CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 3rd January, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. HUBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. R. G. CASEY, Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.

The following were also present:


The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster General.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-8).

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-8).

Secretariat:

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
## WAR CABINET 1 (44).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Forthcoming Operations against Western Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of British and United States Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland: Underground Resistance Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suggested Adherence to Atlantic Charter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed Publication of Long Armistice Terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>German Prisoners of s.s. Kerlogue</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Select Committee on National Expenditure</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Civil Service Leave</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military and Air Operations. (Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 176th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

During December 1943 11,800 tons of bombs had been dropped by the R.A.F., 11,300 of them on Germany. The United States Air Force had dropped 2,480 tons, half on Germany and the rest on Occupied Territory.

During 1943 the R.A.F. had dropped 136,400 tons of bombs on Germany (including 21,000 tons on Berlin) and 21,000 tons on Italy and Occupied Territory, making a total of 157,400 tons. 2,400 aircraft had been lost in these operations. United States aircraft had dropped 24,400 tons on Germany. In comparison, the Germans had dropped 65,000 tons on the United Kingdom during the whole of the war, including 9,000 tons on London.

"Crossbow" targets had been attacked during the week with fairly satisfactory results.

Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Force, amounted to 64 destroyed and 26, probably destroyed. Our losses amounted to 74 bombers and 8 fighters and 1 Coastal Command aircraft. The United States had lost 47 bombers and 4 fighters.

In the Mediterranean the Allied Air Forces had carried out over 5,000 sorties in support of the land battle.

In the Pacific 161 Japanese aircraft had been claimed as destroyed as against 15 Allied.

There had been no confirmed shipping losses during the previous 6 days, but belated reports of sinkings amounted to 16,671 tons. Total losses in December (including ships sunk during the air attack on Bari) amounted to 154,295 tons.

Operations on the Italian front had been hampered by weather, but on the right the 8th Army had cleared Ortona and were making progress towards Tollo. In the United States sector some progress had also been made.

In New Guinea a successful landing had been made at Saidor. In New Britain the landing at Gloucester Bay had been established and the aerodrome captured.

The Russians had made very good progress in the Kiev sector and were driving on to the West and to the South-West. The latter drive was the more important, as it threatened the main railway communications on which the German troops in the Dnieper salient depended.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

Forthcoming Operations Against Western Europe. (Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 176th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

The Deputy Prime Minister said that at the last Meeting reference had been made to the very misleading statement by Senator Johnson about the proportion of British and American troops to be used in these operations. The Chiefs of Staff had been asked to report whether from the military point of view there was any objection to a further statement being made on the matter, and, if it were decided to make a statement, what form it should take.

On the 29th December, 1943, the United States Chiefs of Staff had published a statement that the exact proportion of British and American troops in the joint operations was a military secret, and that there had been no disagreement in the matter between the American and British Chiefs of Staff.

The Deputy Prime Minister suggested that, in view of the statement published by the United States Chiefs of Staff, the matter should be allowed to rest where it was.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed with this view.
3. The War Cabinet was given the latest information about developments in these three countries. This is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Italian Government had notified the British and United States Governments of their desire to adhere to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that in the nature of the case the present Italian Government could not be regarded as having much representative capacity, and it seemed premature for them to take action of this kind at this juncture. In the circumstances he had taken the line that a discouraging reply should be made to the Italian Government's proposal.

The War Cabinet—
Endorsed the view of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded the War Cabinet that the Long Armistice Terms had never been published. Hitherto the Chiefs of Staff had been against publication.

When Parliament met again there would be renewed pressure for the publication of these Terms. Non-publication inevitably gave rise to suspicions as to what the Terms contained. Unless there was some military objection, therefore, he would like to see the Terms published.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Chiefs of Staff to give further consideration to this matter and to report to the War Cabinet in time to enable a decision to be reached before Parliament reassembled.

6. The War Cabinet were informed that, after the action in the Bay of Biscay which had resulted in the sinking of three German destroyers, the s.s. Kerlogue, flying the Eire flag, had signalled that she had 160 survivors on board.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said that the Kerlogue had been signalled and told to put into Fishguard, but had in fact sailed direct to a port in Southern Ireland. The War Cabinet was informed that the circumstances suggested that there might have been good reasons for this course. The Eire Government had now given an undertaking that the prisoners would be interned.
The First Lord of the Admiralty said that, nevertheless, an opportunity should be taken of interrogating the Master of the Kerlogue in regard to these German prisoners. He undertook to keep in touch with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in regard to any action taken in this matter.

7. The Secretary of State for War informed the War Cabinet that the Chairman of one of the Sub-Committees of the Select Committee on National Expenditure had circulated a Memorandum (it was thought to the Co-ordinating Committee) about matters relating to "Crossbow." A copy of this Memorandum had been handed by this M.P. to a member of the Army Council, who had shown it to the Secretary of State. He (the Secretary of State) had made it clear that he regarded the matter as of such gravity that he would be bound to hand the Memorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister. The Memorandum clearly contemplated that what were operational issues should be brought within the orbit of the Committee.

Grave objection was seen by the War Cabinet to the circulation to members of the Select Committee on National Expenditure of memoranda dealing with these operational issues.

The Deputy Prime Minister was invited, as a first step, to discuss the matter with the Chairman of the Select Committee.

8. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (43) 574) proposing that His Majesty's Government should make a declaration in general terms in favour of the restoration after the war of a free and independent Siam. President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had already made such declarations. In default of any similar declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government, our organisations were hampered in obtaining information and maintaining contacts with the Free Siamese Movement.

In discussion, the view was expressed that we should not make any general statement which might hamper our hands in regard to a country at war with us. In particular, we must be careful to avoid specific commitments in regard to boundaries.

The War Cabinet—
Accordingly asked for an opportunity to examine the terms of the proposed declaration before reaching a decision. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs undertook to prepare and circulate a draft.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (43) 588) proposing that annual leave for the Civil Service in 1944 should be extended from 16 to 18 working days with the object of securing that, so far as practicable, all Civil Servants had a break of a fortnight on end.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that there might be some difficulty in settling the date on which annual leave should start in 1944. It was agreed that this point should be considered later.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposals contained in the Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
SECRET.

W.M. (44)

2nd Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 2 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 6th January, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. R. G. Casey, Minister of State Resident in the Middle East (Items 1-2).

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor (Items 1-2).

The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Andrew Duncan, M.P., Minister of Supply (Item 1).

The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport.

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Mr. W. L. Gorell Barnes.

[26702—2]
## WAR CABINET 2 (44).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jute Supplies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointment of New Finance Member.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional Policy in Malaya and Borneo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>British West Indies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment of a British West Indian Contingent in a Theatre of War.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jute Supplies.

1. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 1) calling attention to the long-term position of jute supplies. The present view of the Government of India was that the same acreage should be licensed for planting in 1944 as in 1943. This was estimated to yield 8-3 million bales, whereas the estimated requirements for the year 1944-45 (including allowances for liberated territories in Europe and the Far East) were 10-5 million bales. Little relief could be expected from reducing stocks or using alternative material. The difficulty of increasing the acreage to be licensed was that this could only be done at the expense of rice production. In the circumstances the Minister suggested that the best plan was to consider, with the Government of India, steps to ensure that the acreage licensed was actually planted.

Points in discussion:

(a) If Burma and Malaya were not liberated during the year 1944/45, 0-6 million bales of the total estimated requirements for that year would not be needed.

(b) It was suggested that the European territories at present occupied by Germany, who were at present obliged to use substitutes, could continue to do without jute for a time after their liberation.

On the other hand it was pointed out that any action which had the effect of promoting the use of substitutes for jute would be likely to have an adverse effect on the post-war economy of Bengal.

(c) It was suggested that the failure to plant with jute during 1943 the total acreage licensed for planting was probably due partly to the unpleasant nature of the crop and partly to the high price of rice.

(d) The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that jute and rice were not always competitive crops. Over large areas winter paddy could be grown in the same year as jute, as a follow-on crop. Mr. Casey undertook, after his arrival in Bengal, to find out whether this had been taken into account in calculating the acreage which it would be possible to license for planting with jute.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposal contained in the Memorandum by the Minister of Production.

India.

Appointment of New Finance Member.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (43) 599) as to what should be done when the normal term of office of Sir Jeremy Raisman, the present Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, came to an end in April 1944. Attached to the memorandum was a telegram by Lord Wavell who thought that Sir Jeremy Raisman's successor should be an Indian, and recommended the appointment of Sir R. Mudaliar. The Secretary of State for India strongly supported this proposal.

The following views were put forward by the Secretary of State for India and other Ministers in support of the course proposed.

(a) It was no longer necessary that the Finance Member should be an expert. What was required was rather a Finance Minister, capable of weighing the advice of his experts, and having come to his conclusion, of convincing his colleagues.

(b) This was in accord with the general tendency whereby the Viceroy's Council was ceasing to be a small Council of expert officials and was becoming something much more like a Cabinet, overwhelmingly Indian, of men chosen for their general political and administrative ability but not responsible (as in this country) to the Legislature.
(c) Any Finance Member sent out from this country would find it more difficult than an Indian to get acceptance of the measures required to meet the present financial situation, or, later on, to negotiate the agreement on outstanding financial issues between the Government of India and the British Treasury.

(d) Difficulty had been encountered in finding a suitable British candidate. Any Finance Member who was connected with the Bank of England would be suspected of trying to defend British financial interests. On the other hand, it should be possible to find an expert from this country suitable to act as Adviser to Sir R. Mudaliar.

(e) It was dangerous to continue to withhold key posts from Indians. Moreover, the fact that a man of Sir R. Mudaliar’s undoubted qualities was available afforded an opportunity of making an appointment which would give great satisfaction to that section of Indian public opinion which did not take its views from the political parties.

This view was opposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The following were the main points made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and by other Ministers who shared his view:

(f) The situation which the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council had to face was one of extreme difficulty. It was of the utmost importance to appoint the best man who could be found. Nobody in India had the necessary qualifications.

(g) The proposal that the Finance Member should be appointed for his political ability and that he should rely on the help of an expert adviser did not meet the case. This point was specially emphasised by those with experience of Indian administration.

(h) His Majesty’s Government had a direct responsibility for Indian finance which had repeatedly been acknowledged, and we could not afford to stand aside and see a dangerous situation develop.

(i) The recent Debate in the House of Commons on the food situation in India (a matter within the responsibility of the Indian Provincial Governments) had shown that Parliament would not lightly absolve His Majesty’s Government of responsibility for the shortcomings of Indian administration.

(j) India was to be the base for very important operations. The extent to which India could carry this burden would largely depend on how the financial situation was handled.

(k) At the present time there was a Congress majority on the Board of the Reserve Bank of India. An Indian had recently been appointed to be Governor of the Bank. The appointment of an Indian as Finance Member at this juncture would result in an undue risk that finance questions would be settled as a result of strong political pressure.

(l) Indian public opinion would readily accept the appointment of someone from this country as Finance Member, provided that a man of acknowledged and outstanding qualifications was appointed. In this connection the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he hoped to be able to put forward some further names.

(m) Once an Indian had been appointed as Finance Member, it would be virtually impossible again to appoint to this post someone from this country. But there was no certainty that a man of Sir R. Mudaliar’s qualities would always be available.

(n) If a suitable man could not be found at the moment, it would be worth while to give further consideration to
the extension of Sir Jeremy Raisman's term of office for a further year. In this connection the War Cabinet were informed that the Prime Minister had sent a telegram saying that he thought it would be a grave mistake to appoint an Indian as Finance Minister until we knew how we stood about the sterling balances, and that he hoped his colleagues would consider the extension of Sir Jeremy Raisman's term for another year.

Discussion followed as to whether certain phrases in Lord Wavell's telegram (the 'transfer of financial responsibility in this country to Indian hands cannot be postponed indefinitely'), and in the Secretary of State's memorandum ('demonstrate the sincerity of our desire to see India governed by Indians and in India's interests'), implied that the appointment of an Indian to be Finance Member was a constitutional change and was being urged on that account. There was general agreement among Ministers that no constitutional change was in question. The appointment of an Indian as Finance Member would, however, be a further important step in the process of Indianisation of the Viceroy's Council, which would inevitably have some effect on the growth of convention.

The Deputy Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that it was clear that the predominant view of the War Cabinet was not in favour of the appointment at this juncture of an Indian as Finance Member.

The War Cabinet—

Accordingly invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for India to consider whether they could suggest the names of persons in this country suitable for this appointment; or, alternatively, whether they would wish to recommend the extension of Sir Jeremy Raisman's term for a further year.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 3) setting out the steps that had been taken for the planning of the administration of Malaya and Borneo after reoccupation, and outlining some of the problems to be faced in determining the future system. It was suggested that a Cabinet Committee should be appointed to consider the matter in detail and recommend a directive on which the Planning Authorities could work.

The War Cabinet decided to appoint for this purpose a Committee composed as follows:—

- The Lord President of the Council (Chairman).
- The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
- The Secretary of State for India.
- The Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- The Secretary of State for War.
- The Attorney General.
- The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (W.P. (44) 4) proposing, by agreement with the Secretary of State for War, that a West Indian contingent should be moved to serve with the Central Mediterranean Force as soon as possible after April 1944.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the sending of a West Indian contingent to a theatre of war would be warmly
welcomed by all the Caribbean Colonies, whose inhabitants had been disappointed at having no opportunity of taking any active part in the war. The numbers involved were only about 1,000.

The Minister of War Transport said that, having regard to the small numbers involved, he did not anticipate any difficulty in providing British-controlled ships for the proposed movement. It would not, therefore, be necessary, as suggested in the Secretary of State's Memorandum, to approach the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that American shipping might be made available.

The War Cabinet—

(i) Agreed in principle that a West Indian contingent should be moved to serve with the Central Mediterranean Force as soon as possible after April 1944.

(ii) Took note that the detailed arrangements for the transport of the contingent would be worked out in consultation between the Colonial Office, War Office, and the Ministry of War Transport.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 6th January, 1944.*
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 10th January, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
Marshal of the Air Force Sir CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Group Captain EARLE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Future Operations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Directorship in Cables and Wireless, Limited</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet heard an account of certain recent decisions on operational matters. A record is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet conclusions.

2. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that Cables and Wireless, Limited, had offered a Directorship to Lord Reith, who was at present employed as a Captain, R.N.V.R., in the Admiralty. Lord Reith had enquired whether he would be permitted to accept this appointment.

Royal Naval Officers on the active list were of course forbidden to hold directorships in public companies. But under the Regulations applied to temporary officers at the beginning of the war, had Lord Reith then been a director of Cables and Wireless, he would not, on receiving an R.N.V.R. Commission, have been required to do more than disclose the fact of his Directorship, since the duties attached to it did not involve any clash of interest with the Public Service. In the circumstances, the First Lord of the Admiralty thought that assent should be given to this application. But since Lord Reith had held office as a Minister of the Crown during the war, the Prime Minister, to whom the matter had been referred, had thought that it should be brought to the notice of the War Cabinet.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that there were two Government Directorships of Cables and Wireless, but the present proposal did not affect either of them. He had been consulted by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and agreed with his conclusion.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the First Lord of the Admiralty should inform Lord Reith that he could accept this Directorship.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
10th January, 1944.
WAR CABINET 4 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, 10th January, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Thomas Johnston, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland (Item 6).
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
Mr. C. J. Radcliffe, K.C., Director-General, Ministry of Information (Item 5).
Marshal of the Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1-4).

The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 6).
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-4).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-4).
Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-4).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges,
Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay,
Mr. L. F. Burgis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping Losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of ships in harbour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed publication of Long Armistice Terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Press</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Worker's request for the Accrediting of Correspondents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to British Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Reinstatement in Civil Employment</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Owing to bad weather, Bomber Command had only carried out one major attack, against Stettin, where great devastation had been caused. 120 Mosquito sorties had been made against other German cities.

Photographs taken on the 21st December showed that in the earlier attacks on Berlin some 3,000 acres had been devastated and enormous damage done to production factories, public utility companies and Ministries and public buildings.

"Crossbow" targets had been attacked in bad weather conditions.

United States bombers had attacked Kiel and Ludwigshafen and airfields in South-West France.

Coastal Command had attacked 14 U-boats. One was believed sunk and 5 others damaged. Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Force, amounted to 165 destroyed and 43 probably destroyed. (The former figure included claims of 90 by the United States Heavy Bombers.) Allied losses amounted to 124, including 16 United Kingdom and 54 United States heavy bombers.

Air activity in Italy had been limited by the weather, but 5,000 sorties had been carried out against battle and strategical targets. Included in the latter were the ball-bearing factory at Turin and the torpedo factory at Fiume.

Confirmed shipping losses during the previous week, including belated reports, amounted to 18,153 tons.

Three blockade-runners had been sunk by United States forces.

E-boats had attacked a convoy of 15 merchant ships off Land's End on the 6th January. One escorting trawler and 3 merchant ships had been sunk.

Weather conditions on the Italian front had deteriorated considerably, but an advance of 2 miles had been made at San Vittore on a front of about 8 miles.

Considerable progress had been made during the previous week by the Russian Army in the Kiev Sector, especially in their main thrust towards Vinnitsa. A new offensive had resulted in the capture of Kirovograd and an advance of some 30 miles.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The War Cabinet were given further information regarding the loss of ships in Bari Harbour early in December as a result of enemy air action. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet an account of a talk which he had had with M. Beneš, who had recently returned from Moscow. This is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
4. On the 3rd January, 1944, the War Cabinet had invited the Chiefs of Staff to report whether there were still military objections to the publication of the Long Armistice Terms.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 15) stating that, in their view, on military grounds publication at present was undesirable.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that a telegram had been sent to General Eisenhower in the United States to obtain confirmation that he was still opposed to publication, but a reply had not yet been received.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that three of the objections to publication cited by the Chiefs of Staff seemed to him to be largely political, although no doubt they had a military aspect. In view of the Chiefs of Staff's opinion, he would not press for publication at this juncture, but he thought that the point would be pressed when Parliament met again.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.

5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 7).

The Secretary of State for War said that the Daily Worker had put forward the names of four correspondents for accrediting as correspondents to the British Forces. These had been refused on the grounds of their individual unsuitability. A point had now been reached at which he thought that it should be definitely decided that the Daily Worker should not be permitted to have accredited correspondents with His Majesty's Forces. If a decision in this sense was arrived at, then a statement to this effect should be made to the Daily Worker.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—

(1) accepted, in principle, the Secretary of State for War's proposal that the Daily Worker should not be permitted to have accredited correspondents;

(2) invited the Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, to formulate and submit to the War Cabinet the terms in which this decision should be conveyed to the Daily Worker.

6. The War Cabinet had before them the following Memoranda on the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Bill—

by the Home Secretary and Ministry of Home Security (W.P. (44) 6);

by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 16);

by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (W.P. (44) 17).

The point at issue was whether the right of reinstatement under the Bill should be extended to whole-time volunteers in the Civil Defence, Police and Fire Services. This matter had been discussed by the Reconstruction Committee, which had decided against such an extension.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he had set out the arguments in favour of this extension in detail in his Memorandum. Perhaps the main point was that reinstatement rights were possessed by men and women who had been called up under the National Service Act for duty in Civil Defence.
Forces.” To withhold these rights from whole-time volunteers would, he felt sure, give rise to bitterness and disappointment.

It had been argued that the extension of reinstatement rights to whole-time volunteers in the Civil Defence Services would mean that these rights would have to be extended to persons directed to employment in industry. He did not share this view, since he thought that public opinion would draw a clear line between industry and the Services (including Civil Defence).

The views of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security were supported by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Health.

The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries said that, in his view, women who volunteered for the Women’s Land Army had at least as strong a claim as members of the Women’s Services and Civil Defence personnel, and that there would be strong Parliamentary pressure for their inclusion in the Bill.

The Minister of Reconstruction said that reinstatement rights were generally identified in the public mind with service in the Armed Forces. It was true that these rights had been extended to the small proportion of persons in Civil Defence who had been conscripted to the Civil Defence Forces under the National Service Act of 1941. This was not the result of any deliberate decision of policy, but an incidental consequence of their having been called up under the procedure for call-up to the Armed Forces. The Reconstruction Committee had taken the view that, on balance, it would be wrong, merely because reinstatement rights were enjoyed by this relatively small number of Civil Defence personnel, to extend them to the whole body of volunteers in Civil Defence.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that it was impossible to avoid some anomalies in this matter, and that his main object was to ensure a workable arrangement. The question of the Civil Defence Services had not been raised in his discussions with industry on this matter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that most members of the Civil Defence Services could look to being released when the war with Germany came to an end, and would therefore have an advantage as compared with members of the Forces.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer drew attention, however, to the following cases which might arise:

1. A man might have left a position in industry to become a whole-time volunteer in a Civil Defence Service. His place might have been taken by a man who had been subsequently called up for the Army. Under present arrangements, in such a case, reinstatement rights would attach not to the man who volunteered for Civil Defence but to the man who took his place.

2. The second case concerned a man who had left a post in industry to become a volunteer in Civil Defence and had later become a member of the Armed Forces. In such a case there was no value in the right to reinstatement in the last job occupied before entering the Army.

The Minister of Labour and National Service undertook to look into these instances. He also agreed that representatives of the Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Treasury should consult together as to any repercussions which the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Bill might have, by way of analogy, on Government employment.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that it was clearly difficult to define a satisfactory line of demarcation in regard to reinstatement rights, and that the position of whole-time members of the Civil Defence Services was no doubt somewhat anomalous. But, short of taking away existing rights from
conscripts in Civil Defence "Forces," discrimination between conscripts and volunteers in Civil Defence could not be avoided without creating other and more serious difficulties in other directions.

The War Cabinet—
Endorsed the view of the Reconstruction Committee that the provisions of the Reinstatement Bill should not be extended to whole-time volunteers in Civil Defence, and agreed that the position in this respect should be made clear to Parliament at an appropriate stage.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
10th January, 1944.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that he was satisfied that to accredit correspondents to the "Daily Worker" would not be consistent with security. The Communist Party were already trying to plant agents in the Army and had succeeded in planting members of their party in certain very secret organisations. He thought we ought to say quite flat-footedly that we were not prepared to allow the "Daily Worker" to have accredited correspondents.

MR. RADCLIFFE said that at the present moment the Ministry had no option but to treat the "Daily Worker" on the same basis as any other paper with a fairly considerable circulation. The "Daily Worker"s application to have an accredited correspondent had come from the Newspaper Proprietors Association, of which Association the paper's proprietors were members. In the Ministry's view it was not open to them to deprive the paper completely of all normal press facilities on the grounds that the paper was not to be trusted. On the other hand they have never invited the Editor of the "Daily Worker" to any Ministerial Conference. Up till recently this latter position had been acquiesced in; but the "Daily Worker" had now complained that they had not been invited to the "CROSSBOW" Conference, held by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that it might be relevant in this connection that he understood that General Eisenhower intended to do a good deal of work through Press Conferences.

THE HOME SECRETARY said it could perhaps be argued that, having raised the ban against the "Daily Worker", the paper must now be given all facilities. He agreed that the paper should be given all general facilities, but did not feel that the paper's representatives should also be admitted to intimate Ministerial Conferences. He thought that the Editor would feel under an obligation to pass on any information which he received to the Leaders of the Communist Party. On the merits of the case he was in agreement with the views expressed by the Secretary of State for War.

The question was then raised as to what reason should be given to the refusal to accredit correspondents. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER thought that a reference to the Springhall case would suffice.

The suggestion was made that it might be possible to arrange for the accrediting of a correspondent whom the Government was prepared to trust.
THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, however, thought that this would lead to trouble in the Press.

After some further discussion the War Cabinet -

(1) Accepted, in principle, the Secretary of State for War's proposal that the "Daily Worker" should not be permitted to have accredited correspondents;

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Minister of Home Security, to formulate and submit to the War Cabinet the terms in which this decision should be conveyed to the "Daily Worker".

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
5th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 5 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 11th January, 1944, at 10.30 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. R. G. CASEY, Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. the EARL OF SELBORNE, Minister of Economic Warfare (Item 2).
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Item 2).

Secrétariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES,
Lieutenant-General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY,
Mr. W. L. GORELL BARNES.

CONTENTS.

Minute No. | Subject. | Page.
---|---|---
1 | India | 22
   | Situation in Bengal. | 
2 | Yugoslavia | 24 
3 | Mr. Casey | 24 

[26724-3]
1. The War Cabinet considered the following:

A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 18) covering an exchange of telegrams with the Viceroy in which the view was strongly expressed by Lord Wavell that the Bengal situation could only be safeguarded, and a danger of recurrence of famine avoided, if the Ministry were dismissed, and government by the Governor by proclamation under Section 93 of the Government of India Act was established.

A further exchange of telegrams (657 to the Viceroy and 64-S from the Viceroy); and

A further memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 20) covering a draft of the statement which it would be necessary to issue if the Viceroy's proposal were approved.

The Secretary of State for India said that, in his telegrams, the Viceroy had made it clear that by whatever means, the responsibility for control of the food situation in Bengal must be taken out of the hands of the Ministry. In his telegram 38-S of the 6th January the Viceroy discussed five methods which had been suggested as theoretically possible, and explained his reasons for favouring the adoption of the fifth method—the dismissal of the Ministry for failure to take the necessary food measures, accompanied by the issue of a proclamation under Section 93 by the Governor assuming to himself the powers of the Ministry.

In support of the view that drastic action of some kind was necessary, the Secretary of State gave a number of instances, in the sphere of public health, to illustrate the inability of the Government of Bengal to carry out their responsibilities in times of crisis. He was advised that some 50 per cent. of this year's grain crops would normally be marketed during the next three months, and that there was a grave danger that, if the Ministry remained in control, they would not take the action necessary to ensure that a considerable proportion of the crop did not go underground.

It was clear, however, that the application of Section 93 would have grave repercussions. It was true that there would be no legal way in which the Governor's decision to apply the Section could be challenged. The Ministry would, however, protest on the grounds that the action had been taken because the present Ministry was a predominantly Moslem League Government, and this might lead both to unrest in Bengal and to the resignation of Moslem League Governments in other Provinces. This step should not, therefore, be taken unless it was really necessary, in order to avoid the recurrence of famine.

No doubt it was a serious matter to reject the Viceroy's considered opinion. The Secretary of State wondered, however, whether the necessary results might not be achieved by a combination of the first two methods discussed in Lord Wavell's telegram No. 38-S—namely, a decision by the Governor that the circumstances were such that his special responsibility under Section 52 (1) (a) was attracted in regard to food administration, which would enable him to override the Ministry as he thought fit; and the use by the Central Government of its powers under Section 126A.

In conclusion, the Secretary of State read out a telegram No. 79-S in which the Viceroy reported that he had not discussed the proposed application of Section 93 with his Executive Council, but gave an estimate of their views as indicated by their comments on reports regarding the food situation in Bengal. The general conclusion reached by the Viceroy was that the majority of his Executive Council would favour the proposed action, but that the Indian members, including Hindus, would not wish to be associated with it and would expect him to take entire responsibility.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that Lord Wavell had evidently formed a very unfavourable opinion of the efficiency of the Bengal Government. The War Cabinet had not, however, been
informed of the considered views of the senior officers serving in the Province.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the instances mentioned by the Secretary of State and those cited in telegram 38-S, as to the ineffectiveness of various officials in the Bengal Province. He said that it would appear that the responsibility for several of the appointments in question rested with the Centre, and not with the Provincial Government. If the Government of India, in justification of the use of Section 93, were to rely on some of the instances of inefficiency which had been cited to the War Cabinet, he thought that they might find themselves on very insecure ground.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, in his view, the Governor of Bengal could clearly exercise his individual judgment in matters affecting the supply of food or the health of the people, as being matters which were closely bound up with good government. Moreover, it was important to bear in mind the procedure when a Governor decided to exercise his individual judgment in regard to a particular matter. It was not the case that the Minister concerned first came to a definite conclusion and then submitted the matter for further consideration by the Governor. In practice, what happened was that the Minister consulted with the Governor before deciding what action should be taken, and no question arose of the Minister being formally overridden by the Governor. Moreover, all orders were issued as orders of Government, and there was nothing to indicate that certain orders were issued as a result of the Governor exercising his individual judgment. The whole arrangement thus worked quite smoothly.

If, on the other hand, recourse was made to Section 93, and the present Government was dismissed, the Hindus would be delighted. More of the Moslems would stand back and do nothing, and some would be actively hostile. In the result the Government of Bengal would be left without friends.

It was a serious matter to override the Viceroy's considered judgment, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that, in any event, the newly-appointed Governor should be given time to find his feet and to establish relations with the Government of Bengal. If, after experience of trying to work with the Bengal Government, Mr. Casey found that it was impossible to carry on, the question of recourse to Section 93 could always be considered. But he sincerely hoped that Mr. Casey would find it possible to work through the Ministry, on the lines which he had suggested.

The Secretary of State for War expressed agreement with these views. He felt sure that, even if the existing Ministry were dismissed, it would not be possible to produce a really effective organisation at all quickly. In his view, the use of Section 93 would probably result in worsening the position in Bengal. He did not favour dismissing the Bengal Government except for explicit refusal to carry out clear-cut orders.

The Secretary of State for War also referred to a report in The Times that morning according to which the views of the Centre were prejudiced in the eyes of the Bengal Ministry, by the fact that they happened to coincide with those of the political opposition in Bengal. This might have serious political consequences.

The Lord Chancellor was opposed to the use of Section 93 at this juncture, which he would regard as an extreme step. He quoted the terms of Section 52 (1) (a) of the Government of Indian Act, and thought that the acting Governor of Bengal was wrong in thinking that the present situation in Bengal was not sufficient to justify him in exercising, in regard to health and food matters, his special responsibility under this Section.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also expressed agreement with the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Minister of Aircraft Production was of the same opinion. In his view the use, at this juncture, of Section 93 would create the worst possible impression, at the time when the new Governor
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The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also expressed agreement with the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Minister of Aircraft Production was of the same opinion. In his view the use, at this juncture, of Section 93 would create the worst possible impression, at the time when the new Governor
of Bengal took over. It would make the whole Province hostile to us. Moreover, he did not feel that a case had been established which would justify recourse to Section 93 against the present Government. Responsibility for most of the matters referred to seemed to rest with the previous Government of Fuzul Huq.

Mr. Casey agreed that it was a serious matter to overrule the Viceroy's considered judgment, but favoured an effort to work through the existing Government, rather than to break with it. He referred, in this connection, to the need for making the best use of all available resources, including those from outside the Province.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer in this connection suggested that as many as possible of the members of the I.C.S., now serving the Centre, who had previous service in Bengal, should be made available for service in Bengal during the present emergency.

The War Cabinet's decisions were as follows:—

1. Of the five methods of removing food from Ministerial control, set out by the Viceroy in Telegram 38–S of the 6th January, the War Cabinet rejected (3) —amendment of the Constitution Act—and (4) and (5)—the assumption of powers of direct rule by the Governor under Section 93.

2. The right line of action was for the Governor to decide that the circumstances were such that his special responsibility was attracted under Section 52 (1) A of the Government of India Act in regard to food and health administration (the Viceroy's course (1)) as well as in respect of the proper execution of directions from the Central Government under Section 126A.

3. In communicating this decision to the Viceroy reference should be made to the methods and procedure whereby the Governor of a Province would normally exercise his special responsibilities, as explained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

4. The Secretary of State for India was invited to prepare a telegram to the Viceroy setting out the War Cabinet's views. This telegram should be shown to the Deputy Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer and, subject to their concurrence, should be despatched without further reference to the War Cabinet.

Yugoslavia.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 1st Conclusions, Minute 3.)

2. The War Cabinet were informed of the latest position in Yugoslavia.

The record of the discussion and of the conclusions reached is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Mr. Casey.

