and Manors Railway Station was hit. Donald Brown and Co.'s iron works at Blaydon were reported to be demolished and British Ropes Ltd. factory at Gateshead and Hawthorn Leslie's St. Peter's works at Newcastle were damaged.

75. On the 2nd/3rd September four H.E. bombs fell on the premises of Imperial Chemical Industries at Billingham-on-Tees and the research department workshop of the Fertilizer and Synthetic Products factory was considerably damaged.

Casualties.

76. The casualties for the week ending 0600 on the 3rd September are estimated at 116 killed and 144 seriously injured. There were no casualties in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III
will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 2nd September, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>554,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>586,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1,810,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, &amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>863,000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>2,127,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>532</td>
<td>2,551,000</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1,612,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>4,001,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 64 ships of 180,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 54 ships, totalling 324,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties have occurred to H.M. auxiliary vessels during the period under review:

The minesweeping trawlers Etruscun and War Wing were slightly damaged by the explosion of mines off Harwich on the 1st September.

The following casualties to naval officers and men have been reported:

- Officers: 29 killed; 8 missing.
- Ratings: 133 killed; 80 missing; 6 wounded.

These figures include the losses in H.M. Corvette Zinnia.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 28th August, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 4th September, 1941.

Metropolitan Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of fighter pilots known to be safe, 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

Middle East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above totals, 3 “miscellaneous” aircraft were destroyed, and 6 probably destroyed by A.A. fire.

Italian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

Germany.

Cologne.—Photographs taken on the 28th August disclose extensive areas of new damage, and areas previously damaged and reported by Intelligence sources are now confirmed. Outstanding features are the damage to the Cologne—Nippes Railway workshops and to the southern part of the city.

Karlsruhe.—Photographs taken on the 27th August are obscured by cloud and cloud shadow. It appears, however, that severe damage has been caused to the elevated railway tracks to the west of the main station and to the barracks at Mulhburg, which have been seriously damaged by fire.

Munster.—Considerable economic dislocation has been caused owing to the destruction of the Statistical and Record Department of the German equivalent to our Ministry of Supply. Representatives have visited Switzerland to obtain duplicates of orders placed with Swiss firms.

Hamburg.—Production at Blohm and Voss has been affected by the destruction of the largest boiler in the works.

Mannheim.—As a result of attacks in the first week of August, the line to Friederichsfeld and the suburban station of Seckenheim was severely damaged. The power station was hit, and two reports tell of damage by fire to the I.G. Farben Chemical Works at Ludwigshaven, one estimating the damage at 2 million marks. At Neckaran two factories were burnt out and the goods and passenger station damaged.

Essen.—Over 1,000 workmen are engaged in reconstruction at Krupps. The smelting sheds are working again and also three of the damaged assembly sheds. Work in three shifts has been resumed.

Bremen.—Bombs which hit the Ju. 87 aircraft factory fell in the erection hangar and 30 dive bombers were destroyed and over 100 workmen were killed. Only two aircraft were completed in the following ten days. It is thought that this occurred during the daylight raid of 4th July.

General.—A correspondent writing from Munchen Gladbach on the 5th July states "the cursed flyers have been over here every night for four weeks. Last night the blackguards peppered Anton Street and Verbindungs Street with incendiary bombs. A heavy bomb fell on the fire brigade while they were putting the incendiaries out."

Holland.

Ijmuiden.—Photographs taken on the 26th August show the damage to the iron and steel works caused in an attack by twelve Blenheims on the 21st August. It is thought that production has probably been reduced by 30 per cent.

Italy.

Naples.—The raid on the 10th June resulted in both civilian and military casualties. The material damage was also considerable. The oil refinery was hit, oil tanks exploded and the refinery buildings were almost entirely burnt out. A large textile factory was heavily damaged and the Bank of Naples was hit. The population of the city was terrorised and large numbers of people tried to get away from the city. The railway station and trains were packed with frightened crowds struggling to get aboard.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY N° 107 (3.9.41)

AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R., showing approximate advances

LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Axis forces:
- 6th July
- 20th July
- 3rd Aug.
- 24th Aug.
- 1st Sept.

Main thrusts of Axis forces:

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.

SECRET
AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.-
showing approximate advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis forces:
6th July
20th July
3rd Aug
24th Aug
1st Sept

Main thrusts of Axis forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces—

8th July
20th July
3rd Aug.
24th Aug.
1st Sept.

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by Anis Forces:

8th July
20th July
3rd Aug.
24th Aug.
1st Sept.

Main thrusts of Anis Forces:

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the enemy troops.
WAR CABINET.

MEXICO.

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND SETTLEMENT OF THE OIL DISPUTE.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

1. I WILL not trouble my colleagues with even a compressed story of how the expropriation by Senor Cardenas's Government of the foreign oil companies in the spring of 1938 led to the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Mexican Government and ourselves, but not between the former and the United States Government. The latter, however, kept the dispute open, and, as long as they did so, we, for our part, had two valuable cards: (i) there remained the possibility of the American Government confronting the Mexican Government jointly with ourselves; and (ii) the American oil companies, realising that their bargaining position was greatly enhanced by a solid front with our own companies, and fearing that their Government would force an unsatisfactory settlement on them, have (with one exception) loyally and firmly maintained the Anglo-American front.

2. An American-Mexican settlement would therefore leave us practically without cards. Not only that, but a large American loan to Mexico (out of which the American Oil Companies would indirectly be compensated) would help the Mexican Government to overcome many of the difficulties they are now finding in operating the Mexican Eagle fields. It was the imminence of such an arrangement, including a settlement imposed on the American Oil Companies, that led me to tell the War Cabinet on the 28th August that I felt that we ought to take such steps as we could to obtain terms for our own Oil Companies not less good than those which the American Companies would be having to accept, and that in this connexion we should aim at the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Mexican Government.

3. That morning I had informed the American Ambassador that we had instructed our Embassy in Washington to tell Mr. Welles for his own information that we were now prepared to consider favourably the resumption of diplomatic relations with Mexico. I said that we hoped for the good offices of the United States Government in the negotiations which would ensue with the Mexican Government about oil and other matters, and I expressed the hope that the American and British oil companies might be able to negotiate jointly. I did not expressly say that our desire to consider favourably the resumption of relations...
was conditional upon the United States Government fulfilling our hopes on the
two points, nor upon the Mexican Government giving indications of their
readiness for a reasonably satisfactory settlement of their dispute with the British
oil companies. Two of my colleagues have now indicated to me their feeling that
what I said to Mr. Winant sounded like a proposal to renew relations with Mexico
unconditionally, without providing for a reasonable settlement of the oil dispute,
and that they consider this imprudent.

4. I will not trouble my colleagues with the details of a more conditional
course preferred by the Petroleum Department which was telegraphed to our
Embassy in Washington and which made our readiness to resume relations
subject to certain assistance from the United States Government and certain
assurances from the Mexican Government. Our Embassy's comment on this
was:

"We shall . . . have to be careful, in making our representations, to
avoid creating the impression that under the guise of concession to United
States point of view we are endeavouring to sabotage, for our own purely
British reasons, conclusion of an agreement between the United States
Government and Mexican Government, which we know the former regards
as very necessary from the point of view of their own defence."

5. On renewed consideration of this course I felt clear that the United
States Government would regard it as bound to bring the oil dispute back very
much to the old deadlock from which Mr. Welles has been labouiring long to
remove it; and that, if we pressed them, they would suspect a rather inept effort
on our part to sabotage their agreement. The United States Government feel
no great obligation to consider our feelings in this matter in view of our dilator­
iness (as they see it) to make the advances they have long been urging us to make
to the Mexican Government.

6. Ministry of Economic Warfare and Department of Overseas Trade
for their own reasons both desire resumption of relations with Mexico. I think,
however, they would agree that our principal gain will consist in getting the
goodwill of the United States Government. We are asking much of them, and
we shall be asking more in parts of the world where we consider our interests
primary. There is no doubt that the United States Government believe that
improved relations between Great Britain and Mexico will make their own
problem with Mexico more tractable; and the degree of United States Govern­
ment response to our demands elsewhere may very legitimately be affected by
our own response to their wishes as regards the large unruly country on their
southern boundary.

7. In this situation I feared that it would be useless to ask the United States
Government to suspend an important part of their imminent settlement or to
make our readiness to resume relations with Mexico conditional upon either a
promise from the United States Government to give us their help, or again to
emphasize that we will not renew relations until a satisfactory settlement of the
oil dispute on such and such lines is in sight. It is unpleasant to have to tie our
hands by any unconditional promise, and to have to trust to receive such assistance
as the United States may be disposed to give us. But I feel they will be more
disposed to give it to us if we make this gesture than if we try to put an obstacle
in their path which they will almost certainly brush aside. We shall not deflect
their policy and we shall only be left with a legacy of ill-will and no disposition
to give us help.

8. I therefore ask my colleagues to agree that the next step should be for
the Embassy in Washington to approach the State Department in the sense of
my communication to Mr. Winant (see paragraph 3 above), and to ask the
State Department to give us all the information they can as to the kind of
settlement which they are imposing on the American companies, including the
extent to which the latter will be allowed to negotiate with the Mexican Govern­
ment direct. The Embassy should press again, and strongly, that it would be
most unwise and unfair to compel the companies to give up all control over their
oil-fields. This is of great importance as we still hope that our companies may
be associated with such negotiations. I annex first a telegram from His Majesty's
Minister in Venezuela which shows that our fears as to the possible effects in Venezuela of resuming relations with Mexico have been much exaggerated; and, secondly, a letter from the United States Minister in London to Sir A. Cadogan which shows that our indication of our readiness to resume relations is serving to restrain Mr. Hull from making an announcement covering an oil settlement.

9. On learning from the Embassy details as to the kind of oil settlement that the United States Government have in mind, we shall be able to judge what our next step should be on behalf of the companies.

September 6, 1941.

ANNEX I.

Mr. Gainer to Foreign Office.

(No. 135. Immediate. Secret.)

Caracas, August 28, 1941.

YOUR telegram No. 137.

Venezuelan economic life is at this moment entirely dependent upon production and sale of oil, and the Government are using every possible means of increasing their revenue from this source. They are urging the companies to increase their production and are considering the means of altering the existing concessions laws with a view to a further increase of revenue. The widening of the margin between oil dollar and commercial dollar has provided them with additional revenue at the expense of the oil companies, and there is also some agitation for nationalisation of local sales of oil products and refining as a further means of increasing income from the natural riches of the country. Unofficial circles have also recommended imposition of export tax.

2. Thus Venezuelan Government would now certainly take no action to restrict the output or cut down our supplies and would, indeed, be only too glad to increase them. Nevertheless, if they suspect that resumption of relations with Mexico could result in a transfer of any part of our purchases from Venezuela to Mexico they would be seriously alarmed, and may take some action on the lines indicated above, which though not prejudicial to our immediate supplies, would be most unwelcome to the companies, though it would certainly stop short of making it impossible for the companies to continue to work here.

3. For this reason it should be made quite clear that we intend at least during the war to maintain our present level of purchases of Venezuelan oil. It might be possible to give an assurance of this to Venezuelan Government, but this would have to be carefully worded as they would wish to make it public either to forestall or to counteract newspaper agitation, and regard would also have to be paid to the effect of such a statement upon Mexican susceptibilities.

4. Venezuelan Government, of course, envisage the possibility of Mexico re-entering market at some future date, but at this particular juncture nothing could be more prejudicial to this country.

5. While then in the short run I would not anticipate trouble, in the long run my view is less favourable for reasons given in my telegram No. 10 of 17th January, but only in regard to the effect upon the oil companies in the future and not upon our immediate requirements.

(Repeated to Washington.)
ANNEX II.

Mr. Herschel Johnson to Sir A. Cadogan.

(Confidential.)
Embassy of the United States of America,
London, September 5, 1941.

Dear Alec:

I REFER to our meeting on the 2nd September when I showed you a telegram the Ambassador had received from the Secretary of State in regard to the possible resumption of relations between Great Britain and Mexico. This telegram was in reply to one the Ambassador had sent to Washington following a talk with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which Mr. Eden had told him of his plans in connection with Mexico.

Mr. Hull states in his telegram under reference that he had spoken with the Mexican Ambassador. The Ambassador had informed him once again that the Mexican Government would be happy to renew diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and suggested as the most satisfactory manner of bringing this about that, after preliminary discussions between His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Washington and himself, the Governments of Great Britain and Mexico should merely announce simultaneously the appointment of diplomatic representatives in London and in Mexico City, respectively. The Mexican Ambassador stated that his Government is fully disposed to assure His Majesty's Government that the British oil interests in Mexico will be given treatment as favorable as that given to the American oil interests. Mr. Hull informed Sir Ronald Campbell to this effect, and suggested to him that he arrange to see the Mexican Ambassador in order that they might deal directly with each other on these questions.

Mr. Hull requested Mr. Winant to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Department of State will be more than glad to facilitate in every possible way the early resumption of relations between Great Britain and Mexico. Mr. Hull says that he fully agrees that diplomatic relations should be resumed before any announcement be made regarding oil policies. This suggestion had originally been made to Mr. Winant by Mr. Eden. Mr. Hull says further, however, that he feels sure Mr. Eden will understand that, because of the importance of relations between the United States and Mexico, the announcement of certain preliminary agreements which he hopes may soon be arrived at between the United States and Mexico cannot be long postponed. He therefore earnestly hopes that an agreement may be reached promptly for the resumption between Great Britain and Mexico of diplomatic relations.

Mr. Hull's telegram under reference was shown by Mr. Winant to the Prime Minister and to Mr. Eden on the 31st August.

Yours ever,

HERSCHEL JOHNSON.
9th September, 1941.

WAR CABINET

EXTENSION OF FOOD RATIONING.

Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council

1. The Minister of Food has proposed an extension of food rationing for the purpose of securing better distribution of non-perishable foods in short supply which have not hitherto been subject to rationing control.

Distribution of these foodstuffs is unsatisfactory. Local shortages have become more common and more acute; queues and other shopping difficulties are giving rise to complaints; and there is a growing demand for action by the Government to remedy the situation.

The causes are twofold. First, the rationing of staple foods has naturally sharpened the demand for other foodstuffs with which to supplement the weekly ration. Secondly, the policy of price stabilisation has operated to remove that limitation on demand which rising prices would otherwise have provided. The control of prices and the increase in purchasing power have together produced a disequilibrium of demand and supply; and it has become necessary to introduce some new factor which will curb demand and thus help to secure better distribution of the unrationed foods.

2. The Minister of Food has suggested that rationing control should be extended to the following foods:

(a) A group of foods which is described, for convenience, as "canned meals" and consists, in the main, of canned and manufactured meats and fish, meat and fish pastes and canned beans;

(b) dried fruits;

(c) biscuits;

(d) dried pulses; and rice, sago and tapioca.

3. There are two alternative methods of control:

(a) A Group System, which would resemble single commodity rationing in that it would involve registration with a retailer and a definite undertaking that the ration would be honoured.

The whole range of foodstuffs to which rationing was to be extended would be divided into groups, and each consumer would be entitled to obtain from a specified retailer a fixed amount each week, or each month, of one or other of the commodities included in a group.

This system would have the advantage that it would follow the lines to which the Ministry of Food, the trade and the public have become accustomed.
(b) A Points System, which would not be rationing in the ordinary sense, but rather a method of limiting total demand coupled with a supplementary price system intended roughly to equalise the supply and demand for a large number of commodities.

Point values would be assigned to each of the foods to be brought under control. Each consumer would be allowed to use a specified number of points per week, and he would be free to use his points for the purchasing of any foods he chose, from any retailer who had them in stock. There would be no registration with particular retailers, and no entitlement to particular amounts. The scheme would be on the same lines as that now in force for the rationing of clothing.

When prices are controlled and no longer operate to curb demand, a Points System would provide an alternative means of limiting demand by adjustment of the point values of particular commodities according to relative shortages in supply.

This system would be a novel one so far as food is concerned, and would give rise to problems which have not been experienced in connection with clothing, where the initial stock position was relatively favourable and the number of retail transactions is far less.

4. The Lord President's Committee have reviewed the position and have come to the conclusion that a Points System is to be preferred to a Group System for the following reasons -

(a) It allows the consumer a greater liberty of individual choice of foods - the person who does not care for canned fish can spend his points on other things.

(b) It does not involve registration with a particular retailer. The housewife who cannot find what she wants at one shop is free to buy elsewhere.

(c) It does not favour one class of retailer as against another. A Group System might prejudice the small trader; for, if consumers had to register with particular retailers, they would tend to favour the larger shops where they might expect to find a wider variety of goods.

(d) The Points System would not impose any further limitation on the spirit of competition between retailers and to this extent would preserve the retailers' incentive to give good service.

5. The Committee consider that a Points System of rationing should be applied to the range of foodstuffs described in paragraph 2 of this memorandum. In view, however, of the novelty of the problems involved, they think that the control should in the first instance be applied only to a limited number of foodstuffs, and that it should be extended to other foods within that range when further experience has been gained in the operation of this system of control.

The pressure of demand tends to fall most heavily upon the group of foods described as "canned meals", as these are sought after to supplement the available supplies of fresh meat and fish. Distribution of these foods is, therefore, more uneven, and the need for control is more urgent. It would be convenient if rationing control could be applied, in the first instance, to this group of foods.
The Committee therefore submit the following recommendations for the approval of the War Cabinet —

(i) Rationing control, by means of a Points System, should be applied as soon as the necessary administrative arrangements can be made to the group of commodities described as "canned meals".

(ii) The Minister of Food should be authorised to extend the Points System of rationing to the other foodstuffs enumerated in paragraph 2 of this memorandum, as soon as he feels justified in undertaking this extension in the light of experience gained in the operation of a Points System of food rationing.

(iii) The Minister of Food should be authorised to undertake at once the administrative arrangements (including the printing of coupons, &c.) necessary to enable him to extend this system of rationing over the whole range of foodstuffs enumerated in paragraph 2 above.

(iv) A system of group rationing of foodstuffs should not be introduced unless experience shows that control over "canned meals" by means of a Points System has failed to achieve its object.

(Intld.) J.A.

GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1.
9th September, 1941.
9th September, 1941.

DOMINION REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

With reference to W.P.(41) 208, the attached further telegrams between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia are circulated for the information of the War Cabinet, by direction of the Prime Minister.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W.1.
From the Government of the
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
TO DOMINIONS OFFICE.

Received 5th September, 1941. 9.20 p.m.

IMMEDIATE.
No. 585 MOST SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister.

1. Reference your 607c. I am grateful for the informative survey of the constitutional and other considerations involved in the question of a Minister from one part of the Empire participating in the work and membership of a Cabinet in another part. I would reciprocate the exchange of views by outlining the Australian side of the question as I see it.

2. The machinery for the higher direction of war was discussed, with many other matters relating to the Empire and local defence, during the Imperial Conference 1937. It is regretted that, for reasons which need not be traversed, these discussions were possible on a two party basis only. Memorandum received from the Committee of Imperial Defence, which it was understood had the endorsement of the Minister representing the United Kingdom Government, refers for want of a better title to an "Imperial War Cabinet" and to measures to be taken on the outbreak of war to consider what machinery along these lines is necessary. Memorandum states "The arrangement under which the High Commissioners of the Dominions attend some of the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence (on which the Government of India is permanently represented) appears to lend itself to extension from the outset of a major war in such manner and in such degree as the Governments of the Dominions may themselves decide in each case".

3. I can see no difference in principle between representation of a Dominion by a High Commission at the Committee of Imperial Defence in peace time when matters affecting it are under discussion and representation at the War Cabinet by a Minister for similar purposes. The fact that the despatch of a Minister to London has the support of the Opposition gives his mission Parliamentary endorsement. I assume from paragraph 8 of your cable that you would welcome the presence of an Australian Minister in the War Cabinet when matters relating to higher policy, operations or other questions which affect the Australian war effort or the Australian forces were being considered. If so, we are in full agreement.

-1-
4. I would make the following detailed comments on certain paragraphs of your telegram and in view of the personal and secret nature of the message they will be quite frank so that we may each be aware of the other's mind:-

I agree that the representative who can speak with the best authority is the Prime Minister but the Dominion interests he would represent would be the same in the case of a Minister. If the presence of the Australian Prime Minister is not any more practicable than it appears to be in the case of the other Dominions we feel that some form of Ministerial representation is better than none.

5. As stated above the distinction between the Prime Minister and a Minister is agreed with but a Minister charged with a special mission and carrying the endorsement of the Australian Parliament is somewhat different from a Minister with a department portfolio visiting London to establish contact with the corresponding United Kingdom department with which he is concerned.

6. The views of the Prime Minister of Canada and South Africa are noted with interest but not with surprise. As you are well aware their attitude is determined by local problems peculiar to each Dominion which have been manifest since the Imperial Conference of 1926. We, too, have a special viewpoint based on the closest possible degree of Empire co-operation which, speaking with that frankness permitted within the family circle is evident by comparison of our all-round war effort on land, sea and in the air. The Australian people feel, however, that this effort warrants the right to be heard when vital decisions affecting their interests are being taken. For instance, Australia has a special interest in the Pacific and Indian Ocean problem.

7. No suggestion has been made by the Australian Government involving the retirement of any British Minister from the War Cabinet. Regarding the presence of an Australian Minister as suggested in my paragraph 3 it is understood that, at the War Cabinet Meetings, many Ministers attend in addition to members of the War Cabinet. Attendance of a Dominion representative therefore, means only one person whether he be Prime Minister or Minister. If the other Dominions are satisfied with the present arrangements this should alleviate the numerical aspect but if there are questions for decision affecting their vital interests representation could not be denied if they desired it.

