WAR CABINET 85 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Monday, 3rd July, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P.,
Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON,
Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Hon. Sir FIROZ KHAN NOON,
Representative of the Government of India.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P.,
First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. H. U. WILLINK, K.C., M.P.,
Minister of Health (Item 4).
The Right Hon. LORD PORTAL, Minister of Works (Item 4).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL,
Paymaster-General.
Admiral of the Fleet SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal SIR ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.

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1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the events of the previous six days. Bad weather had interfered with all air operations. Apart from an attack by Mosquitoes on three oil plants in Germany, the operations of Bomber Command had been confined to targets in Occupied Territory. Two-thirds of the effort had been against "Crossbow" targets.

United States heavy bombers had dropped 4,350 tons of bombs. During June, Bomber Command had dropped 57,000 and the American heavies 51,488 tons of bombs.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 14,800 sorties during the week, dropping 1,485 tons of bombs on transport, fuel dumps and railway targets in the battle area.

The enemy had lost 207 aircraft and the Allies 142 during the previous six days.

In the Mediterranean Theatre 10,000 sorties had been flown as against 1,200 by the enemy. 3,400 tons of bombs had been dropped on oil refineries and railway targets in the Balkans. The bombing of the oil refineries had been particularly successful. Enemy losses amounted to 179 as against 99 Allied aircraft.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 2,386 tons. Total losses for June amounted to 36,200 tons, of which total 21,500 tons had been lost in "Overlord" operations.

During June 14 U-boats had been destroyed and 11 probably destroyed.

The First Sea Lord stated that the Minesweeping Flotilla had now sunk over 10,000 mines during the war.

The First Lord of the Admiralty was invited to send a congratulatory telegram to the Flotilla on this achievement on behalf of the War Cabinet.

The United States forces in the Cherbourg Peninsula had been re-grouping for an attack south-west, which had now begun. 29,000 prisoners had been taken in this area. The total number of prisoners taken in Normandy was now about 50,000. British troops west of Caen had delivered an attack across the River Odon to which the Germans had reacted strongly by making a series of counter-attacks, all of which had been held and heavy losses in personnel and tanks inflicted on the enemy. Eight Panzer Divisions were concentrated in this area. A statement was made of the number of troops, vehicles and supplies which had been landed in Normandy. The Prime Minister congratulated the War Office on this very fine feat of organisation which deserved public recognition.

In Italy an advance had been made along the whole front. Allied forces were approaching Ancona on the east and Leghorn on the west coast.

The Russian offensive north of Priep Marshes had made rapid progress. The main direction of the northern thrust was towards Dvinsk, of the middle thrust towards Vilna, and the southern thrust towards Barabowicze. This advance was beginning to threaten the German forces in the north.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The War Cabinet was informed that the total casualties, both American and British, in Normandy, so far reported, were about 56,000. Of these, 7,700 (2,443 British) had been killed, some 30,000 wounded and some 10,000 missing.

These figures might be compared with the 6,000 casualties, missing and killed, sustained by Bomber Command since the "Overlord" preparatory operations started in April, out of a standing force of 10,500. Of this figure of 6,000, it might be assumed that some 5,000 were missing and 1,000 were prisoners of war.
The Secretary of State for Air was asked to consider what publicity could safely now be given to these figures of the casualties sustained by Bomber Command.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that, without consultation with us, the United States Government had decided to withdraw their Ambassador to Argentina and had thereafter asked us to follow suit. We had agreed in the interests of Allied solidarity, but the Prime Minister had made it clear to the President that we were not at all satisfied with the line that had been taken. He himself was uneasy at the turn of events, since the situation might become a serious one from our point of view. Moreover, he felt that the State Department were by no means clear as to what their next move would be. Ambassador Kelly was, however, to see the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs before leaving and might then be able to ascertain something more positive about the general attitude of the Argentine.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that fresh reports had been received to the effect that massacres of Jews in Hungary were taking place on an unprecedented scale. The King of Sweden had protested to Admiral Horthy. Distressing as the situation was, he doubted if there was any effective action we could take. By issuing warnings to which we could not give effect we tended to reduce their value.

The Prime Minister suggested that consideration might be given to a public statement (to be linked with the recent murder of 50 air officers by the Gestapo) that we proposed to employ 50 leading German prisoners in our power on reparatory work, such as forced labour, for a period of ten years after the war, the prisoners concerned being so informed. One effect might be to sow trouble between the military authorities in Germany and the Gestapo. While the possibility of some form of retaliation could not wholly be excluded, it would be very difficult for the Germans to retaliate effectively in respect of a threat by us that we should take certain action on the conclusion of the war. During the war the treatment of all prisoners in our hands would, of course, continue to be governed by the Red Cross Conventions.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to look into the Prime Minister's suggestion.

The War Cabinet had before them a joint memorandum (W.P. (44) 366) by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary of State for War, reporting the outcome of the work of the special committee set up by the Secretary of State for War to discuss arrangements for the control of Civil Affairs in France with M. Vienot, and stating that certain of the French representatives at the recent discussions had returned to Algiers to obtain approval for their work, and were hopeful that this would be given.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the outcome of these discussions had been conveyed to Washington, and we awaited the reactions of the United States Government, pending which no action was in view. He enquired whether the Prime Minister would see advantage in making a personal communication on the subject to the President.

The Prime Minister was of opinion, however, that the balance of advantage rested with the use of the official channel, and the War Cabinet agreed that this should be done.
A discussion followed as to the line to be taken in dealing with questions which had been put down for answer by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on the 4th and 5th July as to the outcome of the conversations with the French.

The Prime Minister suggested that the general line to be taken should be that we had on the official level examined and arrived at a certain basis of ascertained conclusions. These had been forwarded to the United States Government, but we had not ourselves considered them governmentally, and would not do so until the observations of the United States Government were available to us.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed with the Prime Minister's proposal and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to discuss with him the actual terms of the replies to be given.

Air Raids:
Attacks by
Flying Bombs.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 84th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

4. The War Cabinet had before them:

(i) A memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 338) on the subject of the publication of air raid casualty figures for the month of June; and

(ii) A memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 350) proposing that, subject to appropriate safeguards, the Press should be permitted to indicate that London had been the target of the enemy attacks and had borne a share of the resulting casualties and damage.

The Home Secretary and Minister for Home Security gave the War Cabinet figures of the weight of bombs dropped and the numbers of casualties caused in the flying bomb attacks. The weight of high explosive dropped in London in the two weeks ended 29th June was 650 tons as compared with 770 tons dropped in London from aircraft in the worst fortnight of the 1940-41 raids. (October 1940.) A map which had been prepared to illustrate the incidence of the attack in the London area up to 27th June showed that the main weight had fallen on the boroughs South of the river, Lewisham, Croydon, Greenwich and Southwark having suffered particularly. The total number of casualties up to date was 17,328. Although the number of killed was relatively small, about 2,000, the total number of killed and seriously injured in London for the 14 days up to the 20th June was 7,403 as compared with 16,456 for the whole month of September 1940. The fact that many of the bombs fell in daylight, when people were going about their business, no doubt led to a higher casualty rate. The bombs had a high blast effect and many casualties were due to broken glass.

The Minister of Aircraft Production said that, although the damage to factories in the London area had not been great, the attacks were having a serious effect on output.

The Prime Minister said that so far as the Civil Defence Services were concerned it was clear that they were doing excellent work in London. There should be no hesitation in bringing reinforcements to London from other parts of the country. The fullest possible facilities should be provided for the evacuation from London of persons whose work did not require them to remain, and particular care should be taken to provide help for people who could not afford to make their own arrangements. The carrying out of first aid repairs on damaged houses should be treated as a matter of the utmost urgency, and a scheme for the transfer of such casualties to hospitals in other parts of the country should be worked out. It was also necessary to consider the possibility of changes in the warning system.
It seemed clear that a general statement on the subject of the flying bomb attacks should be made in the House, and, if his colleagues agreed, he would propose to announce on the following day his intention of making a full statement on Thursday, the 6th July. Should the House desire to discuss this statement the debate would have to be in Secret Session. The statement would give an indication of the weight of the attacks and would include references to the casualty figures and to the fact that London had been the target.

The following points arose in the detailed discussion of the points touched on by the Prime Minister:

(a) Repair of Damage to Houses.—The Minister of Health explained that on average the attacks were destroying about 500 houses and damaging 21,000 each day. In the first twelve days it had been possible to carry out repairs on about 8,000 houses a day, and, although the rate of repair had now risen to around 12,000 a day, this meant that arrears were accumulating at the rate of 8,000 houses a day. Moreover, the work was being concentrated on the most lightly damaged houses, and the progress of repairs would be slower when the more heavily damaged houses were reached. The labour employed in the London area was at present about 30,000 men, as compared with 40,000 men in the heaviest raids of 1940–41. In his view the labour force should be raised to 50,000 or 60,000 men. Some difficulties had arisen at first in the billeting of workers brought into the London area, but the position now was that room could be found immediately for 10,000–15,000 additional workers.

The Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Works explained that every effort was being made to bring additional labour into the London area. It was hoped that by the end of the week the labour force would have risen to 40,000 men, and a further 10,000 would be brought in the following week. The Minister of Works said that in addition to the labour force employed on the repair of damaged houses, about 15,000 men were employed on the repairs to factories. The work of repair was making heavy demands on materials, and special steps had had to be taken in order to collect materials (e.g., tarpaulins) from other parts of the country.

The Prime Minister suggested that the Ministers concerned should confer with a view to settling what number of building workers was required in order to keep pace with the damage to house property and to decide what steps were required to provide the necessary labour.

(b) Rehousing and Evacuation.—It was generally agreed that every effort should be made to make the maximum use of any available accommodation in London including any accommodation vacated by the United States forces. It was pointed out, however, that in many cases homeless persons did not desire to move to other districts in London.

The Minister of War Transport said that the numbers of persons travelling out of London at the week-end had been unprecedentedly high and that the railway companies had been given full authority to run additional trains. Although there had been large crowds at the stations and many people had had to wait for long periods, the railways had been able to cope with the traffic.

The Minister of Health said that, with the agreement of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, he had decided to start the organised evacuation of school children from London and from the area immediately to the south in the line of fire of flying bombs. Once the evacuation of school children had been carried out, it would be necessary to consider the evacuation of mothers with young children, although it must be remembered that difficulties arose in billeting mothers. Evacuation by private arrangement was also being encouraged.
There was general agreement that any persons who did not require to remain in London and in the areas immediately to the south of London, in the line of fire of the flying bombs, should be encouraged to move to other areas; and it was suggested that the Ministers concerned should consider what further facilities could be provided.

(c) Casualties.—It was generally agreed that it would be desirable to arrange for the removal from London hospitals of any casualties who could be transferred. Battle casualties had been less than expected and there ought to be enough accommodation to spare in hospitals outside London.

The Minister of Labour and National Service pointed out that, if necessary, accommodation could be made available in hostel sick bays in other parts of the country.

The Minister of Health said that he would look into the question of the transfer of casualties from London hospitals as a matter of urgency.

(d) Warning System.—The Prime Minister suggested that alternative arrangements should be made for the sounding of warnings both in the area outside London in the line of fire and in the London area itself. He doubted whether the present system of sirens was suitable to the nature of the attacks, and felt that it might be desirable to substitute some system under which the warning would be given only when a bomb was approaching and only in the limited area where the bomb was likely to fall. If a system of this kind could be devised, it would be easier to give people specific instructions about taking cover.

It was also pointed out that, although there were objections to the firing of guns in the London area, the sound of guns gave an indication of the approach of flying bombs.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he would consider the suggestions made, but that it was extremely difficult to find any adequate substitute for the existing warning system. In general, the siren warned people to be on the alert and, by and large, as experience of the attacks was gained, people were taking cover without too much interruption of their normal life.

The Minister of Aircraft Production said that he was satisfied that the factory warning system was operating very efficiently.

In connection with the warning system reference was made to the fact that a number of ships loaded with ammunition were at present in the Thames Estuary.

The Minister of War Transport said that he had already arranged to transfer a number of these ships elsewhere and would look into the question of transferring the remainder.

In the course of discussion, reference was made to a number of operational matters, including the question of counter-measures. A record is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the statement made by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security as to the extent and weight of attack by flying-bombs and of the information given by the Secretary of State for Air and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, on the counter-measures which would be adopted, and of their estimate of the probable scale and duration of the attacks.

(2) Agreed that in the present situation we should concentrate resources from other areas on relieving the position in Greater London.
(3) Invited the Minister of Labour and National Service, in consultation with the Minister of Production, the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, the Minister of Works and the Minister of Health, to settle the size of the labour force required to keep pace with the damage calling for first-aid repairs in London, and to decide what further steps should be taken to secure the necessary building workers.

(4) Invited the Minister of Health to ascertain whether accommodation could be provided for homeless persons by the use of premises in the London area vacated by the United States forces.

(5) Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, in consultation with the Minister of Health and the Minister of War Transport, to consider—

(a) what steps could be taken to expedite the evacuation of the priority classes from London and from the areas south of London in the line of fire of flying bombs; and

(b) whether facilities could be offered for the evacuation from the London area of persons whose work did not make it necessary for them to remain there.

(6) Invited the Minister of Health to arrange for the transfer on the largest practicable scale of casualties from hospitals in the London area to hospitals in other parts of the country.

(7) Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to consider what modifications could be made in the warning system, both in London and in the areas outside London affected by the flying bomb attacks, with a view to reducing to a minimum the interference with work while at the same time preventing avoidable casualties.

(8) Took note that the Minister of War Transport had taken steps to divert ammunition ships from the London Dock.

(9) Took note that the Prime Minister would make a comprehensive statement on flying bomb attacks in the House of Commons on Thursday, the 6th July. If the House desired to discuss the statement, the debate would have to be in secret session.

(10) Approved the proposal in W.P. (44) 358 that the casualty figures for the month of June should be published in the usual way, and the proposal in W.P. (44) 359 that, subject to appropriate safeguards, the ban on references to the London area in connection with these attacks should be lifted; and took note that in his statement to the House, the Prime Minister would include references to the casualty figures and to the fact that London had been the target of enemy attacks.

(11) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Chiefs of Staff to consider and report on possible counter-measures against Germany, in respect of the deliberate use of an indiscriminate form of attack.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
3rd July, 1944.
WAR CABINET 86 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Monday, 3rd July, 1944, at 8.45 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. O. Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. J. H. Morrison, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. H. Morrison, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. E. Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. A. Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. V. Cranborne, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. J. Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War (Item 1).
The Right Hon. W. S. Morrison, M.P., Minister of Town and Country Planning (Item 2).

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. V. Cranborne, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. J. Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War (Item 1).
The Right Hon. W. S. Morrison, M.P., Minister of Town and Country Planning (Item 2).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

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1. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 344) on the formation of a Jewish Force to participate in operations in Europe. Dr. Weizmann, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, had urged the formation of a Jewish fighting force within the British Army to take part in the liberation of Europe, and had suggested that the existing Palestine Jewish units should be joined together into a division or brigade group to provide the bulk of such a force, which would be supplemented by Jewish recruits from other sources. The Secretary of State for War felt, however, that the creation of a Jewish fighting formation, whether division, brigade group or infantry brigade, would inevitably cause a diversion of effort from the task of defeating the enemy in the shortest possible time. He was uneasy, too, at the political objections that could be urged to such proposals.

The Secretary of State for War said that, besides Dr. Weizmann’s project, Lord Strabolgi had now tabled a motion, for discussion in the House of Lords on the 4th July, urging that all Jews in all Allied countries should be organised into a single very substantial Jewish fighting force. It was necessary to consider the line to be taken by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War in the debate. In his own judgment the formation of a Jewish division was quite impracticable for quantitative reasons. He felt grave doubt as to the practicability even of a brigade group, from the formation of which he was averse for reasons which could be developed on another occasion. He suggested that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State should take the line that the creation of a division or any larger force was not practicable.

The Prime Minister felt that in view of the sufferings which the Jewish people were at present enduring there was a strong case for sympathetic consideration of projects in relation to them. He accepted the objections to a Jewish division, but felt that we should not refuse to examine the possibility of a brigade group.

A general discussion followed consequent on which the War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Government spokesman in the debate in the House of Lords on the following day should take the line that the creation of a Jewish division was impracticable because of the adverse effect which it would have on our organisation but that the possibility of forming a smaller unit, such as a brigade group, would be carefully examined.

2. The Lord President of the Council said that there had been considerable criticism of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Bill and many suggestions were being put forward for its amendment. The attitude of many members of the Labour Party on the debate on the Second Reading would be influenced by the lines which the Government took in regard to such criticism. The position would be eased if it could be indicated that the various points of view put forward would be fully considered on the Committee stage.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that there was no objection to its being indicated that it was the Government’s intention that there should be the fullest discussion of the points raised on the Committee stage of the Bill.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
3rd July, 1944.
W.M. (44)
87th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 87 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 4th July, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX, Secretary of State for Air Recreation.

The following was also present:
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Finance.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES ... ... Secretary.

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Air Raids.  
Attacks by Flying Bombs.  
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 35th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

1. Some discussion took place about the attacks by flying bombs, in the course of which the following points were made:

(i) The Prime Minister said that a considerable proportion of the letters received from the general public urged that countermeasures should be taken against Germany in respect of the use of this indiscriminate form of attack.

(ii) It was important that steps should be taken to look to the daily cleansing of the shelters in use. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security undertook to raise this point with the Minister of Health, with whose Department the responsibility rested.

(iii) It was stated that the term “seriously injured” covered all cases admitted to hospital, even for a very short period, and that this use of the term made the casualty list look worse than it was. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the present system of categorising casualties had been in force for a long time, and that there would be difficulties and disadvantages in adopting a new criterion at this stage. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security undertook to examine this point in consultation with the Minister of Health.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.

2. The War Cabinet were informed that General Alexander had arrived in this country for a short visit. The view was generally expressed that, provided there was no objection on military or security grounds, his visit to this country should be made public and that, if possible, General Alexander should make an appearance at some public gathering or ceremony which would provide an opportunity for some recognition of his achievements.

The Prime Minister undertook to find out from the military authorities whether any objection was seen to a public announcement of General Alexander’s visit to this country. Provided no objection was seen, the Prime Minister also undertook to consider what arrangements could be made to give effect to the War Cabinet’s suggestion as to General Alexander’s appearance at some public ceremony.

3. The War Cabinet had before them the following:

(i) A Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on our post-war financial commitments (W.P. (44) 353).

(ii) A Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction covering a draft of Part I of the White Paper on Social Insurance (W.P. (44) 356).

(iii) A Joint Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Minister of Reconstruction covering Part II of the draft White Paper on Social Insurance (W.P. (44) 357).

The War Cabinet had a general discussion of our post-war financial commitments, in the course of which it was pointed out that to a very considerable extent the social security scheme and other plans for improving the standard of life were dependent on building up a satisfactory volume of export trade after the war. It was also urged that there was need for caution in accepting any fresh financial commitments until we could see our way clearly through the grave difficulties of the post-war period.

On the other hand, it was urged that the introduction of a social security scheme would provide an element of stability after the war which would make an important contribution to industrial contentment and efficiency.
The main point dealt with in discussion was whether Parts I and II of the draft White Paper should be presented to Parliament forthwith, with a view to debates in both Houses before the Recess. In favour of this course, it was pointed out that, if the White Paper was not presented in time to enable a new Ministry of Social Security to be established by the end of the summer, there might be a year's delay in passing the necessary legislation. It was also urged that there was considerable public interest in the scheme, particularly among the fighting forces, and that delay in publishing the White Paper might be misinterpreted.

On the other hand, it was argued that, owing to other preoccupations, the schemes, if published now, would not receive the attention which they deserved from Parliament, the Press or the general public. Moreover, the Parliamentary time-table until the Recess was very tight, and, while it seemed just possible to find time for debates on the White Paper and for other essential business before the House rose for the Recess (the 4th August on present plans), there was no margin for unforeseen contingencies. It was also felt that a considerable volume of public opinion might feel that the Government was out of harmony with public feeling if, at the present juncture, it were to present a White Paper dealing with so far-reaching a scheme.

The War Cabinet—
(1) Decided that publication of Parts I and II of the White Paper on Social Insurance should take place when the House reassembled after the Recess.
(2) Agreed that the Leader of the House should, on an appropriate occasion, state that the White Paper would be presented when the House reassembled after the Recess, and should add that His Majesty's Government did not consider that the present was an appropriate moment to publish particulars of so far-reaching a scheme.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.
4th July, 1944.
SECRET.

W.M. (44)

88th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 88 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Friday, 7th July, 1944, at 11 a.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair for Items 1-3).

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Lord President of the Council (in the Chair for Item 4).

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.


The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State (Items 2-4).

The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 2-4).

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Item 1).

General Sir HAROLD ALEXANDER, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy (Item 1).

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALIFAX, His Majesty's Ambassador to the United States of America.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.


The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State (Items 2-4).

The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 2-4).

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Item 1).

General Sir HAROLD ALEXANDER, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy (Item 1).

The Right Hon. LAD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Item 1).

Air Marshal Sir DOUGLAS EVILL, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Item 1).

Lieut.-General A. F. HARDING, Chief of Staff, Allied Armies in Italy (Item 1).

Secretariat:

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.

General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.

Sir GILBERT LAITHERWAITE.

Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

Major-General L. C. HOLLIS.

Group Captain A. EARIE.
# WAR CABINET 38 (44).

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1. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the War Cabinet, extended a welcome to General Alexander. He was sure that the War Cabinet would like to hear from General Alexander an account of the Italian Campaign.

General Alexander gave the War Cabinet an account of the main outstanding points of the winter campaign in Italy, of the battle which had resulted in the capture of Rome, and of the future prospects in this theatre. A record of this account is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

At the conclusion of General Alexander's statement, The Prime Minister thanked him for the extremely lucid account which he had given. The War Cabinet had the highest admiration for General Alexander's achievements, and the fullest confidence that he would achieve still further success. On their behalf he wished General Alexander all good fortune.

2. At their meeting on the 29th June (W.M. (44) 84th Conclusions), when the War Cabinet had discussed the withdrawal of the special "Overlord" security restrictions, some objection had been taken to the withdrawal of restrictions in cases where a public announcement would be necessary, and it had been agreed that Sir Findlater Stewart should report further on these cases.

The War Cabinet now had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 374) covering a report prepared by Sir Findlater Stewart in consultation with the Departments concerned and with S.H.A.E.F.

Visitors' Ban.

The report pointed out that without a public announcement it would be impossible to reduce the area subject to the visitors' ban and very difficult to relax restrictions on entry into the banned area in favour of particular classes. S.H.A.E.F. were agreeable to the withdrawal of the ban in the area to the west of Southampton and to a public announcement about this change, but they would prefer that no addition should be made to the classes allowed to enter the areas left subject to the ban. On the other hand, the Ministry of Health and the Scottish Office asked that women and children from areas liable to attack by flying bombs should be allowed to enter the areas left subject to the ban.

The War Cabinet felt that it should be possible without a public announcement to arrange for some administrative relaxation of the restrictions on entry into the areas subject to the ban, in favour of persons from areas liable to attack by flying bombs. It might, for example, be possible for the local authorities of the areas liable to flying bomb attacks to inform persons in these areas that no objection would be taken to their entering the areas subject to the visitors' ban. In fact, a certain number of people from East London were already finding their way into areas in Essex subject to the ban; and the Police Authorities were not stopping this movement.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the proposal to remove the visitors' ban from the area west of Southampton and agreed that a public announcement about the change should be made.

(2) Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State for War, the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland, to consider what steps might be taken without a public announcement to relax the restrictions in the areas left subject to the visitors' ban, in order to permit the entry of persons from areas liable to attack by flying bombs.
Overseas Travel.

No general relaxation of the restrictions on overseas travel could be made without a public announcement and to this S.H.A.E.F. were strongly opposed. S.H.A.E.F. had agreed, however, that the Home Office should reinstate compassionate reasons in the list of criteria justifying the grant of an exit permit and should make an announcement to this effect.

The War Cabinet—

(3) Agreed that the restrictions on overseas travel should be retained, subject to the addition of compassionate reasons to the list of criteria justifying the grant of an exit permit, and that an announcement of this limited concession might be made.

Irish Travel.

A public announcement would be necessary if travel on ordinary business between Great Britain and Ireland was to be facilitated and if encouragement was to be given to the flow of Irish workers to Great Britain. If no public announcement were to be made— and S.H.A.E.F. were strongly against any such announcement—all that could be done was to relax the present stringent control of travel for compassionate reasons.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that if the Irish travel ban were relaxed generally at the present time, there was a danger that large numbers of Irish workers now in this country would immediately return to Ireland. He would therefore prefer that the ban should remain in force until the August Bank Holiday.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the present stringent control of travel should be relaxed and cases of hardship or great inconvenience might be considered as well as cases based strictly on compassionate grounds. He would probably be questioned in Parliament, and his reply would have to be on the lines that it was realised that the complete ban on travel to Ireland had imposed hardship on certain classes and that for this reason the Government were making certain relaxations of the restrictions.

It had been necessary to arrange for the transfer of a large number of the Gibraltarians who were now in London to Northern Ireland. Difficulties had arisen in finding accommodation for these Gibraltarians in Gibraltar and La Linea, and for this reason it was not possible to send all of them immediately back to their homes.

The War Cabinet—

(4) Agreed that the general restrictions on travel between Great Britain and Ireland should be retained.

(5) Authorised the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to relax the present stringent control of travel in order to cover certain types of cases in which the ban was causing hardship and great inconvenience; and, if need be, to make an announcement to this effect.

(6) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take up with the Governor of Gibraltar the question of sending back to Gibraltar a larger number of the Gibraltarians now in this country.

Air Lines.

If the Aer Lingus Teoranta and the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Services were reopened the fact would become known immediately, and for this reason it was suggested that the services should remain suspended for a further period. S.H.A.E.F. were in favour of this proposal and the Departments concerned accepted it.
The War Cabinet—

(7) Approved the proposal to defer the reopening of the Aer Lingus Teoranta and the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Services for a further period.

Telephone Calls to Ireland.

Although it would be possible to relax the restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland by administrative action, the relaxation would be bound to become known in a very short time. If, therefore, the general restrictions on Irish travel were maintained, the restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland should also remain.

The War Cabinet—

(8) Agreed that the restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland should be retained.

Expeditionary Force Messages.

If the ban on Expeditionary Force Messages were removed the enemy would soon know that the service had been restored, even though no public announcement were made. S.H.A.E.F. saw no objection to an announcement, since it was unlikely that the enemy would attach much importance to the reopening of the service.

The War Cabinet—

(9) Approved the restoration of the E.F.M. service.

Air Mail.

The air mail services to foreign countries and Gibraltar and to prisoners of war in Germany should be restored and that a public announcement to this effect should be made. S.H.A.E.F. would not object to a public announcement.

The War Cabinet—

(10) Agreed that the air mail services to foreign countries and Gibraltar and to prisoners of war in Germany should be restored.

Second-Class Mails to Northern Ireland and Gibraltar.

An amendment to the Control of Communications Order would be necessary in order to remove the restrictions on the export of parcels and local newspapers to the troops in Northern Ireland and Gibraltar. The enemy would attach little, if any, significance to this step.

The War Cabinet—

(11) Agreed that the Control of Communications Order should be amended so as to remove the restrictions on the export of parcels and local newspapers to the troops in Northern Ireland and Gibraltar.

Further Review of Restrictions.

It was suggested that the position should be reviewed in a month's time with a view to deciding, in the light of the situation, whether the restrictions which had not already been removed might be withdrawn. If in the meantime the situation changed the relaxation of the restrictions could be considered forthwith.

The War Cabinet—

(12) Agreed that on the 1st August Sir Findlater Stewart should review the restrictions still in force, in consultation with the Departments concerned and with S.H.A.E.F.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments as regards our policy towards Turkey. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Future World Organisation (W.P. (44) 370) to which were appended amended versions of Memoranda A and B (previously circulated as annexes to W.P. (44) 220).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that we were under an obligation at some stage to communicate to the United States and Soviet Governments Memoranda giving our views about Future World Organisation, with a view to non-committal discussions at the official level in Washington. In their revised form the Memoranda now before the War Cabinet took into account the views expressed by the Dominions Prime Ministers and were broadly in line with the wishes of the Dominions.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs did not anticipate difficulty with the Dominions. Canada had already agreed, subject to minor amendment. New Zealand and South Africa had agreed at the official level; Mr. Curtin, however, wished to submit the papers to his Government, and some delay might be inevitable there. He suggested that he should be authorised to telegraph to the Dominion Governments the amendments now proposed, and that the instructions ultimately given to our Delegation to Washington should also, when the time came, be communicated to the Dominions.

Lord Halifax pointed out that paragraph 46 of Memorandum B provided that there should be “no attempt to lay down in advance any rigid definition of the occasions on which such action should be taken” for the maintenance of peace and security, though that action when taken should be in accordance with the principles and objects of the World Organisation. It had recently been suggested to him that there would be advantage in distinguishing between the enforcement of the terms of peace to be imposed upon Germany and Japan, and general security. The enforcement of the peace terms might be expected to ensure the peace of the world for many years, and to become a matter in respect of which the President of the United States at the time could act in the same way as he had been able to act over the Nine-Power Treaty.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Memorandum had not been intended to exclude an arrangement of this nature. He would consider further the wording of Section 46 so as to ensure that it did not exclude action to enforce Treaties.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the revised version of Memoranda A and B appended to W.P. (44) 370, and Memoranda C, D, and E appended to W.P. (44) 220.

(2) Invited the Armistice and Post-War Committee to consider the points in regard to which those Memoranda set out alternative solutions, and to make recommendations to the War Cabinet upon them.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to communicate the amendments to Memoranda A and B as circulated under W.P. (44) 270 to the Dominion Governments, and agreed, that the instructions to our delegation at the informal discussions at Washington should also be communicated to them in due course.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 7th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 10th July, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

Lieutenant-General His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Representative of the Government of India.

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.


The Hon. Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Representative of the Government of India.

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.


The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.


The Right Hon. the Earl of Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare (Items 10–12).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1-9).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-9).  
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-9).

Secretariat:  
Sir Edward Bridges.  
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.  
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.  
Mr. W. S. Murrie.  
Mr. L. F. Burgis.

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**WAR CABINET 89 (44).**

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1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the events of the previous week.

Bad weather had interfered with bombing operations, but our bombers had flown 3,900 sorties, dropping 13,600 tons of bombs. Considerable damage had been done to the four "large sites" thought to be connected with the long-range rocket and to the caves in which flying bombs were stored. Forty-three out of 86 flying bomb launching sites had been hit and 4 out of the 7 supply sites had been badly damaged.

Our bombers had taken a successful part in the preliminary bombardment before the attack of the Second Army on Caen. United States heavy bombers had flown 4,500 sorties, dropping 7,700 tons of bombs on oil plants and targets in Germany. 2,200 tons of bombs had been dropped on "Crossbow" targets, railways and airfields in occupied territory.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 22,300 sorties and dropped 3,700 tons of bombs. The enemy had lost 344 aircraft as against Allied losses of 147 bombers, 81 fighters and 7 Coastal Command aircraft.

During the week 756 Flying Bombs had been launched, of which 427 (or 55 per cent.) had been destroyed. Our fighters had destroyed 156 over the sea and 190 over the land.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 13,520 tons. Total losses for July amounted to 33,466 tons. During July 4 U-boats had been destroyed and 2 probably destroyed.

Several minor naval actions had taken place in the North Sea and the Channel, during which a number of enemy E-boats and other craft had been destroyed. Attacks had been made by human torpedoes in the British Assault Area.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff described the fighting in Normandy. American forces, having cleared the Cherbourg Peninsula, had now attacked due south. In spite of difficult country progress had been satisfactory. British and Canadian forces had started an attack on the previous Saturday west of Caen; good initial progress had been made on either flank. The position at the moment was that our troops occupied a line along the River Odon from Verson through Caen. The enemy still held the portion of the town which lay south of the river. So far, 51,000 prisoners had been taken in Normandy.

The Prime Minister said that, on several occasions in Normandy, the enemy, after setting a number of delayed action mines, had surrendered. He asked the Secretary of State for War to consider whether special steps should be taken to ensure that German prisoners disclosed the location of mines, within their knowledge, timed to explode after their surrender.

In Italy there had been hard fighting on either flank, and the best progress had been made in the centre. The Germans were probably fighting a delaying action before falling back to the Pisa–Rimini line.

Since the Russian offensive north of the Pripez Marshes had begun on the 22nd June, their forces had advanced in some places as much as 200 miles. The capture of Vilna was important, since the German forces to the north could now only be evacuated by one railway line or by sea.

The Prime Minister said that while the news from the various battle-fronts was good, the public should not be led to expect that...
the war against Germany would end this year. He had noticed some over-optimism in the press which needed to be corrected.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The Prime Minister said that he thought it might be necessary to publish the total casualties suffered by all three services in all campaigns against Italy since the beginning of the war. Figures had been furnished to him by the War Office in respect of the Army. He asked the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for Air to furnish corresponding particulars for the Navy and Royal Air Force.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments about Turkey.

A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that the arrangements which we had hoped to make, under which the leading role in Greek matters would have been played by His Majesty’s Government and in Roumanian matters by the U.S.S.R., had broken down. The Soviet Government, on being informed of the conditions attached by the United States to their acceptance of that proposal, had indicated that they considered it necessary to give it further consideration and to make a direct approach to the United States Government. Failure to obtain this understanding could only add to the difficulties of dealing with a rapidly-changing situation.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that the War Cabinet would be familiar with the latest developments in the Greek situation. E.A.M. had put forward demands which the Greek Government were quite unable to accept. M. Papandreou had asked that he should have an assurance of support from His Majesty’s Government in the line he was taking. It seemed clear that in existing conditions it was our duty to support M. Papandreou and his Government. Subject to the approval of the War Cabinet, he would take that line in Parliament.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the position, and approved the course of action proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that General de Gaulle’s visit to Washington seemed to have gone very well.

The Prime Minister said that President Roosevelt appeared to have avoided discussing matters of detail and also the question whether the French National Committee should be styled a provisional Government. General de Gaulle had been received with all honour, but as a Commander-in-Chief and not as the Head of a State. He thought that, after the General had left the United States, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should enquire through the State Department what had passed, and thereafter press for acceptance of the arrangements for the control of civil affairs in France that had emerged from the Viénot conversations in London. He hoped that the United States Government would be willing to
agree to a settlement on this basis. If they were not, we might have to consider taking independent action.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the action proposed by the Prime Minister.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that, after consulting the Lord President of the Council, he recommended that we should not proceed with the Money Resolution of the Town and Country Planning Bill until near the Committee stage. It had been arranged that on the first day's debate on the second reading the Minister of Town and Country Planning should open and the Parliamentary Secretary should reply. It might be necessary that a member of the War Cabinet should speak on the second day's debate. He thought that the Government should press to get a Second Reading of the Bill, making it clear that there would be ample time for discussion of points of difficulty after the Second Reading. He hoped that some of his War Cabinet colleagues would be able to be present on the Bench during the debate.

The War Cabinet—
Expressed general approval of these arrangements.

7. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security gave the War Cabinet the latest casualty figures, namely, 3,197 killed, 8,954 seriously injured, 10,023 slightly injured and 36 unclassified, making a total of 22,210. Earlier in the day he had visited his constituency, where a bomb had recently fallen, causing considerable damage to small houses. Although the Civil Defence Services were working well and everything possible was being done for the victims of the attack, there was a certain amount of discontent and a tendency to criticise the Government for not doing more to prevent the attacks.

The Minister of Health said that a recent visit to Croydon had given him the impression that, on the whole, morale was extremely good and that people were standing the attacks with more fortitude than in the first week or two. He had formed the same impression when visiting the East End in the previous week.

The Prime Minister said that it would be wrong to hold out hopes that the attacks would diminish in scale in the near future. The Civil Defence Services had done excellent work and must continue to do everything possible to comfort and help people who lost their homes. Such people should be offered accommodation in areas outside London, and it was for consideration whether they should not be pressed to leave London.

The following points arose in discussion:—

(a) Although the accommodation in the Rest Centres was excellent, persons whose houses had been damaged often preferred to stay in the damaged houses or to go to friends. It would help such homeless persons if arrangements could be made to distribute hot meals to them by means of mobile canteens.

(b) The Minister of Aircraft Production said that he was afraid that, if pressure were put on homeless persons to move into other areas, this might have an adverse effect on production. The War Cabinet were informed that the Ministry of Production, in consultation with the Supply Departments, were preparing a report for submission to the Lord President's Committee on the loss of production due to flying bomb attacks.

(c) The Minister of Health reported that the total number of persons registered for evacuation in the London region and in the rural areas affected by the attacks was 120,000, of whom 45,000 had been moved out.
Air Raids.

[Previous Reference: W.M.(44)85th Conclusions, Minute 4.]
Attacks by Flying Bombs: Public Warning System.

(d) The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security reported that the street shelters continued to be popular. He promised to furnish a report showing the number of casualties among persons using street shelters.

e) The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he would be glad if Ministers who had occasion to make speeches would pay tribute to the spirit with which Londoners were meeting the attacks.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of the information given by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and of the points raised in discussion.

8. The War Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 377) and by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 378) about the public warning system.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he had carefully considered whether the warning system could be modified so as to reduce to a minimum interference with work and, at the same time, prevent avoidable casualties. Under existing arrangements in the Greater London area, the siren was normally not sounded in the day time for isolated flying bombs, and an attempt was made to give the raiders passed signal as soon as possible. When a warning was given at or near dusk, the raiders passed signal was not normally given until an opportunity occurred after 6 a.m. the following day. So far as the rest of South-East England was concerned, warnings were not normally given for flying bombs passing over the area. It had been made clear to the public that the siren was an alert and not an alarm and it was generally treated as such. The sounding of the siren was useful as a warning to those in charge of children and to elderly people, and experience had shown that workers attached importance to it as a warning to their families. Moreover, it was an advantage of the present system that once the raiders passed signal had sounded the public were able to relax. On the whole, therefore, he was of opinion that the siren should continue to be sounded. If the War Cabinet felt that it was desirable, he was prepared to try the experiment of cutting down the length of the warning by half.

The Prime Minister said that there appeared to be no objection to the sounding of sirens at dusk, and in the daytime when numbers of flying bombs were approaching London. It was, however, worth considering whether there should not be an extension of the system of giving some warning of imminent danger. He suggested that the whole question of the public warning system should be examined further by the Civil Defence Committee.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to bring before the Civil Defence Committee the question of improving the public warning system, with particular reference to the possibility of an extension of the system of giving warning of imminent danger.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 385) about evacuation into the protected areas.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security recalled that at their Meeting on the 7th July the War Cabinet had invited him in consultation with other Ministers concerned to consider whether administrative arrangements could be made to allow persons not falling within the permitted classes to enter and remain in protected areas, if they came from areas liable to attack from flying bombs, on the understanding that no public announcement
would be made of the relaxation. Prior to this decision steps had already been taken to prevent the police from expelling or prosecuting persons in priority classes who came to the banned areas from London. The arrangements made with the police, however, could only be temporary, and the present situation, under which persons who ignored the law were allowed to remain in the areas while law-abiding persons who had friends or relatives in the banned areas were deterred from leaving London, was indefensible. He accordingly proposed that it should be stated in Parliament on the following day that, although for operational reasons the visitors' ban must be retained, there would be added to the classes of persons already permitted to enter the protected areas under the Protected Areas Orders, an additional class, viz., persons in the priority classes from London and certain other evacuable areas in Southern England evacuated under the Government Evacuation Scheme or holding an evacuation certificate from a Local Authority under that Scheme. The War Cabinet should know that S.H.A.E.F. would prefer that no public announcement should be made about the addition of this class. In his view, however, which was shared by the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Health, it was essential that a public announcement should be made.

The Secretary of State for War supported the proposal of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security. He pointed out that at their meeting on the 7th July the War Cabinet had agreed that the ban should be lifted in the area west of Southampton. In order to facilitate the evacuation of organised parties of school children to that area, no announcement had yet been made of the lifting of the ban and it had been suggested that an announcement should be deferred for a further week. He would have to answer Parliamentary Questions on the subject of the ban the following day, and it would be convenient if he could announce at that time that the ban on the area west of Southampton was to be removed.

The Minister of Health said that he would raise no objection to an announcement the following day to the effect that from Wednesday the ban on the area west of Southampton would be lifted.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that on the following day it should be announced that the ban on the coastal area west of Southampton would be lifted from Wednesday, the 12th July, 1944.

(2) Agreed that the Secretary of State for War should make it clear that, while the ban on the remaining protected areas must be retained for operational reasons, persons in the priority classes from London and certain other evacuable areas in Southern England would be allowed to enter these areas for the purpose of taking up residence, if they were evacuated under the Government Evacuation Scheme or held a certificate from the Local Authority under the Scheme.

U.S.S.R.
Parliamentary Delegation.
(Previous References: W.M. (42) 23rd Conclusions, Minute 1; and W.M. (42) 174th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

10. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 376), proposing that the necessary travel facilities should be given to a delegation from the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party to visit Russia in order to establish contact and enter into negotiations with the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

(ii) a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (W.P. (44) 383), suggesting that it would be preferable if the delegation were an all-Party Parliamentary one.
It was explained that when this proposal had first been raised in December 1942, it had been thought that it would be difficult for His Majesty’s Government to facilitate a visit to Russia by a delegation representing only one political party. Consideration had therefore been given to arranging that a delegation representing each of the main political parties, and both Houses of Parliament should visit Russia. Difficulties had, however, arisen and the proposal had never been carried out. Since then the Soviet Ambassador had intimated that the Soviet Authorities welcomed a proposal made by the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party to send a delegation to Moscow, and the Secretary of the Labour Party had accordingly approached the Foreign Office.

The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that a visit by representatives of a single political party would be liable to misrepresentation, and that it was most desirable that a further attempt should be made to arrange for an all-party Parliamentary delegation to visit Russia. Any such delegation would, of course, visit not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but the Supreme Soviet. The delegation should include representatives of each of the political parties supporting the present Government.

In discussion, reference was made to a proposal that the Co-operative Union should send a delegation to Russia and a delegation to China. It was explained that the Co-operative Union was distinct from the Co-operative Party, and that visits from the Union to foreign countries would not be regarded as having any special political significance.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Invited the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for Air and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to consult together, with a view to arranging a visit to the U.S.S.R. by a Parliamentary delegation, representative of the parties supporting the present Government.

(2) Agreed that no objection should be taken to the proposal that delegations from the Co-operative Union should visit Russia and China.

11. The War Cabinet again had under consideration the question whether His Majesty’s Government should make a declaration in general terms about the restoration of a free and independent Siam after the war, and had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 365) containing the text of a revised declaration in which the Dominion Governments had expressed their concurrence.

In discussion, the following points were made:—

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander, S.E.A.C., was strongly in favour of a declaration on the lines suggested.

(b) The declaration was in unduly favourable terms, bearing in mind the attitude of Siam in going to war with us notwithstanding the treaty of non-aggression between the two countries.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs explained that the President of the United States had already made a statement which went a good deal further than the revised declaration set out in W.P. (44) 365, and that it was felt that some statement should be made to restore the balance.

(c) Sir Firoz Khan Noon stated that, if a declaration were made in the terms proposed about Siam, we should be asked to make corresponding statements about neighbouring territories—for example, certain of the Malay States. It was also urged that it was undesirable to make a statement about the future of Siam until we had made one about the future of Burma.
(d) It was also felt that it would be better not to make a declaration of this kind until we had recovered some of the territories which we had lost in the Far East.

(e) The Minister of Economic Warfare doubted whether the proposed declaration would be of much assistance so far as concerned S.O.E.'s operational projects.

For these reasons, the War Cabinet reached the conclusion that it would be premature to make a declaration about Siam in the terms proposed at this juncture.

12. The Prime Minister said that this was the last meeting of the War Cabinet which His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who was leaving for India on the following day, would attend. On his return he was going to visit the Indian troops in Italy, who had fought so well under General Alexander. He hoped that the Maharaja would convey to them the War Cabinet's high appreciation of their achievements.

The Prime Minister said that it had been a great pleasure that His Highness should have attended the War Cabinet and the important discussions with the Dominion Prime Ministers earlier in the summer. It was a source of satisfaction that the ruler of one of the leading Indian States, who had contributed in full measure to the common cause, should have been a representative of India in the War Council of the Empire at such a critical time.

The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir thanked the Prime Minister for what he had said. He would convey the War Cabinet's message to the Indian troops. He would also be in a position to tell them in India something of the greatness of the war effort and of the spirit of the people of this country in the fifth year of this prolonged struggle.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.
10th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 12th July, 1944, at 6.15 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. the EARL OF HALIFAX, His Majesty's Ambassador to the United States of America.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3-5).
The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty (Items 1-5).
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIFFES, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production (Items 1-5).
The Right Hon. R. S. HIRSDSON, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 1).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal (Items 1-5).
Colonel the Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 3-6).
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply (Item 1).
The Right Hon. Hugh DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 3-5).
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food (Item 1).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General (Items 1-5).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
## WAR CABINET 90 (44).

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1. The War Cabinet had before them—
   (i) A Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 375) setting out the results of the consideration given by the Ministerial Committee on Man-Power to the man-power allocations for the second half of 1944.
   (ii) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 316) dealing with the man-power requirements for the Army in 1944-45.

The following were the main points in discussion:

**Service Allocations.**

(a) The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that the Man-Power Committee proposed to give the Army an intake of 49,500 men in July and August. This would consist of 28,300, representing the whole of the balance of the new call-up, 6,000 men from the R.A.F. deferred list, 4,000 additional men whose call-up would be brought forward to July and August and who would be replaced by releases from the R.A.F. deferred list later in the year, and transfers of 6,200 and 5,000 trained men from the Navy and the R.A.F. respectively. The men transferred from the Navy and the R.A.F. should be Grade I and, so far as was necessary, compensation should be given to the Navy and R.A.F. by the transfer to them of men of a lower medical category from the Army.

(b) The Prime Minister said that he was glad to note that the Committee had been able to provide for an intake of 49,500 men into the Army during July and August.

(c) The Secretary of State for Air pointed out that if only 4,500 men were provided for the R.A.F. in July and August, it would be necessary either to reduce the number of front line squadrons or to place an increased strain on the men serving in these squadrons. Every effort would be made to avoid any reduction in the front line squadrons but it should be realised that it would be necessary to make increased use of skilled men to perform unskilled work.

(d) The Prime Minister said that he doubted whether the maintenance of the Navy at its present strength could now be justified, having regard to the great reduction in the naval forces of our enemies and to the size of the United States naval forces in the Pacific. Although the figures proposed by the Ministerial Committee should be accepted provisionally, it was desirable that the Defence Committee should consider whether a substantial reduction of, say, 200,000 men, should not be made in the Navy over the next twelve months.

The First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that a very large cut had been made in the Navy in the previous year. Since then the Navy had been called on to undertake new tasks in connection with the invasion of the Continent in the shape of bombarding the enemy coast, manning landing craft and providing beach and port parties. It was also necessary to provide against the new submarine offensive which was threatened, and to build up Naval forces for the Japanese war.

**Civil Defence.**

(e) The allocation made by the War Cabinet in December, 1943, involved a reduction in the Civil Defence Services of 50,000 during
1944, 27,000 being non-replaced wastage and 23,000 actual releases. Wastage was taking place at the estimated rate but it had been found necessary to postpone the planned releases and the Committee considered that they could not ask the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to release more than 11,000 by the end of September. They recommended that the Chiefs of Staff should make a new appreciation of the risk of air attack and that, in the meantime, the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security should prepare a scheme for the release of personnel in certain areas which could be put into operation without delay if and when the War Cabinet decided some disbandment in those areas could take place. Similar plans should be prepared by the Chiefs of Staff for the release of personnel from A.A. defences and fighter stations in the less vulnerable areas.

(f) The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he had taken into account the fact that London and the neighbouring area formed the main target of attack and had encouraged the maximum mobility and adaptability among Civil Defence workers (e.g. by training firemen in rescue work). The Civil Defence forces in the less vulnerable areas had already been reduced very substantially and reinforcements were being drawn on from these areas for London. If it was decided that additional risks might be taken in certain areas, it would be possible to effect savings both in Civil Defence personnel and in the personnel of the Regional Organisation.

(g) The Prime Minister suggested that the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security might consider the possibility of awarding a civil defence medal to Civil Defence personnel who had volunteered for service in any part of the country.

Supply Departments.

(h) The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that the Man-Power Committee were satisfied that owing to the new operational demands which the Ministry of Supply had to meet, it was impossible to secure the original planned reduction of 220,000, and it was proposed that the reduction in the second half of 1944 should be 110,000, making a total reduction during the year of 170,000. The Admiralty and the Ministry of Aircraft Production had already reduced their labour forces to the full extent of the reductions originally planned for 1944, but further reductions of 37,000 in the Admiralty labour force and of 112,000 in the Ministry of Aircraft Production labour force should be made in the second half of the year. The Supply Departments should forthwith consider, through the Joint War Production Staff, how, assuming that the war against Germany continued into the first half of 1945, their programmes could be related to the Service intakes in the remainder of the year and the probable strengths of the Services in the first half of 1945. The Supply Departments should work to the provisional allocations since, even if some slight relaxation were found possible in the August review, it would only postpone the reductions by a short time.

(j) The Minister of Supply explained that one of the main reasons why it had not been possible for the Ministry of Supply to make the planned reductions in their personnel was the additional demand for ammunition—chiefly 25-pounder—which had been made earlier in the year. This alone had meant the employment of 30,000 additional workers and there had been additional demands for a large range of other supplies. With the help of the Ministry of Labour the task of manning the filling factories, in order to produce the new supplies of ammunition, had been carried out smoothly.

The Minister of Production said that the ammunition position appeared to be satisfactory. The figures at the 1st June showed an increase in stocks despite the expenditure of ammunition in the battle of Italy.
(k) The Minister of Aircraft Production said that he had made a provisional estimate showing the effect on the output of aircraft of the reductions proposed by the Ministerial Committee. Once those reductions were made it would not be possible to increase the output programme again.