3. The Deputy Prime Minister said that this was the last time Mr. Casey would attend a meeting of the War Cabinet before taking up the duties of his new post as Governor of Bengal. Mr. Casey would know that he had the warmest good wishes of the War Cabinet for the important and difficult task which he was now undertaking.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 11th January, 1944.
W.M. (44)
6th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 6 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Friday, 14th January, 1944, at 11 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Sir Owen O' Malley, His Majesty's Ambassador to the Polish Government in London (for part of the meeting).

Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary.

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CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet of the course of the discussions which he had had with representatives of the Polish Government about the statement which they intended to issue in reply to the Soviet declaration of the 10th January.

The War Cabinet—

Settled the lines on which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should seek to secure the amendment of this statement. Details are contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet-Conclusions.

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the position of Argentina and to the United States views as to the need for urgent action. The facts were set out in the Memorandum which he had circulated to the War Cabinet (W.P. (44) 21).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he was, of course, anxious to keep in step with the Americans in this matter. He knew that this was a point to which the Prime Minister attached great importance. For the moment, however, he felt that the first essential was that the United States Government should agree to defer action until there had been time to consider the matter in all its bearings.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed this view.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
14th January, 1944.
A.C.A. Meeting held on
WEDNESDAY, 12TH JANUARY, 1944

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY raised two questions which, had the War Cabinet been in session, would have been raised at the Cabinet. The first concerned Poland.

The Foreign Secretary said that the Poles had now changed their mind and did not intend to issue a statement to the effect that they were not prepared to discuss frontiers until after the war. He read out extracts from the text of a statement which the Polish Government proposed to issue. The essential point was that the Poles now intended to say that they were willing to discuss matters of common concern to themselves and the Russians at meetings to be attended by representatives of the Russian Government, His Majesty's Government and the U.S. Government.

The Foreign Secretary said that the proposed statement was not quite on the lines which he would have wished this statement to take. But he saw no reason why we should object to the issue of this statement, more especially seeing that, as a result of our pressure it was a far better statement than that which the Poles had had in mind to issue a day or two earlier.

This course was approved by the Ministers concerned.

ARGENTINE

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY then referred to a telegram from our Ambassador (No. 139 from Washington) reporting that Mr. Hull intended to recommend that the U.S. Government should issue a statement about the Argentine Government, accompanying it by the recall to Washington for consultation of their Ambassador to Buenos Aires, and by the freezing of Argentine funds in the United States. Mr. Hull had said it would be a fine thing if we could do the same.

The Foreign Secretary said that while he was anxious to keep in step with the Americans, he was most apprehensive that the measures proposed would not only fail with their objective in regard to the Argentine Government, but might seriously impede the flow to the United Nations of essential Argentine products. In particular, we were greatly dependent upon Argentine for meat. He therefore proposed to send a telegram to Washington asking the Americans to postpone action, but proposing joint examination by the Combined Boards of the probable effect of any such action on the war effort.

This course was also approved by the Ministers concerned.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
WAR CABINET 7 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 17th January, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (Items 1-4).
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 5).
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellin, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 3-4).
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 5-7).

The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir Archieald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Item 6).
The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport (Item 4).
Major the Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Item 4).
The Right Hon. W. Whiteley, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 5-7).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inland Transport</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business of the House</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Delegated Legislation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control of Parliament over Departmental</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulations and Orders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Press</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Worker's request for the accrediting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of correspondents to British Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 4th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Air Operations.

Home Theatre.

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Owing to bad weather, Bomber Command had only carried out one major attack—against Brunswick. Night air photographs showed the results to have been promising. Mosquitoes had also bombed Berlin and Magdeburg.

United States bombers had attacked most successfully the German fighter assembly factory at Oschersleben and the bomber aircraft components factory at Halberstadt as well as other targets in Germany.

"Crossbow" targets had also been attacked by our own and United States Air Forces.

Coastal Command had attacked 5 U-boats, 1 of which had been assessed as sunk and 3 possibly damaged.

Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Force, amounted to 199 destroyed and 58 probably destroyed. (The former figure included claims of 134 by the United States heavy bombers.) Allied losses amounted to 127, including 39 United Kingdom and 62 United States heavy bombers.

Air activity had increased during the previous week. 9,300 sorties had been flown: 70 per cent, had been against tactical and 30 per cent, against strategic targets. Included in the latter were Sofia, the Piraeus and aircraft factories near Florence.

Enemy losses were 35 aircraft destroyed as against 45 Allied.

Confirmed shipping losses during the previous week, including belated reports, amounted to 17,064 tons. Confirmed losses for January amounted to 35,617 tons.

During the month 2 U-boats had been sunk and 3 probably sunk.

Light forces had operated in the Adriatic in support of the Eighth Army.

A Japanese cruiser had been reported as sunk by one of our submarines off Penang.

Weather conditions on the Italian Front continued to be bad. Most of the fighting had been on the Fifth Army front. The French Corps and the Americans had each made an advance of about 4 miles on a 9 to 10 miles front.

No account had been received from the Russians regarding their attacks in the Leningrad area. Near Veliki Luki the Russians had made an advance which had reached the Nevel–Leningrad Railway. Further south Mozyr had been captured, and considerable progress had been made in that area. The three German counter-attacks in the Kiev salient had all been reported to be held. Still further south the Russians had made some minor improvements in their line. There were still no signs of a German withdrawal from the Dnieper Bend, but there was evidence that they were experiencing difficulties with their railway communications.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 6th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet the latest information in regard to the Russian-Polish situation, a record of which is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.F. (44) 34), in which he reported that Mr. Cordell Hull had agreed to defer the more drastic steps he had been contemplating, but was still pressing to issue a general statement, to impose a general freezing of Argentine assets, and to withdraw the United States Ambassador from Buenos Aires; and wanted us to take parallel action.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had appended to his Memorandum a draft telegram to our Ambassador at Washington setting out the lines on which he should speak to Mr. Hull on this matter and indicating the steps which we might be prepared to take in the interests of Anglo-United States solidarity.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the information which had come in during the week-end, giving the reactions of other countries, all tended to increase his anxiety about the course of action proposed by the United States Government, and brought home the need for further consideration of this matter before any action was taken.

The Minister of Food said that our 1944 import programme included about 1½ million tons of foodstuffs from the Argentine. About one-third of our meat came from that country, and there was very little chance of making good from elsewhere any falling off in imports from the Argentine. Our balance of trade with the Argentine was adverse and, reviewing the position as a whole, he was satisfied that the suspension of trading between the two countries would be far more damaging to us than to the Argentine.

The Minister of Production referred to our urgent need for hides, for which we were largely dependent on the Argentine.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the last two sentences of the penultimate paragraph of the Foreign Secretary’s draft telegram went too far towards committing us to a course of action which might have very serious consequences on supply programmes, failure to achieve which would inevitably have a damaging effect on military operations during 1944. It was accordingly suggested that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should send the telegram to Lord Halifax on the following lines:

"The War Cabinet had again examined the situation. With every desire, on our part, to keep in step on this matter with the United States Government, it seemed to us that, if Mr. Hull’s proposed general statement was at a later stage followed by action, military operations would inevitably be jeopardised. Accordingly, we thought that no final decision should be taken in this matter until the military implications had been examined. We had accordingly asked that the matter should be examined as a matter of urgency by the British Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion met with the general approval of the War Cabinet.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, if at a later date it was desired to make a statement on the lines of the last two sentences of the penultimate paragraph of the Foreign Secretary’s draft telegram, the reference to our own controls would have to be differently expressed.

The War Cabinet’s conclusions were as follows:

(1) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to send an interim telegram to our Ambassador at Washington on the lines suggested at "X."

(2) The Chiefs of Staff were invited to examine and report to the War Cabinet, as a matter of urgency, on the effect on military operations this year of an immediate cessation of supplies of all kinds from the Argentine, and on the strategical implications of breaking off relations with that country.
Inland Transport.

4. The War Cabinet considered the following papers:

(i) A Memorandum by the Minister of War Transport (W.P. (44) 26) reporting that the country's transport system would not be able to continue to move the present load as well as the additional traffic arising from "Overlord," and suggesting that he should examine the position in consultation with the Ministers responsible for heavy movements and agree with them what reductions in traffic should be made.

(ii) A Memorandum by the Minister of Fuel and Power (W.P. (44) 29) pointing out that any further reduction in the volume of coal transport could only be achieved at the expense of war production, of the domestic consumer or of the coal set aside for "Overlord."

(iii) A Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 27) drawing attention to the serious situation which would arise if, so soon after the Government had announced their decision to direct young men to the mines, numbers of miners became idle owing to the Government's inability to move coal from the pits.

(iv) A Memorandum by the Deputy Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 31) suggesting that the whole inland transport position should be examined by the Minister of Production in consultation with the other Ministers concerned.

Points in discussion:

(a) The Minister of War Transport said that all the Departments concerned had been aware for some time that the launching of operations on the Continent based on this country would lead to a difficult transport position. It was, however, only recently that the full implications had begun to become clear, and he had taken the first opportunity of bringing the position to the notice of the War Cabinet.

(b) The Minister of Fuel and Power said that, as a result of the transport difficulties which had already arisen, stocks of coal were already 2,000,000 tons less than had been anticipated. If for the rest of the coal year transport facilities for coal could be restored to the level of last November, it should be possible to avoid further consumption cuts. If, however, further cuts were made in the volume of coal traffic, it would be necessary to consider further cuts in consumption, which might involve the closing down of some less essential production.

The Minister of Production said that the Americans had promised delivery by April next of considerable quantities of machinery required for working outcrops. A difficult position would arise if, after obtaining this machinery, which the Americans had been reluctant to supply, we were unable to move all the coal produced.

(c) The Minister of Production also suggested that, in addition to the points mentioned by the Deputy Prime Minister in his Memorandum, the implications of the inland transport position on our supply and import programmes also required examination.

(d) The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he had made provision for all the labour requirements arising from "Overlord" of which he had received notice, and these had been taken into account in the recent man-power allocations. Had he received notification of some of the additional requirements,
e.g., those for dockers, which had now arisen, he might have been able to make provision for them also. At this late date, however, it was difficult to see how, even if the additional men could be provided, they could be trained in time. In any case, consideration of these additional requirements must inevitably involve a review of the recent man-power allocations.

(e) The Secretary of State for War said that a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Findlater Stewart was now examining a proposal to reimpose, on security grounds, the ban on visitors to the coastal areas. He thought that this Committee should also take into account the relief which such a ban might bring to the inland transport position.

(f) The Minister of War Transport pointed out that reductions on many types of small traffic would yield little result. He hoped, therefore, that any enquiry which might be undertaken would concentrate on the big traffics.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Minister of Production, in consultation with the Ministers concerned, to examine both the immediate problem of coal transport and the more general question of the steps which should be taken to relieve the congestion on the inland transport system.

This enquiry should be carried out on the lines proposed by the Deputy Prime Minister, subject to the points raised in discussion.

Parliament.
Business of the House.

5. The War Cabinet discussed the business of the House in the weeks beginning the 23rd and 30th January.

The main question discussed was whether provisional arrangements to hold the two days' Debate on Electoral Reform in the week beginning the 23rd January should be modified so as to allow of a debate on agricultural policy. The War Cabinet decided that on balance it was desirable that there should be a Debate on agriculture during the course of that week; and, further, that, since the course of the Debate was likely to turn on the interpretation of the Government pledge about fixing prices of agricultural products in relation to agricultural costs, the Debate should be wound up by a War Cabinet Minister.

The War Cabinet accordingly decided on the following programme:

Tuesday, 25th January.—Committee stage of the Vote of Credit. Debate on His Majesty's Government's contribution to the expenses of UNRRA. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would speak first for the Government, and either the Minister of State or the Minister of Food would be asked to reply to the Debate.

Wednesday, 26th January.—Debate on agriculture. The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries would speak first for the Government, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would reply to the Debate.

Thursday, 27th January, and Friday, 28th January.—These days would be occupied by items of the legislative programme.

Tuesday, 1st February, and Wednesday, 2nd February.—A two-day Debate on Electoral Reform. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security would speak first for the Government, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would wind up for the Government on the second day.
6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum (W.P. 44 (44) 30) in which the Minister of Labour and National Service drew attention to an amendment which had been put down to the Disabled Persons (Employment) Bill and which sought to provide that no regulations or orders made under the Bill should have effect until they had been approved by affirmative resolution of each House of Parliament. The proposals at present contained in the Bill provided that regulations and orders should be laid down before Parliament as soon as may be after they had been made, and might be annulled by resolution of either House if a prayer was presented within twenty-eight sitting days next after the laying of the regulations or orders.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that regulations and orders to be made under the Bill fell into the following three categories:

(a) Regulations on matters relating to the entry and retention in the register of the names of persons handicapped by disablement.

(b) Orders (which could only be made after previous consultation with the appropriate employers' or workers' organisations) fixing the standard and special percentages determining an employer's quota under the Bill and designating classes of employment specially suitable for disabled persons.

(c) Regulations on matters of procedure.

He was not prepared to agree that regulations on matters of procedure should be made subject to affirmative resolution. So far as the present Bill was concerned, he would have seen no great objection to agreeing to the amendment so far as the other orders and regulations in question were concerned. He understood, however, that other Ministers concerned with post-war legislation felt that an awkward precedent might be set if a concession were made in regard to these regulations and orders.

The President of the Board of Trade said that the legislation on economic matters, which would be required after the war in place of the present Defence Regulations, would have to contain many provisions empowering Ministers to make regulations and orders. He would see no objection to it being provided that such orders and regulations might be annulled by negative resolution. If, however, they were made subject to affirmative resolution, the consequent congestion of business would be most serious.

The Minister of Production said that he had been asked by the Minister of Supply to make a similar point in regard to the legislation which would be required to provide for the continuance and gradual relaxation of the raw material controls.

The War Cabinet were informed that it was difficult, on the basis of precedents, to draw any hard-and-fast line between the types of regulation or order which were normally made the subject of the affirmative or negative resolution procedure. Broadly speaking, however, it might be said that affirmative resolutions were normally only provided for in cases in which regulations or orders amended the provisions of a Statute or contained provisions affecting monies payable to the Exchequer. It appeared probable that the amendment to the Disabled Persons (Employment) Bill was directed not so much to the merits of the particular proposals about regulations and orders made under the Bill as to the general objection felt by some Members to delegated legislation.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that any concession on this occasion would be likely to lead to the establishment of an undesirable precedent and that the amendment should, therefore, be resisted on the ground that, if regulations and orders arising from the whole field of reconstruction legislation were to be made
subject to affirmative resolution, this would lead to such congestion of Parliamentary business as would seriously impede the work of reconstruction.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Minister of Labour and National Service to deal with the amendment on these lines.

7. At their meeting on the 10th January, 1944, the War Cabinet had accepted in principle a proposal that the Daily Worker should not be permitted to have accredited correspondents with His Majesty’s Forces, and had invited the Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Minister of Home Security, to formulate the terms in which this decision should be conveyed to the Daily Worker.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet approved a draft reply, submitted by the Secretary of State for War, to a question by Mr. Pritt for answer on the following day, subject to the amendment of one sentence.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
17th January, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 18th January, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.

The War Cabinet had a general discussion on the occasion of the Prime Minister's return from North Africa.

The Prime Minister gave the War Cabinet an account of his recent conferences with the Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theatre, and with General de Gaulle.

The outstanding points in the field of foreign policy were passed in review, and a number of operational matters were also discussed.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was sorry to have been away for so long from this country. But it so happened that his stay in North Africa had enabled him to have some very useful conferences with the Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theatre. These had helped to bring about a satisfactory conclusion of a number of matters upon which the forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean depended. The U.S. Authorities had been very helpful, and all the necessary arrangements for Operation SHINGLE had now been made.

In view of these impending operations, he thought it was undesirable to make any statement in Parliament in the near future on the military situation.

Reference was made to the fact that the Germans had occupied several of the islands off the Dalmatian coast.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that when Operation SHINGLE was over, operations ought to be carried out for the capture of some of these islands. We ought not to allow Yugoslavia to be sealed off.

THE PRIME MINISTER had had long talks with General de Gaulle in the presence of Mr. Duff Cooper. He had taken the opportunity of taking General de Gaulle to task for not conducting matters in a way which would lead to early and friendly relations, particularly with the U.S.A.

The Prime Minister said that the position of General de Gaulle, vis-a-vis the French National Committee was now greatly altered. The French Committee of National Liberation was now by no means a one-man show and contained some new and powerful elements, although General de Gaulle was the biggest figure on it.

The Prime Minister referred to the position in regard to Turkey. He understood that the Turks were now refusing to agree that we should send in the 1,200 experts (this was the latest figure which had been agreed upon) unless we met all their armament demands, which were impossibly high. The Prime Minister added that if this position continued, the matter would have to be put very bluntly to President Inoue.

Brief reference was made to the Argentine. Some of the difficulties of the situation, e.g. on the supply side were explained.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought it was important that we should try so to handle matters that
the United States did not withdraw their Ambassador while we took no parallel action. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that we were using all our endeavours to see that the Americans did not take any such action until the consequences had been fully examined.

Poland and Russia

Reference was made to the very difficult position between Poland and Russia.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would consider the matter and would see if he could take any action which would be of help.

The view was expressed that the U.S.S.R. would be putting themselves in a false position if they took the line that it was for their Government to say what personalities should or should not be included in the Governments of other countries.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that a number of Parliamentary Questions on the relations between Poland and Russia had been put down for answer on the following day. So many questions had been put down that he thought it was impossible to ask that they be withdrawn. He proposed to deal with them by a single general statement, the text of which he would show later to the Prime Minister.

Baltic States

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the Cabinet should have a discussion in the near future about the Baltic States. He did not suggest that we should volunteer any public statements on the Baltic States, but our hands in the position might easily be forced. His own views on the matter had changed considerably.

Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was sure we should stand by the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio until Rome had been captured. It was interesting to note that M. Vishinsky had expressed the lowest opinion of Counts Sforza and Groce.

Italian Ships for Russia

No reply had been received from President Roosevelt to telegram No. 545 containing an alternative proposal as to the best way of meeting the Russian demand that certain Italian ships should be handed over to them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this telegram contained a proposal that we should lend the Russians one of our older battleships, the Royal Sovereign, which had recently completed a refit in the U.S.A.

Germany

THE PRIME MINISTER said that recent secret intelligence showed that Hitler's position was still very strong. If operation OVERLORD did not achieve considerable success, many people would no doubt start objecting to the demand for unconditional surrender.
The Prime Minister said that in his view unconditional surrender meant that the enemy's will had been broken, and that it was not thereafter possible for the enemy to claim we had no right to impose particular terms or treatment. The question whether the terms imposed were in accordance with the Atlantic Charter was a question for the Allies to settle.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF gave the Prime Minister an account of the degree of success obtained by bombing attacks on ski sites. Of 94 identified sites about 20 had received Category 'A' and about 30 Category 'B' damage. The space occupied by the buildings on these sites was very small indeed; and they were very difficult to damage.

After some further discussion:

The Chiefs of Staff were invited to prepare a report showing the military advantages and disadvantages of using gas against ski sites in the event of the attacks on this country based on these sites becoming too damaging. Moral and political considerations should not be taken into account in preparing this report.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that when operation OVERLORD was carried out, it might be necessary to divert aircraft from Coastal Command to increase the lift of parachute troops. This use of Coastal Command aircraft might be vital to the battle, and it might, therefore, be necessary to ask for aircraft to be diverted from anti-U-boat warfare, even although such diversions would result in increased sinkings.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said that there would in any case be a substantial risk of sinkings during OVERLORD, since it would be necessary greatly to reduce the number of escort vessels with each convoy.

THE PRIME MINISTER was informed that the plan for OVERLORD attack had not yet been finally settled. General Montgomery was keen that the attack should take place on a wider front.

The War Cabinet was informed that a good deal of progress had been made with post-war reconstruction. The scheme for demobilisation had been re-cast and would shortly be resubmitted to the Cabinet. Draft White Papers were being prepared dealing with comprehensive medical services, social service schemes, workmen's compensation, employment after the war, and "Uthwatt". All these would, of course, be submitted to the Cabinet in draft.
WAR CABINET 9 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 20th January, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON,
M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON,
M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON,
Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Lord Privy Seal.

Colonel the Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 4 and 5).
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG,
M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS,
K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN,
M.P., Minister of Food (Item 1).
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW,
M.P.,
Minister of State (Item 1).

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORN,
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 4 and 5).
The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P.,
President of the Board of Education (Item 5).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN,
M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL,
Paymaster-General.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
## WAR CABINET 9 (44).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Post-War Relief</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance in the Military Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Protection of Monuments and Works of Art</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St. John's Church, Smith Square</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Meeting with Dominion Prime Ministers</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Report of Committee on Basic English</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. At their meeting on the 23rd December the War Cabinet had invited the Minister of State to arrange for an examination of the finance of relief during the military period. The War Cabinet now had before them a memorandum on the matter by the Minister of State to which was appended a joint memorandum, the terms of which had been agreed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 38).

The main point at issue was whether the finance of relief during the military period should be met from our contribution to UNRRA of 1 per cent. of our national income (£80 million). Since the matter had last been discussed in the War Cabinet, a telegram had been received from the United States which showed that the United States Treasury took the view that relief supplies during the military period (and also relief supplies for ex-enemy territories) should be outside the UNRRA 1 per cent. contribution. It had accordingly become necessary to make our position in this matter clear as a matter of urgency, and telegrams had been despatched to Viscount Halifax, making it clear that our 1 per cent. contribution represented the maximum United Kingdom contribution to relief in all areas and at all times. These telegrams were now reported to the War Cabinet for endorsement.

It was pointed out that at the Conference at Atlantic City, our representatives had been authorised to approve contributions to UNRRA at the rate of 1 per cent. of national income; but that the question of how relief in ex-enemy territories or in the military period should be financed had not been clearly defined. It was therefore possible that the attitude which we had now taken up would be regarded as, in a technical sense, inconsistent with the resolutions recorded at the Conference.

After a short discussion the War Cabinet—

Endorsed the view set out in W.P. (44) 38 that the figure of £80 million, or 1 per cent. of our national income, must be regarded as the maximum United Kingdom contribution to relief in all areas and at all times, and took note with approval of the Memorandum by the Minister of State.

2. The War Cabinet had before them two Memoranda on this subject. The first was a Note by the Deputy Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 14), covering a memorandum received from the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Trustees of the British Museum, and signed also by the Principal Trustees of the Museum, by the Chairman of the Trustees of the National Gallery and by the Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Victoria and Albert Museum. This memorandum dealt with the steps to be taken to minimise war damage to monuments and works of art, and with the post-war problems of compensation for and restoration of looted and destroyed properties. The signatories recommended the establishment in this country of a Commission on the lines of the Special Commission set up by the President of the United States.

The second Memorandum, by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 35), set out the steps which had been taken to protect monuments and works of art in territories entered by our forces and also dealt with the post-war problem.

The first point dealt with in discussion was whether the steps taken to prevent unnecessary damage to monuments and works of art in territories entered by our forces could be improved. It was admitted that in the past there had been some avoidable damage and loss. The organisation had accordingly been remodelled and now provided the three essentials required for the task. These were, first, the issue of stringent and effective orders by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, placing upon the Commanders of troops the responsibility for taking adequate steps to deal with this matter. Secondly, the Commanders had been provided with a list of monuments and other historic buildings in their areas. Thirdly,
Officer experts were attached to the fighting commands, and others in the rear of the battle areas were available for posting wherever required. These officers now enjoy an authority which they had not formerly possessed.

General agreement was expressed with the view that the measures now in operation were on sound lines and were well calculated to prevent unnecessary damage to monuments and works of art.

The second point discussed was the steps which should be taken to deal with the post-war problem created by the looting or destruction of works of art and of valuable properties by the Germans. This was a large and difficult subject, and it was generally agreed that use could probably be made to good advantage of the services of a body of experts in this country. As was pointed out in the paper by the Secretary of State for War, steps had already been taken to enlist a panel of authorities on the fine arts, whose advice could be called for in cases of special difficulty.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) The measures described to the War Cabinet for preventing unnecessary damage to monuments and works of art in territories entered by our forces were generally approved.

(2) The Secretary of State for War was asked to arrange, in consultation with the Lord Chancellor, for a full explanation of these measures to be given to the signatories of the memorandum appended to the Deputy Prime Minister's Note.

(3) The Secretary of State for War was also invited to consider the best means of making use of the services of an advisory body of art experts in this country, in connection with the post-war problem arising out of the looting and destruction by the enemy of works of art.

3. Arising out of the preceding minute, the War Cabinet were informed that it was understood that there was a proposal to pull down this church (which had suffered bomb damage) and to sell the site. The Prime Minister expressed the strong view that the church should be restored and that considerable pressure should be exercised to prevent the destruction of this building.

This view was warmly endorsed by the War Cabinet.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 12) reporting that in the absence of some unexpected development it could now safely be assumed that the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa would arrive in the first week of May, and suggesting that consideration should be given to the question whether it was desirable that any preliminary memoranda should be prepared and what briefs should be prepared for the assistance of United Kingdom Ministers at the meeting.

The first point dealt with was attendance at the Conference. The meeting was not a full Imperial Conference, but a meeting of United Kingdom and Dominion Prime Ministers. Arrangements were being made separately for the Indian representatives of the War Cabinet to be available in London so that they could take part in any discussions on special subjects affecting India. The question of attendance of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia was raised. After discussion the War Cabinet decided that it would be desirable to give the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia an opportunity of being present at the time of these discussions, while making it clear that he would not be attending on the same basis as the Dominion Prime Ministers. An invitation should not, however, be extended to Newfoundland.
The second point dealt with was the preparation of papers for the assistance of United Kingdom Ministers. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs suggested that no briefs would presumably be needed on international policy and post-war settlement which would be dealt with by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but he thought that memoranda would be required on certain subjects, e.g., closer co-operation in the Empire, on which he undertook to circulate a paper.

The Minister of Labour and National Service enquired whether preliminary study could be given to the future defence of the Empire and a budgetary contribution.

The Prime Minister thought it would be preferable for any move in this matter to come from the Dominions rather than from His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. He added that we should be at pains to make it clear that the note of the meeting was to be an effort to establish still more strongly, closely and recognisably the unity of the structure of the Commonwealth and of the Empire.

The War Cabinet—

1. Approved the proposal in the paper by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 12) as to those who should be invited to the meeting, subject to the modification that the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia should be invited to be in London at the time of the discussions, on the understanding that it should be made clear to him that he would not be attending on the same basis as the Dominion Prime Ministers, and would only be present at certain meetings.

2. Agreed that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs should convene and preside over a small committee which should include the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and India and the Minister of State, with power to co-opt other Ministers or their representatives as necessary, as a Standing Committee to be in session from now until the Meeting took place, charged with preparing the material for the Meeting and advising the War Cabinet thereon.

Report of Committee on Basic English.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 47th Conclusions, Minute 5.)

The War Cabinet had before them the report of the Committee on Basic English (W.P. (43) 551), which had been appointed at their meeting on the 12th July, 1943 (W.M. (43) 97th Conclusions), under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for India, “to consider whether action should be taken to promote the spread of Basic English and, if so, to consider a programme of action. It should be open to the Committee to consider alternatives to Basic English, such as ‘Essential English.'”

The Secretary of State for India said that the Committee had to deal with two main questions, the first the best method of teaching ordinary English as such, the second the value of Basic English as a self-contained international language.

As regards the first of these matters, they were not satisfied that Basic English represented the best initial preparation for people who were anxious to learn literary English, and they did not feel justified in making any recommendation that would prejudice the excellent work done by other methods aimed at leading more directly to idiomatic and colloquial English. In their view the choice of methods most suitable for this could well be left to the Education Authorities of the countries concerned, private bodies or Institutes abroad, and to the individual student.

As regards the second point, the Committee, on the other hand, were satisfied that there was an important field for the development
of an auxiliary international language such as was provided by Basic English and a still greater potential value. The use to which Basic English might be put in Colonial Administrations with a variety of local languages was obvious.

The practical steps which in the view of the Committee should be taken to encourage development of Basic English as an auxiliary, original and international language were those set out in paragraph 15 of the report of the Committee.

The Secretary of State for India drew particular attention to recommendation 15 (c) that substantial financial assistance should be given to the Orthological Institute through the appropriate Ministry. He added that he was not in a position to suggest a specified amount. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the question of which Department should carry the expenditure also required consideration.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) The recommendations of the report as summarised in paragraph 15 were approved in principle.

(2) On the suggestion of the Prime Minister, it was agreed that, subject to a further scrutiny of the report from the point of view of its suitability for communication to the United States—

(a) a copy should be sent by the Secretary of State for India through the Foreign Office and the State Department to Mr. Cordell Hull;

(b) a copy should also be sent by the Prime Minister under cover of a personal letter to President Roosevelt.

(3) The Secretary of State for India, as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee, was invited to arrange, as recommended in paragraph 18 of the Report of the Committee on Basic English for an inter-departmental Committee to be convened, comprising representatives of the Government Departments concerned, to consider the preliminary action to be taken on the recommendations in the Committee's report.

(4) Note was taken in this connection that no estimate of the extent of the financial assistance required was yet available, and that the question of which Department should assume responsibility for this expenditure had not yet been settled.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
20th January, 1944.
WAR CABINET 10 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 24th January, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.


The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Item 5).

The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport (Item 5).

The Right Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works (Item 5).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.

The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Marshal of the Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Item 5).

Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellin, M.P., Minister of Food (Item 5).

Major the Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Item 5).

Mr. C. J. Radcliffe, K.C., Director-General, Ministry of Information (Item 4).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.
Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.
Mr. L. F. Burgess.
## WAR CABINET 10 (44).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese Atrocities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>“Overlord”</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Arrangements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Preparations for “Overlord”</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 7th Conclusions, Minute 1.)


Mediterranean.

Pacific.

Naval Operations.

Mediterranean.

South-East Asia.

Military Operations.

Italy.

Russia.

Air Raids. Casualties and Damage.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 151st Conclusions, Minute 2.)

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had made heavy attacks on Berlin and Magdeburg.

Coastal Command had attacked two U-boats, possibly damaging one. Off Norway one merchant ship had been torpedoed and others hit.

“Crossbow” targets had also been attacked by our own and United States forces.

Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Forces, amounted to 41 destroyed. Allied losses amounted to 106, including 91 R.A.F. bombers.

10,300 sorties had been flown, 97 per cent. on targets affecting the land battle. Enemy sorties amounted to 850. On the previous Saturday, when the landing around Anzio was taking place, 2,000 sorties had been flown.

Enemy losses amounted to 34 compared to 40 Allied aircraft.

Seven large enemy merchant ships and 28 smaller ones had been claimed sunk.

There had been no shipping losses nor belated reports during the previous week. The confirmed losses for January therefore remained at 35,617 tons. During the month 3 U-boats had been sunk and 2 probably sunk.

Naval forces had operated in conjunction with the landing near Anzio. The weather had deteriorated somewhat, but it was expected that the facilities of the port of Anzio would prove adequate.

The sinking of a Japanese cruiser by one of our submarines off Penang had been confirmed. This submarine, the Tally-Ho, had also sunk a merchant ship.

The Allied landing on either side of the port of Anzio was described. So far, the operation had proceeded satisfactorily, and there was no doubt that the enemy had been surprised. The exact strength of the enemy forces in this area was not known, but his main reserves had been drawn into the battle further south. Vigorous offensive action had been taken by British, United States and French troops on the Fifth Army front. Some American forces which had crossed the River Garigliano in front of Cassino had become isolated, and the enemy had taken some 500 prisoners. But nearer to the sea the river had been crossed to a considerable depth, and our positions held against heavy counter-attacks.