8. This is covered by my paragraph 3.

9. As you state relations between a Minister and the High Commissioner are matters for our decision. The appointment and functions of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs is a similar one for the United Kingdom Government. Though we fully appreciate co-operation and assistance extended by the Ministers who have held this office, we consider that direct consultation on higher questions is a better method than dealing through a third party who is not a member of the War Cabinet.
The satisfaction of the other Dominions with the High Commissioner arrangement naturally follows from their attitude to Ministerial representation.

10. The question of an Imperial War Cabinet is of course a matter for an Imperial Conference. As stated earlier we were unable in 1937 to secure a round table discussion on this and many other important aspects of cooperation. We are, however, not concerned with the past but with vital present and critical future.

CYPHER TELEGRAM.

From the Government of the
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
TO DOMINIONS OFFICE.

Received 5th September, 1941. 8.00 p.m.

IMMEDIATE.

No. 566 SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins.

Following the announcement made last week in Parliament that His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia had decided to send a Minister to London, His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia has given further consideration to the matter and has selected Sir Earle Page for this important mission.

There is no need for me to set out in detail Sir Earle's qualifications as he is known to you and your colleagues.

Your assurance that you will welcome our Minister is very greatly appreciated and we know that he will receive every facility and courtesy from you and Members of your Administration.

I propose to make an announcement that Sir Earle Page will be our representative in the Australian Press of Monday morning, 8th September. Ends.

-8-
CYPHER TELEGRAM.

FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

To the Government of the

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

(Sent 11 p.m. 6th September, 1941)

IMMEDIATE.

No. 613 SECRET.

Your telegram 6th September No. 586.

Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

We shall be delighted to welcome Sir Earle Page and will confer with him freely and fully on all matters concerning Australian interests and the common cause. Ends.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 106)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 0700 September 4th, to
0700 September 11th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. A cruiser force successfully engaged enemy units near the North Cape. A homebound Canadian convoy has been heavily attacked by U-Boats off the east coast of Greenland; otherwise shipping casualties have been below the average.

Home Waters.

2. The Battleship Duke of York and Aircraft Carrier Indomitable have left their builders' yards for docking and completion for service. M.T.B.s. carried out an attack on enemy convoy off Cape Gris Nez on the night 8th/9th September. One 4,000-ton enemy ship was sunk and one of 3,500 tons badly damaged and probably sunk. Of four supporting E-boats, one was probably sunk by depth charge. One M.T.B. was badly damaged and two M.G.Bs. in support were slightly damaged. Our casualties were two wounded.

North Atlantic.

3. The U.S. Destroyer Greer, on passage to Iceland (C), with mails, was unsuccessfully attacked by a U-boat on the 4th September when 170 miles southwest of Reykjavik. She counter-attacked with depth charges, but the result is unknown.

Arctic Waters.

4. On the morning of 7th September, H.M. Ships Nigeria and Aurora engaged an enemy force in Sverholthavet (east of North Cape) in foul weather and sank the German Light Cruiser Bremse, a small destroyer and two small craft. Nigeria was slightly damaged through ramming a wreck, but there were no other casualties.

Mediterranean.

5. H.M. Submarines have continued their attacks in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Talisman fired on two motor lighters off Benghazi on 30th August, hitting both and probably sinking one. On the same day Unbeaten torpedoed and sank a large schooner near the Straits of Messina. On the 4th September, Otus attacked a southbound convoy of 13 merchant ships 200 miles south-east of Messina and sank a ship of the Ramb class (3,680 tons). On the 5th Perseus sank the Italian Tanker Maya (3,867 tons) off the Dardanelles. In enemy air attacks during the week, H.M. Depot Ship Woolwich, H.M. Hospital Ship Maine and H.M. Destroyer Kandakar were slightly damaged by near misses at Alexandria, one officer and 4 ratings being killed and 15 ratings wounded. H.M. Destroyers Kimberley and Decoy were also damaged by near misses while on passage to and from Tobruk. A naval operation for the reinforcement of air forces in Malta was successfully carried out. It is estimated that at least 20,000 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk or damaged by our aircraft.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

6. H.M. Destroyer Croome rammed and sank the Italian U-Boat Mareggiore Francesco Baracca on 8th September between the Azores and Portugal. The Russians claim to have sunk the German U. 78 off the approach to the White Sea. Eleven attacks on U-Boats were made by aircraft, one of which claimed five hits, and seven attacks were made by surface craft, but none of these showed any conclusive result.

Enemy Intelligence.

7. The pocket battleship Admiral Scheer left Oslo on the 7th September and has not since been located. The aircraft-carrier Graf Zeppelin has been photographed at Stettin in the Western Baltic. There is no change in the position of other main German or Italian units.
U-Boats.

Thirty or more German U-Boats have been operating in two groups in the North Atlantic, one about 500 miles westward of Cape Finisterre and the other off south-eastern Greenland. Six of the latter are estimated to have attacked a homeward convoy close to Cape Farewell. Four others have been operating to the northward of the Cape Verde Islands. Apart from the attack on an Italian U-Boat, already referred to, there have been no other indications of Italian U-Boat activity.

Raiders.

It is estimated that there are at present two, possibly three, raiders in the South Atlantic, one in the Indian Ocean, and possibly one in the Pacific.

Black Sea.

There are indications of a possible German sea-borne expedition in the Black Sea against Russia or perhaps against Turkey. Twenty-five thousand German sailors are said to be in Bulgarian ports.

Other Intelligence.

Japan.

8. The main units of the Japanese Fleet are all concentrated in their home ports.

Russian.

At least 5 large submarines and one modern destroyer were passed through the White Sea Canal between the end of July and the middle of August. The Germans claim that the Finnish armies have now cut the Canal, but this is not confirmed.

American.

The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet has been directed to destroy any surface raiders which attack or threaten shipping between America and Iceland (C).

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

9. A heavy attack on a homeward bound convoy was made by several U-Boats off the East coast of Greenland on the 10th/11th September. Details have not yet been received, but seven or more ships are known to have been torpedoed. One ship had been sunk in this area earlier in the week. Two ships have been sunk by enemy aircraft in the Irish Sea and two off the east coast, and one American ship was sunk in the Gulf of Suez. Two ships were sunk by E-Boat off the Norfolk coast and one ship by mine off Spurn Point.

The shipping losses in August (details of which are given in Appendix I) were 30 ships and 5 small craft, totalling 107,662 tons, of which 21 and 5 small craft (77,719 tons) were British. This total is 34,187 tons lower than in the previous month. Twenty-one ships and two small craft (80,310 tons) were sunk by U-boat, principally in the Western Approaches and in the Azores-Portugal area, one ship and two small craft (1,400 tons) by mines in the Thames Estuary, three ships (10,841 tons) by surface craft (one by raider off Galapagos Islands) and five ships and one small craft (15,111 tons) by aircraft. In addition, 14 ships and five small craft, totalling 58,668 tons, which are included in Appendix I, were reported in August but lost in previous months.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

10. During the week ending 10th September 832 ships, including 139 allied and 24 neutral, were convoyed. Four anti-aircraft ships, seven armed merchant cruisers, 71 destroyers and 96 sloops, corvettes and Fleet minesweepers were employed on convoy duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending 6th September totalled 706,151 tons, compared with 819,275 tons during the previous seven days and an average of 858,293 tons during the past ten weeks.
There were, in addition, two shiploads of about 14,000 tons of Special Government Cargo. Oil imports in 34 tankers amounted to 353,896 tons, compared with 218,863 tons in 21 tankers during the previous week. Mineral imports were 167,486 tons, of which 111,156 tons were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore. The corresponding figures for the previous seven days were 207,562 tons and 106,439 tons. Wood and pulp imports were 27,585 tons, and cereal imports 50,040 tons, six ships being fully laden with grain or flour. Other food imports came to 63,367 tons, of which the principal commodities, in tons, were: Refrigerated and tinned meat 10,329, sugar 9,821, lard and fats 5,394, evaporated milk 3,219, dried and tinned fruit 2,821, tea 2,452, butter 2,252, cheese 618, jam 412. There were also 4,304 tons of unspecified tin food. Two consignments of tobacco totalled 902 tons. Among imports of machinery were 945 tons of machine tools, and there were satisfactory quantities of ammunition and other war stores.

**British Minelaying.**

11. Mines have been laid off Stadlandet by H.M.S. *Manxman* and off North Rona by H.M. Ships *Port Quebec* and *Agamemnon*. Minelaying has also been continued by M.T.Bs. off the Belgian coast and by aircraft in the Baltic, Baltic Approaches and off the Frisian coast and French Biscayan ports.

**Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.**

**Home Waters.**

12. Minelaying by enemy aircraft has been reported on three nights only during this past week. On the night 4th/5th September about 20 enemy aircraft were operating off the Tyne and Tees, five off the Humber and one or two machines were thought to be minelaying off Dover, Dungeness, and Milford Haven. Two nights later, minelaying was suspected in the Bristol Channel, and on the night of 9th/10th September off Milford Haven and the Tyne. Twenty magnetic and nine acoustic mines have been detonated during the week, of which eight were off the Humber, five off the Tyne, four off Milford Haven and three in the Barrow Deep. The mine totals, including those dealt with in Foreign Waters, are 1,394 magnetic, 938 acoustic, and 1,033 contact mines.

**Foreign Waters.**

The Suez Canal area was raided during the nights of 4th/5th and 5th/6th September and mines have been dropped in Suez Bay. Sections of the Canal were closed for two days following the first night's raid. The Canal is now open to traffic.

**Enemy Shipping.**

**Northern Waters.**

13. According to the Stockholm press two German tankers carrying cargoes of petrol recently blew up off Bergen, probably as the result of sabotage. The German *Donau*, 9,035 tons, and *Bahia Laura*, 8,561 tons, are reported to have been sunk off Loppahast, some sixty miles north-east of Tromso, with the loss of about 1,700 men. H.M.S. *Trident* attacked an eastbound convoy there on 30th August (Resume No. 105, para. 3).

It is reported that the liner *Bremen*, which was burnt out in March, is now being broken up.

A new quay for the loading of nickel is reported to have been completed at Kirkenes. Port extension works are known to have been in progress for some time.

**The Mediterranean and Adriatic.**

Two German ships are reported to have left Garrucha recently with iron ore for Germany via Marseilles; the *Lisbon*, 1,799 tons, left on the 24th August with 3,050 tons of iron ore, and the *Hans Schmidt*, 4,427 tons, left on 3rd September.
with 6,960 tons of iron ore. The *Atlas*, 2,297 tons, left Barcelona on 3rd September with a cargo of pyrites which she had loaded at Valencia and arrived at Genoa 6th September.

In the Italian press last month it was stated that the *Morea*, 1,968 tons, was sunk by submarine on 16th August, 1940, while returning from Durazzo to Brindisi. The sinking of the *Catalani*, 2,429 tons, in the Adriatic during the war with Greece was also confirmed.

**Vichy French Shipping.**

14. During the month of August 35 ships, totalling 153,000 tons, are reported to have passed Gibraltar eastbound, and 30 ships, totalling 105,000 tons, to have passed Gibraltar westbound without submitting to any contraband control. Five of those which passed into the Mediterranean were Allied or Neutral ships (12,000 tons) which are now sailing under the French flag.

Sixteen of the ships which passed Gibraltar westwards during July and August (56,000 tons) were loaded with war material, and further shipments have been made from Marseilles via Oran for onward transport by rail to Casablanca. S.S. *Gazcon* (4,131 tons) was intercepted by H.M.S. *Albatross* about 200 miles south-west of Takoradi on the 7th September, and was taken into Lagos. She was homeward bound from Madagascar.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**

(An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.)

**Russo-German Campaign.**

15. Operations during the past week include a Finnish advance east of Lake Ladoga and some progress by German forces advancing on Leningrad from the south, thus virtually completing the encirclement of the city; a successful but apparently local Russian counter-attack south-east of Smolensk; further progress by German infantry operating south of Gomel; and the establishment by the Germans of two further bridgeheads over the River Dnieper at Kremenchug and Berislav. Fighting has been fierce at the Dniepropetrovsk bridgehead, which the Germans do not appear to have enlarged appreciably.

**Finland.**

16. There is no news of any operations in the far north or in the Salla sector. On the 7th September the Finns reported having advanced in the area east of Lake Ladoga as far as the River Svir, which flows from Lake Onega to Lake Ladoga and forms part of the Stalin–White Sea Canal. The point reached on the river is believed to be approximately due south-east of Olonets, but the Murmanski–Leningrad railway running south of the river has not been cut.

No further advance has been made by Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus, and there are no reports of operations at Hangö, which remains in Russian hands.

**Leningrad Sector.**

17. Fierce fighting has continued and the situation from the Russian point of view is extremely serious. German motorised forces have reached Schlüsselburg, on Lake Ladoga, and it is believed that this advance has been sufficiently consolidated to cut all land communications between Leningrad and the rest of Russia.

**Central Front.**

18. The Russians have launched a counter-attack, well supported by the Russian Air Force, south-east of Smolensk and have retaken Yelnia.
The objective of this counter-attack was probably the Smolensk-Bryansk railway, which, as far as Roslavl, is an important line of communication for the Germans, but there is no news of any appreciable Russian advance westwards from Yelnya.

Ukraine.

19. Fierce fighting by German infantry has continued along the general line of the River Desna from west of Glukhov to north of Chernigov, which is in Russian hands.

Apart from the fact that the Germans are believed to have crossed the river east of Chernigov, the situation in this sector has remained unchanged.

20. There is no news of the fighting around Kiev itself, but a bridgehead over the River Dnieper has been gained at Kremenecug, whence a considerable advance northwards is reported.

21. Fierce fighting has continued at the Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead, where very strong Russian resistance has prevented any appreciable enlargement of the bridgehead by the Germans.

22. A third bridgehead over the River Dnieper has been established by the Germans at Berislav and some progress southwards has been made.

Conclusions.

23. There is no doubt that the situation on the Eastern Front has become more serious during the past week, in spite of fierce Russian counter-attacks near Smolensk and stubborn resistance in the Chernigov area and along the River Dnieper, particularly at Dnipropetrovsk.

24. The relative stabilisation of the Smolensk front, the pause in the drive by German mechanised forces in the Glukhov area and the period of securing the bridgeheads over the River Dnieper have given a large proportion of the German armoured and motorised forces a certain respite and should have allowed consolidation of the supply position, particularly in the Ukraine.

25. A fresh drive by German mechanised forces will probably not be very long delayed, and the most serious form this could take would probably be a drive southwards from the Glukhov area, with the object of enveloping Kiev and outflanking the Dnieper defences. This might coincide with a northward drive from the Kremenecug bridgehead. A similar drive southwards from the Berislav bridgehead to block road communications between the Crimea and the Ukraine might also develop.

Operations.

Persia.

26. During the week our advanced troops in Northern Persia reached Sultanabad (Iraq), Aveh and Senna. Contact was made with the Russian forces at various points. Minor operations have taken place against armed bands of Persian soldiers led by rebel officers and numbers of rifles have been taken.

27. The Persian Government accepted the Anglo-Soviet terms on the 9th September and, apart from frontier trouble between the Khurs and the Persians on the Iraq-Persia frontier west of Senna, the situation is quiet.

Iraq.

28. Further reinforcements have arrived in Iraq from the Middle East.

Intelligence.

France and Spain.

29. Reports of train movements suggest that three German divisions moved into France from Germany at the end of August. It is possible that an armoured division may now be in France.
In view of reports of the movement of troops to the eastern front from the Rhineland, the reported move of divisions into France may represent reliefs rather than reinforcements. It is still estimated therefore that there are only five infantry divisions between Angouleme and the Spanish frontier; an additional armoured division may have arrived.

**Balkan States.**

**30.** The total number of German divisions in the Balkans (including Hungary and Slovakia) is now believed to be 12. Of these there are probably three or four in Bulgaria, two at least being in the Varna–Bourgas area.

**31.** It seems likely that these last divisions at least may be intended for a combined operation in the Black Sea, probably against South Russia. There have been reports that the Germans have collected a number of barges and other small craft in Black Sea ports, and German naval personnel in increasing numbers are stated to have arrived recently in Varna.

**32.** There is little indication that any of the above preparations are directed against Turkey, and they are more likely to be intended for a sea-borne operation against the Crimea or the eastern shores of the Black Sea.

**AIR SITUATION.**

**General Review.**

**33.** Our bombers were unable to operate on three nights owing to extensive coastal and inland fog. Conditions on the remaining nights enabled attacks in force to be carried out against important objectives; these attacks included the heaviest raids on Berlin and Turin. By day, operations were restricted by unsuitable weather.

Enemy activity over this country remained at a low level.

**Germany, Northern Italy and Occupied Territory.**

**Day.**

**34.** Bomber Command despatched 57 sorties, compared with 103 last week, and dropped 21 tons of H.E. bombs and a few incendiaries. Offensive operations by Fighter Command involved 452 aircraft sorties, of which 315 took place on one day. Poor visibility severely restricted daylight activities, although when conditions permitted anti-shipping operations were carried out as recorded under "Coastal Operations."

**35.** Blenheims, escorted by fighters, made attacks on Cherbourg, where hits were obtained on the docks and on a Synthetic Oil Plant at Mazingarbe, bombs falling on the ammonia plant, coke ovens and a railway siding. On the 6th September three Fortresses were despatched to attack the Admiral Scheer at Oslo, and, failing to locate the pocket battleship, bombed the docks. Two days later, four more Fortresses were despatched against the same target, but were intercepted at 28,000 feet by a formation of Me. 109's, which shot down two of them and severely damaged a third.

**36.** On the only occasion when a large-scale operation by fighters was possible, 27 Squadron sorties were flown; eight enemy aircraft were destroyed, 11 probably destroyed and five damaged. We lost eight fighters, the pilot of one being rescued. Three squadrons of fighters engaged in an offensive sweep later in the week encountered considerable opposition, four Spitfires being shot down; enemy casualties were one destroyed and one damaged.

**Night.**

**37.** Bomber Command despatched 600 sorties, compared with 894 in the previous week. The main attacks were carried out with considerable effect under good conditions, but on three nights no operations were possible owing to unsuitable weather.
38. The principal objectives were industrial and railway centres and shipbuilding yards. A total of 534 tons of H.E. bombs and 48,000 incendiaries was released.

39. The week’s offensive operations opened with an attack, in excellent weather, on Chemical Works at Hüls, near Krefeld. In spite of heavy A.A. fire and many enemy night fighters, the raid was successfully completed, and bombs were observed to burst on the target and near the power station.

40. On the following night, 295 bombers were despatched, including the largest number of our aircraft that has, up to the present, attacked Berlin at any time. About 140 tons of H.E. bombs and over 12,000 incendiaries were released on Berlin. Visibility was exceptionally good and large fires, many of which could be seen from a considerable distance, were started in industrial and railway centres and in the centre of the capital. Three 4,000-lb. bombs exploded east of Alexander Platz and other bombs fell on Unter den Linden and on a railway bridge across the Spree. Fires were seen near the Wannsee and Friedrichstrasse railway stations, at Kopenick, Tempelhof Aerodrome, Frankfurter Strasse and at a camouflaged factory 20 miles from the city. Seventeen of our aircraft were lost on this operation.

41. On the same night, the Deutsche Werke shipyards at Kiel and warehouses at Boulogne were successfully attacked by strong forces of bombers, from which three aircraft are missing. At Kiel, big explosions resulted and at both places numerous fires broke out.

42. The following night, the Henschel Armament Factory and Locomotive Works at Kassel were the objectives. Visibility was again good and some of the 75 attacking aircraft came down to 400 feet before releasing their bombs. The land armament workshops received a direct hit, which was followed by a large explosion; a stick of bombs fell across the railway locomotive works and fires were started in the adjoining railway centre. When our aircraft (all of which returned safely) left the target, the town appeared to contain a large number of fires.

43. On the night of the 10th/11th September 76 Bomber Command aircraft (including 20 heavy bombers) were despatched to attack the Royal Arsenal and railway centres at Turin; 66 tons of H.E. bombs and 2,400 incendiaries, including nearly 500 of 40 lbs. or 50 lbs., were dropped. Weather conditions were moderately favourable, and many aircraft reported a very large fire in the Arsenal, where explosions were seen to throw debris high into the air. In addition many fires were reported in the town, and one particularly large building burning furiously. Between Annecy and Geneva, "V" was flashed from the ground in red, white and blue, and was acknowledged by a Wellington. From this operation three Wellingtons and one Halifax are missing.

44. During the week, aircraft of Bomber Command destroyed four enemy night fighters, probably destroyed a fifth and damaged another.

United Kingdom.

45. Fighter Command flew a total of 1,862 sorties by day, and 344 sorties by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations. Enemy operations against this country have been on a small scale and attacks have been widely dispersed. Long-range bomber and reconnaissance aircraft operated both by day and by night, but few of these penetrated overland.

Coastal Operations.

46. Coastal Command flew 233 patrols (366 sorties) and provided 42 convoy-escorts (127 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 497 (1,030 sorties).

Throughout the week aircraft of the three Commands continued their operations against enemy shipping. Blenheims of Bomber Command destroyed a 1,200-ton Flak ship off the Hague, and a barge, in convoy near the Channel Islands, was hit. Coastal Command aircraft, operating off the Norwegian coast, torpedoed a 5,000-ton merchant vessel, and another of 6,000 tons is believed to have been hit. In an attack on Bergso Island bombs fell on the Harbour and the fish oil factory was set alight.
47. In addition to providing escorts for anti-shipping operations, our fighters destroyed a Flak ship near Ostend; damaged another off Boulogne; hit a 1,000-ton ship off Haamstede; and carried out attacks on a coastguard station near Barfleur, and on a wireless station near Cape de la Hague. Numerous other attacks were made, the results of which were inconclusive or unobserved, and several near misses against shipping were reported.