In reply to a Question by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Air said that the target for the Royal Air Force was 500 squadrons by September 1944 and 529 squadrons by September 1945. The present strength of heavy bombers was 90 squadrons at home and overseas, which were due to increase to 95 squadrons by September 1944 and to 128 squadrons by September 1945. The cuts proposed would mean a reduction of 3 Halifax squadrons and 1 Lancaster squadron below the target for December 1944, and of 9 Halifax and 3 Lancaster squadrons below the target for June 1945.

(l) It was pointed out that the War Cabinet had hitherto proceeded on the assumption of the maximum impact in 1944, and that it was impossible to plan on the assumption that the strengths of the Services should continue to rise during 1945. In these circumstances the planned expansion of the R.A.F. in 1945 ought to be reviewed.

(m) The First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that the cuts which the reductions have required to be made in the allocation could not be made at the expense of shipbuilding or heavy engineering and must come from the manufacture of equipment. The result would be that there would be delay in the completion of ships for the Navy.

Industries and Services in Groups II and III.

(n) The Committee recommended a reduced global allocation of 75,000 men, as compared with an original allocation of 123,000; and for industries and Services in Group III a global allocation of 35,000, as compared with an original allocation of 49,000. In Group II the allocations for coalmining and the merchant navy would have to be met in full. If the global allocations for Groups II and III were approved, it would be necessary to consider their distribution among the industries and services concerned. It was not now expected that the industries and services in Group III which were due to give up labour, would be able to conform to the original allocations, but Departments should continue to regard these allocations as targets and make every effort to achieve them.

(o) The Minister of Food said that since the beginning of the year there had been a reduction instead of an increase in the man-power employed on food production. Particular difficulties were being experienced in the production of flour and margarine and in oil crushing, and the hours worked in these trades were excessive. He hoped that in the distribution of the global allocation to Group II the needs of the food industries would be kept in mind.

(p) The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries said that the peak demands for agricultural labour would arise in August and September, and that it was impossible for the agricultural industry to await the proposed review at the end of August. It had been impossible to find suitable recruits for the Women's Land Army up to the number allocated, and he suggested that it would be helpful if additional prisoners of war were allocated to the agricultural industry. He understood that most of the German prisoners of war were being sent to the United States and that it had hitherto been found impossible to employ German prisoners of war on agricultural work in this country because of the proportion of guards required.

The Prime Minister said that the possibility of employing German prisoners of war on agricultural work should be explored, as a matter of urgency, and that in the meantime no further batches of prisoners of war should be sent to the United States.
The War Cabinet’s conclusions were as follows:

1. The intakes into the three Services and the transfers between the Services during July and August proposed in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph 28 of W.P. (44) 375 were approved.

2. The provisional man-power allocations for the six months, the 1st July–31st December, 1944, proposed in paragraph 27 of W.P. (44) 375 were approved, on the general understanding that these allocations would be reviewed towards the end of August, and subject also to the specific points referred to below.

3. As regards Civil Defence, it was agreed that before the August review—
   (a) the Chiefs of Staff should prepare a new appreciation of the risk of air attack;
   (b) the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Chiefs of Staff would prepare a scheme for the release of personnel from Civil Defence and A.D.G.B. in the less vulnerable areas which could be put into immediate operation if and when the War Cabinet decided that the risk of disbanding these services in those areas could be accepted.

4. For the purpose of the review in August 1944 the Supply Departments should consider through the machinery of the Joint War Production Staff the implications of the provisional intakes and allocations approved, and should review their programmes for the first half of 1945 on the basis that still further cuts in the munitions industries would then become necessary.

5. The provisional allocation proposed for the Ministry of Aircraft Production was also subject to the proviso that it should be reviewed in the light of an examination to be undertaken by the Defence Committee of the assumption as to the strength of the Royal Air Force in 1945 to which the current aircraft programme should be related. Thus should it be assumed that the strength of the Royal Air Force would not be expanded in 1945 beyond the strength which it was planned to reach at the end of 1944?

6. Note was taken that the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Minister of Food contemplated difficulties if further cuts were made in agriculture and food industries. The points raised would be taken into account in the allocations to Group II Industries.

7. In connection with agriculture, attention was drawn to the question whether further help could be found from prisoners of war.

8. The Minister of Labour and National Service was asked to examine, in consultation with the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, the Secretary of State for War, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for Scotland, the possibility of employing German prisoners on agricultural work.

9. Pending this enquiry the Secretary of State for War was asked to take steps to see that further batches of German prisoners were not sent from this country to the United States.

10. Note was taken of the Prime Minister's statement that he proposed to ask the Defence Committee to consider whether a substantial reduction could not be effected in Vote A over, say, the ensuing twelve months.
2. At their meeting on the 17th February, 1944 (W.M. (44) 22nd Conclusions, Minute 2), the War Cabinet had approved in principle a White Paper setting out a scheme for reallocation of man-power after the end of the war with Germany, but had deferred a decision as to the date of publication.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 336) stating that he would like to start consultations with both sides of industry on this matter as soon as possible, but could not do so pending publication of the scheme.

After a short discussion the War Cabinet—

Decided that publication of the scheme should stand over until after the Summer Recess.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a joint memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (W.P. (44) 363) reporting that, as approved by the War Cabinet on the 27th April (W.M. (44) 58th Conclusions, Minute 3) they had discussed the question of closer union between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia during his recent visit to this country, and had informed him that the United Kingdom Government considered amalgamation of the three territories under existing circumstances to be impracticable. They had at the same time put to him proposals for a permanent Inter-Territorial Council.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that Sir Godfrey Huggins, while disappointed at the decision, did not seem to be surprised or unduly upset by it. He had indicated that he would have to consult his colleagues about a public announcement. There were arguments for and against such an announcement, but on balance if the Southern Rhodesian Government should favour one he and the Secretary of State for the Colonies recommended that His Majesty’s Government should agree.

The Prime Minister suggested postponement of a decision on this matter until the result of Sir Godfrey Huggins’s consultations with his colleagues was known, when the matter should again be considered by the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the Prime Minister’s suggestion.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 371) reporting that the Government of India were anxious to have plans ready in the event of its becoming necessary to rearrest Gandhi, and that they favoured his internment, in company with the Congress Working Committee, in Ahmednagar Fort. The Aga Khan’s palace was no longer available.

The Secretary of State for India said that the proposal before the War Cabinet represented the considered view of the Viceroy and the Government of India, whose judgment he felt might properly be accepted on a matter such as this.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Government of India’s proposal should be accepted.
5. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 372) describing the present position as regards ministerial government in Bengal and Orissa. In Bengal there was a possibility that the ministerial government, which Mr. Casey had so far with difficulty been able to keep going, might in the near future collapse. In that event he considered, and the Viceroy agreed, that if the Ministry were to fall in the circumstances described in W.P. (44) 372, Mr. Casey would be fully justified in taking over the administration under Section 93 of the Government of India Act.

The Secretary of State for India felt that the War Cabinet should be aware well in advance of the possibility that it might be necessary to resort to the provisions of Section 93 in the case of Bengal, and he proposed to inform the Viceroy of his general approval of the policy recommended by him and by the Governor.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the position in Bengal and approved the course proposed by the Secretary of State for India.

The Secretary of State for India informed the War Cabinet that in Orissa, for local reasons, the Ministry had resigned and it had not been possible to form an alternative Ministry. The Governor had accordingly been obliged to issue a Proclamation under Section 93 and once again take over the administration. No important reactions on the Indian political scene were expected.

The War Cabinet—

(2) Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for India.

6. The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that the question of the succession to Sir Harold McMichael when his term of office as High Commissioner for Palestine expired some months hence had been under consideration and informed them of the name which he had it in mind to submit for His Majesty's approval when the time came.

The War Cabinet—

Expressed full agreement with the Prime Minister's proposal.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
12th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Monday, 17th July, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 7 and 8).
Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Items 7 and 8).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
The Right Hon. H. U. Willink, K.C., M.P., Minister of Health (Items 7 and 8).
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. W. Whiteley, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 7 and 8).
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Sir Gilbert Latchwaite.
Mr. W. S. Murie.
Mr. L. F. Burgess.
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The Chiefs of Staff reported the chief events of the previous week.

Bad weather had again interfered with bombing operations, but our bombers had dropped 8,000 tons of bombs, including 5,000 tons on flying-bomb targets. Mosquitoes had carried out several harassing attacks on targets in Germany.

United States heavy bombers had dropped 9,000 tons of bombs, practically all on Germany. 6,000 tons had been dropped on Munich, causing very heavy damage.

Fortresses had successfully dropped supplies to the Maquis. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 15,000 sorties, dropping 2,200 tons of bombs.

The enemy had lost 91 aircraft as against Allied losses of 173 aircraft.

In Normandy, 25,000 Allied sorties had been flown as against 2,700 by the enemy.

Flying Bombs

During the week, 593 flying bombs had been launched, of which 259 (or 44 per cent.) had been destroyed, 180 of them by fighters, 57 by A.A. guns, and 22 by balloons. 168 flying bombs had reached London compared with 265 in the previous week.

Mediterranean

In the Mediterranean, Allied aircraft had dropped 7,500 tons of bombs, half of them on communications targets in Italy, France and Hungary. Most of the bridges over the River Po had been destroyed.

Naval Operations

During the previous week, confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 7,174 tons. Total losses for July to date amounted to 40,640 tons.

Four U-boats had been destroyed and 3 probably destroyed so far this month.

The First Sea Lord was asked to report, in a week's time, on the anticipated improvements in German U-boat construction.

Normandy

The clearing of Cherbourg harbour was going on well.

Military Operations

Some advance had been made along almost the whole Normandy front. American forces had made progress on the right flank although handicapped by difficult terrain. British forces had made some advances in the Caen area. The enemy were resisting strongly, and whenever we gained ground counter-attacked immediately. Up to the 11th July, 54,635 prisoners had been captured.

In Italy, an appreciable advance had been made along the whole front.

The Russian offensive had made good progress during the week, the advance having averaged 50 miles between the River Dvina and the Pripet. Bridgeheads had been established across the Niemen. The German Armies in Estonia and Latvia still showed no signs of withdrawing.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

Casualties

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 89th Conclusions, Minute 2)

2. The War Cabinet were informed that the total casualties, both American and British, in Normandy up to the 11th July were 94,000, 33,000 (4,800 killed) being British and 51,000 (7,800 killed) United States forces.

Bread for British Forces in Normandy

3. The attention of the War Cabinet was drawn to a report in the Daily Mail that our forces in Normandy were not receiving a sufficient ration of bread.

The Secretary of State for War undertook to look into this question. He thought that the solution might be to accelerate the
shipment to Normandy of further mobile bakeries. Six of the twelve bakeries earmarked for this theatre were already in Normandy. It was pointed out, however, that shipping priorities were the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. The War Cabinet had some discussion regarding the operation of the censorship by SHAEF Censorship authorities in Normandy. It was stated that messages from Press correspondents in Normandy forecasting the direction of future operations had been passed by the SHAEF censors. It was generally felt that the censorship machinery in Normandy required tightening up.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that the public would react very strongly if they felt that any news appearing in the Press endangered the lives of our troops in France.

The view was generally expressed that all speculation by war correspondents on future offensive movements should be discouraged.

The Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Information undertook to provide the Prime Minister with a statement about present censorship arrangements in Normandy.

The Prime Minister said that, on receipt of this statement, he would take the matter up with General Eisenhower or General Bedell Smith.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in connection with Turkey. A discussion and conclusions are recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he and the Secretary of State for War had had under consideration the disposal of the 1,500 or so Russians who had been captured in France fighting for the Germans. He suggested that we should hand them back to the Russians. But in order not to discourage surrender on the part of others impressed by the Germans to fight against us, we should ask that no steps should be taken to deal with these Russians until the end of hostilities.

It was suggested that we might use these men on agricultural work.

After some general discussion the Prime Minister, summing up, said that he thought we should inform the Soviet Government that we had captured these prisoners; and add that, while we did not know how they came to be fighting on the German side, they had shown every desire to be hostile to Germany. We should ask the Soviet Government what they would like us to do with these men. If they replied asking for repatriation, we should have to agree, but should point out that, for reasons of transport, it might be a considerable time before the men could be sent to Russia. We might, as an alternative, say that these men would be of some use to us as agricultural labourers and enquire whether the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to our using them for that purpose for the time being.

If this course was agreed to, any difficulties in regard to finding accommodation in this country for these men should be overcome.

The War Cabinet——

Agreed with the Prime Minister’s suggestion, and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War to proceed accordingly.
The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security gave the War Cabinet the latest information about the flying bomb attacks. In London the main weight was still concentrated on areas South of the river. Casualties up to date were 3,693 killed, 10,537 seriously wounded, 12,192 lightly wounded and 14 unclassified.

The Minister of Health reported that out of a total of roughly 2½ million houses in London, about 14,000 had been destroyed and 554,000 damaged. In the past week, thanks to the increased labour force available and the diminution in the weight of the attack it had been possible to reduce the arrears of houses requiring repair from 211,000 to 152,000. The Ministers concerned had agreed to aim at a labour force of 50,000 on repairs, and this figure should be achieved shortly.

The evacuation arrangements were working smoothly. A section of the Press had given prominence to difficulties in certain areas, but the response from householders in the reception areas had been remarkably good. He would be glad if the Prime Minister could, at some suitable opportunity, express appreciation of the part which they were playing.

Besides organised evacuation, many people had left London under their own arrangements. The Ministry of Food were trying to estimate the extent to which the population of London had decreased.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, reported that a rearrangement of the active defences had been put into force with a view to reducing the extent of interference between the A.A. guns and the fighters. It was believed that the new arrangements, which had been made with the agreement of both Commanders, would reduce interference between guns and fighters.

The Chief of the Air Staff, who expressed some doubts whether the rearrangement would in practice prove to be an improvement on the previous system, said that attacks on launching sites and supply depots were continuing in so far as weather conditions permitted.

Reference was made to the threat of rocket attack. The War Cabinet were informed that an appreciation had been prepared in the Air Ministry for submission to the Chiefs of Staff.

Attention was drawn to the importance of assessing the likelihood and probable scale of rocket attack from the point of view of the strain on man-power resources, particularly building labour.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he had intended to submit a memorandum to the War Cabinet on new civil defence problems in the event of rocket attacks.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that on the following day he would have to state the attitude of the Government to the suggestion that there should be a debate in Secret Session on the subject of the flying bomb attacks. He thought that the House as a whole did not want a debate in Secret Session. It might, however, be advisable if the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the other Ministers concerned were to have a further meeting with Members whose constituencies were affected by the attacks, on the lines of that held on the 11th July.

In discussion it was suggested that it might be convenient if two meetings were held. At one the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, together with the Minister of Health and other Ministers concerned, could deal with civil defence matters. At the other the Secretary of State for Air and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, could explain our active defence measures. It would be preferable if both meetings could be deferred until the following week, but if the general feeling of the House was in favour of an earlier meeting the civil defence meeting might be held in the present week. Arrangements would be made to admit to the meetings any members of the House of Lords who desired to attend.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the reports made to them on the progress of measures to counter the flying bomb attacks and to mitigate their effect on the civil population.

(2) Agreed that the proposal for a debate in Secret Session should not be accepted, but that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should offer to arrange for two informal confidential meetings between members whose constituencies were affected by the attacks and the Ministers concerned. At one meeting information would be given about the measures taken to mitigate the effect of the attacks on the civil population, while at the other information would be given about active defence measures.

Killing of Survivors of s.s. "Peleus" by U 852.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (W.P. (44) 388).

The First Lord of the Admiralty explained that the Greek s.s. Peleus had been torpedoed and sunk in March by a U-Boat which had attempted to kill all the survivors, three of whom had escaped by shamming dead. Later, intelligence had come to hand that this cold-blooded murder had been carried out by a German U-Boat which had been sunk in May, nearly 50 survivors having been captured and fallen into our hands. Affidavits had been taken from the three survivors of the s.s. Peleus and from some of the U-Boat prisoners, and further statements would be taken.

It had been arranged with the War Office that the crew should be retained in the United Kingdom instead of being sent to Canada. In due course those against whom there was evidence would be put on trial.

It was not proposed that trial should take place until the end of hostilities. But in order to protect our merchant seamen against the repetition of such an incident, it was proposed that the Greek Government should be invited to protest strongly to the German Government about this atrocity. It was also proposed that we should inform the German Government that we held in our hands the survivors of the U-Boat which appeared to be responsible for the incident which was the subject of the protest by the Greek Government, that we were making further investigations, but that we must insist that the most categorical instructions were given to U-Boat commanders to prevent the repetition of such an incident.

The course of action proposed by the First Lord of the Admiralty had been the subject of consultation with the Foreign Office and was supported by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In discussion, the view was expressed that the action proposed was unlikely to have any deterrent effect upon the Germans, and that the only result of a protest on the lines suggested would be to make the facts known, including the fact that we had made a protest which (it was argued) would prove ineffectual. The really important point was to make sure that the men against whom we had evidence of this crime were securely guarded and that there was no risk of their escaping.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that if the men in question were kept in special confinement we were bound to disclose the fact to the Protecting Power, who would have to be told the reason.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that action should be taken to retain the whole crew of the U. 852 in the United Kingdom, and that care should be taken to separate those believed guilty of this
crime from those who had given testimony. Stringent precautions should also be taken to prevent the escape of any member of the crew.

(2) For the present, at any rate, no advantage was seen in any public disclosure of information on this matter or in any formal protest to the German Government through the Protecting Power, and action should not therefore be taken on the lines suggested in paragraph 11 of W.P. (44) 388. The position could be reconsidered, however, if fresh circumstances arose.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,-
17th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 18th July, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES ... Secretary.

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The Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the War Cabinet that a short time ago the State Department through Mr. Winant had invited our delegation, which was taking part in the conference at Bretton Woods on the International Monetary Fund, to go to Washington when that conference was over to resume in an informal way the Article VII discussions on commercial policy and commodity policy. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had taken the view that we could not refuse this invitation altogether. As the War Cabinet were aware, the Minister of State, who was a member of the delegation to Washington for discussions on oil, had gone on in advance of the delegation in order to have discussions on several other matters, including the proposal for replacing the Lend-Lease White Paper of September 1941 (Cmd. 6511). The Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that the Minister of State should indicate the reasons why it was difficult for us to enter into detailed discussions on commercial and commodity policy at this moment.

A telegram now had been received from the Minister of State to the effect that an extremely unfavourable impression had been created in Washington by our attitude over Article VII. The fact that we had indicated that we were unable to discuss these matters at the present time, without explaining our difficulties, had caused resentment. This might reflect disastrously on the discussions with the United States representatives about Lease-Lend in Stage II. The Minister of State pressed that he should be authorised to explain the reasons why we could not make as rapid progress as the Americans wished in the Article VII discussions.

The general view expressed in discussion was that the American attitude showed some lack of comprehension of our difficulties, and that it was not reasonable for them to press us so strongly for the continuance of discussions at this juncture. At the same time it was felt that there would be advantage in giving the Americans a frank explanation of our position, and indicating that we should be ready to resume discussion in the course of the autumn.

The War Cabinet’s conclusions were as follows:

1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to send a telegram to the Minister of State, authorising him to make a communication to the United States Government on the following lines—

   He should explain that the issues involved raised considerable political difficulties for us. His Majesty’s Government felt that it was very undesirable that matters involving serious political difficulties should be actively canvassed at a time like the present, when great battles which might be the climax of the war were being fought. Moreover, the time of Ministers was at the moment wholly taken up with other matters. We were not, therefore, in a position to resume discussions at the present time, but we should be ready to do so in the autumn, when a delegation of those leading Ministers would be ready to discuss the matter with representatives of the United States Government.

2. The Prime Minister undertook to set up a small Cabinet Committee of four or five Ministers to re-examine the Commercial Policy Scheme, with particular regard to the position of agriculture, and the provisions for bulk purchase thereunder.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
18th July, 1944.
WAR CABINET 93 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 18th July, 1944, at 6·15 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON,
M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE,
Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India and
Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS,
Minister of War Transport.

The Right Hon. LORD SELBORENE,
Minister of Economic Warfare.

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National
Service.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON,
M.P., Secretary of State for the Home
Department and Minister of Home
Security.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON,
Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE,
Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs.

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India and
Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS,
Minister of War Transport.

The Right Hon. LORD SELBORENE,
Minister of Economic Warfare.

The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL,
Paymaster-General.

Secretary.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

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Oil.

1. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) a note by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 393) to which was attached the Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Oil as submitted subsequent to the official discussions in Washington and as now proposed to be amended;

(ii) a note by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 394) covering a statement proposed for use by the Ministerial Delegation to the forthcoming Anglo-American oil discussions in Washington;

(iii) a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 395) covering draft instructions to the Ministerial Delegation.

The Lord Privy Seal asked for approval of the papers before the War Cabinet, which represented agreed conclusions as to the policy to be pursued in the forthcoming discussions.

Points raised in discussion were:

(a) The Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested the following drafting amendments in the statement attached to W.P. (44) 394:

(i) Section 14.—For "may amount to £3,000 million before the war is finished" substitute "which will amount to £3,000 million before the end of this year, and cannot be measured until the war is finished."

(ii) Section 16.—We had disposed of our more marketable investments but had not lost the whole of the £200 million referred to. Some slight modification of wording might be considered to bring this out.

(b) The Lord President of the Council said it was important not to create in the minds of the Americans any impression that the discussions in view about oil were general economic discussions. They were, of course, quite separate from any general economic discussions that might take place, and were directed to the reaching of a settlement on a specific issue.

(c) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the Parliamentary position in relation to the outcome of the forthcoming conversations. On the 13th July, in answering questions in the House of Commons, he had made it clear that the position in regard to the outcome of these discussions would be exactly the same as that in connection with any other meeting between Ministers of two countries. Arrangements, if they were arrived at, would of course be presented for the approval or disapproval of the House. But he had brought out that any administration must have power to meet and discuss, and if it so desired arrive at arrangements with others. The Government had been scrupulously careful on all these matters to see that they presented to the House the results of their work at the earliest possible moment. He had felt that it would not be possible to refuse the House the opportunity to discuss the outcome of these arrangements, but he had made it clear that that was without prejudice to the power of the Lord Privy Seal and his Delegation to conclude and to sign an Agreement. If there was a debate subsequently in the House it would be on the Agreement as concluded. There was no reason why the Lord Privy Seal need say anything to the Americans about what was entirely a matter of our domestic procedure. The Agreement contemplated would not take the form of a treaty and would not require ratification; but the issue was too important to be disposed of without the House being cognisant of it.

The Lord Privy Seal said that the one danger was pressure on the United States Government to report to Congress. They would not, however, wish to send the present document to Congress, and would, he felt, be anxious to sign an understanding if reached. The precedent of the Anglo-Russo-American Agreement, which had been in the form of an Agreement between Foreign Ministers, and which had not gone to Congress, was a valuable one.
The Prime Minister wished the Delegation all success in the important negotiations which they were about to undertake.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the statement appended to W.P. (44) 394, subject to consideration of the drafting points raised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as a paper to which the Delegation would speak.

(2) Approved the draft instructions to the Ministerial Delegation appended to W.P. (44) 395.

(3) Took note with approval of the view expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the Parliamentary position in regard to the outcome of the negotiations with the United States Government on oil.

Overseas Resources and Liabilities.

2. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 360) on our Overseas Resources and Liabilities. To this was attached a memorandum by Lord Keynes about "Our External Finance in the Transition."

(ii) a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (WP. (44): 368) on the Sterling Problem.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had felt it his duty to bring before his colleagues the result of prolonged study in the Treasury of various aspects of our probable post-war financial position. In exposition of his paper, the Chancellor of the Exchequer drew attention to the following points:

(1) We should make an approach to the United States Government in order to impress on them the gravity of the position, which, perhaps, they hardly realised. The means and time for the discussion could be settled later. There was no intention of going hat in hand to the United States and asking for favours. We should tell the United States frankly what our situation was, making it clear that we were determined to do our best to grapple with it. We should not make any suggestion as to the help to be given, but should bring out that we expected the United States to treat us fairly as to the cost of the war.

(2) We must develop our export trade without delay to the fullest possible extent.

(3) Our agricultural and import policies must be so framed as to relieve the external financial position to the fullest possible extent.

(4) We should open consultation with the Dominions and with other members of the sterling area about their accumulations of sterling balances.

(5) The question of bringing gold sales in India and the Middle East to an end was already under consideration. We should try to persuade the United States, on the other hand, to increase their gold sales in India.

(6) The matter of clearing our gold liabilities to neutrals was well in hand.

A good deal could be done if the War Cabinet agreed with the general approach, of which he had sketched the salient points and the detail of which was contained in W.P. (44) 360. The situation with which we had to deal was one of potential danger. But properly handled it might result in a strengthening of the bonds between the different constituent elements in the Commonwealth. There was a new community of interest to-day to the extent that it was to the interest of all of us to see sterling strong. He was conscious that the picture which he had to paint might be regarded by some as too gloomy. He should put it on record that certain of his advisers regarded it as too optimistic.

The first point discussed was whether the Chancellor's Memorandum gave a balanced view of the position.
The Lord Privy Seal thought that the presentation of the position in W.P. (44) 360 was too gloomy. Thus:

(1) our present debt was a sterling and not a dollar debt, and therefore much easier to handle than our debt at the end of the last war.
(2) the dollar also was depreciating, perhaps as quickly as sterling. The latter might over a period of years prove to be very much the sounder currency of the two.
(3) confidence in our own situation was all-important.
(4) the change in the value of money made it unwise to attempt to draw exact comparisons between figures now and figures in 1919.

If we went to the United States in a suppliant attitude, we might only alarm them as to our credit. An optimistic approach would be much more to our interest. He himself would have liked to see a statement prepared on more optimistic lines, to set against that prepared by Lord Keynes.

The sterling group was a strong and firm one, and if we could hold it together our position in the post-war manufacturing world would be greatly eased. He thought it unfortunate that any statements should have been made by Lord Keynes in the United States as to funding our debts. Such statements could only be damaging to sterling and they were not in fact, in his judgment, justified.

The Secretary of State for India agreed with the Lord Privy Seal that a more balanced picture would have been desirable. All holders of our sterling credits were in the same position as we were ourselves. They would have to choose between depreciating sterling by buying in too large quantities outside the sterling area (thereby depreciating the value of the credits they held) or buying from the sterling area. This might well be of great advantage to us and might give a great impetus to Empire trade and development. It was most important to maintain general confidence in sterling and to get others to work with us. Moreover, this country should both buy, so far as possible, from the sterling area, and also develop its exports to the sterling area, thus bringing about a gradual reduction in the total amount of the sterling debt held in that area. He agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer that an orderly liquidation of these problems was in the interests of us all.

The Prime Minister felt that we could not reasonably regard our sterling indebtedness as on the same footing as ordinary commercial debts to a bank. We had no assets to set against our debt and we started at a heavy disadvantage when it was remembered that, over and above the problems presented by our overseas indebtedness, Great Britain had to import and to pay for half her food supplies and most of her raw materials. Unquestionably by developing our export trade we should ease our obligations to the sterling area, and help in solving the post-war problem of unemployment. But a lot would have to come back in imports to feed the worker who had produced our exports.

Again, we should bear in mind the risk that (e.g., in regard to India) if we accepted the financial help of the United States we might also be parting with political authority and control. Finance was interwoven with the power and the sovereignty of the State.

Finally, he felt strongly that in any ultimate settlement of this problem of war indebtedness, we must press that the fullest weight should be given to the contribution we had made to the victory of the Allies and to the preservation of those who were fighting with us. Their survival would be very largely due to the fact that we had held the enemy at bay for a year and half single-handed and to the assistance we had given in men, money and materials. Those considerations could not be ignored, and we should be entitled to present the other side of the account in terms of these imponderables when the question of settlement was under consideration.

The First Lord of the Admiralty suggested that if we did not succeed in getting some portion of our war debt funded it would
not be possible to control prices at the level necessary to meet the needs of people in this country.

The Minister of Labour and National Service dealt mainly with the Export Trade. He said that the million or more men who had been idle in the years before the war, if now diverted into production, could produce enough goods to buy a large proportion of the food which we had to import from overseas. Generally, he agreed that we should proceed on the lines recommended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer without delay particularly as regards the steps to stimulate the Export Trade. At the end of the war, the first disposition would be to develop the home market. But the right proportion of our productive capacity must be set aside for the export market. Industry to-day did not know what facilities it would get, or what it ought to do after the war. On all these matters it looked for guidance to the Government.

Discussion then turned on the opening of conversations with the United States.

The Minister of Production said that when we started discussions with the United States about the provision of munitions, food, &c., on lend-lease to this country in the period after the conclusion of the war with Germany, we might be faced with the suggestion that we, on the one hand, expected the United States to continue such supplies on a very substantial scale (a sum of £600 millions for non-warlike stores had been mentioned) while on the other we were demobilising some two to three million men with a view to re-starting and developing our export trade.

The United States Government took the line that our needs after the conclusion of the war with Germany would be less than they were now. There was always the risk that they might enter into commitments about future programmes before learning the full facts of our position. That made early action important to us.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs remarked with reference to the Minister of Production's point that Mr. Stettinius, in the conversations that had taken place with him, had accepted that it was in the interests of the United States that we should have a flourishing export trade after the war.

We should remember in that connection the possibility of an arrangement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in respect of the post-war period. The United States might be willing to give long-term credit to the U.S.S.R. where we could not afford to do so, and moreover on a very large scale.

After further discussion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he wished to deal with two points which had arisen in discussion.

(1) As regards the Lord Privy Seal's point, there was no suggestion that there should be any funding operation in the near future. In the long run there would have to be funding operations before sterling was accorded full convertibility, but he did not know how long the interval might be before such a stage was reached. It would, in his judgment, be essential to distinguish between fruitful and productive debt, such as arose in the ordinary course of commercial transactions, and sterile debt such as that which had been contracted for the purposes of fighting the war, and to treat them on a different footing.

(2) Our prestige both on the continent of Europe and outside Europe stood very high to-day. We were trusted in financial matters. The smaller countries were, in his experience, very anxious lest they should be drawn into the United States financial vortex, and had confidence in us. He urged that we should use no word either in public or in conversations with representatives of other countries to suggest that we despaired of our financial future. He did not underestimate the difficulties which we would have to face, but he had every confidence that things would work out well and that the outcome would be satisfactory.
In conclusion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked the War Cabinet to approve the proposals contained in W.P. (44) 360. If adopted, they would enable a preliminary scrutiny to be made as to the best method of dealing with the issues involved. The results of such examination could be submitted to the proposed Ministerial Committee on Exports, and thereafter, if necessary, by other appropriate bodies such as the Lord President's Committee or the War Cabinet itself. The position of India and the Indian sterling balances was an issue which he proposed should be considered independently in the light of a report which would shortly be made to the War Cabinet by the Special Committee on Indian Finance.

After a brief further discussion, the War Cabinet reached the following conclusions, and agreed that the Departments concerned should proceed with action on the lines indicated:

**Negotiations with the United States Government.**

(1) Negotiations should be undertaken at an early date with the United States Government about the extent of United States help to us after the end of the war with Germany. These negotiations should be based on a full statement of what we should require both in the field of munitions and of non-munitions supplies, with a full explanation and justification of our needs.

**Matters of Internal Policy.**

(2) It was important that a few key men should be released from war work for planning and designing, and that small amounts of raw material for development work should be released, so that our exporters should be in a position to make a flying start at the right moment.

(3) Consideration should be given to the administrative machinery required to ensure that merchants sell abroad in Stage II the right proportion of their output.

(4) We should also aim at getting a large fleet under the British flag as soon as possible.

(5) Various measures (including the provision of any specially qualified staffs needed in the Departments concerned) would be necessary to ensure that existing industries were brought up to a higher pitch of efficiency and that new industries were created.

(6) A Ministerial Committee (backed by an official committee) should be set up to advise how best exports could be promoted.

The Prime Minister undertook to consider the composition of this Committee.

(7) Our agricultural policy and import programmes of manufactured goods should, as soon as shipping could be made available, be adjusted with a view to saving the maximum amount of foreign exchange.

**Monetary Arrangements with Other Countries.**

(8) The existing sterling area arrangements would need revision. The War Cabinet agreed that this was mainly for the future, but were of opinion that it needed early examination with the Departments concerned.

(9) Note was taken that the policy of gold sales was already under review; and the view was expressed that existing arrangements with foreign countries (some of which involved gold liabilities) should be discussed with the Governments concerned.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
18th July, 1944.*
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 20th July, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works (Item 1).
The Right Hon. W. S. Morrison, K.C., M.P., Minister of Town and Country Planning (Item 1).
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. W. Whiteley, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 2).

The Right Hon. Sir Andrew Duncan, M.P., Minister of Supply (Item 1).
The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 2).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.

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Electoral reform and redistribution of seats.
Disposal of Government-owned Factories.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 142nd Conclusions, Minute 6.)

1. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 384) on the disposal of Government-owned factories.

The Minister of Reconstruction said that he had discussed with the Ministers primarily concerned the principles to be followed in disposing of Government-owned factories, and had agreed with them to submit to the War Cabinet the recommendations set forth in W.P. (44) 384.

Two major points of principle called for settlement:—

(i) Should the factories be disposed of to the highest bidder or should they be allocated by the Government according to broader social and economic criteria?

The Ministers concerned agreed that there was a good case for allocation rather than competitive bidding, and they recommended that the available factories should be disposed of according to the criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of W.P. (44) 384.

(ii) Should the factories be sold outright or merely rented to the approved applicant?

The Ministers concerned felt that there should be a bias towards leasing rather than outright sale.

It would be convenient if the President of the Board of Trade could make an announcement of the Government's policy on this matter on Tuesday, the 25th July, when the Board of Trade Vote would be taken.

The following points arose in discussion:—

(a) The Minister of Aircraft Production pointed out that the recommendations in W.P. (44) 384 were limited to factories likely to become available between the end of hostilities in Europe and the end of the war with Japan. It was difficult for a Production Department to say when a given factory was likely to become available, and it would be better to apply the principles to any Government-owned factories likely to become available.

(b) The First Lord of the Admiralty doubted whether the proposal to allocate factories according to broad social and economic criteria, instead of disposing of them to the highest bidder, would work satisfactorily. Thus, how would a proper rent or purchase price be fixed without going into the market?

It was explained that the application of the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of W.P. (44) 384 would mean in practice a decision that the factory concerned should be allocated to a particular type of industry (e.g., an export industry rather than an industry producing for the home market), and that it would be still open to the Government to allocate the factory to the highest bidder within the chosen industry. Again, from the point of view of the national economy as a whole, there might be cases in which it would be desirable to dispose of a factory in a development area on very favourable terms in order to secure the establishment of an industry of permanent value for the area.

(c) The President of the Board of Trade said that he thought that there might be opposition in Parliament to the proposal that, where a lease was granted, the tenant should normally be given the right to acquire an option to purchase the factory outright at the end of the lease. He suggested, therefore, that he should make no reference to this in his statement.

It was urged that the point was bound to be raised in Parliament, and that, if the general aim of the proposals was to be achieved, it was essential both to let prospective applicants know clearly what they were being offered and to make the offer sufficiently attractive. The practice of granting long leases rather than selling land outright was commonly adopted by private landowners and by local authorities, and most applicants would be satisfied with the degree of security offered by a long lease. But there would remain
certain exceptional cases in which out-right sale would be the appropriate course, and the proposed statement should indicate that in such cases out-right sale would not be excluded.

(d) The Chancellor of the Exchequer reminded the War Cabinet that many of the factories concerned were built on requisitioned land, and that, before they could be disposed of by the Government, legislation would have to be passed making the Government owner of the land. When he had put proposals for an Acquisition of Land (Defence) Bill before the Lord President’s Committee, the Committee had insisted on a procedure whereby any case in which the Government sought to acquire land on which they had built a factory would have to be referred to an independent Commission. This would hamper the working of the scheme proposed in W.P. (44) 384, and he accordingly suggested that this decision of the Lord President’s Committee should be reconsidered.

The War Cabinet—
(1) Approved the principles set out in W.P. (44) 384 for the disposal of Government-owned factories.
(2) Agreed that the principles should apply to all factories likely to become available and not solely to those likely to become available between the end of hostilities in Europe and the end of the war with Japan.
(3) Agreed that the proposed statement as to terms of disposal should be amended in the following sense—

The normal procedure for the disposal of factories should be by way of lease for a suitable term, but the possibility of out-right sale in appropriate cases was not excluded.

(4) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reconsider the terms of the draft Acquisition of Land (Defence) Bill with a view to ensuring that the procedure for the acquisition of land on which Government-owned factories had been built did not hamper the application of the principles laid down in W.P. (44) 384.
(5) Took note that the President of the Board of Trade would make a statement on the subject of the disposal of Government-owned factories in the debate on the Board of Trade Vote on the 25th July.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Joint Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and Secretary of State for Scotland (W.P. (44) 391) making recommendations on the report presented to the Prime Minister by the Speaker in his letter of the 24th May dealing with—

(i) redistribution of seats;
(ii) reform of the franchise for Parliamentary and Local Government; and
(iii) methods of election.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security explained to the War Cabinet the recommendations set out in his memorandum, and these met with general approval.

The main point dealt with in discussion was the representation of the City of London. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that, as the proposals for redistribution of seats were confined in the first instance to partial redistribution of “abnormally large” constituencies, no question of altering the City’s present representation of two members would arise until a general scheme of redistribution had been drawn up, i.e., probably after the next General Election. It was the intention, however, that the Bill should make permanent provision for redistribution, and he thought that some direction should be given to the Boundary Commissioners as to the lines on which they should deal with the
representation of the City of London at a later date. The City had at present about 38,000 electors. It was intended that the spouse of person having a vote in respect of business premises should not in future be entitled to vote. This would probably reduce the number of electors in the City to about 24,000, which was less than half the normal quota for Great Britain (53,110). The fact that a number of other constituencies in London would probably lose their members at the first general redistribution made it very difficult to defend a representation of two members for the City. He himself thought that the right course was to make a specific provision that the City of London should have one member only when general redistribution took place. Failing acceptance of this proposal by the Government, the matter might be left to a free vote of the House.

In discussion the view was very generally expressed that, as it was not intended to alter the City's representation in the initial redistribution, there was no need to settle the matter now; and that the right course was that the Redistribution Bill should contain a general direction to the Boundary Commissions that, so far as possible, constituencies should comprise about 50,000 electors, but that in exceptional cases it would be necessary to depart from this figure. A discretion of this kind would be necessary in any case to deal with the special position of large sparsely populated rural constituencies. Any recommendation from the Boundary Commission would, of course, have to be brought in due course before Parliament. Should an amendment to the Redistribution Bill be put down proposing that a specific provision should be inserted in the Bill that when general redistribution took place, the present representation of the City of London should be modified, the Government should take the line that this was not the proper time to settle the issue.

The War Cabinet reached the following general conclusions, which they invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to report to the Prime Minister:

(1) The recommendation of the Speaker's Conference was accepted that the Boundary Commissions should be required to undertake a general review of the state of constituencies at intervals of not less than three and not more than seven years, it being understood that the recommendations of the Commissions would be subject to Parliamentary approval.

(2) The recommendation of the Speaker's Conference was accepted that, in the first instance, there should be a partial redistribution of abnormally large constituencies only, and that the total increase should not exceed 25 members.

(3) The proposals of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security for the division of abnormally large constituencies set out in the Appendix to W.P. (44) 391 were approved. Under these proposals the Bill would include a schedule of 20 existing constituencies (each with an electorate in 1939 of over 100,000), which would qualify for 25 additional members.

(4) The recommendation of the Speaker's Conference was accepted, that constituencies at present returning two members should be abolished except where, after local enquiry by the Boundary Commissions, it was found in any particular case that abolition was undesirable.

(5) It was agreed that there should be separate Boundary Commissions for England, for Scotland, for Wales and Monmouth, and for Northern Ireland.

(6) For the purpose of the first general redistribution the principle should be accepted that there should be no reduction in the present number of members for Scotland or for Wales and Monmouth. The Government should not, however, commit themselves to the acceptance of this principle thereafter.
(7) The question of the representation of the City of London should be dealt with on the lines suggested at "X" in discussion.

(8) The proposals for the Conference for dealing with the reform of the franchise (including assimilation of Parliamentary and Local Government franchise, the limitation of the business premises' qualification by excluding the spouse, and the free and automatic registration of the university elector) should not be included in the forthcoming Bill, but should be left over to be dealt with at a later date.

(9) Subject to the approval of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet authorised the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland to proceed with the preparation of a Redistribution Bill for submission to Parliament on the above lines.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
20th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 24th July, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMBRY, M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Hon. Sir FIROZ KHAN NOON, Representative of the Government of India.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERT, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Item 5).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
Mr. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Item 5).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
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1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week. Bad weather had again interfered with bombing operations, but our bombers had flown 5,500 sorties and dropped 18,000 tons of bombs, a third of which had been on Germany. 5,000 tons had been dropped in the preliminary bombardment before the Allied attack south of Caen.

Bomber Command had also attacked synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr and “Crossbow” targets. Mosquitoes had attacked Berlin.

Home Theatre.

United States heavy bombers had flown 6,200 sorties and dropped 12,400 tons of bombs, 8,700 tons of them on targets in Germany, which had included experimental stations at Peenemunde and Zinnowitz, aircraft factories and oil installations. British and American heavy bombers had had a record week, dropping in all 30,500 tons of bombs.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 7,500 sorties. The enemy had lost 192 aircraft against Allied losses of 283.

During the week 802 flying-bombs had been launched, of which 349, or 43 per cent. had been destroyed and 263 had reached London. The fighters had accounted for 60 per cent., A.A. guns for 30 per cent. and the Balloons for 10 per cent. of those destroyed.

In the Mediterranean, Allied aircraft had dropped 8,500 tons of bombs, mainly on oil plants, aircraft factories and other targets in South-East Europe.

During the previous week there had been no shipping losses due to enemy action. Total losses for July to date, including belated reports, amounted to 51,273 tons.

Six U-boats had been destroyed so far this month.

The Prime Minister said that, at the request of the Admiralty, he had suggested to President Roosevelt that, before the next monthly statement* on U-boat warfare was published, an interim statement should be made emphasising the notable achievement of our small craft and aircraft in holding off attacks by U-boats against shipping engaged in the “Overlord” operation. The President had replied deprecating this suggestion, mainly, he thought, on security grounds.

The Prime Minister asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to send him the material which the Admiralty wished to publish on this matter, and said that he would then consider making a further approach to the President.

Reference was also made to the clearance of mines in Cherbourg Harbour, which had been done by British divers. This feat deserved public acknowledgment.

The Prime Minister said that, provided security reasons permitted, he would consider including some reference to this matter in his forthcoming speech to Parliament on the war situation.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff described the attack made by the Second British Army on the 18th July southwards from Caen. Some delay in getting our forces across the river, together with the fact that the Germans had been very quick in organising an anti-tank screen, had limited the success of this operation. West of St. Lo the United States forces had made some progress. Bad weather was hampering operations on the whole front.

The Prime Minister said that during his visit to Normandy he had visited a great number of troops and never had he seen an army which looked so well or so happy. General Montgomery had expressed his great satisfaction with the equipment and supplies with which, thanks to our military authorities, the army had been supplied.

In Italy we had advanced along the whole front and both Leghorn and Ancona had been captured.

See W.M. (43) 96th Conclusions, Minute 1.
The Russian offensive had made great progress during the previous week. That day the Germans had admitted their retirement from Siedlce and Jaroslaw. Russian forces were very close to Brest Litovsk. The German Armies in Estonia and Latvia still showed no signs of attempting to withdraw.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.

Prisoners of War.

2. The Secretary of State for War said that a Court of Enquiry had been held on the 7th July, 1944, to investigate the death at Audrieu, in Normandy, of certain Canadian and British officers. The Court had found as follows:

(a) one Canadian officer, 23 other ranks and 2 British soldiers met their death at or near the Château d'Audrieu on or about the 8th June, 1944;
(b) the Canadian officer and 18 of the Canadian soldiers were prisoners of war in the custody of the German army;
(c) they had been murdered by members of the 12th S.S. Reconnaissance Battalion of the 12th S.S. Panzer Division (Hitler Jugend) under the direction of certain of their officers;
(d) five Canadian and 2 British soldiers were in all probability prisoners of war in the hands of the same unit and suffered a similar fate to the officer and 18 soldiers.

This report had been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and up to date no information had been received as to what action was being taken by them. A copy of the report had also been furnished to the Canadian Military Headquarters in London. It would be necessary to reach agreement with the Canadian Government as to what should be said on this matter.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

Foreign Affairs.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the attempt which had been made on Hitler's life. Authentic information was very difficult to come by, but there seemed little doubt that there had been, and perhaps still was, a movement of considerable force in Germany behind the Generals. It was still impossible to judge what the consequences would be, but, if the German Government were successful in repressing the movement, the result for the time being would be to rivet the Nazi machine still more firmly on the German nation.

A discussion followed as to what line the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should take in the matter in the House of Commons on the following day. The general sense of the War Cabinet was that at this stage the less said the better. Thus it might be stated that as to a great deal of the affair everyone could judge for himself, but that His Majesty's Government had not yet reached a point in the assessment of the evidence at which a public statement on their behalf would be appropriate.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported to the War Cabinet the latest developments in Russo-Polish relations. A record of the discussion and the conclusions reached is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
Air Raids.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 89th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

Attacks by Flying-Bombs.

4. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security stated that up to 6 a.m. that morning the total casualties from flying-bombs reported were 4,089 killed, 12,126 seriously injured, 14,460 slightly injured and 46 unclassified, making a grand total of 30,721. Arrangements in the reception areas under the evacuation scheme were going better. He would be able to give an encouraging report at the confidential meeting with Members of Parliament fixed for the following day.

Air Raids.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 89th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

Attacks by Flying-Bombs.

Public Warning System.

5. At their Meeting on the 10th July (W.M. (44) 89th Conclusions, Minute 8) the War Cabinet had invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to bring before the Civil Defence Committee the question of improving the public warning system, with particular reference to the possibility of an extension of the system of giving warning of imminent danger.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 401) reporting the result of the consideration given to the matter by the Civil Defence Committee.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security pointed out that, as experience was gained by flying-bomb attacks, the period of the alert was becoming more and more closely adjusted to the period of actual danger. There was, however, a considerable demand for some sort of imminent danger warning within the alert. The Civil Defence Committee had been unable to reach agreement on whether a system of imminent danger warning should or should not be instituted, but their view was that, if any system were to be adopted, it should consist of the display of a red storm cone on premises connected to the industrial alarm system, supplemented by a bell signal audible to the public in the neighbourhood of the premises. It would be impossible to cover the whole of London by a system of this kind, nor would it be infallible in its operation; and this would have to be made clear by the Government should it be decided to adopt the system. Whatever decision was taken, it seemed very desirable to standardise the unofficial and uncoordinated system of warnings on private premises which had grown up since the flying-bomb attacks began.

It was generally agreed in discussion that any system of imminent danger warnings should be based on the industrial alarm scheme, which had reached a very high state of efficiency. It was felt, however, that a visible signal was open to considerable objection, particularly from the point of view of road traffic, and that a system under which localised signals would be given by the ringing of bells or the sounding of klaxons would be preferable.

The following additional points were raised in discussion:—

(a) The Minister of Aircraft Production stressed the fact that workers who received imminent danger warnings in factories were dissatisfied because their families did not receive the same warnings.

(b) The Minister of War Transport said that bus drivers were in favour of a system of imminent danger warnings within the alert.

(c) The Minister of Production pointed out that the production of the necessary equipment for the proposed system of audible warnings might present some difficulties.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that it was desirable to institute a system of localised audible warnings of imminent danger within the alert, based on the existing industrial alarm scheme.

(2) Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, the Minister of Aircraft Production, the Minister of War Transport and the Minister of Works to settle
urgently by what means such a system could be most effectively and quickly provided. The assistance of other Ministers should be called on, as required, and a report of the conclusions reached should be submitted to the Prime Minister.

(3) Agreed that any announcement regarding the system should make it clear that it would be neither universal nor wholly effective.

6. On the 24th May the War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum (W.P. (44) 262) about the Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure on Tank Production, and had decided that an interim reply should be sent to Sir John Wardlaw-Milne.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum (W.P. (44) 400) containing—

(i) A draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Sir John Wardlaw-Milne.

(ii) A draft reply to the Select Committee’s Report prepared by the Minister of Production, the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Supply as an enclosure to (i).

(iii) A summary of the reports received on the performance of British tanks.

The War Cabinet—

Expressed general agreement with these documents and invited the Prime Minister to despatch the letter and the enclosure to Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, subject to such modifications as might be settled in consultation with the Ministers concerned.*

* NOTE.—The letter and enclosure were despatched as drafted on the 2nd August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 26th July, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply.
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Item 2).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES,
General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY,
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

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1. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security explained that through an oversight, which he very much regretted, there had been a failure to lay before Parliament a number of Regulations made under the Fire Services (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1941. Although it might be argued that this did not invalidate action taken under the Regulations, since they came into force as soon as they were made, he had come to the conclusion, after consultation with the Attorney-General, that the proper course was to introduce a Bill of Indemnity. He hoped that it would be possible to get the necessary legislation through Parliament before the Recess.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

2. The War Cabinet had before them the following memoranda on Man-Power in the First Year after the Defeat of Germany:

(i) By the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 380) giving a revised estimate of the minimum forces required to fulfil our military commitments;
(ii) By the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 373) giving the labour required to provide munitions for these forces;
(iii) By the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 382) giving an estimate of civil requirements;
(iv) By the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 379) giving the estimated supply of man-power;
(v) By the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 381) focussing the main issues arising out of the above memorandum;
(vi) By the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for Scotland (W.P. (44) 410) stating that the figure given in W.P. (44) 362 for agricultural man-power in Stage II was inadequate.