Mild weather conditions in Russia had interfered with operations except in the North. The Russian offensives around Leningrad had greatly improved the situation in that area. Further South the Russians had made a considerable advance from Mosyr. In the Dnieper Bend German counter-attacks had only resulted in small gains of ground near Vinnytsa and Uman.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that on the night of the 21st/22nd January 80 bombers and 12 fighter-bombers had been used. This was the largest force to attack land targets in this country in any one night since the 29th/30th July, 1942. About 30 enemy aircraft had penetrated to the London area. The attack had been very widespread, and, while there had been a number of incidents, the damage had not been of a serious nature. The casualties for the whole country had been 28 killed and 108 seriously injured.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported to the War Cabinet the latest development in connection with relations with the Argentine. As a result of the arrest of a German agent, the attitude of the Argentine Government towards the Axis had very greatly stiffened, and the future relations with Germany were likely to be decided in the next two or three days. In these circumstances, Mr. Cordell Hull was suspending all action for the present.

The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that he had thought it well to telegraph personally to Premier Stalin on two or three issues that had recently arisen in the field of relations with Russia and to make our point of view in regard to them clear. He had asked him to receive Sir A. Clark Kerr on his return to Moscow and allow the Ambassador to give him the fuller background. The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the text of his message.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of the Prime Minister's statement and endorsed the terms of his message.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to recent telegrams showing that the United States Government had decided on immediate publication of a statement on Japanese atrocities. He felt that we must conform, and was circulating a draft paper to his colleagues. He would welcome any comments as soon as possible.

The Prime Minister said that he favoured bringing out facts, and did not feel that the reactions of this publicity on Japanese treatment of our prisoners were likely to be bad.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that he anticipated that there might be some criticism of failure to publish this matter earlier. The answer was that in a matter of this gravity and seriousness it was clearly impossible to publish until the facts were reasonably well established.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported that he had been asked to serve as the channel (since there was no other way of despatching the message) for a message of goodwill from some seventy Members of Parliament to the meeting of Italian Liberal politicians which was to take place at Bari on the 28th January.

The Prime Minister urged that every effort should be made to secure, if not the cancellation, at any rate a postponement, of the meeting on the ground that the fresh offensive in Italy was a new factor since the meeting had been arranged and that all energies were now concentrated on the battle of Rome. We could argue that postponement might give the convenors a very much better meeting-place at the cost of a very brief delay. He was averse from using the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs even as a channel in circumstances such as these.

After discussion, the War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph at once to Mr. Macmillan, asking him to do all he could to secure the postponement of this meeting. If it proved impossible to stop the meeting, it was left to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to settle what should be done as regards the transmission of the message from British Members of Parliament.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 24) drawing attention to the undesirability of public pronouncements about the imminence of Continental operations, and also to the dangers which flowed from speculation in the Press about forthcoming operations.

The Director-General of the Ministry of Information said that, since the Memorandum was circulated, agreement had been reached.
with the United States Authorities on this matter. Letters on the same general lines had been sent by the Ministry of Information to newspaper proprietors in this country, and by the appropriate United States authority to newspapers in the United States, drawing their attention to the type of article on forthcoming operations which was attended by risks, and enjoining on them to abstain from speculation.

The Prime Minister said that he had been informed by the Minister of Information (who was unable to attend the meeting) that the Supreme Allied Commander intended to take selected Press correspondents into his confidence to an extent which seemed, in all the circumstances, undesirable. He undertook to send a personal letter to the Supreme Allied Commander on this matter.

The Secretary of State for Air drew attention to an article in a recent issue of the Daily Mail dealing with the use of heavy bombers in connection with "Overlord" which was open to objection. It was understood that the article had not been submitted for censorship. This article had been written before the despatch of the letter referred to by the Director-General of the Ministry of Information.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) The views of the Chiefs of Staff as to the undesirability of public pronouncements on the imminence of operations on the Continent and of speculation in the Press about forthcoming operations were endorsed; the action taken by the Ministry of Information to deal with this matter was noted with approval.

(2) The Minister of Information was asked to find out why the article in the Daily Mail, referred to by the Secretary of State for Air, had not been submitted for censorship.

Preparations for "Overlord":

3. The War Cabinet had before them the following documents:

(a) A Joint Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 2). During the period of this operation additional materials, equipment and labour required for it would have to be diverted from other production or services. The two Ministers sought approval for a procedure whereby their respective Ministries should act together in examining special requirements of this character, making plans to meet them and deciding in detail how any further needs should be met as and when they arose.

(b) A Memorandum by the Minister of War Transport (W.P. (44) 11) specifying the additional labour requirements of his Ministry for railways, road transport, highways and dock labour. This labour would be required at an early date, before the actual operation.

(c) A Joint Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air and the Minister of Aircraft Production (W.P. (44) 13) setting out certain conditions which they would like to see attached to the proposals in the Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Production.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that the meetings of the Committee on Anti-U-Boat Warfare, which had at one time been held weekly and were now held at longer intervals, should in future only be held about once every two months. In place of that Committee, he thought it would be desirable that there should be a weekly meeting to review the impact of the "Overlord" preparations on war programmes and on the civil life of the country generally. The meetings would not, of course, deal with tactical or
strategical issues. The Committee, which had been set up by the War Cabinet a week earlier, under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Production, to deal primarily with inland transport and the impact thereon of "Overlord" preparations, would, of course, continue. The results of this and of any other similar enquiries would, however, be reported to the new Committee. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.

Discussion then turned on the proposals in the Joint Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Production. Objection was seen by several Ministers to the terms of paragraph 8, which read as follows:

"It would be our joint responsibility to see that other Departments which might be affected by our decisions under this head were advised as soon as the appropriate proposals had been adopted."

Anxiety was felt lest the effect of the procedure recommended might be to interfere with vital arrangements of war production in the event of an emergency, such as was contemplated, arising.

The Prime Minister suggested that the point could be met by rewording the paragraph so as to make it clear that it would be the joint responsibility of the two Ministers to see that other Departments which might be affected by their decisions under this head were consulted in good time; and equally that it must be recognised that it would be incumbent on all Departments concerned to do their utmost to give effect to the proposals put to them.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister’s proposal to set up a new Committee under his Chairmanship to deal with the impact of "Overlord" preparations on civilian life and the war programmes.

(2) Approved generally the proposal in the Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Production subject to the modification proposed by the Prime Minister at "X." Any points of difficulty which emerged from the working out of the scheme would, of course, be reported to the new Committee referred to in (1).

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.
24th January, 1944.
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

No. 192.
January 24th, 1944.

D. 5.30 p.m., January 24th, 1944.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
DEDIP.
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Please convey following message from Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

1. We are sending Ambassador Clark Kerr back to you at once in order that he may explain a series of difficulties which, although they appear trifling at the outset, may ripen into the greatest embarrassments for us both.

2. I have been much impressed and also surprised by the extraordinary bad effects produced here by the Pravda story to which so much official publicity was given by the Soviet Government. Even the best friends of Soviet Russia in England have been bewildered. What makes it so injurious is that we cannot understand it. I am sure you know that I would never negotiate with the Germans separately and that we tell you every overtune they make as you have told us. We never thought of making a separate peace even in the years when we were all alone and could easily have made one without serious loss to the British Empire and largely at your expense. Why should we think of it now when our triple fortunes are marching forward to victory? If anything has occurred or been printed in the English newspapers annoying to you, why can you not send me a telegram or make your Ambassador come round and see us about it? In this way all the harm that has been done and suspicions that have been aroused could be avoided.

3. I get every day long extracts from "War and the Working Classes" which seem to make continuous Left-Wing attacks on our administration in Italy and politics in Greece. Considering you have a representative on the Commission for Italy, we should hope that these complaints would be ventilated there and we should hear about them and explain our point of view between Governments. As these attacks are made in public in the Soviet newspapers which on foreign affairs are believed rightly or wrongly not to diverge from the policy of the Soviet Union, the divergence between our Governments becomes
a serious Parliamentary issue. I have delayed speaking
to the House of Commons till I see the results of the
battle in Italy which is not going too badly, but in a
week or ten days I shall have to address the House of
Commons and deal with the matters to which I have
referred in this telegram as I cannot allow charges
and criticisms to go unanswered.

4. I have been very much buoyed up with the feeling
I brought back from Tehran of our good relations and by
the message you sent me through Benes, and I try night
and day to make things go the way you wish them and the
way our triple interests require. I am sure if we had been
together these difficulties would not have occurred.
I am working now constantly at making the Second Front
a success and on an ever larger scale, and my work is
rendered more difficult by the kind of pin-pricking to
which I have referred. Of course a few words spoken by
you would blow the whole thing out of the water. We
have always agreed to write frankly to each other, so I
do so now, but I hope you will see Clark Kerr when he
arrives and let him explain more at length the position
as between Allies not only fused together in war but
linked by our Twenty Years' Treaty.

5. I have not yet been able to telegraph about
my talks with the Poles because I must, in matters of
such far-reaching importance, know where I am with the
United States. I hope however to send you a message in
a few days.

3. Brigadier Maclean and my son Randolph have
safely parachuted into Tito's headquarters.

(OTP)

Distribution

The King
Foreign Secretary
Sir B. Bridges
General Ismay

War Cabinet
Lord Privy Seal
Secretary of State for the Dominions
Minister of Aircraft Production
Information
Service Ministers
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 25th January, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. SIR JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Production.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
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The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. SIR JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer. Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Production.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
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The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Production.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Items 3 and 4).
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CITRIFELS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma (Items 3 and 4).
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The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Production.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Post-War Agricultural Policy</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japanese Atrocities</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[26818—1]
Poland.

1. The War Cabinet had before them—

(a) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 48) to which was appended a record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Polish Ministers on the 20th January.

(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 47) covering a draft agreement with the Polish Government for military supplies and for the Polish Air Force.

A record of the discussion in the War Cabinet on the Polish-Soviet problem is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that, in all the circumstances, he thought it would be better to postpone, for the present, consideration of action on the draft agreement with the Polish Government, on Polish forces, dealt with in W.P. (44) 47.

Post-War

Agricultural Policy.

2. The War Cabinet were informed that the Debate on Agriculture on the following day would deal largely with the interpretation of the undertaking which had been given about the adjustment of prices of agricultural products. On this matter, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries proposed to give Parliament a full explanation of the facts underlying the Government’s policy. This explanation would necessarily have to include a statement of the figures as to price levels and profits, on which the Government relied.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (W.P. (44) 53), in which he stated that the farmers’ confidence would be largely restored if the War Cabinet would agree to the extension of the present guarantee in two respects—

(i) The Minister had been authorised to say that the present system of fixed prices and assured markets for agricultural products would be maintained for two years after the end of hostilities with Germany.

It would be a great help if it could be stated that the present system would be maintained until the end of the harvest of 1947.

(ii) It would also be a help if it could be stated that actual minimum prices for live-stock would be fixed now for the period up to 1947.

The view of the War Cabinet was in favour of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries having authority to make a statement on the lines of (i), but not of (ii).

Discussion then ensued as to whether a statement on these lines should be made by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries on the following day, or whether he should hold it in reserve for use in discussions with the National Farmers’ Union.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries should make a statement on this matter on the following day, on the lines of the Annex to these Minutes.
3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 51), to which was appended a draft of a reply to a Parliamentary Question on this subject.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—

Approved the draft Memorandum, subject to such modification as might be necessary to bring out more clearly that the particular instances quoted in the statement were quoted as examples of the general attitude of the Japanese towards British prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Palestine.

(Previous Reference:
W.M. (43) 563nd
Conclusions, Minute 2.)

4. The War Cabinet had a discussion on the following Memoranda:

(a) A Report by the Committee on Palestine (W.P. (43) 563).
(b) A Supplementary Report by the Committee on Palestine (W.P. (44) 50).
(c) A Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on British Strategic Needs in the Levant States (W.P. (44) 40).

The record of the discussion and of the conclusions reached is recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
25th January, 1944.

ANNEX.

PART OF STATEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY TO BE MADE BY THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES.

Secondly, we must have a clear understanding on the method of using the data so obtained with a view to achieving the purpose the Government had in mind when it gave the "pledge" of 1940. That also I am willing to discuss with the National Farmers' Union.

Thirdly, I would remind the House of the other part of our policy—the guarantee that the system of fixed prices and an assured market will be maintained for the duration of hostilities and for at least one year thereafter. That is a valuable assurance of stable conditions: the period which it covers is, however, difficult to forecast. In seeking a clear and definite understanding about the future application of our policy, I am quite willing to consider with the National Farmers' Union whether this assurance of the continuance of the system cannot be related more closely to the four-year production plan, ending with the harvest of 1947, which I have already set before the industry.

The object would be to cover the transition period from war to peace and allow sufficient time for the formulation after the termination of the war in Europe of a long-term agricultural policy on the basis of the discussions already proceeding with the industry, as part of the general national economic policy.
THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the suggestion which had been made by Sir Henry Morris-Jones, M.P., that Her Royal Highness Princess Elizabeth should be created Princess of Wales, or have some other title conferred upon her on her 18th birthday (21st April).

His Majesty the King had considered the matter and had suggested to the Lord Chancellor that he should draft a press announcement which might be issued from the Palace to the effect that the King did not contemplate making any change in the style and title of Princess Elizabeth on her 18th birthday.

The Prime Minister thought that the suggestion that Princess Elizabeth should be created Princess of Wales deserved further examination, and it would be a mistake to issue the proposed press announcement. He also thought if, after further examination, a decision was to be taken in the sense proposed, an announcement should be made from the Home Office and not from Buckingham Palace.

The Home Secretary said that he was in agreement with the Prime Minister's views. Some examination had, however, been made by his Department into the suggestion that Princess Elizabeth should be made Princess of Wales and he understood that some objections were seen to this course.

The Prime Minister said there was no need for an early decision in the matter, and he would take an early opportunity of speaking to the King on the point.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 27th January, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Oliver Lytton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. V. Simon, Lord Chancellor (Item 2).
The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. V. Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
Colonel the Right Hon. Oliver Stanley, M.P. Secretary of State for the Colonies (Item 2).
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Captain the Right Hon. H. F. C. Crookshank, M.P., Postmaster-General (Item 3).
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

Contents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Publication of Documents on British Foreign Policy</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Broadcasting: Future Policy</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 11th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

1. The War Cabinet had a further discussion on the Polish-Soviet question, a record of which is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Publication of Documents on British Foreign Policy.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 121st Conclusions, Minute 4.)

2. The War Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 49) on the publication of documents on British Foreign Policy.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded the War Cabinet that there had been previous discussion on this matter. He did not now press for authority to publish the collection of documents illustrating the course of Anglo-German relations between 1925 and March 1939. He was, however, impressed by the necessity of making available to the general public here and abroad, more particularly to historians and publicists, material on which to form a sound judgment regarding British foreign policy during the inter-war years. There was a risk of our case going by default and the arguments for publishing a collection of British documents with this end in view was strengthened by the fact that documents illustrating American foreign policy in the inter-war years were already being published. It was not desirable that on the Allied side the only authoritative records of international policy during the period preceding the present war should be those from American sources. In these circumstances he asked for the approval of the War Cabinet to the preparation and publication of a general collection of documents illustrating British foreign policy from 1919 to 1939. A delay of about two years was likely before the first volume would be ready. Publication would begin with the volumes for 1930; and simultaneously work would be carried out on the volumes covering the period between 1919 and 1929. The necessary arrangements would be carried out under the direction of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Woodward's services had been obtained in connection with them.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as set out in W.P. (44) 49.

Broadcasting.

Future Policy.

3. The War Cabinet had before them—

(a) A memorandum by the Deputy Prime Minister (W.P. (43) 580).

(b) A note by the Minister of Information (W.P. (44) 39).

(c) A memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 45).

The Lord President of the Council said that the Charter of the B.B.C. would come up for renewal in 1946 and suggested that in connection with future broadcasting policy, examination should be given to the question of foreign stations exploited by commercial interests. In particular, given the risk that stations adjoining this country might be controlled in the interest of United States business to the detriment of British trade and industry, attention should be paid to international policy on this subject before Continental Governments were reinstated. A further important point was the post-war control of broadcasting on the Continent of Europe and the possibility of using it as a positive instrument of peace and for the spreading of the principles of international co-operation. He suggested that there was a case for an expert inquiry as to how this end could be achieved, and as to how to ensure that international broadcasting services, if established, should also as a prime duty give news as far as possible true and unbiased by national interests.
The Minister of Information said that, owing to the great developments in recent years in the field of broadcasting, the Charter of the B.B.C. would be rather out of date when it came up for renewal. He agreed to the need for an enquiry, but thought that it might with advantage be a small body, under an independent Chairman, to look into the general question of broadcasting policy and report to the War Cabinet.

Agreement was expressed with the need for an enquiry, but the general view of the War Cabinet was that, in the first instance at any rate, the enquiry should be undertaken by a Committee of Ministers.

The War Cabinet—
Decided that a Committee of Ministers consisting of the Minister of Reconstruction (Chairman), the Lord President of the Council, the Minister of Information and the Postmaster-General, with a representative of the Foreign Office, should be appointed to enquire into the general questions of policy raised in these three memoranda, and to make recommendations to the War Cabinet.

Office of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
27th January, 1944.
WAR CABINET 13 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 31st January, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORd WOolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Stafford CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food (Item 5).
The Right Hon. Lord CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-3).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-3).

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE Chief, of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-3).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
## WAR CABINET 13 (44).  

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lord Halifax's Speech at Toronto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Indian States</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petty States in Western India.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplies of Phosphate Rock for Australia and New Zealand.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>War Pensions</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pensions and Gratuities for Officers' Widows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had made three heavy attacks on Berlin, on which a total of 25,000 tons had now been dropped since the 17th November last.

United States bombers had attacked Frankfurt and Brunswick.

Air Operations. 
Home Theatre.

"Crossbow" targets had been attacked by our own and United States forces.

Coastal Command had attacked 9 U-boats, 1 of which had been sunk and 1 possibly damaged. Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Forces, amounted to 294 destroyed and 61 probably destroyed. We had lost 117 bombers and the United States 41.

11,500 sorties had been flown in connection with the land battle. Enemy losses amounted to 126 aircraft destroyed compared to 73 Allied.

Naval Operations.
Mediterranean.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the previous week amounted to 46,700 tons. There had been no belated reports. The January total amounted to 82,290 tons.

Eight U-boats had been sunk and 4 probably sunk during the month.

Light naval forces had bombarded enemy land communications with success. The cruiser Spartan had been sunk by a glider bomb off Anzio. One hospital ship had been sunk and 2 damaged. The hospital ships had been well illuminated and had been bombed from masthead height.

The weather had improved and unloading operations were ahead of schedule.

The operations in Italy were described. On the southern part of the main front attacks on the German positions were now in progress. Attacks by the Allied forces in the Anzio bridgehead had begun on the previous day—the United States in the direction of Cisterna, which they had occupied, whilst the British attack had reached the outskirts of Campoleone. It was thought that, with reserves from the southern front and others coming south, the Germans now had some 4 to 5 divisions opposite the Allied forces which had been landed.

On the Leningrad front the Russians had continued to advance. Further south Novo Sokolniki had been captured. In the Ukraine weather had apparently interfered with operations and the Germans had had some small success. The Russians were also attacking in the Snyela area.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of the above statements.

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that on the night of the 29th/30th about 100 enemy aircraft had crossed the coast. The attack had been somewhat heavier than the attack on the night of the 21st/22nd January. Incidents had been reported from Kent and Sussex and from over 20 London boroughs. A number of fires had been caused, but none of them had been really serious. A number of widely scattered incidents resulting from anti-aircraft gunfire had also been reported. The enemy accounts of the raid had pretended that it had been on a far larger scale.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.
Foreign Affairs.
Argentina.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 10th Conclusions, Minute 3.)
Russia.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 10th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

Lord Halifax's Speech at Toronto.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had a satisfactory talk with the Argentine Ambassador, who had informed him that the Argentine Government proposed to stop all communications, trade and financial transactions not only with Germany and Japan, but also with the enemy satellite States and enemy-occupied territories. Although Argentina did not mean to break off diplomatic relations with the minor satellite States, the measures proposed gave us, in substance, what we required.

The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the terms of the reply which he had received from Premier Stalin to the personal telegram, the text of which he had read to the War Cabinet at their meeting earlier in the week.

Reference was made to Lord Halifax's Speech at Toronto on the 24th January, which had been the subject of some comment. A note summarising the Press reactions had been circulated to the War Cabinet (W.P. (44) 67).

It was pointed out that these comments seemed to result not so much from the substance of the speech, but from the place and time of its delivery.

The Prime Minister suggested that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should consider whether steps should be taken to ensure that the Government were consulted before public statements were made which were likely to be taken as pronouncements on important issues of policy.

Indian States.

Petty States in Western India.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 57), to which was appended a Draft Bill to render legal the attachment of certain Indian States to other Indian States. It was explained in the Memorandum that the Bill was made necessary by a recent decision of the local Judicial Commissioner, declaring *ultra vires* a notification by the Crown Representative transferring the jurisdiction previously exercised by the Paramount Power over a number of small States in the West of India to certain of the larger adjoining States. This transfer of jurisdiction had been made in August 1943 in order to admit the population of the small States concerned to a share in the benefits of modern administration, whilst taking due account of the long-standing rights and dignities of the “Taluqdars” or Chieftains of the States concerned. The Judicial Commissioner’s decision, of the legal soundness of which there appeared to be grave doubt, had created a serious and urgent situation in the States affected. The larger States to which they had been attached were uncertain as to their own position as regards the exercise of jurisdiction. There had been collisions between the representatives of the Taluqdars and the larger “attaching” States, and economic distress was also making itself felt owing to the refusal of many units to obtain through the attaching States the control commodities essential for their people.

The Prime Minister expressed uneasiness lest we should be regarded as proposing to legislate to remove long-established rights as a matter of administrative convenience. He was apprehensive of the possible effect on the Princes of legislation to remove native rights in India or of any suggestion that we appeared to take a light view of such legislation.

The further point was made that legislation such as that now contemplated might be exposed to criticism in Parliament on the ground that jurisdiction was being transferred from British control to the control of Indian States.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security pointed out that the proposal required legislation at a time when agreed
reconstruction legislation which was urgently required was held up for want of Parliamentary time.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that a situation of grave urgency showed every sign of developing in Kathiawar. The normal recourse of appeal to the Privy Council would involve substantial delay, possibly as much as nine months. There was a risk that in the meantime a condition of chaos might develop in the areas affected. In reply to a suggestion that the notification of last August, under which the jurisdiction now in issue had been transferred from the Political Agent to the “attaching” State, should be cancelled or suspended and jurisdiction restored to the Political Agent pending, at any rate, judicial investigation of the matter, it was explained that such a course would have a most unsettling effect locally and could not, apart from that, but reflect unfavourably on the prestige of the Crown Representative.

The Prime Minister suggested that the Leader of the House of Commons should discuss with the Leader of the House of Lords whether arrangements could be made for the introduction of the Bill in the House of Lords, and, if so, whether undue expenditure of Parliamentary time would be involved, and that the matter should be further discussed in the light of this report in a week’s time, when the Secretary of State for India would himself be present.

The War Cabinet—
Endorsed the Prime Minister’s proposal.

5. On the 20th December, 1943, the War Cabinet had decided that the American Authorities should be asked to provide vessels to ship, by the end of March, 281,000 tons of additional rock phosphate to Australia and New Zealand.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of War Transport (W.P. (44) 56) reporting that the War Shipping Administration had so far been unable to agree to this proposal. In view of the fact that some part of the extra shipping needed would inevitably have to be found from British resources, and as the shipments would have to be made by March in order to be available for the coming season in Australia, the Minister of War Transport proposed to allocate additional tonnage to lift about 75,000 tons as soon as possible.

The Minister of War Transport said that he had done all in his power to obtain additional shipping from the War Shipping Administration, but so far without success, owing to the fact that a decision had not yet been reached on certain operational requirements. He hoped that a decision on our part to find shipping for a further 75,000 tons as now proposed might stimulate the Americans to go further to help us in this matter.

He had used all possible arguments with them, but so far he had found it impossible to move them.

The Prime Minister expressed his uneasiness, at a time when the shipping situation was so serious, at the diversion of even the tonnage proposed for this purpose.

Mr. Bruce said that the matter was a most serious one from the point of view of Australia, and that New Zealand was equally interested. Australia was faced with very heavy demands for meat for American troops and was anxious at the same time to give all assistance she could to the United Kingdom. Failure to secure these phosphates was bound, however, to react on the Australian meat output.

The Paymaster-General suggested that, if British shipping was used to transport phosphates to Australia, a lien might be obtained on the resultant meat output. He referred to the very large American demands, which were on a scale far higher than ours.
The Minister of Reconstruction thought that American demands should be looked into.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs thought it was clear that, in view of the extreme scarcity of shipping, the South African request for 37,000 tons of phosphates, which was a lower order of priority, could not be proceeded with.

The War Cabinet—

(a) Approved the proposals of the Minister of War Transport as set out in W.P. (44) 56.

(b) Agreed that the additional 37,000 tons of phosphates asked for by South Africa should not be shipped; and that the South African Government should be informed accordingly.

(c) Invited the Minister of Food to investigate the questions raised as to the extent and scale of United States demands for Australian meat for their troops, and to submit a report setting out the lines on which representations might be made to the United States authorities.

6. On the 4th November, 1943, the War Cabinet had appointed a Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to make recommendations to the War Cabinet on the question of pensions payable to the widows of retired Flag Officers re-employed as Commodores of Convoy and the conditions of payment of the "killed in action" gratuity.

The War Cabinet now had before them the Report of this Committee (W.P. (44) 60). The Committee's recommendations were as follows:

(a) Pensions of Widows of Retired Flag Officers Re-employed as Commodores of Convoy.

The Committee recommended that the widow should receive, in addition to the attributable pension of the rank in which the Officer was re-employed, half of the difference between that amount and the attributable pension appropriate to the higher rank in which the Officer served on a substantive basis before his retirement.

The Committee suggested that this special arrangement might apply to certain other classes of Officers, to be agreed between the Service Departments and the Treasury. A suggested definition for these classes was "pensioned Officers performing work of a specially hazardous character in ranks lower than the rank in which they were pensioned." The Service Ministers and the Minister of Pensions agreed to this proposal.

(b) Killed in Action Gratuity.

The Committee recommended that no change should be made in the present basis of payment of this gratuity. The Service Ministers (with the exception of the First Lord of the Admiralty) and the Minister of Pensions accepted this recommendation.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he remained of the opinion that the proper course was that the gratuity should be paid to cover cases of "violent death due directly to the special risks of war service." This he understood to have been, broadly speaking, the practice in the last war.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—

Endorsed the Committee's recommendations as set out in W.P. (44) 60.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
31st January, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 1st February, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. A. V. Alexander, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production (Items 2-5).


The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Thomas Johnston, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Hugh Dalton, M.P., President of the Board of Trade (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. R. S. Hudson, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (Items 2-5).

Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellyn, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 2-5).

Major the Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Items 2-5).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General (Items 2–5).

The Right Hon. W. Whiteley, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 1).

The Right Hon. Richard Law, M.P., Minister of State (Items 2–5).

The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 1).

Mr. Duncan Sandys, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply (Items 2–5).

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.

WAR CABINET 14 (44).

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Party Truce in Bye-Elections</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Man-Power and Related Questions</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man-Power Allocations for Industries and Services in Groups II and III in 1944.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employment of Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Government Building Programme</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Building Programme</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirements for &quot;Crossbow&quot; Dispersals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet had a discussion about the Party Truce in relation to Bye-Elections. The discussion is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 52) giving the detailed allocations settled, under the supervision of the Ministerial Committee on Man-Power, for the industries and services in Groups II and III, other than those industries for which detailed allocations had already been made.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that the Ministerial Committee had made a full enquiry, and were satisfied that the allocations proposed were the best that could be made within the existing limitations. The Ministers concerned had been consulted and, although it had not been possible to meet all their points, the proposals in the Memorandum had been generally accepted.

The following points were made in discussion:—

(a) The Minister of War Transport pointed out that, since the allocations had been made, he had found it necessary to ask for 9,000 additional workers to meet the demands on transport in the next six months.

(b) The Secretary of State for War said that the allocation for War Office industrial staffs fell far short of War Office requirements. He would, of course, do his best he could with the allocations proposed, but it would be necessary to have recourse to the emergency machinery recently approved by the Cabinet to meet urgent "Overlord" requirements for which staff could not be provided within the allocations.

(c) The Minister of Food pointed out that since he had accepted the allocation for food manufacture, there had been a very large increase in the military demands for canned meat.

(d) The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries emphasised the serious effect which the proposed allocation would have on agricultural production in 1944. He recalled that an additional 700,000 acres had been ploughed up and that he had been asked to increase the acreage of potatoes to over 1 million. If it were not possible to meet a very much higher proportion of his requirements, he would be compelled to reduce the acreage of potatoes and there would also have to be some reduction in the output of milk. The Ministerial Committee had suggested that his difficulties might be met by the employment of additional prisoners of war, but there was no prospect of his getting a sufficient number of prisoners to make up the difference between his requirements and the allocation proposed.

It was pointed out that the shortage of agricultural workers was not large when compared with the total number of workers in the industry, and that to some extent the demand for additional workers was designed to enable the working week to be reduced, a measure which could hardly be justified at the present time.

The Prime Minister said that he accepted the warning given by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, but that he hoped that he would do everything possible to keep production at the highest level with the resources available to him.

(e) Reference was made to the risk that, if, as a result of security measures in connection with "Overlord," the movement of workers to and from Ireland was interrupted, the difficulties of the Agricultural Departments in maintaining production would be increased. The Prime Minister said that this matter clearly required careful examination; and that any difficulties in regard to it should be brought to the Committee, under his chairmanship, on "Overlord" preparations.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the allocation proposed in the Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 52).

(2) Agreed that any necessary adjustments in the allocations to meet emergency conditions should be dealt with by the Minister of Production and the Minister of Labour and National Service under the scheme approved by the War Cabinet on the 24th January, any points of difficulty which emerged being referred to the Committee on "Overlord" Preparations presided over by the Prime Minister.

3. The War Cabinet then considered the Memoranda by the Lord President of the Council (W.P. (44) 36) and by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (W.P. (44) 44) on the employment of prisoners of war in the United Kingdom.

General Policy.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed generally that nothing would be gained by bringing additional Italian prisoners into this country at this stage of the war if this led to substantial demands on materials and labour for building new camps and hostels to accommodate them. He suggested, however, that it might be possible to do more than the Lord President's Memorandum contemplated in the way of using existing accommodation.

The Secretary of State for War pointed out that under the Geneva Convention we were bound to provide for Italian prisoners of war the same standard of accommodation as for our own troops. The War Cabinet took the view that our general policy should be to bring as many Italian prisoners as possible to this country, and that the Minister of War Transport should not regard himself as restricted to the figure of 32,500 mentioned in the Lord President's paper.

Allocation.

With reference to paragraph 7 of the Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (W.P. (44) 44) the Lord President of the Council pointed out that paragraph 7 (a) of his Memorandum (W.P. (44) 36) was not meant to imply that the Departments possessing available accommodation should necessarily have the prisoners.

The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries referred to what he had said about the effect on agricultural production of the allocation of labour given by the Ministerial Committee on Man-Power. Whereas the Ministerial Committee had suggested that it might be possible to ease the position by the use of Italian prisoners of war, the Agricultural Departments had been allocated only 8,600 out of 32,500 prisoners of war who were likely to be available. He was satisfied that he could find accommodation for additional prisoners, and he emphasised again that unless a considerable part of the deficiency in labour was met by the allocation of additional prisoners, there would be a serious fall in output.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that the allocation of Italian prisoners of war had been made by a Committee of Officials convened by the Ministry of Labour. He promised to look into the possibility of varying the allocation with a view to increasing the numbers available for the Agricultural Departments.