48. Thirty-eight aircraft were despatched to lay sea-mines off Oslo, Lorient, St. Nazaire, the Frisian Islands and in the Western Baltic.

49. Enemy minelaying on a small scale was suspected between the Lizard and Falmouth on the night of the 6th/7th, and on the same night an attack was made against shipping off Lowestoft.

Central Mediterranean.

50. On the 4th September five Blenheims attacked ships in Cotrone, which had taken refuge there as a result of a very successful attack made by Swordfish the previous night, and reported in last week’s Résumé. One merchant vessel of 6–8,000 tons was hit and an explosion resulted, and two other ships were attacked but the results were not observed. One Blenheim was shot down by A.A. guns. On the night of the 6th/7th September, seven Naval Swordfish, operating under A.O.C., Malta, intercepted a northbound convoy of three merchant vessels and three destroyers; one vessel of 6,000 tons was hit three times and almost certainly sunk, and a tanker of 6,000 tons was twice hit with torpedoes.

51. A total of 34 tons of bombs was dropped on two nights by Wellingtons on Tripoli (L). The first attack was made on M.T. depots in conditions of excellent visibility. The attack was pressed home from a very low level; all the bombs fell in the target area, where large fires among vehicles and buildings were reported. The harbour was the objective of the second attack; three hits were obtained on a medium-sized merchant vessel, and a number of bombs fell on the Spanish Quay.

52. On two successive nights Wellingtons from Malta attacked the docks at Palermo and dropped a total of 32 tons of bombs. Many hits were made on the three main quays and dry dock, and some extensive fires were started. Three large merchant vessels lying in the harbour at the time of the attack may also have suffered damage. These attacks were followed by two night raids by a total of 16 Wellingtons on the power station, landing stages and ferry ships at Messina; over 22 tons of bombs were dropped and many hits were obtained on the targets. A big fire was reported in the Citadel area of the town.

53. On the 4th September a daylight raid on Malta was attempted by a force of 20 Macchi 200s, which were intercepted by Hurricanes at sea. Later in the day 12 more Macchi 200s were employed to cover rescue operations. In the course of these two operations nine of the enemy fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed and five others damaged, against our loss of two Hurricanes.

54. Formations of from one to six aircraft have attacked Malta on most nights of the week. The few bombs dropped have caused negligible damage. One Cant. Z1007 was illuminated by searchlights and shot down in flames by Hurricanes.

Egypt and Cyrenaica.

55. One night attack was made by 15 Wellingtons on Benghazi, and hits were made on military stores. A heavier raid was carried out against Barce, where the targets bombed included the railway sidings, workshops, barracks and the aerodrome. A series of attacks was made on enemy aerodromes in Libya. At Derna six enemy aircraft were probably destroyed on the ground, and at Capuzzo one large aircraft was destroyed and a big fire was started at the petrol dump. By day seven Marylandis, escorted by fighters, successfully bombed stores and dumps near Gambut, and another attack by nine Marylandis was made on heavy guns east of Tobruk.
56. Enemy night operations were carried out by forces of from 15 to 26 aircraft. Attacks were made each night in the Suez area, particularly against aerodromes, where considerable damage resulted. At Ismailia one hangar and several buildings, including the officers' quarters, were destroyed, and eleven aircraft were damaged. At Abu Sueir five hangars, living quarters, and one Wellington were destroyed, and an oil dump set on fire. Both aerodromes were rendered unserviceable by craters and unexploded bombs. Two raiders were shot down and four others damaged.

Another attack by 26 aircraft was made on Suez on the 7th/8th September when bombs fell in the anchorage, in the canal, and near oil refineries. No damage was reported to shipping or to property, but one of our ships was damaged two nights later. During an attack on Alexandria by nine aircraft, bombs were dropped over a wide area, and caused some damage, but not of a serious nature.

57. In daylight on the 7th September Italian fighters attacked Sidi Barrani aerodrome and destroyed four of our fighters on the ground and damaged seven others. Numerous small raids took place on Tobruk without causing much damage and only negligible casualties.

Greece.

58. On the night of the 8th/9th 23 Wellingtons from Egypt attacked the Corinth Canal. Hits were made on both banks and many bombs fell into the Canal. One aircraft bombed the aerodrome at Heraklion (Crete).

Five Wellingtons also dropped nine boxes of food supplies for propaganda purposes.

Russia.

Russian Air Operations.

59. Reports received indicate that the chief function of the Soviet Air Force has been close support to their ground troops, for which they have two types specially designed. These are the I.L. 2, a single-engined storm aircraft, and the P.E. 2 twin-engined dive-bomber.

60. In addition to army co-operation, Soviet airmen have been co-operating in the "scorched earth" policy advocated by Stalin by dropping incendiary bombs upon crops, villages and forests.

61. In general, there is evidence to show that the Soviet Air Force is still fighting effectively, and it is believed that supplies and replacements are reaching the units satisfactorily.

German Air Operations.

62. On a front of such length, which cannot be defended in equal strength at all points, the value of reconnaissance is particularly marked, and the ability of the German Air Force to locate the weak points has undoubtedly contributed greatly to the success of the Panzer thrusts.

63. In accordance with the usual German practice, the fighter and dive-bomber units have concentrated on close support of the Army in the areas of greatest pressure, i.e., the Leningrad, Gomel and Lower Dnieper districts. This has, no doubt, diminished the difficulties of supply, which must be very considerable, but it has also necessitated the absence of fighter protection and dive-bomber support over large parts of the front, and the lack of dispersal has rendered the aerodromes used by the German Air Force more vulnerable to air attack. The Russians appear to have exploited these two weaknesses in the German air offensive with some success.

64. The scale of attack by long range bombers on Moscow has steadily diminished and the principal bombing objectives now appear to be Russian aerodromes, troop concentrations and communications. Particular attention is being paid to railway lines and bridges in the rear of the main Russian concentrations, but there is no evidence that Russian troop movements have been seriously disorganised.
65. Coastal units have been very active in the Baltic and in the Black Sea and have played an important part in restricting Russian submarine activity and in locating Russian naval units and supply ships.

66. It is difficult to give any reliable figures for aircraft losses. Repair and salvage units follow close behind the front and, whilst subject to air attack, maintain a fair level of serviceability in units, considering the rate of advance. It is thought, however, that the serviceability of the German Air Force units is now not more than 50 per cent, of their strength.

Far East.


67. There has been a reduction in the number of Japanese aircraft stationed in French Indo-China, and it appears that the Japanese have decided, for the present, to direct their main air effort in attacks on Chinese vital centres from Central China bases, where they have concentrated a heavy bomber force estimated at 240.

68. The much-bombed city of Chungking, headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek and his Government, has been the chief target and appears to have been attacked both by day and night, whenever weather conditions have been favourable. In the attack of the 30th August as many as 162 heavy bombers, flying in six formations of 27 aircraft, took part. Night raids have also been carried out on several occasions, but on a smaller scale, the maximum number of aircraft reported being nine in three flights of three.

69. Most of the raiding on Chungking has been carried out by naval heavy bombers based on Hankow. These appear to follow the River Yangtze from their base and to approach Chungking from the north, flying at from 10,000 to 15,000 feet in V formation, each group consisting of 27 aircraft.

70. The Japanese claim to have dropped 10,000 bombs on Chungking between the 8th and 14th August, which is equal to the total quantity of bombs dropped in all previous raids during this year.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

71. Only on the 5th September were bombs dropped by day. No bombs were dropped on the nights 5th/6th, 9th/10th and 10th/11th. On other nights bombing was of a scattered nature over the eastern half of England and Scotland, with a few incidents in Cornwall, Gloucestershire and West Wales on the night of 6th/7th September.

Bombs were dropped at seven aerodromes without causing serious damage.

By Day.

72. On the 5th September a single plane bombed Peterhead, damaging a block of shops and houses, and injuring a few people.

By Night.

73. No concentrated attack was made, and no damage likely to affect the National war effort has been caused, but widespread damage was done to property on the night of 7th/8th September at Louth (Lincolnshire), Margate and Ramsgate. Fourteen soldiers were killed at Margate College.

Casualties.

74. For the week ending 0600 10th September approximately 23 civilians were killed and 38 seriously injured. No casualties occurred in London.
### APPENDIX I.

**SECTION A.**—Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of all tonnages reported lost during the month of August 1941 by enemy action.

*(Note.—Tonnages are gross and vessels are of S.S. Cargo type unless otherwise stated.)*

By Submarine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convey or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 4 ...</td>
<td>Fishing Schooner Robert Max (179)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bay Bulls</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Gunned</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>180 miles E. by S. of Azores</td>
<td>Crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 5</td>
<td>Kamos (4,922)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>W.A. produce</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>225 miles W.S.W. of Sylne Head</td>
<td>51 crew and 9 passengers. 1 crew missing, 8 wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 5</td>
<td>Swiftpool (5,205)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>225 miles W.S.W. of Sylne Head</td>
<td>2 saved, 42 lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>Harlingen (5,413)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>W.A. produce</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>225 miles W.S.W. of Sylne Head</td>
<td>1 killed, 43 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>Belgravia (3,180)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Palm kernels, ground nuts, tin</td>
<td>Port Harcourt</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>210 miles W. of Sylne Head</td>
<td>2 died, 48 saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 5</td>
<td>Cape Rodney (4,312)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Palm kernels, manganese ore</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>225 miles W.S.W. of Sylne Head</td>
<td>Crew saved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Tonnage</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>From—</td>
<td>To—</td>
<td>How sunk</td>
<td>In convoy or not</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Fate of Crew and Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 17</td>
<td><strong>Sessa</strong></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>280 miles E.N.E. of Cape Farewell</td>
<td>3 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td><strong>Gisar</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>350 miles W.S.W. of Fastnet</td>
<td>39 crew, 25 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td><strong>Atea</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>350 miles S.W. of Valenica</td>
<td>11 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td><strong>Aguilas</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Mails and general</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>350 miles W.S.W. of Fastnet</td>
<td>15 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td><strong>M/V Tunker Sildra</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>225 miles S.E. of Freetown</td>
<td>24 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td><strong>Empire Oak</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Methil</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>150 miles W.S.W. of Oporto</td>
<td>5 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td><strong>Aldergroves</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>150 miles W.S.W. of Oporto</td>
<td>All saved except 1 D.E.M.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td><strong>Clionara</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>150 miles W.S.W. of Oporto</td>
<td>8 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td><strong>Spind</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>Gunned</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>150 miles W.S.W. of Oporto</td>
<td>Crew saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td><strong>Inger</strong></td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>40 miles S.S.E. of Butt of Lewis</td>
<td>14 saved, 9 missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td><strong>Tremeda</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Duila</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>About 240 miles W. of Slyne Head</td>
<td>13 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td><strong>Saugor</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General and Govt. stores</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Calcutta via Freetown</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>About 240 miles W. of Slyne Head</td>
<td>23 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td><strong>Embassado</strong></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>Bathurst</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>About 360 miles W. of Slyne Head</td>
<td>Crew 42; 8 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Segundo</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>St. Thomas</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>About 240 miles W. of Slyne Head</td>
<td>27 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Oteio</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General and Govt. stores</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>Sydne via Curacao</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>330 miles W. of Fastnets</td>
<td>58 saved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### By Mine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 12</td>
<td>M/V Fishing Smack</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Off Whitstable</td>
<td>Crew saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Express (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 19</td>
<td>M/V Barge Golden</td>
<td>British</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern edge of Maplin Sands</td>
<td>No survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grain (101)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 24</td>
<td>Skagerak (1,983)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Ipswich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>River Orwell, Harwich</td>
<td>6 survivors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Surface Craft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 11</td>
<td>Sir Russell (1,549)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>B-boat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6 1/2 miles E.N.E. of Dungeness</td>
<td>Crew saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 17</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Kota Nopen</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Raider</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Off Galapagos Is.</td>
<td>No information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7,322)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 20</td>
<td>Czestochowa (1,971)</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Reykjavik</td>
<td>B-boat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20 miles off Cromer</td>
<td>25 saved, 1 lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td>Trident (4,017)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Wheat and beans</td>
<td>Tyne</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Tyne</td>
<td>Crew saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4</td>
<td>Taurus (4,357)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>Pepel</td>
<td>Workington</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>650 miles W.N.W. of Loop Head</td>
<td>6 saved, 2 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4</td>
<td>M/V Cargo Escaut (1,967)</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>Govt. stores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attika Bay, Suaz</td>
<td>3 saved, 3 missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 9</td>
<td>Condence (2,046)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>Blythe</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20 miles E. of Cromer</td>
<td>All saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 11</td>
<td>Empire Hurst (2,032)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>Aguilas</td>
<td>Borrow</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Approx. 50 miles S.W. of Cape St. Vincent</td>
<td>9 saved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 20</td>
<td>Steam Trawler Juliet (178)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>30 miles S.W. of Old Head of Kinsale</td>
<td>All saved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of all tonnages reported lost during the month of August 1941, but relating to July 1941, or previous, by enemy action.

(Note.—Tonnages are gross and vessels are of S.S. Cargo type unless otherwise stated.)

### By Submarine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How Sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Telena (7,406)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Crude Oil</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Peuillas</td>
<td>Gunned</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Salvors Island near Arosa Bay</td>
<td>7 killed, 11 missing, 36 saved. May 29 was abandoned to Spanish Salvors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Conan (9,102)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Milford Haven</td>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>450 miles S.E. of Cape Perrowell</td>
<td>Vessel made S.S.S. message picked up by another merchant ship. Crew 37. 27 saved, rest missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Horn Shell (8,272)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td>Torpedo</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>265 miles W. by N. Madeira</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Mine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How Sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Gas Fire (3,001)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10 miles East of Southwold</td>
<td>Crew saved, 9 injured.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Turkish Refah (8,606 gross tons) previously shown as lost by Submarine is now known to have been lost by Mine.

### By Surface Craft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How Sunk</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Balsos (8,312)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Table Bay Liverpool, via Trinidad</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
<td>Raider</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Approx. 200 miles W. of Ascension Island</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Chaucer (5,702)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Middlesbrough</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Raider</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>750 miles W. of Cape Verde Is.</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Swedish Sir Ernest Cassell (7,789 tons gross) previously shown as lost by Cause Unknown is now known to have been lost by Raider.
### By Aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 6</td>
<td>Halcyon (1,109)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Piraeus</td>
<td>All these vessels now reported as lost during combined operations in Greece. (Virginia S. apparently seized by Italians. Reported to have arrived Trieste August 8, 1941.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 15</td>
<td>Virginia S. (8,885)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Piraeus</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 15</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Proctromos (877)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Piraeus</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 15</td>
<td>Hollandia (1,769)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Piraeus</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>Draco (2,018)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Tobruk</td>
<td>Crew 31, 1 killed. Vessel now reported total loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 24</td>
<td>Rehno (1,965)</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>S.E. of Crete</td>
<td>Now reported lost during combined operations in Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Sailing Barge Ida Burton (40)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Sailing Barge Delite (80)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Sailing Barge Ladore (91)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>Sailing Barge Whitakers No. 11 (48)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Hull</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By other Causes or Cause Unknown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>How sunk.</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate of Crew and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Haig Rose (1,117)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>C.U.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Bristol Channel</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Steam Trawler Oyama (349)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>Western Fishing Grounds</td>
<td>C.U.</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Not known ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18</td>
<td>Susan Maersk (2,355)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Milford Haven</td>
<td>Curaçao</td>
<td>C.U.</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Atlantic ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

16
SECTION B.—Merchant Vessels (excluding Commissioned Merchant Vessels) of 500 gross tons and over REPORTED damaged during the month of August 1941 by Enemy Action. Vessels suffering superficial or minor damage are excluded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name and Tonnage</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>From—</th>
<th>To—</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>In Convoy or not</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Extent of Damage</th>
<th>Casualties to Crew</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2</td>
<td><em>Koolga</em> (1,110)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Southend</td>
<td>Inverness</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Smith's Knoll</td>
<td>Main engines and steering gear damaged by direct hit aft, and making water. Arrived Yarmouth in tow.</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 3-4</td>
<td><em>M/V Tanker Desmoule</em> (8,120)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>Torpedoed under bridge on portside, perforating 4, 5 and 6 tanks. Vessel considered seaworthy and left Suez August 18th for Aden, where she arrived August 7th in tow.</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 3-4</td>
<td><em>M/V Tanker Alexandre Andre</em> (5,261)</td>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>Hulled on portside by torpedo. Later proceeded to and arrived Margawah.</td>
<td>No casualties reported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 9</td>
<td><em>Glendalough</em> (868)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20 miles E. of Cromer</td>
<td>Badly damaged aft. Towed to Grimsby for removal of boiler, wrecked engines and damaged plating.</td>
<td>Crew 18, 6 saved, 12 lost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 12</td>
<td><em>Eaglescliffe Hall</em> (1,800)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Seaham</td>
<td>Sunderland</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>2 miles E. of Sunderland</td>
<td>Hit in engine room and on fire aft. Arrived Sunderland in tow, fire extinguished</td>
<td>Crew 24, 2 killed, 4 injured.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name and Tonnage</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>In Convoy or not</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Extent of Damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 17</td>
<td>Kindersley (1,999)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Blyth</td>
<td>Clyde</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Off Whitby</td>
<td>Engine room damaged by near miss. Returned to port</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 20</td>
<td>S/S Tanker Turbo (4,782)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>N. of Port Said</td>
<td>Holed starboard side by torpedo, vessel has sagged. Has arrived Port Said</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Durham (10,881)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Ballast</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>W. of Pantellaria</td>
<td>Arrived Gibraltar. Holed after part No. 1 hold, through outer bottom and tank top</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>M/V Tanker Donovania (6,149)</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Avonmouth</td>
<td>Barry</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Off Milford Haven</td>
<td>Anchored Barry Roads with serious damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following vessels previously reported damaged are now known to be total losses and are included in Section 1 (A) above:—

Telena, Gasfire, Draco (all British).
### APPENDIX II.

**Merchant Ships (all sizes) other than Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, reported lost by Enemy Action up to 31st August, 1941.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine</strong></td>
<td>481</td>
<td>2,742,000</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>573,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine</strong></td>
<td>215</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface Craft</strong></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>672,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>279,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>270</td>
<td>603,000</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>471,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other causes or cause unknown</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,155</td>
<td>4,851,000</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1,585,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE.**—"Allied" figures include Polish; all French up to June 25, 1940; "Free" French from June 25, 1940; Norwegian from April 9, 1940; Dutch and Belgian from May 10, 1940; Greek from October 23, 1940; and Yugo-Slavian from April 6, 1941. "Neutral" figures include Italian up to June 10, 1940; "Vichy" French from June 25, 1940; Yugo-Slavian to April 6, 1941; and Finnish to July 28, 1941.

### APPENDIX III.

(1) **Additions to and deductions from British Sea-going Merchant Tonnage (ships of 500 gross tons and over), including Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, from 2nd September, 1939, to 7th September, 1941.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tankers.</th>
<th>Others.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Gross Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British ships on September 2, 1939</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>3,270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New ships</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>265,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy ships captured</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships transferred from other flags—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roumanian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other additions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total additions</strong></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>588,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deductions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships sunk by the enemy—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Merchant ships commissioned for Naval Service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Others</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>784,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships captured by the enemy—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships detained in French ports</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overdue, presumed lost</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other deductions (including Marine Risk)—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Commissioned for Naval Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total deductions</strong></td>
<td>121</td>
<td>809,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net additions (+) or deductions (-)</strong></td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-331,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the total Non-Tanker tonnage, vessels representing about 44 million gross tons are engaged on Naval, Military or R.A.F. Services (including some commissioned for Naval Service), some of which bring cargoes to the United Kingdom on their homeward passage. After allowing for vessels (1) trading permanently abroad and (2) undergoing or awaiting repair, including the fitting of defensive protection, the balance is about 6½ million gross tons, some part of which is engaged in the coaling trade of the United Kingdom and Eire.

---

APPENDIX III.
(2) Total losses of, and other deductions from, British Sea-going Merchant Ships of 500 gross tons and over, including Merchant Ships Commissioned for Naval Service, expressed as approximate annual rates of loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total losses sunk or captured by the enemy, and other deductions in the period.</th>
<th>Approximate annual loss if column (2) losses and other deductions in continued for a year.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,105,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First 9 months of war: i.e., from September 3, 1939, to May 31, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Gross Tons.</th>
<th>Gross Tons.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,054,600</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>317,000</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>392,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>319,000</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>376,000</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>389,000</td>
<td>4,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>418,000</td>
<td>6,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These figures relate to losses so far notified, and may be increased by late notifications.

(3) Merchant Ships (100 gross tons and over) under construction in British Yards in the United Kingdom and abroad as at 5th September, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tankers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colliers and coasting ships</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>367,000</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>949,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>344,000</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including 5 vessels (33,000 gross tons) building abroad, 2 merchant ships (18,000 gross tons) taken over by the Navy during construction and 10 ships (11,000 gross tons) of merchant type intended for Naval use. In addition, there are 195 merchant ships, totalling 1,149,000 gross tons, on order or proposed to order in the United Kingdom and abroad (including 18 tankers of 140,000 gross tons).
APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 9th September, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>229,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>723,000</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>582,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, &amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1,416,000</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>836,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>556</td>
<td>2,446,000</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>1,645,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 66 ships of 134,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 54 ships, totalling 324,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties have occurred to H.M. auxiliary vessels during the period under review:

September 6.—M/S Trawler Strathborean mined and sunk off Spurn Point.

September 8.—Minesweeper Corfield mined and sunk off the Humber.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: 5 killed, 4 wounded.

Ratings: 57 killed, 20 wounded.
**APPENDIX VI.**

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 4th September, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 11th September, 1941.