In the Chancellor of the Exchequer's memorandum it was shown that there was a gap of 1½ millions between the estimated man-power supplies and the requirements which would have to be met if we were to meet our four main objectives in Stage II. These objectives were:

(a) To make our contribution to the Japanese war and the Forces of occupation in Europe.
(b) To re-expand our contracted export trade so that we can begin to move towards the position where we can pay with exports for our necessary imports.
(c) To rebuild our cities and begin to overtake the arrears of housing and maintenance.
(d) To raise somewhat the greatly reduced standards of civil consumption.

This calculation assumed that we should receive from the United States and Canada the lend-lease aid for which we intended to ask.

The main question at issue was how this deficiency of 1½ millions in man-power should be distributed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed in his memorandum that an allocation of man-power to the Services and their Supply Departments should first be fixed.

Several Ministers took the view that the allocations proposed to meet (b), (c) and (d) above represented a bare minimum. Thus it was pointed out that the allocations proposed would only restore the standards of civil consumption to about 4/5ths of the pre-war
level. Since these allocations were susceptible of little if any reduction, the most practical course would, therefore, be to decide that the total man-power allocation to the Services and munitions should be reduced by 1 million or, say, 1½ million, and to invite the Service and Supply Departments to prepare revised plans on that basis.

It was also pointed out that production programmes had to be fixed some considerable time ahead. The Americans were busy revising their production programmes, and unless we made known our needs for munitions under lend-lease there was grave danger that the American programmes would be fixed on a basis which would not make adequate provision for them. A decision was therefore required in the near future.

On the other hand, it was urged that, while there might well have to be some reduction in the allocations proposed for the Services and munitions, it was not enough to give the Chiefs of Staff a global figure. The Service Departments were entitled to be given more precise guidance as to the commitments against which provision had to be made. In many respects the Chiefs of Staff, in preparing their memorandum, had to proceed on assumptions on matters on which hitherto guidance had not been afforded to them.

The following points were mentioned as relevant to the forces required for occupying Germany:

(i) The conditions which it might be assumed would exist in Germany after the defeat;
(ii) The extent to which we should be able to rely on German Civil authorities to keep order;
(iii) The extent to which Allied man-power could be used to provide forces of occupation.

It was also suggested that the limiting factor on the forces which we could deploy and maintain in the Far East might well prove to be the shipping available, and that this aspect of the problem would repay closer examination.

Another suggestion made in discussion was that the right method of dealing with the problem would be to make a high-level approach to the Americans and reach a firm agreement with them, as to the minimum forces, land, sea and air, which they would expect us to deploy in the Pacific in Stage II. It was pointed out, however, that this course might be attended by some dangers, since there were signs that certain authorities in the United States would take the view that any man-power released from the British forces in Stage II should be employed in munitions production, and that the only munitions which we could expect to receive from the United States on lend-lease in Stage II would be articles which we were unable to manufacture ourselves.

No formal conclusion was recorded. The Prime Minister undertook to prepare a draft directive in the light of the discussion, indicating the lines on which provisional man-power allocations for Stage II could be made, as a basis for forward planning.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 20th July, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 27th July, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply.
The Right Hon. LORD PORTAL, Minister of Works.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. DR. ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. STAFFORD Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, M.P., Minister of War Transport.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
Mr. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply.
Admiral of the Fleet, SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal SIR CHARLES J. H. B. BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
## WAR CABINET 97 (44).

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Military Operations.
Normandy.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 95th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

"Crossbow."
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 95th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

1. The Prime Minister referred to the statement in the morning newspapers that there had been a serious set-back to British troops on the Orne. The War Cabinet were informed that this statement had been given out by a spokesman of SHAEF at midnight on the previous night. In fact, all that had happened was that on part of the front our forces had had to withdraw about 1,000 yards and that two villages had changed hands twice.

The general view was expressed that a statement of this kind at the present juncture was unfortunate, more particularly in view of the feeling of disappointment in certain circles that our advance from the Normandy bridgehead had not gone faster.

The Prime Minister said that he was sure that the statement made was not in accordance with General Eisenhower’s wishes, and undertook to raise the matter with the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 412) proposing that the Government plans for dealing with attacks on London by long-range rockets should be re-examined.

After a discussion, which has been recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:

(1) Plans should be made to meet the contingency of rocket attacks on the scale which now seemed possible; and certain action should be taken at once.

(2) The following were the matters in regard to which action should be taken forthwith:

(a) The evacuation of the priority classes should be stimulated, and these classes should be extended to include mothers with schoolchildren.

(b) An estimate should be made of the extent to which the population of London had been reduced by official and unofficial evacuation since the flying bomb attacks had started. Enquiry should be made as to the considerable movement of population into London which was reported by railways to be taking place, and as to the reasons for this movement, with a view to a decision on whether any steps should be taken to check it.

(c) Steps should be taken, without publicity, to move patients from the London hospitals to hospitals in other parts of the country. This might involve drawing on the hospital accommodation set aside for Service casualties.

(d) The process of shifting production from factories in London to factories elsewhere should continue, particular attention being paid to key factories.

(e) The 10,000 Government staffs at present housed in poor accommodation with no form of shelter should be moved to other accommodation either in London or elsewhere.

(f) In his forthcoming statement on the war situation, the Prime Minister would give particulars of the casualties caused by flying bombs, and would emphasise that members of the priority classes would do well to take advantage of the facilities for evacuation. He undertook to consider passages submitted to him by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Minister of Health.

(g) In addition, editors might be reminded confidentially about the danger of rocket attack in such a way as to keep the public aware of its possible
imminence while taking special care not to cause alarm.

(b) The Lord President's Committee would consider whether, from the point of view of defence against flying bomb and rocket attacks, it would be advisable to continue double summer time for a further period after the 13th August.

(3) Plans should be prepared to meet the contingency of rocket attack on the following lines:

(a) Transport and accommodation should be available in order to enable up to 2 additional million persons to be evacuated from London to safe areas over a period of three to four weeks. Alternative plans should also be made for moving the same number in a shorter period to a distance of some 20 miles from London.

(b) The emergency arrangements for dealing with a large exodus on foot from London should be brought into a state of readiness.

(c) Arrangements should be made to enable the supply of building labour available for the clearance of débris and the repair of damaged houses in London to be reinforced from both civilian and Service sources.

(d) The co-ordination of the shifting of production from factories in London to factories elsewhere with the transfer of the civil population under the evacuation arrangements should be studied.

(e) Arrangements, to be operated in the event of rocket attack, should be made for the evacuation from London of non-essential Government staffs and for the allocation of the most highly protected accommodation to those staffs who must remain in London.

(4) A meeting would be held on the following day to review and confirm the Conclusions set out under (2) and (3) above and to settle the Ministerial responsibility for each item.

3. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informed the War Cabinet that the Bishop of Chichester had sought to put down the following Motion for Wednesday, the 2nd August:

"To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any information to give about the use of political warfare at the present time, particularly in relation to Germany, and to move for Papers."

The War Cabinet thought that it would be undesirable in the public interest that there should be a discussion of this matter at the present time, and expressed the hope that the notice of motion would not be put down.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was invited to inform the Bishop of Chichester accordingly.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 27th July, 1944.*
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Friday, 28th July, 1944, at 3 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. H. U. Willink, K.C., M.P., Minister of Health (Items 1-3).
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Liewellin, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 1-3).
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Items 1-3).
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Sir Findlater Stewart, Home Defence Executive (Item 2).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
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1. In accordance with the decision reached at their meeting on the previous day, the War Cabinet reviewed the conclusions set out under (2) and (3) of W.M. (44) 97th Conclusions, Minute 2, and considered how the carrying out of the necessary action and the preparation of the necessary plans could best be supervised.

The following points arose in the review of the conclusions:

(a) It was pointed out that the evacuation of hospital patients from London should not be allowed to prejudice the treatment of military casualties in this country, pending the setting up of military hospitals in France. The Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for War should act in consultation on this.

(b) The Minister of Labour and National Service undertook to make an appeal to imported building workers engaged on first aid repairs in London not to go home at the August Bank Holiday.

(c) The Minister of Information said that he would prefer to postpone the proposed confidential talk with editors until more progress had been made with the plans for meeting the rocket attacks.

The War Cabinet:

(1) Confirmed the Conclusions set out under (2) and (3) of W.M. (44) 97th Conclusions, Minute 2.

(2) Agreed that it would be the duty of the individual Ministers and groups of Ministers primarily concerned with each of the items recorded in those minutes to see that the necessary action was taken and plans prepared; and that the Ministerial responsibility for these items should be as set out in the Annex hereto.

(3) Agreed that the work of concerting action and plans as a whole should be assigned to a small Committee of Ministers, composed as under:

- Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (in the Chair).
- Minister of Labour and National Service.
- Minister of Production.
- Minister of Health.
- Minister of War Transport.

Other Ministers would be brought into consultation as necessary. This Committee would have discretion to settle matters brought before them, reporting to the War Cabinet as and when necessary. The Civil Defence Committee would, of course, continue to function and would work in the closest touch with the new Committee.

(4) Agreed that the Minister of Production, in consultation with the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Supply Ministers, would work out arrangements for the shifting of production from London factories to factories elsewhere (W.M. (44) 97 Conclusions, Minute 2, Conclusion 2(d)), keeping in close touch with the main Committee.

(5) Agreed that questions connected with the accommodation of Government staffs would be worked out by an Official Committee under the Chairmanship of a Treasury official, reporting to the Committee referred to in (3).

2. The War Cabinet had before them a report by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 413) to which was annexed a note by Sir Findlater Stewart regarding the security measures to be taken in the event of rocket attack in order to prevent information on the fall of shot from reaching the enemy.

It was explained that Sir Findlater Stewart had put forward
two alternative schemes, one of which was designed to deny all information to the enemy for as long as possible and involved very drastic restrictions, while the other, involving less drastic restrictions, would merely have the effect of imposing a 48-hour delay on the leakage of information to the enemy. The Chiefs of Staff preferred the former plan and suggested that the measures proposed under it should be put into effect when the rocket attacks began and kept in force for a period of 48 hours within which a decision would be taken as to whether the measures should be continued and, if so, for how long.

It was pointed out in discussion that it might in certain circumstances be important to deny the enemy information about the effect of his attack for a week or ten days. Measures such as the holding up of diplomatic communications could be carried out for the initial period of 48 hours, without any formal intimation to those affected by them.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that as soon as rocket attacks began the measures set out in Appendix I of the note by Sir Findlater Stewart annexed to W.P. (44) 413 should be put into force and continued for a period of 48 hours, during which a decision on their continuance for a further period might be reached.

(2) Agreed that, in so far as was necessary to ensure that there was no delay in the imposition of the measures proposed when the attacks began, Sir Findlater Stewart should now approach in confidence all the authorities responsible for putting the measures into force.

3. The Prime Minister said that he had been disturbed to see in the Daily Express a suggestion that jet-propelled fighters might be used against flying-bombs.

It was most important that newspapers should not speculate about future operations or about the development of new weapons, since even ill-informed guesses might lead the enemy to discover our plans.

The Minister of Information said that there was no question of disclosure of information in this case, but it was right that a warning should be given against speculation on topics of this kind. He undertook to convey a warning in the appropriate quarters.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 464) about a proposal, from the United States Government, for an exchange of some 25,000 Japanese soldiers and Korean labourers now isolated in the Central Pacific area against a corresponding number of Japanese-held United States prisoners of war and (if necessary to make up the number) civilian internees.

It was unlikely that the Japanese Government would accept such a proposal, and the physical difficulties of carrying it out would be great. Were it accepted, there would be great indignation in the Empire, and no doubt in Netherlands circles, that such an arrangement should have been made by the United States Government without any similar arrangement in respect of their Allies.

If it was impracticable to dissuade the United States Government from their intention of proceeding with their proposal, it seemed clear that the British Commonwealth should make a similar proposal to the Japanese Government, through the protecting Power, for the exchange of the 130,000 troops isolated in the Southern Pacific against a corresponding number of British (and if the Netherlands Government desired it, Netherlands) prisoners of war in Japanese hands.
There were two alternative forms in which such a proposal might be made:

(a) That the British Commonwealth (and presumably the Netherlands) should independently make a proposal to the Japanese Government, through their protecting Powers, similar to that contemplated by the Americans, in respect of such of their own and of the Japanese troops as were susceptible of such arrangements.

(b) That an attempt should be made to induce the United States Government to agree that the proposal which they said they intended to make to the Japanese Government should be expanded into a single Allied proposal, whereby Japanese garrisons in the Central and South-West Pacific areas should all be treated as exchangeable for British, United States and Netherlands prisoners of war on an agreed equitable basis.

In either event the Foreign Office reply to the United States Embassy should welcome any initiative providing for the recovery of United Nations prisoners and internees from Japanese hands, and add that serious ill-feeling would be created in the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India by any arrangement which did not provide for releasing some at least of the very large number of British Commonwealth prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that there was an overwhelming case against isolated action such as the United States appeared to have in mind. In agreement with the Chiefs of Staff he preferred the second alternative method of approach to the United States indicated in his memorandum. The Secretary of State added, on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, that it was important that the large number of Indian prisoners in Japanese hands should be covered by any general arrangement for exchange.

The Prime Minister agreed with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He felt that the reaction of public opinion to the original proposal put forward by the United States Government, if it became known, would be most serious.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs suggested that the concurrence of the Dominion Governments, which had already been informed of the proposal, should be obtained before any answer was sent to the United States Embassy.

The War Cabinet agreed—

(1) That the reply to the United States Embassy should be in the terms recommended by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in paragraphs 7 (b) and (8) of W.P. (44) 404.

(2) That the concurrence of the Dominion Governments should be obtained in the proposed answer before its despatch.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 26th July, 1944.
Ministers responsible for Action and Planning.

Minister of Health.

Minister of Food.
Minister of War Transport.
Minister of War Transport.
Minister of Information.

Minister of Health.

Minister of Production.
Minister of Labour.
Supply Ministers.

Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Minister of Works.

Prime Minister.

Minister of Information.

Home Secretary.

Minister of War Transport.
Minister of Health.
Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.
Minister of Food.

ANNEX.

(1) Plans should be made to meet the contingency of rocket attacks on the scale which now seemed possible; and certain action should be taken at once.

(2) The following were the matters in regard to which action should be taken forthwith:

(a) The evacuation of the priority classes should be stimulated, and these classes should be extended to include mothers with schoolchildren.

(b) An estimate should be made of the extent of London which was reported by railways to be taking place, and as to the reasons for this movement, with a view to a decision on whether any steps should be taken to check it.

(c) Steps should be taken, without publicity, to move patients from the London hospitals to hospitals in other parts of the country. This might involve drawing on the hospital accommodation set aside for Service casualties.

(d) The process of shifting production from factories in London to factories elsewhere should continue, particular attention being paid to key factories.

(e) The 10,000 Government staffs at present housed in poor accommodation with no form of shelter should be moved to other accommodation either in London or elsewhere.

(f) In his forthcoming statement on the war situation, the Prime Minister would give particulars of the casualties caused by flying bombs, and would emphasise that members of the priority classes would do well to take advantage of the facilities for evacuation. He undertook to consider passages submitted to him by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Minister of Health.

(g) In addition, editors might be reminded confidentially about the danger of rocket attack in such a way as to keep the public aware of its possible imminence while taking special care not to cause alarm.

(h) The Lord President's Committee would consider whether, from the point of view of defence against flying bombs and rocket attacks, it would be advisable to continue double summer time for a further period after the 13th August.

(3) Plans should be prepared to meet the contingency of rocket attack on the following lines:

(a) Transport and accommodation should be available in order to enable up to 2 million additional persons to be evacuated from London to safe areas within a period of three to four weeks. Alternative plans should also be made for moving the same number in a shorter period to a distance of some 20 miles from London.
Ministers responsible for Action and Planning.

Minister of Health.
Home Secretary.
Minister of Food.
Minister of Labour.
Minister of Health.
Minister of Works.
Minister of Food.
Minister of Production.
Minister of Labour.
Minister of Health.

Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Minister of Works.

(b) The emergency arrangements for dealing with a large exodus on foot from London should be brought into a state of readiness.

(c) Arrangements should be made to enable the supply of building labour available for the clearance of débris and the repair of damaged houses in London to be reinforced from both civilian and Services sources.

(d) The co-ordination of the shifting of production from factories in London to factories elsewhere with the transfer of the Civil population under the evacuation arrangements should be studied.

(e) Arrangements, to be operated in the event of rocket attack, should be made for the evacuation from London of non-essential Government staffs and for the allocation of the most highly protected accommodation to those staffs who must remain in London.
The War Cabinet had before them a proposal (C.O.S.(W) 652 (0)) that our deception authorities should arrange for information as regards the place and timing of the fall of flying bombs to be conveyed to the enemy in such a way as to lead them to move the epicentre of their attack to a point further to the South East. It was true that this might result in a larger number of casualties than at present in certain areas. But the general result would be to cause a smaller number of bombs to fall in densely built-up areas, and would thus produce an overall reduction in the number of deaths occasioned by the flying bombs.

From the discussion that followed it appeared that the general sense of the War Cabinet was that it would be a serious matter to assume any direct degree of responsibility for action which would affect the areas against which flying bombs were aimed.

After further discussion, the War Cabinet:

(1) Agreed that the proposal referred to could not be accepted.

(2) Invited the deception authorities to arrange that the information conveyed to the enemy as regards the point of impact and the timing of arrival of flying bombs was such as would create confusion in his mind and present him with an inaccurate picture. The draft of any instructions to be issued on this matter should be submitted to the Prime Minister for approval before issue.
Copies to: General Samay
   General Hillis
   Sir Portland Stewart
   Prime Minister
"CROSSBOW" DECEPTION

Minute to the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the "CROSSBOW" Committee

PRIME MINISTER

1. I understand that, at a meeting of the War Cabinet on the 28th July, it was decided that efforts should be made to confuse the enemy as to where his bombs are falling, without however attempting to induce him to shift his aim in any particular direction.

2. For the reasons given below, I am convinced that action on these lines will not be effective and recommend that this decision should be reconsidered. The Chiefs of Staff, who have further discussed the matter, share this view.

3. There is no doubt that the enemy is aiming his bombs at Central London. However, the brunt of the attack has so far fallen short to the South-East. About half of the bombs landing within 30 miles of Charing Cross (which is thought to be the aiming mark) have fallen within 8 miles of a central point in Dulwich.

4. Owing to this error in aim, an appreciable proportion of these bombs have landed in the more lightly populated districts. It is estimated that if he were to discover his error and lengthen his range, so as to shift the pattern squarely onto the centre of London, the present total monthly casualties would be increased by about 1,000.

5. If, as is now proposed, we confine ourselves to feeding the enemy with information of a confused and inconclusive nature, we shall run the risk that he may by other means find out where his bombs are now falling and correct his fire accordingly.

6. On the other hand, our chances of preventing him from discovering the true facts will be greatly increased if, instead of merely trying to withhold information, we were to seek positively to mislead him. This could best be done by conveying to him the impression that his bombs are over-shooting the target.

7. This plan might have three possible results:

   (i) The enemy might for some reason take no notice of the information with which we provided him. In that case nothing would have been gained or lost.
(ii) The enemy might, on the other hand, already have reason to suspect that his bombs were falling short. If, however, at the same time he received, through our deception channels, reports indicating the exact opposite, he might be confused and decide to make no change in his aim. In this case we should at least have prevented a serious increase in casualties and material destruction.

(iii) Lastly, the enemy might be entirely taken in by these false reports and might in consequence decide still further to shorten his range. The result would be that a much larger proportion of the bombs would fall in open country or in sparsely populated areas. Assuming that he moved his aiming point 6 miles to the south-east, it is estimated that present total monthly casualties would be reduced by some 12,000.

8. I attach a table showing the estimated effect upon the casualty rate of the shifting of the mean point of impact either north-west to Charing Cross, or, alternatively, to a point six miles south-east from Dulwich, the centre of the present pattern:

9. From this it will be seen that if the enemy were to discover and correct his present error in range a very serious increase in casualties might result. In the circumstances, I submit that no avoidable risk should be taken and that accordingly instead of attempting vaguely to confuse the enemy a positive deception plan should be adopted.

10. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Air.

(Signed) DUNCAN SANDYS.

2nd August, 1944

EFFECT OF MOVEMENT OF MEAN POINT OF IMPACT

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<th>Movement of mean point of impact</th>
<th>Estimated changes in monthly casualties</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From present position at Dulwich to Charing Cross</td>
<td>+ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Dulwich to a point six miles to the south-east</td>
<td>- 1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Charing Cross to a point six miles south-east of Dulwich</td>
<td>- 2,100</td>
</tr>
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</table>
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 31st July, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Hon. Sir FIROZ KHAN NOON, Representative of the Government of India.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Items 6-9).
Major The Right Hon. G. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Items 8 and 9).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor (Items 10 and 11).
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply (Items 6-9).
The Right Hon. LORD PORTAL, Minister of Works (Items 6-9).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 5–11).
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1–4).
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1–9).

Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Items 6 and 7).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1–9).
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1–9).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
Mr. L. F. Burgis.

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### WAR CABINET 99 (44).

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1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had flown 4,900 sorties and had dropped 6,636 tons of bombs on Germany and 5,764 tons on Occupied Territory. Stuttgart had been attacked on three nights and great destruction caused. Hamburg, an oil plant in the Ruhr, "Crossbow" targets and targets on the Normandy battle front had also been attacked.

United States heavy bombers had flown 5,750 sorties and dropped 8,200 tons of bombs, half of them on targets in Germany. Bremen, the oil plant at Leuna and tactical targets in Normandy had been attacked.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 27,000 sorties and dropped 5,380 tons of bombs on tactical targets on the Normandy front.

The enemy had lost 241 aircraft against Allied losses of 290.

During the week 712 flying bombs had been launched, of which 372, or 52 per cent., had been destroyed and 234 had reached London.

In the Mediterranean, Allied aircraft had dropped 7,600 tons of bombs, more than half on targets in South-Eastern Europe. 12,270 sorties had been flown as against 1,210 by the enemy. Allied losses amounted to 97 aircraft as against 240 by the enemy.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 10,263 tons. Total losses for July, including belated reports, amounted to 60,501. Six U-boats had been destroyed and 4 probably destroyed during July.

Reference was made to the clearance of mines in Cherbourg Harbour.

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The Prime Minister asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to report what casualties had been suffered by British divers engaged on this work.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff described the progress of the battle in Normandy. On our right wing the Americans had made a very good advance, and one of their combat groups had been reported in Avranches. The previous day the 2nd British Army had attacked and had made considerable progress in a drive south of Caumont. Heavy casualties had been suffered by the enemy, and it was considered that two of their Divisions could be written off entirely. Out of 12 enemy Armoured Divisions in the West, 10 had already been engaged. In the recent fighting 7,200 prisoners had been captured up to the 28th July, making a grand total of 70,000 in the Normandy campaign.

The Prime Minister said that, in his speech in Parliament on the 2nd August, he proposed to refer to the Allied casualties in Normandy. He would be glad if the Secretary of State for War would furnish him with the percentage of losses suffered by the British and American forces.

In Italy the bulk of our advance had been in the centre of the front, opposite Florence, where stiff opposition had been met.

The Russian offensive had made progress all along the 500-600-mile front. The German forces north of Riga were in danger of being completely cut off. The German divisions at Brest-Litovsk had been liquidated; the capture of this place would make it easier for the Russians to switch their troops to different parts of the front. The thrust towards Warsaw continued, but it was probable that the Russians would try to outflank the city.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.
2. Mention was made of the fact that enemy jet-propelled aircraft had been encountered by R.A.F. aircraft over Germany. Some discussion ensued as to the rate of production of jet-propelled aircraft in this country.

The Prime Minister invited the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production, in consultation, to prepare and submit to him a report on this matter.

The Minister of Information again undertook to take steps to discourage all references or speculations in the Press about the operational use of these aircraft.

3. The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that he had sent a telegram on the 26th July to Premier Stalin informing him of the departure for Moscow of M. Mikolajczyk. He read to the War Cabinet the text of the reply, dated the 28th July, which he thought was generally satisfactory.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported that the Soviet Air Detachment stationed at Bari had been given permission to carry out a training flight over Greece. They had taken advantage of this to drop a Soviet Mission with E.A.M., without prior notification to us.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that he took a serious view of this development and proposed to make representations to the Soviet Government.

The Prime Minister suggested that our representations should cover not only the absence of prior notification, but also the procedure adopted.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the course proposed.

5. The War Cabinet were informed that on Wednesday, the 2nd August, on the motion to fix the length of the recess, Mr. Shinwell, M.P., intended to suggest that the House should only adjourn till the 26th August. If this led to a discussion lasting for more than a very short while, it would interfere with the timing of the Prime Minister’s speech.

A proposal was made that, if it looked as though there would be considerable discussion on Mr. Shinwell’s suggestion, arrangements should be made to carry on the debate until 2 p.m., at which time the Prime Minister would speak. If, on the other hand, little discussion was provoked, the Prime Minister might make his speech before lunch.

The Prime Minister said that he would discuss the matter further on the following day with the Leader of the House and the Chief Whip.
6. The War Cabinet were informed that the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security proposed to make a statement in the House the following day about the institution of a public warning signal in addition to the "Alert." The statement included the following paragraph, which was designed to give guidance to drivers and conductors of public transport vehicles:

"My noble friend the Minister of War Transport has had discussions with the employers and the Trades Unions engaged in public transport, and it has been agreed that drivers and conductors will use their discretion as to the action they will take when the danger signal is given. In fact, the Government consider it better to rely on the good sense of the people to take the course each considers best from his own experience and the circumstances at the time rather than to attempt to issue detailed instructions covering all conditions."

It was pointed out in discussion that the proposed paragraph might lead to a certain amount of confusion, since it did not make clear whether in any given situation the views of the driver and conductor or those of the passengers should prevail.

The Minister of War Transport pointed out that there had already been discussions with the London Passenger Transport Board and the Unions and that the paragraph in the statement by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security represented what had been agreed. It was essential that bus drivers should be given discretion whether they should proceed with their journey after the sounding of the danger signal, or stop and take shelter themselves. At the same time it was clearly desirable that if, when the signal was given, a passenger desired to dismount he should be allowed to do so.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the last paragraph of the statement should be confined to making it clear that, after the signal had been given, drivers were bound to stop, whether at a recognised stopping-place or not, in order to allow any passenger who desired to do so to leave the vehicle. For the rest, it would be within the discretion of the driver whether he then continued his journey or stopped the vehicle and himself took shelter.

7. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security gave the War Cabinet the following figures as to the attack by flying bombs. Casualties since the inception of attack by flying bombs up to 9 a.m. on the 31st July:

- Killed: 4,640
- Seriously injured: 13,571
- Slightly injured: 17,083
- Unclassified: 88

Total: 35,382

Damage to Houses up to noon, the 30th July:

- Total number destroyed: 17,540
- Damaged but repairable: 792,531

Of which 611,847 had been rendered habitable; leaving 180,684 damaged but not yet rendered habitable.

The Minister of Aircraft Production gave the following figures of damage to factories engaged on the aircraft programme:

Total factories damaged: 1,442. Of this number, 546 had been completely repaired, 637 had been repaired so that 90 per cent. or more of capacity was usable, 231 partly repaired but less than 80 per cent. of capacity was usable; 28 had been completely destroyed.
General satisfaction was expressed with the position as shown by these figures.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that at a later date it would be necessary to organise another labour force to do the work needed to make damaged houses fit for occupation through the winter. He thought that this work could not be dealt with by the ordinary method of employing private building contractors, but would require some special type of organisation. He would make proposals to the War Cabinet at a later date.

8. The War Cabinet had before them the Report of the Committee on Blackout Restrictions (W.P. (44) 417).

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the Committee had been advised by the Air Ministry that, if any relaxations were made in the blackout restrictions, there was a certain danger of attacks by piloted aircraft, but that the northern and western counties were less likely to be attacked. Although the public would no doubt welcome any relaxation, it was clear both from general soundings and from the evidence of the Supply Departments as to opinion among the workers that there would be considerable criticism of the Government if the relaxations were followed by enemy raids. The Committee therefore proposed that, in the first place, the relaxation should extend only to an area north and west of a line roughly St. David's Head—Bletchley—Goole—Falkirk—Dingwall—Tongue. In this area it was proposed to allow considerable improvements in street lighting and to substitute a “dim out” for the blackout in the case of internal lighting in houses, factories, offices, &c. There would also be improvements in external lighting for industry and in car and cycle lights, though it was not proposed to make any change in the regulations governing head-lamps. The relaxation would come into force at the end of September, but local authorities and other bodies concerned in the area covered by the relaxation, and in certain adjacent areas to which the relaxation might next be extended, should be told to put in hand their preparations. No priority beyond that existing at present should be given for labour and material needed to install the higher standards of street lighting.

The Secretary of State for Air pointed out that, in view of the bomber strength of the German Air Force and the extent to which our night fighters (and anti-aircraft batteries) were occupied in countering flying bombs and in the protection of the Normandy bridgehead, there was some risk even in the limited relaxation proposed by the Committee. While he was prepared to accept this risk, he would strongly advise against any extension of the relaxation to eastern and southern counties. The relaxation of the blackout in London and the more vulnerable counties would undoubtedly be regarded by the enemy as a challenge and might well lead him to combine attacks with piloted aircraft with his flying bomb attacks on London.

In discussion, several Ministers expressed the view that there would be serious disappointment if at the present stage of the war the Government were to announce that the restrictions were to be relaxed over a limited area only. The relaxation would, in fact, help those areas which were least directly affected by the war, and would lead to discontent in the remaining areas, and particularly in London, where some measure of street lighting would undoubtedly mitigate the effects of flying bomb attacks. Since, in any event, no change was proposed until the end of September, would it not be preferable to make no announcement at the present time, but to proceed with preparations in all areas, leaving a decision as to the date and geographical extent of the relaxation to be taken in the light of the circumstances prevailing in September?
The Minister of Aircraft Production said that there might be difficulties in supplying the necessary electric lamps to enable a resumption of street lighting and that the question of priority would have to be considered.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that no announcement about the relaxation of blackout restrictions should be made at the present time and that the date and extent of any relaxation should be considered by the War Cabinet at the end of September.

(2) Agreed that in the meantime local authorities and other bodies concerned in all parts of the country should be told that they could make preparations for a resumption of street and industrial lighting on the scale suggested in W.P. (44) 417 in order that, if at the end of September the War Cabinet should decide that the restrictions might be relaxed, they might be in a better position to carry out the decision.

(3) Invited the Minister of Information to take steps to ensure that no reference to the preparations was made by the Press.

(4) Agreed that any questions of priority for labour and material should be dealt with through the usual channels.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 411) regarding the temporary embargo on building labour and the allocation of building labour. The Memorandum explained that the transport situation no longer required the retention of the embargo, and that it was therefore proposed to discontinue it forthwith. In view, however, of the particularly acute position in the London area, due to flying bomb attacks, and of the general shortage of labour throughout the country, it was proposed that in the London area major works should be started only if they were urgently needed in connection with operations or were of equal priority with first-aid repairs, while outside the London area departments should put forward only those projects which they regarded as most urgent.

In view of the uncertainties created by the present emergency demands for building labour, it was not practicable to put forward immediately any realistic allocation of labour between the Departments for the second half of 1944. It was hoped, however, that proposals would be submitted shortly.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposals put forward by the Minister of Production in W.P. (44) 411.

10. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that when the second reading of this Bill was taken on the following day an amendment would be moved in the following terms:

"Where it is provided by any enactment that any regulations or orders shall be laid before Parliament, such regulations or orders shall cease to be valid unless they are laid before Parliament in accordance with the provisions of such enactment within twenty-one days after the date upon which such regulations or orders are made."

He had discussed the matter with the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General, and had reached the conclusion that the right course would be that on the following day he should give an undertaking that legislation would be introduced to provide that, in future, any Statutory Rule and
Order which might be subject to a negative resolution should cease to be operative if it was not laid before the House within twenty-one Parliamentary days.

On the other hand, it was argued that ample amends had already been made by the Home Secretary's apology in the House, and by the introduction of an indemnity Bill, and that it was undesirable to make a specific provision which might have the effect of invalidating some order which had become the basis for a whole structure of rights and obligations.

It was pointed out, however, that the Government spokesman would be pressed to say whether the Orders were valid, notwithstanding that they had not been laid. This was not an easy question to answer. There was some doubt about the legal position inasmuch as the Fire Services Regulations had been made under a provision which required the orders made under it to be laid before Parliament "as soon as may be." Moreover, there seemed every likelihood that, unless a satisfactory answer was given to the movers of the amendment, there would be pressure to make subordinate legislation the subject of an affirmative resolution to an increasing degree.

After some further discussion, the War Cabinet—

Authorised the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to indicate sympathy with the point of view of the movers of the amendment, and to undertake to give consideration at an early date after the Recess to the best means of meeting the issue raised, whether by legislation on the lines proposed, or otherwise.

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Sir Firoz Khan Noon.

Sir Firoz thanked the Prime Minister for what he had said. He would carry away with him a deep impression of the heavy responsibilities resting upon the Prime Minister and his colleagues, and of their ability to carry this burden. India was whole-heartedly behind the people of this country in the war.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S. W. 1,
31st July, 1944.
Secret.

W.M. (44)

100th Conclusions.

War Cabinet 100 (44).

Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 3rd August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor.

The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.


The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

Major The Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Item 1).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.
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1. The War Cabinet had before them three telegrams from Washington (Nos. 4136, 4137 and 4138) about the discussions between the British and American delegates in regard to the proposed oil agreement. The Lord Privy Seal reported that the American delegates had seen strong objection to our proposal to amend Article 1 (3) in the Memorandum of Agreement by the addition of the words "... with due regard to the right of each country to draw its consumption requirements to the extent that may be considered necessary from the production in its territories, or in which rights are held by its Nationals." Our delegation saw no prospect of getting this amendment accepted. It seemed that the Americans suspected us of seeking at all costs to exclude American oil from British markets.

It was also reported that the Americans now took the view that the words "relevant economic factors" excluded any limitation on foreign oil imports to Britain on account of exchange difficulties.

The views of the delegation on the situation which had arisen were reported and instructions sought as to the line which should be adopted.

The War Cabinet also had before them a draft reply to these three telegrams (attached to the minutes as an Annex), prepared by a Committee of Ministers. The purport of this draft was that there could be no question of accepting any arrangement which would prejudice our exchange position. Provided, however, we could get satisfaction on this point, and in a form which we could make public, we should not, in view of the possible repercussions on other issues, press for the proposed amendment to Article 1 (3).

Several Ministers took the view that we should be weakening our position, not only in the oil negotiations, but also in negotiations on other commodities if we agreed to drop the amendment to Article 1 (3). It was also urged that, since it looked as though the negotiations would in any case break down, there was nothing to be gained by making a concession in regard to the proposed amendment.

On the other hand, it was urged that the consequences of a breakdown at this juncture in the oil negotiations would be very unfortunate, and that, if a break was to come, it was important that it should be on inexpugnable grounds. Furthermore, it was urged that, provided we insisted on a clear statement that we should have to take exchange difficulties into account in deciding the sources of our oil supplies, we should, in fact, secure all or virtually all the liberty of action which we desired.

Further discussion showed the latter to be the preponderant view of the War Cabinet, and it was decided to despatch the draft telegram, subject to two minor amendments—

(a) the insertion in paragraph 5, line 9, of the words "it might be" before "by circumstances";

(b) the addition of the following new concluding paragraph:—

"If as a result of this telegram you find that the United States delegates desire postponement of the discussions, this would suit us very well."

Note.—Before action could be taken on this conclusion, a telegram was received from Washington reporting that there had been fresh developments, and that a further message should be awaited.

2. On the 9th June the War Cabinet had considered a proposal set out in a Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 221) that the Agency-General of the Government of India in Washington should be made into an independent Mission headed by a Minister.

It had been decided to postpone consideration of this proposal until Lord Halifax's next visit to this country.

Consideration of this matter was now resumed.
The main argument in favour of this proposal was that a Minister who was head of an independent Mission, instead of being a member of the Embassy staff, would carry more weight as a representative of the Government of India, and that this would be helpful to us in getting a better appreciation in America of the Indian position.

On the other hand, it was argued that if this change was made, reciprocal facilities in India might be asked for with consequences which might be embarrassing, and that there was no particular advantage to be gained by making the change proposed at the present time.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that no change should be made at the present time, but that the proposal could, if necessary, be brought up again in six months' time.

3. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) A memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 426) containing a copy of correspondence with the Viceroy as to the reply to be given to Mr. Gandhi's letter of the 27th July to Lord Wavell.

(ii) A report by the India Committee (W.P. (44) 429, Revise) containing revised paragraphs which it was suggested should be substituted for paragraphs 3-5 of the draft reply proposed by the Viceroy (Appendix IV to W.P. (44) 429).

The India Committee also recommended that, in order to keep the initiative in our hands, the correspondence should be released as soon as Mr. Gandhi had received the Viceroy's reply, and that the Viceroy should be so informed and asked to make it clear to Mr. Gandhi, in whatever way he thought fit, that immediate publication was proposed.

The Prime Minister expressed grave uneasiness as to the position which had developed. It was most undesirable that the Viceroy should find himself in correspondence with Mr. Gandhi or that matters should have taken a turn that could be represented as a renewal of negotiations between Mr. Gandhi and The King's representative. Mr. Gandhi had consistently been a bitter enemy of this country. The proposals which he had now put forward involved acceptance on our part of "immediate independence" coupled with a readiness to accept a so-called "National Government" for the period of the war. We were to be allowed to continue military operations from India, but on the understanding that no financial burden would fall upon India. Propositions of this nature were quite unacceptable, and he was disturbed to think that we should be corresponding with Mr. Gandhi regarding them. Was there not the risk of our being misunderstood by the minorities and by Mr. Jinnah? Would it not be better that any reply should take the form of an acknowledgment by the Viceroy or his private secretary, to be coupled with a public statement by His Majesty's Government to which Mr. Gandhi would be referred? In any event it was surely essential that a very firm line should be adopted and no risk run of our giving the impression that we were truckling to Mr. Gandhi.

The Secretary of State for India said that the Viceroy had not consulted him before informing Mr. Gandhi, in his letter of the 27th July (W.M. (44) 429, Appendix I), that he would be glad to consider a definite and constructive policy if put forward by him. It was in reply to that letter that Mr. Gandhi had put forward his present proposals, and it was impossible, in the Secretary of State's judgment, to avoid a reply being sent to them. It would be difficult, too, for that reply to be sent by anyone but the Viceroy. It was true that Lord Wavell was under instructions not to enter into negotiations with Indian political leaders. But it was equally very difficult
for the Viceroy to decline to have any conversations with, or respond to any overtures from, prominent political personages. And there could be no question of Mr. Gandhi's political importance. He agreed that the draft which the Viceroy had proposed was open to exception in certain respects. The revised draft prepared by the India Committee was firm and dignified, and he strongly urged its acceptance. The matter was one of urgency, since the Viceroy was to go on tour on the 5th August and was anxious to despatch his reply to Mr. Gandhi before doing so. Mr. Gandhi was likely to meet Mr. Jinnah in the course of the next three or four days, and Lord Wavell favoured the despatch of his reply to Mr. Gandhi before the meeting took place.

The Lord President of the Council said that the India Committee fully recognised the difficulties of the position to which the Prime Minister had drawn attention. On the other hand, we were faced with a situation in which we could not easily avoid a reply to Mr. Gandhi. The reply proposed was entirely in line with the policy of His Majesty's Government as recently restated by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons. It was also within the terms of Sir Stafford Cripps' offer of 1942 which we had again reiterated as our policy.

Other points made in discussion were:

(a) Even as amended by the India Committee, the proposed reply was much too forthcoming and in much too friendly and conciliatory a spirit. We had to consider the reaction of correspondence of this nature on other parties. It would be best to stiffen the tone of the reply.

(b) A neutral statement in the third person by His Majesty's Government or the Government of India, setting out the policy of His Majesty's Government, would be preferable to an answer by the Viceroy.

(c) Attention was drawn, on the other hand, to the importance in dealing with Indians of combining the utmost firmness with great politeness and of scrupulous observance of form. Mr. Gandhi had, after all, written his letter in response to a letter from Lord Wavell. It would be difficult, without giving rise to misunderstanding, and given our general policy of encouraging Indians to get together to reach agreement on India's problems, to refuse to let him have a reply.

(d) It was also urged that a statement by His Majesty's Government would be too great a compliment to Mr. Gandhi.

(e) Attention was drawn to the absence of any reference to the position of the Indian States. While the government of the States might be open to criticism, we were under great obligations to them and they were entitled to full consideration. It was explained, however, that the correspondence had reference only to the transitional stage and to the government of British India. The States would not be affected at this point and reference to them was therefore not called for. They had not been mentioned in Mr. Gandhi's letter or in the Viceroy's telegrams under reply.

Discussion ensued on the terms of the draft reply as amended by the India Committee. The following suggestions were made:

(i) In general the draft should be stiffer and less forthcoming in tone, and more concise in statement.

(ii) Paragraph 3.

Attention was drawn to the phrase "offer of complete and unqualified freedom."

(iii) Paragraph 5.

(a) The suggestion was made that paragraph 5 of the draft as amended should stop at the end of the second sentence, with the words "on that basis."

(b) The Prime Minister suggested further examination of the words "moving fast towards a victorious conclusion."
(c) The suitability of the words "India can hardly play her proper part in the post-war settlement" in the last sentence (if retained) of paragraph 5 was questioned.

(iv) **Paragraph 6.**

(a) In several passages the third person would be more appropriate than the first person.

(b) It was suggested that for the fourth and subsequent sentences a passage on the following lines should be substituted:

"I should be glad to help to achieve agreement if I thought I could do anything to help. But the Indian problem cannot make progress until the Indian Leaders are closer together than they are now. It is, therefore, on those Leaders that there rests the primary responsibility. Let me remind you too that minority problems are not easy. They are real and can be solved only by mutual compromise and tolerance."

The **Prime Minister**, summing up the discussion, said that Indian policy raised issues of great delicacy and political importance and called for very careful handling. He would still have preferred that a situation in which the Viceroy was in correspondence with Mr. Gandhi should not have arisen. As it had in fact arisen he agreed that a reply to Mr. Gandhi should go from the Viceroy, and in general he accepted the soundness of the line proposed by the India Committee. He invited them, however, to reconsider their draft in the light of the discussion and of the specific suggestions for amendments which had been put forward, and to submit for consideration a revised draft. Meanwhile, he would himself communicate privately with the Viceroy and explain that a matter of this importance called for fuller consideration and that, despite any inconvenience caused, we must ask him to await the considered reply of His Majesty's Government.

The **War Cabinet**—

Endorsed the Prime Minister's proposals at "X."

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**Man-Power in 1944.**

**Allocation to the Royal Air Force and Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1944.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 90th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

4. At their meeting on the 12th July the War Cabinet had approved the provisional allocations proposed by the Man-Power Committee for the last six months of 1944, subject to certain provisos. One of these provisos had been that the provisional allocation proposed for the Ministry of Aircraft Production should be reviewed in the light of an examination of the assumption as to the strength of the Royal Air Force in 1945 to which the current aircraft programme should be related. Thus, should it be assumed that the strength of the Royal Air Force would not be expanded in 1945 beyond the strength which it was planned to reach at the end of 1944?

The War Cabinet now had before them a note by the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production (W.P. (44) 423) giving particulars under the following three heads:

(a) The planned expansion of the Royal Air Force between now and the end of 1945 on the assumption that the war with Germany continues.

(b) The effect on this planned expansion of the cut in man-power for Ministry of Aircraft Production proposed in W.P. (44) 375.

(c) The effect on the man-power requirements of the Royal Air Force and of Ministry of Aircraft Production of a decision that the Royal Air Force should not be expanded beyond the size to be reached (under present plans) by the end of 1944.
After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed in principle that the assumption which should govern the current aircraft programme should be that the Royal Air Force would not be expanded beyond the size to be reached (under present plans) by the end of 1944, that is to say, 522 squadrons.

(2) Agreed that the detailed implications in this decision should be worked out by the Minister of Labour and National Service, the Minister of Production, the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production, any unresolved difficulties being submitted to the War Cabinet for final settlement.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
3rd August, 1944.

ANNEX

OIL

Draft Telegram to Washington.

Following for Lord Beaverbrook:

Your telegrams Nos. 4136, 4137 and 4138 have been considered by Ministers.

1. The words in dispute in Article 1 (3) of the Memorandum of Agreement were inserted for two reasons:
   (a) To protect our exchange position in determining the sources of our oil imports.
   (b) To meet the criticism that the arrangement as originally framed was one-sided in character since, while the United States domestic production was assured of a protected market, we had no corresponding right to draw the oil we required from our own sources.

2. So far as concerns the safeguards of our military and strategic position, we understand that no difficulty arises.

3. There can be no question of accepting any arrangement which would prejudice our exchange position; and if we cannot obtain satisfaction on this point there will be nothing for it but to make it clear that we are unable to sign the agreement.

4. On the other hand, we regard it as important not to break with the United States, save on the most vital issues, bearing in mind the repercussions upon the other vital discussion which we are about to enter into on Stage II affecting munitions, food and shipping.

5. We suggest, therefore, that you should take the following attitude. You should make it clear that we cannot enter into any arrangement which would tie our hands with respect to any measures we may find it necessary to take in order to protect our exchange position. It should, therefore, be made clear beyond doubt that the phrase "relevant economic factors" includes exchange difficulties, and that we may be forced, by circumstances over which we have no control, to take into consideration exchange questions in deciding the sources of our oil supplies. The justification for such a stipulation as this has been recognised by the Americans in discussions on other matters. So long as this point is clearly understood and we are free to state this publicly, then, rather than break at this juncture, when good relations are so important, we would reluctantly agree to drop the amendment to Article 1 (3) now in dispute. In reaching this decision we are influenced by the consideration that the contemplated arrangements are concerned primarily with production, and with this distribution only so far as relevant to production.

6. We trust that an explanation on these lines will overcome the difficulties which have arisen. While emphasising that your instructions represent the minimum safeguards for which any Sovereign Power could ask, you should make it clear how reluctant we should be to see these important negotiations break down. If the Americans have any adequate alternative, they will no doubt put it forward now before a rupture becomes inevitable.

7. If you should think that the Americans suspect us of harbouring any sinister designs against their oil interests, you will no doubt disabuse them.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Friday, 4th August, 1944, at 11.30 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. the EARL OF HALIFAX, His Majesty's Ambassador to the United States.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
Colonel the Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 1 and 2).
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 4 and 5).
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 4 and 5).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply (Items 4 and 5).
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Items 4 and 5).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1 and 2).

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
MR. L. F. BURGIS.
**WAR CABINET 101 (44).**

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1. The War Cabinet had before them a Report by the Armistice and Post-War Committee (W.P. (44) 406) on certain points which had been referred to them by the War Cabinet (W.M. (44) 88th Conclusions, Minute 4) in connection with the proposals for Future World Organisation which had been put forward by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (see W.P. (44) 370 and W.P. (44) 220).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs invited the War Cabinet to agree that the recommendations of the Armistice and Post-War Committee should be taken as the instructions to the Official Delegation under Sir Alexander Cadogan which was about to proceed to Washington.

Since the Committee reported we had received the text of the draft scheme which the United States Government intended to lay before the forthcoming meeting. It was very satisfactory from our point of view. One point only was left in doubt. The American scheme contained a reference to arrangements for territorial trusteeships, the details of which had not been filled in. It might be that the United States Government had omitted them merely because they wanted to see the turn which discussions might take. Our position as regards our Colonial territories was, however, perfectly clear. We should take our stand on the policy already approved by the War Cabinet (W.M. (44) 58th Conclusions, Minute 2). He recommended that Sir Alexander Cadogan's instructions on this should be that, if proposals were put forward which conflicted with that decision, he should say that he had no instructions and must refer to London.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of bringing the French, and also the Dutch, in at the next stage in these discussions with the Americans. The instructions to Sir Alexander Cadogan should, he felt, be in terms that the meeting which he was attending would be for preliminary exploration and discussion on the official level. The issues involved in the forthcoming discussions were of great importance, and it was to be regretted that pressure had been so great that the War Cabinet had not been able to devote closer attention to them. He felt sure that the War Cabinet would wish Sir Alexander Cadogan all success in his Mission.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the above statements.
(2) Approved the report by the Armistice and Post-War Committee (W.P. (44) 406) as the basis for preliminary and exploratory discussion on the official level.
(3) Agreed that if the question of territorial trusteeship was raised, Sir Alexander Cadogan should act as proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at "X."

2. The War Cabinet had before them the Report of the Committee on Policy in Ethiopia (W.P. (44) 416) which had been appointed at their meeting on the 28th June, 1944 (W.M. (44) 83rd Conclusions, Minute 2), under the chairmanship of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Report recommended the reopening of negotiations with the Emperor of Ethiopia and contained detailed proposals as to the line to be taken by our representatives on the resumption of negotiations.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the recommendations of the Report were summarised in paragraph 16 of W.P. (44) 416 and represented the unanimous view of the Committee. The Report made it clear that the question of the precise degree of further financial assistance to be given to the Emperor should be left open, pending investigation by the Delegation which it was proposed to send to Ethiopia.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs raised two points on the Report:

(a) Paragraph 13(e)(iv) provided that the surrender of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway should be conditional upon its being held by the Ethiopian custodian of enemy property until the end of the war. He would prefer that no reference to this should be made in any agreement with the Emperor. He felt that we should aim at an arrangement by which joint control over the Railway should be exercised by the French, the Ethiopians and ourselves. This would be more likely to ensure the efficient running of the line.

The War Cabinet agreed.

(b) The Minister at Addis Ababa, without instructions from the Foreign Office, had in discussion with the Emperor indicated that we would be ready to negotiate on the basis of the Emperor's own proposals. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought that, quite apart from Mr. Howe's statement, we should find it easier to negotiate on that basis or, at any rate, to relate our negotiations to the proposals which the Emperor had put forward, and recommended that we should so proceed.