Conditions of Employment.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply asked whether steps could not be taken to enable more profitable use to be made of Italian prisoners of war already in this country by giving
them incentives to work harder and by relaxing present restrictions on their movements.

The Secretary of State for War said that he thought that there would be considerable difficulty in doing this, but that he would examine the point in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) For the time being the Minister of War Transport should bring as many Italian prisoners as possible to this country, and should not regard himself as restricted to the figure of 32,500.

(2) At this stage of the war we should not use material and labour in building new camps and hostels for Italian prisoners; but Departments should try to make the maximum use of existing accommodation.

(3) Note was taken that the Minister of Labour and National Service would examine the possibility of increasing the number of prisoners allocated to the Agricultural Departments.

(4) Note was taken that the Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, would examine whether means could be found to make more profitable use of the labour of Italian prisoners.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 42) setting out the proposed labour allocations for the Government Building Programme for the six months January–June 1944. The Minister explained that he proposed to take stock of the situation in three months' time.

The following points were made in discussion:

(a) The Secretary of State for Air said that the Minister of Production had allocated 14,000 men to the Air Ministry for maintenance. This was based on the number of men employed on maintenance by the Air Ministry in the previous summer, at a time when the number of men on maintenance had been reduced to an abnormally low level in order to employ as many men as possible on new construction. Further, 100 new airfields were now in use and this called for a larger maintenance force.

(b) The First Lord of the Admiralty said that the Admiralty's allocation represented a cut of over 11 per cent. Furthermore, since this cut had been proposed, there had been new operational demands calling for 1,500 men. He also thought that when "Overlord" started it would be necessary to have a pool of 300 or 400 men available to make good damage from enemy air attacks at embarkation points.

(c) The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply said that "Phoenix" was now occupying not 14,000 but 20,000 men. On the other hand, the number of men employed on "Ministry of Supply (Other Works)" was not 30,000 but 26,000 men. As a result, arrears of urgent work under this head were accumulating. He thought it would be very difficult to reduce the allocation for "Ministry of Supply (Other Works)" from 30,000 to 29,000 in June next, as proposed by the Minister of Production.

The Prime Minister said the points raised in discussion could appropriately be taken into account in the adjustments which inevitably had to be made in a matter of this kind. In his view the Minister of Production's proposed allocations should be approved.
The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the allocations of building labour set out in the Memorandum by the Minister of Production.

(2) Agreed that any necessary adjustments in the allocations, to meet emergency conditions, should be dealt with by the Minister of Production and the Minister of Labour and National Service under the scheme approved by the War Cabinet on the 24th January, any points of difficulty which emerged being referred to the Committee on "Overlord" Preparations presided over by the Prime Minister.

5. In connection with the preceding item, the War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 43) asking whether provision should be made for certain building proposals put forward by the Ministry of Aircraft Production in relation to "Crossbow."

After a short discussion the War Cabinet reached the following conclusions:

(1) The proposal to erect the six reserve factories, in the form of prefabricated hangars, referred to in Annex I (a) of W.P. (44) 43 should not be proceeded with.

(2) Authority was given for the following:

(a) the proposal to proceed more quickly, on account of "Crossbow," with the erection of three radio valve factories which formed part of a long-term expansion of the radio valve industry;

(b) certain smaller extensions and modifications of existing buildings, for which labour would be found from the Ministry of Aircraft Production's bulk allocation.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
1st February, 1944.
15th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 15 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 4th February, 1944, at 12 noon.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject.</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet were informed that a series of telegrams had been received from Sir A. Clark Kerr recording the results of a discussion which he had had with Premier Stalin and M. Molotov, dealing, inter alia, with the Polish-Soviet question. A preliminary discussion took place, which is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Some reference was also made in discussion to a Polish opposition paper published in London which continued to attack the Russian Government.

The Minister of Information said that he had had some difficulty in making arrangements for the supply of newsprint to be cut off from this newspaper, but that this point of difficulty had now been overcome.

The Prime Minister said that he attached considerable importance to this being done.

2. The War Cabinet had a discussion on a further proposal in regard to an American approach to Eire, and had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 69).

The discussion and conclusions reached are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
4th February, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 7th February, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grice, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport (Items 6-7).
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations...</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future of the Italian Fleet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Catterick Bridge</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explosion of an Ammunition Train</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Indian States</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petty States in Western India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipment of Food Grains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>London Airfield for Transport Services</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

    Owing to the moon and bad weather, the operations of Bomber Command had been limited to minelaying and light raids.

    United States bombers had attacked Frankfurt, Wilhelmshaven and Emden.

    "Crossbow" targets had also been attacked.

    During January 24,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Germany. This was the highest figure reached in any month.

    Coastal Command had attacked 3 U-boats, possibly damaging 1.

    Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Forces, amounted to 60 destroyed, 9 probably destroyed and 19 damaged. Allied losses amounted to 39 bombers, 32 fighters and 8 Coastal Command aircraft.

    Bad weather had interfered with flying operations, but attacks had been made on enemy communications, airfields and battle targets. Enemy losses amounted to 153 destroyed, against 53 Allied.

    Japanese aircraft claimed as destroyed during the week amounted to 288, including 141 destroyed on the ground. Allied losses amounted to 20.

    The Chief of the Air Staff undertook to inform the War Cabinet of the total number of Japanese aircraft claimed as destroyed during the previous twelve months.

    Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the previous week amounted to 14,352 tons. Losses for January, including belated reports, amounted to 108,400 tons.

    Our naval forces continued to support the land operations. The maintenance position was satisfactory.

    In the Adriatic a 5,000-ton German tanker and other craft had been sunk off the Dalmatian Coast.

    A German U-boat had sunk 5 merchant ships since the 26th January.

    During the previous week German counter-attacks had been made on either flank of the Anzio bridgehead. During one such attack one of our brigades had been isolated, but a counter-attack had restored the position and had enabled the brigade to withdraw. On the main front further south heavy fighting had taken place and Cassino had been outflanked; we were now endeavouring to clear the town.

    In the North the Russians had made considerable progress and were now close to Luga station. Near Vitebsk the Germans had reported Russian attacks, but these had not been mentioned so far by the Russians. Further south the Russian capture of Luck and Rovno threatened important railway communications. Attempts by the Germans to relieve the ten divisions surrounded north of Shpola had failed. The elimination of these ten divisions, together with the probable destruction of another five divisions in the Nikopol area, endangered the whole of the German positions in this salient.

    The War Cabinet—

    Took note of these statements.

2. The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet of the position regarding the future of the Italian Fleet. A record of the Prime Minister's statement is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.
3. The Prime Minister gave the War Cabinet an account of an interview which he and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had had with the Polish Prime Minister. A record is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

4. Reference was made to the ammunition train which had exploded while being loaded on the previous Friday. Some 8 persons had been killed and about 70 injured. Considerable damage had been caused in the immediate neighbourhood.

The Secretary of State for War said that an enquiry was taking place. But, as the station had been destroyed and the records lost, it seemed unlikely that the cause of the explosion would be traced. There was no reason, however, to suppose that the explosion was not due to an accident.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

5. At their meeting on the 31st January, 1943, the War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 57), to which was annexed a draft Bill to render legal the attachment of certain Indian States to other Indian States. The War Cabinet had then endorsed the proposal of the Prime Minister that the Leader of the House of Commons should discuss with the Leader of the House of Lords whether arrangements could be made for the Bill to be introduced in the House of Lords, and, if so, whether undue expenditure of Parliamentary time would be involved; and that the matter should be further discussed in the light of this report.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported that, as a result of his discussions, he favoured the introduction of the Bill in the House of Lords. The Leader of the House of Lords anticipated no difficulty in this course. It was hoped that discussion of the Bill in the House of Commons would not be protracted.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposal to introduce in the House of Lords legislation on the lines of the draft contained in Annexure I to W.P. (44) 57.

6. The War Cabinet at their meeting on the 10th November, 1943, had agreed that shipping should be provided for 100,000 tons of food grains to India during the first two months of 1944.

The War Cabinet now had before them—
(a) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 63). After surveying the harvest returns and the present prospects, the Viceroy stressed the importance of food in maintaining India’s economic stability and in helping to close her inflationary gap. The Viceroy urged that it was of essential importance that, as recommended by the Gregory Food Grains Committee, His Majesty’s Government should provide shipping to carry imports of 1 million tons of wheat for current consumption and half a million tons for reserve. The Secretary of State for India strongly supported Lord Wavell’s recommendation.

(b) A note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 76) circulating on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies a memorandum by the Colonial Office urging that it be made a condition of import assistance to India that the Government of India agree in return to permit the export of 10,000 tons
of rice a month to Ceylon to meet the minimum essential requirements of that island.

(c) A Memorandum by the Minister of Food (W.P. (44) 77) stressing the importance of the export from India to Ceylon of 10,000 tons of rice monthly from her crop, and urging that, if it was agreed that India should import wheat, she should, in view of the probable serious shortage of oils and fats in the world, be asked to release in the year ending the 31st October, 1944, 475,000 tons of ground-nuts, over 400,000 tons of which had duly been purchased by the Ministry of Food.

The President of the Board of Education, speaking on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, said that both he and the Viceroy were anxious to secure the War Cabinet's approval to the proposals in W.P. (44) 63, both on psychological and political grounds, and in order to buttress the position before the present crop came on the market in April or May. The Government of India, who had just fixed a maximum price for millets and were considering a maximum price for rice, had in these last few weeks taken definite steps towards a well-based all-India food policy. On psychological grounds, it would be difficult for India to agree to export ground-nuts or rice unless India's demands for the import of wheat were met.

The Prime Minister questioned the statistical basis of the Government of India's case. The high average production of the three years ended 1938/39—i.e., some 53½ million tons—had been cited in W.P. (44) 63 as the normal crop. To this the high average net imports of 1,298,000 tons for the three years ending 1939/40 had been added, to produce a total average consumption of 54,793,000 tons. As the estimated crops only amounted to 53,000,000 tons, a deficit in 1944 of about 1,000,000 tons resulted, to which there had to be added 500,000 tons for special defence needs. But for the four years ending 1941/42 the average consumption was 52,331,000 tons, i.e., 2½ million tons less than the figure cited by the Secretary of State. This difference would, of course, more than make good the 1½ million tons calculated deficit.

It looked, too, as though, in calculating the 53,500,000 tons available, the fact stated in the paper, that the rice crop was expected to be up by 2 million tons and the wheat crop down by 1 million tons, had been left out of account. That would appear to make an extra 1 million tons available.

He was gravely concerned in these circumstances at a suggestion that shipping, of which we were in such short supply, should be used on a major scale to import food into India, given the effect of its diversion alike on operations and on our imports of food into this country, which could be further reduced only at the cost of much suffering.

The President of the Board of Education expressed his readiness to examine at once the statistical basis of the case, and added that the Viceroy was ready to send an expert representative home to explain the position in greater detail.

The Minister of War Transport said that, while he had been able to provide the cereals previously sanctioned by the War Cabinet for India, there was no prospect of any further shipping being made available by the United States, owing to the increasing demands for shipping for military purposes. It would be quite out of the question to find shipping for the million and a half tons now asked for, which would represent 250 voyages from Australia to India. Any shipping allocated would inevitably reduce the United Kingdom import programme.

The Minister added that he was ready to ensure continuance of imports of rice in Ceylon for the present, at the rate of 10,000 tons a month, either from Egypt or from Brazil.
Other points taken were as follows:

(a) Even on the basis of the figures in the memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, the shortage in Bengal was a very small percentage of normal consumption.

(b) It was urged that shortage in Bengal was partly political in character, caused by Marwari supporters of Congress in an effort to embarrass the existing Muslim Government of Bengal, the Government of India and His Majesty's Government.

(c) The course of prices and the actual food situation in India tended, moreover, to depend on political and psychological factors. India in the past had relied on Burma, both for very substantial annual imports and for reserves. With Burma in enemy hands, the situation could be exploited for either political or economic reasons.

(d) To the extent that the shortage was political, the Viceroy's general position would be strengthened if he was given the means to deal with it; and, provided shipping was available, the way to break a speculative market was to ship in wheat.

(e) The Government of India were unduly tender with speculators and boarders. It was pointed out, on the other hand, that they were doing their utmost to establish a sound food policy. The Viceroy, too, had been very successful in carrying with him the important Muslim grain-producing provinces, and it was desirable to strengthen him by giving him the support for which he asked.

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet—

Agreed that the matter should be further examined, with particular reference to the statistical basis of the paper that had been put before them by the President of the Board of Education on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, in consultation with the Ministers of Food and War Transport and the Paymaster-General; and that it should be considered again in the light of their report.

7. At their meeting on the 1st November, 1943, the War Cabinet had referred to a group of Ministers for enquiry and report a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, proposing the establishment of a new airfield near London capable of accommodating heavy transport aircraft of the latest type.

The War Cabinet now had before them the report of the Committee, presided over by the Lord President of the Council (W.P. (44) 73), recommending that the Air Ministry should be authorised to proceed with work on Stages 1 and 2 of the proposed scheme.

The War Cabinet had a preliminary discussion of this Report, in the course of which the Prime Minister expressed doubts as to the need, on military grounds, for starting work on this airfield at the present time. He also questioned whether, in view of the other demands on our resources, we should be justified in making available at this juncture the labour required. The Prime Minister asked to be furnished with a statement showing the amount of labour required, month by month, on the basis of the scheme recommended in the Committee's Report.

Further discussion of the Committee's Report was postponed to a later meeting.
17th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 17 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Wednesday, 9th February, 1944, at 7.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. THOMAS JOHNSTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland (Items 1-2).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LADY CHERRY, Paymaster-General.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. LADY CRIPPS, M.P., Minister of Information.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. NORMAN BROOK.
Mr. W. S. MURIE.

Contents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand Agreement of 21st January</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[26531—1]
1. The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that he had been in communication with His Majesty The King in regard to the suggestion which had been made in some quarters that a title should be conferred on H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth on the occasion of her 18th birthday. The Prime Minister asked the War Cabinet to agree that he should tender advice to His Majesty in favour of the issue from Buckingham Palace in the near future of a short official announcement that The King did not contemplate any change in the style and title of H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth on the occasion of her approaching 18th birthday.

The Prime Minister said he understood that this would be in accordance with His Majesty’s own wishes in the matter. The King’s Private Secretary would, of course, inform the Governors-General of the Dominions of the proposed announcement before it was made.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction, the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland (W.P. (44) 74) regarding the scheme for a National Health Service. Attached to the Memorandum were the draft of a White Paper on the scheme, and a shorter Memorandum which was to be issued as a Stationery Office publication.

The Minister of Reconstruction explained the main features of the scheme, which was the result of many months of work by the War Cabinet Committees concerned with reconstruction. There had been differences of opinion on a number of points, as was inevitable in the consideration of so extensive and complex a problem; but the scheme now put forward had the unanimous support of the Reconstruction Committee. He sought the authority of the War Cabinet to publish the documents circulated with the Memorandum, not as representing the Government’s final decisions in this matter, but as a basis for public discussion of the scheme.

Points in discussion were:

(a) The scheme did not involve the abolition of private medical practice. Although the public service would provide free medical treatment for all who cared to avail themselves of it, it would be inexpedient to prevent those who so desired from making private arrangements for treatment. Equally, it would have been wrong to exclude any class of persons from treatment under the public service merely on the ground that they could afford to pay for treatment as private patients.

(b) It must be recognised that the scheme would constitute some threat to private medical practice—any proposals for the establishment of a comprehensive medical service must have that effect.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that the proposals for grouped practice—whether in health centres or otherwise—were likely to lead to increased efficiency among the rank and file of the medical profession.

(c) The suggestion was made that the scheme would involve the establishment of a large bureaucratic machine which, through the proposed Central Medical Board, would determine where each doctor should practise.

It was pointed out that, if there was a shortage of doctors and the State had undertaken to provide a universal service, the State must have some power to control the general distribution of doctors in the public service. The degree of this control was not, however, so drastic as had been suggested. In the case of separate practice,
for example, all that was proposed was that the consent of the Board should be required before a vacant public practice was filled or a new public practice established; and it was intended that this consent should be withheld only if there were enough or too many doctors in the area.

(d) It was suggested that the scheme was likely to meet with keen opposition from the doctors, and would be represented as undermining the whole basis of the medical profession.

The War Cabinet were informed that, while opinion among doctors might be divided, it was likely that the scheme would be supported by a substantial proportion of the profession. It was also pointed out that a scheme on somewhat similar lines had been in operation for over thirty years in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland—where it had proved highly beneficial to the population, had increased the efficiency of the service, and had not had the effect of killing private practice.

(e) It was suggested that the reference to Sir William Beveridge in the introductory paragraphs in each of the two Papers might, with advantage, be omitted.

This was agreed to.

The Prime Minister asked that, in presenting this scheme to the public, Ministers should stress the fact that it did not represent the final views of the Government: that it was put forward for public discussion and that constructive criticism would be welcomed; that, when there had been an opportunity for the formation of public opinion, the details would be further discussed with the medical profession and other interests affected; and that only then would the Government proceed in the light of all these discussions to formulate their final conclusions and to bring forward proposals for legislation.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved on this basis the scheme outlined in the documents attached to W.P. (44) 74.

(2) Authorised the presentation of the White Paper to Parliament and the simultaneous publication of the shorter memorandum.

(3) Took note that these documents would be published on the 17th February, and that arrangements would be made for them to be debated in Parliament after an interval of two or three weeks.

3. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 70) about the Australia-New Zealand Agreement of the 21st January, 1944. Attached to the Memorandum was the text of the agreement, together with a telegram on the subject, dated the 25th January, from the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs explained that we had had virtually no prior knowledge of this conference, which we had thought was intended to be a mutual consultation between the two Governments of a preliminary character before consultation with ourselves and other foreign countries. It was therefore, perhaps somewhat unfortunate that the two Governments should have published their conclusions without any prior consultation with us. Nevertheless, on a broad view, he thought that the results of the conference might well prove to be useful. In particular, he pointed out that the two Governments had stated publicly that they had a primary interest in the defence of the Pacific.

The Secretary of State also drew attention to paragraphs 7, 10 and 14 of the agreement, in which the two Governments asked for representation on certain bodies, including representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies. He
thought that it might be difficult to give effect to such claims without giving rise to awkward claims on the part of the United Nations generally.

The main point dealt with in the course of a preliminary discussion was what reply should be returned to the telegram from the two Prime Ministers of the 25th January.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to arrange for a reply to be drafted, in consultation with the other Departments concerned, and submitted to the War Cabinet on the broad lines indicated in his Memorandum. This reply would include a statement to the effect that we took the view that the matters dealt with by the conference would be suitable for discussion at the forthcoming meeting in London of Dominion Prime Ministers.

Office of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
9th February, 1944.
WAR CABINET 18 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Friday, 11th February, 1944, at 11-45 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1–3).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Lord President of the Council (Items 1–5).
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. R. S. HUDSON, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.
Major the Right Hon. G. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power.
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State.

The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., President of the Board of Education.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. Harcourt Johnstone, M.P., Secretary, Department of Overseas Trade.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

Contents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Miners’ Wages ...</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Security of Preparations for “Overlord”</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anglo-American Discussions under Article VII</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Australia–New Zealand Agreement of 21st January, 1944</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Miners’ Wages.

1. The Minister of Fuel and Power said that a point had arisen in regard to the Porter Award on which the Government would have to make an immediate statement. Under that award the minimum weekly wages of adult underground workers and surface workers, and of youths under 21, had been increased and new rates had been laid down for overtime and week-end pay. He thought that the Government must accept the position that provision would be made either directly or indirectly from the Coal Charges Account to meet the cost of this Award, and also of a previous award dealing with holidays with pay. It would also be necessary that there should be an adjustment of pay in certain cases to remove certain anomalies arising directly from the Porter Award. Otherwise there would, for instance, be cases in which “contractors” would have to pay increases to day wage men in their gang without receiving corresponding increase themselves. It appeared, however, that negotiations had been started between the mine workers’ and mine owners’ representatives in certain districts (notably in South Wales) for a substantial increase in piece-work rates, on the understanding that such increases would be accepted as a charge against the Coal Charges Account.

The matter had been discussed in the Lord President’s Committee that morning and it had been agreed that an announcement should be made that, while provision should be made from the Coal Charges Account to meet the cost of the Porter Awards, and of any necessary adjustments to meet obvious anomalies arising directly from those awards (e.g., in regard to wages of “contractors”), the Government were not prepared to make similar provision in regard to other wage increases. He thought that, if the Government took this line, there was a risk of trouble in South Wales, and possibly in other districts. The Ministers concerned, however, were satisfied that this risk must be faced.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he agreed with the views of the Minister of Fuel and Power. Any further concession would have serious consequences of an inflationary character.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed; and took note that the terms of the announcement would be agreed by the Minister of Fuel and Power, in consultation with the Lord President of the Council and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

2. The Prime Minister referred to the Committee which had been set up under his Chairmanship to deal with preparations for Operation “Overlord.” At the meeting of this Committee held on Wednesday, the 9th February, consideration had been given to a scheme for the imposition of a visitors’ ban over a coastal belt from the Wash to Land’s End and covering certain areas of Scotland.

The Prime Minister said that it was of the utmost importance that due regard should be paid to military security. He thought, however, that consideration should be given to measures to deal with the matter on a different basis, namely, by preventing any information passing out of the British Isles. This involved consideration of the facilities enjoyed by the representatives of foreign Governments. He had asked that a Committee consisting of the Minister of Production (in the Chair), Minister of Aircraft Production and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply should be responsible for the preparation of a report on these measures. But, in view of the wide scope of the measures involved, he thought that representatives of the Foreign Office and of the Home Office should be associated with the three Ministers who had been asked to carry out this enquiry.

The War Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of this statement.
3. The Prime Minister referred to the discussion on this matter two days earlier. The matter had, of course, been very fully discussed over a long period on the Reconstruction Committee. The issues involved were, however, very far-reaching, and he had come to the conclusion that, on the whole, it would be desirable that they should be rather more fully discussed than had been possible on the occasion of the earlier meeting, before a final decision was reached to publish the White Paper.

After a short discussion, the War Cabinet—

Agreed that consideration of this matter should be resumed at a meeting to be held at an early date in the following week.

4. At their meeting on the 21st December the War Cabinet had invited the Minister of State to prepare a note focussing for ministerial decision the points arising out of the recent Anglo-American discussions under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, and had asked that the Minister of State should be informed of any points which Ministers wished to raise on the subject.

The War Cabinet now had before them—

(a) Two Memoranda by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 75 and W.P. (44) 81) focussing issues arising out of the Washington conversations and dealing with the points raised by individual Ministers.

(b) A Memorandum (W.P. (44) 82) by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs recommending that the Censorship should be asked to arrange with the Press for the avoidance of all reference to the forthcoming discussions with the Dominions and India whether on the monetary or other aspects.

(c) A Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 95) criticising the outcome of the Anglo-American discussions under Article VII as representing in effect the revival of the gold standard issue and pressing for their rejection.

A general discussion took place on the issues arising out of the papers before the War Cabinet. A record is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

At the end of the discussion the Prime Minister summed up by saying that the general view of the War Cabinet was in favour of proceeding with a policy generally on the lines discussed at Washington, and as set out in the Minister of State's Memorandum, although no doubt there would be a number of specific points which would require further examination. The main point which had emerged from the morning's discussion had been the importance of this country securing adequate safeguards in respect of the transitional period. He thought, too, that those handling these questions should not neglect to consider the alternatives which we should have to adopt if no agreement were reached with the United States on the lines of the Washington discussions.

The Prime Minister added that it was a matter of urgency to settle the lines which our officials should take in the discussions with representatives of the Dominions and India, which were due to start on the 21st February. This immediate task should be entrusted to a small committee of Ministers, though it might later be found desirable to turn this body into a Standing Ministerial Committee to consider our post-war financial, economic and commercial policy in the international field, including general problems likely to arise in the transitional period.
The War Cabinet—
Agreed that a Committee should be set up as follows:—
  Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chairman),
  Minister of Production,
  Lord Privy Seal,
  President of the Board of Trade,
  Minister of State,
  Paymaster-General.

The Committee’s task was to determine, in the light of
the discussion in the War Cabinet as summarised by the
Prime Minister, the attitude to be taken by United
Kingdom officials in the forthcoming discussions with
official representatives of the Dominions and India over
the whole field of the Washington Conversations under
Article VII.
It was, of course, open to the Committee to invite other
Ministers to assist them, as might be necessary, in regard
to any particular aspect of their enquiry.

5. At their last meeting the War Cabinet had invited the
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to arrange for a reply to
the Australian and New Zealand Governments to be drafted and
submitted to them. Copies of the draft reply were handed round
and considered at the meeting.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the draft reply subject to the following
points:—

(a) the offer to share in defence responsibilities in the
Pacific was a notable landmark, and should be made
more cordial;

(b) paragraph 7 should read as follows: “We are in
agreement with the general principle laid down in
this paragraph, with the proviso that its applica-
tion in certain individual instances might be
affected by the terms of the arrangements made at
the time.”

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
11th February, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 14th February, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. SIR STRATFORD CRIPPS, Lord President of the Board of Education.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport.
The Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Paymaster-General.

SECRETARIAT:

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

CONTENTS.

Subject. Page

Indian Food Grain Requirements 86

[26649-1]
Indian Food.

Grain Requirements.

AT their meeting on the 7th February, 1944, the War Cabinet had appointed a Committee consisting of the President of the Board of Education (in the absence of the Secretary of State for India), the Minister of Food, the Minister of War Transport, and the Paymaster-General, to examine further the request of the Government of India for continued importation of food grains, with particular reference to the statistical basis of the case set out in the memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (44) 63).

The War Cabinet now had before them—

(a) the report of the Committee presided over by the President of the Board of Education (W.P. (44) 99);

(b) a draft (W.P. (44) 103) of a possible official telegram to the Governor-General of India conveying to him a decision in the sense of the conclusions of the Committee.

The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that, besides the telegrams before them, there had been a further communication from the Viceroy urging in the strongest terms the seriousness of the situation as he foresaw it, if the Government of India's full demand was not met. The Prime Minister added that the shipping difficulties revealed by the report of the Committee under the President of the Board of Education were very real. While he was in general agreement with the draft telegram to the Viceroy he was most anxious that we should do everything possible to ease the Viceroy's position. No doubt the Viceroy felt that if this corner could be turned, the position next year would be better. It was very important, too, that the difficulties seen by His Majesty's Government in acceding to a request so anxiously pressed by the Viceroy should be clearly stated in the telegram.

The President of the Board of Education observed that the Committee had felt that they ought not to go further than the conclusions set out in their report. But he feared that the decision would cause consternation in India. The Indian grain market was accustomed to depending to some extent on imports. The 50,000 tons of Iraqi barley now in view consequent on his Committee's report was not a large amount; its price would be high; again barley had not the same value, from the Indian point of view, as wheat, and its provision would not have the same effect, particularly in the Punjab.

The Minister of War Transport said that it would be out of the question for him to find shipping to maintain the import of wheat into India at a monthly rate of 50,000 tons for an additional two months. The best that he could do was represented by the proposed import of Iraqi barley. If, when the final figures of the rice crop were available, the Government of India's anticipation of an acute shortage proved to be justified he would then have tonnage in a position to carry to India about 25,000 tons a month. But even this help would be at the expense of cutting the United Kingdom import programme in 1944 below 24 million tons, this being the latest estimate in the light of increasing operational requirements. In the circumstances it was clearly quite impossible to provide shipping to meet the full demand of 1 1/2 million tons made by the Government of India.

The following suggestions were made for the amendment of the draft telegram:

(a) It should be made clear that the Viceroy's request had been further considered by the War Cabinet.

(b) A paragraph should be added to the effect that shipping to carry any additional cargoes could only be provided by the United States, and that it was clear that any such request would be most unlikely to succeed unless it was put forward on the basis of the ascertained facts as to the 1944 harvest.

In this connection reference might be made to the seriousness of our own shipping position.
(c) The last sentence of the existing draft might be expressed differently, so as to make it clear that refusal of India’s request was not due to our underrating India’s needs, but because we could not take operational risks by cutting down the shipping required for vital operations.

The Lord President of the Council drew attention to the shortage of trained staff, at a time when the Indian Administration was making a strong effort to overcome a serious situation. Ought not the India Office to examine the lists of retired members of the Indian Services and consider whether any of them could be invited to return to India to assist the Government of India?

The War Cabinet—
(1) Gave general approval to the lines of the draft telegram to the Viceroy and asked the President of the Board of Education to arrange for a revised draft to be prepared, to meet the suggestions made in discussion, and submitted to the Prime Minister for his approval.

(2) Asked the President of the Board of Education, on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, to arrange for the suggestion made by the Lord President of the Council as to the re-employment of retired members of the Indian Services to be examined.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
14th February, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, 14th February, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winstone S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.
The Right Hon. Sir John Anderson, M.P.,
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton,
M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Herbert Morrison,
M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton,
Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce,
Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.
The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook,
Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg,
M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps,
K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken,
M.P., Minister of Information.
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (Items 1-6.)
Marshal of the Air Force Sir Charles T. A. Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff. (Items 1-6.)

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne,
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. A. V. Alexander,
M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P.,
President of the Board of Education.
The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell,
Paymaster-General.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham,
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff. (Items 1-6.)
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff. (Items 1-6.)

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
Mr. L. F. Burgis.
# WAR CABINET 20 (44).

## CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indian Ocean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bombing of Germany..</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Danger Zones</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Foreign Language Periodicals</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Civil Staffs from Service Departments</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Staffing of Civil Service in the Immediate Post-War</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed United Kingdom–United States Enquiry into</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Assistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Political Warfare Training School</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 18th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Air Operations

Home Theatre

Mediterranean

Pacific

Naval Operations

Indian Ocean

Military Operations

Italy

Russia

Pacific

Bombing of Germany.

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Owing to bad weather Bomber Command had not undertaken any major raids. An attack had been made, however, on the Antheor Viaduct near Nice and a very successful attack on a factory near Limoges.

United States bombers had attacked Frankfurt, Ludwigshafen, Wiesbaden and Brunswick.

"Crossbow" targets had also been attacked. Coastal Command had made two promising attacks on U-boats and possibly damaged six others.

Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Forces, amounted to 170 destroyed, 32 probably destroyed and 123 damaged. Allied losses amounted to 104, including 43 fighters and 52 United States bombers.

Bad weather had again interfered with flying operations, but attacks had been made on enemy communications, ports and airfields. Enemy losses amounted to 41 destroyed, against 43 Allied.

Japanese aircraft claimed as destroyed during the week amounted to 108, as against 11 Allied. The claims for Japanese aircraft destroyed for the year ending the 11th February totalled 3,784 in the air, 955 on the ground and 1,001 probably destroyed.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the previous week amounted to 17,487 tons. Confirmed losses for February amounted to 31,839 tons.

Five German U-boats had been destroyed and 3 probably destroyed so far this month.

The War Cabinet—

Requested the First Sea Lord to convey their congratulations to the Officer Commanding the Second Escort Group, which had sunk 4 U-boats and probably sunk another during one patrol.

A large German tanker had been intercepted and sunk by one of our destroyers. The Khedive Ismail, with troops on board from East Africa in convoy to Ceylon, had been torpedoed and sunk with, it was feared, heavy loss of life.

During the previous week the fighting in the Anzio bridgehead had been of a serious nature, with the result that our line had been driven back a small distance on the left flank. There was no reason, however, for serious anxiety about our being able to hold our positions. On the main Italian front some small progress had been made in the Cassino area after heavy fighting.

Australian Forces advancing along the coast of New Guinea had joined up with United States Forces at Saidor.

