48th Conclusions, Minute 2. Supplies to Russia
53rd Conclusions, Minute 2. Foreign Secretary's Visit to the United States.
      Minute 4. Occupied Enemy Territory: Administrative Arrangements.
56th Conclusions, Minute 2. Air Policy.
      Minute 6. New Zealand Division.
67th Conclusions, Minute 2. Air Policy.
      Minute 4. Air Policy.
73rd Conclusions, Minute 1. Propaganda Policy: Political Warfare Preparations for HUSKY.
      Minute 2. Occupied Enemy Territory: Arrangements for Civil Administration.
74th Conclusions, Minute 1. Future Operations: Operation LIFEBELT.
75th Conclusions, Minute 1. France: General de Gaulle and General Giraud.
76th Conclusions. Future Operations: Operation LIFEBELT.
82nd Conclusions, Minute 1. Tunisia: General Alexander's Statement.
83rd Conclusions, Minute 1. Air Policy: Bombing Policy.
      Minute 2. Trade Disputes Act.
84th Conclusions, Minute 1. Future Operations: Operation LIFEBELT.
85th Conclusions, Minute 6. India: The Viceroyalty and System of Command.
87th Conclusions, Minute 4. France: General de Gaulle and General Giraud.
THE PRIME MINISTER read to the War Cabinet the telegram which he had received from Premier Stalin (F.441/3 of the 2nd April) in reply to the message which he had sent to Premier Stalin on the 30th March informing him that it was necessary to stop sending convoys to Russia by the Northern Route until September. The Prime Minister thought that, in the circumstances, Premier Stalin’s reply was courageous and not unsatisfactory.

The Prime Minister indicated to the War Cabinet the lines on which he proposed to reply to this telegram from Premier Stalin.

The Prime Minister said that, at his request, the Minister of Production (in the absence of the Foreign Secretary) had presided over a Meeting on the 1st April attended by M. Maisky and other Russian representatives, Mr Harriman and the Minister of War Transport, to consider the situation which had arisen out of the decision to postpone the sailings of convoys by the North Russian route, and to examine the possibilities of other supply routes.

THE MINISTER OF PRODUCTION said that at this Meeting he had said that the United States and British Governments intended to continue shipping supplies to Russia to the full capacity of all available routes. He had informed M. Maisky that it was hoped that the rate of clearance by the Persian Gulf route would rise from the present monthly rate of 80,000 tons to 240,000 tons in August next. He had further invited M. Maisky to indicate, within the limits of the port capacity available, what were the categories of supplies which the U.S.S.R. most wished to receive.

The War Cabinet took note of these statements.
FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

Relations between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he did not propose to mention questions like Shipping, which had been dealt with separately, but to confine himself to political issues.

2. Perhaps the political topic most frequently discussed in the United States concerned the relations between the United States and Russia. The Foreign Secretary thought that the President was not happy with the diplomatic side of the picture. Litvinoff was a man of less influence than, and was not so much in the confidence of his Government as, Maisky. Further, the President was not altogether satisfied with United States representation in Moscow. He thought that the President had it in mind to send Mr. Davis back to Moscow when his health was sufficiently recovered.

3. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought the United States Administration made a mistake in not giving the Russians as much information about daily diplomatic events as we did. For example, we had always told the Russians about any tentative peace feelers. He had suggested that the State Department might authorise their Ambassador in Moscow to give the Russians a full account of his (the Foreign Secretary's) talks, as a start in this direction.

4. The Foreign Secretary thought that the public attitude towards Russia was, on the whole, less friendly in the United States than it was in this country. Many people felt that Russia's attitude after the war was unpredictable. There was, however, general support for the view that no harm could come to the United States from endeavouring to come to terms with the U.S.S.R. Among those who would probably not endorse this view was Mr. Hoover. The latter wanted closer relations between the United States and ourselves, but the Foreign Secretary suspected that this was because he regarded this as preferable to closer relations between the United States and Russia.

5. The President had asked the Foreign Secretary whether the latter thought that Russia would want to Communise all Europe after the war. The Foreign Secretary had replied that he did not think so, and that he thought one of the best ways of avoiding this was that we should do what we could to keep on good terms with Russia.
6. The President seemed to have reconciled himself to Russia retaining the Baltic States after the war. His view was that he did not see who was going to turn them out. The President, however, was keen on plebiscites, and might suggest their employment in connection with these States.

7. The President thought that if Poland absorbed East Prussia and received compensation in Silesia, she ought to be satisfied with the Curzon Line as the boundary with Russia, more especially since much of Eastern Poland which she would thereby lose was largely populated by Ukrainians. The President thought that one way of handling the matter would be that this country, the United States and Russia should settle between themselves what they regarded as fair terms as between Russia and Poland, and that we should then unite in persuading the Poles to accept this settlement. The President thought that this would be much better than a prolonged Polish-Russian wrangle.

8. The President had not shown himself anxious about the position. He thought that the Russian terms were reasonable. Mr. Welles, on the other hand, was somewhat apprehensive, on the ground that the Mutual Assistance Pact which the Russians wanted with Finland might mean something in the nature of a Protectorate.