After discussion the War Cabinet—

Agreed that it would be preferable to use the phrase "in consequence of the Emperor's proposals" rather than commit ourselves to basing our negotiations on them.

(c) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs felt that if, as seemed likely, the United States were to take an interest in the Ethiopian question, he would like to encourage them so long as it did not interfere with our desiderata.

The Prime Minister suggested that our policy should be to help the Americans and to work with them in this matter.

The War Cabinet agreed.

(d) The Secretary of State for Air pointed out with reference to paragraph 13(d) of the Report of the Committee that while no difficulty arose as regards the requirements of the R.A.F. in the terms of the Emperor's draft, the draft contained no provision for British civil air transport. He suggested that, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he should adjust the draft so as to secure facilities for our civil aviation, though there should be no question of our endeavouring to obtain exclusive rights.

The War Cabinet—

Accepted the proposal of the Secretary of State for Air and invited him to arrange the precise terms of the redraft with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(e) The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs thought that it would be well to inform the Dominions of what we were doing as regards Ethiopia, though he did not suggest that there should be any question of consultation with them.

The War Cabinet agreed.

Subject to the points raised in the discussion, the War Cabinet—

Approved the recommendations of the Committee on Policy in Ethiopia as set out in W.P. (44) 418.
3. At their meeting on the 12th July, 1944, the War Cabinet invited the Minister of Labour and National Service to examine, in consultation with other Ministers, the possibility of employing German prisoners on agricultural work.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Report by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 421). Departments had stated that they could employ up to 17,200 German prisoners. These would have to be housed in prisoner-of-war camps and the only suitable camps available were now occupied by non-co-operating Italians. In order to make room for the 17,000 Germans, an equivalent number of non-co-operating Italians would have to leave the camps and be given alternative accommodation. This could only be done if they changed their status and became co-operators. The memorandum made recommendations for improving the amenities of co-operators in order to induce as many non-co-operators as possible to change their status.

In discussion the question was raised whether the precautions for guarding the German prisoners whilst at work were adequate. The Secretary of State for War gave an assurance on this point and added that no prisoners holding extreme Nazi views would be used; such prisoners were sent either to Canada or the United States.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals in the Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 421).

4. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 419) about Supplies from North America in Stage II. This memorandum summarised the more important questions which would have to be raised in forthcoming discussions with the Canadian Government and the United States Administration. Attached to the memorandum was a fuller paper, dealing in detail with the British requirements after the close of the European war, and setting out the line of argument which it was suggested should be adopted.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the view seemed to be held in some quarters in the United States that the release of man-power from the forces, which would follow on the defeat of Germany, would ease our position very greatly, and that there could be a very great restriction in the scope and volume of supplies made available to us under Lend-Lease. Our first task was to convince them that the supplies we intended to ask for would give us no more than the minimum required to enable us—

(a) to play our part in the Japanese war;
(b) to begin as soon as possible in Stage II the recovery and expansion of our export trade; and
(c) to do what was urgently necessary by way of rehousing and restoration and some slight improvement in the meagre standards of our civil economy.

We had to convince the Americans and Canadians that such provision properly qualified for Lease-Lend or Mutual Aid; that their promises of supplies should constitute a firm commitment on which we could plan effectively the disposition of our man-power; and finally that in the long run it was to their interests that we should receive assistance to this extent and on these terms in Stage II.
In the course of discussion, which showed general agreement with the point of view set out in the memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Production, the following points were made.

(a) The figures in the memorandum about the size of the Services in Stage II assumed that our forces one year after the defeat of Germany would be between 65 and 70 per cent. of the forces at mid-1944. These figures would, of course, require modification in the light of the Prime Minister’s directive on man-power in Stage II (W.P. (44) 431).

(b) The Prime Minister said that it was important that we should let the Americans know the extent of the forces which we intended to deploy against Japan in Stage II, and should ask them whether they wished these forces to be supplemented in any respect, making it clear that, since the whole of our resources were fully stretched, we should have to continue to rely on their aid in regard to shipping, for example, and munitions. The position would be clearer when certain decisions had been reached as to our Far Eastern strategy.

(c) Lord Halifax said that we should have to make great efforts to persuade the Americans that we were not seeking to gain an undue advantage by continuing to receive, in Stage II, Lend-Lease goods which were not essential from the point of view of winning the war. It was essential that the broad lines of the picture set out in this paper should be brought home to those in the highest authority in the United States administration.

(d) It was explained that the statement on page 12, paragraph 40 (a), that the food programme contemplated would permit of some small easement on the present rations was inaccurate. The programme in question permitted no such easement.

(e) It was generally felt that the most difficult part of the case to put across was our requirements for continued supply of raw materials on Lend-Lease. In the end we might have to agree that, while we should continue to get on Lend-Lease the raw materials required for explosives and munitions, Lend-Lease procedure would not cover raw materials required for general civilian manufacture.

(f) It was pointed out that in the long run it was, of course, in the best interests of the United States that we should build up our export position in Stage II, since otherwise our purchasing power would be gravely diminished, and this would have a serious effect on United States export industries.

The War Cabinet—

Gave general approval to the memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 419) as indicating the general line to be taken in the forthcoming discussions and as a brief for use by Ministers in these discussions.

Lord Halifax.

5. The Prime Minister said that Lord Halifax would shortly be returning to the United States. His presence at War Cabinet meetings had been of the greatest value. He and his colleagues wished Lord Halifax a continuance of the success which had attended his mission at Washington and warmly congratulated him upon the high honour recently conferred upon him by The King.

Lord Halifax thanked the Prime Minister for what he had said.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
4th August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet
War Room on Friday, 4th August, 1944, at 3 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the
Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON,
Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SNCAL, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 2-4).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL,
Paymaster-General.
Mr. M. S. McCORQUODALE, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Minister of Labour (Item 4).
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Item 4).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

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1. The War Cabinet at their meeting on the 3rd August invited the India Committee to consider further the terms of the draft reply to be sent by the Viceroy to Mr. Gandhi's letter of the 27th July (Appendix IV to W.P. (44) 426). They now had before them the report of the Committee (W.P. (44) 430) submitting a revised draft telegram.

The sense of the War Cabinet was very strongly that (a) we must be at pains to protect the position of the Untouchables in any arrangements for the future government of India, and that we should bring out equally that there was no intention of failing in the discharge of the other obligations which we had incurred to racial or religious minorities or to the Indian States; (b) it was important to make it clear that we regarded ourselves as in no sense open to criticism for our trusteeship of India.

After discussion, the War Cabinet approved the draft telegram appended to W.P. (44) 430, subject to the following amendments:

(a) Paragraph 3.—Add at end: "The object of these conditions was to ensure fulfilment of their duty to safeguard the interests of the racial and religious minorities and of the depressed classes, and their Treaty obligations to the Indian States."

(b) Paragraph 4.—Second sentence: after the words "and that until" insert the words "the invasion peril is removed."

(c) Paragraph 4.—Last sentence: before "arrangements" insert "financial."

(d) Paragraph 5.—Fifth sentence: amend to read: "...agreement in principle between Hindus and Muslims and all important elements as to the method by which the new Constitution should be framed."

2. Exactly a year ago the War Cabinet had appointed a Standing Committee on Indian Financial Questions under the Chairmanship of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the following terms of reference:

"The Committee's first task is to consider steps to combat inflation in India. This inquiry should cover such questions as whether some part of India's capacity, now devoted to war production, should not be switched back to the manufacture of consumer goods.

The Committee's second task is to examine the growing indebtedness of the United Kingdom to India."

The War Cabinet now had before them a report from the Committee (W.P. (44) 398), the conclusions of which are summarised as follows:

(a) Inflation.
Considerable progress has been made by the Government of India towards securing command of the situation, but the question how much further assistance is required from outside, if India is to stand the strain involved in the South-East Asia campaign, cannot yet be answered.

(b) United Kingdom Expenditure.
It is inopportune to propose any amendment of the Defence Expenditure Plan. Nor can the supplies which His Majesty's Government are drawing from India be foregone. It is possible, for the present, only to ensure that the terms of contracts under which supplies are obtained are as favourable as circumstances allow, and to aim at keeping down inflation, with its inevitable repercussion upon costs.
Sterling Balances.

The future growth of the balances cannot be either estimated or prevented, and we must rely upon effecting a settlement in respect of India’s abnormal balances at a more propitious time. Meanwhile, nothing should be done to prejudice this ultimate settlement.

The main point dealt with in discussion was the growth of India’s sterling balances.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that some part of India’s large holding of sterling was accounted for by the excess of India’s exports to, over imports from, other countries in the sterling area, or Canada and the United States. These were commercial transactions, and the proceeds of the sales, whether in sterling or dollars, had been credited to us, and we had therefore received good value.

There was no doubt, however, that a considerable part of India’s sterling balances was the result of war transactions which were sterile in the sense that we had received no commercial benefit therefrom. Moreover, these transactions had taken place at a time of inflation in India, and, apart from inflation, in certain cases we had paid altogether excessive prices. This aspect of the matter was being fully examined.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer had no doubt that in the end we should be able to make a strong case for scaling down our liabilities and for making repayments by easy stages, subject to the condition that in the meantime this country would secure an ample share of the volume of Indian trade.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer added that no obligations had been entered into as regards payment of interest on these balances. While the task of negotiating a settlement of this matter would be a formidable one, he saw no reason why a settlement should not be reached on the lines which he had indicated, which would not involve us in an undue burden.

This led to discussion of the Defence Expenditure Plan, which governed the incidence of military expenditure as between India and the United Kingdom.

The Prime Minister reminded the War Cabinet that this plan had been drawn up in 1940 before Japan had entered the war. It had never since been revised; and now imposed an altogether unfair burden on this country. We were entitled to put in a counter-claim which would include such items as the part played by British naval, military and air forces in the defence of India against invasion.

The War Cabinet were reminded that this matter had been considered in September 1942. At that time it had been decided to send a communication to the Viceroy, for communication to the Government of India, putting on record the War Cabinet’s view that the entry of Japan into the war had fundamentally changed the situation since the Financial Settlement of 1940 had been negotiated; that, while we did not suggest that a new settlement should be negotiated at the present juncture, a further review and eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India would assuredly be required.

The War Cabinet were also reminded that the Viceroy, after receiving this telegram, had strongly advised against communicating to his Council what amounted to a formal reservation by His Majesty’s Government in regard to the future treatment of the debt which Britain was incurring to India under the present settlement. The Viceroy had urged that to do so might have grave consequences on the political situation and on the industrial and commercial aspect of India’s war effort. In consequence, no communication on the matter had yet been made to the Government of India.

The Prime Minister said that he felt growing uneasiness at the position. He was sure that the facts of the position were not understood by Parliament or the public. Furthermore, he would have
greatly preferred that we should before now have given some clear indication to the Government of India of our attitude to this matter. He felt strongly that the principle of a counter-claim was justified on merits, and hoped that he would have the support of his colleagues in maintaining this attitude.

After some further discussion, the War Cabinet—

(1) Took note with general approval of the Report of the Committee on Indian Financial Questions (W.P. (44) 398) and of the course of action set out therein.

(2) Reaffirmed the conclusion reached by the War Cabinet in September 1942 that the basis of the financial settlement of 1940 was no longer appropriate, and agreed that we were entitled to seek a readjustment of the position on a wider basis, which would take into account, among other factors, the extent to which British forces and material, both in India itself and elsewhere, had contributed to save India from invasion.

3. At their meeting on the 3rd August (W.M. (44) 100th Conclusions, Minute 1) the War Cabinet had provisionally approved proposals for dealing with the deadlock that seemed likely to arise in the discussions between British and American representatives at Washington in regard to the proposed oil agreement. Before action could be taken on those conclusions a telegram had been received from Washington reporting that there had been fresh developments and that a further message should be awaited.

The War Cabinet now had before them telegrams Nos. 4179 and 4180, dated the 4th August, from the Lord Privy Seal, reporting that, as a result of further discussion, unanimous conclusions had been reached by the joint delegation. While it had not proved possible to secure an amendment to the draft Memorandum of Understanding in the sense desired by us, an alternative solution had been reached which they considered gave us the substance of our proposed amendment to Article I (3) of the draft Memorandum and which they thought in some respects strengthened our position. They recommended that they should now be authorised to sign the Memorandum with the statement attached to it.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer observed that the solution which had been independently reached by Lord Beaverbrook and the delegation corresponded very closely to that which the War Cabinet had decided on the 3rd August to suggest to the delegation. The effect appeared to be that, while we did not secure our proposed amendment of Article I (3), our position was safeguarded by an agreed statement written into the minutes of the Plenary Session and available for publication to Congress and to Parliament. The terms of the statement appeared to safeguard our exchange position and appeared generally adequate.

The War Cabinet—

Took note with great satisfaction of the outcome of the discussions and, subject to urgent consideration of the specific drafting alterations which the delegation had recommended in telegram No. 4180, agreed that authority should be given for the signing of the Memorandum with the statement attached to it.
Man-power in the First Year after the Defeat of Germany.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 96th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

4. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on the 26th July, 1944 (W.M. (44) 96th Conclusions, Minute 2), the Prime Minister had undertaken to prepare a draft directive indicating the lines on which provisional man-power allocations for Stage II could be made as a basis for forward planning.

The War Cabinet now had before them a draft directive prepared by the Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 431).

The directive proposed that it should be assumed that there would be a cut of 1,100,000 on Service and munitions requirements and that the effect of this cut should be worked out. The cut would still leave a very substantial deficit; and it would have to be decided later how far it would be necessary to impose further cuts on military demands and how far the deficit could be met by reducing civil requirements or by increasing the supply of man-power. In the meantime, a further scrutiny of civilian claims should be made with a view to reducing their total by about 200,000. In the allocation of man-power available for civil purposes, the restoration of the export trade should have first priority, and it should be laid down that we could not fall short of the tentative provision made for the first year of the building programme. Other civil standards should be restored where the need was greatest, but these should have a lower priority. The broad lines on which the effects of the cuts on Service and munitions requirements should be worked out were that there should be a cut of 200,000 men in the Navy, 300,000 in the Army and 200,000 in the R.A.F., leaving 400,000 to be found by reductions in the output of munitions.

The Prime Minister stressed the provisional nature of the directive and said that he would be glad to study the military proposals further with the Chiefs of Staff when they had had time to work out the effects of the cuts. It would be for the Chiefs of Staff to consider how the available man-power could be used to the best advantage and, having done this, to point out the consequences of the cuts to the Government, who would then have to decide whether to accept any risks involved. Within the next month or two it should be possible to get a clearer view of the military tasks which still remained to be carried out.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that W.P. (44) 431 should be accepted as a general basis for planning in Stage II, subject, as regards the military proposals, to the procedure indicated by the Prime Minister.

The provisional allocations of man-power resulting from this paper would, of course, be subject to review in the light of further decisions affecting the distribution of our war effort, including the man-power review which was due to take place towards the end of August.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
4th August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Wednesday, 9th August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff.

The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

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Greece.

1. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 433) examining the question of the despatch of British troops to Greece on the withdrawal of the Germans. The discussion, and the conclusions reached, are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that he proposed to ask for the removal of the Russian Officer-in-charge of the Russian air detachment at Bari, who had recently been responsible for dropping a Russian Military Mission to E.L.A.S. without our knowledge. He suggested that this would best be done through the Military Mission. He had already taken up with the Soviet Government the question of the position of this Russian mission, and the intentions of the Soviet Government as regards relations between it and the British and Soviet Missions already in Greece.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed to the course proposed.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
9th August, 1944.
SECRET.

W.M. (44)

104th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 104 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Wednesday, 9th August, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir J. ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. V. CHANDONNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
Colonel the Right Hon. O. STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Right Hon. Sir J. GEIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. S. CRIFFS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. B. BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
Sir O. SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Items 9 and 10).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir A. BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir E. BRIDGES.
General Sir H. L. ISMAY.
Sir G. LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
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1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous nine days. Bomber Command had flown 6,856 sorties and dropped 22,700 tons of bombs. United States heavy bombers had flown 10,400 sorties and dropped 19,700 tons of bombs, 11,000 of which had been on Germany.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 29,000 sorties and dropped 6,000 tons of bombs. They had also destroyed 187 tanks, 177 locomotives and a considerable number of motor transport vehicles and railway trucks.

The enemy had lost 232 aircraft as against Allied losses of 335. During the previous nine days 536 flying bombs had been launched, of which 51 per cent. had been destroyed. 16,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on flying bomb launching sites and storage depots.

During the week ending the 7th August there had been no shipping losses due to enemy action. Total losses for July amounted to 74,020 tons.

Eight U-boats had been destroyed and four probably destroyed during July.

The Prime Minister said that what might prove to be a battle of great importance was now being fought in Normandy. The British and Canadian attack south of Caen was proceeding satisfactorily and our armour was now within 6 or 7 miles of Falaise. The American forces, moving with great daring, were engaged in a wide encircling movement. To avoid encirclement of part of his forces the enemy might have to make a considerable withdrawal.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security gave the War Cabinet the following figures as to the attack by flying bombs. Casualties since the inception of the attack up to 6 a.m., the 9th August:

- Killed: 5,194
- Seriously injured: 14,971
- Slightly injured: 19,536

Total: 39,601

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that there had been some criticism that the time for which the siren sounded for the “alert” or “raiders past” was rather on the long side. He proposed gradually to reduce the time of the signal, perhaps by as much as 50 per cent. He did not suggest making any public statement, but would observe what the reactions of the public were.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

4. The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet a personal telegram which he had received from Premier Stalin about his talks in Moscow with M. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. M. Mikolajczyk and his colleagues had then had discussions with representatives of the Polish National Committee. No final decisions had been reached, but the outlook seemed more promising.
The Prime Minister said that he would communicate this telegram to President Roosevelt.

Reference was made to the battle in progress in Warsaw between the Germans and the Polish Underground Army. Three Polish aircraft had succeeded in dropping weapons for the latter on the previous night. It would clearly be much easier for help to be sent by the Russians instead of from Western Europe; but a previous approach had been rather coldly received.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to submit to the Prime Minister the draft of a telegram which he might send to Premier Stalin on this matter.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that the Daily Worker had asked the Italian Communist Party for permission to appoint a correspondent to Italy, and had invited Signor Togliatti to cable an article on the present position in Italy.

In his view it was undesirable that the Daily Worker should obtain material from Italy, and it would be embarrassing if the Minister of a Government with whom we were not yet at peace were to write articles for the British Press.

He had accordingly instructed Sir Noel Charles to request the Italian Prime Minister to take steps to prevent any messages from being sent to the Daily Worker.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the action taken by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 434) about an offer made by Admiral Horthy to the International Red Cross that, provided accommodation could be found by His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government, the Hungarian authorities would allow all Jewish children under 10 years of age in possession of a visa for foreign countries, and all Jews (both adults and children) covered by Palestine immigration certificates, to leave Hungary. (This offer was quite distinct from the approach made about two months ago by the Gestapo for the transfer of Jews from Yugoslavia, Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland, in return for the delivery of motor lorries and certain commodities.)

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet the main facts about the offer. The United States Government had informed us that, in their view, our two Governments should undertake to care for all Jews who were permitted to leave Hungary, or who reached neutral or United Nations territory. This went beyond acceptance of the “Horthy offer.” The matter had been discussed by the War Cabinet Committee on Refugees, and the general view had been that we should take joint action with the United States Government on this matter, but that we must make it clear to the Americans that in practice we were not in a position to accept an indefinite commitment.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that we could take another 11,000 refugees in Palestine without any conflict with pledges which had been given in Parliament as to the continuance during the war of the White Paper policy. The War Cabinet were informed that Switzerland had undertaken to take 50,000 children, and possibly a greater number, though in that event additional imports would be needed. This was a very generous offer which would go far to relieve the situation.
General agreement was expressed with the view that the extent to which we had made provision for refugees since the outbreak of the war was not realised by the United States Government, and that, if the present offer of the Hungarian Government to allow Jews to leave Hungary resulted in a considerable exodus, we should have to press them strongly to undertake their fair share of the burden.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that he was prepared to consult the Dominion Governments on this matter as proposed in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but thought it was unlikely that they would see their way to help.

The War Cabinet’s conclusions were as follows:

1. The draft telegram to the United States Government (Annex IV to W.P. (44) 434) was approved subject to the addition to paragraph 2 of the words "and take their fair share of the burden."

2. In addition, a further telegram should be sent suggesting the terms of the declaration to be made jointly by His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government. So far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned, this should be to the effect that to the extent of their resources they will co-operate with the United States Government in caring for Jews who are permitted to leave Hungary and who reach neutral or United Nations territory.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to arrange for the preparation by the Departments concerned of a short statement, setting out what we had done to provide accommodation for refugees since the war, as a basis for a communication to the United States Government on this matter.

Palestine.

Reference was made to the attack made on Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner, who was due to retire shortly, while travelling to attend a farewell function in his honour.

The Prime Minister said that he thought it should be made clear to the responsible Jewish leaders that we looked upon them to take all practicable steps in their power to stamp out the gangs responsible for such outrages.

The War Cabinet also agreed that consideration of the general issues affecting our policy in Palestine should be resumed at an early date.

Jewish Fighting Force.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 86th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

8. On the 3rd July the War Cabinet agreed that the Government spokesman in the House of Lords should announce that, while the creation of a Jewish Division was impracticable, the possibility of forming a smaller unit, such as a Brigade Group, would be carefully examined.

Arrangements were in train for the formation of a brigade which could later be expanded into a Brigade Group.

Discussion centred on three points. The first was whether the Brigade Group should be available for general service in any theatre or part of the world.

The Prime Minister said that the Jewish Brigade would in fact be called upon to serve against the Germans, but not against Japan.

The Secretary of State for War said that there was no intention to employ the force in the Far Eastern war; but he thought that the brigade ought to be free from any express limitations of service.
The Prime Minister suggested, and the War Cabinet agreed, that this matter should be dealt with by means of a private letter, which would state that there was no intention of employing the brigade in the Far East, but that it would be undesirable to make any specific announcement to this effect, since this might be embarrassing vis-à-vis the United States.

The second point was whether the brigade would serve in Palestine or would be brought there for demobilisation.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that if the Jewish Brigade was brought back to Palestine this would lead to wide disturbances.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed that the brigade would not serve in Palestine.

The third point concerned the question whether the Jewish force should be allowed to carry a special flag.

It was agreed that this matter should be further considered when a design for the flag had been prepared.

9. At their meeting on the 28th July (W.M. (44) 98th Conclusions, Minute 2) the War Cabinet had agreed that, in the event of rocket attack, certain security measures, set out in Appendix I of W.P. (44) 413, should be put into force and continued for a period of 48 hours.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 435) pointing out that under these measures all foreign governmental organisations in this country would be absolutely prevented from communicating with their Governments or officials outside this country for a period of at least 48 hours. He proposed that an exemption should be granted to Allied Governments resident in this country and to the United States and Soviet Ambassadors. The Foreign Ministers of these Governments and the Ambassadors would, however, be asked to make themselves personally responsible for ensuring that no information about rocket attack was sent out of this country by ordinary cypher telegram and courier, and steps would also be taken to ensure that such information was not sent out by the United States Embassy over their direct lines or by the private wireless transmitter at the Soviet Embassy. The Foreign Office would agree the terms of the request to the Allied Foreign Ministers and the Ambassadors with the Home Defence Committee.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in W.P. (44) 435.

10. At their meeting on the 7th July (W.M. (44) 88th Conclusions, Minute 2) the War Cabinet had agreed that on the 1st August Sir Findlater Stewart should review the “Overlord” security restrictions still in force in consultation with the Departments concerned and with S.H.A.E.F.

The War Cabinet now had before them a note by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 432), annexed to which were extracts from a report by Sir Findlater Stewart giving the result of a review which he had carried out.

It was explained that, as a result of the review, it had been agreed that the visitors' ban should be lifted from the Firth of Forth area and that an announcement to this effect had been made. It had also been agreed that the restrictions on overseas travel and on travel between Great Britain and Ireland should be removed, and the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security had made a statement in Parliament indicating that there would be a relaxation of these restrictions.
With regard to the remaining measures, S.H.A.E.F. had agreed that the restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland might be removed on or about the 15th August, and that the Eire authorities might be informed about the same date that the Aer Lingus Teoranta Service might be reintroduced. The Security Service and the security authorities in the War Office had strong objections to the restoration of the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service, and it was proposed that the Departments concerned should consider this matter further with the Security Executive.

S.H.A.E.F. had urged that the visitors' ban on the area from the Wash to Southampton should be retained for a further period, which might amount to a matter of months. On the other hand, the Civil Departments, who were prepared to accept the continuance of the ban for a few more weeks, were of opinion that it imposed considerable hardship on the population and should be removed as soon as possible.

In discussion, it was pointed out that, in view of the recent course of operations, the arguments adduced by S.H.A.E.F. in favour of the retention of the ban had lost much of their force. The ban undoubtedly imposed inconvenience on the civil population by debarring them from holiday areas, and the general feeling of the War Cabinet was that it would be desirable to explain to S.H.A.E.F. that in all the circumstances they hoped that the request for the continuance of the ban for a further period would not be pressed.

The Secretary of State for War explained that, long before the imposition of the general ban in the interests of "Overlord" security, the public had been excluded from certain coastal areas in Kent. He assumed that, despite the raising of the general ban, the public would continue to be excluded from these areas.

The Secretary of State for War also undertook to consider what steps might be taken, by the removal of barbed wire and other obstructions, to give the public freer access to the sea in areas where there was no longer any reason for excluding them from the beaches.

With regard to the removal of the restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland and the restoration of the Aer Lingus Teoranta Service, it was urged that there might be considerable security objections to making any change in the present position so soon as the 15th August. It was also argued that there were strong security objections to the restoration of the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Invited Sir Findlater Stewart to explain to S.H.A.E.F. the grounds on which the War Cabinet felt it desirable that the ban should be lifted and to express the hope that in the circumstances the request which had been made for its continuance would not be pressed. The general removal of the ban would be without prejudice to the continued exclusion of the public from certain coastal areas in Kent and elsewhere for special military reasons.

(2) Agreed that the proposals (a) to remove the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland, and (b) to inform the Eire authorities that the Aer Lingus Teoranta Service might be resumed, should be reconsidered in two to three weeks' time.

(3) Took note that the Security Executive would consider with the Departments concerned the question whether the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service might be restored.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
9th August, 1944.
The War Cabinet were informed that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply had addressed to the Prime Minister a minute (copy attached) about the decision taken by the War Cabinet on the 28th July that efforts should be made to confuse the enemy as to where his flying bombs were falling without attempting to induce him to shift his aim in any particular direction.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply was convinced that action on these lines would not be effective and said that the Chiefs of Staff shared his view. There was no doubt that the enemy was aiming his bombs at Central London, but in fact about one-half of the bombs landing within 30 miles of Charing Cross had fallen within 8 miles of a central point in Dulwich. If the enemy could be induced to believe that he was shooting over the target and thus to shift the point of impact south-east from Dulwich, there would be a very considerable saving in casualties and damage. He accordingly suggested that the proposal which had been before the War Cabinet at their meeting on 28th July that a deliberate attempt should be made to convey to the enemy the impression that his bombs were over-shooting the target should be adopted.

In favour of the proposal made by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply the following arguments were adduced:

(i) A shift of the mean point of impact to a point 6 miles south-east from Dulwich would mean that a very much greater number of the bombs would fall either on completely open country or on less thickly built areas. It was estimated that this would lead to a reduction of 1,500 a month in the numbers killed and of over 10,000 in the numbers injured. Conversely, if the enemy were to adjust his aim in such a way as to make Charing Cross the mean point of impact, the numbers killed each month would rise by 500 and the numbers injured by 2,500.

(ii) Since the areas to which the enemy's fire would be diverted were more openly built, less damage would be suffered to property.

(iii) It was essential that the agents on whom the enemy depended should supply him with some information. If the information given by these agents was merely of a vaguely confusing kind, the agents would be discredited and the enemy would be driven to seek information by other means. In the result he might well discover that his bombs were, in fact, falling short and adjust his aim. Thus, if the policy proposed did nothing else, it would at least prevent the present position from deteriorating.
6. Mr. 2. Prime Minister
6a. Lord President
6b. H. Duncan
6c. R. S.
(iv) It was not proposed to make any abrupt change in the information conveyed to the enemy, but to give him selected information about actual incidents, so as to lead him to build up a pattern which would gradually convince him that he was over-shooting. Up to the present he had been given the impression that he was achieving a mean point of impact at Charing Cross.

The following arguments were brought forward against the proposal:

(i) The Government would be taking a very serious responsibility in diverting the enemy's fire from one area to another, and before attempting to do so they should be satisfied that their action would be of substantial advantage. This had not been established.

(ii) The type of property in the south-eastern areas to which the greater weight of bombs would be diverted if the enemy were misled, was largely of light construction, and, despite the fact that the houses were more openly spaced, the total damage from any particular incident might in the result be found to be higher.

(iii) The result of diverting the enemy's aim would probably be that a larger number of bombs would land in East London.

(iv) If the enemy found that his agents, after indicating to him for over six weeks that the mean point of impact was Charing Cross, were suddenly suggesting that his bombs were over-shooting the mark, he might suspect that the information given to him was deliberately misleading. In any event there was no guarantee that he did not check the agents' reports against other sources of information.

No conclusion was reached. It was decided that the policy pursued hitherto (i.e. that of giving the enemy the impression that he was achieving a mean point of impact at Charing Cross) should be maintained for the present and that the War Cabinet should resume consideration of the matter later.

11th August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Monday, 14th August, 1944, at 4:30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., Minister of Education.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

Subject.

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At their meeting on the 4th August the War Cabinet had approved the terms of a draft reply to be sent by the Viceroy to Gandhi. This telegram had been despatched to the Viceroy as No. 17258 of the 5th August.

The War Cabinet now had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 441), to which were attached two further telegrams from the Viceroy. The first of these telegrams (No. 1546–S.) raised certain objections to the draft approved by the War Cabinet, while the second (No. 1547–S.) contained a further suggested redraft of the reply to Gandhi.

These telegrams had been considered on the 12th August by the India Committee, who had taken the view that, if the Viceroy still saw strong objection to the draft contained in No. 17258, the only alternative appeared to be that he should send a very short reply, the terms of which were suggested in telegram No. 17797 (Appendix IV to W.P. (44) 441).

The War Cabinet also had before them a further telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th August (No. 1560–S.), in reply thereto, raising objections to the shorter draft, and again urging that his own suggested redraft (No. 1547–S.) should be approved.

The War Cabinet also had before them a telegram from the Prime Minister approving the proposed short reply (No. 17797).

(i) The first point dealt with in discussion was the Viceroy’s suggested further redraft (No. 1547–S.).

The Secretary of State for India said that, in his view, no issue of policy was raised by this redraft which was in line with War Cabinet policy. Since the only difference was one of wording, he thought that the considered judgment of the man on the spot should be accepted.

On the other hand, the general view of the War Cabinet was that the difference was not entirely one of wording. The draft contained in telegram No. 17258 had been the result of prolonged consideration by the War Cabinet when a decision had been deliberately taken to stiffen the tone. Several members of the War Cabinet who had held strong views on the matter were not now available for immediate consultation. In these circumstances there could be no question of accepting the Viceroy’s further suggested redraft.

(ii) The next point dealt with was choice between the draft approved by the War Cabinet and despatched as telegram No. 17258 and the alternative shorter version proposed by the India Committee (telegram No. 17797).

The Minister of Education favoured adoption of the shorter draft. In his view the present moment was not a good one for presenting the Indian leaders with a lengthy document on which they would comment in detail. The Prime Minister had also expressed strong approval of the short telegram.

On the other hand, the view was strongly expressed that the longer telegram approved by the War Cabinet would almost certainly be preferred by the Viceroy; and, moreover, that there was considerable advantage in putting on record the points set out in the longer answer.

(iii) The question was raised whether it would be possible to send no reply until the outcome of the Gandhi–Jinnah conversations were known. It was pointed out that the Viceroy had stressed the importance of Gandhi receiving a reply before his meeting with Jinnah. Moreover, the Viceroy had asked Gandhi to make a proposition and had received his letter on the 27th July, and a prolonged delay would put him in the wrong, and might create an impression that Gandhi’s offer merited careful consideration.

(iv) The view of the War Cabinet was thus that the Viceroy should have the option between the longer and shorter replies.
proposed by the War Cabinet. It was felt, however, that he should be given an explanation of the reasons which had weighed with the War Cabinet when authorising the form of reply despatched to the Viceroy in telegram No. 17258.

(v) In this connection the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs felt that international and not only Indian opinion had to be borne in mind. It was of great importance that paragraph 3 of the War Cabinet's redraft (No. 17258) should be retained as setting out our case to the world. He did not feel that the Viceroy's redraft was acceptable.

(vi) The Chancellor of the Exchequer favoured recapitulation of the main features of the Cripps offer, which Gandhi's letter deliberately ignored. It was important to bring out also that there would be no change in the constitutional position during the war. The Viceroy's answer suggested that he was more concerned with the present constitutional position than with adhering to the essentials of the Cripps offer, including the keeping of faith with the minorities, the depressed classes and the princes. Our duty to India compelled us to bring out that those were terms which must be accepted as the necessary condition of any advance at all.

(vii) The War Cabinet agreed to the following amendment to the longer draft approved by them on the 4th August, viz.:

(a) That paragraph 2 of the redraft in telegram No. 17258 of the 5th August should be amended to read as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government remain most anxious that a settlement of the Indian problem should be reached. But proposals such as those put forward by you, &c. . . . ." as in the draft;

(b) That consequentially paragraph 5 of the same draft should be amended to read—

"It is clear in these circumstances that no purpose would be served by discussion on the basis which you suggest. If, however, the leaders of, &c. . . . ."

The War Cabinet conclusions were as follows:—

(1) The Viceroy should be invited to send, to Gandhi either the longer draft approved by the War Cabinet (telegram No. 17258) subject to the amendment proposed above, or the shorter draft (No. 17767).

(2) A further telegram should be sent to him, giving an explanation of the reasons which had weighed with the War Cabinet in preferring their longer draft to the draft proposed by the Viceroy.

Draft telegrams on these lines were prepared and, after an adjournment, were approved. Copies are appended to this record.

The Secretary of State for India wished his dissent to be recorded on the ground that on a matter, not of broad policy, but of wording and tone, the earnest and repeatedly expressed opinion of the Viceroy, in touch with the whole Indian situation, should not be overridden.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
14th August, 1944.
From the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 14th August, 1944.

(Most Immediate.)

(17968.)

1. Your telegram of 12th August, 1560-S.

2. Cabinet have again considered the question with full understanding of points you have put to them. I have already explained difficulty they feel in any substantial revision of draft contained in my telegram in absence of Ministers who were present when it was prepared. These objections are still, in their view, decisive. They must therefore ask that reply to Gandhi should be either in terms of draft contained in my 17258 of 5th August, subject to amendments in paragraph 3 below or in terms of alternative draft contained in my 17797 of 11th August, and they leave choice as between these two drafts to you. Reasons which weigh with them in preferring draft in my 17258 to draft proposed by you are contained in my immediately following telegram.

3. Should you decide in favour of longer draft as against short draft, they propose following amendment to meet point taken by you.

Paragraph 2 of my 17258 of 5th August.

Amend beginning to read as follows:—

(1) "His Majesty's Government remain most anxious that a settlement of the Indian problem should be reached. But proposals such as those put forward by you, &c. . . . ." as in draft.

(2) Consequentially, amend first three sentences of paragraph 5 of draft contained in my 17258 of 5th August to read:—

"It is clear in these circumstances that no purpose would be served by discussion on the basis which you suggest. If, however, the leaders of, &c. . . . ."

From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 14th August, 1944.

(Most Immediate.)

(17969.)

My immediately preceding telegram. Cabinet are anxious that you should realise that fullest consideration has been given to your proposals. They differ from you with reluctance and only because of their strong sense of importance of the issue. Drafting amendments suggested in my immediately preceding telegram meet a point you have raised. They wish you to know that the following were the reasons for their decision in favour of the longer draft in my 17258 in particular of the inclusion of paragraph 3:—

(1) They see in Gandhi's letter a deliberate attempt to ignore essentials of the very generous offer made on their behalf by Cripps. They regard it as their duty to themselves and to India to restate those essentials, and to make it clear that they must be accepted as the necessary condition of any advance.

(2) In particular, they think it necessary to bring out their responsibility for fulfilling their obligations to minorities, depressed classes and States.

(3) They feel that it would be very dangerous to allow Gandhi's reference to finance to go unchallenged. He is quite capable of claiming afterwards that silence represents acquiescence on our part in his proposals.

(4) While most anxious to be conciliatory and polite, reaction on other elements in India and on world opinion cannot be overlooked. As regards India, Gandhi has not withdrawn policy which resulted in his imprisonment, and he has just again advocated symbolic civil disobedience. Proposals he has put to you are outrageous in character. Minorities and States will be watching our reply. While polite we must be firm, and Cabinet feel that their longer draft does not at all go too far.

(5) Finally, reactions on international opinion are of great concern to them. Foreign Secretary feels, and Cabinet agree, that those reactions make it essential to restate their case fully and firmly and to leave no room for any suggestion that we are moving from position we have taken up or, on the other hand, adopting a weak line with Gandhi. It is for that reason that they have thought it necessary to stiffen the tone of the proposed reply. They feel sure that you will appreciate the need of this from the broad point of view to which Cabinet have to give weight.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 14th August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
Mr. M. S. McCorquodale, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labour (Item 6).
Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., Minister of Education.
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
Miss Ellen Wilkinson, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Home Security (Item 6).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
Mr. W. L. Gorell Barnes.
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The War Cabinet asked the Deputy Prime Minister to convey a special message of sympathy on their behalf to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the loss of his younger son.

Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 104th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Air Operations.

Home Theatre.

Flying Bombs.

Mediterranean Theatre.

Naval Operations.

2. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous five days.

Bomber Command had flown 4,043 sorties and dropped 13,257 tons of bombs.

United States heavy bombers had flown 3,906 sorties and dropped 7,403 tons of bombs, 1,672 of which had been on Germany.

Coastal Command had flown 1,048 sorties. Ten U-boats had been attacked, of which 3 were sunk, 1 probably sunk and 1 possibly damaged, while 5 awaited assessment. In attacks on shipping, 2 minesweepers had been sunk and 31 other vessels damaged.

A.E.A.F and United States fighters had flown nearly 19,000 sorties and dropped 4,753 tons of bombs.

No enemy aircraft had flown over the United Kingdom.

Over the battle area the enemy had flown about 1,000 sorties by day and 370 by night.

The enemy had lost 189 aircraft as against Allied losses of 259.

310 flying bombs had been launched, of which 157 had been destroyed and only 58 had reached the London area. 3,450 tons of bombs had been dropped on flying bomb installations.

In the Mediterranean Theatre Allied aircraft had flown 6,800 sorties for the loss of 98 aircraft as compared with 600 enemy sorties for the loss of 49.

Total confirmed shipping losses for August amounted to 25,953 tons.

Five U-boats had been sunk during August. The Germans were now transferring U-boats from their three Northern Biscay Ports to Bordeaux and La Pallice.

Our light forces had had engagements off the French coasts on four nights. Thus, on the night of the 11th August H. M. Cruiser Diadem and 2 destroyers had sunk a 6,000-ton Sperrbrecher, and on the night of the 13th August 2 destroyers had intercepted and engaged an enemy convoy between Jersey and Guernsey, many hits on the enemy ships being observed. Both destroyers in this action had sustained slight damage and casualties.

On the 12th August H.M.S. Rodney had bombarded a 12-gun battery on Aldernay with satisfactory results.

During the course of the week ending the 14th August H.M. Cruiser Froebisher, H.M. Repair Ship Albatross, a minesweeper, a store-ship and a United States and British merchant ship were damaged by under-water explosions in the assault area.

During the night of the 6th August the floating dock at Trincomalee collapsed and H.M.S. Valiant, which was being docked, had sustained damage.

A new attack on Falaise was being launched from the north that day. Meanwhile, United States troops were pushing northwards and eastwards from Argentan and thus narrowing the gap of retreat for the considerable German forces in the area of Flers. The enemy had finally abandoned their counter-attack against Avranches. The enemy forces were in a difficult position, and the outlook for the Allies was promising.

The build-up of our forces was proceeding very satisfactorily. Over 15,000 tons a day had been handled over the beaches. We now had in France 27 days' reserve of rations, 16 days' reserve of petrol and 2 to 3 weeks' reserve of most types of ammunition.

There had been little change in the position on the Italian front. Some progress had been made in Florence and by the Polish troops on the Adriatic coast.
Eastern Front. On the Eastern Front the Russians had made a number of small thrusts in the North and had held German counter-attacks in the neighbourhood of Kovno, Warsaw and Cracow.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.

Poland. 3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had just had three hours' talk with the representatives of the Polish Government. Taken as a whole, the position was by no means unsatisfactory. It seemed that the atmosphere at the meetings between Premier Stalin and M. Mikolajczyk had been quite favourable. M. Mikolajczyk had not yet discussed matters with his Cabinet, but inclined to the view that the right way of dealing with the situation might be that the Presidency should be conferred on a new incumbent, who would choose a new Government representative of all the parties. He thought that there was a reasonable chance that such a Government would be accepted by the Russians, although the representatives of the Polish National Committee would resist a solution on these lines.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought that M. Mikolajczyk would have considerable trouble in getting a solution on these lines accepted by his supporters in this country. He had advised M. Mikolajczyk that he should not let any constitutional difficulties stand in the way of seeking a solution of the present difficulties. There was nothing more which we could do at this juncture.

Reference was made to the arrangement for sending help by air to the Polish Underground Army in Warsaw.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that two squadrons had already been diverted to this work, and that additional crews and some additional aircraft had been sent to reinforce the Special Duty Squadron employed on this work. It was hoped that United States aircraft would shortly start dropping supplies.

The War Cabinet was also informed that M. Stalin had promised to send supplies, and was proposing to drop a Liaison Officer in Warsaw to make the necessary arrangements.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that there was some risk that bitterness as a result of the difficulties of the Polish Underground Army in Warsaw might lead to something being said which would exacerbate Polish-Russian relations. M. Mikolajczyk had it in mind to make a helpful statement on the matter when he held a press conference. It would be of assistance if the Minister of Information would encourage M. Mikolajczyk to hold this press conference in the near future.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that on several occasions the Polish Government had pressed him to issue some statement to the effect that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognised the Polish Underground Movement as having belligerent status. He had taken the line that any such statement, to be of any value, would have to be countersigned by the Soviet Government. His attitude had evoked protest from certain quarters in this country, and he thought it desirable, therefore, to seek the views of the War Cabinet on the matter.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the line taken by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was the right one, particularly as Poland was in the area of Russian operational responsibility.

The War Cabinet—
Took note, with approval, of these statements.
4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 439) setting out the statement of policy on which he proposed to base himself in speaking to M. Massigli. Subjects to be discussed included “France and the work of the European Advisory Commission: questions concerning the armistice, the Rhineland and the occupation of Germany.”

The War Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of this Memorandum.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the future of French Indo-China (W.P. (44) 444), this being one of the matters which would be dealt with in the forthcoming discussions with M. Massigli. The policy already approved by the War Cabinet was that the French should be allowed to retain these territories after the war, provided they accepted such international obligations as might result from a system of collective security. The position was complicated, however, by the attitude of the United States Government in this matter. In the circumstances the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposed to leave the initiative to M. Massigli on this subject as far as possible. Discussion showed general agreement with the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the view was expressed, however, that, in view of the exploratory nature of the talks, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might wish to be rather more explicit as to the policy in this matter.

The War Cabinet—

Took note, with general approval, of the line set out in the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 440) about the man-power allocations for the second half of 1944.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer recalled that at their meeting on the 12th July, 1944, the War Cabinet had approved the provisional man-power allocations for the second half of 1944 proposed in W.P. (44) 375 on the understanding that those allocations would be renewed again in August. It had been hoped that it might be possible in August to make definite assumptions about the date of the end of the war with Germany. The present assumption on which Departments were working was that regard should be had to the possibility that the war with Germany might continue after the 30th June, 1945. The available man-power was, of course, decreasing, and it was particularly desirable that Departments should be able to work on as definite an assumption as possible in deciding how the deficiency should be apportioned. He suggested that in the present circumstances it was reasonable to ask Departments to prepare and submit to the War Cabinet revised estimates of their requirements for the second half of 1944 on the assumption that the war with Germany, though it might be prolonged beyond the end of 1944, would not continue beyond the 30th June, 1945. It had been suggested to him that it might be better to substitute for that date the 31st March, 1945.

The following points were raised in discussion:

(a) The Minister of Aircraft Production asked whether the acceptance of the proposal made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer would affect the decisions reached by the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 3rd August, 1944, with regard to the provisional allocation of man-power to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (W.M. (44) 100th Conclusions, Minute 4). It was agreed that the acceptance...
of the new assumption would not affect the earlier decisions.

(b) The Secretary of State for War confirmed that, in considering the needs of the Army, account would be taken of the fact that the casualties sustained in France were lighter than had been expected.

(c) The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Home Security, said that, in view of the additional strain on the Civil Defence Services in the areas liable to flying bomb and rocket attacks, it might not be possible for the Ministry of Home Security to release as many as 11,000 Civil Defence Workers by the end of September.

There was general agreement that it would be safe to assume that the war with Germany would not continue beyond the 30th June, 1945.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the revised estimates of man-power requirements for the second half of 1944 might be based on the assumption that the war with Germany would not continue beyond the 30th June, 1945.

(2) Invited the Service Ministers and the Minister of Production to submit estimates of man-power requirements for the Services and the munition industries on the revised assumption in time for the War Cabinet to review the possible requirements before the end of August and to fix firm allocations of man-power for the second half of 1944.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 14th August, 1944.
WAR CABINET 107 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Map Room, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 16th August, 1944, at 12:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.


The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. the Duke of Devonshire, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Item 2).

The Right Hon. the Earl of Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare (Item 2).

The Right Hon. G. H. Hall, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Item 2).

Sir F. A. Newsam, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Item 2).

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Under-Secretary (Civil).

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Hungarian offer to allow Jews to leave Hungary.

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Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 106th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

Jewish Refugees.

Hungarian Offer to Allow Jews to Leave Hungary.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 104th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in connection with assistance for the Polish underground forces in Warsaw. The discussion and the conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that, since the War Cabinet had last considered Admiral Horthy's offer to the International Red Cross to allow certain categories of Jews to leave Hungary, there had been further discussions between the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador as to the terms of the declaration to be made jointly by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. In the result, agreement had been reached, subject to approval by the War Cabinet and by the State Department, on an amended draft, a copy of which is annexed to these minutes.

The amended draft differed from the original in two important respects:

(a) Instead of accepting responsibility for "all Jews" permitted to leave Hungary, the commitment undertaken by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government would now refer only to the Horthy offer. That offer covered two specific categories of Jews, and the maximum number involved was likely to be between 60,000 and 70,000. Reports which had just been received as to difficulties of transportation suggested that, in fact, the number for which provision would have to be made might be much smaller.

(b) The draft declaration approved by the War Cabinet on the 9th August was to the effect that His Majesty's Government's co-operation with the United States Government in this matter would be "to the extent of their resources." The United States Government had seen objection to this qualification, but we had made it clear that there were practical limits to the numbers with which we could deal. As the result of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State's negotiations, they had now given an assurance, subject to confirmation by the State Department, that, after jointly using our capacity, the United States Government would take any balance for which we could not provide. The effect was that we and the United States jointly accepted the Hungarian proposal, and would appear before the world as sharing alike. But actual demands upon us would not exceed the accommodation we could provide.

He regarded the outcome of Mr. Hall's discussions with the American Ambassador as eminently satisfactory, and invited the War Cabinet to approve the amended draft of the declaration approved by them on the 9th August.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the Secretary of State for the Colonies desired to make it clear that if Palestine became involved it would not be possible to provide for more than 11,000 additional Jews in Palestine.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the risk that at a later stage there might be criticism in Parliament or elsewhere of the fact that, while the United States and His Majesty's Government were accepting a joint commitment, the heavier burden in respect of that commitment might, in practice, fall on the United States. He recognised, however, that any such criticism would have to be faced.
After further discussion, the War Cabinet—

(1) Took note with satisfaction of the outcome of the negotiations conducted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with the American Ambassador.

(2) Approved the substitution of the amended draft proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the draft declaration approved by the War Cabinet on the 9th August, subject to confirmation either by telegram or in writing from the State Department of their acceptance of it.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
16th August, 1944.

ANNEX.

Because of the desperate plight of the Jews in Hungary and the overwhelming humanitarian considerations involved, the two Governments are informing the Government of Hungary through Intercross that, despite the heavy difficulties and responsibilities involved, they have accepted the offer of the Hungarian Government for the release of Jews and will make arrangements for the care of such Jews leaving Hungary who reach neutral or United Nations territory, and also that they will find temporary havens of refuge where such people may live in safety. Notification of these assurances is being given to the Governments of neutral countries who are being requested to permit the entry of Jews who reach their frontiers from Hungary.
WAR CABINET 108 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Friday, 18th August, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in connection with the provision of assistance for the Polish Underground Army fighting in Warsaw. The discussion and conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 18th August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 21st August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. LORD CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. SIR JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CHIFFS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

Mr. D. M. Foot, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Economic Warfare (Item 5).
Sir ALEXANDER MAXWELL, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Items 4-7).
Air Marshal Sir DOUGLAS C. S. EVILL, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1-3).

Secretariat:
General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
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Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 106th Conclusions, Minute 2.)


Flying-Bombs. South of France.


Military Operations. N.W. France.

South of France. Italy. Russia.

1. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had flown 4,960 sorties and dropped 15,900 tons of bombs. 4,400 tons had been dropped on targets in Germany and 11,500 on Occupied Territory, including airfields, U-boat pens, shipping targets, "Crossbow" targets and operations in support of the battle.