In the North the Russians had been pressing along the East Bank of Lake Peipus and had taken Luga. This advance seriously threatened the German salient South of Lake Ilmen. The Germans continued to report heavy Russian attacks at Vitebsk. The Germans were still endeavouring, unsuccessfully, to relieve the 10 encircled divisions North of Shpola.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The Prime Minister said that one or two cases had been reported in which aspersions had been thrown on the R.A.F. by certain members of the United States Air Forces because we did not bomb Germany by day. If this were to continue, it might lead to difficulties. He thought that the best way of dealing with the matter would be for the United States Authorities themselves to explain to their personnel the facts of the position, and the extent of our own air effort and air losses as compared with those of the
United States. He suggested that it would be as well if the Chief of the Air Staff could see General Spaatz and put this suggestion to him.

_The Chief of the Air Staff_ undertook to carry out the Prime Minister’s suggestion.

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**Danger Zones.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (41) 69th Conclusions, Minute 4; see also W.P. (43) 207.)

3. _The First Lord of the Admiralty_ said that the Spanish fishermen had announced their intention of fishing to the north of the existing sink-at-sight zone. If they adopted this course, it would give rise to difficulties, and he therefore proposed that the existing sink-at-sight zone should be extended to a line running from the tip of Land’s End to the south of Ireland. This proposal had been discussed with the Foreign Office, who were in agreement with it.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed.

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**Poland.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 16th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

4. _The Prime Minister_ gave the War Cabinet the latest information about Polish affairs. This is recorded in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

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**Foreign Language Periodicals.**

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 15th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

5. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on the 4th February the Minister of Information had informed the War Cabinet that he had arranged for the supplies of newsprint to be cut off from a Polish Opposition newspaper which continuously attacked the Russian Government.

In discussion, reference was made to the existing powers for dealing with the foreign language periodicals published in this country which persistently attacked another ally or in any way imperilled Allied unity.

_The Minister of Information_, who had circulated a Memorandum on this point (W.P. (44) 101), said that he was satisfied on balance that it would be undesirable to seek further powers from Parliament to deal with this matter. He thought that it was best to continue to rely on the Ministry of Supply’s licensing powers, which were based on the paper control.

General agreement was expressed with this view. But it should be made clear that the responsibility for giving decisions on this matter lay with the Ministry of Information, and that it was for the Ministry of Supply to act promptly on any recommendation received from the former Ministry in this matter.

This was approved.

Discussion then turned on the controversy which was being conducted between the Poles and the Russians in their respective periodicals. _The Prime Minister_ suggested that, as part of our policy of fostering better relations between the Poles and Russians, we should point out to the Russians the action which we had already taken, and which we were prepared to take in future, in regard to the Polish press, and should indicate that we hoped that the Russians in return would exercise some degree of restraint in the newspapers under their control.

_The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs_ undertook to prepare a statement suggesting what action could be taken on these lines.
Withdrawal of Civil Staffs from Service Departments.

6. The War Cabinet had before them—

W.P. (44) 62: A Note by the Secretary circulating by direction of the Prime Minister, a copy of a Minute addressed to him by the Service Ministers; and

W.P. (44) 79: A Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, dealing with the question of withdrawal of civil staffs from Service Departments.

In their Minute to the Prime Minister the Service Ministers pointed out that the question had been considered by the Lord President’s Committee as part of the proposals of the Minister of Labour and National Service to obtain additional women for urgent high priority work of national importance (L.P. (43) 77th Meeting). The Lord President’s Committee had then had before them a proposal made in a Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (L.P. (43) 288) that the Service Departments should be granted total exemption from the withdrawal of civil staffs, without reference to the Kennet Committee, but had decided that it would not be possible to grant this exemption. In view of the threat to the efficiency of their Departments, the Service Ministers felt that they could not accept this decision of the Lord President’s Committee without reference to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. They claimed that, at a time when the three Service Departments were at the peak of their war effort, they ought not to be subjected to the loss of efficiency which would result from the withdrawal of young and active clerks who knew their work, and they argued that, in any event, the Kennet Committee was not an appropriate body for deciding what staffs were essential and that the task of submitting proposals to the Kennet Committee would absorb effort which ought, especially in the Service Departments, at the present time to be devoted to more positive objectives.

In his Memorandum (W.P. (44) 79) the Lord President of the Council suggested that it was not unreasonable that the Service Departments should be called on, like other Departments, to satisfy an impartial body that the proposed withdrawals would seriously impair their efficiency. He also pointed out that the argument that the Kennet Committee had no responsibility for the administrative results of their decision could be equally well used by many other Departments and must be rejected as being incompatible with any orderly system for the equitable allocation of our man-power resources.

In opening the discussion the Lord President of the Council said that the scheme for withdrawing women of the 1923 age-class from Government Departments provided for a number of exemptions and gave the right of appeal to the Kennet Committee. He felt that, in view of this, the position of the Service Departments was fully safeguarded.

The First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that the staffs of the Service Departments had been excluded from the scope of the enquiry carried out by the Committee on the Reduction of National Government Staffs, although they had been covered by the programme for the withdrawal of 10 per cent. of mobile women employed in Government Departments. He stressed the difficulties which would arise if the Service Departments were compelled to part with fully trained women at a time when they were about to undertake important and difficult operations. There was no guarantee of prior substitution, and the substitutes who would be provided would be inferior in quality and would not be able to stand the pace at the present time. The Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air supported the views put forward by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, if the Service Departments were granted automatic exemption, there would be bound to be discontent. The fact that the Service Departments were not automatically exempted would not preclude them from getting exemption from the Kennet Committee for essential staffs.
The Minister of Labour and National Service said that to grant a total exemption to the Service Departments would put him in an extremely difficult position both as against other Departments and in Parliament. He was, however, ready to consider some deferment of the date of withdrawal of staffs from the Service Departments.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that he doubted whether it was wise to withdraw women of the 1923 class from any Government Departments at the present time. In any event, he must ask that, if an exemption were granted to the staffs employed in Service Departments, the same exemption should apply to the staffs of the Ministry of Home Security engaged on operational duties.

The Prime Minister said that he had considerable sympathy with the views of the Service Ministers. He recognised that to give total exemption to staffs in the Service Departments might be inequitable from the point of view of the individual and might lead to a certain amount of discontent. He was, however, opposed to any step which would impair the efficiency of the Service Departments in preparing for the operations which were impending this year. He suggested that the Service Departments should accept, in principle, the same treatment as the other Departments; but that, having regard to the special circumstances of the moment, no staffs should be withdrawn from the Service Departments for a period of three months. During that period there would be an obligation on the Service Departments to take the initiative in doing everything possible to release any staffs who could be spared. Towards the end of the period the question whether withdrawals from the Service Departments should be carried out would be reviewed in the light of the releases which had been made. The same principles should apply in the case of the staffs in the Ministry of Home Security to which the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security had referred.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed to the proposal made by the Prime Minister.

Staffing of Civil Service in the Immediate Post-War Period.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (44) 86) dealing with the staffing of the Civil Service in the immediate post-war period. Appended to the Memorandum was a draft statement which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to make at a very early date in the House of Commons.

The Memorandum explained that detailed proposals had been worked out in consultation with the Departments and that discussions had begun with the Staff Side representatives on the National Whitley Council. Some time would elapse before the results of the discussions could be submitted for final Ministerial approval, and it was desirable that in the interval an indication should be given of the Government's general approach to the problem. The broad principles had already been agreed by the Ministers principally concerned and the Staff Side representatives concurred in the proposal that a statement should be made.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the proposals had been approved by the Ministerial Committee on the Machinery of Government. The proposed statement, which would be made in very general terms, would indicate that the Government's immediate objective was to recruit at the earliest possible moment properly qualified personnel, that the main source of recruits would be from those who would have had an opportunity of competing for the Civil Service but for the interruption of war, and that there would be a substantial preference for ex-Service candidates.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he would be grateful if, in making his statement, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer would say that a statement would follow shortly on the subject of recruitment to the Foreign Service. The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to do this, and added that certain other minor amendments were being made to the draft statement.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the making of a statement on the lines set out in the Annex to W.P. (44) 86.

The War Cabinet had before them a note by the President of the Board of Education covering a Memorandum by the India Office (W.P. (44) 96) about a proposal, made in the first instance by the United States Chiefs of Staff, that a combined committee should be formed in India to determine the extent of economic assistance necessary for India to be built up as a base for forthcoming operations in South-East Asia.

In discussion, doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of associating United States representatives in an enquiry which was likely to have a very wide range. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the proposed terms of reference had been so drawn as to be limited to the economic assistance required to enable India to be a proper base for operations and specifically excluded any enquiry into the general financial and economic policy of the Government of India.

The Prime Minister said that the need for the proposed enquiry would to some extent depend on certain strategic decisions affecting South-East Asia which had not yet been taken.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the President of the Board of Education, on behalf of the Secretary of State for India, to obtain the comments of the Government of India on the proposed terms of reference, emphasising the dangers of a combined enquiry with a very wide scope, and indicating privately to the Viceroy that the decision as to the need for this enquiry was in part dependent on certain decisions on operational matters now pending.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Information (W.P. (44) 92) dealing with the provision of domestic staff for the residential training school which had been set up to train personnel for front-line and occupational propaganda in connection with operations in Western Europe.

The Minister of Information said that the staff required numbered about 100 women. He had been unable to get any of the Service Departments to take responsibility for providing the necessary staff, and had therefore brought the matter before the War Cabinet. He had already tried, without success, to obtain assistance from the Women's Voluntary Services.

The Secretary of State for War said that he doubted whether the provision of this domestic staff could be regarded as falling within the scope of the War Office, and that, in any event, he had not the resources to meet the request of the Minister of Information.

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet—

Invited the Lord Privy Seal to decide which Department should be responsible for providing the necessary staff. The withdrawal of any staff from a Service Department for this purpose would be taken into account in the review of the question of the withdrawal of civil staffs from Service Departments which had been agreed earlier [see Minute 6].

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
14th February, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 15th February, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. THOMAS JOHNSTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster General.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. NORMAN BROOKS.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the discussions with the Polish Ministers. The discussion is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. At their meeting on the 11th February the War Cabinet had agreed that the proposals for a National Health Service (W.P. 44) should be further discussed before a final decision was taken to publish the White Paper.

The following were the main points raised in the course of a further discussion of the scheme outlined in the White Paper:

(a) Would the scheme mean the end of private medical practice and the family doctor?

The War Cabinet were informed that the scheme would not prevent the continuance of private practice; in particular, doctors taking part in the public service would not be prevented from taking private patients. Nor would it affect the relation between the doctor and the patient. The conception of the family doctor would indeed be strengthened, since dependants of insured persons would in future become eligible for free medical treatment.

It was true that the eventual effect of the scheme might be to limit the scope for private practice—since, when free medical treatment was available for all, there might be some reduction in the numbers willing to pay for private treatment. At the same time, the scheme would not directly prohibit or restrict the extent of private medical practice.

(b) Would the scheme mean the end of the voluntary hospitals, which had for so long taken the lead in teaching and in research? These hospitals, supported by voluntary contributions, were rightly jealous of their independence. Could they continue to play the same part in the development of medical science if they became financially dependent on public authorities and had, in consequence, to accept public control?

The War Cabinet were informed that it was not proposed that the management of the voluntary hospitals should be taken over by public authority. The scheme contemplated that these hospitals should make a certain number of beds available for public patients, and that they should be paid for this service. But the payment, which would be made by the Central Government, not by the local authority, would not meet the whole of their expenditure: they would still have to rely on voluntary support for a substantial proportion of their revenue. Ministers had discussed these proposals with responsible representatives of the voluntary hospitals, who were satisfied that they could still enlist the support of voluntary contributors, so long as it was made clear that their independence was preserved and that the revenue guaranteed to them by the scheme was not sufficient to meet the whole of their expenditure.

(c) To what extent would the scheme interfere with the right of doctors to set up in practice as consultants?

It was explained that the proposals for a consultants’ service, linked with the hospitals, would make the service available to a far wider range of patients. The eventual result of the scheme would be to increase the number of consultants, and to improve their distribution over the country as a whole. This would be brought about, not by any system of State selection of doctors for consultant work, but by providing greater opportunities for doctors to practise as consultants. The scheme would not, however, prevent consultants from seeing patients privately, in addition to any part which they took in the public medical service.

(d) The Secretary of State for Scotland referred to the scheme originally known as the Clyde Basin Experiment and subsequently, after its extension to the rest of Scotland, as the Supplementary Medical Service. Under this scheme general practitioners were able to refer any patients for whom they felt that specialist advice was desirable to the Regional Medical Officers of the Department of
Health and, through them, to consultants in private practice. Up to the present date nearly 7,000 patients who might not otherwise have been able to obtain the services of a consultant had been dealt with. No fees were charged by the consultants for their services, and all the consultants attached to Scottish hospitals were in favour of the scheme. This scheme illustrated both the need for extended consultant services and the method by which such services might be provided under the proposals in the White Paper.

As regards voluntary hospitals, the Secretary of State said that in 1940 over 30,000 patients were on the waiting list of voluntary hospitals in Scotland. By agreement with the voluntary hospitals arrangements had been made under which patients on these waiting lists were admitted to the new hospitals built for the Emergency Medical Service. 26,000 patients had been dealt with under this scheme, and the voluntary hospitals had co-operated willingly in making it a success.

(e) With regard to the finance of the scheme, The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that the estimate of the cost of the general practitioner service was based on the payment of £8.4 million made to general practitioners in 1938 in respect of the 17,800,000 persons who were then insured under the National Health Insurance scheme. The basis of remuneration of general practitioners under the new proposals had been left open; probably payment would be in the main by capitation fees, although in certain cases salaries would be paid.

The total cost falling on public funds would be £132 million a year, of which about £40 million would probably be derived from social insurance contributions. The rest would be shared between the tax-payer and the rate-payer in almost equal proportions. There would be some increased burden on the rates, but the new burden would fall mainly on the Exchequer.

After a full discussion, the War Cabinet—

Re-affirmed their decision of the 9th February that the documents annexed to W.P. (44) 74 should be published as the basis for public discussion and further negotiation with the various interests concerned.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 17th February, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. THOMAS JOHNSTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland.
The Right Hon. Sir WILLIAM JOWITT, K.C., M.P., Minister without Portfolio.
Major the Right Hon. G. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT WOMPERSLEY, M.P., Minister of Pensions.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indian Food Grain Requirements</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[26068]
At their meeting on the 7th February the War Cabinet had considered the reply to be sent to the Viceroy about the Government of India’s request for the continued importation of food grains. A reply on the lines approved by the War Cabinet had been despatched on the 16th February (No. 3691).

The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that a further telegram had now been received from the Viceroy (No. 332-S of the 18th February) strongly urging the reconsideration of the War Cabinet’s decision.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the most convenient course would be for this telegram to be considered by the Committee consisting of the President of the Board of Education (in the absence of the Secretary of State for India), the Minister of Food, the Minister of War Transport and the Paymaster-General which had previously examined this question.

The War Cabinet—

Approved this suggestion, and asked that the Committee should consider this further telegram from the Viceroy, and submit a report for consideration on Monday, the 21st February.

2. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) A Note by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 71) with an Annex setting out proposals for the reallocation of man-power during the transition period between the end of the war in Europe and the end of the war in Japan;

(ii) A Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 94) dealing with the application of the proposals in W.P. (44) 71 to the Civil Defence Services;

(iii) A Joint Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland (W.P. (44) 97) on the question of the release of Regular Police serving with the Forces; and

(iv) A Note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 106) covering a Colonial Office Memorandum on the question of the release from the Forces of recruits for the Colonial Service.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that his proposals were confined to the demobilisation of the Armed Forces and dealt only with the position in the transition period between the end of the war in Europe and the end of the war in Japan. During this period the Navy and the Royal Air Force would have to retain a larger proportion of their personnel than the Army, and he had come to the conclusion that there should be no general demobilisation until the end of the war with Japan, and that during the transition period compulsory recruitment of men for the Forces should be continued, while releases of men should be regarded not as demobilisation but as a reallocation of man-power between the Forces and Industry. The proposals must, on the one hand, satisfy the Forces that as many men as possible were being released, and, on the other hand, should release the necessary labour for essential reconstruction work. Accordingly, in addition to the men, referred to as Class “A,” who would be released from the Forces on an age and length of service basis, there should be an additional class, known as Class “B,” who would be transferred out of turn from the Forces to Industry for certain specified reconstruction employments on the application of the Ministry of Labour. There would be a marked distinction in treatment between the two classes.

In addition to the men released in Classes “A” and “B,” it would be necessary to provide for the release of a limited number of specialists on an individual basis on the lines of existing practice.
The Prime Minister complimented the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister without Portfolio on the proposals. He stressed the importance of devising a straightforward scheme which would be accepted as fair by the Forces, and said that the experience at the end of the last war showed that the fundamental principle must be release on the basis of age and length of service. He recognised that the release of a certain number of men in Class "B" was essential, but he felt that it would be important to keep down the number of men in this class, and suggested that the proportion of Class "B" to Class "A" should not exceed one to ten. He also emphasised the need for distinguishing the treatment given to men in Class "A" from that given to men in Class "B".

The following points were raised in discussion:

(a) Finance.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he was less concerned with the total cost of the proposals than with the desirability of making payments to men released from the Forces in such a way as to avoid inflation and fit in with general economic policy. He suggested that it would be sufficient to give men in Class "A" a period of six weeks, instead of eight weeks, on furlough with full pay and allowances, and that the "transfer grant" proposed for men in Class "B" should be restricted to two weeks instead of four. These periods did not include additional periods of paid furlough in respect of foreign service. This point was reserved. There were also certain other financial points (with which he need not trouble the War Cabinet) on which he was in correspondence with the Minister of Labour.

(b) Position of Civil Defence Workers.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security claimed that, although Civil Defence workers might not be entitled to treatment absolutely identical with that given to men in the Forces, they should receive similar consideration. Many Civil Defence workers had undertaken dangerous duties, and in pay and conditions of service they were in a similar position to men in the Forces. He suggested that Civil Defence workers might at least get the same treatment as men in Class "B".

The Prime Minister expressed doubt whether the claim could be justified.

The Minister of Labour and National Service thought that there would be some advantage in having a separate scheme applicable to Civil Defence Workers.

The War Cabinet were informed that, in a note addressed to the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty had pointed out that any proposal to treat Civil Defence workers on lines similar to those proposed for the Forces might react on the Admiralty's Departmental Constabularies.

(c) Release of Regular Police.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security and the Secretary of State for Scotland stressed the importance of releasing regular policemen as early as men in Class "B". We must have an efficient police force to deal with any possible unrest in the years immediately after the war, and the return of the regular police to their duties could be regarded merely as a transfer from one disciplined service to another.

(d) Principle of Release on Basis of Age and Length of Service.

It was pointed out that the principle of release on age and length of service basis was not identical with the principle of "first in first out", since a weighting was given for age, and it was agreed that the balance between the respective weightings given for age and length of service would require examination. It was also explained that consideration had been given to the possibility of giving a weighting for foreign service, but after very full enquiry the conclusion had been reached that no practicable scheme could be devised.
(c) Public Announcement of the Proposals.

In the Note which the First Lord of the Admiralty had sent to the Prime Minister attention was drawn to the importance of arranging the public announcement of the Government's proposals in such a way as to avoid any danger that men in the Forces might get a garbled version. It was agreed that the arrangements for announcing the proposals would require very careful consideration.

(f) Compensation to Men retained in the Forces.

In his Note to the Prime Minister the First Lord of the Admiralty suggested that men who would otherwise be entitled to demobilisation, but had to be retained because of overriding military needs, should be given compensation by improved pay or special gratuities. It was suggested that, so far as the Royal Air Force was concerned, an alternative might be to offer men retained for service in the Japanese war permanent service in the peace-time Royal Air Force, which would, in any event, have to be kept at a high level. It was pointed out that issues of great difficulty were here involved, which would have to be examined.

(g) Agricultural Workers.

The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries said that he hoped that it would be possible for some of the younger agricultural workers who had been reserved during the war to be called up for service in the Forces and to be replaced by men released in Class "B."

(h) Release of Specialists.

It was pointed out that it should be possible to meet the essential requirements of the Foreign Service and the Colonial Service under the arrangements for the release of specialists set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Annex to W.P. (44) 71.

(i) Pension Rights.

The Minister of Pensions urged that any public announcement should clearly explain the pension rights of the men released in each class, and it was agreed that this would be necessary.

The Prime Minister said that, while he felt sure that the War Cabinet would approve the general lines of the scheme, the various points raised could properly be referred for examination by an Inter-Departmental Committee. Detailed proposals should be worked out in the next few months and full preparations made so as to enable a complete scheme to be presented to Parliament and to the Forces at the appropriate moment. He thought, however, that it would be premature to reach a decision at this stage on the proposals (set out in paragraph 3 of the Annex to W.P. (44) 71) for presenting the scheme to the public.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved generally the proposals for reallocation of manpower set out in paragraphs 4 to 12 of the Annex to W.P. (44) 71, subject to (a) above.

(2) Agreed that the Committee, under the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour, referred to in paragraph 13 of the Annex, should be set up forthwith, and that, in addition to discharging the functions set out in paragraph 13, the Committee should examine outstanding points, including a number of those raised in discussion.

(3) Agreed that the Departments concerned, acting in consultation through the Committee referred to in (2), should forthwith prepare a detailed scheme on the basis outlined in W.P. (44) 71.

(4) Deferred a decision on the date and method of presenting the scheme to the public.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
17th February, 1944.
WAR CABINET 23 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 21st February, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. S. M. Bruce, representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.


The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., President of the Board of Education.

Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellin, M.F., Minister of Food (Item 6).

The Right Hon. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General.

The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1-4).

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

The Right Hon. Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor (Item 6).

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir James Grigg, M.P., Secretary of State for War.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport (Item 6).

The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. Sir Walter Womersley, M.P., Minister of Pensions (Item 5).

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

Field-Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:


Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

Mr. L. F. Burges.
## WAR CABINET 23 (44).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hours of Business in the House of Commons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Allowances for Children of Officers killed on service</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Grain Requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military
and Air
Operations.

(Previous
Reference:
W.M.(44)20th
Conclusions,
Minute 1.)

Air Operations.
Home Theatre.
Mediterranean.
Pacific.

Naval
Operations.
Mediterranean.
Pacific.

Military (
Operations.
Italy.
Pacific.
Russia.

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the
previous week.
Bomber Command had attacked Berlin, Leipzig and Stuttgart.
United States bombers had attacked Leipzig and Brunswick:
6,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Germany during the week.
"Crossbow" targets had also been attacked. Coastal
Command had made nine attacks on U-boats, possibly damaging one.

Over 9,000 sorties had been flown and 4,000 tons of bombs
dropped in support of the land battle. Enemy losses amounted to
56 aircraft as compared to 72 Allied.

In an attack on an enemy convoy off New Hanover 8 large and
8 small ships had been sunk and a number of others damaged.
Claims for Japanese aircraft destroyed amounted to 81 as against
25 Allied.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the week
amounted to 7,754 tons, and, for the first three weeks of February
38,993 tons.
Our submarines had sunk a number of merchant ships off the
Norwegian coast.
H.M.S. Penelope had been sunk by a submarine.
The Japanese had admitted the loss of 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers
and 18 transports as a result of the United States attack on Truk.

During the previous week the enemy had delivered several
heavy attacks against the Anzio bridgehead. The most serious had
been carried out on the 18th February on both sides of the road from
Campolone to Anzio. The attacks had been held and the line
practically restored by counter-attacks. On the main front our
attempts to take the Cassino monastery had not yet succeeded.
The campaign in the Solomon Islands had been completed
except for a few isolated Japanese garrisons.

In the North the enemy had held the Russian thrusts towards
Pskov, whilst withdrawing his forces from Staraya Russa. The
Germans continued to report Russian attacks at Vitebsk. The
German divisions encircled north of Shpola had now been
eliminated.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.

Air Raids.
Casualties and
Damage.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M.(44)13th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)

2. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said
that on the night the 18th/19th February 179 people had been killed
and 484 seriously injured. Figures for last night's raid were not
yet complete, but so far 106 persons had been reported as killed.
The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that
it looked as though the series of attacks, starting with that on the
21st/22nd January, represented the inauguration of a new offensive
against London. He also gave figures which suggested that the
number of enemy raiders which had crossed the coast and penetrated
to the London area on recent raids had been rather larger than the
estimates at first given by A.D.G.B.

The Prime Minister said that he was arranging for a meeting
of the Night Air Defence Committee to be held later in the week.
Every endeavour should of course, be made to arrive at the accurate
assessment of the strength of enemy attacks.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of these statements.
Foreign Affairs.

Spain.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that our Ambassador at Madrid took the view that the Spaniards were now prepared to agree to a settlement of outstanding issues whereby no wolfram would be exported from Spain to Germany for six months, the German Consulate at Tangier would be closed, and the Allies would obtain possession of all the Italian ships in Spanish Territorial Waters except two, which would be the subject of arbitration. If we could reach a settlement on these terms, this would be very favourable to us.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet the latest information as to the position in regard to these four countries. This information is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Poland.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 21st Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Finland.

Bulgaria.

Italy.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 151st Conclusions, Minute 4.)

Parliament.

Hours of Business in the House of Commons.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded the War Cabinet that it had, at an earlier stage, been agreed that, beginning in March, the House of Commons would sit for an extra hour, the normal hour of rising becoming 6 p.m. instead of 5 p.m.

A proposal was also under consideration that, a little later in the year—say, from the date when double summer time was introduced—the House should sit from, say, 2 p.m. to 9 p.m. He would like to know whether, if such an arrangement could be made, it would meet with the approval of the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet were of opinion that there would be great advantage in such an arrangement during the period of double summer time.

Allowances for Children of Officers Killed on Service.

5. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informed the War Cabinet that on the 8th December last Lord Cork had moved a Resolution in the House of Lords in the following terms:

"That in the opinion of this House the rate of allowances for children of officers killed on service is too low and should be raised."

Lord Cork had received overwhelming support for this Resolution, which he had been able to carry without a division. He had now put down a notice for the 7th March to ask what, if any, steps it was proposed to take on the Resolution. There was very little possibility of Lord Cork being induced either to abstain from the Motion or to abstain from pressing his Motion to a division on receiving a negative reply from the Government.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was anxious that the War Cabinet should be aware of the position, so that the Government spokesman would be able to inform the House that the Cabinet had again considered the proposal, but were unable to recommend any change.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, when service pay and allowances had last been settled, His Majesty’s Government had made it clear that that settlement would stand, failing any material change of circumstances. The position of the children of officers killed on service had then had most careful consideration. An increase in allowances at this stage would have a most unfortunate effect on the general position.
Reference was made to the recent decision of the War Cabinet increasing the pensions payable to widows of Retired Flag Officers re-employed as Commodores of Convoys.

The question was raised whether this decision should be announced, either on the occasion of Lord Cork's Motion in the House of Lords or in a debate in the House of Commons on Service pay and allowances on the 2nd March. It was felt, however, that, unless the point was specifically raised, it would be better not to announce this concession on either of these occasions.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said that he thought he would have to announce the decision in the debate on the Estimates on the 8th March.

The War Cabinet—

Authorised the Government Spokesman in the House of Lords on the occasion of Lord Cork's Motion to take the line that the Cabinet had again considered the question of the allowances paid for the children of officers killed in action, but had found it impossible to recommend any change.

6. At their meeting on the 17th February the War Cabinet had had before them a further telegram, dated the 16th February, from the Vicerey about the Government of India's request for the continued importation of food grain, and had agreed that this telegram should be considered by the Committee, consisting of the President of the Board of Education (in the absence of the Secretary of State for India), the Minister of Food, the Minister of War Transport and the Paymaster-General, which had previously examined this question, with a view to the submission of a report for consideration by the War Cabinet on Monday, the 21st February, 1944.

The War Cabinet now had before them the Committee's report (W.P. (44) 118). The Committee, while impressed by the insistence with which the Vicerey urged the case for some further degree of assistance to the Indian Food Grain position, were clear that the difficulty was the provision of the requisite shipping. The information available to them was that shipping on the scale necessary could not be made available, save at a cost of a further dangerous inroad into the British import programme or a serious interference with operational plans. The Committee had considered alternative methods of assisting the Vicerey and recommended consideration of the following:

(a) a further diversion to India of the shipments of food grains destined for the Balkan stockpile in the Middle East. This might amount to 50,000 tons, but would need War Cabinet approval, while United States reactions would also have to be ascertained;

(b) there would be advantage if ships carrying military or civil cargo from the United States or Australia to India could also take a quantity of bagged wheat;

(c) the Vicerey should be asked to consider to what extent skilful publicity could be used to magnify the effect of such supplies of food grains as could be made available;

(d) the Government of India should be asked to use to the fullest advantage such supplies of barley as would be made available from Iraq, probably 50,000 tons.

The President of the Board of Education reviewed the recommendations made by the Committee, and added that any diversion of shipping from operational purposes did not lie within the Committee's competence and would have to be considered elsewhere.

It was suggested that, in view of the opinions expressed by the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Supreme Commander, South-East Asia Command, as to the military importance of maintaining...
adequate supplies of food grains for India, enquiry should be made of the Viceroy as to what military stores now under order for India those Commanders would be prepared to sacrifice with a view to the space so made available being used for the shipment of wheat. It was made plain that room could not be found for consignments of wheat to India except at the expense of other cargo, as all ships sailing to India were fully loaded.

The Minister of War Transport informed the War Cabinet that he had further examined the position. He was impressed by the Government of India’s reluctance to accept barley if that could be avoided. He felt now, after consultation with the Middle East Supply Centre, that the right course would be to abandon the proposed despatch of 50,000 tons of Iraqi barley to India. That barley could be usefully absorbed in the Middle East. In that event, he could now undertake to provide shipping for the shipment to India, in its place, of 50,000 tons of wheat. Any such arrangement would be entirely independent of the suggestion that a contribution of 50,000 tons of food grains should be obtained from the Balkan stockpile.

The President of the Board of Education expressed his readiness to accept the proposal of the Minister of War Transport. After further discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:—

1. The proposal to ship 50,000 tons of barley from Iraq should be abandoned.
2. 50,000 tons of wheat should be provided for India in place of the Iraqi barley.
3. The proposal to divert approximately 50,000 tons of food grains now en route from Australia for the Balkan stockpile to India should not be proceeded with.
4. The Viceroy should be asked to report what military stores he, the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Supreme Commander, South-East Asia Command, would be prepared to see removed from cargoes scheduled for India with a view to their replacement in those cargoes by bagged wheat.
5. A draft telegram to the Viceroy embodying these conclusions of the War Cabinet should be prepared by the President of the Board of Education and submitted to the Prime Minister.

The President of the Board of Education said that he ought to make it clear that the Secretary of State for India, on his return, might wish to raise the general question of India’s future food grain requirements.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
21st February, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 23rd February, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).

The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.

The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON,
M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,
Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON,
M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE,
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS,
K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.

The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P.,
President of the Board of Education.

Colonel the Right Hon. J. J.
LLEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food.

The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN,
M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. LORD CHEEWELL,
Paymaster-General.

The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P.,
President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. R. S. HUDSON, M.P.,
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Major the Right Hon. G. LLOYD
GEORGE, Minister of Fuel and Power.

The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P.,
Minister of State.

The Right Hon. HARcourt JOHNSTONE,
M.P., Secretary, Department of Overseas Trade.

Secretariat:

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Proposed Oil Conference</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lease-Lend</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Dollar Balances in the U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Discussions under Article VII</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The War Cabinet had a preliminary discussion of a proposal to hold an oil conference in Washington, on which four memoranda* had recently been circulated to the War Cabinet. The War Cabinet were informed that the Prime Minister had sent a personal telegram to the President on the 20th February on this matter, to which a reply had just been received. These telegrams were read to the War Cabinet and conclusions were reached as to the lines of an interim reply which the Prime Minister might send to the President.

The Prime Minister said he would consult with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Ministers directly concerned on oil questions, in framing the terms of his reply.