9. There had been much talk about France, of a somewhat varied nature. Mr. Hull clearly hated General de Gaulle. The Foreign Secretary had heard a good deal of the complaint that we had not done enough to defend the American point of view. For the most part, however, discussion had related to the future handling of the French. On this it seemed that there was one point of difference between the United States and ourselves. The United States did not want to see the establishment at this stage of a single French authority, even if that authority was not recognised as a National Government. The Foreign Secretary had made it clear that we should greatly prefer to deal with individuals, and were willing to see Giraud and de Gaulle separate. They also wished to deal separately with the French authorities in the Pacific islands and in Martinique. The Foreign Secretary said that he wondered whether this was in part attributable to the United States desire to see some of the French islands in the Pacific internationalised.

10. In the course of the conversations the President had referred to previous suggestions that Indo-China, Dakar and Bizerta should be internationalised. Mr. Welles had reminded him that he was committed, by public declarations, to a policy of restoring the full integrity of the French Empire. It seemed unlikely that these particular suggestions would be further pursued.

11. If the Allied forces landed in France, the United States did not want the Allied forces to be accompanied by any French civil authority. They thought that the territory liberated by the Allies should be administered by the Allies. The Foreign Secretary had said that, while he had not consulted the War Cabinet on this point, he thought that our view was different, and that we should want to have some French civil authority working with the Allied military authority from an early stage.
Political Relations

13. The Foreign Secretary said that those had not worked out very happily in North Africa. The reason was perhaps that the State Department had much less close contact with the Services than the Foreign Office had in this country with the Chiefs of Staff. Or, perhaps it was more accurate to say that the State Department's contacts were with the political heads of the Service Departments, but not with the United States Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Hull was clearly anxious for better collaboration in the future than in the past. He had suggested that the Foreign Office might attach one of its number to the staff of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that the State Department should do the same. This would help to bring about better co-ordination. It was clear, however, that the difficulty lay mainly in the faulty American set-up.

Trends of S.S. Opinion.

15. The President, Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles had all told him that United States opinion was trending away from isolation. This was amply borne out by the statements made by many Senators and Congressmen whom the Foreign Secretary had met. Mr. Welles had said that he hoped that the Senate would, in a month or so, pass a resolution which would give the President a good deal more latitude in his foreign policy. He had hoped that, by a series of resolutions being passed, the President would be given increasing support for his policy, and that this would avoid the gulf between the Executive and the Legislature which had existed in President Wilson's case at the end of the last war.

Future World Organisation.

16. The President thought that the elaboration of a world-wide organisation could not be worked out between ourselves and the United States alone, but that representatives of other nations must be brought in at all stages. It was perhaps for this reason that the President was anxious to stress the United Nations conception whenever possible.

17. The sort of world-wide organisation which the President had in mind was as follows. The basis would be a General Assembly not unlike the Assembly of the League of Nations. Next, there would be an Advisory Council, comprising representatives of the three Great Powers and China, and also six or eight other representatives chosen by the other countries. Thirdly, the President hoped that the Advisory Council would be prepared to entrust
pretty wide powers to an Executive consisting of the three Great Powers and China. He also proposed that there should be an officer, to be called the Moderator, who would have powers not unlike those of the Secretary-General of the League, and who would be authorised to convene the Advisory Council and the Executive whenever matters arose which called for consultation.

18. As regards the Council of Europe, the President thought that it would be impossible for the United States to belong to it. Mr. Welles thought that it might be in effect a council subordinate to the main body. As such it might deal with economic matters, communications and health, but not with political issues.

19. The Foreign Secretary said that he saw little in this lay-out in which our ideas differed from those of the President, except as regards the extent of the powers which it was hoped might be entrusted to the Executive of the three Great Powers and China.

20. The President had referred to a suggestion which he had made earlier (in discussion with the Prime Minister), that after the war only the four Great Powers would retain national armed forces. He had, however, been reminded that, even if it were possible to impose such terms on enemy countries, it would hardly be practicable to disarm neutral countries; and it seemed unlikely that this suggestion would be seriously pressed.

21. In discussion it was emphasised that in most European countries compulsory military service was an essential feature of the national life; and it was difficult to believe that, in the years immediately following the war, any French or Polish Government could be brought to dispense with national forces. The only practical way of weaning Europe from the maintenance of excessive national forces would be through the establishment of world machinery for the settlement of international disputes, on the lines of the Advisory Council mentioned above, which would have at its disposal international forces capable of enforcing its decisions. The route to this goal would be to persuade each country to earmark a portion of its national forces which would be available to serve at the request of the Council as part of an international force. It might be desirable that, as a first step towards this objective, the Armies of Occupation after the war should be built up on this basis.

22. The Foreign Secretary, continuing, said that a good deal of thought had been given in Washington to the future treatment of Germany. Mr. Sumner Welles was a keen advocate of dismemberment; and the President himself appeared to favour this view. Mr. Hull had not finally made up his mind on this point, and it could not be said that the State Department unanimously favoured dismemberment.

23. Mr. Welles' view was that Germany should eventually be divided into a number of independent States - e.g., Bavaria, a smaller Prussia, Saxony and North-Western Germany. Austria should at first remain separate, but might subsequently link up with Bavaria. The Ruhr should remain under international supervision for some years after
the war. It was a part of his plan that, for the purposes of our military occupation of Germany immediately after the war, we should make military divisions (with separate Commands etc.) corresponding broadly to the areas of the separate States into which we hoped the Greater Germany would eventually be broken up. The Foreign Secretary said that, in his view, this last point was a new and valuable contribution.