United States heavy bombers had flown 4,000 sorties and dropped 8,400 tons of bombs, 4,900 of which had been on targets in Germany.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 24,000 sorties, practically all of which had been in close relation to the battle and in exploitation of the enemy's withdrawal. This force claimed to have destroyed 264 tanks, 3,800 motor transport vehicles, 132 locomotives and 900 railway trucks. Many others had been damaged. These claims had not so far been checked.

The enemy had lost 235 aircraft (including 76 on the ground). Allied losses amounted to 193 fighters and 82 bombers.

647 flying bombs had been launched, of which 464 had been destroyed.

In connection with the operations in the South of France, 3,400 sorties had been flown in addition to airborne operations. 5,500 tons of bombs had been dropped on airfields and enemy communications.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 3,000 tons. Confirmed shipping losses for August amounted to 28,900 tons.

Eight U-boats had been sunk and one probably sunk during August.

Enemy shipping had been intercepted in the Bay of Biscay and a number of ships sunk and driven ashore. In the assault areas there had been attacks by human torpedoes, 9 of which had been destroyed by our aircraft.

Cruisers and gunboats had bombarded targets in connection with the landing operations in the South of France. A number of enemy corvettes, E-boats and M.T.Bs. had been sunk.

In North-West France the advance of United States Forces had met with little opposition and their chief problem had been maintenance. They had now established a bridgehead across the Seine between Mantes and Vernon and were moving north towards Elbeuf. British and Canadian Forces had now joined with American Forces in the Argentan area and had closed the enemy's escape route to the west. Perhaps 12 German divisions, including 4 Panzer, were trapped in this pocket, from which they were still trying to escape.

Between the Loire and the Seine the enemy might have 36 divisions, 5 of which had not been in the main battle. In the Pas de Calais area and in the Low Countries there were 7 divisions, on the Atlantic Coast 1 only, in the Marseilles area 7 and 2 in Savoy. If we were able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Seine, except perhaps in small numbers, his main field Army would have ceased to exist, and we could claim complete victory.

Our forces were now reported to have reached Rians on the River Durance, and there had been an unconfirmed report that they had reached Aix. Opposition had been light and 12,000 prisoners had been taken. It was probable that the enemy would stand and fight in Toulon and Marseilles. In the Rhone Valley and to the north of it the Maquis was adding to the enemy's difficulties.

On the Italian Front there was little to report, but slight progress had been made on the extreme right of our line.

In the Northern Sector the Russians had crossed the border between Lake Peipus and Lake Pskot. Further south they had advanced towards Riga on a wide front to a depth of about 20 miles. German attacks in the neighbourhood of Kovno had been held. North-east of Warsaw the Russians had lost a little ground, but to the south they had extended their bridgehead across the Vistula and claimed to have annihilated three German divisions.
The Germans had reported Russian attacks on the Lower Dniester, but these had not received confirmation from the Russians.

The War Cabinet—

**Air Raids.**

**Attacks by Flying-Bombs.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 99th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

**Poland.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 108th Conclusions.)

The Polish Underground Army.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 106th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that casualties in the past week had been relatively light. The total casualties since the beginning of the attacks were:

- Killed: 5,465
- Seriously injured: 15,632
- Slightly injured: 20,813
- Unclassified: 21

Total: 42,131

During the week 36,094 houses had been damaged and 62,561 had received first-aid repairs. Since the beginning of the attacks 1,027,269 houses had been damaged and 952,495 had received first-aid repairs.

The War Cabinet—

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in the Polish situation. Very severe fighting was taking place in Warsaw, and he proposed to circulate to the War Cabinet certain reports which he had received. Difficulties had arisen with the Soviet Government over the proposal that United States airmen should land on Russian aerodromes after dropping supplies on Warsaw, and the Poles were aware of this. They had again seen him to-day and had represented the urgent need for supplies. Arrangements had, in fact, been made for a small number of planes to drop supplies nightly for the present. This would be an encouragement to the Poles. He suggested that he, the Secretary of State for Air and the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff should meet the Poles on Tuesday, the 22nd August, and discuss whether anything further could be done in this connection. He remained uneasy about the political repercussions of the difficulties that had arisen over Russian assistance.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and approved the suggestion at "X."

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the Polish request that their Underground Army should be recognised officially as a fighting force. When this matter was previously discussed it had been felt that, for such a declaration to be of value, the Russians must be associated with it. Their support had not, however, been forthcoming. He was now advised that without using the phrase "belligerent status" His Majesty's Government, on the basis that it was they who had been supplying the Poles, could make a statement which would give some cover to the Underground Movement. He suggested that the draft of any such statement, with which he would be quite ready to ask the United States to associate themselves, should be agreed with the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air. It would not, in any event, go beyond what we had said in respect of the Maquis. Nor would it be anti-Russian in character.

The point was made in discussion that a statement at this point might well give rise to misunderstanding or criticism of the Russian attitude in the United States, while, unless it was framed in terms stronger than could probably be contemplated, it might be of little value to the Poles.
After further discussion, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested that the draft statement, when prepared, should be brought before the War Cabinet.

(2) The War Cabinet—

Approved the action proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. The Deputy Prime Minister said that, in accordance with the decision of the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 9th August, Sir Findlater Stewart had taken up with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the question of the removal of the visitors' ban and that S.H.A.E.F. had now agreed to the removal of the ban from the 25th August, on the understanding that no public announcement on the subject was made before that date.

The Secretary of State for War said that the War Office would make the necessary arrangements to remove the ban from the 25th August. No announcement need be made until the morning of the 25th.

The Minister of Aircraft Production recalled that at their meeting on the 9th August the War Cabinet had agreed that the proposal to remove the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland should be reconsidered in two to three weeks' time. These restrictions imposed great inconvenience on the transaction of business by the Ministry of Aircraft Production and he hoped that they could be removed.

It was explained that the intention was that the question of the removal of the restrictions should be brought before the War Cabinet for consideration early in the following week.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the visitors' ban should be removed from the 25th August, on the understanding that no public announcement on the subject was made before that date.

(2) Took note that the question of the removal of the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland would be brought before them early in the following week, and agreed that, in the meantime, all practicable steps should be taken to exempt Government Departments from the restrictions.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 446) on the subject of relief supplies for occupied Europe.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded the War Cabinet that they had several times considered proposals that relief supplies should be allowed to pass through the blockade and that up to the present time no concession had been made beyond the relief shipments to Greece which had been authorised in February 1942.

There had been constant pressure both in this country and, to a greater extent, from the United States for some further concession and, although it had been hoped that the United States Government would be content with a proposal, which had been discussed during the recent visit of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare to Washington, that relief from within the blockade area should be permitted to go to certain internment camps selected by the International Red Cross, Mr. Hull had now intimated that, largely for political reasons, the United States Government felt bound to press for the setting up in London of an Anglo-American Committee to examine the possibility of providing limited amounts of foodstuffs for distribution to children and nursing and expectant mothers. It would be recalled that on the 30th June the Belgian, Netherlands and Norwegian Ambassadors had proposed a scheme.
involving about 20,000 tons of foodstuffs a month and some 60,000 tons of shipping.

Experience showed that at least four months were required for examination, agreement by the enemy and planning before any action could be taken, and, in view particularly of the present military situation, which might result in nothing having to be done, it seemed expedient to agree to the proposal made by the United States Government. If the proposals were agreed to, the first step would be to set up an Anglo-American Committee in London to draw up a scheme for submission to the British and United States Governments.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Economic Warfare, said that, although on merits the Minister of Economic Warfare was opposed to the proposal, he agreed that in present circumstances it would be expedient to meet the views of the United States Government. The proposed Anglo-American Committee would have to examine not only the question of finding the necessary supplies and shipping, but also the arrangements for dealing with what experience in Greece had shown to be the difficult problem of ensuring effective control. If the Committee was set up, the Minister of Economic Warfare attached great importance to its being empowered to consider not only relief in kind but also monetary relief. At present the War Refugee Board were paying hard currency to persons in enemy and occupied territories without any consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and it was desirable that the machinery of the Committee should be used to ensure that the giving of relief in monetary form was properly controlled. In suggesting this extension of the Committee's functions we should, of course, have to make it clear that our object was not to widen the scope of monetary relief but to secure a greater degree of co-ordination.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Food, pointed out that the amount of foodstuffs of the kinds contemplated which would be available during 1944 was already insufficient to meet the needs of civilian consumers in this country, of the Armed Forces and of the liberated areas during the military period. Unless, therefore, the United States Government were willing to cut consumption by their own civilians or Armed Forces, it was difficult to see where the necessary supplies could be found.

The Minister of War Transport said that, since it was proposed to carry the supplies in neutral vessels, no question of Allied shipping arose. So far as Swedish vessels were concerned, it was extremely doubtful whether the German Government would allow neutral shipping to leave the Baltic.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should return a favourable reply to Mr. Hull's letter and should agree to the setting up of an Anglo-American Committee in London to draw up a scheme of relief for submission to His Majesty's Government and to the United States Government.

(2) Agreed that it should be suggested to the United States Government that the Committee should consider also the question of controlling the grant of monetary relief to persons in enemy and enemy-occupied territory.

Relief. Finance of Supplies to Italy.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 455) on the finance of supplies to Italy. The relief supplies sent to Italy by His Majesty's Government and the United States to prevent disease and unrest had been financed on our side by a Vote of Credit, and on the American side by a War Department Appropriation. An undertaking given to Congress made it impossible for the War Department any longer to accept financial responsibility for supplies to Italy. The Americans had
proposed accordingly to make available to the Italian Government the dollar equivalent of the United States troops' pay in Italy, thus putting the Italians in a position to pay for supplies from the United States. This procedure was objectionable—

(i) as possibly implying a breach of the Armistice terms;
(ii) since it would be impossible for us to follow the American example and make the sterling equivalent of British troops' pay available to the Italian Government.

In addition, the American Government, in order to attract the Italian votes in the forthcoming Presidential election, had expressed a wish to extend the field of supplies to Italy to cover general economic rehabilitation. This would result in treating Italy better than the smaller Allies.

The matter had been discussed by the Minister of State in Washington, after the Americans had agreed not to announce their proposed policy until the War Cabinet could be consulted. The period assigned for such consultation having expired, a telegram had now been despatched, after consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for War, which made it clear that—

(a) in no circumstances could we agree at the present time to any programme of rehabilitation for Italy;
(b) we would agree to the Americans making United States' troops' pay available to the Italian Government, provided that if any further statement had to be made it would contain no reference to rehabilitation, and would make it clear that such payment was by way of advance, was without prejudice to the final settlement with Italy, and represented a difference not of policy but of financial procedure.

The Minister of State said that he had little to add to the Memorandum he had circulated on this subject. The arguments against the course advocated by the Americans in respect of troops' pay were very strong, but he thought that the arrangements which had now been made sufficiently safeguarded our position. Equally, there were decisive arguments against any proposal to agree to a programme of rehabilitation for Italy. The telegram that had been sent made that clear, and brought out also that, if American Press comment came out too strongly in favour of rehabilitation, we must hold ourselves free to make our own position clear.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the position, and approved the action which had been taken by the Minister of State.

7. The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that the Lord Mayor of London had asked whether authority might be given for ringing the bells of St. Paul's and the City Churches on the liberation of Paris.

It was explained that there was no objection to the ringing of bells from the point of view of the Ministry of Home Security.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that, although it would be inexpedient at the present time to take any action which could be regarded as a general celebration of victory, there was no objection to the limited proposal to ring the bells of St. Paul's and the City Churches on the occasion of the liberation of Paris as a compliment by one great capital to another.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
21st August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet, held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 24th August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.

Secretariat:

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Thanksgiving Service.

[28155]
1. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 462) containing a draft declaration on the question of belligerent status for the Polish Underground Army. The discussion, and the conclusions reached, are recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the detailed arrangements proposed in connection with a Service of Thanksgiving for the liberation of Paris, and invited their approval of the holding of this service and of the arrangements in question.

A discussion followed as to whether the service would most appropriately take place on Friday, the 25th August, at 12 noon, as was originally contemplated, or whether it would not be advisable to postpone it until, say, Monday, the 28th August, so as to facilitate the making of the necessary arrangements and ensure that no hitch arose.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the holding of a Thanksgiving Service for the liberation of Paris in the Crypt of St. Paul’s, and the detailed arrangements in connection therewith, as set out in the Annex to these Minutes.

(2) Agreed that the service should not be broadcast as it proceeded, but that it should be recorded, so that it might be broadcast thereafter.

(3) Decided that no previous announcement of the service should be made in the press or by the B.B.C.

(4) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to arrange that the service should be held at 12 noon on Monday, the 28th August.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
24th August, 1944.

ANNEX.

LETTER FROM THE HOME OFFICE TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, DATED 24TH AUGUST, 1944.

I have arranged, subject to approval, for the Service to take place in the Crypt of St. Paul’s Cathedral to-morrow morning at 12 noon. The Service will last for about half-an-hour, comprising two hymns, a lesson, a psalm, some prayers, the Te Deum and ending, after the Blessing, with the Marseillaise and the National Anthem.

The War Office have been asked to supply a small band to play appropriate music before the Service and to accompany the two hymns and the two anthems.

A form of service is being printed to-night. The Cathedral authorities have been asked to ring the bells at the termination of the Service. A Guard of Honour of 20 French naval personnel will be drawn up by the Wellington carriage.

Arrangements are being made for tickets to be issued to the War Cabinet, High Commissioners, the Diplomatic Corps, Heads of Departments, the Board of Admiralty, the Air Council and the Army Council. In addition, other tickets are being made available for Dominion and Allied liaison officers, and it is hoped that it will be possible to arrange for some tickets to be issued to the rank and file of the fighting Services of the United Nations represented in the invasion of Normandy. A fair number of tickets is being issued to the Press, including the Foreign Press.

There will be no advance publicity of the Service, which we are hoping the B.B.C. will record.

The Lord Mayor will attend.
SECRET.
W.M. (44)
111th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 111 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 28th August, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer (Items 1-6).
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD HEVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. ARTHUR SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BROWN, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Item 9).
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State.
Captain the Right Hon. H. F. CROOKSHANK, M.P., Postmaster-General (Item 8).
Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-7).
Admiral of the Fleet: Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-8).
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1-8).
Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-8).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
WAR CABINET 111 (44).

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Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 109th Conclusions, Minute 1.)


Mediterranean.


Russia.


Southern France.

Italy.

Russia.

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had flown 3,100 sorties and dropped 5,500 tons of bombs, 5,400 of them on Germany. Targets in Germany included Russelheim, Darmstadt, Kiel and Königsberg. The previous day Bomber Command had carried out, without loss, their first daylight attack on Germany. Targets had included the oil plant at Homberg.

United States heavy bombers had flown 4,814 sorties and dropped 7,150 tons of bombs on oil plants, aircraft factories in Germany and the experimental stations at Peenemunde and Rechlin. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 16,000 sorties. In the battle in Northern France they claimed to have destroyed 66 tanks, 2,045 lorries, 193 locomotives and 133 railway trucks and to have damaged many others. The enemy had lost 296 aircraft (including 127 on the ground). Allied losses amounted to 239 aircraft, including 59 British and 56 United States heavy bombers. Allied aircraft had flown 13,000 sorties and dropped 5,000 tons of bombs on enemy oil plants, airfields, communications and in connection with the operations in Southern France. Enemy losses amounted to 212 aircraft as against 128 Allied.

During the previous week confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action amounted to 17,007 tons. The total for August to date was 53,402 tons.

Eight U-boats had been sunk and 3 probably sunk during August.

There had been considerable light craft activity off the French Channel ports and in the Bay of Biscay. A number of E-boats, R-boats and merchant ships had been either sunk or damaged. On the 25th August H.M.S. Warspite had bombarded forts at Brest in support of the land battle.

About 15,000 tons a day were now being unloaded at Cherbourg. A convoy of 33 ships had reached Russian ports safely on the 25th August.

American, French and British battleships and cruisers had carried out frequent bombardment in support of attacks on Toulon and other objectives.

United States forces had occupied Troyes and were reported to be in Vitry and Meaux. Further north, British and Canadian forces had made a considerable advance from the Falaise pocket. The Seine had been reached and we had established two bridgeheads across it at Vernon and Elbeuf. There were still, however, pockets of strong enemy resistance west of the river.

In Brittany it was estimated that there were about 20,000 Germans in Brest, 10,000 in Lorient and 10,000 in St. Nazaire.

Since D-day a rough estimate of casualties suffered by the enemy was 200,000 prisoners, 40,000 killed and 200,000 wounded.

A considerable area of territory had been liberated in the past week. Toulon and Marseilles had been cleared (except for a few pockets) and Allied troops had advanced as far west as Avignon. In the north, Grenoble had been reached and the Rhone Valley occupied around Loriol. 17,000 prisoners had been counted, but the number captured was probably by now not far short of 30,000.

On the 26th August General Alexander had started a new offensive on the right of our line. This had made good progress.

In the north the Russians had made an advance towards Lake Peipus but had lost Tukums. Round Warsaw the Russians had made small gains. Further south the two main Russian thrusts into Roumania had converged and surrounded about 10 or 12 German divisions.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the above statements.
Air Raids.

Attacks by Flying-Bombs.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 109th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

- Killed: 5,758
- Seriously injured: 16,830
- Slightly injured: 22,309

Total: 44,892

Casualties had tended to fall during recent weeks and the situation was easier.

Flying-Bombs.

Attitude of the Press.

(Previous References: W.M. (44) 104th Conclusions, Minute 3, and W.M. (44) 97th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security reported that the total casualties from flying bombs to date were:

- Killed: 5,758
- Seriously injured: 16,830
- Slightly injured: 22,309

Total: 44,892

Took note of this statement.

4. The Minister of Information informed the War Cabinet that the Prime Minister had agreed that, as the Americans had just published their total casualty figures to date, the total British casualties sustained since the war began should be published on the 3rd September. The Minister suggested that there might be advantage in also publishing at the same time the total number of men and women in the Armed Forces and Auxiliary Services. Hitherto security considerations had precluded any such publication, but he thought that it might now be found possible to relax the restrictions previously in force.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff said that in their opinion attacks by flying bombs would probably continue for some time longer, though probably on a reduced scale.

The Minister of Information undertook to do what he could to restrain the Press from fostering the belief that flying bomb attacks would cease altogether in the immediate future.

Publicity.

Casualties and Strength of Forces.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 64th Conclusions, Minute 5.)

4. The Minister of Information informed the War Cabinet that the Prime Minister had agreed that, as the Americans had just published their total casualty figures to date, the total British casualties sustained since the war began should be published on the 3rd September. The Minister suggested that there might be advantage in also publishing at the same time the total number of men and women in the Armed Forces and Auxiliary Services. Hitherto security considerations had precluded any such publication, but he thought that it might now be found possible to relax the restrictions previously in force.

The Chiefs of Staff undertook to examine this aspect of the matter.

The Minister of Labour reminded the War Cabinet that the full man-power figures had been withheld from the House of Commons on security grounds. The Government must be careful not to expose themselves to criticism by publishing such figures for the first time during the Recess.

After further discussion, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the general sense of the War Cabinet was in favour of publication on the 3rd September of our total casualties, military and civil; but that the question of publishing figures of the total numbers in the Armed Forces should be left for decision by the Prime Minister on his return, after consideration of the points raised in discussion.*

The War Cabinet—

Agreed to the course proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

* The statement published on the 3rd September was confined to casualties, it being agreed that publication of total numbers in the Armed Forces should be deferred until a later occasion.
5. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that a Member of Parliament had applied for permission to travel to Turkey on business grounds (his firm was interested in engineering contracts), and also to visit Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Italy and Algiers, returning via Paris.

An application from the same Member of Parliament to visit Turkey had been rejected by the War Cabinet in March last.

The War Cabinet were reminded that in July 1943 they had decided that permission to travel to neutral countries should be granted only where the Government were satisfied that a definite public advantage would be served by the journey, or that the applicant had urgent and important bona fide domestic business which could not be transacted without a personal visit.

It was also pointed out that at the time when the previous application had been rejected we had been taking all practicable steps, on security grounds connected with the Second Front, to ensure that people did not leave this country to visit neutral countries. These grounds no longer existed.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the application should be granted only in so far as it rested on business grounds which could be substantiated and which complied with the general test prescribed by the War Cabinet.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 475) reporting recent developments in connection with the preparation of draft armistice terms for Bulgaria.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that we and the United States had been broadly in agreement throughout, but there had been delay in receiving a final answer from the Russians. The matter had, however, been discussed in the European Advisory Commission on the 26th August, when M. Gousev had undertaken to make a recommendation to his Government on the general lines set out in the Memorandum before the War Cabinet. It was hoped that agreement between the three Powers could be reached almost immediately. If not, we might have to go ahead without the formal concurrence of the Soviet Government, who, after all, were not at war with Bulgaria. Our other Allies would be consulted before the terms were communicated to the Bulgarians. No decision had yet been reached as to the actual venue of discussions with the Bulgarians.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

7. The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the position of the Polish Underground Army fighting in Warsaw and relations between Poland and Russia. A record of the discussion and of the conclusions reached is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

8. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 468) dealing with the following “Overlord” security restrictions:

(i) The special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland;
(ii) The suspension of the Aer Lingus Teoranta Service between Great Britain and Ireland; and
(iii) The suspension of the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service between Great Britain and Sweden.
The Minister of Production explained that neither S.H.A.E.F. nor the Security Service raised any objection to the removal of the special restrictions on telephone calls between Great Britain and Ireland, or to the resumption of the Aer Lingus Teoranta Service. The question of the resumption of the Swedish A.B. Aero Transport Service had been examined by the Security Executive, who had ascertained that the Departments concerned were strongly in favour of a resumption of the service and that neither S.H.A.E.F. nor the Security Service would object to its restoration. In these circumstances he proposed that, subject to the views of the Prime Minister, the restrictions should now be removed.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Postmaster-General supported the proposal made by the Minister of Production.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposal of the Minister of Production.

Parliament.
Redistribution of Seats.
(Pevious Reference: W.M.(44)04th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Joint Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland (W.P. (44) 460) dealing with the representation of the City of London and the number of seats to be assigned to Scotland and to Wales and Monmouth.

Representation of the City of London.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security recalled that at their meeting on the 20th July the War Cabinet had taken the view that it would be desirable to avoid a decision on the question of the representation of the City of London at the present stage, and had agreed that it should be left to the Boundary Commissioners in the first instance to consider whether a special case existed for leaving the City as a double-Member constituency, with the result that the question would not arise for decision until a Bill was introduced to give effect to a general scheme of redistribution recommended by the Boundary Commissioners.

For the reasons given in the Appendix to W.P. (44) 460, however, it did not seem practicable to adopt this course.

It was accordingly proposed that the forthcoming Redistribution of Seats Bill should provide that the City should return such number of Members, not exceeding two, as might be determined by the subsequent Act which would have to be passed in due course to give effect to the first general scheme of redistribution recommended by the Boundary Commissioners. Thus the issue was in no way prejudged, and the eventual decision would have to be taken only when the second Redistribution of Seats Bill came forward and when the whole question of the representation of London Boroughs was under review. This would presumably be after a General Election. The first Redistribution of Seats Bill would also provide that there should be no alteration of the boundaries of the Parliamentary constituency of the City of London, so that there would be no question of its being combined with any neighbouring constituency.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the forthcoming Redistribution of Seats Bill should provide that there should be no alteration of the boundaries of the Parliamentary constituency of the City of London, and that the City should return such number of Members, not exceeding two, as might be determined by the subsequent Act which would have to be passed in due course to give effect to the first general scheme of redistribution recommended by the Boundary Commissioners.

* The Prime Minister endorsed this proposal.
(2) Took note that the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security would make it clear in introducing the Bill that nothing was being done which in any way prejudged the issue whether, in any subsequent redistribution scheme, the City of London should return two members.

Representation of Scotland and of Wales and Monmouth.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security explained that the Speaker’s Conference had recommended that, while the total number of Members of the House of Commons for Great Britain should remain substantially as at present (i.e., 591, excluding University seats), there should be no reduction in the present number of Members of the House of Commons for Scotland or for Wales and Monmouthshire (i.e., 71 and 35 respectively). The War Cabinet, however, at their meeting on the 20th July had decided, subject to a report being made to the Prime Minister, that for the purpose of the first general redistribution the principle should be accepted that there should be no reduction in the present number of Members for Scotland or for Wales and Monmouth, but that the Government should not commit themselves to the acceptance of this principle thereafter.

The Secretary of State for Scotland felt strongly that to limit the assurance of the continuation of the present Scottish and Welsh representation would excite apprehension and controversy and had suggested that the right course was to accept the recommendation of the Speaker’s Conference without modification, leaving any subsequent adjustment in the total Membership of the House of Commons, or in the representation of England, Scotland or Wales, to be effected by legislation if a situation arose in which such an adjustment became imperative.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security himself found it difficult to advise that such a permanent commitment should be accepted. He suggested that the right course was to provide on the forthcoming Redistribution of Seats Bill that the number of constituencies in Scotland should be not less than 71 and in Wales and Monmouthshire not less than 35 until Parliament should otherwise determine; and to add a statutory requirement that each of the three Boundary Commissions should review annually the aggregate number of electors for the whole of Great Britain and for England, for Scotland and for Wales and Monmouthshire respectively, and should make a special report to Parliament whenever the number of electors obtained by dividing the aggregate for England, for Scotland or for Wales and Monmouthshire by the number of Members assigned to that country differed by more than 25 per cent. from the number of electors obtained by dividing the aggregate for Great Britain by the total number of Members for Great Britain.

The Secretary of State for Air said that there would be very strong opposition in Scotland, where great importance was attached to the question of Parliamentary representation, to any proposal to depart from the recommendation of the Speaker’s Conference. This opposition was bound to show itself in the House and the Government would be faced with the alternative of withdrawing or of putting a very great strain on the loyalty of their supporters.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster supported the Secretary of State for Air and pointed out that the fact that the Government were throwing over the recommendation of the Speaker’s Conference was likely to be an issue at the next election and to encourage the Scottish Nationalist Movement.

The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that the proposal made by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security that there should be annual reviews by the Boundary Commissioners was likely to excite unnecessary controversy, and that in the forthcoming Bill it would be preferable simply to provide that the number of constituencies in Scotland should be not less than 71 and in Wales
and Monmouthshire not less than 35. In introducing the Bill the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security would make it plain that this provision could not, of course, be binding on future Parliaments. Nor, indeed, could the possibility be excluded that some future Parliament would decide to increase the total number of Members of Parliament for Great Britain as a whole—contrary to the recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference.

The War Cabinet—

(3) Invited the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to proceed on the lines indicated at “X” above.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
28th August, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, SW.1, on Tuesday, 29th August, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. SIR JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BROWN, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

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Post-War Relief. 1. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 459) on the finance of relief in the military period. The War Cabinet on the 20th January, 1944, had accepted a figure of £80 million or 1 per cent. of our National Income as the maximum United Kingdom contribution to relief in all areas and at all times. The United States had subsequently dissented strongly from the suggestion that our contribution of 1 per cent. of our National Income could be used to finance relief in the military period. The House of Commons had in consequence been informed that an additional burden in respect of relief in the military period might fall upon us.

A proposal for the division of the cost of procurement between the United Kingdom and the United States in the relative proportion of our respective contributions to U.N.R.R.A. had proved unacceptable to the United States.

The United States Government now proposed that His Majesty's Government, the United States and Canada should agree to procure supplies for military relief up to a total of $1,000 million, this being a provisional estimate of the supplies necessary, during an initial period of six months, for the civilian population for which the Anglo-American forces would be responsible. The three countries would agree the proportion in which each would carry such part of the outlay as was not recovered in repayment from the recipient countries. The burden falling on the United Kingdom seemed likely to be between 22 and 27 per cent. of the total (say, £55 to £69 million), of which an unknown percentage would be recovered.

The American proposal bore more heavily on His Majesty's Government than that which we had put forward ourselves. On the other hand, we were committed to carry some share of the burden. The memorandum recommended that His Majesty's Government should accept the United States proposal, and that Lord Halifax should open negotiations in Washington with a view to the question being disposed of before the Second Council meeting of U.N.R.R.A. at Montreal on the 15th September.

The Minister of State briefly reviewed the arguments contained in his memorandum. He also suggested that it would be well to associate the Canadian Government with the proposed negotiations with the United States.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer recalled that when the matter had been discussed in the Cabinet in January 1944 the decision had been that an overall obligation limited to £80 million to cover relief in all forms should be accepted by His Majesty's Government. The United States Government had suggested that such a decision would make it very difficult for them to secure the approval of Congress to their own participation. In consequence it had been made clear in the House of Commons that the burden of a measure of relief might fall upon us in respect of the military period which in practice might turn out to be in addition to our £80 million. When that statement had been made, it had been contemplated that the military authorities would cease to be directly responsible for civil relief at quite an early stage, and that the additional obligation likely to fall upon us would not exceed, say, £8 to £10 million. He could not regard our share of the net cost of procuring supplies to the extent of $1,000 million as within the limits of the statement made in the House of Commons.

In the second place, how could we reconcile acceptance of a commitment of this order with the financial picture we had to paint to the United States? In undertaking our original obligation of £80 million we had gone further than was justified by our financial position.

He suggested that we should inform the United States Government that we could not go beyond the statement in the House of Commons; that we should reiterate our acceptance of a figure of £80 million, or 1 per cent. of our National Income, as our contribution to U.N.R.R.A.; and say that we were prepared to interpret...
the statement in the House of Commons in terms of a fixed additional sum of £8 to £10 million if so much was needed after allowance had been made for repayment by recipient Allies.

Furthermore, in our view the Allies who were to benefit by relief in the military period, and could afford to pay for it, should be called upon to make payments for relief as they received it. This would have the effect of making the money last longer.

The following further points were made in discussion:

(a) The line of demarcation suggested between the operations of U.N.R.R.A. in the post-military period and those of the military during the military period was artificial. We had already agreed to contribute 1 per cent. of our National Income to U.N.R.R.A. Would it not be possible to find the additional funds for the purchase of commodities for the military period by using the credit of U.N.R.R.A. in the first instance, to be made good by the refunds expected from paying countries?

It was explained that this would not be practical politics until U.N.R.R.A. was established on a firm financial footing. In any case U.N.R.R.A.'s funds were probably inadequate for the purpose.

(b) U.N.R.R.A. had no responsibility in respect of the military period. They would enter the field in that period only when invited by the military authorities.

(c) Recipients of relief who were in a position to do so, should pay for relief as they received it. On that assumption the contributions promised by the United States and Canada, plus a United Kingdom undertaking to underwrite a possible gap of not more than £10 million between receipts and expenditure might well meet the case.

It was pointed out in reply that it was difficult to reach a firm estimate of the probable gap between receipts and expenditure. Canada had accepted her obligation on the basis that it would be redeemed by the provision of Canadian supplies. If sufficient transport could not be found to carry such supplies, it was questionable whether she would be willing to accept a financial obligation for supplies from elsewhere.

(d) As matters stood, we were financing relief in liberated countries from military votes. The cost of doing so, on the assumption, which it was suggested would otherwise rule, that we shared it equally with the United States, represented a much heavier burden than we should incur under the scheme before the War Cabinet. It was pointed out, on the other hand, that we had an implied right to recover from the beneficiary in respect of relief provided by the military. It was also contended that no arrangement as to the basis of adjustment had so far been made, either between the United States and ourselves, or between the two of us and countries liberated or to be liberated.

(e) It was urged that it was inequitable that the whole burden of finding the requisite supplies should fall on the United States and the United Kingdom and Canada.

It was pointed out, on the other hand, that the cost of relief in the military period, failing other arrangements, was treated as part of the cost falling on the countries conducting the military operations.

(f) Under the constitution of U.N.R.R.A., countries which had been occupied by the enemy were required to pay for the cost of relief which they themselves received to the extent of their ability, but they had no obligation to contribute to the cost of relief in other countries.

After further discussion the War Cabinet—

Approved in principle the method of approach suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at "X" above, and invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to elaborate proposals on these lines with the Minister of State, and to report back to the War Cabinet.
2. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the
Minister of State (W. P. (44) 466) asking the approval of the War
Cabinet to the general line which he suggested should be taken by
the United Kingdom Delegation at the Second Session of the
U.N.R.R.A. Council, to be opened on the 15th September in
Montreal.

After the Minister of State had developed the main points
in his memorandum, discussion turned mainly on the question of
U.N.R.R.A. and enemy countries. The Minister of State in his
memorandum suggested that it would be better to try to avoid the
issue being raised of U.N.R.R.A. being allowed to undertake relief
of enemy or ex-enemy populations, though we should do nothing to
prevent such a development in the future, since if relief became
necessary in, for example, Austria, the use of U.N.R.R.A. might
well be less costly for us than any alternative open to us.

The Lord Privy Seal thought that the United States would seek
to extend the scope of U.N.R.R.A. to cover enemy countries, but
the Minister of State thought that this was not the case.

The view generally expressed by Ministers was in support of
the line taken in the Minister of State's memorandum.

The question was then raised whether it would not be to our
advantage that relief in Italy should be brought within the scope
of U.N.R.R.A.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that Sicily was
now no longer under military government, and that Southern Italy
would shortly be in the same position. Unless relief in these areas
was to be found by U.N.R.R.A., what alternative was there except
that it should be financed by the United States and United Kingdom
taxpayers, the probability of any repayment being remote?

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that if
U.N.R.R.A. was now to start making relief available in Italy,
this would be extremely unpopular with the Greeks and Yugoslavs.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that if the
relief of Italy was once brought within the scope of U.N.R.R.A.
we should find it difficult, if we should wish to do so, to withdraw
relief from Italy. He found it difficult to separate relief of
ex-enemy countries from the general settlement to be made with
these countries, and he thought that we should, therefore, retain
within our full control relief arrangements in enemy or ex-enemy
countries. He adhered to this view, which was generally shared
by Ministers, even though it meant that, for the present, we should
have to take our share of financing relief in Italy.

The view was expressed by the Minister of Food that the
arrangements in Italy ought to be reconsidered in order to ensure
that the Italians did all they could to pay their way. The present
arrangements were not, he thought, satisfactory, and it might be
a good thing if the military authorities showed some inclination
to limit the amount of help given to Italy.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he knew
that the Prime Minister was not satisfied with the position in Italy,
and he would wish to review the arrangements in that country. He
thought that the position with regard to Italy should be reserved.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) It was agreed that the United Kingdom delegation to the
forthcoming meeting of the Council of U.N.R.R.A. should

(a) Do all possible to uphold U.N.R.R.A. and encourage
the Administration to take a line calculated to gain the confidence of the Allies.

(b) Encourage the Director-General to go ahead with
the things he had to do, rather than try to strike
a balance now between his assets and liabilities.
(c) Adopt a sympathetic attitude to Allied demands for supplies, but explain that United Kingdom consumption standards could not be reduced, though we might be prepared not to raise them after the European Armistice as far as we should otherwise have felt necessary.

(d) Not raise the general question of U.N.R.R.A. in enemy countries, but propose that U.N.R.R.A. be authorised to undertake—

(i) care and repatriation (excluding enemy nationals) in enemy territory;

(ii) fighting of epidemics in enemy territory;

(iii) evacuation from Allied liberated territory of enemy or ex-enemy nationals settled there.

(2) The position as regards relief arrangements for Italy would require special examination by the War Cabinet, and was reserved for further consideration.

France.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 474). The French Committee of National Liberation had raised the question of the participation of France in the proceedings of the European Advisory Commission with the Chairman of the Commission. In view of the special position of France as regards German affairs, the Secretary of State proposed to instruct the United Kingdom representative to support the request of the Committee that a French representative should attend meetings of the Commission when German affairs were being discussed.

The War Cabinet—
Approved this proposal.

Parliament.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had received several letters, including one from Sir Herbert Williams, M.P., suggesting that Parliament reassemble before the date fixed (26th September). He proposed to reply that it was not proposed to make any change in the arrangements already made.

This was agreed to.

France.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that he had been approached by a Member of Parliament with a request for permission to visit France to make contact with his friends. While another Member had recently entered France in his capacity as a War Correspondent, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested that it would be desirable to maintain the position that permission should be required for any visit to France by a Member of Parliament, and that he should reply that in present conditions in that country it was not possible to arrange for any private visits by Members.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at "X."
Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 11th
Conclusions, Minute 7.)

6. **The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs** informed the War Cabinet that the United States Government had now agreed to the proposed declaration recognising the Polish Underground Army as a fully combatant force, and would associate themselves with the declaration. He had told the Soviet Government of our intention and of the terms of the declaration, which would now be issued.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
28th August, 1944.*
WAR CABINET 113 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 31st August, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir William Jowitt, K.C., M.P., Minister without Portfolio (Items 4-5).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.

Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Item 3).

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 2-3).

The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 5).

The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.


Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-3).

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-3).

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laitewaite.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
## War Cabinet 113 (44)

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1. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (W.P. (44) 476) on the killing of the survivors of the s.s. Peleus by members of the crew of U 852.

In his Memorandum the First Lord of the Admiralty asked that the conclusions reached on this subject by the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 17th July should be varied in two respects:—

(a) The War Cabinet had then decided that the whole crew of U 852 should be kept in the United Kingdom. It was now desired to repatriate to Germany an engine-room rating who was seriously injured and who there was no reason to suppose was implicated.

(b) The War Cabinet had agreed that there was no advantage in making any formal protest to the German Government at that stage. As three Greek survivors had now reached this country who knew the facts, the position would get known. The First Lord of the Admiralty proposed that the Foreign Office should now approach the Greek Government and suggest a formal protest by them to the German Government.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals of the First Lord of the Admiralty.

2. At their meeting on the 12th July the War Cabinet had decided that publication of the scheme for the Reallocation of Man-Power after the end of the war with Germany should stand over until after the Summer Recess.

The War Cabinet now had before them—

(i) A Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service urging that the scheme should be published at the earliest possible moment (W.P. (44) 470).

(ii) A Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service, to which was attached a revised draft of the White Paper (W.P. (44) 481).

The War Cabinet first considered the revised draft of the White Paper.

(i) The Minister of Labour and National Service had received a letter from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education strongly urging that a specific reference should be made in paragraph 11 to releases of men in Class B for educational purposes.

The War Cabinet decided that specific reference in this paragraph to education would throw the draft out of balance, and would raise the question why a number of other important services were not mentioned.

(ii) The question was raised whether the last sentence in paragraph 11, which referred to men being “mainly required to supplement the labour force available for building houses against the time when sailors, soldiers and airmen would be returning in large numbers to civil life,” was in conformity with the Prime Minister’s directive on Man-Power in Stage II (W.P. (44) 431), which assigned first priority among civil purposes to the restoration of the export trade.

The view of the War Cabinet was that it would be undesirable to refer specifically to the export industry in the White Paper; and that, since the building trade was the outstanding trade in which large-scale releases in Class B would be necessary, the reference should stand as drafted.

The War Cabinet then turned to consideration of the date of publication of the White Paper.
(iii) There was general agreement with the view advanced by the Minister of Labour and National Service that the scheme ought to be published at an early date. This was all the more necessary because a large number of articles were being published, purporting to give particulars of the scheme, but often grossly inaccurate; and there was a danger of confusion if publication was further delayed.

(iv) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that, for reasons of administration, the War Office wanted the scheme published in the very near future. Before long it was hoped to withdraw certain Divisions from France in order to prepare them for service in the Far East. It would be important to know which men in these Divisions qualified for demobilisation under the Government Scheme, and it would take some months to go through the Army and apply the appropriate demobilisation group or code number to each man. This work could not be started in advance of publication of the scheme without the scheme becoming known.

(v) On the other hand, the Secretary of State for Air and the First Sea Lord urged that it would be far better that, simultaneously with the publication of the reallocation scheme, an announcement be made in regard to the improvements in pay and conditions of service to be granted to those who were retained for service, and in particular to those called on for service against Japan.

(vi) The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the Service Ministers differed in their views as to the extent of the increases called for, the Admiralty scheme being on a more generous scale than that proposed by the Army. He had made endeavours to reach agreement on this matter with the Service Ministers, but an early settlement was made more difficult by the absence of several Ministers from London. A further meeting with representatives of the Service Departments had been arranged for Monday, and he suggested that the outcome of this meeting should be awaited.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) The revised draft White Paper set out in W.P. (44) 481 was approved, and it was agreed that it was desirable that it should be published at a very early date.

(2) If possible, simultaneously with the publication of the White Paper, a statement should be made as to the improvements in the conditions of service of men retained in the Armed Forces after the end of the war with Germany. The Chancellor of the Exchequer undertook to report to the War Cabinet at an early date the progress made on this matter.

Rocket Attack.

(Previous References: W.M. 44) 98th Conclusions, Minute 1, and 104th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security reminded the War Cabinet that at their meeting on the 28th July they had agreed to assign to the Rocket Consequences Committee the work of concerting action and plans to meet rocket attack on the scale which then seemed possible.

He hoped shortly to be in a position to report to the War Cabinet on the work of the Committee; but before doing so he had felt it right to ask the Chiefs of Staff for a revised appreciation of the scale of attack in the light of the later information which had been obtained about the rocket and of the general progress of our Armies. If the War Cabinet agreed he would propose that the Rocket Consequences Committee should in making their plans base themselves on this new appreciation.

A discussion followed which is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposal of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security that the Rocket Consequences Committee should base their plans on the revised appreciation.
4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 457) regarding the publication of the White Paper on Social Insurance.

The Minister of Reconstruction recalled that at their meeting on the 4th July the War Cabinet had decided that the publication of Parts I and II should take place when the House reassembled after the Recess, and that on the 11th July the Prime Minister had announced in reply to a Question that it was the Government's intention to publish the White Paper in time for it to be discussed when Parliament reassembled after the Recess.

It was desirable that Members should have a reasonable time to study the White Paper before it was debated, and if publication was delayed until the House reassembled it might prove difficult to have a debate in the first three or four weeks. This in turn would delay the passage of legislation to set up a Ministry of Social Insurance, the early establishment of which was necessary to enable progress to be made with the legislation implementing the White Paper proposals. He accordingly suggested that the White Paper should be published on the 16th September, which would give an interval of ten days before the House reassembled.

The texts of both Parts of the White Paper had been very thoroughly examined by the Reconstruction Committee and had been before the War Cabinet (W.P. (44) 356 and 357) at their meeting on the 4th July (W.M. (44) 87th Conclusions, Minute 3). He hoped that the texts might be regarded as approved by the War Cabinet. Popular versions of both Parts were ready for publication.

There was general agreement that it was desirable to publish the White Paper before Parliament reassembled, and it was suggested that the Minister of Reconstruction should consult the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury as to the date when the debate on the White Paper was likely to be taken with a view to selecting a date which would give a reasonable period before the debate, without allowing too long a time to elapse. It was also pointed out that there would be advantages in publishing the Social Insurance White Paper shortly after the White Paper on the Reallocation of Man-power.

The Minister of Labour and National Service asked whether, with a view to expediting the preparation of legislation to implement the White Paper proposals, it would not be possible to pass at an early date the Bill establishing a Ministry of Social Insurance. It was pointed out that it would not be possible to introduce this Bill before the debate on the White Paper. In the meantime, however, it was desirable that as much preparatory work as possible should be done.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the publication of Parts I and II of the White Paper on Social Insurance, subject to such minor amendments as might be agreed between the Ministers concerned.

(2) Agreed that the White Paper should be published before the reassembly of Parliament, and authorised the Minister of Reconstruction to settle the date of publication after consultation with the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury.

(3) Invited the Minister of Reconstruction to consider whether, pending the establishment of a Ministry of Social Insurance, more rapid progress could not be made with the preparation of the legislation necessary to implement the White Paper proposals.
Administration of Forestry Policy.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chairman of the Machinery of Government Committee (W.P. (44) 420) making the following recommendations about the future arrangements for the administration of forestry policy—

(i) that there should continue to be a single Forestry Commission covering England and Wales and Scotland on the understanding that there would be appropriate devolution of responsibility in different parts of Great Britain;

(ii) that Ministerial responsibility for, and control over, the work of the Forestry Commission should be assigned to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for Scotland acting jointly; the present statutory powers of the Treasury being reduced to the normal powers of control in establishment and financial matters;

(iii) that the statutory provision whereby one of the members of the Forestry Commission must be a Member of the House of Commons should be repealed and that Members of the House of Commons should be disqualified from being members of the Commission.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the main reasons in favour of (ii) was that there was likely to be a great expansion in the Commission's operations after the war which could not be carried out effectively unless the Commission was under direct Ministerial control.

The following were the main points made in discussion:

(a) Was it right to assign to the Agricultural Ministers responsibility for forestry, seeing that the interests of forestry and agriculture sometimes conflicted?

It would no doubt be urged against the scheme that, since agriculture was a more important industry than forestry, the arrangement would result in the latter's being unduly subordinated to the farmers. But this argument was based on a misconception. The right way of dealing with the conflict of interests between forestry and agriculture was to entrust to the same Minister a clear-cut responsibility for ensuring a properly balanced policy and the necessary power to enforce it.

(b) It was important that, although there should be the closest co-operation between the staffs of the Agriculture Departments and the Forestry Commission, it should be made clear that the Forestry Commission should be responsible directly to the Ministers themselves without any intermediary.

(c) The Position of Scotland.—On the understanding that there would be appropriate devolutions of responsibility in different parts of Great Britain, the scheme proposed the continuance of a single Forestry Commission covering England, Wales and Scotland. This was of importance in the interests of securing a unified forestry policy and a unified research, education and information service.

The Secretary of State for Air said that there would be a strong demand in Scotland for a separate Forestry Commission for Scotland. The conflict of interest between forestry and agriculture was of particular importance in Scotland, and for this reason he strongly favoured the scheme put forward by the Machinery of Government Committee, under which the Secretary of State for Scotland would be responsible for both agriculture and forestry and for securing a due balance between the two interests. He did not, however, think that the proposal that there should be a Commissioner instead of an Assistant Commissioner for Forestry in Scotland would weigh with those sections of Scottish opinion which desired a separate Forestry Commission.

(d) The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries supported the scheme and endorsed the arguments set out under paragraph (a) above. Between the wars the Forestry Commission had bought land
piecemeal when they could get it cheap, and had not been in a strong enough position to ensure that land was selected for afforestation on a balance of the best interests of both forestry and agriculture.

(e) The Minister without Portfolio said that he had discussed the matter with both Forestry Societies. He agreed it was necessary that the Forestry Commission should be brought under Ministerial control if it was to carry out the greatly increased programme of afforestation now contemplated, but he feared that the scheme proposed might prove somewhat controversial.

(f) Reference was made to the recommendation that the provision whereby one member of the Forestry Commission must be a Member of the House of Commons should be repealed, and that Members of the House of Commons should in future be disqualified from being members of the Commission. Some regret was expressed about the abolition of the present arrangement. The general view of the War Cabinet was, however, that its continuance was not compatible with the arrangements proposed for Ministerial control of Forestry.

The War Cabinet—

1. Agreed that the issues raised should be submitted to the Prime Minister before a final decision was taken. Subject to this—

2. Approved the recommendations of the Machinery of Government Committee set out at "X."

3. Authorised the Ministers concerned to arrange for detailed discussion, in consultation with the Forestry Commission, of the legislative and administrative changes required to implement these recommendations, with a view to the introduction of legislation as soon as possible after the Recess.

Civil Defence.

Relaxation of Fireguard Duties.

6. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he had come to the conclusion that a substantial relaxation of fireguard duties should now be made. A new appreciation of the likely scale of air attacks against the United Kingdom had recently been made, on the basis of which he had decided, after consultation with the Civil Defence Committee and the Regional Commissioners, that the requirement to carry out fireguard duties in all parts of the area North and West of the line Humber to Southampton Water could now be removed. In parts of the area South-East of that line it would also be possible to reduce fireguard duties to some extent in rural areas. In London and South-East England fireguard duties would have to be retained for the present, but the position would be kept under review.

There would be consultation with the Government Departments which were appropriate authorities under the Fire Guard (Business and Government Premises) Order, 1943, so that they might be informed of the proposal and invited to take similar action in respect of the premises for which they were responsible.

It was important that the public should not be informed of what was proposed until the necessary arrangements for the relaxation had been made.

The War Cabinet—

Took note with approval of the intentions of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security with regard to the relaxation of fireguard duties.
7. The Chancellor of the Exchequer reminded the War Cabinet that in 1942 the Canadian Government by the “billion dollar gift” had put at our disposal dollars to pay for our orders in Canada. This sum, however, had left a deficit which had been covered by our making a payment to Canada in United States dollars ($150 million).

In 1943-44 Canada had altered the arrangements. They had provided food and munitions as Mutual Aid and had voted an appropriation of $1 billion. This arrangement had just seen us through the year.

For 1944-45 they had voted a further Mutual Aid Appropriation, but had reduced their $1 billion to $800 million. In the early summer it had become clear that this sum would be quite inadequate for our expenditure in Canada. The Canadian Government had made certain proposals which, however, were obviously unacceptable to us in our present financial position. The Treasury representatives at Bretton Woods had gone to Ottawa for further negotiations where they had been joined by an officer from the Ministry of Production.

The total deficit in our balance of payments with Canada for the current financial year was about $550 million. Under the existing accounting arrangements, a substantial part of the expenditure on the Canadian forces in the field was, in fact, being borne by the United Kingdom, and the Canadian Government had readily accepted the principle that Canada should pay the full cost of its own fighting forces. To this end they had agreed to a number of adjustments, back-dated to the 1st April, 1943. The result of these various adjustments was that the Canadian Government had accepted a financial liability which not only covered the $550 million deficit, but provided us in addition with a further $200 million, which would discharge an agreed liability to Canada in respect of the first Air Training Scheme. The attitude of the Canadian Ministers and Departments had been based on a real understanding of our position. Lord Keynes, Sir Wilfrid Eady of the Treasury, and Mr. R. W. B. Clarke of the Ministry of Production, were to be congratulated on the successful outcome of the negotiations.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he proposed to send a message, accepting the arrangements proposed, and he hoped that in doing so he could express the warm thanks of the War Cabinet to the Canadian Government for their generous attitude.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
31st August, 1944.
W.M. (44) 113th CONCLUSIONS

(Thursday, 31st August, 1944 - 6 p.m.)