**Metropolitan Area.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 fighter pilots are safe.

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

**Royal Air Force.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**German.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above totals, 2 "miscellaneous" aircraft were destroyed, and 2 probably destroyed and 3 damaged by A.A. fire.

**Middle East.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

**Germany.**

**Berlin.**—In the raid on the 12th/13th August the windows of the exhibition halls in Charlottenburg were blown in. These halls were in use as grain stores and the glass has mixed with the grain.

**Karlsruhe.**—In the first week of August the power station was damaged and the town was virtually without electricity for five days. The administrative offices and waiting rooms at the main station were severely damaged and railway services dislocated for three days. The Schloss Hotel and a large food store in the York Strasse were destroyed. The population are said to be discontented with the A.R.P. arrangements and nervous of future attacks. Four official shelters caved in and very few of the inmates escaped.

**Hannover.**—In the raid of the 14th/15th July the main building of the chemical laboratory at the high school (which was used for experimental work on new explosives) was hit and three-quarters burnt out. Damage was severe in the Charlotten Strasse.

**General.**—The effect on the morale of the public of the "Fortress" attacks is serious as the first notice of their presence is usually the arrival of the bombs themselves.

A correspondent writes on the 24th July: "The day before yesterday I had to go to Cologne on business. I was staggered to see this town, formerly so full of joie-de-vivre and high spirits, after the violent air raids of early July. The damage to buildings, Furniture, merchandise, &c., is estimated at 300 million marks."

**Holland.**

**Rotterdam.**—Photographs taken on the 1st September, 1941, show that as a result of a daylight raid on the 25th August a cargo vessel of the Noordam type, of about 10,000 tons, is lying on her side in shallow water. The engine shops and assembly hall at Wilton's shipbuilding yard have been severely damaged and a warehouse nearby damaged by fire.

**France.**

**Cherbourg.**—Photographs taken during the daylight attack on the 4th September show bursts across dock No. 3 and a quayside to the east. Two vessels in the dock may well have suffered some damage.

**Mazingarbe.**—Photographs taken during the daylight attack on the 4th September show many hits on the railway sidings and on rolling stock therein.

**Lannion.**—Photographs taken on the 31st August, 1941, during a daylight attack show bombs bursting on the runway of the aerodrome and to the north thereof.

**General.**—Three pilots recently escaped from France have stated that the Potez Aircraft Factory has been very severely damaged and that when they were in the Roubaix area all coal mines were idle owing to lack of power. Other reports tell of reduced output of coal and a complete stoppage of all work in the shipbuilding yard at Le Trait for several days, due to hits on the works power centre and the cutting of electric cables in the yard. The destruction of the machine tool department has caused further difficulties.
Leaflet Raids.

Considerable encouragement is to be found in the growing evidence of the success of the propaganda operations carried out by Royal Air Force leaflet raids.

Despite the reduction in activity due to unfavourable weather, very satisfactory results were achieved during August, when the distribution was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leaflets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over Germany</td>
<td>4,557,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over France</td>
<td>1,946,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Belgium</td>
<td>1,550,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Holland</td>
<td>1,309,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Norway</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,481,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dropping of bogus ration cards has in particular created confusion, especially as it occurred at a time when the authorities had for various reasons, been obliged to extend the period of availability from 31st August to 30th September. This operation is regarded as having been an outstanding success.

During the month under review there has been no definite evidence of the effect of the "Luftpost" or other leaflets on Germany, but remembering that there is proof of listening on a considerable scale to British broadcasts in German, to counter which a special talk was recently given by Dr. Goebbels, it can be assumed that equal interest is shown in the various items of news contained in successive editions of the "Luftpost".

There is continued evidence of the excellent results achieved by air-borne propaganda in maintaining morale and the will to resist in occupied countries. The tea-bags are particularly welcome in Holland, while the following information from Occupied France proves the value of "Le Courrier de l'Air" and other leaflets:

(a) "Propaganda leaflets have had excellent effects on workers in Brest Region."

(b) "Our leaflets had a tremendous effect on the French population and were eagerly looked for every morning after any of our planes had been over. The Germans were very much down on this, but were unable to prevent these leaflets going the rounds of the village."

(c) "Leaflets dropped in Brittany and Normandy were collected and circulated among the local population."

BRITISH (RED) AND FOREIGN (BLACK) MERCHANT SHIPPING LOSSES BY DIFFERENT FORMS OF ENEMY ACTION

Note: Includes vessels of all tonnages (but excludes Commissioned Ships). Italian losses are included up to June 10 1940.

- By Submarine
- By Mine
- By Surface Craft
- By Aircraft
- By other causes or cause unknown

This graph is based on information received in the Admiralty up to 15th Jan. 5th Sept. 1941.

Intelligence Division, Sept. 1941
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 108 (10-9-41)

MAP I.

SECRET

G.S.O.R. 5462
WESTERN U.S.S.R.
SCALE 1/9 M. OR 63 MILES TO INCH

REFERENCE
International Boundary
Railways

AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate advances

MOCK

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces—
20th July
24th Aug
6th Sept

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note — It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the various forces.
THE QUESTION WHETHER WE SHOULD DECLARE WAR ON FINLAND, HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I submit to my colleagues the results of my examination of the pros and cons of declaring war on Finland. I also submit, separately, arguments in respect of similar action against Hungary and Roumania, which countries are invading Russian territory to a greater extent than the Finns.

2. It is very doubtful whether a declaration of war or the threat of such against any one or all the three Governments would influence their action. We have already taken all the practical measures that are taken on a declaration of war save the internment here of Finns, Hungarians and Roumanians.

FINLAND.

3. The question of declaring war on Finland arises from the Russian appeal to us to do anything we can to influence Finland to cease hostilities. In default of other possible measures to this end, the Prime Minister responded in his recent message to Stalin: "We are willing to put any pressure upon Finland in our power, including immediate intimation that we will declare war upon them if they continue beyond the old frontiers." The Finns, according to our reports, continue to advance—to some depth in certain places—beyond their pre-1940 frontiers. We have had many reports of war-weariness and disillusionment among the Finns, but also a report that the mood has changed again with the fall of Viborg and the recent successful advances.

4. Sir S. Cripps, reporting on his interview with Stalin after the delivery of the Prime Minister’s message, said that Stalin would, of course, like us to declare war on Finland at once. I do not think that a threat of a declaration of war would influence the Finns nor, I fear, would such action do so. It is even conceivable that it might work in the opposite direction by making the Finns feel that the breach with us being complete, there was nothing left to them but to plan their future as a vassal of Germany. It is to the Left elements in Finland that we must look. There is nothing to be hoped of Field-Marshal Mannerheim. A declaration of war by us will not strengthen the position of our friends in Finland.
5. Furthermore, a declaration of war would create for us certain shipping difficulties, which would not be grave, but would be distinctly awkward. They may be summarised by saying that—

(a) We should forfeit our chances of getting twenty-eight good ships for ourselves for the North Atlantic (at present we are planning for them to be taken over by the Swedes, who would charter them to us). If we declare war, the most we can expect is that, after long delays, they may be employed in trade useful to the Americans.

(b) We might cause not a little dislocation to United States trade (e.g., in bauxite), for we have been carefully shepherding these ships temporarily into this trade by arrangement with the United States Maritime Commission.

(c) We should lose a certain number of good Finnish crews.

HUNGARY.

6. Relations with Hungary were maintained until the Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia, because, although Hungary was the country most exposed to German pressure, it had shown some powers of resistance and a high degree of national unity. In fact, Hungarian behaviour compared favourably with that of, e.g., Roumania or Bulgaria.

7. The Hungarian attack upon Yugoslavia ranged Hungary more definitely in the Axis camp, but the Hungarian Government has nevertheless since managed to maintain a higher degree of independence in its internal policy than most other Governments in Europe.

8. Hungary therefore remains potentially one of the more stable elements in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and it may well prove useful after the war to find in Budapest a relatively efficient administrative and financial machine when conditions throughout Europe are likely to be chaotic.

9. The arguments in favour of declaring war on Hungary are:

(a) That such a step might please the Yugoslav and Soviet Governments, against whom Hungary has been fighting; and

(b) That it would demonstrate to the world that countries which are not with us will be regarded as definitely against us.

10. Such a step might also cause pleasure among some Czechoslovaks, but the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs has recently stated that he does not despair of reaching a relatively satisfactory settlement with Hungary after the war, and showed no desire for His Majesty's Government to alter their present attitude towards Hungary.

11. The arguments against declaring war on Hungary, which appear to be conclusive, can be summarised as follows:

(a) The Hungarian Government and people are genuinely anti-Nazi and for the most part anti-German. They are certainly not anti-British. Provided they are not penalised excessively at the peace settlement, they would welcome a British victory and release from German domination. A British declaration of war would, however, convince most Hungarians that their only hope for the future lay in a German victory, with the result that they would co-operate much more wholeheartedly with Germany than they are doing at present;

(b) There is no conflict of interests between this country and Hungary, with whom it should be possible to resume relations on a satisfactory basis after the war;

(c) The existence of a stable national State with a running administrative and financial organization should prove useful in the post-war reconstruction;

(d) Relations between Poland and Hungary have been particularly close for many centuries. The conversations which have taken place between the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments have contemplated the
inclusion of Hungary into some federal organization in Central Europe and the use of Polish good offices to remove Hungarian-Czecho-
slovak differences. A solution on these lines, which should be satis-
factory, would be much hampered by a British declaration of war
against Hungary. This would probably also impose an additional
strain upon our relations with Poland;

e) The Hungarian Government and people have been left in no doubt
regarding British disapproval of their recent actions and attitude. A
gesture, such as a declaration of war, is not, therefore, necessary to
bring home to them that they must expect to bear the consequences of
their actions;

f) Action on our part ranging European countries more definitely in the
German camp is likely to facilitate German propaganda regarding
the “New Order” in Europe.

ROUMANIA.

12. Roumania and Hungary should be considered together: if we declared
war on one but not the other, we should implicitly favour the Hungarian (or
Roumanian) claim to Transylvania (HIs Majesty’s Government have hitherto
merely stated that they do not recognise the Vienna settlement assigning Transyl-
vania to Hungary since it was imposed under duress in time of war). The effect
of a declaration of war on Roumania but not on Hungary would be disastrous to
our cause in Roumania, where the Transylvanian patriots remain our chief
sympathisers.

13. We should therefore declare war on both Hungary and Roumania, or on
neither.

14. There are the following specific arguments against declaring war on
Roumania:—

(a) By declaring war on Roumania we should be more or less committed
to drastic treatment of Roumania at the general peace settlement.
It has proved impossible to draw up even provisional plans for the
future settlement of South-Eastern Europe, and it might conceivably
suit our book to reconstitute a large Roumania. It would be easier
to do this if we had not in the meantime committed ourselves to
regarding Roumania as an enemy.

(b) A declaration of war on Roumania would almost certainly be unwelcome
to the Yugoslav Government, who entertain feelings of gratitude
towards Roumania owing to the fact that, unlike Hungary and
Bulgaria, she has not seized portions of Yugoslav territory, but on
the contrary has shown herself helpful in various ways.

The Greek Government would probably not welcome the move,
since they probably, like the Yugoslav Government, favour the
reconstitution of Roumania after the war as a buffer to Bulgaria and
Hungary.

We can only guess at the probable Turkish reactions, but they
are not likely to regard such a move with favour.

(c) If we declared war on Roumania, we should certainly be pressed by the
Greek and Yugoslav Governments to declare war on Bulgaria.
Bulgaria is not fighting Russia, and it would not be to our advantage
to declare war on her. To do so would be an empty gesture and would
have an unfavourable effect on the not inconsiderable anti-German
elements in Bulgaria. It would, moreover, be necessary to consult the
Turkish Government before taking this step, which they would
probably urge us strongly not to take.

(d) A declaration of war on Roumania would certainly increase the pressure
on us from various Roumanians in this country to recognise a “Free
Roumanian Movement,” which we are unwilling to do because the
Roumanians available are not sufficiently good material for this
purpose.
(e) It is improbable that a declaration of war would benefit our position in Roumania itself. It might, on the contrary, lead to an increase of anti-British feeling, since the impression would be given that we were actively siding against Roumania with the Russians, whom Roumanians have always regarded as their bitterest enemies.

CONCLUSIONS.

15. Finland.—I recommend that His Majesty's Government should neither threaten nor actually issue a declaration of war unless the Soviet Government press them very strongly to do so.

16. Hungary and Roumania.—(a) The arguments against declaring war on these two countries appear in themselves to be conclusive. I therefore recommend that, if it is decided to declare war on Finland, we should not follow suit in the case of Hungary and Roumania, even at the cost of some inconsistency.

(b) If, nevertheless, it is considered necessary to declare war, it will be essential not only to declare it on both countries simultaneously, but also to declare war on Bulgaria.

A. E.

Foreign Office, September 13, 1941.
WAR CABINET.

FAR EASTERN POLICY.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ON the 24th August the Prime Minister, referring in his broadcast to the menace created by Japan's latest expansionist activities, said: "It is certain that this has got to stop." He added that, if the efforts of the United States to bring about an amicable settlement in the Far East should fail, "we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States." The immediate point for decision is whether it is necessary or desirable to add anything to these statements.

2. The attached note describes in detail our consultations with the United States on the subject of a warning to Japan. The position is as follows: At the Atlantic meeting, President Roosevelt declared his intention of giving a warning in words which, in the event, he did not use. His actual warning did not make it clear, as had been the original object, that war with the United States might be the result of further Japanese moves. On the other hand, its scope was widened beyond the south-west Pacific and the wording was deliberately chosen to meet the suspicions of China and Russia that they were being left out. It seemed advisable, in any parallel action on our part, to adhere to the wording agreed upon at the Atlantic meeting, but the United States Government have made it clear that, while they do not want us specifically to link up our warning with theirs, they would prefer us to adopt wording as wide as that which they had used; and (while attaching less importance to this point) they have suggested that express mention of the word "war" should be avoided. (Field-Marshal Smuts also doubted the advisability of a warning on the original lines, and especially the use of the word "war.")

3. There is force in the United States contention that the Far East should be treated comprehensively and that the Japanese should not be led to think, by a warning applying to one sector of the front (e.g., the south-west Pacific), that they need fear no reactions from us if they attack in another sector (e.g., Russia). It is certainly true that the Japanese are likely to be deterred from any action if they believe that such action would meet with united opposition from the United States, Russia and ourselves. Nevertheless, I am doubtful of the value or the wisdom of a warning on our part, at this time, at once so wide and so vague as the United States have given. It could not, in any event, be given without further consultation with the Dominions and the Dutch, who would certainly scrutinise its implications closely before agreeing. This alone appears to rule it out as an immediate measure.
4. I recommend, therefore, that we drop the idea of a further warning to Japan, at all events until after a further review of our whole Far Eastern policy, with particular reference to the action, if any, which we should feel able to take in the event of an attack by Japan on Russia or of a new attack on China. I hope very shortly to circulate a paper on this subject.

5. If this recommendation is adopted it will be necessary, after consulting the Dominions, to communicate our decision to the United States Government. To base that decision on the ground that the United States warning covers China and Russia and goes therefore further than we are prepared to go would be undesirable. It would be better to take the line that on reflection we feel that a warning from us in the more general terms suggested by the United States would add nothing to the Prime Minister's broadcast and might even detract from its force. That broadcast has made clear both our attitude towards Japan's expansionist policy and our complete support of the United States, and has, we feel sure, been taken by the Japanese Government as the complement of the United States warning. We think it better therefore to let the matter rest there unless events show the need for something more.

6. I suggest that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs be asked to obtain the concurrence of the Dominion Governments in a communication to the United States Government on the above lines.

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1941.*
ANNEX.

Proposed Warning to Japan as to the Consequences of Further Encroachments:

BOTH the Secretary of State and Mr. Cordell Hull on the 6th August made statements indicating that Japanese domination of Thailand would menace the security of our respective possessions. It was pointed out in various quarters, however, that what was wanted in order to deter Japan was something which would indicate unmistakably that a Japanese incursion into Thailand might lead to war with ourselves and the United States. Representations in this sense made by the Thai Government were strongly supported by Sir J. Crosby, and Sir R. Craige also advised that, whatever our attitude was, we should leave the Japanese Government in no doubt about it. He strongly endorsed Sir J. Crosby's plea for a joint public declaration of the importance attached by the United States and ourselves to the complete independence of Thailand, and said that nothing but a very determined attitude on the part of the United States, the Netherlands and ourselves had any chance of deterring the Japanese military authorities from pushing things to extremes.

2. Previous to the statements of the 6th August, referred to above, instructions were sent to Lord Halifax to propose to the United States Government parallel warnings to Japan, going as far as possible to indicate that any further Japanese penetration into Thailand or elsewhere (we had in mind the Netherlands East Indies) would provoke action on the part of the United States and ourselves.

3. The Defence Committee on the 9th August telegraphed to the Prime Minister that there was a growing feeling in this country that the only hope of preventing Thailand from ultimately sharing the fate of Indo-China was a plain warning by ourselves, and a fortiori by the United States and ourselves together, that this would lead to war. The Defence Committee recognised that a blunt warning that we would regard a further Japanese move into Thailand as a casus belli might in itself be too challenging; but their unanimous view was that the situation would best be met by parallel warnings by the United States and ourselves, delivered strictly privately to the Japanese Government through the diplomatic channel, to the effect that any incursion by Japanese forces into Thailand would produce a situation in which we should be compelled to take counter-measures likely to lead to war between our respective countries and Japan.

4. During the Atlantic meeting, the President agreed to send a note to the Japanese Ambassador including the following passage: "Any further encroachment by Japan in the south-west Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan." The President said he would also add something to the effect that it was obvious that, the Soviet Union being a friendly Power, the United States Government would be similarly interested in any conflict in the north-west Pacific.

5. The Prime Minister authorised the President to inform the Japanese Government that His Majesty's Government were in complete accord with them in this matter and would collaborate fully.

6. On the President's return to the United States he communicated a memorandum to the Japanese Ambassador which departed from the wording quoted above. The memorandum related to Japanese action in Indo-China and closed with a warning in the following terms: "This Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that, if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or programme of military domination by force or threat of force of neighbouring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take any or all the steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals, and towards ensuring the safety and security of the United States." This memorandum was communicated to the
Japanese Ambassador on the 17th August. There was no direct reference to the north-west Pacific and no indication that His Majesty's Government shared the view of the United States Government.

7. On the 24th August the Prime Minister made a broadcast in which he made it clear that Japanese expansionist policy had got to stop, and that if the efforts of the United States to bring about a settlement in the Far East should fail, we should range ourselves at the side of the United States.

8. On the 27th August His Majesty's Minister in Washington was informed that, even after the Prime Minister's broadcast, we still felt it desirable that, apart from our support of the United States, we should, in the interests of the security of our own territories, be compelled to take counter-measures in the event of further Japanese expansion. We should, however, prefer to adhere to the wording of the warning elaborated at the Atlantic meeting, and we suggested two alternative formulae which we might use according to whether or not the United States saw objection to our warning being linked specifically to that given by the United States Government. The two formulae were as follows:—

**Formula 1.**

His Majesty's Government are aware of the communication which President Roosevelt made to the Japanese Ambassador on the 17th August regarding the concern of the United States at Japanese military activities in Indo-China and the steps which the United States Government would be compelled to take if the Japanese Government pursued a similar policy in regard to neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government share the concern of the United States Government and cannot disregard the plain threat to the security of British territories which such a policy on the part of Japan would constitute.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against the countries bordering on British territories or against Japan herself, feel it necessary, in the interests of peace, to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the south-west Pacific area would compel His Majesty's Government to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

**Formula 2.**

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have watched with grave concern the successive encroachments of the Japanese armed forces in Indo-China and the accumulating evidence of an intention on the part of the Japanese Government to continue this policy of expansion by force, or threat of force, into countries bordering on British territories. They cannot disregard the plain threat to the security of those territories which such a policy would constitute.

His Majesty's Government therefore, who have for their part no aggressive intentions either against these countries or against Japan herself, feel that the time has come for the most complete candour. They accordingly find it necessary, in the interests of peace, to let the Japanese Government know that any further Japanese encroachment in the south-west Pacific area would compel His Majesty's Government to take counter-measures, even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

9. The United States Government have now made it clear that they would prefer us to avoid mention of their warning. They have further suggested (a) that the word "war" should be avoided and (b) that our warning should not relate solely to the south-west Pacific area, but should be made more broadly and take the form of a warning against the continuance of the war and expansion policy and programme of conquest by force. Mr. Hull explained that the United States formula had been expressly adopted to meet possible suspicion by China and Russia that they were being left out.
RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL DE GAULLE AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1941, AT 12 NOON.

CIRCULATED TO THE WAR CABINET BY DIRECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

Present:
The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.
General C. de Gaulle.
Secretary: Captain C. M. Berkeley, Offices of the War Cabinet.

1. General de Gaulle’s attitude towards Britain.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had witnessed with very great sorrow the deterioration in General de Gaulle’s attitude towards His Majesty’s Government. He now felt that he was no longer dealing with a friend. He had received a letter from General de Gaulle on the subject of a recent press interview. Clearly an important person whose utterances carried weight was often in danger of being taken advantage of by newspaper correspondents. But quite apart from this matter, the Prime Minister had received evidence from many sources that General de Gaulle had throughout his recent travels left a trail of Anglophobia behind him. This was a most serious matter in all the circumstances, and the Prime Minister had been greatly pained by the accumulation of evidence he had received.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that it could not be seriously maintained that he was an enemy of Great Britain. His position and previous record made it inconceivable. He would, however, say frankly that recent events, especially in Syria, had profoundly disturbed him and cast doubts in his mind as to the
attitude of many British authorities towards him and the Free French Movement. These events, added to the great difficulties of his personal position, to his isolation, and no doubt to the factor of his personal temperament, had led him to utterances which must clearly have been disagreeable to British ears. He wished to express his frank regret for these utterances.