24. In discussion, the view was expressed that, while the tenancy of the German-speaking peoples to preserve their unity would be strong, it might well be practicable in course of time to promote, and cement different national groupings in Central Europe. A start might be made with a Federation of States grouped round Vienna. There were good reasons - racial, political and economic - why Bavaria should be linked with Austria rather than with Northern Germany; and this movement might be accelerated by prescribing somewhat easier conditions for German States which adhered to Vienna rather than Berlin. If such a Confederation of the Danube proved practicable, it might be desirable that some part of Yugoslavia should be joined with it, to provide access to the sea; and, if so, the present frontier of Yugoslavia might be extended to include Trieste.

25. It was also suggested that it would be helpful in preserving European peace if more emphasis were laid on the building up of inter-State commerce and communications, so that common commercial interests would run across the lines of the political frontiers.

26. The Foreign Secretary said that the President's policy in relation to the Far East was "Japan for the Japanese". He contemplated that Kanchukuo and Formosa should be restored to China; that the Japanese Mandated Islands should be internationalised; that Korea should be an independent republic, after an initial period under international tutelage, and that Sakhalin should be restored to Russia.

27. In this connection the Foreign Secretary added that he had been assured by the Chinese Ambassador at Washington that China had no ambitions in respect of Sian, Indo-China, Burma or Malaya.

28. During these conversations the President had not evinced any desire for new American bases in the Pacific. The Prime Minister said that there was no reason why any difficulty should arise between ourselves and the United States on this question. War between this country and the United States was unthinkable; and it was therefore a major British interest that the United States should secure full mobility of their sea and air power throughout the Pacific. It should be the basis of our policy that we would not object to any American proposals to acquire further bases in this area.

29. The Foreign Secretary said that, though certain commercial interests in the United States had decided ambitions in this field, the United States Administration had not yet cleared their minds about the future of civil aviation after the war. In these circumstances he had
reached an understanding with the President that H.M. Government and the United States Government would continue to study this question independently, on the basis that each would let the other know as soon as it was ready to enter upon joint discussions. Meanwhile, each Government would do its best to discourage public discussion which might have the effect of crystallising public opinion in either country prematurely on these issues.

30. The War Cabinet thanked the Foreign Secretary for his statement, and congratulated him on the success of his visit.
The Prime Minister referred to recent telegrams regarding the proposals likely to be put forward by the State Department for the military government of territories occupied in the course of the operation HUSKY.

These proposals were based on the hypothesis of joint Anglo-American responsibility and joint conduct of the military government under the supreme command of General Eisenhower. The State Department appeared, however, to be proceeding on the view that the administration should be so organised as to give the greatest possible emphasis to the American character of the undertaking. This was based on the thesis that public opinion in the territories affected is more pro-American than pro-British.

The Prime Minister said that he had sent a telegram to President Roosevelt suggesting that, as the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British, the British should be senior partners in the military administration of occupied territory in the area. He had suggested that, under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower, a British General Officer should be appointed as military governor of the territory and should be assisted by a joint Anglo-American staff. Such an arrangement, while avoiding dualism in the executive decisions taken on the spot, would allow of decisions of major policy being taken as usual by agreement between the two Governments.

For the present this proposal had been put forward on grounds of administrative convenience. If, however, it should be contested by the Americans, it might become necessary to justify it on more general grounds. We might have to invoke the principle that, in a joint operation, the command should go to the country contributing the major proportion of the force. We had accepted an American Commander-in-Chief for the operation TORCH at a time when it was supposed that the major part of the forces engaged would be American. In the event, the proportions had changed. The bulk of the forces now engaged in active operations in North Africa were British. And the same would be the case with the operation HUSKY.

The War Cabinet -

(1) Took note, with approval, of the line which the Prime Minister was proposing to take in communicating with President Roosevelt on this subject.

(2) Agreed that the Foreign Secretary should inform the Resident Minister in North Africa, for his guidance, that we were opposed to the general proposition that the military administration to be set up in these territories should be predominantly American in character.
In connection with the account of the week's air operations, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that reports had been received from the French complaining of the inaccuracy of the bombing operations carried out by U.S. aircraft on targets in France. No complaints were made by French opinion against the R.A.F. bombing operations against targets in France. The French recognised that these operations were carried out with great accuracy, but that a certain proportion of bombs must miss their mark and cause civilian casualties. But it was reported that the U.S. bombing was so inaccurate that anti-American feeling was being built up in France. The particular case quoted was the attack aimed at the marshalling yards at Rouen, which had resulted in heavy casualties in the city.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that, after this attack, he had told General Eaker of the reports which had been received and had asked him that particular care should be exercised when bombing targets of this nature. Since that date there had been no case where serious injury had been inflicted on the civilian population in France.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that the United States Army Air Force should not carry out attacks on targets in France where this was liable to cause heavy civilian casualties. There was, of course, no objection to their continuing to bomb the enemy submarine bases from which the civilian population had been evacuated. He asked the Chief of the Air Staff to impress this on General Eaker. It was of course to be hoped that an increasing proportion of the attacks of the United States Army Air Force would be directed against targets in Germany.
W.M.(43) 56TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE (C

Confidential Annex

(19th April, 1943 - 5.30 p.m.)