At the beginning of the meeting, the FOREIGN SECRETARY, at the request of the Prime Minister, informed the War Cabinet that it had been decided to invite General Montgomery to accept the baton of a Field Marshal.

The War Cabinet -

Took note of this statement.

(There was in fact some suggestion that this might be rather unfair on General Alexander, but the War Cabinet did not press the point.)
WAR CABINET 114 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Friday, 1st September, 1944, at 11.30 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
Mr. A. T. LENNOX-BOYD, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Colonel the Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State (Items 1-4).
LORD BRUNTISFIELD, Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty (Items 1-4).
Mr. P. V. EMRYS EVANS, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Items 1-4).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
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Civil Air Transport.

1. The War Cabinet resumed the discussion on future departmental responsibility for civil air transport, and had before them a Note by the Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 480), to which was attached minutes by the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State for Air. The Prime Minister stated in his Note that he was willing that an additional post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Air Ministry should be created in order to deal exclusively with civil aviation while it remained under the authority of the Air Ministry, and that at the close of the war civil aviation should pass to the Ministry of Transport. This was endorsed by the War Cabinet, although the view was expressed that Parliament might not view with any great favour the creation of a third post of Under-Secretary of State. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he would report this view to the Prime Minister.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 472) and the Secretary of State for Air (W.P. (44) 473) on the international position.

The Lord Privy Seal gave the War Cabinet an account of the exchanges with Mr. Berle. Following the April talks, we had prepared proposals for an international regulating authority based on the Canadian draft Convention. Mr. Berle had not favoured these proposals, but had agreed to go to an international conference on the basis of the recommendation of the Balfour Committee. We had accepted this suggestion. Subsequently, it had appeared that the U.S.S.R. were not willing to attend an international conference, and Mr. Berle had come under strong pressure from the operational and manufacturing sides of the United States Air Transport Industry. In the result he had abandoned any idea of an international conference and now proposed that the United States and we, so far as possible in collaboration and on a non-exclusive basis, should move out on to the civil air routes of the world. A good deal of pressure had been applied to get us to accept this proposal.

We had now sent a telegram to Mr. Berle asking him to postpone his project and offering to call an international conference ourselves in London. No reply had yet been received to this, but a recent utterance on the subject by Mr. Cordell Hull showed that there was clearly no hope of a favourable reply. Meantime, events were moving rapidly. 5,970 aircraft were now being built in the United States for air transport purposes and the United States operating companies were pushing on with applications for licences. Unless we took drastic action we should be left behind. He saw no alternative now to our going forward with the development of air lines on our own, working in agreement with the United States so far as we could and making every effort to build up our own aircraft manufacturing industry.
The Secretary of State for Air said that, if we abandoned the proposed international conference, we should be going back on the statement made by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Lords on the 10th May. Such a step would be extremely distasteful to the Dominions and would shake the confidence of our European Allies. We had strong grounds of principle for adhering to our views, and we should find support among foreign countries, who feared United States domination in the field of civil aviation. There was, in fact, good reason to believe that Mr. Berle's present proposal was at least partly due to his having failed to persuade foreign Governments to reject the idea of restricted regulations before entering the proposed international conference. If we could expedite the production of converted bomber aircraft (such as the York, the Tudor and the Avro XXI) and of the Brabazon types, so as to be able to offer them to foreign countries, we should be in a strong position. In his view, the reply to Mr. Berle should be on the lines of the second alternative in the Washington Embassy telegram No. 4560. This was that we should tell the Americans that, while we could not prevent their negotiating with other Powers for air transit rights and facilities, we adhered to our belief that an international authority with teeth would ultimately be found essential, and therefore that we were prepared to grant only temporary facilities in British territory prior to any such agreement being concluded. Further, that we would not grant any facilities which would be likely to tend to retard the interests of smaller Powers.

Although it was clear that the United States Government would not at this stage agree to come under any international authority for the regulation of quotas, frequencies, &c., they would, he felt sure, agree to an international authority for the purpose of radio safety regulations, &c. Would it not be possible to work towards an international authority which would have full power of regulation so far as we ourselves, the Dominions and other foreign countries were concerned, and which the United States Government might join only for the purposes of the control of radio safety regulations, &c., on an international scale?

The Secretary of State for India supported the Lord Privy Seal and said that any attempt to create an international authority for the purpose of regulation was doomed to failure and would only create suspicion in the United States that we were combining with other countries to oppose them. He thought that the Dominions' interest in an international regulating authority was largely due to our lead, and that they would not press strongly for such an authority to be set up unless we also favoured this course.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions doubted whether the Dominion Governments would favour a policy which was likely to bring us into collision with the United States Government.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that any proposal for an international regulating authority, excluding the United States, would be bound to antagonise the United States Government and would lead to competition with them in which we should be handicapped. Requests for facilities were already being received from the United States Government by Colonial Governments and a decision on the issue of policy should be reached as quickly as possible.

The Minister of Labour and National Service suggested that before any final decision was taken as to our course of action there should be a high-level approach to the United States Government with a view to making quite sure that the proposal made by Mr. Berle did in fact represent their settled policy. He attached great importance to this from the point of opinion in the Labour Party in this country. Unless it was abundantly clear that the proposals for the international regulation of civil aviation had been definitely turned down by the United States Government, suspicion and dissatisfaction would be aroused.
If it was clear that the United States Government were opposed to an international conference, then he would not be averse to our taking steps to develop our own air lines in co-operation with the Dominion Governments and friendly foreign Governments. He suggested that the whole question of what action should be taken in the event of a negative reply from the United States Government should be examined as a matter of urgency while steps were being taken to obtain a final answer from the United States Government.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested that, in the first instance, we should await a reply from Mr. Berle. Thereafter the Prime Minister might be advised to approach the President in order to get an authoritative statement of the United States Government's attitude. Should it be clear that the United States were unwilling to agree to an international conference, we should make it plain that we must then proceed to make agreements with the Dominions and foreign countries.

This, however, should be done by separate negotiations and discussions, and we should not attempt to convene an international conference to which the United States Government would not be a party. The War Cabinet expressed agreement with the course of action outlined by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that, subject to the terms of the reply received from Mr. Berle, the Prime Minister should be invited to approach the President with a view to obtaining a clear statement of the position of the United States Government.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the other Ministers concerned, to prepare and submit to the War Cabinet a draft telegram which the Prime Minister might send to the President.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Air, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to prepare a report for consideration by the War Cabinet elaborating in the light of the discussion the policy which we might follow if the United States Government adhered to the views expressed by Mr. Berle.

3. The developments in the international position in regard to civil aviation led to a discussion on the steps which could be taken to expedite the development and manufacture by this country of aircraft for civil use after the war.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production, said that the position as regards the so-called converted bomber types was by no means unfavourable, but could be considerably improved if rather more design staff could be made available. At present one York a fortnight was being manufactured and we were working up to an output of twenty a month by June 1945. It was hoped that the prototype of the thin Tudor would fly at the beginning of 1945, of the fat-bellied Tudor about March 1945, and of the converted Halifax at Christmas 1944. All these types were competing with military types for draughtsmen and there was an immediate need for 250 more trained draughtsmen over those previously allocated.

The Brabazon types were, of course, a much more long-distance project. Four of the seven Brabazon types had been allotted to particular firms and it was hoped to allot the remaining three shortly. It had been contemplated that flying trials of type III A would start three years after design work started, but by a great
effort it might be possible to reduce this period to two and a half years, or even to two years. The main cause of delay was the shortage of draughtsmen. Of 2,500 draughtsmen employed on aircraft design work, it was believed that about one-third were employed on modifications, including a number working on twenty American types for use in this country. The target dates for Brabazon types which had been approved by the War Cabinet could be met if the further 250 draughtsmen referred to could be made available.

Discussion centred round two main points:—

(a) The steps which could be taken to accelerate the programme.
(b) The adequacy of the programme.

As regards the steps to accelerate the present programme, the Secretary of State for Air said that the Ministry of Aircraft Production, by a great effort, was in process of meeting the target dates submitted to and approved by the War Cabinet, but an acceleration was now required. Besides the 250 further draughtsmen which the Ministry of Aircraft Production asked should be transferred from military to civil aircraft work, he thought that 500 skilled engineering draughtsmen should be made available for this work. (The total number of skilled engineering draughtsmen in this country was 32,000.) He also thought that it would also be necessary to increase the labour force in certain aircraft factories, particularly Avros. Finally, it would be necessary to obtain authority from the Chancellor of the Exchequer for placing production orders for certain of the Brabazon types before the prototypes had flown. This involved a risk of nugatory expenditure, and was a matter on which the Chancellor would be entitled to have the considered views of himself and the Minister of Aircraft Production. He was certain, however, that this was the best way of making really rapid progress.

In further discussion the Minister of Labour and National Service stressed the importance of not overloading the factories in which these civil types were to be produced. In particular, he enquired whether it is necessary for Avros to be engaged on so many different types.

The War Cabinet agreed that the measures proposed for accelerating the progress on the development and manufacture of civil aircraft should be examined as a matter of urgency.

Discussion then turned on the adequacy of the existing programme. The Lord Privy Seal expressed the view that the York was of no value at all for civil purposes and the Tudor of very little value. The real need was for the whole Brabazon programme to be greatly accelerated, particularly the Brabazon Type I.

In the course of further discussion certain doubts were expressed as to whether in present circumstances the Brabazon types met our needs. One or two Ministers suggested that the right course would be that, instead of developing new British designs, we should take American proved types and build aircraft on those lines. This, it was urged, would enable us to manufacture the types of aircraft which were preferred by civil users in the shortest time.

The general view of the War Cabinet was, however, in favour of proceeding with the design, development and manufacture of British types. It was stated, however, that many British users were expressing dissatisfaction with the Brabazon types, and the attitude of B.O.A.C. itself to the Brabazon types was called in question.

It was pointed out that the outline specifications of the Brabazon types had originally been drawn up eighteen months ago. The Lord Privy Seal said that in his view the proper course was that the Brabazon types, or some of them, should now be revised to bring them into accord with the latest developments and experience.
The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

1. Great importance was attached to steps being taken to accelerate the design, development and production of aircraft for civil use. The Minister of Production, the Minister of Labour and National Service, the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production, or their representatives, undertook to examine, as a matter of urgency, the steps necessary to achieve this end, and to report back to the War Cabinet.

2. This examination should proceed on the basis that some diversion was now justified from the war effort in order to bring about an acceleration in the production of aircraft for civil use.

3. It would be desirable, however, that any steps taken in this matter should be so arranged as to avoid publicity. Thus the types in question might be described as transport types.

4. The Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production were asked to submit a report to the War Cabinet comparing the British and United States types of aircraft now being designed and manufactured for civil purposes. The report should deal with the question whether the British designs were adequate, and should embody the considered views of the B.O.A.C. as to the adequacy of the Brabazon types.

4. In Annex II to W.P. (44) 480 the Secretary of State for Air stated that he thought it would be necessary to inform Parliament that a decision had been reached that B.O.A.C. was to remain the single chosen instrument for the development of our overseas air transport.

The Secretary of State for Air pressed for an early opportunity for the discussion of this issue. The Government must be in a position to give a clear answer as soon as Parliament reassembled, and the issues involved might be found to require examination by a Committee of the War Cabinet before final conclusions were reached.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that it was out of the question to attempt to reach a solution on the difficult issues involved at the present meeting. He suggested, however, and the War Cabinet agreed, that the matter should be brought forward for discussion within a fortnight.

5. The Minister of Labour and National Service drew attention to the procedure which was being adopted by the Ministry of Aircraft Production in connection with the displacement of labour from the Coventry "shadow" factories engaged in the production of Hercules aero engines. Owing to production cuts it had been decided to abolish the night shifts at these factories, with the result that about 10,000 workers would be displaced. There was a settled procedure for dealing with cases of this kind, which had been evolved by the Ministry of Production and the Ministry of Labour and National Service with a view to ensuring the orderly movement of labour to other production. The Ministry of Aircraft Production were, however, apparently arranging that their Parliamentary Secretary should visit Coventry and intimate the decision to cut production to the workers concerned before any arrangements had been made for their transfer to other work. Any action of this kind was likely to lead to labour troubles, and he asked that the War Cabinet should agree that nothing should be done until it had been possible to work out transfer arrangements through the usual machinery.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production, said that the action arose out of a War Cabinet direction that the Ministry of Aircraft Production should cut their labour force. He agreed, however, that action should be postponed until the necessary arrangements were made for the transfer of the workers to other employment through the usual machinery. He assumed, however, that, once this had been done, there would be no objection to his paying a visit to the factory in order to explain to the workers the reasons why they were being transferred to other employment.

The Minister of Labour and National Service confirmed that there would be no objection to this.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Ministry of Aircraft Production should postpone any action in order to enable the matter to be dealt with by the usual machinery.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
1st September, 1944.
WAR CABINET 115 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Defence Map Room on Monday, 4th September, 1944, at 12:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


SIR EDWARD BRIDGES Secretary.

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1. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 492) about the disposal of Soviet prisoners captured in France and in the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary proposed—

(i) that we should agree to the Soviet Government's request to repatriate their prisoners from the United Kingdom;
(ii) that we should instruct the Middle East authorities to send back all Russians whom the Soviet authorities wished to have back, irrespective of whether or not the men wished to return; and that the practice of obtaining statements from the Soviet prisoners as to their willingness to return should be discontinued;
(iii) to explain to the Soviet Government that shortage of shipping made it impossible for us to accede to their request that we should arrange for repatriation from the United Kingdom.

After a short discussion the War Cabinet approved these proposals.

Poland.

2. The War Cabinet discussed the position of the Polish Underground Army in Warsaw. The discussion and conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

France.

3. The War Cabinet were informed that arrangements had been made for a T.U.C. Delegation to visit Normandy. Now that Paris had been liberated, the Delegation wished to visit Paris and to make contacts with the C.G.T.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed to the Foreign Secretary's suggestion that he should inform Sir Walter Citrine that the position in Paris was still difficult, and that the military authorities were opposed to visitors to Paris at the present time, but that he would be informed as soon as conditions made a visit possible.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
4th September, 1944.
In addition to the matters dealt with in the agenda of this meeting (attended by members of the War Cabinet only) a number of other questions were referred to.

**FRANCE.**

The Prime Minister said that there should be no change in our relations with the French National Committee until he (the Prime Minister) had had an opportunity of discussion with President Roosevelt. He added that he thought we should encourage the French to put themselves on their country as soon as might be, and that he thought that there would be a process of continual modification in the constitution of the French National Committee.

The Foreign Secretary referred to the proposals in his memorandum (W.M. (HK) 47) that a representative of the French National Committee should be invited to attend a meeting of the Economic Advisory Council for discussion of the armistice terms with Germany. This memorandum had been discussed by the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 29th August, and had been approved.

The Prime Minister said that he raised no objection to such ad hoc participation.

**DEFENCE REGULATIONS.**

The Prime Minister referred to the discussion which he had had with the Home Secretary about Regulation 18B. He (the Prime Minister) wanted Regulation 18B abolished when the war with Germany came to an end, and all persons detained under that Regulation released and habeas corpus restored to its full vigour.

The Home Secretary said that he had no objection to letting Regulation 18B lapse, on the understanding that it might be necessary to take powers to detain persons reasonably believed to be helping the Japanese. This, however, would be a relatively small matter.

The matter was not discussed from the point of view of reaching a decision, and no formal conclusion was reached.

**PREFABRICATED HOUSES.**

The Prime Minister said that he was disturbed about the position and was asking that a small committee should be set up to examine the position and report to him on his return.

**TRAVEL FACILITIES.**

Reference was made to the decision reached by the War Cabinet on Monday, 28th August, that Mr. R.R. Stokes' application should be granted insofar as it rested on business grounds which could be substantiated.

The Prime Minister said that he was strongly opposed
to Mr. Stokes' request being granted. If he were allowed to go, there would be pro tanto delay in the immense list of people who had strong claims for travel facilities on compassionate grounds. He saw no reason why this individual's application should be granted.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said there was no question of the Cabinet affording him any special travelling facilities. All the decision involved was that Mr. Stokes should be treated in the same way as any other business man with large engineering interests in Turkey, who on account of those interests, applied to visit Turkey. Moreover, he rather thought that action had already been taken.

No formal conclusion was recorded.
WAR CABINET 116 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Monday, 4th September, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. LORD SIMON, Lord Chancellor (Item 9).

The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 7-9).

The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. LORD BEVERBROOK, Paymaster-General.

Captain the Right Hon. H. H. BALFOUR, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air (Items 7-9).


Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.

General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.

SIR GILBERT LAITHTWAITE.

Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
**WAR CABINET 116 (44).**

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Naval, Military
and Air
Operations.

Bomber Command had flown 3,100 sorties and dropped 8,158 tons of bombs by day and 2,165 by night on "Crossbow" targets, airfields in Holland, coastal batteries in France and targets in Germany.

69,850 tons of bombs had been dropped by Bomber Command during the month of August, this being the highest total in any month.

United States Heavy Bombers, whose operations had been restricted by the weather, had flown 2,750 sorties and dropped 3,600 tons of bombs.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 12,400 sorties, attacking enemy road and railway movements. They claimed to have destroyed 2,895 motor transport vehicles, 170 armoured fighting vehicles, 35 tanks, 28 oil cars, 464 locomotives and 62 barges and other craft.

The German Air Force was almost completely disorganised by shortage of fuel and the rapid advance of our forces. The enemy had lost 93 aircraft (including 55 on the ground). Allied losses included 70 bombers and 78 fighters and fighter bombers.

363 flying bombs had been launched, of which 260 had been destroyed and 37 had reached the London area. No flying bombs had been launched since 1:15 p.m. on the previous Friday.

Allied aircraft had flown 12,500 sorties and dropped 9,000 tons of bombs. Enemy losses amounted to 283 aircraft as against 72 Allied.

Confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action for the month of August amounted to 88,336 tons; losses for September to date were 6,255 tons.

Eight U-boats had been sunk and 5 probably sunk during August.

There was evidence that the enemy was instituting inshore patrols off Moray Firth, in the Minch, off the North Channel and North Coast of Cornwall.

A series of operations had been carried out off the Norwegian coast. The Tirpitz had been attacked and a number of hits obtained. Subsidiary targets had also been attacked and more than 20 ships either destroyed or damaged.

Bad weather had restricted unloading operations in the Channel ports since the 2nd September. Dieppe had not been completely blocked and a thousand tons of stores had been unloaded at the port on the previous day.

The operations in Northern France were described. British forces had crossed the Somme near its mouth and were working along the coast towards Boulogne. Further inland a rapid advance had been made and Brussels had been taken. This force (which was making for Antwerp) had last been heard of at Alost. No news had been received of American forces since reaching Mons, Sedan, Metz and Nancy. The enemy garrison in Brest continued to hold out.

The continued advance of the Allied Forces in France was now mainly a question of overcoming administrative difficulties.

The most critical stage in the supply of Paris had been overcome.

United States forces were east of Lyons, preparing for further advance. The railway line from the coast to Lyons was in good order.

On the right of our line an advance of some 20 miles along the sea-coast had been made in the direction of Rimini. On the remainder of the front there had been a general German retirement.

The Russians had made little progress north of Riga, but their attacks to the north of Warsaw had been held in check. Great progress had been made in Roumania. Ploesti and Bucharest had been occupied and the Danube reached on a wide front.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the above statements.
2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the casualties as a result of attacks by flying bombs for the previous week had been as follows:—

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly injured</td>
<td>574</td>
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The total figures to date were as follows:—

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>5,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured</td>
<td>17,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly injured</td>
<td>22,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,763</td>
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</table>

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

"Crossbow."

(Previous References: W.M.(44)98th Conclusions, Minute 2, and W.M. (44) 113th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that in the light of the changed situation he thought that certain new decisions were now called for. In particular, he recommended—

(a) that the scheme for the evacuation from London of further members of the priority classes should now be discontinued;

(b) that the movement of patients from London hospitals to hospitals in other parts of the country should be stopped.

(These points were in accordance with proposals he had received from the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Health.)

(c) that the basis on which the Rocket Consequences Committee had made their plans, and which had been revised the previous week, called for further review in the light of the increasing unlikelihood of this form of attack.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the action proposed by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had received some further letters suggesting that Parliament should reassemble before the date fixed. He thought that we should adhere to the view that no change was called for in the arrangements already made.

This was agreed to.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs inquired whether it could now be assumed that when Parliament reassembled it would meet in the House of Lords Chamber in the Palace of Westminster.

This was approved and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to take the necessary action in concert with the authorities concerned.

6. The Prime Minister again referred to the question of a special flag for the proposed Jewish Fighting Force. The design proposed was the Star of David on a white background between two pale blue bars. The flag would only be flown with the Brigade and on operations. He had consulted President Roosevelt who favoured the proposal, which he wished to recommend to the War Cabinet for their approval.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the Prime Minister’s proposal.
7. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 490) reviewing the position as regards the relaxation of the blackout in the light of the improvement in the war situation, and urging that if relaxations were made it would be desirable that they should be announced before British Double Summer Time ended, on the 17th September, 1944.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that much the simplest course would be to allow the whole country to benefit at the same time and to the same extent. There were, however, security and practical arguments in favour of a distinction between London and the south-eastern counties and the remainder of the United Kingdom.

In the course of discussion it was urged that the case for avoiding discrimination against London and the south-eastern counties, which had been severely tried, was very strong. Admittedly the risk of further raids could not be wholly excluded, and there might be criticism from the areas affected in the event of a raid. This should, however, be set against the very great general relief which relaxation of the blackout would present. Rather than discriminate against London and the south-eastern area it would be better to postpone relaxation until it could be made of general application to the country as a whole.

It was urged on the other hand that it would be a pity to postpone relaxing the blackout at once where no further risk was involved.

The President of the Board of Trade said that in the event of a decision to relax the blackout on the lines recommended by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, immediate action should be taken to stop the manufacture of blackout material and switch to other production.

After further discussion the War Cabinet agreed as follows—

(1) An announcement should be made at an early date that the blackout would not be continued throughout the coming winter in any area in this country; and that stage by stage, as circumstances permitted, the following relaxations would be made:

   (a) The substitution of a dim-out for the blackout in respect of domestic lighting, on the lines set out in W.P. (44) 490.

   (b) The relaxation of industrial and vehicle lighting on the lines recommended in W.P. (44) 490 and 417.

   (c) The introduction of improved street lighting up to the standards recommended in W.P. (44) 490.

(2) The question of prosecution would, of course, be handled in a reasonable spirit.

(3) The President of the Board of Trade was invited, in the light of the above decision, to arrange for the diversion of capacity forthwith from the manufacture of blackout material to other types of material appropriate to the conditions which would prevail when effect had been given to those relaxations.

8. The War Cabinet were reminded that at their meeting on 14th August, it had been decided that revised estimates of manpower requirements for the second half of 1944 might be based on the assumption that the war with Germany would not continue beyond the 30th June, 1945.

The Minister of Production said that this decision had enabled some substantial cuts to be made in the allocations to the Supply Departments; but he suggested that the time had come when a more optimistic view might be taken.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that for the purpose of estimating man-power requirements in the second half of 1944, it could now be assumed that the war with Germany would not continue beyond the 31st December, 1944.

It was also suggested that steps should now be taken to switch some labour and productive capacity from war production to the production of articles for civil consumption—crockery, hollow ware, furniture, clothing and the like—now in very short supply.

The President of the Board of Trade said that the necessary plans and programmes had been prepared. What was now required was a decision for the diversion of the necessary labour and raw materials.

The Minister of Production said that the necessary arrangements could be made by the Ministers concerned acting in collaboration if the principle was approved by the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet—

(2) Agreed that some diversion should now be made from war production to production of articles for civil consumption, and invited the Ministers concerned to take the necessary action to this end.

The President of the Board of Trade said that it would be of great assistance to him if the Supply Departments could now furnish him with particulars of the more important factory units at present engaged on war production which would be turned over to civil production early in Stage II.

The War Cabinet—

(3) Invited the Supply Departments to take steps to furnish this information to the Board of Trade as a matter of urgency.

War Criminals.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 454) about a warning to neutrals against granting asylum to enemy leaders and war criminals. The matter had been considered in the summer of war 1943 when the War Cabinet had felt that it would be premature to raise it. A stage had now been reached, however, at which a further authoritative pronouncement seemed desirable, at the highest level and on behalf of the three major Allies. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recommended a joint Declaration in the terms of the draft annexed to W.P. (44) 464 by His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the Soviet Government, and asked for authority to consult the United States and the Soviet Governments in this sense.

The general sense of the War Cabinet was in favour of the course recommended by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the course of discussion the following points were made:

(a) The position of Quislings.—The War Cabinet took note that the words "accomplices in other countries" in paragraph 3 of the draft Declaration appended to W.P. (44) 484 sufficiently covered the position of Quislings.

(b) The suggestion was made that paragraph 5 of the revised draft should be omitted on the ground that it might be considered by neutrals as a threat to their independence and provoke embarrassing counter-declarations; and that the point would be sufficiently covered if after the word "retribution" in paragraph 4 of the draft Declaration the words "wherever they may be" were inserted.
The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposals of the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs in W.P. (44) 484, and agreed to the draft
Declaration subject to the amendment at "X."

The Prime Minister said that he was increasingly impressed
with the need for a very early Declaration, of the kind that he had
previously urged, regarding the grand criminals whose crimes had
no geographical location. He felt that the effect of such a Declara-
tion might be of great value as dividing the Nazi leaders from
popular feeling in their country. We need anticipate no difficulty
with the Russians in this matter, and he would propose to discuss
it personally with the President.

The Lord Chancellor said that with the Attorney-General and
the Minister of Aircraft Production he had, as desired by the War
Cabinet, been drafting a formula for this purpose. He undertook
to let the Prime Minister have a copy of the draft at once.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
4th September, 1944.
WAR CABINET 117 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 5th September, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Item 8).
The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 8).
The Right Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works (Item 8).
Captain the Right Hon. H. H. Balfour, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air (Items 1-8).
Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Item 8).
Sir Reginald Hill, Deputy Director, Ministry of War Transport (Item 8).
Air Marshal Sir Douglas C. S. Evill, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Item 1).

The following were also present:
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellyn, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 1-8).
Major the Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, Minister of Fuel and Power (Item 8).
The Right Hon. Richard Law, M.P., Minister of State (Items 1-5).
Mr. A. T. Lennox-Boyd, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production (Item 8).
Lieut.-General Sir Archibald E. Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 8 and 9).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.
Brigadier F. I. C. Jacob.
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1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the latest developments in the Polish situation. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. At their meeting on the 29th August (W.M. (44) 112th Conclusions, Minute 1) the War Cabinet had asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report further, in the light of the views then expressed, on the United States proposals for sharing the cost of relief in the military period. They now had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 486), to which was attached a draft telegram prepared in consultation with the Minister of State, suggesting the line to be taken.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the draft telegram contemplated a possible commitment (£12,500,000) slightly in excess of the figure which he had had in view when the matter was last discussed in the War Cabinet. He was ready to go as far as this and recommended the telegram for the approval of the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the draft telegram recommended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and appended to W.P. (44) 486.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a Note by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 487) asking for guidance on certain issues in regard to Italy likely to arise at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of U.N.R.R.A.

The Minister of State asked for confirmation that it was the wish of the War Cabinet—

(i) that he should not propose that U.N.R.R.A. should conduct general relief work in Italy (including the provision of foodstuffs);

(ii) that he should not oppose U.N.R.R.A. functioning in Italy in looking after displaced persons other than enemy nationals and in fighting epidemics;

He also asked—

(iii) for discretion to support a proposal, likely to be put forward by the Americans, that U.N.R.R.A. should look after displaced persons of enemy nationality as well as of Allied nationality in Italy, and should render certain assistance there for the preservation of public health and in the care of children, at a total cost not exceeding $50,000,000.

The following points were made in discussion:—

(a) While arguments might be advanced in favour of U.N.R.R.A. assuming responsibility for relief in Italy, U.N.R.R.A. was most unlikely to be willing to take this over. In any event, very strong exception would be taken by our Allies to admitting Italy to the benefits of U.N.R.R.A. while their own claims were still unsatisfied.

(b) If it were necessary to continue to spend money on relief in Italy, the matter should be handled by some organisation specialising in relief, so as to ensure competent management and avoidance of unnecessary expense.

(e) The suggestion was made that a paper should be prepared setting out the present position as regards the arrangements for administration of relief in Italy, and the incidence of such expenditure, and explaining what would be the incidence of expenditure on measures of relief and rehabilitation in areas which passed from the control of the military authorities to that of the Italian Government.
(d) The Minister of State informed the War Cabinet that the War Office had asked for confirmation that the proposals in his paper as to the scope of U.N.R.R.A. would be subject to the following conditions:—

(i) that U.N.R.R.A. should operate as the agent of the military authorities and under the control of the A.C.C. so long as the A.C.C. continues to exist;

(ii) that a definite scheme should be put forward for approval (the proposals on the American side were still very broadly stated);

(iii) that SACMED's agreement should be sought before there was a final commitment.

On this the view of the War Cabinet was that—

The Minister of State should put forward the War Office point (i), but should not press it if any difficulty seemed likely to arise; and that the War Office points (ii) and (iii) should be accepted.

After discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:—

(1) The Minister of State should base himself generally on the propositions contained in W.P. (44) 497, and summarised earlier in this minute.

(2) The Secretary of State for War was invited to submit a Memorandum to the War Cabinet dealing with the following points:—

(a) The existing arrangements governing the administration of relief in Italy and the incidence of expenditure thereon in areas under military control; in areas vacated by the troops but not yet handed over to the Italian Government; in areas handed over to the Italian Government.

(b) The total expenditure so far incurred on relief in Italy.

(c) What steps were being taken to get agricultural and industrial production restarted in Italy.


4. The Minister of State enquired whether the terms of the Prime Minister's Directive (W.P. (44) 469) could be communicated to the State Department; or whether, failing this, there would be any objection to his making a public reference at Montreal to the fact that such a directive had been issued.

The War Cabinet—

Decided that the Directive should not be communicated to the State Department, and that no public reference should be made to it. The Minister of State might, however, say that the Prime Minister had shown his personal interest in the work of U.N.R.R.A., but without indicating in what manner.

Personnel for U.N.R.R.A.

5. The Minister of State said that Governor Lehman had asked Sir Ronald Campbell to lend a British civil servant to serve as Deputy Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. The civil servant in question was very highly qualified, but he understood that there would be great difficulty in making him available even if he was himself anxious to serve. On the other hand, if he was not made available, this important post might be filled by an American citizen. He was anxious to inform Governor Lehman that this matter had been considered by the War Cabinet.

After further discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:—

(1) The Minister of State should tell Governor Lehman that the particular civil servant for whom he had asked could not, unfortunately, be spared, but that alternative names
were under consideration, and that we were doing our utmost to find a man fully competent to fill the post.

(2) It was of the utmost importance that we should make available for this post a man of the requisite attainments. Ministers were invited to forward suggestions to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the course of the next few days.

Armistice Terms.
Arrangements for Signature.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 111th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 495) proposing that he should try to arrange that the armistice with the Axis Satellites should in each case be signed by one military representative on behalf of all the United Nations Governments who were at war with a particular satellite. This would be without prejudice to the Instrument of Surrender for Germany, which clearly stood by itself.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposals of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Roumania.
Armistice Terms.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 47th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

7. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 496) reporting the Soviet Government's proposed armistice terms for Roumania and the comments which we had made in reply.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that discussions were still proceeding. The Russian attitude had been reasonable, save possibly on the matter of their reparations demand, which was still under discussion.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Man-power.
Policy in 1944.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 100th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

8. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 487) containing proposals by the Ministerial Committee on Man-power for allocations during the remainder of 1944. These proposals had been framed after consideration of memoranda put in by the Service and Supply Ministers and by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security setting out their requirements.

The following points were made in discussion—

Civil Defence.
(a) The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he was satisfied that the net reduction of 50,000 over the year 1944 could now be realised. In view of the fact that the War Cabinet had agreed that policemen should be released as soon as possible from the forces in order to take up their previous occupation, he suggested, however, that it would be unwise to call up for the Services further men from the Police Force.

Admiralty.
(b) The Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, said that the previous deficit of 6,400 men on Vote A would be increased by the proposed allocations to 31,500. Steps had already been taken to pay off older ships, and further economies could only be made at the expense of the build-up for the war against Japan. It was essential to man new construction, and the closing of bases in the United Kingdom would give little help, as the men released were mainly unfit to go abroad or came in the categories for early release. The Admiralty had a requirement for 8,500 specialists. This would not be met by the proposed intake of 7,000 men; and the position
was made worse by the fact that they had already anticipated their allocation for the period by taking in 1,900 men, many of whom were not specialists. He suggested that the intake of 50,000 to the Army should be reduced by 5,000 in favour of the Navy.

(c) The Admiralty would find it difficult to release 10,000 volunteers for the mines, since experience had shown that a very large proportion of the volunteers were rejected as unsuitable. He thought that 7,000 suitable men might be obtained, but he suggested that the Navy should be given the 10,000 replacements in the form of new intake, the balance of 3,000 being made up by compulsory transfers to the Army.

(d) With regard to the Admiralty labour allocation, he pointed out that the reduction of 18,000 men involved would be a serious matter and would delay the build-up of Naval forces in the Far East.

The view of the War Cabinet on these proposals was that the cuts proposed in the Admiralty service and industrial allocations were not disproportionate compared to those of the other Services and were not unreasonable having regard to the view expressed by the Prime Minister that the strength of the Navy should be decreased by 200,000 men during the first year after the defeat of Germany. It was pointed out that it was, of course, open to the First Lord of the Admiralty to address representations to the Prime Minister on his Department's allocations of Service and Industrial man-power.

War Office.

(e) The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that in the existing war situation the War Office were prepared to accept the revised allocation of 50,000 men for the Army, but added that there were certain points that the War Office would take up with the Minister of Labour and National Service.

Air Ministry.

(f) The Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air said that the Air Ministry were satisfied with their allocation of 2,000 men.

Supply Departments.

(g) The Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, and the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production, said that, in view of the recent decision of the War Cabinet that plans should be made on the assumption that the war with Germany would end by the 31st December, 1944, the proposed reductions in allocations for the Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Aircraft Production could be achieved, and might be improved upon later in the year.

The Minister of Labour and National Service suggested that any further releases from the munition industries should be applied to increase the labour available for civil industries.

This view was endorsed by the War Cabinet.

Industries and Services in Groups II and III.

(h) The proposals for the allocations to these industries were generally approved, subject to such minor adjustments, e.g., in the gas industry, as might be found desirable.

The War Cabinet—

 Approved the proposed allocations set out in the Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the understanding that when the Ministry of Labour's Manpower Survey became available in October, and when there had been time for further study of the implications of the decision that plans should be made on the basis of the war with Germany coming to an end by the 31st December, 1944, some review of the allocations to the munition industries would be necessary with the object of increasing the amount of labour available to the civil industries.
The Home Guard.

Service Pay.

Improvements in conditions of service for men retained in the Armed Forces after the end of the war with Germany.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 113th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

9. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Prime Minister had asked that further measures to stand down the Home Guard should now be taken. He had consulted the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff earlier in the day, and, as a result, the following measures were proposed:

(a) That the call-up and medical examination of further entrants to the Home Guard should now be suspended.

(b) That, subject to the outcome of a conference with Commanders-in-Chief to be held the following day, compulsory drills should be suspended.

The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff explained that it was hoped that there would be enough volunteers from the Home Guard to continue the manning of certain anti-aircraft defences which were still necessary and to help the Civil Defence Authorities with urgent work in connection with bomb damage in London. The Chiefs of Staff had already called for a report upon the guarding of vulnerable points by the Home Guard and hoped shortly to be able to recommend the termination of these duties.

In response to a suggestion by the Minister of Labour and National Service, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, undertook to examine the present measures for guarding Royal Ordnance Factories with a view to reducing as much as possible the man-power employed.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals at (a) and (b) above, and invited the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the outcome of the conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, and of the terms of the statement which the War Office would propose to issue to give effect to these decisions.

10. The Chancellor of the Exchequer reminded the War Cabinet that at their meeting on the 31st August the view had been recorded that, if possible simultaneously with the publication of the White Paper, a statement should be made as to the improvements in the conditions of service of men retained in the Armed Forces after the end of the war with Germany. He had undertaken to report to the War Cabinet at an early date on the progress made on this matter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave the War Cabinet an outline of the scheme which had emerged from the discussions which he had had with the Service Ministers and the Secretary of State for India and the Minister of Labour and National Service. At the moment the scheme was provisional only, but he hoped that it would be finally accepted by the Service Ministers and the Government of India.

After a preliminary discussion, the War Cabinet recorded the view that an announcement on the lines indicated by the Chancellor should be made at the same time as the publication of the White Paper setting out the scheme for the reallocation of man-power. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was invited to communicate in this sense with the Prime Minister.*

* This telegram was despatched as Cordite No. 3.
11. The War Cabinet were reminded that it had been decided that arrangements should be made for a visit to the U.S.S.R. of a Parliamentary Delegation supporting the present Government.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that under the arrangements made the delegation would probably be leaving towards the end of the present month. In the present circumstances it was thought that there might be some advantage if the date of departure were somewhat delayed.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed this view, and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to arrange accordingly.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
5th September, 1944.
WAR CABINET 118 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 7th September, 1944, at 12.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.


The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.


Lieut.-General Sir Archibald E. Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The Right Hon. Erskine Churchill, M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

Vice-Admiral Sir Ellenbrooke P. Barrow, K.C., M.P., Minister of Health.

Air Marshal Sir Archibald E. Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob.

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Channel Islands.

1. The War Cabinet had before them a report by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 491) setting out the plans which were being made for the occupation of the Channel Islands when the Germans were ready to surrender, and inviting the War Cabinet to take note of those plans and to give approval to the expedition concerned being held at not less than seven days' notice to sail.

The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the Chiefs of Staff fully recognised the desirability on political grounds of the occupying force moving in as soon as possible after capitulation. The seven days' notice for which they asked could, however, be reduced only at the cost of interference with military operations. It was possible that we might receive news of the impending German surrender before it became public property, in which event the interval between publication of the news and the arrival of the relieving expedition could be reduced.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security accepted the force of the military considerations which weighed with the Chiefs of Staff. There was, however, a risk of damaging political criticism if the occupying force could not move in almost at once. From this point of view it would be helpful if, once the Germans had undertaken to surrender, arrangements could be made to despatch food and other necessary supplies immediately, either by air or by sea. He asked that this suggestion should be discussed between the Home Office, the Service and other Departments concerned.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that, unless the quantities involved were very small, pressure on air carrying space would be almost as great as on shipping.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the plans for the despatch of a force to the Channel Islands in the event of the surrender of the German garrison, set out in W.P. (44) 491.
(2) Approved that the expedition should be held at not less than seven days' notice to sail.
(3) Invited the Departments concerned to consult with the Home Office (a) as to the possibility of sending in supplies in advance of the arrival of our forces; and (b) as to the arrangements for announcing the German surrender.

Hungary.

Armistice Terms.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 36th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 499) explaining the position as regards armistice terms for Hungary, to which was attached a statement of the armistice terms proposed.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recommended that, if the terms were approved, (a) they should be communicated to the European Advisory Commission if the Soviet Government agreed to discussion in that body; (b) if, however, the Soviet Government made any difficulty about adopting the European Advisory Commission procedure, that they should be communicated to the United States and Soviet Governments by the Foreign Office.

It was suggested in discussion that the following drafting points might be considered in connection with the armistice terms as set out in the Annex to W.P. (44) 499:

(i) Article 8.—For ‘‘for political reasons’’ substitute ‘‘for political or racial reasons.’’
(ii) Paragraph 8.—Amend last sentence to read: ‘‘Such legislation to be repealed and the effect of such legislation to be reversed.’’
After further discussion, the War Cabinet—

(1) Approved generally the proposals of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as set out in W.P. (44) 490.

(2) Approved the armistice terms set out in the Annex to W.P. (44) 499, subject to consideration by the Official Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration of the drafting points that had been raised in discussion and of any others that might arise.

3. The War Cabinet had before them the following papers:

(a) A Note by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security covering the Report of the Rocket Consequences Committee (W.P. (44) 500). In his Note the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security suggested that no further action on the lines of the Report should be taken, and that Departments should be instructed to suspend or, where appropriate, to reverse any action already taken.

(b) A Report by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff setting out the policy which they recommended for dealing with offensive and defensive counter-measures against the flying bomb and the Rocket (W.P. (44) 501).

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that there were certain matters in the production field upon which action was far advanced, and on which it was necessary to decide whether it would be better to proceed or to turn back. For example, should the making of plans for the dispersal of certain important factories be stopped, and should the preparation of extensions to factories in less vulnerable areas be cancelled? It might be easier in a few cases to finish what was in progress rather than to cause confusion by bringing it to a sudden close.

The War Cabinet approved the policy recommended by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, it being understood that individual cases would be dealt with on their merits on common sense lines.

The War Cabinet were informed that, although the danger to London from flying bombs or rockets would shortly disappear, except for the possible airborne launching of flying bombs, there was a remote possibility that Paris or Antwerp or other Continental objectives might be attacked. It was for this reason that it was felt that it would be a mistake to shut down all development of radio counter-measures. Much of the research would also be of use for general war purposes, and for the future.

The Minister of Aircraft Production said that the production of balloons had now been cut down to 200 a month. He hoped that it might be possible now to cancel all production and to supply our requirements from stock. This would enable the capacity and labour now being employed on making balloons to be switched to the manufacture of civilian cotton goods, of which there was a great shortage.

The Minister of Reconstruction supported this proposal.

The Minister of Labour and National Service was sympathetic to this proposal, but hoped that action of this kind would not be taken piecemeal. He was in touch with the President of the Board.
of Trade with a view to securing a list of priorities for the resumption of civil industry, and a comprehensive and orderly scheme for the transfer of labour was most important.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that no further action on the lines of the Report by the Rocket Consequences Committee should be taken, and that, subject to a common-sense interpretation of this policy in individual cases, action already taken should be suspended or, where appropriate, reversed.

(2) Approved the proposals of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff for dealing with offensive and defensive counter-measures against "Crossbow."

(3) Invited the Air Ministry to examine the possibility of cancelling further production of balloons.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
7th September, 1944.
W.M.(44) 118th CONCLUSIONS
(Tuesday, 5th September, 1944 - 5 p.m.)

At the beginning of the meeting, the
FOREIGN SECRETARY raised the question of whether
Mr. R.R. Stokes, M.P.'s application to visit various
countries should be granted. He thought that when this
matter had last been discussed in Cabinet, it had been
agreed that he should be allowed to visit Turkey and the
Middle East. He asked that this should be confirmed.

The War Cabinet -
Endorsed the Foreign Secretary's view,
and agreed that he should so inform
Mr. Stokes.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Saturday, 9th September, 1944, at 12 noon.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Vice-Admiral Sir E. Neville Syfret, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff.
Air Marshal Sir Douglas C. S. Evill, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff.
Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply.
Lieu.-General Sir Archibald E. Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob.

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Subject: Attack by Rockets

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The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security informed the War Cabinet that two missiles had fallen the previous evening—one in Chiswick and one near Epping. From investigation, it appeared almost certain that these missiles were rockets of the type expected. They had caused large craters, but there was less blast than from the flying bomb, and there had been few casualties.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff said that there had been no radar trace of these rockets, but the sound-ranging organisation had plotted them, and their observations showed that they had come one from the neighbourhood of Rotterdam and the other from the direction of Amsterdam. Owing to the lack of radar trace, no warning was received, and therefore no jamming could be put into operation. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff had considered the position earlier in the day, and counter-measures in accordance with the previously arranged plan had been put into operation, i.e., Intruders had patrolled during the night, and armed reconnaissance had been sent out early in the morning. So far, there were no reports, and no further rockets had arrived. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff had arranged for the Service Staffs to consider immediately whether steps should be taken to send mobile radar sets or sound-ranging and flash-spotting equipment to Belgium, from where there would be a better chance of locating the firing-points.

The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff explained to the War Cabinet the military situation in Belgium and Holland, and the probable course of operations. He said that he had telegraphed to Field-Marshal Montgomery asking him to give an estimate of when the area Rotterdam—Utrecht—Amsterdam would be sealed off or captured. The reply to this would enable the Staffs to form an opinion as to whether apparatus could be got to Belgium in time to make it worth while sending it. The Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the War Cabinet (W.P. (44) 413) that, if rocket attacks started, certain drastic measures should be taken to prevent information leaving the country. They now felt that the conditions were entirely different from those in which their previous Report had been made, and that no such drastic steps were called for. Their suggestion was that the only security measure that need be taken was to instruct the Press that no reference should be made to the firings, or, if this could not be done, at least to the fall of shot. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff felt that no serious attack could be developed by the enemy, whose organisation in Holland must have been hurriedly improvised, and any attacks would probably be of short duration.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security then put forward certain points on which decisions were required, as follows:

(a) Publicity.—There were arguments for and against a statement to the public at the present time. On the whole, he was inclined to recommend that there should be no publicity for at least 24, and perhaps 48, hours, but that information should be given confidentially to the Press. If in the meanwhile further rocket attack developed, it might be necessary to reconsider the matter, and he asked that some discretion should be given to himself, in conjunction with the Minister of Information, to act as might seem necessary.

(b) Warning of Attack.—It was clearly impossible in present circumstances to give a warning of the arrival of rockets. He had considered whether to sound the alert in the evening, so as to induce people to take shelter at night, but he had decided against this course the previous evening, and he proposed that there should be no sounding of the alert unless a more serious attack developed.

(c) The Closing of the Tube.—Under present arrangements the tube under the river between Waterloo and Leicester Square was closed to the public on the sounding of an alert, though this precaution had not been thought necessary at the beginning of the attack by flying bombs. There would obviously be no sounding of the alert.
for the fall of each rocket, and there was the danger that one might penetrate the tube, with disastrous results. The chances were extremely small, however, and he recommended that for the moment the tube should remain open.

(d) Evacuation.—The Minister of Health would require to know whether any change was to be made in the present plans whereby no further evacuation was being made, but people were being discouraged from returning. He suggested that this policy should remain unchanged.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note that all possible counter-measures were being taken, and that, if possible, apparatus for the location of firing-points would be moved to Belgium, so as to improve the chances of getting warning of attack.

(2) Agreed that the security measures set out in Appendix I to W.P. (44) 413 should not be applied.

(3) Agreed that for the present there should be no publicity of any kind—the matter to be reviewed on Monday—unless attacks on an appreciable scale developed in the interval, when the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, in consultation with the Minister of Information, should use his discretion in the matter. In the meanwhile, confidential information should be given to the Press.

(4) Approved the proposals of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security set out at “X” above.

(5) Invited the Vice-Chiefs of Staff to instruct S.O.E. to endeavour to obtain information from the Resistance Movement in Holland of the rocket storage, handling, and firing arrangements, so that air attacks could be profitably directed.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 9th September, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Saturday, 9th September, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:

- The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
- The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
- The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
- The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
- The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
- The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
- The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
- The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
- LORD BRUNTISFIELD, Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty.
- Captain the Right Hon. H. H. BALFOUR, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air.

Secretariat:

- Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
- Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

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At their meeting on the 31st August the War Cabinet had agreed that, if possible simultaneously with the publication of the White Paper about reallocation of man-power after the end of hostilities with Germany, a further statement should be made as to improvements in the conditions of service of men retained in the armed forces after the end of the war with Germany.

At their meeting on the 5th September the War Cabinet had heard from the Chancellor of the Exchequer an outline of the scheme which had emerged from the discussions he had had with the Service Ministers, the Secretary of State for India and the Minister of Labour of National Service, and had invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to communicate it to the Prime Minister.

The War Cabinet now had before them a telegram from the Prime Minister (Gunfire No. 26) raising certain points about the scheme and suggesting that an announcement on this subject and on the reallocation scheme should be postponed until the scale of our effort against Japan had been ascertained, and until the climax of the struggle with Hitler was over.

The War Cabinet also had before them a telegram from the Government of India (No. 7167) urging that further time was required for consideration of the scheme, and that in its application to India any increase should be divided into two elements, of which one part should be given in cash and the rest as deferred pay to be given at the end of hostilities.

After discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:

1. The Press Conference which had been arranged for Monday, the 11th September, at which the Minister of Labour and National Service had intended to explain the reallocation scheme to the Press (prior to its issue in the Press on the following morning), should be postponed for a week, and the Prime Minister should be informed accordingly.

2. Further telegrams should be prepared for despatch to the Prime Minister setting out the following points which had been raised in discussion:

   a) Without a public announcement work could not be started on picking out the men in the early demobilisation groups. This further delay would seriously endanger the despatch by the due date of troops for the Burma campaign.

   b) The Service Departments reported that Commanders in the field pressed strongly for an early announcement of the demobilisation scheme, and there were indications that the troops attached great importance to knowing where they stood on this matter.

   c) The reasons in favour of making both announcements simultaneously.

   d) Various points as regards details of the improvements in conditions of service, e.g., that the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, on advice received from their Commanders-in-Chief, pressed strongly that the whole improvement should be given in immediate cash rather than that part of the increases should take the form of deferred benefits.

Note.—Telegrams on the lines indicated in (2) were prepared, but they were not despatched, as in the meantime further telegrams on this subject were received from the Prime Minister.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
11th September, 1944.
WAR CABINET 121 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, 11th September, 1944 at 5 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., Minister of Education.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

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1. At their meeting on Saturday, the 9th September, the War Cabinet had agreed that telegrams giving explanations on certain points should be despatched to the Prime Minister. Telegrams on the lines agreed had been prepared but had not been despatched, as in the meantime further telegrams had been received from the Prime Minister.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—-

Agreed to the despatch of a telegram to the Prime Minister suggesting that one of his colleagues should proceed to Quebec to give him a full explanation in person of the proposed scheme for improvements in Service emoluments.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Education, circulated on behalf of the Secretary of State for India and the Minister of War Transport (W.P. (44) 511), about the report of the Commission set up by the Government of India to enquire into the Bombay explosion.