2. Syria.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had been at great pains before General de Gaulle's arrival in Egypt to make it clear to all concerned that the General was the man he trusted and the man with whom he proposed to work. Everything had been done to smooth the path before General de Gaulle.

No doubt there had been faults on the British side in handling relations, and he could well believe that General de Gaulle had suffered some annoyances. To some extent hitches of this nature were unavoidable, but General de Gaulle knew that he could appeal to the Prime Minister at any moment, and that efforts would at once be made to smooth out any difficulty. Instead General de Gaulle had become increasingly antagonistic, and had made no communication to the Prime Minister.

GENERAL DE GAULLE reminded the Prime Minister of his message of the 28th June, in which he had stated that any breach over Syria would have the most serious consequences on the Free French Movement. On his arrival in Syria he soon realised that many of the British authorities had no conception of the status of the Free French Movement. He found himself surrounded with political and military authorities who to all appearances had it as their aim to diminish the rôle of the Free French in Syria. His representatives had endured countless humiliations, and the agreements he had entered into with the Minister of State, apparently to their mutual satisfaction, had remained a dead letter for a whole fortnight.

In normal circumstances difficulties of this sort between two countries would be smoothed out in a moment by their Ambassadors. At a time when France was broken and humiliated, his own efforts to vindicate her must fail if he met with such treatment.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained Britain's attitude in regard to Syria. Britain had no ambitions of any sort in that country, and no desire whatever to supplant France. Her one object was the defeat of Hitler, there and everywhere, and nothing must stand in the way of that purpose. Syria was an important unit in the Arab world, as well as one of the military factors in the defence of Egypt. We could not allow a repetition of events in Syria, the repercussions of which in adjacent territories endangered our military position. It followed that we had to be in control in Syria for all purposes connected with the winning of the war. That, he repeated, was the sole purpose that had brought us there.

Clearly the securing of our position in the Arab world involved a transfer of many of the functions previously exercised by France in Syria to the Syrians.
themselves. The position of France in respect of Syria after the war would be different from that which had obtained before the war, not because Britain would have acquired some of the powers previously exercised by France, but because France would have voluntarily transferred a large part of those powers to the Syrians. That was essential. The Arabs saw no sense in driving out the Vichy French only to be placed under the control of the Free French. They desired their independence, and had been promised it.

Once again Britain sought no selfish advantage, pursued no Imperial ambitions, in Syria. She recognised that France had been pre-eminent in Syria in the past and that she would still remain pre-eminent there, as compared with other European countries, after the war, though many of her former powers would have been surrendered. The only British object—and this applied as much to Jibuti as to Syria—was to prosecute the war; but for that purpose we could not tolerate any development which rendered our task more difficult, and which might invoke loss of time, effort and even lives.

GENERAL DE GAULLE denied that he entertained any suspicions of selfish British motives in Syria. Although British and French policies towards the Arab world were not the same, in Syria or elsewhere, there could be no disagreement on the principles laid down by the Prime Minister, and it was he himself who had promised the Syrians their independence.

Similarly he had always recognised the fact that the ultimate military control must rest in British hands. This principle, laid down in the agreements of the 7th August, 1940, had been confirmed in his recent negotiations with the Minister of State and had been scrupulously respected—though the British Authorities in Syria had not met this Free French willingness to accept the general authority of their High Command in any helpful or accommodating spirit.

The question was not one of principle—on which there was no disagreement—but one of method, regarding which he maintained that the Free French in Syria had been subjected to constant and unnecessary humiliations.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would be ashamed to use the British power, which in Syria was overwhelming, for any purpose not essential to the defeat of Hitler. For any such purpose, however, as to assure the necessary degree of security, he would not hesitate to use the full power at our disposal against any one, in the knowledge that he would thus be serving the common cause.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that it was natural and good that British forces—whose overwhelming preponderance over the Free French in Syria he did not contest—should be used in all cases where their use would contribute to the defeat of the common foe.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that matters now seemed to be going more smoothly in Syria and that the relations between General Catroux and the British Military Authorities were now satisfactory.
He wished to reiterate the point, however, that the British Command could not allow itself to be exposed to dangers which might have been warded off, such as local risings, which might spread to adjacent territories. Further, the political situation in Syria must be so handled as to give the Arab world a real measure of satisfaction. He went on to outline the possible course of events in the Middle East in the future, and gave General de Gaulle an estimate of the huge forces we were building up in that area. The British Government were determined to maintain a position which would permit them to hurl the totality of their forces against the enemy when the time came, without having to divert a portion of those forces for the purpose of maintaining the security of the territories upon which we were based. Nothing could be allowed to interfere with the prosecution of the war, and that principle was the touchstone of British policy as far as Syria was concerned.

GENERAL de GAULLE said that he fully appreciated what the Prime Minister had said. The Free French would abide by their promises to the Arabs and would play their part in future campaigns, placing their full resources resolutely at the side of the British armies.

THE PRIME MINISTER assured General de Gaulle that he was not unmindful of the importance to the common cause of so treating the Free French Movement in Syria as to make the French nation realise that General de Gaulle was the guardian of its interests in Syria, and that those interests were pre-eminent as compared with those of other European countries. To strengthen General de Gaulle’s position in France, he would particularly bear in mind the General’s position as defender of the historic connection between France and Syria.

GENERAL de GAULLE said that he had much evidence to show that the necessity for the Syrian campaign had been understood in France, and that it had led to no stirring of anti-British or anti-Free French feeling.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had been anxious that developments in Syria should not damage General de Gaulle’s standing in French eyes. It was no part of British policy to belittle the Free French contribution to the Syrian campaign.

GENERAL de GAULLE said that he hoped the Prime Minister had received, together with less welcome reports, echoes of the very deep and sincere admiration for the British Imperial forces which he had repeatedly expressed in the past few weeks.


THE PRIME MINISTER then turned to the question of Jibuti. He put the hypothetical case that the Governor might be willing to surrender to the British but not to the Free French, or that he might make it a condition of surrender that the territory would not subsequently be handed over to the Free
French. The territory was at present being severely blockaded, but passive resistance might not break down for several months. If such a condition were to be put, would General de Gaulle wish to proceed with this somewhat inconvenient conflict, or would he be prepared to accept the terms and to secure the military use of this important territory for the Allies for the rest of the war?

GENERAL de GAULLE said that he attached little importance to the form of the surrender. It might well be that, for reasons of prestige, the Vichy Government might impose conditions such as those the Prime Minister had outlined. Those conditions need not, in his judgment, be taken too seriously, and it would be of some importance to avoid giving the enemy an excuse for alleging, as he had done in the case of Syria, that once again British greed had prevailed over the Free French cause. Subject to that proviso, he attached little importance to the actual terms. He asked, however, that the details of the administration of the territory after the surrender should be settled in advance by agreement between the British and Free French Authorities.

In practice the terms of surrender would no doubt leave His Majesty’s Government free to make what arrangements they saw fit for the subsequent administration of the territory.


THE PRIME MINISTER then turned to the question of the leadership of the Free French Movement. He had come to the conclusion that it would be in the Free French interest if a formal Council were created, which would have an effective voice in shaping the policy of the Movement of which General de Gaulle was the head as the recognised leader of all Free Frenchmen.

GENERAL de GAULLE agreed that there would be some advantage in his having about him some body analogous to a government. He had given the matter a good deal of thought, but there were some difficulties. A Council such as the Prime Minister had suggested would only be of value if it consisted of really representative persons. Such representatives would be difficult to find, in view of the profound revolution now in progress in France. Moreover, if the Free French Movement had awakened an echo in the people of France, the reason was largely that it was a movement marked by a very high degree of unanimity. That unanimity had been achieved by avoiding all contact with politics and basing the whole Movement upon the continuance of the struggle against the common foe. The creation of a representative Council would inevitably bring political factors into play, and the unanimity of the Movement might thereby be endangered. He would, however, give the whole question very careful thought. He was already examining the possibility of summoning a Free French Congress of representatives of all the territories which had rallied to the Movement, early next year. Some form of Conseil de Gouvernement might, perhaps, emerge from that Congress, which would provide the Movement with a democratic basis.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had a double object in view: to encourage General de Gaulle's supporters in France, and therefore to do nothing which would diminish General de Gaulle's stature as the champion of continued resistance to the enemy; and at the same time to improve relations between His Majesty's Government and the Free French Movement by giving the latter a broader basis. He believed that the latter purpose would be served by the creation of a Council, with whom His Majesty's Government would then deal. He was glad to hear that General de Gaulle proposed to give this matter his earnest attention.

In conclusion, the PRIME MINISTER asked General de Gaulle to realise how important it was to give no ground to the suspicion that he (the General) entertained hostile thoughts towards Great Britain, or even thoughts that might subsequently take on a hostile character. He wished to press this advice upon the General, because already some British figures entertained a suspicion that General de Gaulle had become hostile and had moved towards certain Fascist views which would not be helpful to collaboration in the common cause.

GENERAL de GAULLE said that he would give the utmost weight to the Prime Minister's advice. He did not think that the accusation of authoritarian views could be maintained in the light of his most recent statements and of certain further statements he proposed to make. He begged the Prime Minister to understand that the leaders and members of the Free French Movement were necessarily somewhat difficult people; else they would not be where they were. If this difficult character sometimes coloured their attitude towards their great ally, in so far as daily actions and utterances were concerned, he could rest assured that their entire loyalty to Great Britain remained unimpaired.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would be glad to see General de Gaulle again at some future time if the latter wished. If the Minister of State came home, a meeting à trois might be convenient.

*September 16, 1941.*
War Cabinet.

Report on the Action of the 2nd Armoured Division.

Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

(Reference: W.P. (41) 159 and 201.)

In the Report on the action of the 2nd Armoured Division during the withdrawal from Cyrenaica, March–April 1941 (W.P. (41) 159), certain statements appear in Appendix B to the effect that among the many factors which led to the disaster were false air reports and lack of tactical reconnaissances. A subsequent report was received in which these statements were investigated, and found to be unjustified. This report was circulated to the War Cabinet as W.P. (41) 201.

A telegram (T.N.G/85224 of 25/7) in the following terms was received by the War Office from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East:

"Report on withdrawal from Cyrenaica.

Regret A.O.C. not consulted. False deductions may have been made from air reports, but please withdraw suggestion that false air reports were rendered by R.A.F. and that there was lack of tactical reconnaissances in latter stages (see Appendix B of Report)."

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff consider that this telegram should be placed on record, and it is accordingly circulated to the War Cabinet for information.

(Signed) E. E. Bridges,

Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W. 1,
September 21, 1941.
WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ
(No. 107)
of the
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION
from 0700 September 11th, to
0700 September 18th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. British and Russian Naval Forces have successfully attacked enemy shipping in Northern Waters. Our shipping losses have been light.

Home Waters.

2. On the 11th H.M. Destroyer *Vimiera* shot down an enemy aircraft which was attacking an East coast convoy off Yarmouth.

During the night of the 11th/12th a force of our motor torpedo-boats and motor gunboats attacked enemy armed trawlers off Cape Gris Nez with light guns, but the results were not observed.

It is estimated that 11,500 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk and 18,000 tons damaged by our aircraft.

North Atlantic.

3. United States Naval Forces are now assisting to escort convoys in the Western Atlantic and are providing anti-submarine and raider patrols in this area.

Northern Waters.

4. The military force which landed at Svalbard (Spitsbergen) on the 25th August carried out the demolition of the coal mines and coal stocks on the island. In the course of the operations 2,200 Russian miners were repatriated to Archangel, and the Norwegian residents on the island were brought back to this country. The military forces were transported in the *Empress of Canada* with a suitable escort, and no opposition was encountered throughout the operations.

On the 12th September Naval aircraft from H.M.S. *Victorious* carried out an attack in Bodo Fjord (Norway). One ship of 2,000 tons was sunk and others were attacked with indefinite results. The power station in Glom Fjord was possibly hit and fires were started in the aluminium works.

Russian submarines torpedoed a transport and a destroyer off Petsamo during the night of the 11th/12th, and on the 14th sank an escorted 3,000-ton transport between Kirkenes and Petsamo. On the night of the 14th/15th two transports were torpedoed and sunk off Petsamo by Russian motor torpedo-boats.

Mediterranean.

5. On the 13th a reinforcement of 45 aircraft for Malta was flown off from H.M. Aircraft Carriers *Furious* and *Ark Royal*, escorted by units of the Gibraltar force. One Hurricane crashed on taking off from *Furious*, the pilot being killed, and two were damaged on landing.

The Netherlands submarine *O 21* sank the Italian s.s. *Isarco* (5,915 tons) with a cargo of phosphates south-west of Naples, rescuing the master and 21 of her crew. While returning from patrol in the Gulf of Genoa the Netherlands submarine *O 21* sank a barque of 1,200 tons and torpedoed and probably sank a merchant vessel of 6,000 tons. Both were southbound and fully laden.

It is estimated that 24,000 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk and at least 29,000 tons severely damaged by our aircraft.

During the week ten French ships (22,000 tons) westbound and four (7,000 tons) eastbound, have passed through the Strait of Gibraltar under escort.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

6. During the week there have been twenty-one attacks on U-Boats, the majority of which have taken place in the area between Iceland (C) and Greenland. Of the U-Boats which attacked the convoy off Greenland, one was sunk by H.M. Canadian Corvettes *Chambly* and *Moosejaw*, thirty prisoners being captured, and three other promising attacks were made in this area. Thirteen attacks were carried out by aircraft, one of which, off Cape Clear, is considered promising; but although hits and near misses were reported in six of the other attacks, in no instance was there any definite evidence of destruction.
Enemy Intelligence.

7. The pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and the battleship Tirpitz are unlocated. There is no change in the position of other main German or Italian units.

U-Boats.

8. About thirty German U-Boats have been operating during the week. There have been two main groups, one in the area Iceland (C) to south Greenland and the other to the northward of Rockall. Of the remainder four have been operating in the area of St. Paul’s Rocks (N.E. of Brazil), and others off the Canary and Cape Verde Islands. There has been no definite information of the position of Italian U-Boats.

Enemy Attack on Trade.

9. In the attack on the convoy reported in last week’s Résumé, according to the information at present available, seventeen ships (65,387 tons) were torpedoed in the homeward bound convoy attacked by U-Boats off Greenland on the 10th and 11th of September. Of these, seven (20,521 tons) are known to be sunk and two (8,723 tons) have reached port, but the fate of the remainder is still uncertain. This convoy was again attacked on the night of the 16th/17th and one ship was torpedoed.

During the present week two outward bound ships were torpedoed to the west of Ireland. Casualties from bombing have occurred off the Faroes, to the west of St. Kilda and in the Western Approaches, and early in the week two ships in convoy were damaged off Yarmouth. Two ships have been mined to the northward of Cromer. On one night in the week E-boats attacked a convoy off Sheringham and torpedoed two ships, both of which reached port in tow.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

10. During the week ending the 17th September 1,031 ships, including 198 Allied and 21 neutral, were convoyed. Seven armed merchant cruisers, four anti-aircraft ships, fifty-nine destroyers and one hundred sloops, corvettes and minesweepers were employed on escort duties.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the 13th September totalled 1,542,157 tons, compared with 708,151 tons during the previous seven days and an average of 946,514 for the past ten weeks. There were also two shiploads of about 10,000 tons of special Government cargo.

Oil imports totalled 512,590 tons; mineral imports were 328,354 tons, of which 198,504 tons were steel, scrap-iron, pig-iron and iron-ore. Timber and wood pulp imports were 85,740 tons; copra and palm oil, 43,524 tons; and cereals, 208,601 tons; 26 ships being fully laden with grain. 7,339 tons were rice. Other food imports were exceptionally large, the total being 247,755 tons. The principal commodities, in tons, were: sugar and molasses, 56,663; lard and fats, 15,389; dried and fresh fruits, 13,926; cocoa, 7,662; tea, 7,289; evaporated milk, 7,086; cheese, 5,185; jam and honey, 4,781; eggs, 4,339; butter, 3,565.

British Minelaying.

11. During the week mines have been laid off North Rona and the French channel coast. Minelaying by aircraft has been carried out in the Western Baltic and German North Sea ports.

Enemy Minelaying, British Minesweeping.

Home Waters.

12. Minelaying by enemy aircraft has again been on a small scale. On the five nights on which it took place different sections of the Thames Estuary were visited, and on two nights in the week a few aircraft also visited the Bristol Channel area, including Milford Haven.

A mine, which was laid not later than the 8th April, blew up the tug Flying Kite in the River Clyde on the 15th September, and damaged another tug which had to be beached.
During the week thirteen magnetic and eleven acoustic mines have been destroyed, six of them in the Humber area. The mine totals to date are: Magnetic, 1,407; Acoustic, 992; Contact, 1,042.

Foreign Waters.

13. The Suez Canal area was raided on two nights during the week, but the Canal was only temporarily closed.
Six mines were dropped at Tobruk during a raid early on the 10th September.

Enemy Merchant Shipping.

14. When Oslo was attacked by the R.A.F. on the 6th September, a Norwegian tanker of some 3,500 tons is reported to have been hit and half-submerged; two German transports are also reported to have been hit, one of them being sunk and the other set on fire.

It is reported from Oslo that on the 12th September the Norwegian _Lofoten_ (1,571 tons) was attacked and sunk off North Norway by H.M. Ships and aircraft. A Finnish broadcast has announced the sinking by enemy action of the Finnish _Tauri_ (2,517 tons).

A badly-damaged transport anchored off Helsingborg on the 15th September.

It is reported from Sofia that the Bulgarian _Chipka_ (2,300 tons) sailed from Varna on the 15th September and was then mined and sunk.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**

[An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Resume as an inset.]

Russo-German Campaign.

15. In addition to a slight German advance over the River Litsa, on the Murmansk front, and progress by German forces south of Lake Ilmen, serious developments have occurred in the Ukraine, where a drive southwards from the Glukhov area was synchronised with a northward advance from Kremenchug. The two forces are approaching each other, and thus threatening to cut off all Soviet forces approximately within the triangle Nyezhin-Kiev and the confluence of the rivers Sula and Dnieper. In the south a considerable German advance has been made from the Berislav bridgehead as far as the northern end of the Perekop Isthmus.

Finland.

16. A German force of mountain infantry and some motorised troops attacked on the River Litsa on the 9th September. An advance of some three miles was made, but stiff Russian resistance prevented further progress. Fighting still continues, but a report of the 14th September stated that the Germans had sustained considerable losses and that the operation had not been successful.

17. No information has been received regarding the Salla front, and there is no indication of a Finnish-German advance beyond the line of the River Svir, to the east of Lake Ladoga, though a Stockholm report of the 16th September asserts that the Finns have broken Russian resistance in the province of Olonets.

18. On the Karelian Isthmus no appreciable advance has been made beyond the 1939 Finnish frontier towards Leningrad.

Leningrad Sector.

19. Very little progress has been made by the German forces investing Leningrad from the south and east. The line is believed to run approximately from Schussenburg, through Krasnogvardeisk, which is in German hands, to a point on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland some 45 miles west of Leningrad. It is possible that the Germans have crossed the River Neva near Schussenburg, thus threatening the only remaining communication with Leningrad by way of Lake Ladoga.
Estonia.

20. The Germans were reported by a neutral source on the 16th September to have captured the island of Worms, but Oesel and Dago remain in Russian hands.

Lake Ilmen Sector.

21. The German communiqué of the 16th September claims that strong Soviet forces in the area south of Lake Ilmen have been decisively defeated. It is claimed that more than 53,000 prisoners, 320 tanks and 625 guns of all calibres were captured.

Central Front.

22. There is no further news of Russian operations in the Yelna area. The front remains quiet and there are no indications of any Russian counter-attacks against the German flank in the region of Glukhov.

Ukraine.

23. The operations aimed at the encirclement of Kiev and the subsequent destruction of the Russian forces within that sector had already begun when the bridgehead at Kremenchug was secured over a week ago. At the same time, whilst German infantry kept the Russian forces heavily engaged all along the line of the River Desna, north-east of Kiev, as far as Chernigov, the armoured thrust from Glukhov was being prepared, and actually began about the 11th September. At the same time, strong armoured and motorised forces began advancing northwards from the bridgehead at Kremenchug, and it is probable that the two forces have by now met.

24. At the Dniepropetrovsk bridgehead the Germans appear to be merely holding their position pending the further development of operations in the Glukhov-Kremenchug area and south-east of Berislav. Considerable Russian forces are believed to be in the Dniepropetrovsk area and to be harassing the Germans without, however, affecting the position as a whole.

25. The bridgehead at Berislav has been considerably enlarged and German infantry have reached the vicinity of Perekop. A further advance eastwards towards the only railway connecting the peninsula with the mainland appears also to have been made and, if developed, would cut all land communication with the Crimea.

Operations.

Libya and Egypt.

26. In the Tobruk area active patrolling and exchanges of artillery fire have continued. On the night of 13th/14th September, a series of successful raids were carried out by Australian units on the enemy positions opposite the Eastern Sector of the perimeter. In retaliation the enemy, employing 9 tanks and about 100 infantry, attacked one of our observation posts outside the perimeter and captured the garrison of six men.

On 14th September enemy tanks attacked one of our strong points but were driven off by artillery fire. Throughout the week enemy aircraft have carried out repeated attacks on Tobruk but damage has been slight.

27. In the Frontier area the enemy carried out a reconnaissance in force on 14th September. About 100 tanks crossed the frontier and advanced some 40 miles into Egyptian territory, causing our light covering troops to fall back. This force later withdrew, pursued by our light forces and harassed by the R.A.F. By the evening of 15th September, our troops were in their former positions of observation.