The full record of the discussion and the conclusions on this item is contained in the Secretary’s Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Reference was also made to a personal telegram from the President to the Prime Minister on the question of our dollar holdings in the United States.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer undertook to send the Prime Minister a memorandum which would provide material for a reply to this telegram.

At their meeting on the 11th February the War Cabinet had appointed a Committee to determine, in the light of the discussion in the War Cabinet, the attitude to be taken by United Kingdom officials in the forthcoming discussions with official representatives of the Dominions and India.

The War Cabinet now had before them a report by this Committee (W.P. (44) 121). This document contained a report from the majority of the Committee, to which was appended draft instructions to the United Kingdom officials on particular issues, and a minority report signed by the Lord Privy Seal.

Considerable discussion took place on three main issues. The first of these was the proposed International Monetary Fund. On this, the main point dealt with was the probable effect of this Fund on the continuance of the main features of the sterling area.

The second issue considered was Imperial Preference. On this, the view was expressed by some Ministers that great care should be taken to avoid giving any indication that we were ready to see reductions in Imperial Preference, unless and until it was clear that the Americans would be willing to make substantial reductions in their tariffs. The view was also expressed that the Americans were unlikely in the event to make such reductions. There was general agreement, however, that the word “expedient” should be substituted for the words “worth while” in the formula at the top of page 3 of the Committee’s Report (W.P. (44) 121).

The third issue on which discussion took place was the position of agriculture under the provisions of the proposed Commercial Union.

At the end of the discussion the Prime Minister said that he thought that it would be desirable that the War Cabinet should have an opportunity for further consideration of these matters before recording conclusions. At the same time, he thought that there would be no objection to the report of the Committee, together with the instructions appended thereto, being given to the United Kingdom officials who were taking part in the discussions with the

* Memoranda by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (44) 102 and 109).
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 119).
Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty (W.P. (44) 126).
Dominion and Indian Representatives, which had now begun, as a
general guide to the lines on which the discussions should be
conducted, provided it was clearly understood that the report did
not carry with it the authority of the War Cabinet, and that these
matters would be further discussed by the War Cabinet in the near
future.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed this view.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
23rd February, 1944.*
SECRET.

W.M. (44)

26th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 25 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, 24th February, 1944, at 12.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. H. U. Willink, K.C., M.P., Minister of Health (Items 3-6).
The Right Hon. Lord Portal, Minister of Works (Items 3-6).
The Right Hon. Earl of Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare (Items 3-6).
The Right Hon. Richard Law, M.P., Minister of State (Items 1-2).

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
**WAR CABINET 25 (41).**

**CONTENTS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AirRaids</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Indo-China</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railway Fares of Peers attending Sittings of the House of Lords.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Discussions under Article VII</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Prime Minister asked the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security to consider the issue of an announcement to the effect that, unless people had work to do, they should proceed to shelters during air raids. In recent months the people of London had got into the habit of ignoring the risks of enemy air activity. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said he would look into this point. He also undertook to examine a suggestion that certain tube shelters should be opened to the public.

2. The War Cabinet considered a draft telegram from the Prime Minister to the President in reply to a telegram from the latter which had been considered at their last meeting. Copies of the draft reply were handed round. A number of amendments were made and the War Cabinet agreed that the reply, as amended, should be despatched.

3. The War Cabinet considered—

(i) A Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction (W.P. (44) 110) on Housing in the Transitional Period; and

(ii) A Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P. (44) 122) dealing with the suggestion that legislation conferring on public authorities statutory powers to purchase land compulsorily at 1939 prices should be enacted as soon as possible.

The Minister of Health said that the proposals in the Memorandum by the Minister of Reconstruction were designed to place local authorities in a position to make an immediate start on a two-year programme of new houses of permanent type as soon as the war in Europe was over. It was hoped to have 100,000 houses completed or under construction by the end of the first year, and 200,000 additional houses by the end of the second year. Under existing legislation housing subsidies were limited to the provision of houses for slum clearance, for the abatement of overcrowding and for agricultural workers. The most urgent need after the war, however, would be for houses for general needs, and it was therefore proposed to introduce legislation extending the scope of the housing subsidies, and that the Secretary of State for Scotland and he should enter into discussions with representatives of the local authorities about the rates of subsidy payable after the war. The present restriction on the purchase of land for housing purposes should be removed and legislation should be introduced giving the Health Ministers power, during a period of two years, to confirm opposed compulsory purchase orders without holding a public enquiry. In presenting the proposals to the local authorities the Health Ministers would make it clear that the total volume of house-building in the transitional period would necessarily depend on the labour available, and that this could not yet be estimated with precision. The local authorities would, however, be asked to have their plans ready to ensure that, if building resources permitted, they would be ready to undertake a programme of the order indicated.

The Minister added that the proposals in W.P. (44) 110 related only to the provision of permanent houses, but that he and the Secretary of State were discussing with the Minister of Works other proposals for the provision of emergency houses.
The Prime Minister said that the first task must be to restore any damaged houses which could be brought back into use. This was being done.

The Prime Minister then said that he envisaged a large programme for the provision of emergency houses, to be undertaken by exceptional methods, so as to ensure that a large number of houses were made available immediately after the war for the young married couples who would then want to set up house. This would, of course, be without prejudice to the long-term programme for the erection of houses of permanent type.

The Prime Minister proceeded to outline some of the points which he thought should be included in such a programme, e.g., the erection of a considerable number of model houses in order to obtain the views of working-class women, and the incorporation of standard furniture and fittings to the greatest degree.

Discussion then turned on the question raised by the Minister of Economic Warfare in his Memorandum.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the prices paid for land required for public purposes should be based on the standard of value of the 31st March, 1939, which meant, incidentally, that account ought to be taken of changes in the value of money since that date.

It was explained that the recommendation made by the Uthwatt Committee was at present before the Reconstruction Committee, who would be reporting on it to the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Authorised the Minister of Health and Secretary of State for Scotland to open discussions with representatives of the local authorities on the basis indicated in paragraphs 3 to 6 of W.P. (44) 110, and to arrange for the early introduction of the legislation mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 6 (d) of W.P. (44) 110.

(2) Took note that the recommendation of the Uthwatt Committee that land required by public authorities should be bought at prices not exceeding those ruling at the 31st March, 1939, was at present being examined by the Reconstruction Committee and would be brought before the War Cabinet.

Indo-China.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 111), to which were attached memoranda, prepared by the Foreign Office and by the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee, about our policy in regard to Indo-China and France's Pacific possessions. Broadly, the conclusion reached in these memoranda was that we should aim at continuance of French sovereignty over Indo-China and France's Pacific possessions, subject to certain conditions, the chief of which was the establishment of international bases at strategic points. It was also suggested that the Dominion Governments should be consulted on the matter at the earliest opportunity with a view to forming an Imperial policy on this matter.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course of action proposed in W.P. (44) 111 and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to take the necessary action in consultation with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
5. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (44) 117) about the recovery of railway fares by Peers attending sittings of the House of Lords.

The War Cabinet—

Approved in principle the proposal set out in this Memorandum, invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to arrange for the detailed arrangements to be discussed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and agreed that when this had been done the matter should be raised in Parliament.

6. The Prime Minister said that he intended to set out for the consideration of his colleagues certain principles which he thought would meet with general acceptance in regard to the matters which formed the subject of Article VII discussions. He hoped that this would prove helpful.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
24th February, 1944.
WAR CABINET 26 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 28th February, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair for Items 1-10).
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Lord President of the Council (in the Chair for Item 11).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. S. M. BRUCE, Representative of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia (Items 1-10).
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor (Items 7-8).
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food (Item 9).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State (Item 9).
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 11).
Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Items 1–9).
Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1–6).

Secretariat:
Lord Bridges.
Lieutenant-General Sir Hastings L. Ismay.
Mr. W. S. Murrie.
Mr. L. F. Burgis.

WAR CABINET 26 (44).

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject.</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Nash</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean Theatre.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposals arising out of consideration of the future of the Italian Fleet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentine.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Defence</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Deep Shelters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Civil Claims against Members of the United States Forces</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Application of Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Act, 1941, to France</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Food Problems in Liberated Europe</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Army Benevolent Fund</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Service Pay and Allowances</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Prime Minister extended a welcome, on behalf of the War Cabinet, to Mr. Nash, who was now on a visit to this country.

Naval, Military and Air Operations.

(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)23rd Conclusions, Minute 1.)


2. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

So far as air operations were concerned, the week had been the most active of the whole war, 20,000 sorties having been flown; 9,058 tons of bombs had been dropped on Germany alone.

Bomber Command had attacked Schweinfurt and Augsburg, following daylight attacks on these cities by United States aircraft. In addition, United States bombers had attacked Regensburg, Rostock, Furth and Gotha with good results.

It was believed that the German capacity for aircraft production had been considerably reduced as a result of the combined United Kingdom and United States air offensive, culminating in the attacks carried out during the previous week.

“Crossbow” targets had been attacked.

Enemy losses for the week, including claims by the United States Air Forces, amounted to 348 destroyed, 86 probably destroyed and 155 damaged. Our losses included 63 R.A.F. bombers and 165 United States bombers.

The enemy had lost 22 aircraft destroyed, 5 probably destroyed and 6 damaged in raids on this country, while 7 further aircraft had been destroyed by intruders across the Channel.

Weather had interfered with our activity in support of the land battle, but targets in Southern Germany and the Balkans had been attacked. In the Mediterranean the enemy had lost 272 and the Allies 141 aircraft.

It was considered that Japanese air resistance in the New Ireland and New Britain area had collapsed. Some 40 enemy merchant vessels (most of them large) had been sunk and a number of others damaged.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the week amounted to 28,349 tons, including belated reports. February losses so far amounted to 67,042 tons.

During February 12 German U-boats had been destroyed and 4 probably destroyed.

Since its formation the Second Escort Group had destroyed 17 U-boats, of which the Commanding Officer had sunk 12 with his own ship.

The Japanese main fleet had abandoned Truk as a fleet base. In an attack on Guam by aircraft from a United States carrier 135 Japanese aircraft had been claimed as destroyed for the loss of 6 United States aircraft.

During the previous week the fighting had not been very severe on the Anzio bridgehead front, but an early attack by the enemy was expected. Owing to the size of the force in the bridgehead, this command would in future be known as the Allied Bridgehead Force. On the main front there had been nothing to report.

The situation on the Burma front had improved considerably and the Japanese had suffered a very large number of casualties.

The Prime Minister said that he had in mind to make a statement to the House of Commons in the near future regarding the situation on this front.

The Russians had made considerable advances along the whole of the Northern part of the front from Lake Peipus to near Novo Sokolniki. It looked as though the enemy intended to effect a considerable withdrawal in this sector.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.
3. The Prime Minister gave the War Cabinet information as to the latest position in regard to the proposal which had been made to meet the request of the Soviet Government that certain Italian ships should be handed over for their use.

A record is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the War Cabinet information about the main issues in the field of foreign affairs.

The Finnish situation seemed to be developing satisfactorily.

As regards the Polish-Russian situation, our Ambassador was to see Premier Stalin that day. Meanwhile, the Polish Government had not helped matters by the statements which they had put out in this country.

The discussions with the Spanish Government were proceeding satisfactorily.

The Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that the President had agreed that any change in the Italian Government should await developments in the military situation.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reported that the situation that had arisen in the Argentine, which was obscure, was still under examination, and that he could not yet make any statement about it.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

5. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security made a report to the War Cabinet on the air raids that had taken place in London between the 21st and 25th February.

The raid on the 21st/22nd February, carried out by 26 aircraft, had been of minor importance; very extensive flare-dropping had been a feature of it. The raids on the three following nights had been in many respects similar to one another. Each of these raids had been carried out by 100 to 150 aircraft, many different types having been employed. Casualties last week and the preceding week had been as follows:

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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>371</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seriously injured</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>1,016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slightly injured</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>500</td>
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</table>

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the month’s casualty figures, which in the normal course were due for release in the immediate future, should be published.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 135) on Deep Tube Shelters. The Memorandum set out the present position in regard to these shelters, their numbers, and the accommodation they afforded. As a result of recent raids, there had been a sharp
increase in the pressure on shelter accommodation, which was aggravated by the removal of certain of the bunk accommodation from tube shelters. The resultant congestion at certain tube shelters had led to pressure, encouraged by sections of the Press, for the opening of the deep shelters. The accommodation in those shelters had been provided to meet the need felt at the end of 1940 for shelters in which people could spend the whole of the night. The recent raids had been short and sharp and the deep shelters had not been built for this contingency. Moreover, of the eight deep shelters, one was in occupation by military staffs and two others were being adapted for the accommodation of Operational Staffs. The Civil Defence Committee had agreed that it would be desirable that all the deep shelters should be so reserved, while the Defence Committee (Operations) had decided that in the allocation of accommodation in deep tube shelters priority must be given to the maintenance of the machinery of Government.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that, looking at the matter from the point of view of the shelter accommodation available, there was no need to take these shelters into use. He deprecated anything that would encourage the development of the deep shelter mentality, and drew attention to the possible effect on morale of Civil Defence workers of encouraging it. On a review of the whole position, he recommended that the deep shelters should not be opened to the public and that an explanation of the reasons underlying this decision should be given.

The Prime Minister suggested that, if the present raids were continued, and these shelters were known to exist, but the accommodation was not made available, there was a risk of strong public criticism. Would it not be possible to allow the public to use them temporarily and to close or empty them at the appropriate time? He also thought that the effect on morale of the opening of these deep shelters could be exaggerated.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the possibility of allowing the public to use these shelters temporarily, and thereafter requiring them to vacate, had been most carefully examined; but all expert opinion was agreed that it would not be practicable to do so and that very serious difficulties would follow any attempt to apply such a policy. Admittedly, the amount of shelter accommodation in issue was small in relation to the total population to be catered for. But he attached importance to the question of morale, and to avoiding anything that would encourage the existing prejudice against street shelters, or tend to develop the deep dugout mentality. A question had now been put down in the House of Commons for to-morrow and he was anxious, if the present policy was approved, to give in reply to it a real justification of the policy which he was advocating. He outlined the terms of his proposed reply.

The Prime Minister said that, while he still felt some doubt as to the course proposed, he would not press his point of view.

After further discussion, the War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposals of the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, as contained in W.P. (44) 135, and agreed as to the terms of the reply to be given in Parliament, subject to the omission of the reference to "forthcoming offensive" and the substitution therefor of some such words as "essential military purposes."
7. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 133) setting out proposed arrangements for dealing with civil claims against members of the United States Forces. Attached to the Memorandum was a draft statement which would be made in the House of Commons if the arrangements were approved.

The main proposals in the Memorandum were:

(i) His Majesty's Government should assume responsibility for the settlement and payment of claims arising out of traffic accidents, accidental shootings, accidental explosions, loss of or damage to chattels in premises requisitioned by United States Forces, and certain other accidents, such as those caused by practice gun-fires and fires in billets. Responsibility would be limited to claims arising on and after the 19th March, and claims would be accepted only if they arose out of acts or omissions of United States Forces in the course of their military duties;

(ii) His Majesty's Government should accept responsibility for payment, but not for the examination, of any outstanding claims of the kind referred to in (i) and the Americans should be urged to clear up these claims satisfactorily and speedily; and

(iii) In the case of outstanding claims for sums exceeding 5,000 dollars, His Majesty's Government should assume at once the responsibility for the examination as well as the payment, since, if it were left to the Americans to settle these claims, they would be forced to refer them to Congress, with a consequent delay of many months.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that there was a great deal of criticism of the delay in settling claims against members of the United States Forces and that, unless a satisfactory solution could be reached, it would be difficult to keep this criticism in check. By no means all the traffic accidents which gave rise to claims were due to dangerous driving.

The following points arose in discussion:

(a) Could American drivers not be made to conform to the same restrictions on speed as were imposed on British Service drivers? It was suggested that the possibility of getting the United States authorities to agree to this might be explored.

(b) To what areas would the arrangements proposed in W.P. (44) 133 extend? It was explained that the arrangements would extend only to the areas covered by the British Claims Commission.

(c) The Prime Minister thought that the proposed statement to be made in the House of Commons was too long. It was agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should make a brief oral announcement and circulate the full statement in the Official Report.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals in W.P. (44) 133 subject to "X" above.

8. The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) A Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council (W.P. (44) 124) proposing that an order should be made under Section 1 (2) of the Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Act, 1941, applying the Act to France; and
A Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security (W.P. (44) 130) stating what responsibilities and liabilities would fall on him in the event of the establishment of a French Maritime Court in this country.

The Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council explained that the Lord President’s Committee were satisfied that an order should be made to enable a French Maritime Court to be established, but that, in view of the desirability in present circumstances of proceeding with great caution in any matter involving the French Committee of Liberation, they had felt it necessary to draw the attention of the War Cabinet to the proposal.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the proposal that an order should be made under Section 1 (2) of the Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Act, 1941, applying the Act to France.

Food Problems in Liberated Europe.

9. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P. (44) 113) proposing that, in view of the present world food situation, British propaganda should encourage the Spring sowing of crops, while continuing to urge peasants not to market the food through Nazi-controlled channels.

The Minister of Economic Warfare recalled that at the meeting on the 24th September, 1943 (W.M. (43) 131st Conclusions, Minute 3), the War Cabinet had decided to reconsider before the Spring sowings the question whether British propaganda should go so far as to encourage food production in Europe. He suggested that the time had come to take this step if we were going to avoid a situation in which the population of liberated areas in Europe would blame the Allies for the shortages of food which were likely to arise.

The Prime Minister saw some objection to open propaganda on these lines. He suggested that, while not changing our open propaganda to the populations of occupied areas, local agents should be instructed to speak on the lines proposed.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed that there should be no change in the public propaganda to populations of occupied countries on the subject of food production, but that local agents in these countries should be instructed to encourage food production.

Army Benevolent Fund.

10. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War (W.P. (44) 119) covering a scheme worked out by the Army Council for the formation of an Army Benevolent Fund.

The War Cabinet—
Deferred consideration of the scheme until after the forthcoming debate in the House of Commons on Army pay and allowances.

Service Pay and Allowances.

11. The Secretary of State for War said that in the Debate on Army Estimates Mr. Kendall, M.P., had a Motion calling attention to the inadequate pay and allowances of Service men and women and moving “that this House is of the opinion that the pay
and allowances of members of His Majesty’s Army are inadequate to enable them and their families to maintain a reasonable standard of living, and therefore it is urgent that immediate increases be made in such pay and allowances.

The Secretary of State for War reminded the War Cabinet that on the occasion of the last major alteration in Service pay and allowances in September 1942 it had been stated on behalf of the Government that the concessions then introduced were regarded as a final solution of the matter so long as prices remained substantially at their present levels.

Since that date price levels had not changed, but there had been some increase in industrial wages. The Secretary of State informed the War Cabinet of the general lines of the statement which he proposed to make. This was that His Majesty’s Government stood on the position which they had taken up in September 1942 and which had been reaffirmed on several subsequent occasions, and that they remained of opinion that the general scheme of the present pay and allowances was essentially sound and afforded a fair and reasonable standard for officers and other ranks and their families. At the same time the door was not closed so far as concerned the detailed application of the scheme then adopted. The position was constantly being examined in the light of the information received, and suggestions made in debate would be added to evidence already received and would be taken into consideration.

In discussion, it was suggested that the House might be reminded that on the occasion of the alterations effected in September 1942 the whole position had been very fully discussed between the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister of Aircraft Production and a committee representative of all sections of the House, who had accepted as satisfactory the rates of pay and allowances which had then been introduced. It was generally agreed that reference to this might be included in the Secretary of State for War’s statement.

Subject to this point, the War Cabinet—

Endorsed the general lines of the statement outlined by the Secretary of State for War.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,*
*28th February, 1944.*
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 3rd March, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. W. WHITELEY, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (for part of meeting).

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES, Secretary.

CONTENTS.

Subject.
Parliament—
Proposed Special Supply Day for Wales.
Invitation to Members of Congress.
Statement on Demobilisation.
The War Cabinet considered a suggestion, put forward to the Prime Minister in a minute by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, that, following the precedent of Scotland, a special supply day should be set aside for Wales. The question which Minister or Ministers should answer would be settled in the light of the points which were likely to be raised in the debate.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that, if questions in regard to employment in Wales were raised, he thought that it should be made clear that there was a single employment policy concerning the whole country. This was agreed to.

The War Cabinet—
Accordingly approved the suggestion and agreed that an announcement in regard to it should be made in the near future.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the War Cabinet that it was proposed that the two Houses of Parliament should send a message to Congress inviting a number of members to visit this country. The motion would be moved and seconded by back-bench Members. It was not certain whether the invitation would be accepted, but we had ascertained from our Ambassador in Washington that the invitation would be welcomed.

The War Cabinet agreed that the Minister of Labour and National Service should arrange for Parliament to be informed, in the near future, of the outlines of the scheme for demobilisation or reallocation of man-power in the transitional period, which had been approved by the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 17th February, 1944.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 3rd March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 6th March, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty (Items 2-3).
The Right Hon. STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State (Item 3).
The Hon. ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVEROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport (Item 3).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General (Item 3).
The Right Hon. GEOFFREY LLOYD, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Fuel and Power (Item 3).

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[27080—1]
Poland.
(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)26th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

1. The War Cabinet had under consideration further communications in regard to the Russo-Polish situation. A record of the discussion and conclusions reached is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Italy.
Proposals arising out of the consideration of the future of the Italian Fleet.
(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)26th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

2. The War Cabinet considered the situation resulting from the public statement made by President Roosevelt on this matter, and reached conclusions as to the broad lines on which the situation should be handled. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Oil.
(Previous Reference: W.M.(44)25th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

3. The War Cabinet gave further consideration to the proposal for an Oil Conference in the United States, and decided on the terms of the reply which the Prime Minister should send to President Roosevelt. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
6th March, 1944.
SECRET.

W.M. (44)

29th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 29 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street S.W. 1, on Monday, 6th March, 1944, at 7 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellin, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 5-7).
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.
The Right Hon. W. WHITELEY, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 5-7).
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (Items 1-4).

The following were also present:
The Hon. W. NASH, Deputy Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. JAMES STUART, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Items 5-7).
The Hon. SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force SIR CHARLES F. A. PORTAL, Chief of the Air Staff (Items 1-4).

Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Items 1-4).

Secretariat.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.
Mr. L. F. BUEGIS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Day of Prayer</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Negotiations with Japan for the Exchange of Civilians</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction of Cheese Ration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Service Pay and Allowances</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had attacked Stuttgart. United States aircraft had attacked Brunswick, French airfields and "Crossbow" targets. In the attack on Berlin the Americans that day had sent 800 aircraft and had lost 45. The escorting fighters were reported to have destroyed 70 enemy aircraft for the loss of 14.

During the month of February 32,600 tons of bombs had been dropped, of which 23,000 had been on Germany.

Conclusions. Enemy losses for the week amounted to 88 aircraft destroyed and 14 probably destroyed. Our losses included 5 R.A.F. bombers and 45 United States bombers. The A.E.A.F. had lost 9 bombers and 52 fighters.

In the Mediterranean the enemy had lost 23 aircraft destroyed as against 41 Allied. A number of enemy ships had been sunk or damaged.

Rabaul had been attacked without any response from the Japanese.

The confirmed shipping losses by enemy action for the week amounted to 6,502 tons, but it was anticipated that belated reports might add another 14,000. February losses, including belated reports, amounted to 79,766 tons. This was the lowest figure for any month of the war.

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2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Mr. Granville, M.P., had put down a Question, for answer on the following day, about the conversations with representatives of the Turkish Government. It was clearly not in the public interest to give any information on this matter. If, therefore, Mr. Granville was unwilling to withdraw the Question, he proposed to confine his reply to saying that he had no statement to make at the present time.

The War Cabinet—
Approved this course.

3. The Prime Minister said that the Archbishop of Canterbury had suggested to His Majesty The King that there should be a National Day of Prayer for the success of our arms in the operations which were to be undertaken this year in Western Europe. His own view was that, in view of the difficulty of selecting a suitable date and the danger of discouraging the troops, the proposal was inexpedient, and he proposed to advise His Majesty in this sense. If necessary, a National Day of Prayer might be held some time after the operations had begun.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the course of action proposed by the Prime Minister.
Negotiations with Japan for the Exchange of Civilians.

4. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 137) regarding negotiations with Japan for an exchange of civilians.

The Memorandum explained that it had been hoped that the negotiations, which had been going on for some time, would result in the release of 1,600 of the 17,000 British and Allied civilians remaining in the Far East, including 600 of the 2,500 in Hong Kong, where food conditions were extremely bad and were rapidly deteriorating. Apart from their primary object, the negotiations were important in that the exchange ships were the only means by which the Americans and we could send much-needed supplies of medicines, food and clothing to British and Allied prisoners of war and civilians.

A deadlock had been reached in the negotiations because the Australian Government were unwilling to release 330 pilots and pearl-divers who had been included among the 1,600 civilian internees selected by the Japanese Government for repatriation. The Australian Government claimed that these seamen, who had been resident in Australia up to the outbreak of war, could not be released on account of the specialised knowledge which they possessed of operational waters and because of their value in salvaging operations. The attitude of the Australian Government was strongly endorsed by General MacArthur.

In these circumstances, the Memorandum proposed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should seek the concurrence of His Majesty’s Governments and the Allied Governments concerned in proposing to the Japanese Government an exchange on a head-for-head basis of 1,270 persons in place of 1,600, the Japanese Government relinquishing their claim to the 330 Japanese seamen in return for the right to select 330 British or Allied civilians in Japanese hands to be excluded from the exchange.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asked whether it might not be possible to get the Australian Government to agree to the release of the 330 Japanese seamen now that operations in the Pacific had moved further from Australia.

Mr. Bruce doubted whether it would be possible to move the Australian Government. The case for releasing the seamen had been put very strongly to the Australian Government and through them to General MacArthur; but both the Government and General MacArthur were very emphatically opposed to the release.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he had not much hope that the Japanese Government would accept any arrangement which would not give them the 330 Japanese pilots and pearl-divers for whom they had asked. He felt, however, that it was worth making an attempt on the lines proposed. If the Japanese Government would not accept an arrangement of this kind a further approach might be made to the Australian Government.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed the proposal made in paragraph 9 of W.P. (44) 137, on the understanding that, if the offer was not accepted by the Japanese Government, a further approach should be made to the Australian Government with a view to persuading them to agree to the release of the 330 Japanese seamen concerned.

National Health Service.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 21st Conclusions, Minute 2.)

5. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that it was proposed that the Government should put down a positive motion in the following terms:

"That this House welcomes the intention of His Majesty’s Government, declared in the White Paper presented to Parliament, to establish a comprehensive National Health Service."

The debate, which would extend over two days, would be opened by the Minister of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland.
would wind up. The Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Health, would speak during the debate. It was proposed to have a simultaneous debate on the White Paper in the House of Lords.

The question was raised whether by putting down a positive motion the Government might be setting a precedent which would prove awkward in the case of more contentious White Papers. The general view was, however, that the course proposed, which was in line with what had been done on the White Paper on Education, need not bind the Government on a future occasion.

The War Cabinet—
Approved the arrangements proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the discussion of the Health Service White Paper in Parliament.

Food.

6. The Minister of Food said that, owing to shortage of supplies of cheese, the cheese ration for non-priority consumers would have to be reduced from 3 ozs. to 2 ozs. per week for a period of 20 weeks from the beginning of April. During this period consumers would be receiving larger supplies of milk. In addition, it was proposed to issue extra quantities of canned meat and fish under the points scheme, and to raise the purchasing power of points from 20 to 24. The protein intake would thus be kept up.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

Service Pay and Allowances.

7. The War Cabinet had a short discussion as to the reply which the Prime Minister should give on the following day to a Question by Mr. Kendall, M.P., asking whether he was in a position to implement the promised investigation into Army Pay and Allowances, what would be the constitution of the group to be invited to discuss the problem, and whether any invitations had yet been extended.

In discussion, it was agreed that it was important to avoid any suggestion that the group invited to discuss the problem would be in any sense a representative body. In 1942 the discussions had taken place with a number of M.P.'s who were interested in the matter, and this position should be maintained.

It was also agreed that it was important that the reply given should emphasise the reservations made by the Leader of the House on the 2nd March and, in particular, that the discussions were without any commitment.

The War Cabinet agreed that a reply should be given on the following lines:

"No, Sir. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House suggested that the same kind of informal discussions which took place in 1942 might be repeated. Arrangements to give effect to this undertaking, subject to the reservations set forth by my right hon. Friend, will be made through the usual channels."

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
6th March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 7th March, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food (Items 1-2).
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Minister of War Transport.
Major the Right Hon. G. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power (Items 1-3).
The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P., Minister of State.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Service Pay and Allowances</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Post-War Relief</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food requirements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Miners' Wages</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Washington: Joint Liaison Publicity Committee</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. At the Prime Minister's suggestion, the War Cabinet agreed that the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor of the Exchequer should undertake, on behalf of the Government, the informal discussions on Service pay and allowances with Members of Parliament who were interested in this matter. These Ministers would, of course, act throughout in the closest consultation with the Service Ministers.

2. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War about the extent of military responsibility for relief and rehabilitation in Europe (W.P. (44) 141). The Memorandum set out the basis on which the United States War Department were preparing for relief under the Directive issued by President Roosevelt.

The Secretary of State for War asked the War Cabinet to authorise him to accept, on behalf of the War Office and Army, the responsibility for relief and rehabilitation in liberated and conquered areas in Europe on the same principles as those on which the United States War Department were working, subject to the necessary changes consequent upon the difference between the British and United States governmental machinery; and to take action in conjunction with the United States War Department as regards agreement on requirements, procurement and allocation of relief supplies.

The first point dealt with in discussion was whether the military authorities should be responsible for relief and rehabilitation during the first six months, after which UNRRA should take over. General agreement was expressed with this view. It was explained that the period of six months meant six months from the beginning of effective occupation of any country, and that, unless there was a sudden collapse, the period of military responsibility would not cover the same period of six months in every liberated territory.

The next point dealt with was whether the scale on which these demands were framed was not much too high. It was pointed out that the food demanded was sufficient to provide a complete diet on the agreed scale for 23 million people for six months. It was difficult to imagine circumstances in which all food supplies would have been removed from liberated areas. It was probable that we should not, in fact, have to do more than supplement the diet of the people of these areas to the extent of, say, one-quarter. If so, we were providing enough food to supplement to that extent the diet of 92 million people. This was surely far more than we were likely to be called upon to do.

Again, if we were now to underwrite these relief requirements, it was feared that we should then be under strong pressure to agree that they should be pooled with the United Kingdom needs and a pro rata cut in food enforced all round. This might lead to a reduction in our food imports.

Attention was also drawn to the risk that the United States War Department might go on to the market and buy the food, without the concurrence of the Combined Food Board, and thus diminish the supplies available to this country.

Finally, it was suggested that a more practicable way of dealing with the matter would have been to have started by an enquiry as to the food which was available and the shipping which could be spared to bring it to Europe, and that in this way definite results would have been achieved more easily without prejudice to our own position.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that as long ago as November last President Roosevelt had given a Directive to the United States War Department to proceed on the basis proposed, and that it would be awkward for us to proceed on a different basis. Moreover, there was no likelihood that food supplies for relief would
be available in any quantities unless consumption was reduced in the United States. The prospect of getting such a reduction would be greatly increased if the problem was approached on the lines of the President's Directive.

It was also urged that the interests of this country were fully safeguarded by the procedure which would be followed.

Thus, the estimates of requirements now put forward were submitted for planning purposes only. When agreement had been reached on requirements, the next stage would be for the matter to come before the Combined Food Board, where availability of supplies would be discussed. That Board could not act without consent of our representative, who could refuse to agree to any allocation which would have the effect of reducing supplies to this country.