NEW ZEALAND DIVISION

The War Cabinet were informed of a recent exchange of telegrams about the participation of the New Zealand Division in operations, after the African coast had been cleared of the enemy.

On the 14th April the Prime Minister had sent a telegram to Mr. Fraser (Wmch No. 1) informing him of the operations which it was intended to undertake after the African coast had been cleared of the enemy; saying that Generals Alexander and Montgomery were most anxious that the New Zealand Division should take part in those operations; and asking if the New Zealand Government would allow its Division to take part in them. Mr. Fraser had replied on the 17th April (Pera No. 1) that he had given an undertaking to consult the New Zealand Parliament before any such decision was given, that the House of Representatives would normally meet on the 19th May, and that he did not think a special meeting could be arranged before the 5th May. He felt that a sudden summons of Parliament for the immediately ensuing week might give rise to undue alarm and speculation, and he suggested that the matter should be discussed with the New Zealand Minister of Defence (Mr. Jones) who was in London.

On the 18th April the Prime Minister had sent a further telegram (Wmch No. 3) explaining that if the New Zealand Division was to take part in operation HUSKY its immediate withdrawal to Egypt for special training in amphibious operations was necessary. A decision could not, therefore, be postponed until May. He had enquired whether we should be justified in acting on the assumption of a favourable response from the New Zealand Parliament.

This had been followed up by a further telegram from the Prime Minister (Wmch No. 4) transmitting a message from General Alexander to the effect that the delay in getting an answer about the New Zealand Division was causing him grave concern, since he could not make plans for the battle until he had obtained an answer.

Two telegrams had been received that day from Mr. Fraser (Pera Nos. 2 and 3). In the latter telegram he stated that he could not assume responsibility for a favourable answer. The New Zealand War Cabinet would, of course, agree that the New Zealand Division should be taken out of Tunisia for special training, provided it was clearly understood that such agreement did not amount to a commitment of the Division to the task indicated before the New Zealand Parliament had had an opportunity of discussing the matter.
THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF explained that, owing to the limited training facilities available, it was not possible to train more than the number of Divisions which would take part in the HUSKY assault. He thought that General Alexander was faced with the need for an immediate decision whether to employ the New Zealand Division in the forthcoming battle or to take it out of the line and send it back for training in amphibious operations.

The War Cabinet's view was that, while it was likely that the New Zealand Parliament, when the time came, would be willing to allow their Division to take part in the HUSKY Operation, it would not be right to take the risks involved in planning on this assumption. The right course was therefore that a telegram should be despatched by the Prime Minister to General Alexander informing him that it was not possible to obtain an immediate decision, on which he could rely, that the New Zealand Division would be available for HUSKY, and that he should therefore make his plans on the assumption that the Division would not be so available.

Note: After the Meeting, telegrams were sent by the Prime Minister to General Alexander in the sense of the above (021125), and to Mr. Fraser to inform him of the War Cabinet's decision (Minch No. 5).
W.M. (43) 61st CONCLUSIONS

Confidential Annex

(29th April, 1943 - 12 noon)

FAR EAST

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the three Commanders-in-Chief had been summoned home for consultation, and he thought the War Cabinet would be interested to hear their views on the situation in Burma and the Indian Ocean.

Operations in Arakan had been very disappointing, and the general conditions of warfare in Burma favoured the Japanese. The mountainous jungle country forbade the use of modern weapons, and hampered the operations of aircraft. Communications were few and difficult, malaria was prevalent, and the morale of our troops was reported to be less high than it should be. At Casablanca we had agreed - largely as a concession to United States opinion - to mount a full-scale operation for the re-capture of Burma between the monsoons of 1943 and 1944. Since then, the demands made on shipping by HUSKY, and other commitments, had increased, and we had not been able to provide the shipping required to carry to the Indian Ocean the requirements of the Burma operation. We should probably have to relinquish the idea of reconquering Burma during the coming winter. Alternatives were being studied by the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief.

In the meanwhile, an invitation had been received from the United States Chiefs of Staff for the three Commanders-in-Chief to return to India via Washington, where they would meet General Stilwell and General Chennault, who had been summoned there. It was open to doubt whether this invitation should be accepted, in view of the natural urge which existed in America to devote resources to the war against Japan. He (the Prime Minister) would much rather that the United States Chiefs of Staff should come to London. On the other hand, if the invitation were rejected, and things did not go well, it would afford a pretext to the Americans for saying that we had neglected an opportunity for making a combined plan. The matter would have to be carefully considered.

The Prime Minister then asked the Commanders-in-Chief to give their views on the situation.

SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL said that the situation in Burma was entirely governed by communications. These were bad, not only in Burma, but in North East India, where the River Brahmaputra (over which there was no bridge) prevented through road or rail communication. There was only a single track metre-gauge railway in Assam, which in peace-time took two or three trains a day. This had now been worked up to its maximum capacity, and river transport had also been developed, though the latter was hampered by the dispatch of river craft to Iraq earlier in the war. The result was some congestion in North East India, where both American and British airfields were being developed on a large scale, for which purpose a great deal of material had to be brought in. This competed with the development of
the communications themselves. Until a year ago, there was no road between India and Burma. Now there was 260 miles of difficult road from the railhead at Manipur to the Chindwin Valley. Two roads were being made, one forward from Imphal, and one from Ledo to Myitkyina. The whole country was covered with jungle, and the malaria was very severe.