The Commissioners had issued a report which set out the causes of the disaster and contained a number of statements reflecting on the Ministry of War Transport and its representative in India. The Government of India had, in setting up the Commission, committed themselves to publishing the report, except such parts as in the opinion of the Commission would be detrimental to the public interest. Publication had been approved and would take place in India on the following day. Furthermore, it had been arranged that a statement should be made on behalf of His Majesty's Government to controvert the incorrect, and in some cases tendentious, statements made regarding the Ministry of War Transport's organisation.

In discussion, the arrangement made by the Government of India which committed them to publish the report (except such parts as the Commission itself considered should not be published) was criticised as unfortunate. It was also felt that the procedure proposed, whereby simultaneously with the report a Resolution should be issued controverting some of the statements in the Commissioners' report, was open to considerable objection. The War Cabinet felt that, given the possibility of political repercussions in India and of damaging criticism in the United Kingdom and the United States, they should have been consulted before these arrangements had been concluded. It was also felt that the proposal that the Minister of War Transport should telegraph an expression of his confidence to Mr. Masson (the head of the Ministry's organisation in India) shortly after the publication of a report by independent persons, strongly criticising Mr. Masson's actions, and that the message of confidence should be published in the Indian Press, ought not to be proceeded with until the War Cabinet had had an opportunity of reading the report and considering the matter.

Later, the Minister of Education reported that it was too late to alter the arrangements made for publication of the report and of the resolution of the Government of India commenting thereon. The Minister had, however, arranged that action should be deferred on the proposed message from the Minister of War Transport to Mr. Masson until the matter had been further considered.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
11th September, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 11th September, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. THEO LUDBY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Minister of Education.

Mr. ERNEST THURTLE, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Information (Item 3).

Vice-Admiral Sir E. NEVILLE SYFRET, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

Captain The Right Hon. H. H. BALFOUR, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air (Items 7 and 8).

Sir ORME SARGENT, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Lieut.-General Sir ARCHIBALD E. NYE, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir DOUGLAS C. S. EVIL, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff.

Secretariat:

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.

SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

Major-General E. I. C. JACOB.

Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
**WAR CABINET 122 (44).**

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</table>
1. The Vice-Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had flown 3,300 sorties and dropped over 10,000 tons of bombs, 9,800 tons of which had been in day operations against Havre, Brest and targets in Germany. Operations by night had been limited by weather. Mosquitoes had bombed targets in Germany each night.

United States heavy bombers had flown 4,500 sorties and dropped 9,000 tons of bombs—practically all on armament factories and industrial targets in Germany. The synthetic oil plant at Ludwigshafen had also been attacked. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force had flown 10,000 sorties, mostly in support of land operations. They also claimed to have destroyed 1,100 motor transport vehicles, 22 armoured fighting vehicles, 20 tanks, 30 oil trucks, 600 railway wagons and 300 locomotives. Enemy losses had been 44 aircraft destroyed in the air and 281 on the ground, as against 157 Allied losses.

Allied aircraft had flown 10,500 sorties and dropped 9,000 tons of bombs. Enemy losses amounted to 105 aircraft (98 on the ground) as against 65 Allied. The Italian liner Rex had been set on fire and was reported a total loss.

Allied aircraft had flown 10,500 sorties and dropped 9,000 tons of bombs. Enemy losses amounted to 105 aircraft (98 on the ground) as against 65 Allied. The Italian liner Rex had been set on fire and was reported a total loss.

Confirmed shipping losses due to enemy action for the month of September amounted to 28,000 tons.

Two U-boats had been sunk and one probably sunk so far this month.

Warspite and Erebus had bombarded Havre with good results.

The first troop convoy to be sailed direct from America had arrived at Cherbourg on the 7th September. Ostend had been considerably damaged by the enemy. Antwerp was virtually undamaged, but could not be used until the estuary had been cleared.

United States cruisers and destroyers had bombarded enemy strong points in the Monaco area. On the east coast of Italy our destroyers had bombarded enemy positions and batteries in the Rimini area in support of military operations.

Canadian troops moving up the coast in the Pas de Calais had met determined opposition, but had now reached the line Bruges–Ghent–Antwerp. Enemy troops were endeavouring to cross the Scheldt to the Dutch Islands. Enemy forces were still holding out in Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. British forces had met considerable opposition on the line of the Albert Canal, but had established two bridgeheads across it. Further south the United States First Army, meeting little opposition, had advanced to the line Maastricht–Luxembourg. Further south still General Patton’s army had been strongly opposed. Metz and Nancy were still in the hands of the enemy. The maintenance situation on the whole front was stretched to its limits, but would be eased as soon as we could obtain ports further east.

The enemy forces which had been pursued up the Rhône Valley, where they had put up a determined resistance, would probably retire towards Belfort and Mulhouse.

The main thrust on the extreme right of our line was meeting with strong opposition in country which favoured the defence. In the Florence area the enemy was withdrawing, but probably meant to stand on the Gothic line.

A Russian offensive, north of Warsaw, had met with limited success. The main Russian effort had been concentrated on occupying Roumania and pushing into Bulgaria and Transylvania. They had reached Turnu Severin on the Yugoslav frontier. There were indications of large enemy withdrawals from the Dodecanese and also from the islands west of Greece and from Southern Greece, though it seemed likely that the enemy intended to hold on to certain key-points. The enemy’s withdrawal would be difficult if the Russians pushed on into Yugoslavia.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.
Air Raids.
Casualties and Damage.
(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)116th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the casualties, as a result of attacks by flying bombs, rockets and enemy shelling from the French coast, for the previous week had been as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seriously injured</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>Slightly injured</td>
<td>30</td>
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The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security informed the War Cabinet that there had been two or three further incidents since their previous meeting on Saturday—one in Kent and two in Essex. Little damage and few casualties had resulted.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff said that the latest information showed that all three incidents were caused by rockets, and slight Radar traces had been recorded. It seemed that they had been launched from the area between Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and an Intruder aircraft the previous evening reported seeing a trail of fire, probably of a rocket. He detailed the steps taken to institute counter-measures as a result of the Staff discussions on Saturday and Sunday.

As a result of these measures, some kind of warning might be received of the approach of missiles, but it was uncertain how long it would take to install equipment on the Continent.

Discussion followed as to whether the ban on publicity should be maintained. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff said that the Chiefs of Staff favoured this course, since so far there was nothing to indicate that the Germans had been able to control or track their rockets. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, on balance, favoured the continuance of silence, subject to daily review.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Information, said that the Minister of Information favoured the continuance of the ban, and the Press editors supported the Government action. The situation might change if the Germans started publicising their attacks.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that, should any question arise of imposing a drastic ban on information leaving the country, it would be necessary to issue a warning to the French, as their communications would now have to be placed in the same category as those of the American and Russian Governments. This was agreed to.

The War Cabinet—
(1) Took note of the operational measures which had been taken by the Chiefs of Staff.
(2) Agreed that for the present the ban on publicity should be maintained.

Former Polish Cabinet Ministers in Roumania.
(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)71st Conclusions, Minute 1.)

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Polish Government had enquired whether we could assist in getting the ex-Ministers of the Polish (1939) Government now in Roumania out of that country and grant them transit facilities. Later, they had asked whether we could arrange to fly these persons out of Roumania. He thought it was clear that we should not attempt to arrange for them to leave Roumania, and he proposed so to inform the Poles. On the other hand, these Ministers belonged to the Government which had declared war in 1939. If they succeeded in leaving Roumania it would, he suggested, be desirable that we should grant them transit visas, and also, if that proved unavoidable, permission to go to some place in the Empire, but not the United Kingdom. If the War Cabinet agreed, he would consult the
Germany.

Proposed Treatment after defeat.

Possible German Threat to Murder Prisoners of War.

Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. 44 117th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Jet-Propelled Aircraft.

Question of a further Anglo-American Statement.

(Previous Reference: W.M. 44 99th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

Secretary of State for the Colonies as to the choice of a place in that event.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that we were informed that Mr. Morgenthau was much disposed to take the line that we should let German economy break down after her defeat. It was possible that this and other issues connected with the future of Germany would be raised with the Prime Minister at Quebec. If the War Cabinet agreed, he would, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and one or two other of his colleagues who were principally concerned, as also with the Vice-Chiefs of Staff, prepare a note for the Prime Minister, a copy of which would be circulated to the War Cabinet.

After discussion, the War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a report by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff (W.P. 44 512) on a possible German threat to murder prisoners of war. The Memorandum concluded that no action could be taken unless and until organised military resistance had ceased or Hitler had issued a threat to murder prisoners of war. In that event, a warning in terms advised by the Foreign Office should be employed, and certain other action (set out in paragraph 12 of W.P. 44 512) might be taken.

The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that there was at present no concrete indication that Hitler was likely to make a threat of this nature. The issue was, however, one which might be raised in the Quebec discussions, and the proposals in the paper now before the War Cabinet had been drawn up with a view to their being despatched to the Chiefs of Staff, subject to the approval of the War Cabinet, for use in that event.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff as set out in paragraph 12 of W.P. 44 512 and agreed that, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister, the report should be used at the Quebec discussions if the matter were raised by the Americans.

7. The War Cabinet discussed the position of the Underground Army in Warsaw and the steps which could be taken to aid them.

The discussion and conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

8. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Vice-Chiefs of Staff (W.P. 44 502) on a proposal by General Arnold for a second joint Anglo-American statement regarding jet-propelled aircraft.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff reminded the War Cabinet that in January 1944 a Joint Anglo-American statement had been issued to prevent speculation in the press. It had then been agreed between the Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold that no further official statements would be made and that publicity would so far as possible be discouraged. Now that the Germans were using jet-propelled aircraft, there was strong pressure from the
press for information, and General Arnold had asked that the ban should be reconsidered. The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff agreed that this would be desirable, and if the War Cabinet approved, he would agree an announcement with General Arnold, in consultation with the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

The Minister of Aircraft Production supported the proposal, but asked that the strongest pressure should be brought on General Arnold to secure permission for the publication of a photograph of the original jet-propelled aeroplane. That would ensure that the credit for it was attributed to us while no information of value would be disclosed to the enemy. This was agreed.

It was suggested in discussion that an announcement of the kind envisaged was unlikely to dispose of criticism that the United States and the United Kingdom were behind Germany in the matter of jet-propelled aircraft, and that it would be well to bring out that such aircraft had been used by the R.A.F. against the flying bombs. On the other hand, it was pointed out that it would be undesirable to make exaggerated claims that might not admit of being substantiated.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff as set out in paragraph 8 of W.P. (44) 502.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 456) explaining that it was thought that about half of the released prisoners of war might desire to have some form of rehabilitation treatment, and that he had instructed his Department to plan courses varying from six weeks to three months. The courses would include lectures, films, discussions and an element of physical rehabilitation, and would be planned in consultation with the other Departments concerned.

After a short discussion the War Cabinet—

Took note with approval of these arrangements.

10. The War Cabinet had before them a note by the Minister of Reconstruction covering final proofs of parts I and II of the White Paper on Social Insurance (W.P. (44) 503).

The War Cabinet—

Approved these proofs and authorised the Minister of Reconstruction to settle the date of publication, after consultation with the Joint Parliamentary Secretaries to the Treasury.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
11th September, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 18th September, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.


The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., Minister of Education.

Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.

Vice-Admiral Sir E. Neville Syfret, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1–11).

Air Marshal Sir Douglas C. S. Evill, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1–11).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Muter.
Major-General E. I. C. Jacob.
Mr. L. F. Burgess.
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Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)122nd Conclusions, Minute 1.)


1. The Vice Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had dropped 9,400 tons of bombs by day and 6,100 by night. The targets by day had included six synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr, the rail centres of Osnabruck and Münster, suspected rocket supply dumps and the Tirpitz, which had been attacked (it was thought unsuccessfully) from Russian bases. In connection with the land battle attacks had also been made on Bonnogone and on airfields and defences in Holland.

United States heavy bombers had dropped 8,700 tons of bombs, mainly on oil targets in the Leipzig area.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force, whose losses amounted to 132 aircraft, had flown 11,600 sorties, mostly in tactical support of land operations. Fortresses had attacked Brest and Boulogne. 5,494 tons of supplies had been delivered by air.

In the airborne operation of the previous day 1,452 troop-carriers and tug aircraft had been employed.

Allied losses for the week included 22 British and 122 United States bombers.

Allied aircraft had flown 11,000 sorties. 3,100 tons of bombs had been dropped on industrial targets in Germany, Austria and Poland and on enemy communications, and 3,800 tons in support of the land battle.

Confirmed shipping losses from enemy action for the month of September to date amounted to 29,000 tons. On the night of the 10th/11th September an attack by “X” craft had successfully sunk the dock at Bergen.

On the previous Saturday a German ship—the Rostock—which claimed to be a hospital ship but was not so recognised by us, had been intercepted and brought into Plymouth. The German wounded had been disembarked and were being treated as prisoners of war.

Except for certain types of mines, Havre and Ostend were clear for navigation.

In operations north of Crete a small enemy convoy had been destroyed.

Operations during the previous week had been governed by the maintenance problem. In the Belfort area Allied forces from the South had joined up with forces from the West. Epinal and Luneville were in our possession, but Metz was still in the hands of the enemy. The First United States Army had penetrated Germany at a number of points between Trier and Aix. The most important thrust was just south of the latter town.

On the British sector Havre had been taken, with 10,000 prisoners, and Canadian forces were now attacking Boulogne, which was expected to fall at any moment. There had been considerable activity south of Eindhoven, where strong German counter-attacks had been repulsed with heavy casualties.

On the previous day airborne troops had landed in Holland.

The object of the operation was to capture the bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen, Grave and Heumen. It was as yet too early to get a clear view of the situation, but one report stated that the Guards Division had already made contact with the airborne troops at Eindhoven.

On the Adriatic sector some advance had been made and bridge-heads established over the Marano River. In the neighbourhood of Florence the Gothic line had been penetrated at two places. The Germans were showing no signs of withdrawal; and prisoners had stated that they had received orders to fight to the last.

In North Finland the Germans were disengaging and their force of some 9 Divisions, which was endeavouring to withdraw into Norway, was being followed up by the Russians. In Russia the Germans had reported Russian attacks between Valka and Riga.

North of Warsaw the Russians had captured Lomza. In Warsaw itself, where there had been fighting in the suburbs, the Russians had not yet succeeded in crossing the Vistula. Further south the Russians had reached the Czechoslovak frontier and controlled the greater part of Transylvania. Sofia had been occupied but no Russian advance had yet been made into Yugoslavia.
Broadly speaking, the enemy was withdrawing from certain islands but retaining troops in others. On the Greek mainland the greater part of the Peloponnesian had been evacuated, although the enemy were keeping a bridgehead at Corinth. It was estimated that there were some 7 German Divisions in Greece together with ancillary troops.

American forces had been landed successfully on Palau and Morotai.

The recent Japanese advances endangered the American airfields at Kweilin.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that during the week 26 long-range rockets had been launched. These had resulted in 20 incidents in this country—-14 in the London region, 4 in Essex and 2 in Sussex.

There had also been two phases of flying bomb activity. The first had been on Friday, when 13 flying bombs had operated, of which 6 had crossed the coast and 2 had reached London, 3 being destroyed by fighters. The second phase had been on Sunday evening, when 4 had operated, of which 3 had crossed the coast and 1 had reached London, 1 being destroyed by a fighter.

From the morning of the 12th up to the night of the 15th/16th September there had been repeated shelling of Dover, Folkestone, Deal and neighbouring districts. 143 shells had exploded on land.

The total number of civilian casualties sustained during the week were as follows:

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<th>Seriously Injured</th>
<th>Slightly Injured</th>
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<tr>
<td>Long-range rockets</td>
<td>56 148 220</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Flying Bombs</td>
<td>13 17 101</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-range shelling</td>
<td>22 57 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total number of Civilian casualties</td>
<td>91 222 385</td>
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The most important incidents from long-range rockets had been one on Southgate which had resulted in 17 persons being killed, one in Brockley and one which had damaged Chrysler’s Works at Richmond. The only serious incident from flying bombs had occurred at Barking, where extensive damage had been caused and the L.N.E.R. line temporarily blocked. There had also been considerable damage to property in Dover from shell fire.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security reminded the War Cabinet that a week ago it had been decided that for the present the ban on publicity about attacks by long-range rockets should be maintained. He thought that the general view of the public, as ascertained by the Ministry of Information, was now in favour of continuation of the ban.

In discussion it was urged that a statement that a small number of long-range rockets had landed in this country would not convey any useful information to the enemy, and that it was a serious matter for the Government to suppress the publication of news. The War Cabinet were also informed that in other parts of the country exaggerated rumours were current as to the damage done by the rockets.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that the enemy had not yet stated that rocket attacks had been made against this country, and that any statement published in this country would no doubt be used to bring to the German people the encouragement they so much required. Again, if an announcement was made at the present time, it would not be possible to inform the public that warning could be given of impending attacks. Finally, if a public statement could be delayed for a further week, the position might well be changed by developments in the military situation.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Decided that the question of a public announcement about long-range rocket attack should be deferred for consideration at the meeting of the War Cabinet to be held on Monday, the 25th September;

(2) Invited the Chiefs of Staff to submit an appreciation of the prospects of the continuance of this form of attack, for consideration at that meeting.

4. The War Cabinet decided that the attacks by long-range rockets did not justify any change in the arrangement, already approved, that, when Parliament reassembled, the House of Commons should meet in the House of Lords Chamber in the Palace of Westminster.

5. The War Cabinet decided that there was now no objection to publication of the hours of sitting of Parliament. In this connection the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as Leader of the House of Commons, undertook to bear in mind a suggestion that, so far as possible, the sittings of the House should not for the present be prolonged after dark.

6. The War Cabinet had a short discussion as to the business of the House, having regard to the desire for a debate on the war and international situation in the first week after the adjournment.

The War Cabinet agreed that, subject to the usual consultation, the main business of the House in the first week should be as follows:

**Tuesday, 25th September—**

Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Bill: Conclusion of Second Reading, and Committee Stage of the Money Resolution.

**Wednesday, 27th September—**

Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Bill: Committee and Remaining Stages.

Town and Country Planning (Money Resolution Committee Stage).

**Thursday, 28th September, and Friday, 29th September—**

Statement on the War and International Situation followed by a debate.

Note was taken of the importance of ensuring that the Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Bill was sent to the House of Lords as early as possible, bearing in mind that the House would also be called upon to deal with the Town and Country Planning Bill before the end of the session.
7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet a brief account of the main matters dealt with at the Quebec Conference.

At the conclusion of this account, the Deputy Prime Minister said that the outcome of this Conference was a matter of great satisfaction and the War Cabinet invited the Deputy Prime Minister to convey their warmest congratulations to the Prime Minister.

8. The Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the War Cabinet that it had been decided at the Quebec Conference to set up a Joint Anglo-American Committee to work out the principles agreed on by the Prime Minister and the President on the scale and scope of mutual lend-lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan.

The United States members of the Committee would be Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Leo Crowley. After consulting the Minister of Production, he had proposed that the United Kingdom members should be himself, normally represented by Lord Keynes, with Mr. Brand as his alternate, the Minister Resident for Supply (with Sir Henry Self as his alternate) and Sir Ronald Campbell.

Lord Keynes would be willing to serve, but could not reach the United States before the first meeting of the Joint Committee, which had been fixed for the 20th September. In these circumstances it was proposed that the meeting on the 20th September should be on an informal basis, at which we should be represented by the Paymaster-General, the Minister Resident for Supply, Sir Ronald Campbell and Mr. Robert Brand. Thereafter the Committee should adjourn to a date at which Lord Keynes could attend.

These proposals had been embodied in a telegram which the Prime Minister had directed should be considered by Lord Halifax and the Paymaster-General. Subject to this, he hoped that the War Cabinet would approve the proposed membership.

The following points arose in discussion:

(a) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asked whether a visit by Lord Keynes might give undesirable publicity in the United States to the establishment of the Committee.

It was suggested that, if any objection could be raised on these grounds, Lord Halifax would take the point.

(b) The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs pointed out that some difficulties might arise with Dominion Governments in that, although the text of the agreement between the Prime Minister and the President referred to “lend-lease aid between the United States and the British Empire,” they had not been consulted. He suggested that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should agree with him the terms of the telegrams which he proposed to send to the Dominion Governments informing them of the agreement.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to this suggestion, but explained the limited extent to which the Dominions which receive lend-lease are involved.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Expressed their agreement with the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to the United Kingdom membership of the Joint Committee.

(2) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to settle the terms in which the Dominion Governments should be informed of the agreement.
9. The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the Polish situation. The discussion and conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

10. The Secretary of State for War read to the War Cabinet a draft Press announcement about the Jewish Fighting Force which he had agreed with the Jewish Agency and which it was proposed to publish on the 20th September. A sentence in the original draft stating that all Jews, wherever they were resident, would be eligible to serve in the Force had been deleted. The statement would make it clear that the formation of the Jewish Fighting Force had been carried out at the instance of the Jewish Agency; that it was intended to despatch the Jewish Battalions of the Palestine Regiment, which would form the basis of the Infantry Brigade, to Italy at an early date; and to provide the necessary supporting and auxiliary troops to complete the Brigade Group as soon thereafter as practicable.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the issue of a Press announcement in the terms agreed with the Jewish Agency.

11. The War Cabinet had before them a Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Information (W.P. (44) 519) on the subject of the re-education of German prisoners of war.

It was proposed that the Political Warfare Executive, basing themselves on the experience gained in dealing with Italian prisoners in India and the United Kingdom, should undertake the task of re-educating the German prisoners of war who were now being retained in the United Kingdom, as well as the German prisoners now in the Middle East. If the Political Warfare Executive were to accept this responsibility, however, it was essential that the necessary facilities in the way of segregation of prisoners and the co-operation of the military authorities concerned should be secured.

The Secretary of State for War said that, although he was in full agreement with the policy proposed, he must warn the War Cabinet that, in view of large numbers of prisoners who now had to be dealt with, and the extent to which it had been necessary to send experienced staff abroad, the results achieved might be disappointing.

The Minister of Information pointed out that little or nothing had been done in the way of re-education among the German prisoners in Canada and the United States, although Canada was now taking some steps to improve conditions, and it was intended to inform the United States Government of our proposals in the hope that they might take similar steps.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he would like to consider, in consultation with the Political Warfare Executive, whether anything could be done to re-educate Germans detained in the Isle of Man.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the Political Warfare Executive should undertake the re-education of German prisoners of war and that all possible steps should be taken to facilitate their work.
(2) Took note that the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security would consult with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Information about the re-education of Germans detained in the Isle of Man.

12. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informed the War Cabinet that, without any prior consultation with His Majesty's Government, the United States Government had invited the Government of Eire to the Civil Aviation Conference which was to be held in the United States on the 1st November. It was proposed to hold inter-Imperial talks in Canada towards the end of October, in preparation for the Conference, and the question arose whether the Government of Eire should be invited to attend these talks. If the Government of Eire were not invited, they might be driven into the arms of the United States Government, and it had to be borne in mind that they held a key position in civil aviation. It could also be argued that the question of civil aviation was not directly connected with the war, and that sooner or later it would be necessary to bring the Government of Eire into Imperial consultations on post-war questions. For these reasons he felt that, despite the attitude which the Government of Eire had adopted during the war, it would, on balance, be desirable to invite them. If the War Cabinet agreed to this course, as a first step he proposed to consult the other Dominion Governments. This was all the more necessary seeing that the invitation would have to be issued by the Canadian Government.

The Secretary of State for Air supported the proposals to invite the Government of Eire to the preliminary talks. The support of the Eire Government would be valuable, both in connection with the reopening of air lines to the Continent and in connection with the general question of post-war air routes. In particular, it would be of great importance for our trans-Atlantic air routes to obtain the use of airfields in Eire. Another argument for the inclusion of the Eire Government was that before the outbreak of war proposals had been agreed between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Newfoundland and Eire for a trans-Atlantic service, and these proposals would inevitably come up for discussion at the preliminary talks.

The Lord Privy Seal also supported the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. It was, however, equally important that Newfoundland should be represented both in the preliminary talks and at the International Conference.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security suggested that, if the Government of Eire were represented, it would be desirable that some representation should be given to the Government of Northern Ireland, who were particularly interested in obtaining a share in any post-war civil aviation developments.

There was general agreement that, as Eire had been invited to the main Conference, nothing would be gained by excluding her from the preliminary talks. The United States Government ought not, however, to have invited the Eire Government to attend the International Conference without prior consultation with His Majesty's Government, and it was felt that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should take up with the State Department the whole question of representation at the Conference, including the omission of Argentina. With regard to Newfoundland and Northern Ireland, there might be difficulties about giving them independent representation, but the matter should be examined. Thus it might be possible to arrange for advisers from Newfoundland and Northern Ireland to be attached to the United Kingdom delegation.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to consult the Dominion Governments on the question whether the Government of Eire should be invited to the preliminary inter-Imperial talks. In doing so he should set out the arguments for and against this course as the matter presented itself to the War Cabinet.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Air to consult with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security as to the representation of Newfoundland and Northern Ireland at the preliminary talks and at the Conference.

(3) Agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should take up with the United States Government the general question of the issue of invitations to the International Conference.

Office of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
18th September, 1944.
124th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 124 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 19th September, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Secretary of State for Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. HUBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. LORD BEVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CRIPPES, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. BRENDA BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply (Items 1 and 2).
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Minister of Education.
The Rt. Hon. SIR WALTER WOMERSLEY, M.P., Minister of Pensions (Item 3).
Vice-Admiral Sir E. NEVILLE SYFRET, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1 and 2).
Air Marshal Sir DOUGLAS C. S. EVILL, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1 and 2).

The following were also present:

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIR.
Major-General E. I. C. JACOB.
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1. The War Cabinet had a short discussion as to the arrangements for publication of White Papers on these subjects, and reached the following conclusions:

   (1) A Press Conference would be held on Thursday, the 21st September, to explain the Reallocation Scheme and the scheme for improvements in service conditions. White Papers on both subjects would be released for publication in the morning papers of Friday, the 22nd September.

   (2) This arrangement rendered necessary some alteration in the dates of publication of Parts I and II of the White Paper outlining the Social Insurance Scheme. The Minister of Reconstruction would now hold the Press Conference for Part I on Monday, the 25th September, and it would be released for publication in the press on the morning of Tuesday, the 26th September. The release of Part II would be correspondingly delayed.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 517) setting out the effect on the man-power situation and on the production of munitions of the assumption that the war against Germany would not continue beyond the 31st December, 1944. The Memorandum suggested that the War Cabinet should decide, in the light of the information given, whether the Supply Departments should now take action in accordance with the new assumption by way of cancelling contracts or reducing previously proposed orders.

   The following points were made against the proposal that immediate action should be taken to the full extent indicated in W.P. (44) 517:

   (a) The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the Chiefs of Staff had been present when the War Cabinet reached this decision. Since that time the Vice-Chiefs had not been in touch on this matter with the Chiefs. The present moment was a particularly awkward one in which to make a forecast of the end of the war. He asked whether it would be possible for plans and preparations to give effect to the War Cabinet decision to continue, but for action to be suspended for two or three weeks, when the present operations would have developed further.

   (b) The First Lord of the Admiralty said that the Admiralty were not much affected by the assumption, but he noted that a recent telegram from the Supreme Commander hinted at the possibility of more prolonged operations.

   (c) The Secretary of State for Air said that he had not been present when the War Cabinet took their decision about the assumption as to when the war with Germany would end. He doubted the wisdom of making such large and irretrievable reductions at the present time. They would reduce the heavy bomber force by 12½ per cent. by the end of March and by 25 per cent. by the end of June 1945. They would also cause a loss of 800 fighters between the 1st January and the 30th June, 1945. If a decision could not be deferred he would like, as a measure of insurance, to see half of the proposed cut in Lancasters restored; the Halifax output continued in the bomber form, instead of being switched to the transport form (though conversion sets would be produced), and half the cut on fighters restored. If the war continued into 1946, there would be a great demand for bombing in order to bring about a speedy end, particularly as land operations would be largely held up by the winter.
weather. It would be rash to assume that the air fighting would be less intense, and casualties smaller, in view of the great efforts being made by the Germans to bring into service their improved fighters.

The Vice-Chief of the Air Staff said that the case for insurance on aircraft production rested on the probability of considerable heavy fighting in the air continuing throughout the winter. The German night fighter force, was still strong and efficient, and it was, therefore, important to keep up the strength of the bomber force. In fighters the need was for quality. We were committed to giving Russia 100 Spitfires a month under the Protocol.

(d) Commenting on (c) The Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff thought that it would be wrong to suggest that land operations would not continue into winter on account of the weather. The defeat of Germany would be brought about by the combined efforts of all three services, and he did not think that special demands would be made on the Royal Air Force to the exclusion of the army.

In favour of taking immediate action to the full extent indicated in W.P. (44) 517 the following points were made:

(e) The Secretary of State for War said that he was prepared to accept the consequences of the assumption that the war with Germany would end on the 31st December, though it might be necessary to make some adjustments in the ammunition group of munitions as time went on.

(f) The Minister of Supply and the Minister of Aircraft Production pointed out that any further delay in taking action would mean either the continuation of the production of munitions that would never be used, or considerable unemployment. A start on cutting down the initial processes of manufacture was long overdue if the 31st December assumption was likely to be verified.

(g) Sir Robert Sinclair said that the reduction of output to Stage II levels could only be carried out by instalments, and it would be most undesirable to delay the first instalment. The plans referred to in the Minister of Production’s Memorandum were made before the “Octagon” decisions had been taken, and the latter would still further reduce our munitions requirements for Stage II. Furthermore, the plans did not assume as great a degree of assistance from the United States as we now had the right to expect.

(h) It was pointed out that the insurance suggested by the Secretary of State for Air would have the effect of changing the assumption about the end of the war with Germany to the 1st April, 1945, instead of the 31st December, 1944. On this basis the Ministry of Aircraft Production would only be able to release an extra 40,000 men before the end of 1944 instead of 100,000, and 240,000 in the first quarter of 1945 instead of 300,000. The labour so retained would then have to be released over a short period in May and June.

(i) Reference was made to a telegram (Gunfire 198) from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Production in which he stated his opinion as follows:

“I am very doubtful myself whether the German war will end by the end of the year. It may straggle over in a reduced condition into 1945. Nevertheless, I approve the practical steps you propose to take subject to War Cabinet and Defence Committee agreement.”
It was pointed out that the Prime Minister's hypothesis did not mean that the war would continue for a number of months at full intensity, but rather that there would be a gradual reduction of the enemy's resistance, and thus of our expenditure in munitions. This hypothesis, which seemed most likely, would be adequately covered by the production of munitions under the plans proposed by the Minister of Production.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that on balance the need for making a start with reductions in the output of munitions was such as to make further delay undesirable. It was also felt that even if the war continued for a few months into 1945, the slight reductions in the power of our forces which might follow from the proposals in the Minister of Production's Memorandum would not have any material effect upon the outcome. The general situation in the air did not seem to warrant the provision of the insurance asked for by the Secretary of State for Air.

The War Cabinet—

Reaffirmed their previous decision that, for the purpose of estimating man-power requirements in the second half of 1944, it should now be assumed that the war with Germany would not continue beyond the 31st December, 1944, and agreed that this conclusion should now be translated into definite action as outlined in the Memorandum by the Minister of Production.
result of this would be to diminish the incentive to promotion. He would prefer a scheme under which the allowances set forth in paragraph 1 (b) ii would be 1s. 3d. for a leading seaman, 1s. 6d. for a petty officer and 1s. 9d. for a chief petty officer.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had understood that all three Service Departments were satisfied with the proposals. The scheme which he had outlined to the War Cabinet on the 5th September did not provide any greater measure of differentiation than the revised proposals. He would see whether any minor adjustments could be made to meet the Admiralty's point, but in its essentials the revised scheme, which had the full support of the other Service Departments, must stand.

This was agreed to.

(b) It was suggested that in presenting the proposals in the White Paper care should be taken to avoid any confusion between those increases which were, and those which were not, subject to income tax.

(c) The Minister of Education pointed out that there had not been time to consult the Government of India about the revised scheme and suggested that it should be left open to the Government of India to propose increases in the pay of senior officers paid under the Indian Pay Code if on examination it were found that, having regard to the increases which officers of corresponding rank paid at British rates would receive by way of Japanese Campaign Allowance, such increases were justified.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the disparity between the Indian and British rates was so great that it was most unlikely that any case could be made out for an increase. He would not oppose an examination of the matter, however, provided that His Majesty's Government were not committed to accept the Government of India's proposals.

(d) The Minister of Education asked that the announcement of the increases for personnel paid at British rates should make it clear that the Far Eastern Allowance was in substitution for the Field and Colonial Allowance. Otherwise there would be a demand for comparable increases from those paid under the Indian Pay Code, which already provided for an element comparable to Colonial Allowance.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the proposals in paragraphs 1 to 5 of W.P. (44) 527, subject to the points made in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) above.

Should the improvements be taken into account as regards family allowances, dependants' allowances and war service grants?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the Service Departments had all urged that these increases should not be taken into account for the purpose of family or dependants' allowances. He was prepared to acquiesce in this view. On the other hand, he was clearly of opinion that the increased emoluments should be taken into account for the purpose of war service grants. Any other course would lead to results which could not be justified. But there would no doubt be some agitation in favour of ignoring the increases now proposed in the calculation of war service grants.

The Minister of Pensions agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's view. But it must be recognised that a decision in
this sense would lead to appeals being made to Members of Parliament in individual cases. Any decision now reached to take into account the improved emoluments in assessing war service grants must be adhered to in the face of such agitation.

The Minister of Pensions said that he assumed that, as on previous occasions, 4/7ths of the increases would be taken into account in reassessing war service grants. He also added that the review of war service grants would have to be spread over a considerable period.

The War Cabinet—

(2) Decided that the increases now proposed should not be taken into account for the purpose of family and dependants' allowances, but should be taken into account for the purpose of war service grants; and that a statement to this effect should be included in the White Paper.

Date from which the improved emoluments should take effect.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that it had already been agreed that the introduction of the proposed improvements should not be deferred until after the armistice with Germany but should take effect from a current date.

The Minister of Labour and National Service urged that the new benefits should be introduced with effect from the 3rd September, 1944, and pointed out that there would be considerable advantage in making increases on account of long service payable as from the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the war.

On the other hand, it was represented that it would be administratively difficult to arrange for payment of the increased amounts to be made before the 1st November, 1944. It was also generally felt that to make special additions in respect of service in the Far East payable from the same date would not be readily acceptable to those who were now engaged in hard fighting in North-West Europe. On this ground there was a good deal to be said for making the special allowances for those who undertook service in the Far East take effect from the 1st November, 1944.

The War Cabinet decided—

(3) That the improvements in respect of long service should take effect from the 3rd September, 1944; but that the improvements in respect of service in the Far East should take effect from the 1st November, 1944.

Proposal to grant an additional period of paid leave to men held for service in the Far East.

Discussion followed on the proposal which had been put forward for consideration by the Prime Minister that, to meet the anxiety of men held for service in the Far East as to whether they would find employment on their ultimate return, an undertaking might be given that any man who failed to secure employment within his period of paid leave after demobilisation should continue to receive his service pay and allowances while unemployed, within a period of 12 months from his demobilisation.

The War Cabinet gave very careful consideration to this matter. It was generally agreed that it might well take longer to find employment for men on final demobilisation than for those demobilised at the end of the war with Germany. If this proved to be the case, there would be much to be said for some extension of the period of paid leave, to the extent and subject to such conditions as might be found to be necessary when the time came.

On the other hand, it was felt that to promise at this juncture a period of paid leave considerably in excess of the period of 56 days (plus the foreign service addition) already included in the demobilisation scheme, would have serious disadvantages. There was a risk that men who had a firm promise of a long period of paid leave might be disinclined to take jobs offered to them, more especially if the pay of the job was below that which they would receive during
paid leave. Further, to give an undertaking now of a year's paid leave might also have a bad effect on public opinion by making it appear that the conditions of service in the Far East must be very unpleasant if it were necessary to offer such great inducements. It was also pointed out that the period of 56 days which was included in the general scheme was already regarded in many quarters as a very generous provision. In the last war no such provision had been made.

The general conclusion of the War Cabinet on this point was as follows:—

(4) On balance it was undesirable at this stage to make any provision for a special increase in paid leave on demobilisation for those who had served in the Far East, beyond the provision already included in the general scheme. The matter was one for examination in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the end of the Japanese war.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
19th September, 1944.*
# War Cabinet 125 (44).

**CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Friday, 22nd September, 1944, at 11:30 a.m.**

**Present:**
- The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
- The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
- The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
- The Right Hon. Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor (Item 3).
- The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
- The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
- The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
- The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 1–3).
- Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 4 and 5).

**Secretariat.**
- Sir Edward Bridges.
- Mr. W. S. Murrie.

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1. The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that at the "Octagon" Conference it had been decided that for the purposes of planning production and the allocation of man-power, the date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany. This date would be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that Departments should act on this basis in their forward planning.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.

Man-Power.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 509) covering a draft White Paper on the reallocation of man-power between civilian employments during the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that if the War Cabinet approved the general lines of the draft, he proposed to discuss it with the Joint Consultative Committee and thereafter submit a final draft to the War Cabinet.*

Principles governing Reallocation.

(The following points were raised on this section:—

(a) A sentence might be included to the effect that steps were being taken to decide how much labour would be allocated to particular employments (e.g., production for export, building, &c.).

(b) It was suggested that it would be desirable to qualify the statement in paragraph 5, that persons in Class A would be allowed to exercise their reinstatement rights and go back to their former employment or restart their businesses. The point might perhaps be met by the insertion of some such words as "so far as this is physically possible and no conflict with the control is involved."

The Secretary of State for Air drew attention to the importance of not inserting any qualification, which might be regarded as a departure from what had been promised in the White Paper already published on the reallocation of man-power between the armed forces and civilian employment.

(c) It was suggested that the statement in paragraph 16 (1) about women preparing to join their husbands on release from the Forces might be open to too wide an interpretation.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that the object in view was to allow women, who had been transferred from their home areas, to return in time to make a home for their husbands before they were released from the Forces. He would, however, see whether closer definition was possible.

(d) The First Lord of the Admiralty and the Minister for Aircraft Production said that difficulties would arise if the statement in paragraph 17 (that persons who had worked away from home for three years or more, and wanted to obtain work nearer home, would be given first priority for release irrespective of the work on which they were engaged or whether they were redundant) meant that persons who had worked away from home three years or more would be entitled to release even though the factories in which they were engaged had no redundancy at all.

The Minister of Labour and National Service explained that the object of the statement in paragraph 17 was to ensure that, where a number of workers were redundant in a factory, the management would do their best to re-arrange the workers with a view to releasing those from other areas, instead of dismissing those workers whom it was most convenient to dispense with.

* Subsequently circulated as W.P. (44) 563.
The Minister of Labour and National Service confirmed that persons released from the Civil Defence Services would be liable for call-up for the Forces, if they were of the appropriate age. It seemed unlikely, however, that there would be many within the age limits.

The Minister of Education asked whether a substantial number of persons released could be allowed to undertake training as teachers. He proposed to discuss the detailed arrangements with the Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Minister of Labour and National Service explained that he was engaged in consultations with the University authorities about re-opening Arts Courses, and that he hoped it would be possible to arrange for the early release of Service personnel at present engaged on administrative work in the Services, because they had been wounded or had finished their operational duties. This matter was being looked into by the McCorquodale Committee.

The Secretary of State for Air drew attention to the need for retaining a fair proportion of personnel with educational qualifications in order to carry on the Services' schemes for demobilisation and training.

The Secretary of State for War pointed out that there was a risk of dissatisfaction if arrangements were made to include in Class B persons who were not required for reconstruction employment, but were being released in order to undertake further education and training.

It was suggested that it might be desirable not to give in paragraph 18 firm figures of the age limits for call up for the Forces.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he estimated that the call up of men aged 18 to 25 would probably cover all the needs, but that he had added two years as a margin of insurance. He saw some difficulty in going beyond 27 and was inclined to think that it would be preferable not to give definite figures in the White Paper.

He added that, in so far as these workers were needed for essential munitions production, they would be protected by deferment. A sentence making this clear would be added to the White Paper.

The Service Ministers pointed out that, since it was clear that women would be required in the Services after the war, the word "probably" should be deleted from the first sentence of paragraph 24.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that a large number of younger policemen had been released for service in the Forces and that it was understood that these men would return to the Police Service. Even after their return, however, the average age of policemen would be dangerously high and it would be necessary to obtain up to 15,000 young recruits in the first two years after the war.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he hoped that most of the new recruits required for the Police Force would be found from younger men released in Class A, rather than from men within the call-up age limits who had not already been in the Forces.

The Secretary of State for War suggested that in cases where it was desired to recruit for central or Local Government Services men due to be released from the Forces, it would be very desirable to provide full information about the openings available to the men before their discharge.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he would be glad to co-operate with the Service Ministers in making full information about entry into the Police Force available to men in the Forces.
(j) The Service Ministers stressed the extent to which the Service Departments depended on women for clerical labour and said that, if breakdowns in certain departments were to be avoided, it would be necessary to consider very carefully the arrangements for the release of women and for the substitution of other labour. Service Depots had hitherto had lower priority for the supply of labour than factories, but in the transitional period it would be essential that these Depots should be treated as having equal priority with factories.

Labour Controls in Stage II.

(Section III of W.P. (44) 509.)

(k) There was general agreement that simultaneously with the publication of this portion of the White Paper, the Government would require to make a statement on the retention of economic controls. These controls would be essential, both in order to secure the necessary production of munitions for the Japanese war, and also to ensure that labour and materials were devoted to those types of civilian production (e.g. for the export trade, and for rehousing) which were entitled to priority on reconstruction grounds. A report on the problem of the retention of economic controls in the transitional period had been prepared by an Official Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee. It was clear that while there could be a progressive relaxation of the controls during the transitional period, a large number of them would require to be retained in whole or in part throughout the whole period. There was, of course, the wider question of the retention of emergency powers in general after the end of the war with Germany. This question would inevitably be raised in Parliament and would give rise to a considerable amount of political argument. It was felt, however, that it could be distinguished from the narrower question of the retention of the necessary economic controls during the transitional period, provided that it was made clear that the Government's proposals were limited to that period.

The Minister of Labour and National Service suggested that the Minister of Reconstruction should consult with the Departments concerned and submit to the War Cabinet a draft paper about the economic controls which would have to be retained in the transitional period. This draft paper could then be considered by the War Cabinet, concurrently with a revised White Paper on the Re-allocation of Man-power with a view to simultaneous publication.

(l) The Minister of Education suggested that the form of presentation in Section III might be altered in order to indicate more clearly that there would be a considerable relaxation of the controls exercised over labour.

(m) The Minister of Education pointed out that paragraph 34 of the draft White Paper dealing with juveniles was in extremely general terms, and suggested that he might try to work out more detailed proposals with the Minister of Labour and National Service. The Minister of Labour and National Service explained that he had already undertaken discussions with the Ministry of Education and the Scottish Education Department with regard to the control of juvenile employment and that it was intended to discuss certain proposals with the local authorities very shortly. He was anxious to dissociate the control of juvenile labour from the war-time system of control, and to graft it on to the new educational system.

(n) The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs pointed out that in view of the possibility that the Japanese war might come to an end at an earlier date than was expected, it would be desirable to give consideration to the question of what controls would have to be retained in the period immediately after the end of the Japanese war.
The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he had already arranged for an investigation into the question of the control of labour after the end of the Japanese war, and proposed to consult the other Departments concerned on the matter very shortly.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the draft White Paper circulated with W.P. (44) 509 as a basis for discussion with the Joint Consultative Committee.

(2) Took note that the Minister of Labour and National Service would consider the point raised in discussion and would submit a revised draft after the discussions with the Joint Consultative Committee.

(3) Invited the Minister of Reconstruction, after consultation with the other Ministers concerned, to submit to the War Cabinet proposals in regard to the continuance of economic controls in the transitional period, in order that a Government announcement on this subject might be made simultaneously with the publication of the White Paper on the reallocation of man-power.

Detention of Members of the British Union.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 60th Conclusions, Minutes 1 and 2.)

3. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 505) regarding the detention of members of the British Union under Regulation 18B and the question whether any steps should be taken under Regulation 18AA with regard to property held by the Union. The discussion and conclusions reached are contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

4. The War Cabinet had a discussion about the proposed announcement to be made jointly by the Prime Minister and the President about Italy. On the previous day a telegram had been sent to our Ambassador at Washington suggesting a number of amendments in the draft announcement (see "Cordite" 393). In this telegram it had also been pointed out that it was desirable that the statement should be communicated to the other United Nations before it was made, as it represented important changes in policy. The War Cabinet were informed that the President now contemplated that the statement might be released on Sunday, the 24th September. A further telegram had accordingly been sent to our Ambassador at Washington, pointing out that in addition to the considerations already mentioned, public reactions were likely to be critical of a statement promising Italian administration an increasing measure of control immediately after the lack of control shown by the recent lynching incident. A telegram had also been received from the Prime Minister expressing the view that postponement for ten days or a fortnight would be desirable.

The War Cabinet were strongly of the opinion that the proposed announcement should be postponed. This would also enable certain aspects of the proposed announcement to be further considered.

The War Cabinet accordingly agreed that a telegram should be sent to the Prime Minister (and repeated to Washington) asking the Prime Minister to send a telegram himself to the President pressing strongly for the postponement of the proposed announcement.

Note.—After consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it was decided to vary this procedure and to send a telegram to Lord Halifax which would be repeated to the Prime Minister.
At their meeting on the 29th August the War Cabinet had agreed to accept a settlement of the liability for irrecoverable expenditure on relief during the military period on the basis of the following proportions:

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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
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This had been subject to our commitment in respect of our proportion of the irrecoverable deficit not exceeding £10 million, unless further authority was given by the War Cabinet at a later date.

This figure of £10 million had subsequently been raised to £12½ million.

The War Cabinet were now informed that a telegram had been received from the Minister of State dated the 19th September (No. 10 Relief) to the effect that the State Department were prepared to agree to our percentages, but wished the limit of irrecoverable expenditure to be shared in the proportions named to be raised from $200 million to $450 million. This would raise our liability from £12½ million to £28½ million.

In support of this view it was pointed out that expenditure in Italy to date amounted to $150 million, and must be regarded as irrecoverable. If $50 million were set aside for the Balkans before UNRRA operated there, this would only leave $200 million for further relief and rehabilitation in Italy and elsewhere during the military period. The Minister of State had expressed the view that if we were to secure acceptance of a percentage as favourable to us as 25 per cent., the negotiations should be completed at once. He had accordingly asked authority to agree to reach a settlement on the basis that the limit of irrecoverable expenditure to be divided between the three countries in the agreed proportions would be raised to $400 million or $450 million.

The Financial Secretary, Treasury, explained that the Chancellor thought that this was as favourable a settlement as we were likely to secure, and asked that authority should be given to the Minister of State to act accordingly.

In the course of the preliminary discussion the proposal was criticised on two grounds; first, that the additional expenditure would constitute a very heavy additional burden on the people in this country, in view of our financial position. Secondly, it was urged that it looked as though, under the scheme proposed, a very considerable proportion of the expenditure might be spent in Italy. The view was expressed that the Italian people were not in so great need of relief as the people in Balkan countries still to be liberated. It was important that we should do all we could to make sure that the countries who had fought on our side throughout the war received more favourable treatment than the Italians, who had fought against us. Consideration ought to be given to the question whether we could not impose some limit on our relief expenditure in Italy during the military period.

Discussion on these two points ensued. The War Cabinet felt, however, that before reaching a decision they would prefer to have before them a memorandum, setting out the considerations in favour of the course now proposed, and dealing with the points raised in discussion.
Monday, 25th September, 1944

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that what seemed to be a genuine peace-feeler had been received from Stockholm. An intermediary who had spoken to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs said that responsible circles in Japan considered it necessary to get peace as soon as possible in view of the imminent German collapse. We proposed to notify the United States Government and, subject to their views, to tell them that we were not prepared to give any reply to indirect approaches from the Japanese.

The Foreign Secretary said that the Japanese Government had also renewed their attempts to persuade Germany to make a separate peace with Russia. At a later stage in the meeting he informed the War Cabinet that the Russians had refused to receive a special mission from the Japanese, the despatch of which had been connected with this manoeuvre.

Hungary.

Continuing, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that a peace-feeler had been received from Hungary. A representative from Hungary (General Nadoy) together with a Lieut.-Colonel Howie of the South African Artillery, an escaped prisoner-of-war who had been living in Hungary for a year, had arrived in Italy. They had no written credentials, but there seemed no doubt that they had been authorised by the Regent in the Hungarian Government to ask for an armistice. Colonel Howie, however, had given a slightly different account of his last conversations with the Regent, the gist of which
was that the Hungarians understood that Russian occupation was inevitable, and would do all that they could to take action against the Germans if Allied troops would participate in the occupation of Hungary and the country was not left entirely to the Russians to control.

The United States and Russian Governments were being informed of this approach. It had been made clear by General Wilson that there could be no question of negotiation.

The War Cabinet -

Took note of these statements.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 25th September, 1944, at 12 noon.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

Colonel the Right Hon. Oliver Stanley, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 3–5).

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.


The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Thomas Johnston, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland (Items 1–4).


Lord Bruntisfield, Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty (Item 4).

The Right Hon. George Hicks, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Works (Items 2–4).

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Mr. W. S. Murrie.
### WAR CABINET 126 (44).

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Unemployment Insurance. 1. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 535) proposing legislation to increase the rates of unemployment benefit.

The Minister of Labour and National Service stressed the importance of ensuring that adequate provision was made for persons who found themselves unemployed during any dislocation due to the change-over of production from war to peace. It was proposed that the new rates, which were set forth in paragraph 2 of W.P. (44) 535, should come into force at the end of hostilities in Europe. The Government Actuary had agreed that, in view of the short-term nature of the proposals, it would be proper in the present circumstances to refrain from making any increase in the rate of contribution. It was proposed to make one further small modification in the rate for married women, the effect of which would be to entitle a married woman, who wholly or mainly maintained an infirm husband, to receive 22s. a week instead of 20s.