Thereafter the matter would come before the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, where again our representative could object if action was taken contrary to our interests.

The matter would also have to come before the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. The War Cabinet was informed that the United States War Shipping Administration had said that they would cover our import programme before assigning shipping for relief purposes.

In further discussion, it was urged that there was much to be said for safeguarding our position by setting certain points on record explicitly as a condition of authorising the present proposals; as, for example, that the present estimate of requirements was put forward for planning purposes and seemed to be in excess of what could in fact be supplied; that before we would agree to the allocation of food and shipping we must have assurances that there would be no diminution in the supplies to this country of food (and certain other commodities), which must continue on the scale at least sufficient to maintain our existing standards, which were not susceptible to reduction; and likewise, as regards shipping, that there should be no reduction in the United Kingdom import programme.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the Secretary of State for War's paper did not deal with finance. Discussion on financial issues was now proceeding, and it was to be hoped that the Americans would agree that the cost of relief supplies during the military period should be met in the same proportions which had been agreed under the UNRRA agreement. They might ask us to share the cost of relief during the military period on a fifty-fifty basis, but we should resist this.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Minister of Production, the Minister of Labour and National Service, the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Food to draw up, in the light of the discussion, and submit to the War Cabinet a draft instruction to the Secretary of State for War, setting out the points which should be safeguarded before authority was given to the proposals set out in W.P. (44) 141.

Miners' Wages.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Fuel and Power (W.P. (44) 146) on the wage structure of the coal-mining industry.

The Minister of Fuel and Power explained that he had accepted an invitation to preside over a meeting of representatives of the Mining Association and the Mine Workers' Federation on the following day, at which the overhaul of the wage structure of the coal-mining industry would be discussed. In order to bring about a closer relation between wages and output and to give mine workers
a greater sense of security for the future, he desired to put the following two proposals before the meeting:

(i) That the existing flat rate addition to wages of 4s. 6d. a shift, should, in the case of piece-workers, be merged into the piece-work rates by means of appropriate percentage increase in the tonnage or yardage rates; and

(ii) That the resulting revised rates and the existing minima should be continued by an agreement between the two sides of the industry until December 1947, at which date either side might give six months' notice of amendment or termination of the agreement.

These proposals would involve an undertaking by the Government to continue a system of financial pooling on the lines of that now provided by the Coal Charges Act and to maintain the price of coal at a level which would ensure a reasonable credit balance for the industry. The cost of the proposals, assuming that there was no increase in output, would not exceed £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 per annum, which was no more than the cost of the suggested Pit Bonus Scheme, which, if the proposals were accepted, could be dispensed with. The Lord President's Committee had approved the proposals, but, in view of the Government and the War Cabinet involved, had invited him to submit them to the War Cabinet. He was satisfied that the scheme would provide a real incentive to piece-work to increase their production and would establish settled conditions on which the future planning of the industry could be based.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he was strongly in favour of the scheme put forward by the Minister of Fuel and Power. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he also thought that the proposals were on the right lines.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the proposals of the Minister of Fuel and Power and authorised him to give the undertaking set forth in paragraph 3 of W.P. (44) 146.

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Washington: 4. The War Cabinet had a discussion about the need for continuance of the Joint Liaison Publicity Committee, Washington. They were informed that about a year ago the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Captain Crookshank) had visited America to examine the staffing of British Government establishments and to find ways and means of reducing them. He had reported in favour of the abolition of this Committee.

The question of the Committee's continuance had then been the subject of discussion between the Service Ministers and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the latter had accepted the strongly expressed views of the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air that, in their considered judgment, the Committee should continue.

The post of Chairman of the Committee had been vacant throughout the greater part of 1943, but had been filled, in December 1943, by the appointment of Air Vice-Marshal MacNeece Foster.

Early in February 1944, in the early stages of the Anzio landing, Air Vice-Marshal MacNeece Foster had given an off-the-record talk to the Press. Contrary to the terms on which the talk had been given, extracts from it had been given wide publicity in the Press as made on the authority of a "high British source." The Prime Minister, whose attention had been drawn to these statements, had taken strong exception to them, and had urged that statements of this kind should not be made without express Ministerial authority. He had asked that the Committee should be suppressed.
The Secretaries of State for War and Air had urged that the Committee should continue, and the matter had accordingly been brought before the War Cabinet.

In the ensuing discussion, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air gave their reasons for favouring the continuance of the Committee. In their view, it was an advantage to have this Committee in Washington, the Minister of Information’s office being mainly centred in New York. They maintained, moreover, that the Committee had done much valuable work, more particularly by establishing close relations with the American Services and by getting them to pass information about the British Services to the American Press.

On the other hand, objection was seen to a Committee which handled publicity matter, operating under the aegis of the Joint Staff Mission, independently of the Ministry of Information.

The War Cabinet supported the Prime Minister’s view that it was undesirable that the Joint Liaison Publicity Committee, Washington, should continue to operate under the aegis of the Joint Staff Mission, the Head of which was responsible to him as Minister of Defence.

The War Cabinet also took the view that any organisation in the United States dealing with Service publicity should be subject to the control of the Minister of Information.

The War Cabinet accordingly invited the three Service Ministers to discuss with the Minister of Information what arrangements should be made to carry on the work hitherto done by the Joint Liaison Publicity Committee, under the control of the Minister of Information.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 7th March, 1944.*
WAR CABINET 31 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 10th March, 1944, at 11.30 a.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. A. Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.


The Right Hon. E. Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. O. Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.


The Right Hon. L. Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

Secretariat:

Sir E. Bridges.

Mr. W. S. Murrie.

Contents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Position in Mining Industry</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Overlord&quot; Security</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Reference was made to the position in the mining industry. The War Cabinet was informed that, while a large number of men were out in South Wales, there was now little trouble in any of the other coal-fields.

The Minister of Production said that, if the strike in South Wales continued, there was a danger that at the beginning of next week there would be a reduction in electrical power for industry of about 30 per cent. in that area. This would have some effect on war production. He thought, however, that the right policy was to continue production at the full rate until such time as work in particular factories had to be stopped owing to the shortage of coal, and not to send coal specially to South Wales from other areas. This course would have the incidental advantage of bringing home to those concerned the effect of the stoppage in the South Wales coal-field on essential war production.

The War Cabinet—

Endorsed this view.

The War Cabinet was also informed that some desire had been expressed in certain quarters that there should be an opportunity for a Debate in the House of Commons in the near future on the position in the coal-mining industry. The view of the War Cabinet was that discussion on this matter in the House of Commons at the present juncture would not serve any useful purpose and should be discouraged.

"Overlord"

Security.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 18th Conclusions, Minute 2).

2. The War Cabinet had before them a paper by the Minister of Production (W.P. (44) 153) covering a note dealing with certain proposals connected with "Overlord" security. The discussion and conclusions are recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
10th March 1944.
Note of Points not thought worth recording in the Cabinet Conclusions

1. **Hours of Sitting.** There was some reference to this and the Foreign Secretary said that he would be embarrassed if, having got general agreement to the hours of 2 - 9 on condition that there was work for Standing Committees, if set up, it emerged that there wasn't any flow of legislation. The Lord President said he was looking into this.

2. In connection with the above, reference was made to the Water Bill, and the Prime Minister asked Lord Woolton to bring it before the Cabinet at an early date.

3. **Talk about the Dollar Balances**, but no conclusion worth recording.

4. The Foreign Secretary was asked to tell Clark Kerr how well President Roosevelt had reacted to the telegram to Russia about Poland.

5. **Talk about the Housing Bill**, leading to discussion about Uthwatt and land values, all of which is being settled in the R. Committee. No definite conclusion, but the need for bringing this to a point at which it can come before the Cabinet in the near future was strongly emphasised.

6. The Prime Minister wants to see the draft White Paper on the Social Security Scheme as soon as possible, even if it isn't finished.

   Generally, I think it is clear that it would be a good plan to let the Prime Minister have early drafts of any of the White Papers which are nearing completion.

7. Mr. Bevin spoke of circulating a draft White Paper about the Demobilisation Scheme and suggesting an early discussion at a meeting of the War Cabinet attended by the Service Ministers.

8. The Lord President undertook to send a note to the Prime Minister about his suggestion that our aircraft should attack panzer divisions in France.

9. The Minister of Production undertook to send a note to the Prime Minister about shortage of man-power in the Guards.

10. There was some talk about the Prime Minister making a broadcast. The Prime Minister would like to do this in about a fortnight, but some of his colleagues would like to wait until rather more of the White Papers on reconstruction problems have been issued.

10th March, 1944

W.M. (44) 31
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 13th March, 1944, at 11.15 a.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.


The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.


The Right Hon. Sir Andrew Duncan, M.P., Minister of Supply.

Major the Right Hon. G. Lloyd George, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power.

The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

CONTENTS.

Subject.

Production in South Wales and South-Western Region.

Effect of the coal shortage on electricity supplies.

[27099—2]
The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Production on the situation in regard to the supply of power for industrial purposes in South Wales and South-West England. The Memorandum recorded the interim action which had been taken on the 10th March to meet the situation which showed signs of developing, and the outcome of meetings with representatives of the industry and the interested Departments held in Cardiff and in Bristol on the afternoon of the 11th. As a result of those meetings the following proposals were submitted for approval by the War Cabinet:

(a) In South Wales a reduction in industrial load of 53,000 kilowatts, for which arrangements had been agreed with all concerned.

(b) In the South-Western Region an economy of use should be enforced amounting to 15 per cent. of the average consumption during the four weeks ended the 4th March, 1944. This would apply to all firms using an appreciable amount of electric power, probably embracing undertakings using 30 kilowatts or more.

The question of discharging or "laying-off" workpeople in connexion with these reductions might arise in South Wales. An undertaking operating under the Essential Work Order was obliged to pay wages to employees laid off; and it seemed right that, in these circumstances, such payments should be recoverable.

Arrangements had been made for the authority vested in the Minister of Fuel and Power under the Defence Regulations to be delegated to the Ministry of Production Regional Controllers to enforce these cuts. It had also been arranged that special exemption would be given to work on products of particular urgency in connexion with forthcoming operations.

The Minister of Production, in his Memorandum, also proposed:—

(1) That a survey should be made forthwith of Regions other than the South Wales and the South-Western Region in order to determine the supply positions in relation to (a) industrial, and (b) domestic load, so that from the production angle the best possible plans might be made to safeguard the position in advance of a crisis; and

(2) That consideration should be given to the question whether some cut should not be made in "domestic" consumption of electricity.

The Minister of Production said that the Central Electricity Board had at first put the shortage in these two areas as about 250,000 kilowatts. This would have meant a 50 per cent. cut in South Wales and an 80 per cent. cut in production in the South-Western Region. So big a cut would have involved a risk of serious loss of essential war production, and immediate action had therefore been taken. As a result of the steps taken locally, and by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the short fall had now been reduced to 60,000 kilowatts. While the situation to-day was easier, he still felt, however, that the proposed measures should be adopted and pressed for immediate action in that sense. The margin was a very narrow one and it was relevant that when work was restarted in the pits, this would involve the use of power to the extent of 20,000 kilowatts, as compared with the total of 53,000 kilowatts by which the industrial load was now to be reduced in South Wales.

The Minister of Fuel and Power said that, from the long-term view, he was ready to support any steps which would bring down consumption. In the last week for which figures were available the consumption of coal by electricity undertakings in the country as a whole had been 21 per cent. more than in the corresponding week last year, and the coal stocks of electricity undertakings as a whole had averaged only 42 weeks' consumption. As regards the imme-
The Minister of Labour and National Service remarked that he was wholly in favour of substantial economies if they could be achieved. But these economies were being linked with the effects of the coal strike. An immediate announcement of the measures proposed by the Minister of Production might, he feared, play into the hands of those elements in the coalfields which might not be anxious to see the settlement of the strike. He strongly urged the importance of postponing any action until the 15th, or, if possible, the 16th March, and basing justification for these measures, when taken, on the need for economising electricity. He was also strongly against the making of any public announcement. To-day and to-morrow were the vital days for the settlement of the strike. The week-end had left only the Welsh position uncleared in the coal dispute, and he thought it most important, for the reasons given, not to take the risk of any action which might reduce the chance of a settlement.

The Minister of Information was strongly opposed to making any public announcement.

The Minister of Aircraft Production pointed out that the scheme put forward in the Minister of Production’s Memorandum had been the subject of discussion with the employers and trade unions over the week-end, and they were aware, therefore, that it was being submitted to the Government for approval. This immediately affected the possibility of entire secrecy.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he thought that the issue of instructions to give effect to the measures proposed need attract very little attention if they were issued confidentially (no public announcement being made), and if as few men as possible were stood off, reductions in production being dealt with by cutting down overtime.

After further discussion, the War Cabinet reached the following conclusions:

(1) The measures recommended in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum by the Minister of Production were accepted subject to a delay of 24 hours. Those concerned should be told to-day to await further orders, and the instructions in regard to these measures should be treated as confidential, and no communication about them should be made to the Press.

(2) Every endeavour should be made to avoid work-people being laid off temporarily as a result of these cuts, recourse being had to a reduction of overtime. In so far as employees were temporarily laid off (as a direct result of the cuts imposed) wage payments would be recoverable from the Supply Department concerned, through the appropriate machinery.
(3) The Minister of Production and the Minister of Fuel and Power should, at the appropriate moment, formulate plans for dealing, in other Regions, with emergencies similar to that now under discussion.

(4) No statement should be made to the Press as to the action being taken. (It was hoped that it would not be necessary for any statement on the subject to be made in Parliament until the position in South Wales had eased.)

(5) Because of the importance of avoiding publicity at this juncture, consideration of the means to secure a reduction in "domestic" consumption of electricity was deferred.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
13th March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 13th March, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
Major the Right Hon. G. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
Mr. W. S. MURRIS.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trial of M. Pucheu.
1. The War Cabinet discussed briefly the position in the mining industry.

The Deputy Prime Minister reported the decisions which had been taken at the meeting of the War Cabinet earlier in the day (W.M. (44) 32nd Conclusions).

The Minister of Fuel and Power reported that about 50 per cent. of the pits where strikes had occurred were now working again.

The Minister of Labour and National Service said that the statement, which had appeared in some newspaper headlines, that the strikers had gained 90 per cent. of their demands, was wholly inaccurate. He was convinced that the strikers would now return to work, though it might be some time before full working was resumed in all pits. Once the strikes in South Wales were over, he believed that it would be possible to get the workers to make good the loss in output.

With reference to the Parliamentary question which had been put down by Mr. Granville, M.P., the Prime Minister said that he proposed to say that the time was not opportune for a statement or for a Debate on the subject.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.

2. The War Cabinet considered the terms of a reply which the Prime Minister had drafted to the Private Notice Question* by Sir W. Davison, M.P., referring to the refusal of the Eire Government to remove Axis Diplomatic and Consular representatives from Eire, and enquiring what further action, if any, His Majesty's Government had in view to minimise the danger from espionage.

The Prime Minister drew attention to the statement in his proposed reply that the restrictions on travel announced were the first step in a policy designed to isolate Southern Ireland from the outer world during the critical period which was now approaching. In view of what was at stake in the operations to be undertaken this year, the most stringent steps must be taken to avoid a leakage of information from Southern Ireland. He contemplated that, later in the year, it might be necessary to prevent the sailing of ships or the departure of aircraft from Southern Ireland to the Continent.

The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs suggested the addition of a paragraph to the Prime Minister's draft stressing that the initiative in this matter had been taken by the United States. This was agreed to.

In further discussion of the draft reply, it was also agreed to make certain amendments so as to avoid giving the Eire Government an opportunity to divert the argument from security to the partition issue.

Subject to the amendments made in discussion, the War Cabinet—

Approved the terms of the Prime Minister's draft reply.

3. The Prime Minister referred to the result of the trial of M. Pucheu, former Vichy Minister of the Interior, who had been condemned to death. If M. Pucheu was executed, he thought that the United States Government would become still cooler towards

* For this Question, and the reply given on the 14th March, see Annex.
the French Committee of National Liberation. This might react
on the claims of the Committee to be given the control of any
portions of France immediately it had been liberated. But, on the
facts available, we could not say whether the death sentence was
justified. In all the circumstances, he felt that it would be
undesirable for His Majesty's Government to intervene.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed with the view expressed by the Prime Minister.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
15th March, 1944.

ANNEX.
(Extract from Hansard, Vol. 398, No. 46, Cols. 36-37.)

Eire (Security Measures).

Sir William Davison (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether, in
view of the refusal of the Government of Eire of the American request supported
by Great Britain that Axis Consular and Diplomatic representatives should be
removed from Eire having regard to the serious danger to the Allies in connection
with the forthcoming invasion of Europe in having a centre of espionage within
the British Isles, he is satisfied that the steps recently taken to minimise the
danger are adequate, and, if not, what other measures the Government have
in view.*

The Prime Minister: The initiative in this matter was taken by the United
States because of the danger to the American armed forces from the presence of
Axis missions in Dublin. His Majesty's Government were, however, of course,
consulted throughout by the United States Government, and gave the American
approach full support. We have for some time past taken a number of measures
to minimise the dangers arising from the substantial disservice to the Allied cause
involved in the retention by Mr. de Valera's Government of the German Minister
and the Japanese Consul with their staffs in Dublin. The time has now come
when these measures must be strengthened, and the restrictions on travel to
Ireland announced in the press yesterday are the first step in the policy designed
to isolate Great Britain from Southern Ireland and also to isolate Southern
Ireland from the outer world during the critical period which is now approaching.

I need scarcely say how painful it is to us to take such measures in view of
the large numbers of Irishmen who are fighting so bravely in our armed forces
and the many deeds of personal heroism by which they have kept alive the martial
honour of the Irish race. No one, I think, can reproach us with precipitancy.
No nation in the world would have been so patient. In view, however, of the fact
that both British and British Dominion lives and the lives of the soldiers of our
Allies are imperilled, we are bound to do our utmost to obtain effective security
for the forthcoming operations.

There is also the future to consider. If a catastrophe were to occur to the
Allied armies which could be traced to the retention of the German and Japanese
representatives in Dublin, a gulf would be opened between Great Britain on the
one hand and Southern Ireland on the other which even generations would not
bridge. His Majesty's Government would also be held accountable by the people
of the United States if it could be shown that we had in any way failed to do
everything in our power to safeguard their troops.

* An earlier version of this Question, in a form disallowed by the Speaker, was circulated
in W.P. (44) 157.
SECRET.

W.M. (44).

34th Conclusions.

WAR CABINET 34 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 13th March, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor (Items 4-6).
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
The Right Hon. Lord WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The Hon. W. NASH, Deputy Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand.
The Hon. R. H. L. ISMAY, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT SIMON, Lord Chancellor (Items 4-6).
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
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Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
The Right Hon. Lord WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

Secretariat:

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Captain G. H. OSWALD, R.N.
## WAR CABINET 34 (M).

### CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visit of Mr. Stettinius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Neutral Countries</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant of Travel Facilities from United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>War Criminals</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unconditional Surrender</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civil Aviation</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth and Empire Conference on Radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

As the weather and moon had been unfavourable for night attacks on Germany, Bomber Command had attacked two railway centres in France.

United States heavy bombers had made two heavy daylight attacks on targets in the Berlin area, during the second of which there was no enemy fighter opposition. The Allied Expeditionary Air Forces had attacked “Crossbow” and railway targets in France. Coastal Command aircraft had sighted 16 U-boats, attacked 10 and sunk 1. Off Holland 3 merchant vessels had probably been torpedoed.

In the Mediterranean 7,400 sorties were made as opposed to an estimated enemy total of 800. Railway targets, ports and airfields had been attacked. Twenty-four enemy aircraft had been destroyed and 12 probably destroyed for the loss of 38 of our aircraft. A strong enemy attack by 50 aircraft on a convoy off Algiers had been driven off by fighters, who had shot down 4. A good attack had been carried out on Toulon.

The main targets had been airfields and railways. An important airborne troop-carrying operation had been carried out. Approximately 7,500 men with equipment and animals had been landed in Burma in the rear of enemy positions. During supporting operations 80 enemy aircraft had been destroyed on the ground.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action during the week, including belated reports, amounted to 28,300 tons. A convoy from North Russia had returned without loss, 5 U-boats having been sunk during its passage. The escort-carrier Chaser had accounted for 2 of these U-boats and had assisted in the sinking of a third. During this year seven convoys had reached Russia, carrying just under a million tons of cargo. Our coastal forces had been active off the coast of Holland and had inflicted damage on the enemy on several nights.

Our submarines had scored successes against Axis shipping off the South coast of France and in the Aegean.

Bad weather had interfered with our unloading operations at Anzio in the early part of the week, but over 7,000 tons had been unloaded on the 10th and 11th. There had been no losses by enemy air action off the beachhead.

The Russians had had a most successful week over the whole of the Southern front and were driving towards the River Dniester on a very broad front. Very important captures of material had been made in the advance from Uman. There were no signs of an enemy withdrawal from the Crimea. There had been little movement on the Northern front.

Two Chinese Divisions and two long-range penetration groups were advancing towards Myitkyina. The task of the airborne forces which had been flown in, in the rear of enemy positions, was to attack the enemy’s lines of communication and then make contact with the Chinese-American forces. In the Arakan the 81st West African Division had withdrawn slightly to counter a Japanese encircling threat. On the main front our forces continue to advance and Buthidaung had been captured.

New Guinea.—On the 3rd March the Americans had made a fresh landing just south of Madang.

New Britain.—On the 6th March the Americans had made a fresh landing on the Willaumez Peninsula and had advanced against light enemy opposition.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.
2. Attention was drawn to a recent article in the Press on the Russo-Polish situation.

The Minister of Information undertook to enquire and report to the War Cabinet what action could be taken to ascertain the source from which the newspaper had derived the information on which this article was founded.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he understood that Mr. Stettinius, the United States Under-Secretary of State, proposed to arrive in this country on his visit on the 3rd April. This would be just before Easter Week and would not be convenient. He thought that we should send a message to say that it would be more convenient if he could time his visit so that he would either arrive a little earlier or, say, about a fortnight later.

The War Cabinet—
Approved this course.

3. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that a request had been received from a Member of Parliament to visit Turkey. On the 2nd July, 1943, the War Cabinet had laid it down that facilities for travel to any neutral country should be withheld unless the Government were satisfied that a definite public advantage would be served by the journey, or that the applicant had bona fide domestic business to transact in that country which was urgent and important and could not be transacted without a personal visit; and that these rules should apply to Members of Parliament in the same way as they applied to other persons.

The Member of Parliament in question had business interests in Turkey, and it could, therefore, be argued that his case fell within the terms of the War Cabinet ruling.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that at the present moment we were taking all practicable steps to ensure that people did not leave this country to visit neutral countries, on security grounds. No reason was seen for making an exception in favour of the present applicant.

The War Cabinet—
Decided that the application in question should be refused.

4. On the 10th November the War Cabinet had had before them a Memorandum by the Prime Minister (W.P. (43) 496) about the punishment of war criminals. In this Memorandum the Prime Minister had pointed out that the Joint Declaration on Atrocities signed in Moscow would result in a large number of lesser war criminals being handed over to the Sovereign States against whom their outrages had been committed. It remained to deal with the major war criminals. He had suggested that the United Nations should prepare a single list of major war criminals who would be declared outlaws and might be put to death without trial on falling into the hands of the Armed Forces.

The War Cabinet had invited the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney-General and the Minister of Aircraft Production to redraft the Prime Minister's Memorandum on the basis that (a) Quislings were excluded from the scope of the proposal; (b) any person in the suggested list of major war criminals coming into the hands of the Armed Forces of the United Nations should be seized and held pending a decision by the United Nations as to their fate. The War Cabinet now had before them a Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet (W.P. (44) 106) circulating the formula proposed by the three Ministers.

The Prime Minister, in reviewing the position, said that he greatly hoped that the list of the 50 or 100 most prominent war criminals would be drawn up. The compilation of such a list would
tend to make a gulf between them and the ordinary people of the enemy countries. On reflection, he still felt that there was much to be said for the summary execution of the persons on that list when they fell into our hands, rather than to announce that it was our intention to keep them in confinement until the United Nations had decided on their fate.

The Lord Chancellor said that the redraft which had been circulated (W.P. (44) 105) referred specifically to the three-Power Declaration made at Moscow. That Declaration had set out the procedure for dealing with war crimes committed in occupied territories, and had concluded with the statement that it was without prejudice to the case of enemy criminals whose offences had no particular geographical location and who would be punished by a joint decision of the Governments of the Allies. The present draft was intended to extend the last paragraph of this Declaration and to round off the arrangements embodied in it. Furthermore, the revised draft negatived the idea that those criminals would be dealt with by ordinary processes of law, and made it clear that they would be kept under control until a decision as to their fate was reached by the United Nations.

The Secretary of State for Air pointed out that in W.P. (44) 105 the only charge which was levelled against “the inner ring of political leaders” was their responsibility for the barbarous way in which the war had been conducted. Surely an even greater charge was their direct personal responsibility in having conspired against world peace.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security added that there was the further charge of evil practices against certain races and their perversion of justice.

He agreed with the Prime Minister that any arrangement which would have the effect of leaving war criminals in the custody of the United Nations, pending a decision as to their fate, might be highly embarrassing.

After further discussion, the Prime Minister said that he thought there would be advantages in ascertaining the views of the United States and of the Russians on how the major war criminals should be dealt with. He asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to consider whether he thought the present was a suitable moment to take this step.

He also suggested that the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney-General and the Minister of Aircraft Production should be invited to give further consideration to the draft formula and to prepare an alternative version in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the course proposed by the Prime Minister.

5. The War Cabinet had before them—

(a) A Memorandum by the Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 33).
(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.P. (44) 125), to which was appended the draft of a declaration which might, if approved, be issued in the name of the Prime Minister, President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin.
(c) A Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 83).

The Prime Minister said that the question for decision was whether anything further could wisely be said on “unconditional surrender.” It was relevant that there were signs of criticisms from some quarters of the House of Commons on the ground that we were not adhering strictly to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. That criticism was based on some recent remarks of his own about the transfer of territory. But we had never bound ourselves to
apply the terms of the Atlantic Charter to ex-enemy countries. For example, it was impossible, in his judgment, to deny the right of the United Nations to make territorial changes in the Reich. That was a strong argument for holding to the term "unconditional surrender" which gave a free hand to the United Nations. He recognised, on the other hand, the force of the argument that a reassurance to the German people that in the event of their surrendering they would not be deprived of everything might make it easier for them to surrender. The draft now before the War Cabinet was designed to test how far we could go in that direction. He doubted, however, if any real advantage could be gained by attempts at reassurance of this nature at this moment.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that his draft Memorandum (W.P. (44) 125) had been prepared with a view to seeing how far it was possible to go by way of reassurance. It should be borne in mind that reassurance of this nature was designed to be set against the immense propaganda value to which Goebbels was at the moment turning the anxiety not only of the German people but of all enemy or ex-enemy countries in Europe as to the action which would be taken by the victorious Allies.

The general view of the War Cabinet, as expressed in discussion, was that on balance no advantage would be gained by the adoption of any of the formulæ proposed at this time; but that the matter might be further considered later. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested that the matter might be re-examined when the European Advisory Commission had examined the German Armistice terms.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that the matter should be re-examined at a later date.

6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Aircraft Production reporting the conclusions reached by the Commonwealth and Empire Conference on radio for civil aviation (W.P. (44) 147).

The Conference had suggested that the establishment of a world radio authority for air transport was essential to the achievement of general standardisation of radio for international air transport, and had recommended an early exchange of views with the United States and others of the United Nations and continuous Commonwealth and Empire consultation both during and after the present war.

On the technical side, the Conference had put forward recommendations for a complete series of standard radio systems which would be available in the immediate post-war period, and had also suggested tentative longer-term plans for standard post-war systems.

The Memorandum proposed that immediate technical discussions, based on the recommendations of the Conference, should take place with the United States and with others of the United Nations, and that the technical recommendations of the Conference should be remitted to the Radio Board.

The War Cabinet agreed—

(1) That the proposed discussions with the United States and others of the United Nations should be undertaken: action to this end would be taken under the supervision of the Committee on Post-War Civil Air Transport.

(2) That the technical recommendations of the Conference should be remitted to the Radio Board.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 13th March, 1944.
WAR CABINET 35 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Wednesday, 15th March, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, Secretary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet had a discussion about the situation in Italy and in Yugoslavia. A record of the discussion and conclusions is recorded in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Reference: W.M. (44) 26th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

Yugoslavia.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 5th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Soviet Government had asked for a visa for a journalist who belonged to the Union of Polish Patriots and was a Soviet citizen. It was clear that, if this journalist was allowed to come to this country, it would lead to great difficulties with the Polish Government, and in the circumstances he proposed that the visa should be refused.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed with this view.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
15th March, 1944.
WAR CABINET 36 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Monday, 20th March, 1944, at 6 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.
The following were also present:
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
Colonel the Right Hon. OLIVER STANLEY, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies (Item 4).
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGGS, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLEWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food (Item 4).
The Right Hon. LORD CHEREWELL, Paymaster-General.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Field-Marshal Sir ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES,
Lieutenant-General Sir HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject.</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-East Asia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food grain requirements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Naval, Military and Air Operations.

Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 34th Conclusions, Minute 1.

Air Operations.
Home Theatre

Mediterranean.

South-East Asia.

Naval Operations.

Mediterranean.

South-East Asia.

Naval Operations.

Mediterranean.

Military Operations.

Italy.

Burma.

Russia.

1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had carried out very heavy attacks against Stuttgart and Frankfurt, the latter being the heaviest attack we had yet made. Railway centres at Amiens and Le Mans and factories in France had also been attacked. Mosquitoes had bombed Germany each night. United States heavy bombers had attacked Brunswick, Augsburg, Friedrichshafen and Munich, together with airfields in Germany and “Crossbow” targets. Coastal Command had made one promising attack and had possibly damaged another U-boat. Enemy losses for the week had been 273 aircraft destroyed and 51 probably destroyed. United Kingdom–United States losses had been 142 bombers, 43 fighters and 2 Coastal Command aircraft. 220 enemy aircraft had been over this country during the previous week, of which 21 had been destroyed.

In addition to the heavy attack on Cassino, Allied aircraft had operated against railways and ports. Strategic targets included Toulon, Vienna and Sofia. Enemy losses amounted to 62 aircraft compared with 54 Allied.

Airborne operations in Burma had been successfully carried out. Enemy losses amounted to 26 aircraft destroyed compared with 17 Allied. In the Pacific 85 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed compared with 10 Allied aircraft.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action during the week amounted to 31,328 tons. The losses for March to date amounted to 81,240 tons. Eleven German U-boats had been destroyed and 2 probably destroyed so far this month.

The unloading at the Anzio bridgehead now amounted to some 6,000 tons a day.

The attack on Cassino on the 15th March had been preceded by a heavy air bombardment. The New Zealanders had then launched an attack in a southerly direction, and had captured practically the whole of the town, although the Germans were still holding out in the southern portion. We had not yet succeeded in taking the monastery.

Our troops had cleared the enemy from the Tiddim road near Tuitum.

The War Cabinet agreed—

That there was now no reason why General Wingate’s name should not be mentioned in connection with the Burmese operations. The Secretary of State for War was invited to communicate to the Minister of Information as to the form which the announcement should take.

The Russian operations continued successfully. During the previous week they had opened up two new offensives, one south of the Priepet marshes towards Kowel, and the other south of Luck. North-east of Nikolaev the Germans were in a bad position, and two corps had been roughly handled. The Russians had reached the Dneister on a front of about 60 miles between Mogilev-Podolsk and Ribnitsa and had crossed on a 30-mile front. The advance seriously threatened two of the four bridges over this river.