Five enemy tanks are known to have been destroyed, and a number of prisoners were taken. Two of our field guns were lost.
28. It is believed the German force in Libya now consists of two normal armoured divisions (one perhaps not yet at full strength) and attached G.H.Q. units. This force, together with the Italian troops, would be sufficient for an attack on Tobruk but a general offensive is unlikely until further reinforcements arrive and greater reserves of supplies have been accumulated.

29. The frontier area has been quieter during the last week, and there have been no reports of activities by Kurdish tribesmen or rebel Persian soldiers. Part of our armoured forces have moved to Qum, as a result of the decision for a joint advance on Tehran by the Russians and ourselves.

30. The Shah abdicated on the 16th September.

31. Further reinforcements have arrived from India during the past week.

32. Air reconnaissance of the Franco-Spanish frontier reveals a certain accumulation of M.T. and of fuel dumps and the improvement of north–south communications, but activity appears to be slight. This information points to long-term preparations, and a German move into Spain is not considered imminent.

33. The German forces in the Balkan area (including Hungary and Slovakia) are believed to be still 12 divisions. There is no indication of an immediate threat to Turkey, but efforts are doubtless being made to intimidate her in connection with the trade negotiations.

34. Work on the Bulair defences is still going on, and great activity continues in the area of the Catalca lines. Many anti-tank ditches have been and are being dug here, and over a dozen large blockhouses, under construction or completed, were recently seen from the Uzunkopru–Istanbul road.

35. Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German hostilities, the Japanese have been making extensive military preparations in Manchukuo, Korea, Sakhalin and in Japan itself for a possible future attack on the Far Eastern Red Armies.

36. In general these preparations have consisted of raising twelve new divisions, and moving considerable forces from North China and Japan to Manchukuo. As a result the Japanese forces in the north, including those in Japan proper, probably now outnumber the Russians East of Lake Baikal, whose strength has been depleted by troop movements to the western front. The Japanese are, however, weaker in A.F.Vs. and probably in aircraft.

37. Should the Japanese decide to attack, likely objectives would be Vladivostock, North Sakhalin and possibly Kamchatka. Successful operations against these places would settle in Japan’s favour her more serious difficulties with the U.S.S.R., namely, the threat of air bombing from Vladivostock, and the questions of fishing rights off the Kamchatka coast and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. The season of the year is unlikely greatly to affect the timing of operations for, although September is undoubtedly the most suitable month for fighting, the Japanese troops are for the most part now well acclimatised to Manchurian winters, and are suitably equipped to withstand the cold. It is interesting to remember in this connection that in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 the Battle of Mukden was fought under the most severe winter conditions.
AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

38. Better weather on the Continent resulted in an increased offensive against targets in Germany and enemy-occupied territory. Our aircraft again carried out many attacks on hostile shipping.

In the Central Mediterranean a heavy toll was taken of enemy merchant shipping.

Enemy activity over this country continued at a low level.

Our fighters have had successes in their initial operations in North Russia.

Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

39. Bomber Command despatched 113 sorties, compared with 57 last week, and dropped 21 tons of H.E. bombs and a few incendiaries. Offensive operations by Fighter Command involved 918 aircraft sorties. Anti-shipping activity is recorded under "Coastal Operations" and operations against U-Boats in "Naval Situation."

40. The synthetic oil plant and power station at Mazingarbe were the objectives for the only major attack carried out against land targets. Two squadrons of Blenheims were despatched with fighter escort; 17 aircraft attacked the oil plant, where a large building was hit and an oil cistern apparently exploded, whilst several fires were started in the target area.

41. A number of operations were carried out by fighters. These were on a comparatively small scale except on one day when, in a series of offensive sweeps and bomber-escorts, 515 sorties were flown, during which 12 enemy fighters were destroyed, nine probably destroyed and nine damaged; our losses were 18 Spitfires but four of the pilots were rescued.

Night.

42. Bomber Command despatched 835 sorties, compared with 600 in the previous week. An improvement in weather conditions enabled attacks to be carried out on six nights. The principal objectives were shipyards, railway centres, and the enemy naval units at Brest.

43. On the night of the 13th/14th, a total of 120 bombers attacked the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen at Brest. Over 170 tons of H.E. bombs and about 850 incendiaries were dropped, but accurate observation was impossible owing to searchlight dazzle and an effective smoke-screen which completely covered the targets; the docks are believed to have been hit.

44. Intense searchlight dazzle was also encountered on the 15th/16th in an attack by 110 aircraft on Hamburg, where fires were started near the main railway station and the Blohm and Voss shipyards. A similar number of aircraft bombed rail and industrial centres at Frankfurt on the 12th/13th. During the week between 30 and 50 aircraft reached their objectives at Kiel, Rostock, Havre and (on two nights) Karlsruhe; attacks on a lighter scale were made against Cherbourg and Boulogne.

45. Apart from numbers of fires, some of them large, in all these target areas, the resultant damage was generally unobserved, as detailed observation was handicapped by clouds, extreme darkness and searchlight glare. It may be noted, however, that, among the total of 869 tons of H.E. bombs released during the week, were twelve of 4,000 lbs., and that the total of 40,500 incendiaries included over 1,100 fifty-pounders.

46. Night fighters operating against aerodromes in northern France and in Holland destroyed one enemy aircraft and damaged two more.

47. At night, enemy fighters over Holland, Belgium and north-west Germany operated on a rather reduced scale. On the night of our attack on Brest, very small fighter opposition was encountered.

United Kingdom.

48. Fighter Command flew, in all their operations, a total of 2,660 sorties by day and 540 sorties by night; the latter totals include dusk and dawn operations.
49. Enemy operations against this country have been on a small scale. Bombs were dropped by day in Aberdeenshire and Tyneside. At night no concentrated attack developed, bombs being dropped by long-range bombers which made brief landfall in widely scattered coastal areas. Our day fighters shot down one Ju. 88, while night fighters destroyed three enemy bombers and probably destroyed another.

Coastal Operations.

50. Coastal Command flew 237 patrols (378 sorties) and provided 45 convoy-escorts (150 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 609 (1,282 sorties).

51. Operations against enemy coastal shipping formed the major part of daylight operations by Bomber Command, and several attacks on merchant vessels were also made by aircraft of Coastal and Fighter Commands.

52. Bomber Command aircraft attacked a convoy of seven merchant vessels, four flak ships and a destroyer off the Frisian Islands, and three of the former were claimed as sunk. Another convoy of six ships off the Dutch coast was bombed by aircraft of the same Command; one cargo ship was reported a total loss and, later, a reporting vessel was sunk. The five ships destroyed totalled about 11,000 tons.

53. In addition, six merchant vessels of a total tonnage of 18,000, are believed to have been damaged by bombs; others were hit by machine-gun and cannon fire during attacks by aircraft of Fighter Command.

54. Fifty-one aircraft were despatched to lay sea mines off the Frisian Islands, Heligoland, and in the western Baltic.

55. Long-range bomber aircraft of the German Air Force again concentrated on anti-shipping activities in the North Sea, particularly off the East Anglian, Yorkshire and Scottish coasts. Coastal type aircraft operated regularly in the South-Western Approaches. Attacks on shipping were made on the 11th, off Harwich, on the 12th, off Yarmouth, on the 13th, off Stonehaven, on the 14th, off Harwich, Scarborough, north-west Ireland and the Faroes, and on the 15th, south of Ireland and off Scarborough. On the 11th a convoy was attacked five times. In all these attacks only one ship is known to have been sunk. Enemy minelaying was continued, particularly in the Thames Estuary.

56. Enemy defensive fighter patrols by day over coastal areas from Brest to the Frisians were small. Fighter strength is being rigidly conserved.

Central Mediterranean.

57. On the 11th September, naval Swordfish, operating under A.O.C., Malta, sighted a southbound convoy, consisting of seven merchant vessels and six destroyers, 75 miles north of Kerkennah Island. Thereafter a series of night and day attacks were successfully carried out by Swordfish, Blenheims and Wellingtons with the result that three merchant vessels of a total tonnage of 24,000 were probably destroyed and all the other merchant vessels, of a total tonnage of approximately 26,000, were hit on one or more occasions. Three Blenheims were shot down in daylight, but the crew of one was rescued by H.M. Submarine Utmost.

58. Three Blenheims, during an offensive sweep of the central Ionian Sea, attacked a small convoy 100 miles south-west of Cape Matapan; a merchant vessel of 3,000 tons was hit at least twice and was seriously damaged.

59. On three nights a total of 24 Wellingtons from Malta bombed Tripoli (L). On one night six aircraft reported hits on ships lying alongside the Spanish Quay, and many other bursts were seen on or near ships in the harbour. Swordfish and Wellingtons also laid mines in and outside the harbour and around the North Mole.

60. On the night of the 11th/12th September Wellingtons dropped 16 tons of bombs on Palermo, and straddled the dry dock containing a merchant vessel. On the 17th, five Blenheims bombed two munition factories at Ligata (75 miles west of Syracuse) with very good effect; many direct hits were made on each target, and three large sheds and one big building in the centre of the installation were demolished.
Egypt and Libya.

61. Attacks on Benghazi harbour were maintained by a total of 38 Wellingtons on six nights during the week; no spectacular results were reported, but bursts were observed in the harbour area and near ships, and several fires were started, including an oil tanker at the Juliana Mole, which was seen to be burning furiously the following night.

62. A total of eight Wellingtons and eight naval Albacores carried out night attacks on the landing grounds at Martuba and Gambut; three enemy aircraft are known to have been destroyed but many others are believed to have suffered a similar fate. A day attack on Gambut was made by six Tomahawks escorted by twelve Hurricanes; eight enemy aircraft were damaged on the ground, while two Tomahawks were lost.

63. On the 14th September, Marylands escorted by fighters made 23 bombing sorties against about 500 vehicles near Alam Dignaish (27 miles N.E. of Maddalena); several direct hits were made and seven fires started. During an engagement with enemy fighters, one Me. 109 and one G. 50 were destroyed and another Me. 109 was probably destroyed, while one Maryland and three Hurricanes were shot down, but the fighter pilots are safe. On the same day 11 Italian Ju. 87s were reported to have landed or crashed in our forward area and some have been captured intact; full details are not yet available. On another day nine Marylands attacked stores dumps at Bardia and started four large fires.

64. Our reconnaissance aircraft were active over a wide area, and fighters have maintained patrols covering our forward landing grounds and over Tobruk and shipping.

65. Enemy raids on Tobruk were frequent, and on some nights they were almost continuous. Damage was done to stores, but on the whole the military damage caused was slight. German aircraft operating from Greece have made increasing use of Crete as an advanced landing ground for units operating against Tobruk and Mersa Matruh.

66. Two night raids were made in the Suez area by 13 and 18 enemy aircraft respectively; an oil refinery was hit and a warehouse was burnt out in the customs area. On the night of the 14th/15th September some military damage was caused at Abbassia, near Cairo, in addition to which there were many civilian casualties. A few service and civilian casualties were also sustained in the Alexandria area.

67. The bombing of Cairo and relatively frequent nightly alerts have induced considerable nervousness in the Egyptian public and an agitation has been started with the support of the Wafd for the declaration of Cairo as an “open city.” The British authorities have urged the Prime Minister to stop further agitation and are endeavouring to divert the attention of the public to A.R.P.

68. The Germans are evidently making no attempt to carry out intensive operations with their Mediterranean force, as they probably anticipate the necessity to carry out both intense and sustained operations when large-scale land operations in the Western Desert are resumed.

Crete.

69. On the night of the 12th/13th, ten Wellingtons from Egypt dropped 19 tons of bombs on the aerodromes at Heraklion and Maleme, causing fires and explosions. Many bombs fell on the main runway at Heraklion, and it is believed that ammunition dumps were set on fire.

Russia.

British Air Operations.

70. On the 12th September, Hurricanes flew 13 sorties on aerodrome defence and 6 sorties as escort to Soviet Bombers. A patrol of four Hurricanes contacted 4 Me. 109s and one Henschel, and destroyed two Me. 109s, probably destroyed a
third and damaged the Henschel. Another patrol of four Hurricanes intercepted 
three bombers escorted by four Me. 109s; the enemy evaded our fighters and the 
bombers jettisoned their bombs.

Russian Air Operations.

71. There is no information this week of Russian air operations in the 
important sectors of the front. The Russians are reported to have done no bombing of central, west or north 
Finland, but they have frequently bombed the town of Porvoo (Borgo), which lies 
about 30 miles east of Helsinki, on the coast. The reason for this is not clear, 
since it is not known that any target of military importance exists there. Up to 
the 3rd September Helsinki had had 97 alarms, although only four were followed 
by bombing.

German Air Operations.

72. German Air Force activity on the Russian front has been on a most 
intensive scale throughout the week. Except at the extreme north and south the 
principal effort has been concentrated in three comparatively small areas, namely, 
(a) the Leningrad area, (b) the area south-east of Gomel and (c) the neighbourhood 
of the Dnieper bridgeheads west of Dniepropetrovsk. In these areas continuous 
attacks have been made on Russian troop concentrations and communications both 
by long-range bomber and dive-bomber aircraft.

73. In the extreme north German Air Force activity appears to have 
increased. Fairly strong concentrations of bomber and fighter units have been 
identified in the extreme north of Norway for some time and may have been main­
tained there in anticipation of British activity in this area. Now that the 
Spitzbergen operations have been concluded a considerable part of these units 
may now be used for operations on the Murmansk Front and in Central Finland, 
as well as against shipping on the supply routes to Murmansk and the White Sea.

74. In the Black Sea area heavy bombing attacks have been made against 
Odessa and anti-shipping and mining operations have continued, but in other 
respects the air activity has been on a somewhat smaller scale.

75. The intensity of the operations in the three main areas is undoubtedly 
putting a great strain on the German Air Force units there and the difficulties of 
supply and maintenance are enormous. The scale of effort has been maintained, 
or even increased, by making the utmost use of every available aircraft, but it is 
unlikely that a sufficiently high degree of serviceability can be continuously main­
tained and some slackening in the offensive may soon become apparent.

Finnish Air Force.

76. There has apparently been a considerable increase in the intensity of 
the operations of the Finnish Air Force compared with the operations against 
Russia in 1939-40. Pilots are reported to have done five times as much operational 
fighting and a fighter squadron of 15 Fokker D. 21 is reported to have done 
225 hours' operational flying in a week. The weather is, of course, better now 
than it was at the end of 1939. The Finns claim that they have still over 
100 fighters operating, and that their Brewsters, of which they originally had 44, 
have already destroyed 90 Russian aircraft. There is apparently no shortage 
of aviation fuel or S.A.A.

The Finns claim to have destroyed a total of 335 Russian aircraft, 262 
between the 22nd June and the 13th August. This number is said to include 
between 20 and 30 Russian I. 18 fighters. Finnish claims during last year's 
campaign were fairly accurate.

Far East.


77. There has been a lull in the series of heavy raids on Chungking which 
reached a climax between the 8th and 14th August, when the Japanese heavy 
bomber forces appear to have made their maximum effort. If the intention was 
to shake the morale of the city's population in general, or the Government in 
particular, the effort does not appear to have been any more successful than 
similar previous attempts in 1940.
Air Intelligence.

Withdrawal of Japanese Air Units from Central China.

78. Reports from China indicate that a large number of aircraft have recently been withdrawn from the Hankow area. Although weather conditions in the Yangtze Valley at this period of the year are unsuitable for effective large-scale bombing, the number of aircraft mentioned suggests other reasons for their withdrawal. As Japanese interest appears for the present to be centred in the north, they may be intended to reinforce the Japanese air strength in Manchuria, possibly after reorganisation and re-equipment in Japan.

Russia's New Fighters.

79. The older types of Russian single-seater fighters now in use have been generally condemned as bad copies of Curtiss and Boeing designs. This is by no means the truth. Even less warranted are the criticisms of the new fighter monoplanes which, aerodynamically and structurally, do their designers much credit.

A Russian test pilot lately had an opportunity of flying a Spitfire VA at an English aerodrome, and was asked for a comparison with the MIG-3, the fastest of the new Russian fighters. His verdict was that the Spitfire is easier to take off, fly and land; that the manoeuvrability of both aircraft is very good and the rate of climb about the same. In his opinion, the MIG-3 is slightly faster, but in this connection it must be borne in mind that he did not take the Spitfire up to its optimum height for maximum speed.

French Air Force.

80. There is every indication that the French collapse in Syria has resulted in increased determination on the part of the French Government to strengthen the defences of the French African empire against eventual attack. Since the Syrian Armistice there has been a marked increase in the volume of shipment of war material from North to West Africa as well as in the numbers of Air Force personnel transferred to North Africa from France (during July these totalled rather more than twice those transferred in June and four times those transferred in May). Other evidence leaves little doubt that an increase in French first-line strength in Africa is also contemplated.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

81. Bombs have been dropped on land in daylight on only two days of the week, and they did no appreciable damage.

By Night.

82. There have been only a few isolated cases of bombing, and these have been confined to the eastern half of the country. The damage done has been insignificant and has been confined almost entirely to house property and gas and water mains, at Scarborough on the 14th-15th and at Dover on the 17th-18th September.

83. Railway lines between Blackhill and Knitsley, Durham; near Diss, Norfolk; and between Scarborough and Whitby were hit but were soon-repaired.

84. Bombs fell on three R.A.F. Stations, but no damage has been reported.

85. On the 16th-17th September twenty shells, nineteen of which fell into the sea, were fired across the Channel into the Dover area without doing any damage.

Casualties.

86. Casualties for the week ending 0600 on the 17th September are estimated at 3 killed and 4 seriously injured. There were no casualties in London.
APPENDICES I, II and III will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 15th September, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>307,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>594,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>728,000</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>589,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1,819,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, &amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1,480,000</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>847,000</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2,807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>567</td>
<td>2,490,000</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1,659,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>4,190,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 66 ships of 134,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 54 ships, totalling 352,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

- Officers: 9 killed; 1 missing; 2 wounded.
- Ratings: 34 killed; 6 missing; 7 wounded; 139 ratings have been reported prisoners of war.
### APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

**0600 hours, Thursday, 11th September, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 18th September, 1941.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 fighter pilots are known to be safe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force.</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italian.</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

Germany.

Berlin.—Photographs taken during the attack on the night the 7th/8th September confirmed the success of the attack. Intelligence sources have reported the raid as very successful and the damage as heavy. It is reported:

(a) At that part of the Potsdamer Station reserved at night for wagons for railway postal traffic 50 out of 65 wagons were destroyed in the station, the railway line was torn up and the roof completely destroyed. The tunnel leading from a station underneath the adjoining street to the Post Office sorting centre was hit and fell in. Out of 350 people in the station 180 were killed.

(b) The main buildings of the Potsdamer Station were also badly damaged, and traffic was at a complete standstill after the raid.

(c) The lines leading to the Anhalter Station were hit in eight places, and it is thought repairs will take at least a week.

(d) There were several hits on the railway lines near the Friedrichstrasse Station and the elevated railway was also hit in several places. It is thought that traffic on the elevated railway will be interrupted for some weeks as a result.

(e) Between the Anhalter and Potsdamer Stations 22 houses were completely destroyed.

(f) The hotel Eden (one of Berlin’s de luxe hotels facing the zoological gardens) was hit as well as several buildings in the neighbourhood.

Kassel.—Night photographs taken during the raid on the 8th/9th September confirm the success of this raid. Numerous fires are seen in the neighbourhood of the main railway station and to the south thereof.

Frankfurt.—Photographs taken on the 7th September disclose damage near the main gasworks, among some railway workshops outside the main station and also among workers’ dwellings near the aerodrome.

In the raid of the 7th/8th July a chemical factory at Griesheim was severely damaged. The power house was hit and the southern wing of the factory rendered useless. Considerable stocks of chemicals were destroyed.

General.—A Dutchman who recently travelled from Holland to Switzerland writes on the 21st August, 1941, “on the journey here we saw to our delight that the stations at Cologne and Dusseldorf had been badly damaged by direct hits, and that the stations at Karlsruhe and Frankfurt were damaged by bombs which had fallen very close. We slept in Karlsruhe in a hotel which had lost practically all its windows the night before. In the station yard were three great bomb craters filled up with sand, and in front of the station there wasn’t an unbroken window, and some had the window frames torn out as well. The station clock had no dial, and the overhead tram wires hung dejectedly down. Since the 10th May, 1940, I have not had such a pleasant moment.”

Norway.

Oslo.—In the raid on the 6th September three vessels were hit, one of which sank. The barracks at Lambertseter were hit, five Germans being killed, and damage was caused to the Drammen glass works.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY № 109 (17·9·41)

MAP I.

G.S.Q.R.S46A
WESTERN U.S.S.R.
SCALE: 1/4M OR 83 MILES TO 1 INCH

REFERENCE
International Boundary
Railways

AXIS OPERATIONS
AGAINST U.S.S.R.
showing approximate advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:
20th July
22nd Aug
8th Sept
15th Sept

Main thrusts of Axis Forces:

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 109 (17-9-41)  MAP I.

AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.-
showing approximate advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces:—

Note:—It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken
place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The
lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate
limits of advance of the foremost troops.
WAR CABINET.

CAUCASIAN OIL.

Report by Lord Hankey's Committee on Preventing Oil from reaching Enemy Powers.

At their meeting* on the 21st August, 1941, the War Cabinet considered inter alia a Report† by the Committee on Preventing Oil from Reaching Enemy Powers, in which certain proposals were made with the object of overcoming any last minute hesitation by the Russians to destroy the Caucasian oil industry if it appeared likely that this might otherwise fall intact into the hands of the enemy.