The Secretary of State for Scotland pointed out that the proposals would increase the disparity between rates of sickness benefit and of unemployment benefit. He hoped that the presentation of these proposals would be done in such a way as to allay any dissatisfaction at this disparity.

The War Cabinet

Authorised the Minister of Labour and National Service to introduce legislation increasing the rates of unemployment benefit on the lines proposed in W.P. (44) 535.

Housing. 2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 536) covering the report of the Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to make a plan for the production of prefabricated houses.

The Minister of Reconstruction explained that the note appended to paragraph 8 giving Lord Portal's estimate of the number of houses which the programme proposed would produce by the 31st December, 1946, did not form part of the Lord Privy Seal's report.

The Lord Privy Seal pointed out that the Committee had come to the conclusion that, provided that there was no delay in putting in hand the production of Portal steel houses, about 50,000 could be secured within two years of the launching of the programme. The Committee also recommended that orders should be given for the production of Uniseco houses (asbestos cement on a timber frame) and Arcon houses (asbestos cement on a light steel frame). The firms concerned estimated that about 100,000 of these houses could be produced within two years of the launching of the scheme. The Committee felt that in the absence of any method of checking the estimates they must be accepted. The Committee had also examined the Tarran house (concrete panels on a timber frame) and recommended that it should be rejected. The Committee stressed the importance of planning the production without delay, of securing an adequate flow of labour for the erection of the temporary houses on the site, and the utmost drive and resource in carrying out the programme. They regarded the programme as inadequate for the needs of the population and suggested that new projects for the provision of temporary accommodation should be undertaken at once.

The War Cabinet discussed first the size of the temporary house programmes.

It was urged, on the one hand, that the production of 150,000 temporary houses in two years was inadequate for our needs, and the question was raised whether more houses of the Portal, Uniseco and Arcon types could not be secured. The use of other firms to produce
houses of the Uniseco and Arcon types, the employment of the Tarran firm, subject to the making of satisfactory financial arrangements, and the possibilities of other types (e.g., the Braithwaite three-storey flat unit) should be explored.

On the other hand, stress was laid on the fact that the main public demand was for permanent houses. While there would be no objection to increasing the programme of temporary houses to, say, 250,000 in the first two years, there was a danger that any greater concentration on temporary houses would slow down the production of permanent houses, since both types would be competing for the same fitments and for labour for erection on the site. The Ministry of Works had carried out a promising experiment in the production of a permanent house at Northolt with a great saving in man-hours, and it was urged that it would be better to use labour and materials on this type than to concentrate too much on temporary houses.

Further points in discussion were:

(a) The Lord Privy Seal confirmed that urgent enquiries were being made into the possibility of designing a house of aluminium construction.

(b) The Tarran firm had built a house which had received the approval of the Burt Committee on house construction. A model of this house had been erected in an exhibition of temporary houses which was about to be opened at the Tate Gallery. In these circumstances it would be difficult to reject the Tarran house altogether, and it was suggested that the best course might be to state that the possibility of its production on a large scale was being investigated.

This was agreed to.

(c) The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Works, said that the production of temporary houses would be subject to strict costing arrangements in order to ensure that costs were kept down to a minimum.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the programme of Portal, Uniseco and Arcon houses proposed in the report circulated with W.P. (44) 536.

(2) Agreed that the possibility should be explored of supplementing the programme by the production of houses of the Tarran and other types, in so far as this could be done without substantially interfering with the programme of permanent houses.

(3) Agreed that an announcement based on (1) and (2) might be made during the resumed debate on the Second Reading of the Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Bill.

The War Cabinet next discussed the production of kitchen units and fitments for temporary and permanent houses.

The Lord Privy Seal explained that preparations had been made to order 175,000 kitchen units of the standard type required for temporary houses.

Fitments were, of course, required for permanent houses, and the question was raised whether provision for these houses should be made by ordering additional kitchen units together with other standard fitments.

The Minister of Health said that it would be impossible to use the standard temporary house kitchen unit in all the types of permanent houses which local authorities would desire to build. In the Housing Manual which had just been sent to local authorities, however, a substantial measure of standardisation of fitments had been recommended.
The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that every endeavour should be made to secure the maximum standardisation of fitments, and that, although the temporary house kitchen unit might not be suitable for all permanent houses, it should be used wherever possible. Even where it could not be used as a whole, the components might be used separately. Stress was also laid on the importance of placing bulk orders for housing fitments, including fitments for permanent houses, well in advance of the time when they would be required. The question was raised whether this would be feasible if local authorities were given any considerable measure of latitude in selecting the types of permanent house to be built in their areas.

The War Cabinet—
(4) Agreed that the necessary orders should be given as soon as possible for the production of kitchen units and other fitments for temporary houses;
(5) Invited the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland to examine as a matter of urgency and report to the War Cabinet on the possibility of standardising the fitments for permanent houses and of placing bulk orders for the necessary supplies.

The Minister of Reconstruction raised the question of the procedure for placing orders for the production of temporary houses and of housing fitments. Under the present arrangements too many Departments were concerned. He asked whether, now that the Ministry of Works had given their advice on the question of design, the Health Departments could not in future deal direct with the Ministry of Supply.

The War Cabinet—
(6) Agreed that this matter required examination, and invited the Minister of Reconstruction to submit his views on the matter to the Prime Minister.

The Secretary of State for Scotland stressed the importance of ensuring that the sites on which the temporary houses would be erected were serviced in good time. Delays had occurred in the servicing of sites, due partly to the difficulty of obtaining adequate technical staffs to supervise the work.

The Minister of Health said that he did not expect any difficulties over the servicing of sites in England and Wales.

The War Cabinet—
(7) Invited the Secretary of State for Scotland to discuss with the Minister of Labour and National Service the provision of additional technical staffs.

The Minister of Production drew attention to the statement in the Prime Minister's directive (W.P. (44) 188) that the emergency housing programme should be carried out by exceptional methods, on the lines of a military operation. In order to strengthen his own position and that of the Minister of Labour and National Service in face of competing demands for war production and for projects for the reconversion of industry, he asked that the War Cabinet should reaffirm this statement.

The War Cabinet—
(8) Reaffirmed this statement in the Prime Minister's directive of the 5th April, 1944.

The War Cabinet discussed the arrangements for the resumed debate on the Second Reading of the Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Bill.

The War Cabinet—
(9) Agreed that the Secretary of State for Scotland should open the debate and that the Minister of Production should wind up.
3. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Town and Country Planning about the finance of open spaces (W.P. (44) 531). This matter had been discussed by the Reconstruction Committee on the 30th August. It had then been agreed that, subject to consultation with the Departments primarily concerned and the concurrence of the War Cabinet, an assurance would be given in the House of Commons that Parliamentary authority would be sought to provide Exchequer assistance, where it was shown, that a local authority could not without financial hardship acquire land for open spaces up to an approved minimum standard owing to the cost of the land in relation to the resources of the financial authority.

The Minister’s memorandum set out the statement which it was proposed should be made.

The following points were made in discussion:

(a) The 3rd sentence of the statement read as follows: "The provision of adequate open space is, in their view, a local not a central function; the benefit accrues almost entirely to the local population and only very indirectly to the nation as a whole." Several Ministers felt that this sentence was open to challenge and it was agreed to omit it.

(b) The statement should refer to "... cases in built-up areas where it can be shown to the satisfaction of His Majesty’s Government that a local planning authority could not, without undue financial hardship, conform to the requisite standard ..."

(c) A sentence on the following lines should be inserted: "Grants from the Minister of Education will also be available under the provisions of Section 3 of the Physical Training and Recreation Act, 1937, as amended by Section 53 (4) of the Education Act, 1944."

The War Cabinet—

Approved the draft statement subject to these and minor drafting amendments.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a joint memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction and the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 532) suggesting measures to improve the serious housing position in London due to flying bomb attacks.

Restrictions on the taking of Service leave in London.

The Minister of Reconstruction proposed that London should be placed out of bounds for troops on leave, other than those whose homes were in the area.

The Secretary of State for War said that this was the rule for British troops, but that it was becoming increasingly difficult to enforce it as the danger from flying bombs and rockets decreased and in view of the fact that it did not apply to the United States and Dominions Forces.

The Secretary of State for Air said that Dominions Forces must be treated in the same way as United States Forces.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, said that the Admiralty were willing to accept the proposed restriction, provided an exemption were granted to personnel on 48 hours leave from Portsmouth and Chatham. It was pointed out, however, that such an exemption would detract greatly from the value of the proposed restriction.
The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that, in view of the serious housing position in London, the proposed restriction should be imposed but that in the first instance an attempt should be made to secure the agreement of the United States authorities to the placing of London out of bounds or to some limitation of the numbers of United States troops allowed to take leave in London.

The War Cabinet—
(1) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to approach the United States Ambassador on the lines indicated at "X" above.

Surrender of Requisitioned Property.
The Minister of Reconstruction proposed that the Service Departments should surrender any requisitioned property in the London area which was not in use and should consider sympathetically applications for property still in use.

The Secretary of State for War stressed the importance of having hostel accommodation in London in order to provide for troops now overseas who would be released from service or who would be given leave in the near future. Although these troops were so far as possible routed away from London, it was inevitable that considerable numbers should pass through London, and there would be serious criticism if accommodation for them was not available.

The Minister of Health asked whether further steps could not be taken to release small dwelling houses requisitioned in the London area by the Service Departments.

The War Cabinet—
(2) Invited the Service Ministers to make every effort to release requisitioned property in their possession in the London area.

Staffing of Hostels.
The Minister of Reconstruction said that it would be of great assistance if the Service Departments would make available women from the Women's Services to act as cooks and to undertake domestic duties in hostels for building operatives.

The Secretary of State for War and the Parliamentary Secretary, Admiralty, said that the War Office were already short of their requirements of women with the necessary qualifications. Moreover, if any staff were to be supplied, it would have to be on the understanding that the conditions of work were satisfactory.

The War Cabinet—
(3) Invited the Minister of Labour and National Service, in consultation with the Service Ministers, to consider what assistance in the staffing of hostels could be provided by the Service Departments.

Use of Italian Prisoners of War.
The Minister of Reconstruction proposed that the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Allocation of Prisoners of War should examine the possibility of releasing, for emergency housing work in London, Italian prisoners of war who had experience of erecting huts.

The Secretary of State for War said that, while he was not opposed to the suggestion, he was very anxious that the two Construction Companies which had been lent for work in London should be returned to the Army, since they were urgently required for operations abroad.

The War Cabinet—
(4) Agreed that the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Allocation of Prisoners of War should examine the
Closer Union between Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 90th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

Possibility of the release, for emergency housing work in London, of Italian prisoners of war now employed by the Service Departments.

Civil Building by Government Departments.

The Minister of Reconstruction pointed out that it had been agreed that, for a period of six months, no licences should be granted for building work in the London area, except war damage repairs and the remedying of urgent sanitary and structural defects.

He asked the War Cabinet to give a ruling that the same principle should apply to work carried out or sponsored by Government Departments, which was not subject to licensing.

The War Cabinet—
(5) Agreed to the proposal made by the Minister of Reconstruction.

Decorations and Minor Repairs in Government Departments.

The Minister of Reconstruction invited the War Cabinet to agree that all work on decoration and minor repairs in Government Departments should be virtually suspended during the next six months. The War Cabinet's ruling would be applied by the Ministry of Works.

The War Cabinet—
(6) Agreed to the course proposed by the Minister of Reconstruction.

Allocation of Houses.

The Secretary of State for War said that concern was being expressed among the Forces overseas about the allocation of houses, particularly in the London area. It was felt that persons now in this country would get priority and that no houses would be available for men when they were released from the Services. It was desirable that some reassurance should be given to the Forces.

The Minister of Reconstruction said that the British Legion had suggested that a statement should be issued to the effect that men who had been in the Forces would have first priority. It was, of course, impossible to give any promise of this kind.

The War Cabinet—
(7) Invited the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland to prepare a statement to meet the point raised by the Secretary of State for War.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a joint memorandum by the Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies (W.P. (44) 521). When this matter had last been considered by the War Cabinet they had decided that no announcement should be made about the setting up of a permanent Inter-Territorial Council, or about the related issue of amalgamation, until the results of Sir Godfrey Huggins's consultations with his colleagues, on his return to Southern Rhodesia, were known.

Attached to the joint memorandum was a letter from Sir Godfrey Huggins dated the 8th August, in which the idea of a standing Inter-Territorial Council was accepted, but somewhat grudgingly. It seemed as though pressure from Southern Rhodesia for amalgamation might be resumed again before long.

The Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies concluded that the best course would be that His Majesty's Government should make an announcement, as soon as possible after the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly met in October, on the lines of Appendix B to W.P. (44) 521. It was proposed to
communicate the draft to the Southern Rhodesia Government in advance. Their concurrence would not be expressly asked for, but any comments which they made would, of course, be considered.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course of action proposed in W.P. (44) 521.

6. The Deputy Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that, at the meeting of the Lord President's Committee on the 22nd September, approval had been given in principle to the establishment of a College of Aeronautics on the lines proposed by an inter-Departmental committee. Subject to any alterations necessary on security grounds the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee would be published, and it was intended that an early start should be made with a scheme for a temporary college at Abingdon. The Deputy Prime Minister thought that the War Cabinet should be aware of this development.

The Secretary of State for Air said that he regretted that the Abingdon airfield would not be available; but the scheme could be initiated on the Aldermaston airfield, which the Inter-Departmental Committee had envisaged as suitable for the location of the permanent College.

Several Ministers expressed regret that an alteration should be found necessary in the scheme which had been submitted to, and approved by, the Lord President's Committee only three days earlier.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the statement by the Deputy Prime Minister.
(2) Invited the Minister of Aircraft Production to arrange for examination at an early date of the point raised by the Secretary of State for Air, as to the availability of the Abingdon airfield for the proposed College.

7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that several further telegrams had been exchanged since this matter was considered by the War Cabinet on Friday. The President had been very anxious that the joint statement should be released for publication in the papers that morning, the 25th September, but had now agreed to postpone publication until the morning papers of Wednesday, the 27th September.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thought that this course should be accepted. He added that the amendments which we had put forward in Cordite 393 had all been accepted. He also proposed to ask the President to make a further minor amendment in the text of the paragraph about the provision by U.N.R.R.A. of medical aid and other supplies for Italy.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

8. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the War Cabinet would be aware that some difficulty had arisen as to the grant of facilities for non-official civilians to visit France. It had been alleged in some quarters that more favour had been shown to United States than to British civilians.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that a temporary arrangement had now been made whereby S.H.A.E.F. undertook to grant facilities for such visits to non-official civilians whose names...
were communicated to them by the War Cabinet Offices as having been vouched for by the appropriate authority. The War Cabinet Offices in this matter would act on behalf of the War Cabinet and on the recommendation of the Foreign Office.

The War Cabinet—
Took note with approval of this arrangement.

9. The Minister of Production said that Mr. Stokes, M.P., had put down a question to the President of the Board of Trade for answer on the following day, referring to an American decision to switch over 40 per cent. of total production to peace purposes on the conclusion of hostilities with Germany; and enquiring what corresponding action we proposed to take. He (the Minister of Production) had already prepared, for consideration by the War Cabinet, a statement on this subject which he suggested should be made in Parliament in the following week. He hoped that although this draft statement had not yet been circulated, the War Cabinet would agree that the President of the Board of Trade could answer Mr. Stokes's question on the following day by saying that the Minister of Production hoped to make a statement in Parliament at an early date.

The War Cabinet—
Approved this suggestion.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
25th September, 1944.
WAR CABINET 127 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, 25th September, 1944, at 5-30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. STAFFORD Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. JAMES STUART, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 11).
Mr. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Item 3).
Mr. P. J. NOEL BAKER, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of War Transport (Items 9–11).
Vice-Admiral Sir E. NEVILLE SYFRET, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1–6).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Major-General E. I. C. JACOB.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1–6).
## WAR CABINET 127 (44).

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The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had made 2,900 sorties and dropped 9,360 tons of bombs, 6,000 of them on Germany. It was now believed that in the attack on the Tirpitz on the 15th September a hit had been obtained in the fore part of the ship with a 12,000-lb. bomb.

United States heavy bombers had flown 2,800 sorties, dropping 4,470 tons of bombs. 650 sorties had been flown carrying supplies to the Army in France and Holland. 110 aircraft had taken supplies to Warsaw, two of which had been lost. In all, 40 British and 36 United States bombers had been lost during the week.

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force, whose losses amounted to 91 aircraft, had flown 7,460 sorties. 5,173 sorties had been flown in the Airborne Operations and their subsequent support, 3,139 being by powered aircraft and 2,034 by gliders. Losses in powered aircraft had been 146. The total lift had been some 22,000 men and 2,600 tons of stores and equipment. The weather had been unfavourable, but on the whole the air part of the operation had been successful.

Coastal Command had sunk 2 submarines and possibly damaged 3 others.

10,900 sorties had been flown and 8,700 tons of bombs dropped. Forty-eight enemy aircraft had been destroyed as against 57 Allied.

Attacks had been made against shipping in the Formosa area. It was claimed that 1 transport, 7 freighters and a tanker had been sunk and 197 small vessels damaged.

There had been no shipping losses from enemy action during the previous week.

On the night of the 18th September H.M.S. Stayner had sunk 3 E-boats north of the Straits of Dover, taking 67 prisoners. Havre had been cleared of mines. At Ostend a small number of ships could now berthed.

A U-boat had been destroyed near Crete. It was thought that there were only 2 U-boats left in the Mediterranean.

A convoy of 33 ships had arrived in Russian ports without loss.

The main operations during the previous week had been the thrust to link up with the airborne troops dropped on the 17th September. This had been achieved so far as concerned the two United States Airborne Divisions. But one brigade of the British Airborne Division dropped at Arnhem had been definitely lost. Some contact had been made with the other brigade of the Division and further efforts to this end were in progress. Further to the south the Germans had twice pushed into the corridor, interfering with our communications, but the position had been re-established.

The Canadians had now reached the banks of the Scheldt at Antwerp. Contrary to reports, Belfort still remained in German hands. Generally speaking, enemy resistance was stiffening, but the main Allied difficulty was still the supply situation.

In the Adriatic sector considerable progress had been made and our troops had captured Rimini and were now moving into open country. In the centre the American forces had cleared the main crest of the Apennines and were approaching the Bologna-Rimini road.

Progress had been made in the north and Tallinn had been cleared. Minor progress had been made on the Hungarian-Czecho-Slovakian frontier. The Russians had also made a pronounced thrust to the west in the neighbourhood of Arad.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.

Production.
2. In connection with the preceding item, the question was raised whether an endeavour ought not to be made to ensure that ships returning from Russian ports carried cargoes of timber. This might mean some delay in the turn-round of ships, but, having
regard to our urgent need to build up stocks of timber, this might well have to be faced.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Minister of Production, in consultation with the Minister of War Transport, to enquire into this matter.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the terms for the Bulgarian Armistice were being settled by the European Advisory Council. The Russians and the United States had agreed that the Bulgarians should be told that before discussions could be concluded they must withdraw their troops from Greece and Yugoslavia. It had also been agreed that the terms of the armistice should be presented at Ankara.

The question whether a representative of General Wilson should sign the armistice, as well as a Russian General, had not yet been settled.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave details of an interview which the British and American Ambassadors had had with Marshal Stalin, at which the decisions of the Quebec Conference had been communicated to the Marshal. Marshal Stalin had made certain observations regarding the situation at Warsaw. His attitude towards the Poles now seemed more favourable, but the population of Warsaw was in sore straits and very short of food.

The War Cabinet—
Requested the Chiefs of Staff to suggest to the United States Air Command that they should consider undertaking a further flight to Warsaw, dropping mainly food supplies.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had seen M. Raczkiewicz, the Polish President, who was still considering the unanimous decision of the Polish Cabinet that General Sosnkowski should be removed from his post. It remained uncertain whether the Polish President would comply with this request. But M. Mikolajczyk, who had stated he would resign if the President did not accept his Cabinet's recommendation, had agreed to hold his hand for the moment. General Anders had stated that General Sosnkowski's retention, or otherwise, was a matter of indifference to the Polish Army.

4. The War Cabinet was informed that two rockets had been launched (on the 18th September), of which one had fallen in the London area. Since then none had fallen in this country.

During the week 83 flying bombs had been launched from aircraft, of which 11 had reached the London area. Two enemy aircraft launching flying bombs had been destroyed the previous night.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Report by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 534) on the future scale of attack by flying bombs and rockets. The Chiefs of Staff stated in their Report that the attack by flying bombs might persist for some considerable time on an average of about 20 launchings a night, of which 4 might reach the London defence region. There had been no rocket firings for a week, but the possibility of attack could not be entirely ruled out until the whole of Holland West of the line running North and South through Eindhoven had been overrun. The Chiefs of Staff recommended that there should be no public statement on the rocket firings, and suggested that the matter might be reviewed in a week's time.
The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that, while he had no strong views on the matter, he thought that on the whole it might be best to make a statement in Parliament. It was nearly three weeks since the attacks started, though there had been a lull for a week. Parliament was about to meet, and it was probable that the Germans must by now have received some information about the fall of the rockets. If the War Cabinet wished a statement to be made, it could be done as a special statement at the end of Questions, or else the Prime Minister might deal with the matter in his forthcoming speech. He thought it would be quite easy to restrain the Press from giving details which might be of assistance to the enemy.

The Minister of Aircraft Production thought that, as the Germans had said nothing about the attacks, it would be far better for us also to remain silent. There was no particular demand for publicity, and we ought to avoid anything which might give the Germans encouragement.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Information, confirmed that there was no particular demand for publicity. He said that, if it were decided to make an announcement, there should be no difficulty in restraining the Press.

The view of the War Cabinet was that it would be best to leave well alone and say nothing—at any rate until we could definitely say that no further threat existed.

It was pointed out that statements might soon be published in the American Press, as people crossing the Atlantic would tell the story; but it was thought that, if approached, the American authorities would co-operate to maintain secrecy.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note of the estimate of the future scale of attack made by the Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Agreed that no public statement about the rocket attacks should be made for the time being, and that it should be suggested to the Prime Minister that, if he wished to refer in his forthcoming speech to the attacks on London, he should confine himself to a statement indicating the scale of attack now being experienced from both rocket and flying bomb, without making specific reference to the rocket.

(3) Invited the Chiefs of Staff to approach the American Chiefs of Staff with the suggestion that they should take steps to restrain publicity in America.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 514), to which was annexed a copy of a letter from Admiral Mountbatten regarding operations which he desired S.O.E. to conduct in Siam.

It was explained that up to the present it had not been possible to conduct successful operations in Siam, but that S.O.E. now had reason to expect assistance from the Regent and the new Prime Minister. Although there was a risk that contacts between S.O.E. and the Regent and Government of Siam might be misconstrued as committing His Majesty's Government in some way to them, it was felt that in view of the military advantages there would be no objection to the proposal provided that it was made clear in any dealings with the Siamese that our only interest was the defeat of Japan and the expulsion of the Japanese from Siamese territory, and that no political commitment was involved as regards the ultimate régime and organisation of Siam.

The Minister of Economic Warfare strongly supported the proposal made in W.P. (44) 514, and confirmed that complete liaison had been established with the United States Forces on this matter.
The Secretary of State for India supported the proposal, and paid tribute to the efficiency of the organisation which S.O.E. had built up for operations in the Balkans.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal that S.O.E. should undertake operations in Siam on the lines proposed in W.P. (44) 514.

Enemy Assets and Looted Property.

7. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 533), to which was appended a resolution passed by the Bretton Woods Conference on the subject of the transfer and concealment of enemy assets, and especially of looted property, in neutral countries.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposal made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in W.P. (44) 533, and agreed that the Foreign Office should arrange for action to be taken accordingly.

Finance of Relief in the Military Period.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 125t; Conclusions, Minute 5.)

8. At their meeting on the 22nd September the War Cabinet had agreed that, before reaching a decision on the proposals in the telegram dated the 19th September from the Minister of State (No. 10 Relief), they should have before them a memorandum setting out the considerations in favour of these proposals and dealing with the points which had been raised in discussion.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 543).

The Memorandum explained that there appeared no escape from our sharing in the expenditure on relief in the military period and that, in so far as the total expenditure depended on the course of military operations, and on the extent to which it was possible to recover the costs from the countries in which the military operations were carried out, it was not possible to put any definite limit on the total commitment. While it was unfortunate that so much expenditure had had to be incurred in Italy, from which we could not at present recover the costs, this was an inevitable result of the course which military operations had taken.

With regard to the scale on which supplies were made available in the military period, we might well argue that if for humanitarian, political or other reasons, the United States desired to raise the scale above the standard necessary for the prevention of disease and unrest, they should pay the additional cost. The main question, however, was whether we should accept a commitment to meet 25 per cent. of the cost of relief in the military period with the stipulation that the situation should be reviewed should the total cost reach $450 million. This would mean the definite acceptance of a liability of up to roughly £28½ million.

It would be impracticable to earmark any part of our contribution for use in Greece or Yugoslavia, since expenditure had to be incurred wherever operations took place, and the course of operations might well lead to greater expenditure being incurred in Italy than in Greece or Yugoslavia. On the other hand, every effort would be made to ensure that U.N.R.R.A. would operate in Greece and Yugoslavia as soon as possible after our Forces had entered them.

The Memorandum accordingly suggested that in all the circumstances the Minister of State should be authorised to conclude the negotiations on the terms which he suggested.

Against the settlement proposed, it was recalled that when the question of the procurement of supplies for relief in the liberated areas had been raised earlier in the year, the very modest standard of relief proposed had been criticised on the ground that it might affect adversely the standards of consumption in this country...
(W.M. (44) 30th Conclusions, Minute 2). If it was now proposed that we should share the cost of a more lavish standard of relief for a former enemy the Government would have great difficulty in defending the position, particularly if the scale of relief granted in Italy were to lead to some curtailment of the scale given in Greece and Yugoslavia. There was little evidence that the Italians were really trying to help themselves, and there was a danger of pauperising them. $150 million had already been spent in Italy and it was idle to suppose that as we gained control of the North the total expenditure would not soon exceed the total of $450 million.

On the other hand, it was argued that the settlement now proposed represented a great improvement on the original proposal, and that, so far as concerned relief in the military period on a scale sufficient to prevent disease and unrest, our obligation was inescapable. In further discussion, the question was raised whether we could not limit to some extent our commitments by suggesting that the figure at which the situation would have to be reviewed afresh should be $400 million instead of $450 million and by stipulating that our acceptance of a liability for 25 per cent. of the total expenditure was on the clear understanding that nothing beyond expenditure on supplies necessary in the interest of military operations for the prevention of disease and unrest should be brought into account. The effect of this would be to require the United States Government to pay the whole cost of any supplies on a higher scale which they might choose to provide for political reasons. While it was not certain that we could stand out for this principle consistently with the general policy towards Italy, an attempt to secure acceptance of it was worth making.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he would favour this course.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Minister of State should be instructed to continue negotiations on the basis—

(a) that the United Kingdom contribution should be limited to 25 per cent.;
(b) that there should be a review of the whole situation when the total irrecoverable expenditure reached $400 million; and
(c) that our acceptance of a liability for 25 per cent. of the total expenditure was on the clear understanding that nothing should be brought into account beyond expenditure on supplies necessary in the interest of military operations for the prevention of disease and unrest.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 507) proposing that a Ministerial Committee should be set up to formulate our policy in regard to the issues involved.

The War Cabinet—

Approved this proposal, and invited the Prime Minister to settle the composition of the Committee.

The War Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Secretary of State for Air (W.P. (44) 530) and by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 540) about the forthcoming International Conference on Civil Air Transport, due to begin in Washington on the 1st November.

The first question discussed was our attitude to the American invitation to the Conference.

The Secretary of State for Air reminded the War Cabinet that at the Anglo-American discussions in London in April last it had
been agreed that we should go forward to a full International Conference as soon as possible. We had made it clear that this would be on the basis of the recommendations of the Balfour Sub-Committee formulated at the time of the Commonwealth discussions. This had been accepted by Mr. Berle.

At a later date Mr. Berle had apparently abandoned any idea of an International Conference, and proposed that we and the United States, so far as possible on a non-exclusive basis, should move out on the civil air routes of the world. We had made it clear that we could not acquiesce in this position and had offered to call an International Conference ourselves in London. In the result, the United States had changed their attitude and had issued invitations to a full International Conference without further reference to us. In the circumstances, he (the Secretary of State for Air) thought that it would be extremely difficult for us now to say that we were not prepared to attend the proposed conference.

The Americans had not issued a formal agenda for the conference, but had issued a full statement which included a list of objectives. From this it was clear that they hoped that by dealing, in the first instance, with interim operating rights they would avoid discussion of the proposal put forward by the United Kingdom and endorsed by the Commonwealth countries for the establishment of an international authority with executive powers. In the Secretary of State for Air’s view, we must make it clear that we had not changed our views and intended to press for the discussion of this project at the conference.

Closely connected with this was a second question, namely, the proposals for a further Commonwealth discussion on civil aviation before the proposed International Conference.

The War Cabinet were informed that, in the first instance, it had been proposed that this should take place in London. It had become clear, however, that Canada would not attend a conference in London, the ground put forward being that their officers would not have time to go to London before the proposed International Conference. New Zealand had then proposed that the conference should take place in Ottawa. A week ago we had telegraphed to Canada supporting that suggestion. Canada had not yet replied, but it was thought that South Africa would be willing to send representatives to Ottawa.

The latest development was that a telegram had been received from Australia pressing for a conference at Canberra before any international conference took place.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs said that, much as he liked the Australian line of approach, he felt in the circumstances it was impracticable to fix up a conference in Canberra in the time available. He thought that Canada would not go to Canberra and that the best prospect would be to concentrate on bringing about a conference at Ottawa ten days or a fortnight before the International Conference on the 1st November.

The Lord Privy Seal explained the reasons why he thought that we should endorse Australia’s proposal for a Commonwealth meeting at Canberra and should ask the United States to postpone the international conference. In his view there was not sufficient time to work out a scheme for Empire air routes between now and the 1st November, and Ottawa was not the most favourable place in which to make the attempt. It was of the utmost importance that we should not go to the conference until an Empire policy had been worked out.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that we could hardly take the line that we would not now accept the invitation to the international conference in the United States. At the same time, there could be no question of agreeing to attend the conference if there was to be no discussion of the scheme which we favoured for an international authority with effective powers to regulate both the technical and economic aspects of post-war international air transport. We should therefore accept the invitation to attend the
conference, but should make it clear that it was our intention—as it had always been—to raise the question of the orderly development of post-war civil air transport under the control of an international authority with executive powers.

Discussion then turned on the arrangements for a Commonwealth meeting prior to the international conference. The general view of the War Cabinet was that we should concentrate on bringing about the proposed conference at Ottawa, and making it fully effective, and that if necessary we should bring strong pressure to bear on the Canadian Government to agree to this course.

The War Cabinet’s conclusions were as follows:

1. The United States invitation to the proposed international conference on civil air transport in Washington in November should be accepted on the understanding referred to at “X” above, and subject also to (b) of the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air (W.P. (44) 530).

2. Every endeavour should be made to secure an effective Commonwealth conference in October in Canada, with strong delegations from this country and the Dominions.

3. A decision was deferred on the question whether a White Paper should be presented to Parliament in the near future, outlining the policy which we advocated for the future development of air transport until a draft White Paper had been prepared by the Secretary of State for Air and considered by the War Cabinet.

4. In reply to a Question by Mr. Ronald Tree, M.P., on the following day, the Secretary of State for Air should state that he was not at present in a position to give answers to the points raised.

11. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 525) on the prolongation of Parliament.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security explained that the Prolongation of Parliament Act, 1943, expired on the 25th November, and that legislation to prolong Parliament for a further period must be passed before that date. Although it would no doubt be argued that at the present stage of the war a prolongation for six months would be sufficient, his view was that the right course was to prolong Parliament for a further year. This, of course, would not preclude a dissolution at any time. It would also be desirable to empower the House of Commons of Northern Ireland to prolong its life, if it chose to do so. This would be justified on the ground that Northern Ireland was equally involved in the war.

The War Cabinet—

Authorised the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to proceed with legislation prolonging Parliament for a further year from the 25th November, and empowering the House of Commons of Northern Ireland to prolong its life for a corresponding period.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
25th September, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 27th September, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. H. U. Willink, K.C., M.P., Minister of Health (Item 1).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Item 1).
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Item 1).

Secretary:
Sir Edward Bridges.
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.

[28376—1]
## WAR CABINET 128 (44).

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1. The War Cabinet were informed that a telegram had been received from the Swiss Government to the effect that food for the civilian population of the Channel Islands was exhausted, and that the German Government were prepared to allow the immediate removal of the civilian population (other than men capable of bearing arms) or to permit importation of food by means of Red Cross ships.

The Chiefs of Staff considered that as under present conditions the Islands had no military importance and British subjects were involved, no objection need be raised to acceptance of the German offer. They preferred the proposal that food should be imported by Red Cross ships to the evacuation of the civilian population.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security concurred in preferring this alternative.

The War Cabinet were also informed that the alternative of evacuation would involve employing for three weeks two ships specially built for the Channel Islands service, which were now being used in the build-up of our forces on the Continent. Furthermore, the evacuation of the population would give rise to difficulties, owing to the shortage of housing accommodation in this country.

It was argued that if we were to send food to the civilian population this would enable the German garrison to hold out longer, since they would almost certainly requisition for their own use some at any rate of the food grown by the Islanders. Moreover, it was politically undesirable to allow this large German garrison to hold out indefinitely.

On the other hand, it was felt that if we were to send in food, we could stipulate that this would be subject to agents of the Red Cross being allowed to go to the Islands with the food supplies and make sure that it was only distributed to the civilian population.

The Prime Minister said that an occupying Power was responsible for the civilian population, and if they were unable to maintain them it was their duty to surrender. We should, therefore, reply that so long as the German garrison remained in occupation we held them responsible for feeding the civilian population, and that if they were unable to fulfil this duty we called upon them to surrender forthwith.

After further discussion the War Cabinet agreed as follows:

(1) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to send a reply to the Swiss Government on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister at "X." Consideration would be given by the Air Staff in consultation with the Foreign Office to the possibility of dropping a message by air, over the Channel Islands, indicating the terms of the reply which was being sent to the Swiss Government.

(2) In the event of our failing to secure a settlement of the matter on these lines, and of the civilian population being in immediate danger of starvation, we should then take the line that we were willing to agree to food supplies being sent to the civil population of the Islands, provided that agents of the Red Cross accompanied the supplies and remained in the Islands in order to ensure that they were only used to feed the civil population.
2. The War Cabinet gave further consideration to the proposed legislation to prolong Parliament for a year from the 25th November, 1944.

The view was expressed that, at the present stage of the war, prolongation for as long as a year might be the subject of considerable criticism and that it might, therefore, be advisable to limit the period of prolongation to six months.

On the other hand, to prolong the life of Parliament for only six months would tie the Prime Minister's hands unduly and tend to arouse party feeling by raising the expectation that a General Election was likely to take place in the first half of 1945. While there would no doubt be some criticism in the House, the balance of advantage appeared to lie in favour of prolongation for a year.

In the course of discussion The Minister of Labour and National Service explained that, in accordance with the line which he had adopted in other cases of applications for release from the Services, he had informed the political parties that any requests for the release of political agents should be postponed until the end of September.

The War Cabinet—

Confirmed the decision reached at their meeting on Monday, the 25th September, that legislation should be introduced prolonging the life of Parliament for a year from the 25th November, 1944.

3. The War Cabinet examined the question of legislation to increase the rates of unemployment benefit, and confirmed the decision reached at their previous meeting in favour of the introduction of legislation, increasing the rates of unemployment benefit.

4. The War Cabinet discussed further the suggestion, which they had considered at their meeting on the 19th September, that an additional period of paid leave should be granted to men held for service in the Far East.

Reference was made to the importance of convincing those who were taking part in operations in the Far East of the Government's intention to do everything possible to compensate them for any disadvantage which they might suffer through being retained in the Services for an additional period. An additional period of paid leave would be an earnest of the Government's intention to see that the men who served in the Far East secured employment on their return, notwithstanding that those released at the end of the German war stood the best chance of getting good jobs.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he hoped that no decision would be taken on this proposal until the War Cabinet had had an opportunity of considering a note which he proposed to circulate, setting out the very comprehensive provision which was being made for the resettlement of men released from the Services.

The War Cabinet—

Took note that the Minister of Labour and National Service would circulate a memorandum setting out comprehensively the provision made by the various schemes for the resettlement of men released from the Forces, and agreed to resume the discussion when this memorandum was available.
5. *The Prime Minister* gave his colleagues a brief account of certain of the outstanding points dealt with at the Quebec Conference.

6. At their previous meeting, the War Cabinet had agreed that the Minister of State should be instructed to continue negotiations on three conditions. The last of these had been that our acceptance of a liability for 25 per cent. of the total expenditure was on the clear understanding that nothing should be brought into account beyond expenditure on supplies necessary in the interest of military operations for the prevention of disease and unrest.

A telegram had now been received from the Minister of State (No. 57 Relief) to the effect that adherence to the "disease and unrest" standard would leave uncovered some part of the programme of increased economic assistance to which the President and the Prime Minister had agreed. He therefore proposed that, in lieu of the condition referred to above, there should be substituted an understanding that the revised formula should be applied to all supplies for Italy within programmes agreed from time to time between the United Kingdom and the United States Government, but that we should not be committed to bear any part of the cost of supplies to Italy outside the scope of agreed programmes.

The War Cabinet—

Approved this suggestion, and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to arrange for revised instructions in this sense to be sent to the Minister of State.

7. The War Cabinet discussed whether any further action could be taken to ensure that full advantage was taken of the recent relaxation of lighting restrictions.

It was explained that in the provinces, apart from those coastal areas where the fear of raids persisted, full advantage was being taken of the relaxation, but that in London there had been little change. So far as domestic lighting was concerned this was due partly to the fear of raids by piloted aircraft, partly to the requirement of full blackout on the alert, and partly to the difficulty of obtaining alternative curtain material. With regard to street lighting, representatives of the local authorities in the County of London had made it clear that they did not think it was worth while adapting street lighting systems to comply with the modified standard now permitted, in view of the possibility that in a short time a complete relaxation of restrictions would be possible.

All evidence went to show that in London public opinion would not favour any further relaxation of the restrictions at present.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1,*

*27th September, 1944.*
The Prime Minister said that he feared that there might be some criticism of the proposal to prolong the life of Parliament for as much as a year at the present stage of the war. It was important that the Government should not give the impression that they were clinging to office. There would no doubt be critics of the Government who would point out that the present Parliament had been elected nine years ago and that of the present population no one under the age of 31 had had an opportunity of voting. In view of this would it not be better to make the period of prolongation six months and to seek a further prolongation next spring, if, as might well be the case, hostilities with Germany had not come to an end in 1944?

On the general question of the continuance of the present Government, his own view was that it would be in the best interests of the country that the present Government should remain in office until the end of the Japanese War, although he doubted whether in the event this would be possible. He was clear, however, that when the time came for a General Election, the members of the present Government must agree on the fairest way of presenting the issues to the country and of setting the field for the contest, and that there should be no question of seeking party advantage by surprise tactics.
Reference was made to a "Coupon Election", under which the parties constituting the Government would allocate the seats among themselves and avoid contesting the same seats. He did not himself favour this course.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL expressed general agreement with what the Prime Minister had said about the manner in which any General Election would have to take place. With regard to the prolongation of Parliament, he felt that the choice of a period of six months would tie the Prime Minister's hands unduly and would be likely to excite party feeling in the Spring of 1945 by raising the expectation that a General Election would be held not later than May 1945. Another disadvantage on the choice of a period of six months was that it might encourage the public to expect a quicker end to the German war than seemed likely.

THE HOME SECRETARY said that last year there had been some criticism of the legislation prolonging the life of Parliament until November 1944, and there might be rather more criticism this year of the proposal to prolong the life of Parliament for a further year. He agreed, however, with the Lord President of the Council that the period of prolongation should be twelve months. A further disadvantage of making the period six months was that, unless a further prolongation was agreed to, it would be necessary to hold a General Election at an awkward time from the point of view of Parliamentary business.

The new registration arrangements would not be in operation until the 1st of December, 1944, and
preparations for a poll would not be completed until at least two months after that date.

THE MINISTER OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION suggested, as a compromise, that the proposed legislation should provide for a period of prolongation of six months, which could be extended for a further six months on an affirmative resolution of the House.

THE MINISTER OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE said that, in accordance with the line which he had adopted in other cases of applications for release from the Services, he had informed the political parties that any requests for the release of political agents should be postponed until the end of September.

In further discussion agreement was expressed with what the Prime Minister had said as to the manner in which any dissolution should be carried out.

With regard to the proposed legislation, the general feeling was that the balance of advantage lay in favour of prolongation for a year.

The War Cabinet -

Confirmed the decision reached at their meeting on Monday, 25th September, that legislation should be introduced prolonging the life of Parliament for a year from 25th November, 1943.
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Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
WAR CABINET 129 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 29th September, 1944, at 11.45 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Item 6).
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Item 7).
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War (Items 1-5).
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., Minister of Supply (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Item 7).
Captain the Right Hon. H. F. CROOKSHANK, M.P., Postmaster-General (Item 7).

The following were also present:
Miss ELLEN WILKINSON, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Home Security (Item 1).

Secretariat.
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
## War Cabinet 129 (44)

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1. The War Cabinet discussed the question whether the Home Guard and Civil Defence workers should retain their uniforms after they had been released from service.

The Secretary of State for War said that it had already been agreed that members of the Home Guard should retain their boots, and that he proposed that they should retain their battle dress and waterproof capes. There were, however, difficulties in agreeing to their retaining their great-coats, since the production of great-coats made considerable demands on materials and the available stocks might prove insufficient for the needs of the Army. Men on demobilisation from the Army would not retain their great-coats, though each man would be given a civilian macintosh.

The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Home Security, urged that members of the Civil Defence Services should be allowed to retain their great-coats. There would be strong opposition to any proposal that the great-coats should be surrendered, and a distinction in favour of the Civil Defence Services could be justified on the ground that many Civil Defence workers had not been given full uniforms.

It was pointed out in discussion that the productive capacity in the clothing industry was greatly strained, and that an additional burden had been placed on it by the demand for suits and macintoshes for men demobilised from the armed Forces.

The general feeling of the War Cabinet, however, was that if it was at all possible, the Home Guard and members of the Civil Defence Services should retain their great-coats.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the Home Guard should retain their boots, battle-dress and waterproof capes.

(2) Invited the Minister of Production, the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, the Secretary of State for War, the Minister of Supply, and the President of the Board of Trade to consider whether the available resources would allow the Home Guard and members of the Civil Defence Services to retain their great-coats.

2. At their meeting on the 4th September (W.M. (44) 116th Conclusions, Minute 8), the War Cabinet had decided that, for the purpose of estimating man-power requirements in the second half of 1944, it could be assumed that the war with Germany would not continue after the 31st December, 1944.

On the 19th September, the War Cabinet had considered a memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 517) setting out the effect of this assumption on the man-power situation and on the production of munitions. The Prime Minister, when in Quebec, had telegraphed that he thought that the war would straggle over in a reduced condition into 1945, but that he, nevertheless, approved the steps which the Minister of Production proposed to take, subject to the agreement of the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee.

The War Cabinet had reaffirmed their view as to the assumed date, and had agreed that this conclusion should be translated into action as outlined in the Minister of Production’s memorandum.

The Prime Minister said that he now thought that, with enemy resistance stiffening, the war might continue until, say, the end of February 1945. It was for consideration whether any of the cuts in production decided upon were too drastic.

The Minister of Production said that, broadly speaking, owing to the amount of stores accumulated and in transit, the reductions which he had proposed and the War Cabinet had approved would suffice to enable our Forces to continue to fight with the same striking power, and with the same intensity, until the end of March.
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The Minister of Production said that, broadly speaking, owing to the amount of stores accumulated and in transit, the reductions which he had proposed and the War Cabinet had approved would suffice to enable our Forces to continue to fight with the same striking power, and with the same intensity, until the end of March.
If the war in Europe were to continue at the same intensity after that date, a difficult situation would certainly arise. He thought that more risk could be taken with capital equipment than with expendable stores. The tank programme was being cut from 350 to 170 tanks a month, but the effect of this would not be felt until the second quarter of 1945.

The Prime Minister thought that we might take more risks over production of aircraft than over tanks and that the tank position required further enquiry.

The War Cabinet agreed as follows:

1. The Minister of Production undertook to submit a memorandum on the tank position in the course of the next few days, setting out the stocks on hand and the rates of production.

2. As it was clear that a decision on this matter should be reached in the very near future, there was no need for the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Supply to slow down any of the action now in progress for the release of labour.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 545) dealing with the release of capacity from war production.

The Minister of Production explained that there was considerable pressure for a statement on the Government’s plans for the release of capacity from war production and the reconversion of industry to civil use at the end of the European war. He accordingly proposed, if the War Cabinet agreed, to make the statement annexed to W.P. (44) 545 in Parliament on the following Tuesday. The statement included an offer of a debate on the subject, which might conveniently take place after the debate on Re-allocation of Man-power. In drafting the statement great care had been taken to avoid anything which would prejudice the negotiations with the United States Government on Lend-Lease in Stage II.

In discussion, stress was laid on the danger that, with the Presidential Election pending in the United States, any statement of the kind proposed might be liable to misinterpretation. It was suggested that the line which the Minister of Production should take in Parliament should rather be that, while the Government were doing everything possible to ensure that when the proper time came there would be a smooth change-over from war-time to peace-time production, the stiffening of German resistance made it impossible to give any definite promise of immediate action to divert resources from war work. At the same time the Ministers concerned should, of course, press on with action in consultation with individual industries but without any general publicity.

It was also pointed out that the statement annexed to W.P. (44) 545 had necessarily had to be drafted in such cautious terms that it gave very little useful information to industrialists.

The Minister of Production said that it might be possible to redraft the statement in such a way as to relate it entirely to the action which would be taken at some future unspecified date, and so get over the objections which had been raised in discussion.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Minister of Production, in the light of the discussion, to prepare a revised statement on the release of capacity from war production.
4. The Prime Minister said that he had it in mind to move the second reading of the Prolongation of Parliament Bill. In doing so he would make a general statement regarding the continuation of the present Government which would, he hoped, do something to counter the agitation in certain quarters for an early General Election.

The War Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister's intention.

5. The Secretary of State for War said that the German prisoners of war for whom we were responsible were being kept in France under extremely unsatisfactory conditions. It was impossible to get the French authorities to construct better accommodation and the presence of these prisoners was an embarrassment to our Forces. He had therefore come to the conclusion that the only solution was to transfer a considerable number to this country. To enable this to be done the transfer to this country from South Africa of a further 13,000 Italian prisoners of war would have to be stopped. In particular, he asked for authority to cancel the sailing of a ship which was on the point of leaving South Africa for this country with about 3,000 Italian prisoners.

In discussion, the view was expressed that we ought not to add to our own accommodation difficulties by bringing to this country German prisoners of war whom it ought to be possible to house in France, having regard to the vacant accommodation which was bound to be available in that country. It was also urged that if the German prisoners of war were kept in France they could be usefully employed on the destruction of flying bomb launching sites and submarine pens.

The War Cabinet agreed as follows:

(1) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Secretary of State for War, was invited to press the French authorities to agree to the retention of German prisoners of war in France and to their employment on the destruction of flying bomb launching sites, submarine pens and similar installations.

(2) Any proposal for stopping the transfer of Italian prisoners of war, in accordance with the agreed programme, should be submitted to the Prime Minister, after consultation with the other Ministers concerned.

Civil Air Transport.

Position of Eire vis-à-vis the International Conference and preliminary Empire Talks.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 127th Conclusions, Minute 10.)
The invitation to the Eire Government having been issued, nothing could now be done to prevent their attending the International Conference. It remained to consider whether the Eire Government should be invited to the preliminary Empire talks at Ottawa. The War Cabinet was informed that the Dominion Governments were in favour of the Eire Government’s being invited.

On the other hand, it was urged that to invite the Government of Eire to send representatives to an Empire Conference might well prejudice the whole of our relations with Southern Ireland after the war. We wished to see these relations re-established on a friendly footing. But the right way to go about this was surely not to invite representatives of Eire to attend this Empire Conference, as though nothing had happened and without regard to the other and under issues involved. It was all the more difficult to do so during the war, while German and Japanese Ambassadors were still in Dublin.

As against this it was urged that the Empire Conference was to be an official one to deal with technical matters, and that if Eire went to the International Conference without first going to the Empire Conference, there was a risk that she might be driven into the American camp.

In reply to this, it was pointed out that the increasing range of aircraft lessened the importance of Irish bases for Trans-Atlantic flights.

After some further discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows—

(1) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to take up with the State Department their action in inviting Eire to attend the Conference without prior consultation with us, notwithstanding the fact that no invitation had been issued to the Argentine.

(2) The arrangements for the Empire Conference at Ottawa in October should stand, but no representative of Eire should be invited to attend.

(3) The Prime Minister undertook to send personal telegrams to the Dominion Prime Ministers, explaining the reasons why we felt that the Government of Eire should not be invited to the Ottawa meeting in present circumstances.

7. The War Cabinet had before them the following memoranda on the future of B.O.A.C.—

(i) two memoranda by the Secretary of State for Air (W.P. (44) 268 and 520);

(ii) a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 498);

(iii) a memorandum by the Minister of Aircraft Production (W.P. (44) 508).

They also had before them the following memoranda on the private ownership of British airlines—

(iv) a memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, W.P. (44) 263 (Revise);

(v) a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, W.P. (44) 279.

A record of the discussion and conclusions reached is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.