The War Cabinet—

Took note of these statements.
2. The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the position in Finland and Hungary, and the developments of the Russo-Polish situation. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that the chief events of the week had been a raid on London on the night of the 14th/15th March and one on the previous night, 19th/20th, against the East Coast. 160 aircraft had taken part in the former raid, of which 145 had come overland, and 15 had been brought down. On the previous night 58 aircraft had operated over scattered points in Lincolnshire and Norfolk. Nine enemy aircraft had been brought down. The casualties for the week included 59 killed and 172 seriously injured.

The War Cabinet—
Took note of this statement.

4. The War Cabinet at their meeting on the 21st February had approved certain proposals of the Indian Food Grain Requirements Committee for dealing with the requests of the Viceroy for the continued importation of food grains. They now had before them—

(a) copies of further telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy, who continued to urge the psychological importance of substantial imports, and was averse from finding rice for Ceylon until the main question of imports for India had been resolved;

(b) a Report by the Chiefs of Staff (W.P. (44) 165), who recommended—

(i) that, in view of reduced requirements, the allocation of shipping for military maintenance programmes should be reduced by 25 ships during the period April to June, and that the Ministry of War Transport should be invited to make available the equivalent capacity in the second and third quarters of 1944 for the carriage of 200,000 tons of wheat to India;

(ii) that the United States military authorities should be approached with a view to their making a similar contribution in shipping;

(iii) that the proposal to ship small quantities of wheat to India in deadweight or in stowage should be approved in principle, subject to supply difficulties being solved;

(iv) that the shipping necessary to provide the cereals for the minimum maintenance requirements in India should be tabulated in future as a military requirement.

The Minister of War Transport said that on the latest figures available there was statistically a surplus of food grains in India. But it was clear from the Viceroy's messages that, despite abundant harvests, the need for imported wheat on psychological grounds remained. He was ready, therefore, to transport 200,000 tons of
wheat to India, but on the understanding that the 25 ships required would be additional to the ships that had already been released and transferred to other operational uses, and that the Army would not ask for this released quantity to be made good later this year. He was averse from asking the United States War Department to make a cut in their military cargo shipments to India, and thought that no commitment to India should now be made beyond the 200,000 tons. He had had expert examination made of the suggestion that bagged wheat should be included in the cargoes of ships loading for the East coast of India, and was satisfied that for technical reasons it was impracticable.

The Secretary of State for India urged very strongly that the Viceroy should be given the full amount of 434,000 tons for which he was now pressing. The psychological aspect of this matter was of first-class importance. Nearly three-quarters of a million lives had been lost through famine and its sequels. Unless there was general confidence that there was no risk of recurrence nothing could prevent the peasant in 750,000 villages holding back his small parcel of grain, with the result of famine or at least famine prices. Whatever crop estimates might be, it was only grain actually procured and under Government control that was available for distribution or exchange. It was essential not to risk a general breakdown in India or the interference with military operations which the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Supreme Commander, South-East Asia Command, feared might follow from a shortage of food. The War Cabinet would incur a grave responsibility if this took place in face of the reiterated warnings of the Viceroy. As far as the suggestion that a quantity of rice should be found from India for Ceylon, against which 150,000 tons of wheat at present earmarked for Ceylon should be diverted to India, the Viceroy's hands would be immensely strengthened in considering this proposal if His Majesty's Government could first meet him on his main demand for wheat.

A general discussion followed. Attention was drawn to the serious under-estimate by the Government of India of the rice crop for this year and to the faulty basis of their statistical case. It was argued, on the other hand, that the statistical issue had ceased to be of importance, and that the considerations in issue were now essentially psychological.

Reference was made by Mr. Bruce and Mr. Nash to the importance of ensuring the import of phosphates to Australia and New Zealand, on the basis previously discussed. The question was raised whether the twenty-five additional ships which were to bring wheat to India from the Southern Dominions could carry phosphates on the outward voyage.

The Minister of War Transport said that this would not be possible without serious dislocation; but he was fully alive to the importance of the point raised by Mr. Bruce and Mr. Nash.

The War Cabinet agreed as follows:

(1) The allocation of shipping for military maintenance programmes should be reduced by twenty-five ships during the period April to June. The Minister of War Transport was invited to use the capacity so released for loading 200,000 tons of wheat to India in the second and third quarters of 1944. This was on the understanding that the twenty-five ships to be made available by the Army would be additional to the ships already transferred to other operational uses, and that the Defence authorities would not ask for this capacity to be made good later this year.

(2) It should be made clear to the Viceroy that, having regard to stringency of the shipping situation, there was no prospect of wheat additional to the 200,000 tons becoming available in the remaining quarters of 1944.
(3) The Viceroy should be strongly pressed to agree to an exchange of rice for wheat with Ceylon, whereby a further 150,000 tons of wheat could be shipped to India.

(4) The effect of the above measures, and of the 50,000 tons already arranged for, would be to provide India with a total of approximately 400,000 tons of wheat. The War Cabinet felt that an announcement of so substantial an import of wheat should enable the Viceroy to handle the situation.

(5) It would not be desirable to approach the United States military authorities for assistance and that should be made clear to the Viceroy.

(6) For the technical reasons which had been explained by the Minister of War Transport, the proposal to ship small quantities of wheat to India in deadweight or in stowage should not be pursued.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 20th March, 1944.
Prior to the meeting of the War Cabinet on Monday, 20th March, the War Cabinet alone met at 5.30 p.m. The point discussed was the speech made on the previous day by Mr. Herbert Morrison, in which he had discussed how the great volume of reconstruction legislation was to be passed in a reasonable period of time, and had suggested that it might be necessary to pass legislation in very general terms, leaving the details to be filled in by delegated legislation.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he was going to see the 1922 Committee later in the week, and he had been warned that he would be asked whether the Home Secretary's speech represented Government policy; and if not, what were the views of Conservative members about this matter, and when these views were to be expressed.

THE HOME SECRETARY pointed out that no notice had been given that this matter was going to be raised. The issue he had raised was a grave problem which merited discussion. Unless a solution to it was found, we should be in a hopeless position. So far as he could see, the matter was not really a Party political issue.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Home Secretary's speech had been a perfectly reasonable exposition of the problem, and of one way of solving it. He also told the War Cabinet that the Home Secretary had showed him his speech beforehand, and that he (the Prime Minister) had seen nothing in it to which exception need be taken. He had taken the view that the speech had been written with the intention of correcting impressions given by the speech made by the Home Secretary a week earlier. He quite agreed that the Home Secretary had a perfect right to make a speech on these lines. At the same time, he said that the speech could very easily be answered by Conservative members. He indicated the lines on which he would be disposed to answer it, if an answer had to be given. Clearly, however, no answer would be given to the Home Secretary's speech, by one of his colleagues, which would not have the effect of weakening the Government.

Broadly, the line taken by the Prime Minister was that speeches of this kind, if repeated, could only lead to a break-up of the Government. It was his duty to keep the Government together and, for that purpose, it was necessary that Ministers of different Parties should forego their right to speak their views on certain matters.

The meeting terminated with a tacit understanding (not however recorded in any specific conclusion) that it would be far better that speeches of this kind should not be made in future.
WARM CABINET 37 (44).

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 21st March, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, Secretary.

Contents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demobilisation</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposed Statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The War Cabinet had a further discussion about the relations between Poland and Russia. A record of the discussion is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

2. Reference was made to the draft White Paper on Demobilisation which had been circulated to the War Cabinet by the Minister of Labour and National Service (W.P. (44) 162).

   The Prime Minister said that he had given further consideration to this matter and he thought that from the point of view of morale of the troops, the present would be an unfortunate time to lay a White Paper on this subject. It was also relevant that, on a two-stage ending of the war, there would be far less scope for demobilisation from the Navy than from the other two services when hostilities with Germany ended. While, therefore, he was fully confident of the merits of the scheme, he thought it would be better not to publish it at the present time; he suggested that he might give some general indication in a broadcast speech, in the near future, of the points fundamental to any sound scheme of demobilisation.

   The Minister of Labour and National Service said that he was ready to accept this suggestion, but he thought that it would be necessary for the Minister of Information to take steps to damp down discussion of this subject in the press.

   The War Cabinet—

   Took note of these statements.

3. Reference was made to the Debate in the House of Lords on the following day on a motion by Lord Latham on planning.

   The War Cabinet was informed that the Debate might extend to two days, and the Prime Minister said that he would discuss with the Minister of Reconstruction, who would speak early in the Debate, what other Peers should speak on behalf of the Government.

4. The War Cabinet were reminded that we had agreed to send a delegation to Washington for discussions on oil, on the understanding that the discussions would start on the official and expert level. Discussion took place as to the procedure for handling these discussions.

   The War Cabinet—

   (1) Agreed that a Ministerial Committee should be set up which would comprise the Ministers in charge of the Departments principally concerned in questions of future oil policy; and took note that the Prime Minister would discuss with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the composition of this Committee.

   (2) Agreed that Sir W. B. Brown should be appointed to head the official and expert delegation to Washington, and should also be Chairman of a group of officials representing the Departments concerned, charged with the preparation of material for the discussions, subject to directions from the Ministerial Committee.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
21st March, 1944.
38th Conclusions.

**WAR CABINET 38 (44).**

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 21st March, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).


The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.

The Right Hon. JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Hon. THOMAS JOHNSTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Scotland.

The Right Hon. HUGH DALTON, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.

The Right Hon. R. S. HUDSON, M.P., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.


The Right Hon. HARCOURT JOHNSTONE, M.P., Secretary of Overseas Trade.

The Right Hon. BERNARD RUDGE, K.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.

The Right Hon. SIR STAFFORD Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.


The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

The Right Hon. JAMES STUART, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 1).

The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Right Hon. HARCOURT JOHNSTONE, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 1).

The Right Hon. JAMES STUART, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury (Item 1).

Secretariat:

Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.

Mr. W. S. MURRIE.

**Content.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pensions (increase) Bill</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Town and Country Planning Legislation</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[27146—3]
1. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that on the second reading of the Pensions (Increase) Bill some criticism had been expressed of the Bill.

The criticisms fell under two heads: the first concerned the supplementary provisions as to increase of pensions. Thus a married man whose pension was £150 a year or less would receive an increase of 25 per cent., and a man whose pension fell between £150 and £250 an increase of 20 per cent.

He thought that he could meet the criticism on this part of the Bill by certain minor changes, e.g., he proposed to increase the maximum figure in the case of married pensioners from £250 to £300 a year and to extend the definition of dependants.

The second criticism concerned certain pensions which under a settlement made at the end of the last war had been subject to a provision whereby 20 per cent. thereof had been varied in accordance with changes in the cost of living. These pensions had been stabilised about 1935 at 9¼ per cent. below the 1919 rates. This stabilisation had proved to be in the interests of the pensioners concerned until 1939, but thereafter had been in the interests of the Exchequer. It had now been contended by Major-General Sir George Jeffreys, M.P., that failure to restore this 9¼ per cent. cut in full to all the pensioners in question was a breach of faith. This, of course, was not a fair statement of the facts. The provision in the Bill dealing with this class of pensioners gave an increase of 10 per cent. on pensions of this class up to £200 a year, of 7½ per cent. on pensions exceeding £200 but not exceeding £400 a year, and of 5 per cent. on pensions exceeding £400 but not exceeding £600 a year.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he was satisfied that to concede what was demanded in this case, namely, restoration in full of the 1919 rates, would have very dangerous repercussions. For example, it would raise the issue of bonus to higher grades of Civil Servants. At present there was no cost of living bonus payable on salaries in excess of £1,000 a year. He hoped that the Cabinet would support him in resisting the claim made for restoration of these pensions to the full 1919 rates.

The War Cabinet supported the view taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the point of principle, but favoured some adjustment as, for example, that the increase of 10 per cent. should apply on pensions up to £400 a year and that the 7½ per cent. rate should apply on pensions exceeding £400 but not exceeding £600 a year.

2. The War Cabinet had a preliminary discussion on the subject of future Town and Country Planning Legislation, and had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of Town and Country Planning (W.P. (44) 164) to which was appended:

(i) The heads of a Bill empowering the compulsory purchase of land required for development and redevelopment, regulating the disposal of such land when acquired and fixing the price of land acquired for public purposes; and

(ii) A statement of the principles of the legislation required to implement the Government's undertakings with regard to positive national planning.

The Memorandum proposed that the Bill, the heads of which were set forth in Appendix I, should be introduced and passed into law by the summer. It also suggested that, not later than the introduction of the Bill, the Minister should make a statement setting out what were the Government's proposals for the control of land use, the payment of compensation and the levying of fees for the grant of permission for change of use; and undertaking to introduce as soon as possible a Bill to carry these proposals into effect.
In discussion it was generally agreed that fresh powers were required for the acquisition of land for such public purposes as the redevelopment of reconstruction areas and the carrying out of the plans for housing and other forms of development which would have to be undertaken immediately after the war.

Basis of Purchase of Land for Public Purposes.

Discussion then turned on the need for legislation to give effect to the principle accepted on behalf of the Government in the statement made by the Minister of Works and Buildings in the House of Lords on the 17th July, 1941, that the compensation payable in public acquisition or control of land should not exceed sums based on the standard of values at the 31st March, 1939.

In paragraph 5 of Appendix I to W.P. (44) 164 it was proposed that the price at which the land should be acquired should be the value of the land as at the 31st March, 1939, to which should be added or from which should be deducted any amount by which the value of the land for its use as at that date should have increased or diminished; and that in assessing any such sum it should be a direction to the arbitrator to disregard any temporary and abnormal increase or diminution in the value of the land in question due solely to local circumstances arising from the war.

It was argued in favour of this proposal that it was in line with the practice already adopted by the War Damage Commission in making payments; that it took account of the fall in the value of money without an explicit admission—which would be dangerous—that this was being done; and that, by allowing the price to be influenced by any general rise which might have taken place since 1939 in the value of the kind of land which was being acquired, it put owners who were dispossessed by the public purchase of their land in a position to reinstate themselves. It was also pointed out that in so far as the formula proposed brought the price paid for land acquired for public purposes nearer to current values, on which Death Duties were at present charged, it lessened the potential criticism of the Government's scheme.

On the other hand, it was argued that the formula departed too far from the principle embodied in the statement made on behalf of the Government by the Minister of Works and Buildings on the 17th July, 1941, namely, that compensation payable in public acquisition or control of land should not exceed sums based on the standard of values at the 31st March, 1939. Allowance should, no doubt, be made for the fall in the value of money, but difficulty was seen in agreeing to the proposition that the price paid for land acquired for public purposes should be affected by general increases in the values of particular kinds of land which had taken place since 1939. It was contended, for example, that it was not fair that the general increase in the value of agricultural land which had taken place over the war years—an increase largely due to the encouragement given by the Government to agriculture—should be reflected in the price paid for land acquired for public purposes. No doubt the application of a formula which allowed only for the fall in the value of money would give rise to some hard cases. But there was much to be said for putting before Parliament a proposal which was consistent with the pledge already given, and which could not be represented as a substantial departure from the principle which the Government had accepted.

Discussion then turned on the principles of legislation required to implement the Government's undertakings with regard to positive national planning. (See Appendix II of W.P. (44) 164.)
country were not unnecessarily used for building. Again, local authorities had hitherto been hampered in the work of town and country planning by consideration of the amount of compensation which would be payable under particular schemes. Under the proposals put forward by the Minister in Appendix II, the costs of compensation would, in the long run, be balanced by the fees payable when permission was given for the change of use for development of land. It was also urged that the proposed scheme would put a stop to the evils of land speculation.

On the other hand, it was argued that the effect of the scheme would be to raise the question of compensation in respect of development rights as a potential issue in regard to all the land of this country. The result would be that all landowners would have to consider whether they should not put in claims for compensation. The amount of work involved would be very great indeed, and would cause unnecessary disturbance in regard to all transactions in land at a critical time. It was for consideration whether some scheme could not be devised which would ensure that the question of compensation in respect of refusal to allow a particular plot of land to be developed was not raised until the question became a live issue.

The War Cabinet—
Agreed to resume discussion of these aspects of the scheme at a later date.

House of Lords: The War Cabinet agreed that in the Debate on Lord Latham’s Motion on the following day, the Government spokesman should say that final conclusions on these matters had not yet been reached and the Government would not be in a position to announce decisions until after the Easter Recess.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
21st March, 1944.
**WAR CABINET 39 (44).**

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on Thursday, 23rd March, 1944, at 12.15 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., Deputy Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Sir ANDREW DUNCAN, M.P., President of the Board of Trade.
The Right Hon. H. U. WILLINK, K.C., Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries.
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. LLWELLYN, M.P., Minister of Food.
The Right Hon. LORD CHERWELL, Paymaster-General.

Secretariat:
Sir EDWARD BRIDGES.
Sir GILBERT LAITHWAITE.

### CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent United Nations Organization</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Minister of State (W.P. (44) 161) covering—

(a) the draft First and Second Reports to the Governments of the United Nations by the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture;

(b) recommendations on these Reports by the Committee of Officials.

The Committee had reached the conclusion that the Reports, while not in all respects in the terms which we could have desired, were generally satisfactory provided that our representatives on the permanent organisation exercised the vigilance and leadership necessary to secure that its activities were kept on the proper lines. They accordingly recommended that, if the other Governments were prepared to accept these Reports, His Majesty’s Government should do likewise. If, however, other Governments put forward amendments to the draft Constitution appended to the Second Report, the British delegate on the Commission should refer home for instructions. In that event, opportunity would arise for making certain amendments which were in themselves desirable.

The Minister of State briefly reviewed the origin of these documents and the circumstances in which they had been framed. He was satisfied that their substance was in general accordance with our interests and that, were we now to move amendments to protect our position more completely, there was a risk that other amendments would be moved by other Governments which might have the result, which we were anxious to avoid, of securing for the Executive of the Food Organisation powers which we had been consistently anxious that they should not exercise.

The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries drew attention to the recommendations contained in Article XI (f) and (g) on page 29 of W.P. (44) 161, which stated that the functions of the Organisation should be to promote the adoption of policies for the provision of adequate agricultural credit, and in regard to agricultural commodity arrangements. These clauses were not, in his view, consistent with the Organisation being a fact-finding body of an advisory character. He would like to see these clauses amended; otherwise we might find ourselves in a very awkward position later on. If amendment was regarded as impracticable, we ought at least to define more precisely what was intended by the word “promote.”

The Minister of State said that paragraph 80 of the draft Second Report at page 19 of W.P. (44) 161 should be read with the draft Constitution. This made it clear that a decision on any recommendations from the Organisation would only be taken by the member Governments.

In the discussion which followed there was general support for the view that steps should be taken to protect the point raised by the Minister of Agriculture, and that this could best be done by a declaration, the terms of which would have to be carefully considered, to be made by the United Kingdom Representative at the time of signature.

The War Cabinet agreed as follows:—

(1) Our Representative should be instructed to take the line that, if other Governments were to accept the draft Reports as they stood, His Majesty’s Government would do likewise.

(2) If, however, other Governments put forward amendments to the draft Constitution, our Delegate on the Interim Commission should refer home for instructions. In that event, there would be an opportunity to press for certain of the amendments which the Committee of Officials had recommended as desirable.
(3) Our Representative should, when intimating our acceptance of the Reports, make a Declaration, the terms of which should be settled by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of State, to protect the position as regards the nature of the functions to be exercised by the Food Organisation. The Declaration might be to the effect that His Majesty's Government, while agreeing to the Declaration and ready to sign the proposed Constitution, did so on the understanding that, notwithstanding the provisions of Article XI (f) and (g) of the Constitution, the Organisation would not assume functions in regard to the matters referred to in those clauses, which would fall within the scope of other organisations which might hereafter be established, and that the Constitution does not of itself confer on the Organisation direct executive functions in this field. The meaning of these clauses was understood to be that the Organisation would properly seek to influence the Governments of the United Nations to agree upon international measures to be realised through other agencies.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
23rd March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 27th March, 1944, at 5:30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.

The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:

The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, M.P., Minister of Information.

The Right Hon. LORD BRABERBROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:

Sir Edward Bridges.
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite.

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proposals arising out of the consideration of the future of the Italian Fleet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sentences on British Sailors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Poland.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 37th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Italy.
Proposals arising out of the consideration of the future of the Italian Fleet.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (44) 28th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

Russia.
Sentences on British Sailors.

1. The War Cabinet had a discussion on the Russo-Polish situation in the light of the latest communication on this subject from Premier Stalin.

2. The War Cabinet also discussed the reply to be sent to the Russian request that the ships to be handed over to them should be sailed to Russia by British crews. It was agreed that this request could not be acceded to.

3. Reference was also made to the severe sentences that had been passed by the Russian Courts on two British sailors arrested after a drunken brawl. The War Cabinet agreed that Sir A. Clark Kerr should be asked to press M. Molotov for an early reply to the personal representations made to him by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in view of the possibility of Parliamentary Questions.

A record of the discussion and conclusions reached on these three matters is contained in the Secretary's Standard File of War Cabinet Conclusions.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
27th March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday, 27th March, 1944, at 6.30 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for India and Secretary of State for Burma.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.
The Right Hon. JAMES GREIG, M.P., Secretary of State for War.
The Right Hon. STAFFORD CRIPPS, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, 1st Viscount, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. SIR ALFRED CADOGAN, Paymaster-General.
The Hon. W. NASH, Deputy Prime Minister of the Dominion of New Zealand.
The Right Hon. LORD BEAVEROOK, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, 1st Viscount, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. SIR ALFRED CADOGAN, Paymaster-General.
Admiral of the Fleet SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
The Hon. SIR EDWARD BRIDGES, Paymaster-General.
Field-Marshal SIR ALAN BROOKE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Secretariat:
SIR EDWARD BRIDGES.
Lieutenant-General SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY.
Mr. L. F. BURGIS.
WAR CABINET 41 (44).

CONTENTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minute No.</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Naval, Military and Air Operations</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home Theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Air Raids</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties and Damage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motion by Lord Chatfield</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business of the House.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of the Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hours of Sitting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secrecy as to times of Sitting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Service Personnel</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Chiefs of Staff reported the principal events of the previous week.

Bomber Command had carried out very heavy attacks against Frankfurt, Berlin and Essen. Factories and railway centres in France had also been bombed, and Mosquito attacks made on Germany each night. A total of 10,408 tons of bombs had been dropped. United States heavy bombers had attacked Berlin, Brunswick, Frankfurt and Schweinfurt together with ‘Crossbow’ targets. 16,000 sorties had been flown from these Islands during the week. This was the highest number so far flown in any week. A total of 12,200 tons of bombs had been dropped on Germany during the week. Coastal Command had made one promising attack on a U-boat and had probably damaged another. Enemy losses for the week had been 115 aircraft destroyed and 17 probably destroyed. Our losses had been 184 Allied bombers, 48 fighters and 6 Coastal Command aircraft. 267 enemy aircraft had been over this country by night during the previous week, of which 20 had been destroyed.

In addition to strategic targets, ports, railways and targets in the battle area had been attacked. Twenty-four small vessels had been sunk and 39 either probably sunk or damaged. Enemy losses amounted to 217 aircraft (this figure should be accepted with some reserve) compared with 59 Allied.

Confirmed shipping losses by enemy action during the week amounted to 14,915 tons. The losses for March to date amounted to 106,916 tons. Thirteen German U-boats had been destroyed and 3 probably destroyed so far this month.

The unloading at the Anzio Bridgehead continued to be satisfactory. A Commando Force had raided Solta Island, where the entire German garrison of 106 had been eliminated, 78 prisoners being taken.

2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to the discussions which we and the United States were having with the Spanish Government over a number of points, and particularly with regard to the export of wolfram from Spain to Germany. He thought that this was not worth a severe struggle, and he hoped to persuade the United States Government to share this view.

The War Cabinet concurred.

3. The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that there had been two fairly heavy raids in the previous week, on the nights of the 21st/22nd and the 24th/25th March. The casualties for the week had been 97 killed, 383 seriously injured and 280 slightly injured.
4. The War Cabinet were informed that Lord Chatfield had put down the following motion for discussion in the House of Lords on the 28th March:

“To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they are planning to improve the administration of Imperial and National Defence after the war; and, in particular, whether they will consider the practicability of obtaining agreement of all parties that National Defence policy shall in future be a non-party matter; and to move for Papers.”

The line to be taken in regard to this motion was discussed, and it was generally agreed that it was unlikely that national defence policy could in practice be treated as a non-party matter.

The War Cabinet—
Invited the Paymaster-General to reply to this motion on behalf of the Government. If the course of the debate should make it desirable, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs would also take part in the debate.

5. The War Cabinet agreed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should make his budget statement on Tuesday, the 25th April.

6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that there was a wide diversity of view on this matter. On the whole, however, it seemed that the Government should take the line that, as soon as sufficient legislation was available to justify setting up Standing Committees, the House should be asked to change the normal hours of sittings from those now in force to 2 p.m. to 9 p.m. In the meantime, no change should be made. This would mean that the hours of sittings would not be altered until, say, after Whitsun.

The War Cabinet—
Endorsed this proposal.

7. The War Cabinet discussed whether any useful purpose was served by the present practice of not making public in advance the dates of the sittings of Parliament.

The War Cabinet—
Decided that, in view of the regularity of the sittings of Parliament on certain days of the week, there was no justification for continuing the present rule of secrecy, which could now be discontinued as regards both the days and the hours of sitting.

8. The Secretary of State for War said that, when the Army Annual Bill was debated later in the week, a motion would probably be put down by members of the Commonwealth Party which would be supported by the Independents and by some members of the Labour Party. The terms of this motion were not yet known, but it would purport to favour an extension of the political rights of Service personnel.

The War Cabinet were informed that the regulations of all three Services did not permit Service personnel to take an active part in support of any political organisation or party. This regulation had been interpreted with a good deal of discretion. A blind eye had been turned to minor infringements, but there had been one or two bad cases in which disciplinary action had been
taken. A demand was now likely to be made that members of the Services, if on leave and in mufti, could attend and address political meetings.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that it would be very undesirable to allow Service personnel to address public political meetings, whether in uniform or in mufti. If such permission were once given, it would not be possible to lay down conditions as to what subjects could or could not be touched upon.

On the other hand, it was felt that no obstacle should be placed in the way of members of the Services being adopted as prospective candidates, provided that the steps to that end did not involve attendance at public meetings. There was, however, no reason why a member of the Services should not appear before a private meeting of the Selection Committee of a political party in a constituency.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that the Secretary of State for War should state, in the forthcoming debate, that there was no objection to Service personnel being adopted as prospective candidates for Parliament, provided the steps necessary for their adoption did not involve their attendance at public meetings.

(2) Agreed that the existing rule should be maintained whereby Service personnel are not permitted to take part in public political meetings, whether in uniform or in mufti.

[Note.—This conclusion does not apply to the special case of a serving officer or other rank who has become a prospective candidate.]

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
27th March, 1944.
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street Annexe, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 28th March, 1944, at 10 p.m.

Present:
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National Service.
The Right Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, M.P., Minister of Production.
The Right Hon. Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction.

The following were also present:
The Right Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Privy Seal.
The Right Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft Production.
The Right Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information.
The Right Hon. W. Whiteley, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury.
The Right Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P., President of the Board of Education.
The Right Hon. James Stuart, M.P., Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Treasury.

Secretariat:
Sir Edward Bridges.
Mr. W. S. Muirie.

CONTENTS.

Subject.       Page.

Education Bill... ... ... ... ... 188
The War Cabinet discussed the situation which had arisen as a result of the Government having been defeated that evening, by 117 votes to 116, on an amendment moved by Mrs. Cazalet-Keir, M.P., to Clause 82 of the Education Bill, that the Minister of Education, in approving salary scales, should not differentiate between men and women solely on the grounds of sex.

The President of the Board of Education explained that Clause 82 had been included in the Bill to meet the views of the teachers. The Clause enabled the Minister to secure that the remuneration paid to teachers was in accordance with the scales recommended by the Burnham Committees—indeed bodies representing both teachers and local authorities. The result of the amendment carried against the Government was to put the Minister in a position in which he had to interfere with the proceedings of the Burnham Committees to the extent of requiring them to fix scales applicable equally to men and women. Both he and his predecessors had always avoided any interference with the proceedings of the Burnham Committees, on the ground that bodies of this kind must have complete freedom to reach their own decisions.

It was clear that the supporters of the amendment, and in particular the Tory Reform Group, had seized the opportunity of raising the question of equal pay on Clause 82 of the Education Bill because they saw no prospect of raising it at any other time. He had made the seriousness of the situation plain to the House so that those who voted for the amendment could not be in any doubt as to the consequences of the vote.

The President added that, from the point of view of administration, it would be possible to omit the Clause altogether from the Bill without any embarrassment.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agreed that the President of the Board of Education had so handled the situation that none of the members present could have failed to realise the implications of a vote against the Government. His impression was that after the vote there had been a change in feeling among those members who had supported the amendment, and an attempt had been made to suggest that the Government should not treat the matter as one of confidence, but should consider whether they might not acquiesce in the decision of the House. He had made it clear that, while the Government accepted the proposal to report progress, he could give no undertaking whatsoever as to the Government's attitude.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the Government were committed to formidable military operations in the near future. This incident might well have a most damaging effect on opinion abroad, and it was essential that prompt measures should be taken to make it clear beyond any doubt that the Government had the full support of Parliament. The great majority of members were with the Government, and, if the issue was treated as a major one of confidence, he was sure that the effect would be salutary.

The Lord President of the Council said that the situation which had arisen was the culmination of a course of irresponsible conduct pursued by certain members of the House. He fully endorsed what the Prime Minister had said.

The Minister of Labour and National Service agreed that the question must be treated as a major issue of confidence. Any sign of weakness on the part of the Government would have the worst possible effect on industrial relations. He agreed with the President of the Board of Education that it would be disastrous to depart from the principle of non-interference with the decisions of independent tribunals on wage questions.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that the deputation which he had received in the previous week on the subject of equal pay had not pressed for the immediate application of the
principle, but only that it should form a feature of the post-war Civil Service.

Further discussion showed complete agreement that the President of the Board of Education could have taken no other line, and that the matter must be treated as a major issue of confidence.

The War Cabinet then turned to the question of the procedure to be adopted in the House. There was general assent to the view that no time should be lost in restoring the position. It was felt, however, that it would be advantageous to allow one day to elapse in order to enable members who were out of London to return.

The President of the Board of Education pointed out that, as a result of the proposed procedure, at least one day of those set aside for the Committee Stage of the Education Bill would be lost. He was most anxious that, if at all possible, the Committee Stage should be completed by Easter.

It was agreed that the possibility of sitting for an extra day for this purpose should be borne in mind.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) The line taken by the President of the Board of Education in dealing with Mrs. Cazalet-Keir's amendment was cordially endorsed.

(2) At the meeting of the House on the following day, Wednesday, the 29th March, the Prime Minister would make a statement emphasising that the Government felt that at this serious stage of the war there must be no doubt of the support which they enjoyed from the House of Commons. There would therefore have to be an alteration in Government business.

(3) The Prime Minister's statement would proceed to indicate the procedure to be followed when the Committee Stage of the Bill was resumed on the following day, Thursday, the 30th March. The Government would then oppose the Motion that the Clause, as amended, should stand as part of the Bill, and this would be treated as a vote of confidence. In the same way, when the Report Stage of the Bill was reached the Government would move to restore the Clause as it originally stood in the Bill. This also would be treated as a vote of confidence. After the Prime Minister's statement had been made, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would move the adjournment of the House.

(4) The Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the President of the Board of Education and the Joint Chief Whips were invited to settle the terms of the draft statement referred to in (2) and (3).

(5) The Joint Chief Whips were invited to take steps to ensure a full attendance in the House on Thursday, the 30th March.

(6) The Prime Minister, the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Board of Education would speak on behalf of the Government in the Debate on Thursday, the 30th March.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.
29th March, 1944.