The proposals involved an assurance to the Soviet Government that if they carried out their intention to destroy the Caucasian oil industry and required as a result to import oil and equipment for war purposes, and for post-war reconstruction, His Majesty's Government would make available supplies within the sterling area during the war and, if necessary, for a period of two years thereafter on a basis of equality of treatment with Great Britain for essential requirements of equal importance. The War Cabinet agreed that before taking a decision an approach should be made to the United States Government inviting their co-operation on the subject. Mr. Berthoud was subsequently sent to the United States for the purpose of assisting His Majesty's Embassy in the negotiations with the State Department.

Mr. Berthoud has now returned with a copy of a draft Declaration on parallel lines to that proposed by us which, subject to the approval of the President, the State Department is prepared to transmit to the United States Ambassador in Moscow for use if and when the occasion arises. Before submitting the Declaration to the President, however, the State Department wish to be assured that it is acceptable to His Majesty's Government. The terms of the proposed United States Declaration is attached as Annex I, and the proposed Declaration by His Majesty's Government is reproduced as Annex II.

We regard the United States Declaration as very satisfactory and going fully as far as could be expected. The State Department, which has had cognizance of our proposed Declaration, proposes to inform the United States Ambassador in Moscow that he should closely co-operate with his British

* W.M. (41) 85th Conclusions, Minute 7.
† W.P. (41) 197.
colleague as to the time of presenting the Declaration to M. Stalin. The State Department desire that, if possible, the United States Ambassador in Moscow should consult them in advance as to the timeliness of using the Declaration, but they are prepared to agree that if the time factor precludes previous communication with the Department in Washington, or if other reasons should make an immediate communication to M. Stalin necessary, he may act without further instructions.

5. We recommend that the War Cabinet:
   (a) Approve the terms of the Draft Declaration by His Majesty’s Government in Annex II.
   (b) Authorise the despatch of a telegram to Washington signifying their concurrence with the proposed United States Declaration, on the lines of Annex III.
   (c) Authorise the despatch of a telegram to our Ambassador in Moscow on the lines of Annex IV.

Signed on behalf of the Committee:

HANKEY, Chairman.

Great George Street, S.W. 1,
September 19, 1941.
ANNEX I.

_Draft Declaration by United States Government._

In case there should be oil shortages in the Soviet Union as a result of the destruction by the Soviet Government of the oil extracting and processing industries in the Caucasus for the purpose of preventing the oil resources and refineries in that area from being exploited and utilized by the forces of the aggressor, the Government of the United States will take such steps as are legal and necessary in order to enable the Soviet Government to purchase and obtain the delivery of oil and oil products in or available to the United States for use in the present struggle against aggression or for use in carrying on the work of the reconstruction of the Soviet Union after the cessation of hostilities on a basis at least as favorable as that on which similar products will be sold and made available to other countries which have consistently made sacrifices in their efforts to overcome the forces of aggression.

The Government of the United States will adopt a similar attitude with respect to such efforts as the Soviet Government might need to make, both during and following the termination of hostilities, to obtain oil extracting and refining machinery in the United States to replace that which it has destroyed.

ANNEX II.

_Draft Declaration by His Majesty's Government._

(a) "If the Soviet Government carry out their intention to destroy the Caucasian oil industry and require..." as a result to import oil both for their war purposes and during the period of post-war reconstruction, His Majesty's Government will assist the Soviet Union by every means in their power to obtain such supplies. To this end His Majesty's Government undertake in respect of oil supplies available within the sterling area, to accord to the Soviet Union both prior to the cessation of hostilities and, if necessary, for a period of two years thereafter, equality of treatment with Great Britain for essential requirements of equal importance.

(b) Conditions of purchase and payment for the oil to be agreed between the two Governments.

(c) For post-war requirements of oil the Soviet Union to receive in regard to ocean tanker tonnage and freight rates equality of treatment with Great Britain for essential requirements of equal importance.

(d) Replacement of drilling and refining equipment necessitated by the destruction by the Soviet Union of the Caucasian oil industry will in so far as such equipment is available from within the sterling area, be dealt with by His Majesty's Government in accordance with the same principles as those laid down in this agreement for oil.

(e) The above undertakings are given on the basis that in such a case it is right for Governments which are allied during and after the war to assist one another as regards post-war reconstruction.

* [Alternative opening phrase for use by our Ambassador in Moscow, at his discretion, is: "If as a result of the destruction by Soviet Government of the Caucasian oil industry they require..."
] (See Annex IV, paragraph 5 of draft telegram to Sir Stafford Cripps.)
ANNEX III.

Draft Telegram to Sir R. I. Campbell, Washington.

(Most Secret.)

No. ... Repeat to Moscow.
Your tel. No. 4217 [of the 12th September: Caucasus oil].
We welcome most cordially United States form of assurance. In informing State Department please express warm appreciation of His Majesty's Government for most helpful attitude taken by them in this issue, which seems to us to be of the greatest possible importance.

2. Please inform me when President's approval is given and telegraphic instructions are being sent to United States Ambassador at Moscow.

ANNEX IV.

Draft Telegram to Sir S. Cripps, Moscow.

(No. ... Most Secret.)

Repeat to Washington.
My immediately preceding telegram.
I will inform you so soon as I learn instructions have been sent to your United States colleague, and you should at once concert with him.

2. United States assurances have been drawn up in such a way as to conform as closely as possible, having regard to the different circumstances, to proposed British assurances contained in my telegram No. 4687 to Washington (of the 23rd August). For this reason and others, which will be explained to you by Mr. Berthoud, we do not propose to adopt suggestions put forward in your telegram No. 1073 (of the 2nd September).

3. As you are aware, it is intended that these assurances should be given to the Soviet Government in the event of the situation, as regards the German advance towards the Caucasus, becoming so acute that further delay in ensuring the demolition of oil installations would appear to be dangerous. You should, of course, only act if you reach the conclusion that there is a real doubt whether the Russians intend to demolish adequately and that an assurance is likely to turn the scales and result in adequate demolition. In that event, acting in consultation with your United States colleague, you should inform appropriate Soviet authority, preferably Stalin himself orally, that you have been authorised to give the assurances. You may leave with him aide-mémoire containing the assurances.

4. When you consider the time has come to take the action outlined in the preceding paragraph you should, if possible, consult me by telegram before so doing. If you feel that circumstances render it essential to give the assurances without losing the time involved in consulting me, you may do so. In the latter case you should inform me of your action immediately. You should, in any case, not take action before the return of Mr. Berthoud to Moscow. Mr. Berthoud should reach Moscow with or before the Beaverbrook Mission.

5. If you think it more advantageous you may open our draft Declaration with the following words: "If as a result of the destruction by the Soviet Government of the Caucasian oil industry they require ..." These words closely resemble United States draft, and are in substitution of the words: "If the Soviet Government ... as a result." Please let us know which formula you prefer.
SECRET.

22nd September, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES - MIDDLE EAST.

(WESTERN DESERT, ABYSSINIA, GREECE, CRETE, SYRIA & CYPRUS.)

Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet.

By direction of the Prime Minister, the following list of Battle Casualties in the Middle East is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Great George Street, S.W.1.
TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES - MIDDLE EAST.
(WESTERN DESERT, ABYSSINIA, GREECE, CRETE, SYRIA & CYPRUS.)

From: 30th November, 1940.
To:  29th August, 1941.

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<th>Other Ranks</th>
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<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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SECRET.

(CIGS/PM/135).

COPY.
SECRET

W.P. (41) 226
(Also C.O.S. (41) 585)
September 25, 1941

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET

WEEKLY RÉSUMÉ

(No. 108)

of the

NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR SITUATION

from 0700 September 18th, to
0700 September 25th,
1941

[Circulated with the approval of
the Chiefs of Staff.]
NAVAL SITUATION.

General Review.

1. There has been no outstanding event at sea during the period.
U-boat attacks on three convoys have resulted in our shipping losses being heavier than last week, though still slightly below the weekly average for the war.

Home Waters.

2. On the 18th an enemy aircraft, which was shadowing a convoy off Flamborough Head, was probably destroyed by H.M. Destroyer Westminster. On the same day aircraft from Fighter Command sank or seriously damaged four minesweepers off Ostend. On the following evening, off the East Coast, H.M. Armed Merchant Cruiser City of Durban was hit by a bomb which failed to explode; H.M. Destroyer Valorous shot down one of the attacking aircraft. During the night of the 20th/21st two coastal convoys off the Wash were unsuccessfully attacked by six E-boats, two of which were claimed to be damaged by the escorting destroyers.

Rattray Head Lighthouse was damaged by aircraft on the 20th.
It is estimated that 6,200 tons of enemy shipping have been sunk and over 40,000 tons damaged by our aircraft; details are given under Air Situation.
H.M. the King of the Hellenes arrived in England in s.s. Durban Castle escorted by two destroyers on the 22nd.

North Atlantic.

3. On the 19th H.M. Canadian Corvette Levis, on escort duty with a home-bound convoy from Canada, was torpedoed and sunk 130 miles east of Cape Farewell (Greenland).

Northern Waters.

4. On the 12th the Russian submarine K. 2 sank a westbound laden merchant ship of 3,000-4,000 tons 40 miles north of Varanger Fjord. H.M. Submarine Tigris sank a 2,000-ton merchant ship in Rolvsoy Sound (West of North Cape) on the 13th. On the 17th she attacked and probably damaged a 3,000-ton ship in the entrance to Kraenanger Fjord.
Jan Mayen Island has been occupied by a Free Norwegian expedition.

Mediterranean.

5. Between the 7th and 14th of September H.M. Submarine Thunderbolt, on patrol off the Libyan coast, torpedoed three merchant ships of 1,500-5,000 tons and a small minelayer.
During the night of the 18th/19th our submarines carried out a successful attack on an enemy convoy consisting of three large liners escorted by destroyers, 35 miles north-east of Tripoli (L). One liner was sunk and the s.s. vulcania (24,469 tons) was damaged.
During the week Blenheim and Swordfish aircraft from Malta have sunk or seriously damaged 16,000 tons of enemy shipping between Sicily and the African coast. An enemy destroyer was also seriously damaged off Tripoli (L).
At 0800 on the 20th explosions occurred in the R.F.A. Tanker Denbydale (8,145 tons) in Gibraltar harbour, and in the s.s. Durham (10,808 tons) and the oiling hulk Fiona Shell anchored in the Bay. The attacks appear to have been made by one-man submarines as a breathing apparatus was recovered in the vicinity. The Denbydale was seriously damaged, Durham was beached and the Fiona Shell sank.
During the week eleven French Merchant ships (upwards of 32,000 tons) westbound and five (13,120 tons) eastbound, have passed through the Strait of Gibraltar under escort.
On the 22nd three French submarines and a sloop passed westbound.
Red Sea.

6. The French launch *Rewak*, carrying petrol for Jibouti, has been intercepted and taken in prize to Zeilah.

Anti-Submarine Operations.

7. H.M. Destroyer *Vimy*, 500 miles south-west of Cape Finisterre, attacked a U-boat and possibly damaged it.

   Aircraft attacks have been carried out south-west of Iceland (C), north-west of the Hebrides, and west of Brest, without definite results.

Enemy Intelligence.

8. It is reported by reconnaissance that the battleship *Tirpitz* and the pocket-battleship *Admiral Scheer* have been carrying out exercises in the western Baltic; otherwise all the larger German surface units have been located during the week, and no important change has taken place in their dispositions.

   Reports have been received that the large liners *Roma* (30,816 tons) and *Augustus* (30,418 tons) are being converted into aircraft-carriers at Genoa.

U-Boats.

9. About thirty German U-Boats have been operating during the week. One large group has resumed operations to the south-east of Greenland, and others have been operating on the convoy routes to the west of Ushant and west of the Canaries.

Oil Storage in Northern Norway.

10. The storage cisterns at Ramasfjordnes (Tromso area) which were being built in 1939 for the Norwegian Navy are reported to be now completed. There are said to be 3 cisterns, each of 4,000 tons capacity. There is, in addition, storage for 10,700 tons of black oils at this place. Between mid-June and mid-July last 16,000 tons of aviation spirit are reported to have been unloaded at Ramasfjord.

Russian Intelligence.

11. Five more Russian submarines have passed to Northern Waters through the White Sea Canal, thus making a total of twelve which have passed the Canal. With these twelve the number of Russian submarines in the extreme North is now twenty-six.

   On the 21st September two Soviet minesweeping tugs, with 60 naval personnel, including 15 officers, arrived off the Stockholm archipelago. These ships had left Dagkun (north of Oesel) after dark on the previous day in company with other Soviet ships, which were, however, sunk in an attack by German torpedo craft.

Enemy Attack on Seaborne Trade.

12. During the week under review U-boats have made determined attacks on three convoys. Four ships were torpedoed, three of which are reported sunk, in a homeward bound convoy from Canada off the east coast of Greenland. Three ships were torpedoed in an outward bound convoy which was attacked on two successive nights to the west of Ushant. A homeward bound convoy from Sierra Leone was attacked three times on two successive nights to the west of the Canaries and four ships were torpedoed, of which three are believed sunk. Details of attacks on these convoys may be incomplete. Two ships were mined and sunk in the Thames Approaches, and another was damaged off Milford Haven. An Isle of Wight ferry steamer was sunk by an explosion, presumed to have been caused by a mine, outside Portsmouth harbour; between twenty and twenty-five persons are missing. Three ships were damaged by bombing off the East coast, one of which subsequently sank. A rescue vessel, with survivors from the torpedoed ships in the outward bound convoy previously attacked by U-boats, was bombed and set on fire by Focke-Wulf aircraft when 550 miles north-east...
of the Azores, and was subsequently sunk by our own gunfire; ninety-nine sur-
vivors, twenty of whom were seriously wounded, were picked up, but the master
and twenty-nine of the crew are missing. The Focke-Wulf was destroyed by
fighter aircraft from the escorting anti-aircraft ship.

It has now been ascertained that fifteen ships (62,662 tons) were sunk and
one is missing in the homeward bound convoy attacked by U-boats off Greenland
on the 10th and 11th September.

Protection of Seaborne Trade.

13. During the week ending the 24th September, 1,133 ships, including
230 allied and 25 neutral, were convoyed. Five armed merchant cruisers, five
anti-aircraft ships, seventy-five destroyers (including 15 United States destroyers)
and ninety-three sloops, corvettes and minesweepers were employed on escort
duties. Since the beginning of the war 82,185 ships have been convoyed, of which
409 have been lost by enemy action.

Imports into Great Britain by ships in convoy during the week ending the
20th September totalled 775,903 tons compared with an average of 900,348 tons
during the past ten weeks. Oil imports totalled 236,080 tons; mineral imports
were 223,419 tons, of which 115,838 were steel, scrap iron, pig iron and iron ore.
Timber and wood pulp imports were 64,584 tons. Cereals 22,296 tons
and cereals 36,361 tons, of which 6,500 tons were rice. Other food imports
amounted to 106,803 tons of which the principal commodities, in tons, were:
refrigerated and tinned meats, bacon and hams 33,239, sugar 26,784, lard and
and fats 8,270, cocoa 6,841, evaporated milk 6,032, fruit 3,871, jam and honey 2,774,
eggs 2,040, tea 1,580, cheese 1,099. Three consignments of tobacco totalled
1,151 tons. Among satisfactory arrivals of machinery were 1,006 tons of machine
tools.

British Minelaying.

14. A series of minelaying operations have been carried out off the Dutch,
Belgian and French Channel coasts during the week. In addition mines have
been laid off the Butt of Lewis.

No aircraft minelaying has taken place.

Enemy Minelaying and British Minesweeping.

15. During the period under review minelaying by enemy aircraft has taken
place in the Thames Estuary, on the East Coast possibly as far north as
Flamborough Head, and off Falmouth and Milford Haven. During the week
thirty-five acoustic and four magnetic mines have been destroyed in the Estuary,
twenty-five of which were in the Barrow Deep. The mine totals to date are
magnetic 1,424; acoustic 1,034; contact 1,061.

Enemy Merchant Shipping.

16. During August, seven enemy merchant vessels larger than 1,000 tons
attempted to pass through the Straits of Dover, four eastbound and three west-
bound. This shows a striking reduction compared with the eighteen vessels which
attempted to pass through the Straits of Dover in July.

According to foreign broadcasts the Norwegian ships Richard With, 995 tons,
and Barøy, 424 tons, have been sunk off the coast of Norway. The Norwegian
Vard, 681 tons, is also reported to have been attacked and set on fire, but she
was towed into Bergen by a German tug.

A broadcast from Lisbon has stated that the Swedish Yarravonga, 4,900 tons,
has been sunk while on a voyage from Germany to Sweden. The crew were saved
and taken to Hamburg.

The Bulgarian Rodina, 4,159 tons, is reported to have been mined and sunk
off Burgas on 19th September.

The Italian tanker Celeno, 3,741 tons, bound from the Ægean for the Black
Sea, was expected to call at Istanbul on 23rd or 24th September.

The Italian tanker Recca, 5,441 tons, which was seized by the Cuban Govern-
ment at the beginning of April, has been incorporated into the Cuban Navy and
renamed Libertad.
In the Persian Gulf the German *Hohenfels*, 7,862 tons, has been refloated and beached on an even keel at Bandar Gulf and should be ready for towing in the near future.

**Vichy French Shipping.**

17. Four tankers escorted by two destroyers sailed from Toulon for Constanza on the 10th September to fetch cargoes of fuel oil. Two French tankers, one of them being the *Vendémiaire*, 9,228 tons, are reported to have passed the Dardanelles bound for Roumania on the 23rd September. This is the first attempt made by the French to fetch oil from the Black Sea since early June, when two tankers were torpedoed by British submarines in the Aegean. If these four tankers succeed in returning to France fully laden, the French oil position will be considerably eased, and Germany will be relieved of the immediate necessity to supply France's essential requirements over her already congested railways.

The French have recently started the convoying of merchant ships sailing between Dakar, Madagascar and Indo-China. The first of these convoys sailed from Tamatave for Dakar about the 12th August and consisted of 5 ships totalling 36,767 tons. The second sailed from Saigon for Madagascar on the 7th September and consisted of 3 ships of a total of 25,000 tons, two of the ships being eventually bound for France; the cargo included 13,500 tons of coal for Madagascar. Another convoy is believed to be sailing shortly from Diego-Suarez for Saigon, consisting of 4 ships totalling 28,920 tons; these ships are carrying general cargo from France for the Far East.

It was announced on the 10th September that sailings from France to Indo-China would recommence, and the first ship to sail since the 19th July is reported to have been the *Eridan*, 9,928 tons, on the 12th September, to be followed by the *Louis L.D.*, 5,795 tons.

**MILITARY SITUATION.**

(An outline map showing Axis operations against Russia is included in this Résumé as an inset.)

**Russo-German Campaign.**

18. No very great change has taken place during the past week. In the Leningrad sector stubborn resistance by the Russians is believed to be causing the Germans heavy losses. The Germans are at present on the defensive in the Smolensk sector, where successful local operations have been carried out by the Russians. In the Ukraine German armoured forces advancing from Glukhov and Kremenchug have met, and are now mopping up the encircled Soviet troops with the support of infantry divisions. Though some Soviet forces may possibly have avoided encirclement in the initial stages of the operation, there is no doubt that Russian losses in men and material have been very heavy. Further to the south the German advance has cut all land communications with the Crimea.

**Finland.**

19. Reports suggest that no advance has been made on this front. On the Karelian Isthmus the Russians are holding the Finnish forces on the general line of the 1939 frontier.

**Leningrad Sector.**

20. The Germans have not materially improved their position, and their operations have been hampered by bad weather. No reports have been received of concentrated air attacks either on the Russian defensive positions or on the city itself. The German intention may, therefore, be to contain the city until resistance weakens and until it can be taken without incurring further heavy losses.

**Estonia.**

21. The Germans have established a foothold on the island of Oesel and are reported to be advancing westwards.
Central Sector.

22. The situation on the front in this sector has not changed.

Ukraine.

23. German armoured and motorised forces advancing southwards from Glukhov met those advancing northwards from Kremenchug about a week ago. Though some Russian forces avoided encirclement, the greater part of Marshal Budenny’s forces in the area Glukhov-Kremenchug-Kiev were cut off, and the remnants of this encircled force are now fighting very stubbornly even though there is little prospect of extrication. The German communiqué of the 23rd September claims the capture of 880,000 prisoners and the capture or destruction of 570 tanks and 2,100 guns. While these claims are regarded as somewhat excessive, there can be no doubt that Russian losses in this sector have been very severe, and their final extent cannot at present be computed.

24. The German forces in the area Glukhov-Kremenchug have consolidated their gains and an advance has been made from the Kremenchug bridgehead in the direction of Poltava, which is almost half way to Kharkov.

25. In the extreme south of the Ukraine, German forces are reported to have reached the shores of the Sea of Azov. All land communication with the Crimea is cut.

26. The Russian forces in the Crimea are not believed to be very large. The threat to the naval base of Sebastopol is, therefore, considerable.

Comment.

27. The present situation has three serious aspects. First, there is the threat to the Donetz Basin which, coupled with the possibility of an advance to Rostov-on-Don, would bring the Germans a great deal nearer to the Caucasus, one of their chief objectives. Secondly, the capture of the Crimea would mean the loss to the Russians of the naval base of Sebastopol and would consequently have a serious effect on the ability of a Russian Navy to operate in the Black Sea; and thirdly, the possibility of a German offensive in the central sector in order to destroy the Russian reserves in the Moscow area and cut communications with the south cannot be excluded.

Operations.

Libya and Egypt.