After the Casablanca Conference, instructions had been received for a full-scale invasion of Burma in the winter of 1943/44 to be prepared. In consultation with the Americans, a plan had therefore been made for an advance by a British Corps from Manipur and a Chinese Corps from Ledo, with the object of joining hands with the Chinese Army advancing from Yunnan. This advance would be carried to Mandalay. Meanwhile, landings would be made at various points in lower Burma, and a direct assault would be made on Rangoon. This plan was to be put into effect in November, in the hopes that it would permit the reduction of the country before the onset of the ensuing monsoon. He had always regarded the operation as difficult and attended with considerable hazards. The assault on Rangoon, which was essential to success, meant a landing right up the river which was the only way in. Nevertheless, no other plan could be found, and provided everything went well, and all preparations were completed to time, he thought that the plan, though hazardous, might succeed. It required the shipment of 180,000 tons to the Indian Ocean every month from March 1943. During March and April, however, only 60/70,000 tons a month had actually been shipped. This meant inevitably the postponement of the operation, which in its turn meant that it had little or no chance of being carried through in the time available.

The operations which had been taking place in Arakan had as their object the capture of Akyab. If enough assault shipping had been available, a direct attack on Akyab would have been made, but without the shipping there was no way of doing the operation except by a land advance down the Mayu Peninsula. Arakan was the worst part of Burma in which to operate, and could never be a route for invasion. The operations had shown up certain weaknesses in training and leadership of our troops, and had given us a good insight into the Japanese tactics, which were undoubtedly skilful. Considerable loss had also been caused to the enemy. It was hoped to profit by what had occurred. At the same time as the Arakan operations, a specially trained and organised Brigade had moved across the Chindwin to cut the railway between Wunto and Myitkyina. This had been done successfully, and the Brigade had then crossed the Irrawaddy with a view to raiding the Japanese. Unfortunately, most of the mules with the Brigade had died of anthrax, so that it had been necessary to withdraw in small columns, some of which had got back, and some were still out. The object had been to gain experience of such operations, and although it had originally been intended to carry them out in conjunction with an advance by the Chinese from Yunnan which had not materialised, they had, he thought, been valuable.

The monsoon would be breaking in two or three weeks' time, and as far as possible troops would be withdrawn from the unhealthy regions. Two Divisions, which would form the holding force during the monsoon, would not be fit for operations next winter. Various alternatives to a full-scale invasion of Burma had been considered, one of which was to advance into Northern Burma, and to try to occupy as far South as Mandalay and the dry belt. The difficulty about this was that communications through to Mandalay could not be established within the time available. On the whole, therefore, it seemed better to restrict our operations.
next winter to something more limited, and to concentrate on the build-up of airfields and the air route to China.

SIR RICHARD PREISE gave an account of the progress which had been made in building up the Air Forces in India. Initially, the object had been to develop resources to cover Ceylon and Bengal. When this had been done, and the threat appeared to have receded, the build-up had been directed to the offensive, with the object of gaining air superiority in Burma, and supporting the land operations. We might now be said to have gained air superiority, though the Japanese had adopted the practice of withdrawing from all their forward aerodromes, and holding back out of reach of our bombers. They had so developed airfields and facilities, that they could concentrate rapidly in any desired direction, carry out two or three raids, and then again withdraw. Our chief need was for long-range fighters and bombers. The original target had been for a build-up of about 70 Squadrons. We now had 46 Operational, of which 24 were engaged in general reconnaissance, and other duties in Ceylon, and on the North West Frontier, leaving 40 for fighting. As many as possible had been concentrated forward on aerodromes on the Burma frontier, though some difficulty had been experienced in arranging an adequate warning system.

SIR JAMES SOMERVILLE said that the Naval situation in the Indian Ocean could only be judged in the light of projected operations in other theatres. At the present time, the Fleet had been obliged to confine their activities to escorting convoys, and anti-submarine work off the coast of Africa. No offensive operations whatever had been possible. He was not at all in favour of the plan for the reconquest of Burma. Its success would depend upon cover for landings given entirely by seaborne aircraft, and also on the absence of fortifications on the Rangoon River.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Eastern Fleet had certainly been greatly reduced, and this had been possible owing to the absence of any forward move by the Japanese. Meanwhile, our Air strength in India and Ceylon had been very greatly increased. The most serious problem was the land situation, and the plan which had been made for the reconquest of Burma looked extremely unpromising. It could not be said that the conquest of Burma was an essential step in the defeat of Japan, though the Americans were in favour of that attempt. Nor would the occupation of Northern Burma mean the immediate resumption of traffic on the Burma Road; a year would be required for its restoration. Everything pointed to an alternative line of action, and this the Chiefs of Staff would study with the Commanders-in-Chief. In the meanwhile, we must not let the Americans drift away from the conception of Germany as the major enemy. He hoped that Sir Archibald Wavell and Lord Leathers would consult together over the Indian shipping requirements. These should be scrutinized, and divided into their component parts. We should not try to build up too big an Army in India, and we could not afford to waste shipping which would be so urgently required in the Mediterranean.

SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL said that no new Divisions were now being formed, and the intake of recruits was only for maintenance and the formation of ancillary units. He hoped that our propaganda would be directed to instilling the importance of the war against Japan. It was most necessary that the British soldiers in India should be made to feel that they were taking part in campaigns which were of the utmost importance, and which must be carried through.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the Secretary of State for India should take up this point.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS referred to the attack on the Ford and General Motors Assembly plants at Antwerp, carried out by the United States Army Air Force on the 4th May. He referred to the discussion on this matter which had taken place in the War Cabinet three weeks ago, and said that he was still receiving disturbing accounts of the unfortunate effects on morale in enemy-occupied territories resulting from the inaccuracy of American bombing attacks.

Reference was made to the Conclusions of the Cabinet at an earlier discussion, when the Chief of the Air Staff had been asked to impress on General Faker that the United States Army Air Force should not carry out attacks on targets in territory of the Allies occupied by the enemy, where this was liable to cause heavy civilian casualties.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR said that, following on this decision, the Chief of the Air Staff had discussed the matter with General Andrews and General Eaker and some 20 targets had been chosen as suitable for attack by the U.S. Army Air Force. This list included the two targets which the Americans had attacked in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, and which were regarded as sufficiently far from the centre of the city to reduce the risk of heavy civilian casualties. It was added that the Americans were somewhat sensitive on this matter, and that we should not be deterred by enemy propaganda from attacking targets in Allied territory occupied by the enemy, which were of military importance. Complaints of inaccurate bombing in occupied territory were, of course, a recognised German propaganda line.

THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, while agreeing that there was force in this view, thought that the position should continue to be carefully watched.
PROPAGANDA POLICY. by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (D.O. (*43) 10) covering —

(a) telegrams recommending that the change from "hard" to "soft" in our propaganda against Italy should be made at once rather than immediately before the "Husky" assault;

(b) a draft declaration to the Italian people.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum explained that there were two points at issue, the timing of the change in our propaganda from "hard" to "soft" and the text of the declaration. On military grounds the Vice Chiefs of Staff had advised that the switch should be made at once and that the declaration should be made by the Prime Minister and the President at the conclusion of the present conference in Washington. In his view the course proposed might give rise to certain political disadvantages, to which he had drawn the Prime Minister's attention in a telegram which was read to the Meeting. Although the decision regarding the timing of the change from "hard" to "soft" would be taken in Washington, he had thought it best to bring his views to the notice of the War Cabinet who would wish to consider the terms of the declaration.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Minister of Information said that he was unable to express an opinion as to the timing of the change since the memorandum had only been in his hands for a short time and he had not previously been consulted on this matter.

Preliminary discussion showed that the War Cabinet would wish to have further time to consider the proposed declaration, the exact wording of which was felt to be of considerable importance.

The War Cabinet:

Agreed to give further consideration to the proposed declaration at a meeting the following day and instructed the Secretary to despatch a telegram informing the Prime Minister that their views would be telegraphed to Washington immediately after that meeting.

-1-

* ALCOVE No. 310.
* ALCOVE No. 324.
The Minister of Labour and National Service drew attention to the advantages from the point of view of propaganda to be gained by having ready a supply of radio sets for issuing to the civil population of territories as we drove out the enemy.

The War Cabinet:

Took note that the Minister of Labour and National Service would communicate with the Minister of Economic Warfare regarding this suggestion.

The Minister of Labour and National Service also drew attention to the need for preparing plans to organise the labour forces which would become available in enemy and occupied countries when we effected a re-entry into the Continent of Europe.

The War Cabinet:

Took note that the Minister of Labour and National Service would furnish the Lord President of the Council with a note on the above matter.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR said that in the coming months, under clear conditions with bright moonlight, penetration into areas heavily defended by fighters was costly. Furthermore, under these conditions bombing accuracy almost up to daylight standard could be achieved. It was therefore desirable to have available as many alternative targets as possible. Large numbers of machine-tools from Krupps factory at Essen had been removed to factories in France and Belgium. It was proposed therefore to attack these factories and in particular the Schneider Works at Le Creusot, the Gnome works near Paris, the Aircraft Factory at Villacoublais and the Renault Works near Paris. Only experienced crews would be employed on these attacks, which would be confined to nights suitable for accurate bombing. Even so, however, the possibility of damage to civilian property and civilian loss of life could not be avoided. These attacks fell within existing approved policy.

But in view of complaints of the inaccuracy of the bombing attacks carried out against targets in enemy occupied country by the U.S. Army Air Force, he had thought it best to acquaint the War Cabinet with the intention to attack these targets.

The War Cabinet took note with approval of the above statement.
The War Cabinet resumed consideration of this matter, and had before them copies of a Note handed round by the Minister of Information. This Note recommended that the timing of the change from "hard" to "soft" and of the declaration should be the minimum interval before the assault.

The Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security said that a declaration containing promises to the Italians would divide public opinion in this country and the United States, and our own Press might well defeat our propaganda. This was a very strong argument in favour of delaying the change from "hard" to "soft" and the declaration until the shortest possible time before Operation HUSKY.

The Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff emphasised the need to do everything possible to assist this most difficult and hazardous operation. The object of our propaganda should therefore be to weaken the resistance of the garrison in HUSKYLAND, and the best way of achieving this was probably through the families of the individual soldiers. This process, however, required the longer period which General...
The War Cabinet resumed consideration of this matter, and had before them copies of a Note handed round by the Minister of Information. This Note recommended that the timing of the change from "hard" to "soft" and of the declaration should be the minimum interval before the assault.

THE HOME SECRETARY AND MINISTER OF HOME SECURITY said that a declaration containing promises to the Italians would divide public opinion in this country and the United States, and our own Press might well defeat our propaganda. This was a very strong argument in favour of delaying the change from "hard" to "soft" and the declaration until the shortest possible time before Operation HUSKY.

THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF emphasised the need to do everything possible to assist this most difficult and hazardous operation. The object of our propaganda should therefore be to weaken the resistance of the garrison in HUSKYLAND, and the best way of achieving this was probably through the families of the individual soldiers. This process, however, required the longer period which General Eisenhower favoured.

After further discussion, the War Cabinet were of opinion that the change from "hard" to "soft" should not be made at once, but nearer the time of invasion.
Discussion then turned on the terms of the declaration (Annex II to D.O.(43)10).

The War Cabinet agreed that if the declaration was to take its present form, the word "political" should be deleted from paragraph 9. There was, however, general support for the view that the declaration, at once be more effective, and political difficulties would be avoided, if emphasis could be placed less on the political future than on the re-unifying of families and the restoration of peaceful lives. It was also suggested that promises should be avoided (in view of the plight of the occupied territories we could not undertake to make ample food supplies available), and that the reference to the Atlantic Charter should be omitted.

The War Cabinet:

(a) Agreed that a telegram should be despatched to the Prime Minister stating that if it was intended to adopt the draft declaration which had been sent to Washington, the word "political" should be omitted from paragraph 9; but adding that it was proposed to forward a revised draft of the declaration in the near future.

(b) Invited the Minister of Information to prepare and submit to the Foreign Secretary a revised declaration in the light of the discussion.

(c) Invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform the Prime Minister that, in their view, the switch from "hard" to "soft" propaganda should be made much nearer the date of invasion. This telegram should contain a summary of the main arguments in the Minister of Information's Memorandum.
MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM.

INCOMING MESSAGE

FAN 127

From: AGWAR.

To: ETOUSA (Action)

ALGIERS (Action)

FAN 127. 21st May, 1943.

R-8795. EDITED LITERAL TEXT.

Interior Addresses: For: FORTUNE, ALGIERS.

From: THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Reference: Our FORTUNE 111, 16th April (No record)

BIGOT - HUSKY.

1. Reference your telegram of 17th May on the subject, the President has expressed the following views on Psychological Warfare for HUSKY.

The Prime Minister concurs:

"Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they cease hostilities they will have peace with honour. We cannot get away from unconditional surrender. All we can tell them is that they will be treated by U.S. and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people be constituted into a Nation in accordance with the principles of self determination. This latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship."

2. Accordingly the existing approved statement of policy, transmitted in our FORTUNE 111 of April 16th, will in your planning for Psychological Warfare be adhered to.

Circulation.

BRIK, Jacob
Foreign Secretary
First Sea Lord
C. G. Täls, W/O
A. M. S. S. O.
Minister of Information
Minister of Economic Warfare.
The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (W.I. (43) 214) raising a point on the draft of a general directive dealing with the Civil administration of HU3KYLAND when in Allied military occupation.

It was common ground that leading Fascist officials would have to be removed from office. We had proposed that they should be replaced by subordinate Italian officials, chosen because their sympathies were not Fascist, and because they were capable administrators. The American view was that the holders of all important posts, e.g., Prefects and Mayors of important towns, would inevitably be Fascists and would have to be removed. They thought that the powers previously exercised by the holders of these major positions should be handed over to Allied officers.

In his Memorandum, the Foreign Secretary said that he thought the American scheme was unworkable, as there were not enough qualified Allied administrators to go round. The result of the American policy would be that we should have to accept as administrators large numbers of untrained Americans of Italian origin. This would lead to a serious loss of efficiency, if not to a breakdown of the Civil Government.

The Foreign Secretary annexed to his Memorandum a draft reply which, while it accepted the view that our aim should be a purely Military Government, maintained that for practical reasons we should have to fall back on Italians in a number of cases.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he was anxious to avoid disagreement on this point and that, provided we could reach accommodation on a middle line, he thought we could be satisfied, inasmuch as control would in practice rest with General Alexander and Lord Rennell, as Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER suggested that it was not necessary, as proposed in paragraph 3 of the draft reply, that the selection of Italians for posts of Prefects or for Mayors should be confined to subordinate Italian officials. There might be non-Fascist Italians who would be suitable for these posts, but who were not holding any official position.