28. In the Frontier Area the German reconnaissance in force which commenced on the 14th September and was referred to in last week’s Resume, was carried out by two columns advancing parallel to each other south of the escarpment. They were harassed by our desert columns, consisting of armoured-car units and motorised infantry and artillery, which withdrew before the German advance. By the morning of the 15th, however, the enemy forces had commenced to withdraw, and both columns, which had been heavily and successfully bombed by our aircraft while refuelling the previous evening, and engaged by our artillery, retired to their original positions on the line Halfaya-Sidi Omar. Enemy losses include 20 killed and 28 prisoners—of which 16 were Italian airmen—10 tanks and 15 M.T. vehicles destroyed or captured, and 22 aircraft destroyed or captured, with others probably destroyed and damaged. Our own losses were 2 killed and 3 missing, one armoured car and several M.T. vehicles damaged and 7 aircraft destroyed; 5 of the pilots are safe.

29. Since then operations in the frontier area have been confined to patrolling on both sides and reconnaissance by aircraft, including enemy bomb attacks on the Oases area, Fort Maddalena and Kufra.

30. At Tobruk the situation has been far quieter than of late and only two light raids have taken place during the period under review, neither of which caused damage. Shelling also has decreased, with sporadic outbreaks of activity in various sectors, but a heavy sand storm has been blowing almost continuously and has seriously limited patrolling activities.
Abyssinia.

31. On the 15th September our troops carried out a successful patrol on the enemy left flank in the Wolchefit area and penetrated a considerable distance behind the enemy front lines.

East Africa.

32. The East African Command came into being at 2359 hours 14th September.

33. A considerable number of Somali refugees (many being British subjects) crossed the frontier from French Somaliland during the week.

Persia.

34. As a result of the dilatory attitude of the Persian Authorities towards handing over the Germans, British and Russian forces advanced to Teheran, and reached the outskirts of the city during the afternoon of 17th September, without incident. Contrary to various reports contained in the Press, the capital was not occupied and both British and Russian forces camped outside.

35. Khurdish tribes have taken advantage of the confusion prevailing in the Persian Army and frontier guards in Persian Khurdistan and have occupied the towns of Baneh and Sakiz (about 90 miles N.W. of Kermanshah).

Intelligence.

France.

36. There are indications that the Germans may be forming a new armoured division north of the Gironde. There is no evidence that the new division has so far been equipped with tanks.

Balkan States.

Roumania.

37. A movement of Roumanian troops into the Timok valley district of Yugoslavia was reported to be imminent or in progress on 12th September. It is believed that one division crossed the Danube at Tunru Severin on the night of 9th/10th September, while four other divisions were standing by in the Orsova area. The extent of the territory to be occupied is not yet known, nor has any further news of the operation been received. It is to be presumed that territory in Yugoslavia has been offered to Roumania by Germany in return for their continued co-operation in the Russian campaign, which has now become thoroughly unpopular.

Libya.

38. It is reported, but not confirmed, that 12,000 German troops passed through the Brenner into Italy during the first week of September. Considerable German forces are also said to be in Southern Italy being acclimatized for Africa.

39. Certain German reinforcements recently arrived in North Africa, but all were non-divisional units belonging to G.H.Q. pool. There may also have been some German troops in the two liners which were sunk on 16th September. The total German forces in Libya are still believed to be two armoured divisions, of which one is incomplete. There is as yet no evidence that elements of a third division have arrived.

AIR SITUATION.

General Review.

40. The weather during the week was so unfavourable that our night operations against enemy objectives in Germany and Occupied Territory were considerably restricted. Our aircraft continued their attacks on hostile shipping in Home Waters and in the Mediterranean.

Enemy activity over this country was at a low level.
Germany and Occupied Territory.

Day.

41. Bomber Command despatched 129 sorties, as compared with 113 last week, and dropped 40 tons of H.E. bombs and 200 incendiaries. Fighter Command flew 1,663 aircraft; sorties in the course of offensive operations over northern France and the Netherlands and against shipping. Attacks on shipping are recorded under "Coastal Operations."

42. The targets attacked included power stations, communications, shipyards and docks. The electricity power stations at Gosnay, near Bethune, and at Grand Queville, near Rouen, were each attacked by 11 Blenheims. At Gosnay, the power house and the generator station were hit, and at Grand Queville bombs fell in the target area. The railway centres at Abbeville and Hazebrouck were attacked by Hampdens and Blenheims, and both targets were hit several times. The six Blenheims which bombed the Grand Queville shipyard scored hits on buildings in the yard and on an adjoining cellulose factory. The docks at Cherbourg were attacked by six Blenheims, and bombs were seen to fall in the centre and on the western edge of the Bassin Napoleon. A Fortress bomber dropped two tons of bombs on Emden. Among other targets attacked were a herring oil factory at Floro, 70 m. N. of Bergen, and the railway repair shops at Lille, on which over five tons of bombs were dropped.

43. Offensive operations by Fighter Command were impossible on four days of the week owing to bad weather, but on the other three a total of 84 squadron sorties were flown. One of these squadrons destroyed six and probably destroyed two of a number of enemy aircraft which were flying round an aerodrome near Ostend. Total enemy losses during these operations were 58 aircraft destroyed, 18 probably destroyed and 28 damaged. We lost 31 fighters, but five pilots were rescued.

44. An interesting feature of enemy activity during the week has been the increased activity of single-engine fighter units over the Pas-de-Calais area in opposing our daylight sweeps. During the previous weeks these units had shown little inclination to intercept our fighters when they crossed the coast in small numbers. With the increase in the strength of our sweeps during the week the German Air Force countered with considerable forces. An increase in the number of patrols flown by day over Belgium, Holland and N.W. Germany by twin-engine fighter units has also been noticeable.

Night.

45. Owing to unfavourable weather throughout the week, only 230 sorties were despatched by Bomber Command compared with 835 last week, and the total of 228 tons of H.E. bombs and 14,300 incendiaries which was released is the lowest since the week ended the 5th June. All operations were cancelled on three nights, and on another only three aircraft were despatched. The objectives on the remaining nights were the industrial centres of Berlin and Frankfurt and the docks at Stettin, Ostend and Havre.

46. The heaviest attack of the week was made on Stettin, Germany's most important seaport in the Baltic, which is being used extensively for reinforcements for the Russian campaign. Sixty-four tons of H.E. bombs and 2,400 incendiaries were dropped by 53 aircraft. It was difficult to observe results owing to cloud and haze, but bursts were seen in the centre of the city, on the main railway station and on warehouses in the dock area. There were several fires, including a particularly large one near the railway centre.

47. Fifteen tons of H.E. bombs and 1,530 incendiaries were dropped on Berlin. Bursts were seen at the western end of the Unter den Linden and in the Schoneburg district, and a big fire was started near the Air Ministry. At Frankfurt, which was attacked on a lighter scale, hits were obtained on the industrial and railway centres and on buildings near the General Post Office.

48. A total of 60 tons of H.E. bombs and 3,000 incendiaries were dropped on the docks at Ostend and Havre, and bursts followed by fires were seen at various point in the dock areas.

49. Two Havocs of Fighter Command scored hits on the aerodromes at Beauvais and Evreux, and a Beaufort of Coastal Command hit a factory near Nantes.
Coastal Operations.

50. Coastal Command flew 223 patrols (302 sorties) and provided 31 convoy escorts (100 additional sorties). Shipping protection patrols carried out by Fighter Command totalled 370 (775 sorties).

51. Aircraft of Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands continued their attacks on enemy shipping. Fifteen Blenheims of Bomber Command, escorted by fighters, made a particularly successful attack on two convoys off the Dutch Coast. Attacking at mast height in face of heavy A.A. fire and through a ship-borne balloon barrage, they set fire to five merchant vessels of a total tonnage of 27,000. Hits were also obtained on a tanker of about 3,000 tons. Other Blenheims of the same Command sank a 5,000 ton merchant vessel off the Belgian Coast and one of 1,200 tons off Ijmuiden, and scored four hits on another of 850 tons west of St. Nazaire.

52. Hurricanes of Fighter Command sank two flak ships and two minesweepers off Ostend, and severely damaged three minesweepers, a flak ship, a trawler and a 1,000 ton ship of the corvette type off the French and Belgian coasts.

53. A Hudson and a Beaufort of Coastal Command scored hits on two merchant vessels of 8,000 tons and 3,000 tons respectively off the Alscboen Light.

54. The offensive activity of the German Air Force continued to be directed chiefly against shipping. Six shipping attacks were made during the week, two by day, one off Harwich and one in the Atlantic, and four by night, three off Spurn Point and one off Scarborough. Enemy minelaying was probably carried out on three nights, in the Bristol Channel, the Thames Estuary and the Humber.

United Kingdom.

55. Fighter Command flew, in all their operations, a total of 2,265 sorties by day and 177 sorties by night; the latter total includes dusk and dawn operations.

56. Enemy day activity over this country has been on a negligible scale. At night only on two occasions have attacks been made on our cities. Southampton was the centre of a very scattered attack, and Margate was subjected to a brief attack, possibly by Ju. 87 dive-bombers. If these aircraft were responsible for this attack, which seems likely from the pattern of the bombing, it is a new development in the use of the stuka aircraft on the Western Front.

Central Mediterranean.

57. Reconnaissance aircraft from Malta continued to search for enemy shipping convoys; these were subsequently attacked on every possible occasion by Naval and Royal Air Force aircraft, with the following results:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ship</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laden Schooner</td>
<td>Near Zuara</td>
<td>Total loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laden Schooner</td>
<td>Near Zuara</td>
<td>Blew up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,000 ton Liner</td>
<td>Tripoli (L) and later off Kerkennah Island</td>
<td>Hit repeatedly by Blenheims. Last reported stationary off Kuriat Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>Near Tripoli (L)</td>
<td>Direct hits amidships. Badly damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Vessel (8,000 tons)</td>
<td>Tripoli (L)</td>
<td>2 hits by Blenheims. Damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Vessel (3,000 tons)</td>
<td>Off Kerkennah Island</td>
<td>Sinking and on fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Vessel (8,000 tons)</td>
<td>North of Kerkennah Island</td>
<td>Sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Vessel (small)</td>
<td>North of Kerkennah Island</td>
<td>Hit by torpedo and bomb. Probably sunk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
58. On five nights Wellingtons made 33 sorties against Tripoli (L) and dropped a total of over 50 tons of bombs. These attacks were principally directed against the harbour, and, in addition to a number of hits which were made on the Spanish and Karamanli Moles, many bombs were seen to fall on shipping lying alongside. The barracks and buildings near the W.T. station also were successfully bombed.

59. Two Blenheims made a good daylight attack on heavy M.T. and petrol tankers on the Misurata–Sirte Road, resulting in considerable confusion, and the destruction of one petrol tanker and serious damage to 30 other vehicles; one Blenheim is missing. Another attack by 11 Blenheims was made on the barracks at Homs (L) and Misurata; the barracks were seriously damaged and hits were also made on M.T. dumps and petrol lorries, and troops were sprayed with machine-gun fire with good effect; two of our aircraft collided over the target and a third crashed.

60. Enemy bombing activity has been on an extremely small scale. The only attack on Malta was on the night of the 19th/20th September, when one out of six aircraft penetrated over the Island and dropped some incendiaries which did no damage.

For fully three months it has not been possible for the Germans to allocate adequate aircraft for the protection of the important supply route between Tripoli and Sicily or for attacks on Malta. A long-range bomber reserve training unit has been employed on operational duties, exemplifying the difficulties experienced by the German Air Force in discharging its commitments in this area.

Egypt and Libya.

61. Six attacks were made on Benghazi Harbour by approximately five Wellingtons each night. Hits were made on the Central and Cathedral Moles and on ships at the Italian Mole. One vessel moored at the Outer Mole exploded as a result of an attack, and debris was thrown over a wide area.

62. In daylight a total of 39 Marylands attacked supply dumps near Bardia and Gambut and many direct hits were observed; they also bombed a petrol dump south of Gambut.

63. Our aircraft made widespread reconnaissances over Cyrenaica, and also over the Dodecanese Islands and between Greece, Crete and Libya. Fighters maintained protective patrols over Tobruk and shipping, and carried out offensive patrols over the frontier area.

64. There was a marked reduction in enemy operations as compared with the previous week. Suez and Port Said were attacked at night with bombs and mines by about eight aircraft and some slight civilian damage resulted. The situation at Tobruk has been much quieter; single aircraft have attacked during daylight, but with little effect. One early morning attack was carried out by 13 aircraft and mines were dropped in the harbour.

Russia.

British Air Operations.

65. Weather conditions have been generally unfavourable. One patrol of eight Hurricanes destroyed four Me. 109s without loss to themselves.

Russian Air Operations.

66. There is no information of Russian air operations.

German Air Operations.

67. Unfavourable weather conditions in the Northern Sector have hampered air operations against Leningrad, where the situation appears recently to have changed very little. It is reported that German Air Force long-range bombers and fighters were making extensive use of aerodromes in south Finland earlier in the month for operations against Russian batteries between Luga and Kronstadt, the Karelian Isthmus, and shipping and naval forces in the Gulf.
of Finland. Light bombs are said to have been used against shipping, presumably with the object of disabling rather than sinking vessels likely to be of military value.

68. The German Air Force has been extensively employed in co-operation with the ground forces engaged in the encirclement of Kiev. Close support units consisting of dive-bombers and fighters have been intensively engaged in this area, the long-range bombers operating mainly by day against targets further to the rear.

69. In the Black Sea area operations have been chiefly confined to attacks on shipping and naval forces at Odessa and Sebastopol.

Air Intelligence,

Finland.

70. The Finnish Parliament has passed a law providing that enemy parachutists shall receive the same punishment as spies.

Italian Air Force in Libya.

71. In last week's Résumé (paragraph 63) a number of Italian Ju. 87s were reported to have crashed in our forward area. It appears that the squadron took off for an offensive operation and, presumably owing to faulty navigation, ran out of petrol and force-landed in our territory. At least eight of the aircraft have been reported as destroyed, and from the Italians' point of view it seems likely that practically the entire squadron and its crews will have to be written off.

72. This will cause the Italians serious embarrassment since the number of Ju. 87s in the Italian Air Force, and of crews accustomed to their use, is not large. It is thought that the Italians had only three dive-bomber squadrons in Libya.

Spain.

73. On the 15th June a damaged Focke-Wulf landed in Spain after an engagement with one of our convoys, in which the pilot had been killed. The aircraft subsequently escaped, but this may have been due more to carelessness than bad faith on the part of the Spanish Authorities.

HOME SECURITY SITUATION.

General.

By Day.

74. Bombs were dropped on land on only two days of the week. There were no casualties and no appreciable damage.

By Night.

75. Bombing was again on a very small scale.

On 20th/21st September there was some scattered bombing in Hampshire and eight people were killed and some houses demolished at Gosport. There were some incidents of a minor nature in the East Riding of Yorkshire and along the South-East Coast.

76. The following night Margate was attacked. There were a few slight casualties and some damage to house property.

77. On 23rd/24th September minor bombing took place in South-West England and South Wales. A parachute mine fell on a Military Camp at Fishguard, Pembrokeshire. Two soldiers were killed and a few civilians injured.

Casualties.

78. Casualties for the week ending 0600 on 24th September are estimated at 13 killed and 19 seriously injured.
APPENDICES I, II and III
will be published monthly.

APPENDIX IV.

Merchant Ships (all sizes) lost by the enemy up to 22nd September, 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured or seized</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>367,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scuttled or sunk</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>781,000</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>591,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified ships reported as sunk or destroyed by S/M, A/C, &amp;c. (tonnage estimated)</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>1,476,000</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>573</td>
<td>2,514,000</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>1,664,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, 70 ships of 138,000 gross tons under enemy control or useful to the enemy have been sunk.

Also some 85 ships, totalling 483,000 gross tons, have been placed under protective custody in United States and South American ports to prevent sabotage by their crews. Some of this tonnage has been taken over and put into service by the United States and some by South American Republics.

The losses of unidentified German ships include a number claimed by the Russians.

APPENDIX V.

Casualties to H.M. Auxiliary Vessels and to Naval Personnel.

The following casualties have occurred to H.M. Auxiliary vessels during the period under review:

September 18.—M.T.B.'s 55 and 70 seriously damaged in collision off Dover.

September 20.—M/S Trawler Marconi sunk in collision off Harwich.

September 22.—M.L. 144 sunk by a floating mine off Dungeness. Four ratings missing, three seriously wounded.

The following casualties to naval personnel have been reported:

Officers: 1 killed; 2 missing; 2 prisoners of war; 4 wounded.
Ratings: 3 killed; 4 missing; 64 prisoners of war; 4 wounded.

Thirteen officers previously reported missing are now reported killed.
APPENDIX VI.

Operational Aircraft Battle Casualties.

0600 hours, Thursday, 18th September, 1941, to 0600 hours, Thursday, 25th September, 1941.

### Metropolitan Area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No account is taken of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

### Overseas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force</th>
<th>In the Air</th>
<th>On the Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11 (M.E.)</td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4 (N. Russia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (M.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4 (N. Russia)</td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
<td>2 (M.E.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Italian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Probably Destroyed</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1 (M.E.)</td>
<td><strong>Nil</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII.

Air Attacks on Enemy Territory in Europe.

Extracts from Recent Raid Assessment Reports.

The following reports of damage have been received during the past week from air reconnaissance and Intelligence sources:

Germany.

Berlin.—The raid of the 7th/8th September had a great effect and the inhabitants no longer try to conceal their discontent. The bulk of the damage was done in the industrial quarters of the city. One of our large bombs, which fell within a few yards of the Pariser Platz, at one end of Unter den Linden, completely demolished five large buildings and killed over 100 people. Three large fires were reported, the most serious being near the Ost Kreuz Station, where some warehouses are said to have been destroyed. This raid has been described as the heaviest and most determined attack yet made on the city.

Bochum.—The gas works have been put out of action. One of the gasometers exploded as a result of a direct hit. The smelting works were hit and the town suffered heavily.

Note.—The date of this damage was not given, but censorship sources have referred to a heavy raid on Bochum on 12th or 13th June.

Hamm.—Blast furnaces are no longer operating and a railway bridge nearby was hit and destroyed.

Warnemunde.—In the raid of 11th/12th September the Heinkel Works was seriously damaged and the casualties there were 30 killed and 300 wounded. There was heavy damage in the town and the railway line to Berlin was cut.

General.—The following is an extract from a letter written in English on the 4th August by a Hamburg correspondent to a friend in the United States:

"In one of the last nights several large bomb exploding shells fall down here to us and we thought, when we heard the howling and cracks and panic, our last hour had come. It is impossible to describe these moments, but the bombs fall down into the gardens and not into the houses, so that we live and have only damages."

Italy.

Naples.—In the raid of the 20th/21st July the port and railway station are reported to have been damaged, and the train service with Rome to have been dislocated. The Castellammare naval yard on the Bay of Naples was damaged. A bomb scored a hit on the German G.H.Q. building in Naples itself and the total casualties in this raid are said to have been 400 killed and wounded.

Belgium.

Liége.—On the night of the 9th/10th July the S.A. Angleur-Athus (an iron and steel firm making shells and bombs) sustained a loss of about £20,000 and £30,000. The damage was caused by a fire resulting from an air attack.

Note.—This was the night of the successful attack on Aachen, and one aircraft claims to have bombed two large factories near Aachen. Liége itself is about 25 miles from Aachen.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY № 110 (24-9-41)

SECRET

G.S.O.R. 5518
SOUTH WEST U.S.S.R.

SCALE 1:4,000,000 OR 63 MILES TO INCH

MILES 0 25 50 100 150MILES

AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.-
showing approximate advances

LEGEND

Approximate lines reached by
Axis forces—
24th Aug
8th Sept
15th Sept
22nd Sept

Pockets of Soviet resistance

Main thrust of Axis forces

Note—It is emphasized that in the
mobile warfare which has taken
place up to date there can be
no continuous front line. The
lines on the map there-
more indicate only the approximate
limits of advance of the foremost
troops.
ISSUED WITH WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY N° 110 (24.9.41)

MAP I.

SECRET

G.S.O.R. 5518
SOUTH WEST U.S.S.R.
SCALE 1:4,000,000 OR 62 MILES TO INCH

MILES
0 25 50 100 150

AXIS OPERATIONS AGAINST U.S.S.R.-
showing approximate advances

LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces-

24th Aug
8th Sept
15th Sept
22nd Sept

Pockets of Soviet resistance

Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: it is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limits of advance of the foremost troops.
LEGEND
Approximate lines reached by Axis Forces

24th Aug.
8th Sept.
15th Sept.
22nd Sept.

Pockets of Soviet resistance
Main thrusts of Axis Forces

Note: It is emphasized that in the mobile warfare which has taken place up to date there can be no continuous front line. The lines on the map therefore indicate only the approximate limit of advance of the foremost Totals.
WAR CABINET.

DELIVERY OF LEASE-LEND AIRCRAFT FROM INDIA TO CHINA.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.

THE Government of India have reported that they are arranging with the Chinese Consul-General, Calcutta, and Mr. Matheson, in charge of United States defence supplies for China, for the establishment of an erection plant at Calcutta for Lease-Lend aircraft and for storage at Calcutta of 50,000 tons of other war materials.

The Government of India are ready to offer the necessary facilities and are in fact proceeding in anticipation of sanction, but they suggest that it will be necessary to attach the condition that no armaments or cameras could be carried on planes flying from Calcutta to China under this plan. This condition, though originally applied in the case of planes from Burma, was relaxed in their case by the War Cabinet (reference W.M. (41) 71st Conclusions of the 17th July, 1941, Minute No. 7), and I propose to assume that in the absence of objection this relaxation may be taken to apply mutatis mutandis to planes flown from India, and to inform the Government of India accordingly.

The various departments agree, but it is considered that the extension of the decision of the 17th July requires to be confirmed by the War Cabinet.

India Office, September 26, 1941.

L. S. A.