THE LORD PRESIDENT said that the phrase "purely Military Government" might be read in two senses. If it meant that the authority of the Military Commander must be unchallenged and supreme, no-one could take exception to it. If, however, it meant that local administration must be permeated with military officials at all levels, this was a proposition which we should certainly not accept, since it would mean putting in entirely unsuitable and inefficient people, with results that would be disastrous. The Lord President suggested
that the line should be that all important Fascist officials, and other persons on whom no reliance could be placed, should be removed; but that only if no reliable person could be found among the local inhabitants, should recourse be had to persons brought from outside to fill local Government posts in the occupied territory.

The War Cabinet -

Expressed general approval of the line taken in the Foreign Secretary's draft reply, and authorised him to despatch the reply, subject to amendment in the light of the points brought out in discussion. In particular, it was agreed that the first two lines of the draft telegram required amendment.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
21st May, 1943.
MOST SECRET

WAR CABINET.

It is requested that the attached copy of the Confidential Annex to W.M. (43) 74th Conclusions, Minute 1, be substituted for the copy at present in your possession, and the latter returned to me personally.

(Signed) E.E. BRIDGES.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
26th May, 1943.
The War Cabinet considered a telegram from the Prime Minister (CINCJ 1943) stating that he and the President of the United States had now received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff a formal statement stressing the extreme importance of our acquiring the use of these Islands at the earliest moment. The Prime Minister considered that this statement established the military necessity of the project; and he developed in his telegram the objections which he felt to the suggestion that, before seizing the Islands by force, we should make a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government asking them to agree to our use of the Islands. He believed that such a request would be rejected; and by making it we should increase the difficulties of the military operation by forfeiting the element of surprise. He therefore asked to be empowered to state, in the name of the War Cabinet, on the following Monday that, if the President agreed to share the responsibility, we would authorise the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make and execute a plan to attack the Islands at the earliest possible moment.

The following were the main points in a full discussion:

(a) The main point dealt with was that the Prime Minister's proposal seemed to involve making an attack, without warning, on the territory of our oldest Ally, whom we had recently been providing with arms to defend herself against aggression.

Grave difficulties were expressed about this aspect of the matter. The War Cabinet were informed that our Ambassador at Lisbon thought there was some prospect of persuading Dr. Salazar to yield to a request for facilities on the Islands, if made by way of a diplomatic approach, particularly if it were made at the present time, when our prestige was high after the victory in Africa. If such an approach succeeded, we should have secured the whole of our aim; if it failed, we could still proceed to take the Islands by force; and we should be in a far stronger position in the eyes of our Allies if we resorted to force only after other means had failed.

On the general issue, Ministers generally (with the exception of the Home Secretary — see (k) below) were strongly of the opinion that we should first make a diplomatic approach; and that if we attacked the Islands without warning, our action would be badly received in this country, would create a very unfavourable impression on our Allies, and would damage our reputation after the war.

(b) THE FOREIGN SECRETARY thought that the political difficulties of the project would be increased if it were desired that the United States should take any substantial part in the operation. Public opinion in Portugal was strongly pro-British and, if this action were taken by us alone, the mass of the people in Portugal would try to regard it in a favourable light. There was not, however, the same sympathy for the United States among other reasons, because the Portuguese were suspicious of American ambitions in respect of these Islands. If, therefore, the operation were undertaken, it was more important that it should appear to be predominantly British than it had been that TORCH should appear predominantly American.
THE MINISTER OF PRODUCTION pointed out that account must be taken of the possibility that a breach with Portugal would result in securing to the Germans larger supplies of wolfram, of which they were now in urgent need. Their stocks were becoming exhausted, and production in countries under Axis control was small. They relied therefore increasingly on what they obtained from Spain and Portugal. A breach with Portugal might mean that we should get less, and the Germans more, of the Portuguese supplies of wolfram. Though a drop in our supplies might not be disastrous for us, an increase in Germany's supplies would be of valuable help to her war production.

Discussion then turned on the military aspects. THE VICE-CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF read to the War Cabinet the appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff dated 10th May (D.O. 438), together with a telegram which had been sent to the Prime Minister by the Defence Committee after consideration of this Report (ALCOVE 181).

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that M. Maisky had told him that morning that the Russians had expected that the Germans would by now have launched an attack on them and were surprised that they had not done so. Was it possible that they were waiting to see where we should attack? If the German forces were not engaged in an offensive against Russia, was it possible that they would have free reserves which they could use for other purposes; e.g., for example, for an occupation of the Iberian Peninsula?

THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that this was a question which he would like time to consider. He was, however, disposed to reply that the Germans' main preoccupation would necessarily be the Russian Front, and that the chances of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula, even if we seized the Islands, were remote. Furthermore, he thought that it would be a very daring action on the part of the Germans to invade the Peninsula before we had launched our offensive in the Mediterranean.

If the Germans occupied the Iberian Peninsula, would this make the passage through the Mediterranean more difficult?

THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that, if the Germans could deploy their air forces over the whole Peninsula, the passage of our ships through the narrows of the Western Mediterranean would become very difficult. He thought, however, that any diversion of German forces from the Russian Front was much more likely to be made towards the Central Mediterranean than towards the Iberian Peninsula.

Reference was made to the effect of carrying out an assault on the Islands "within the next three or four weeks" (See paragraph 4 of PENCIL 159) upon the HUSKY Operation.

THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that he felt quite certain that the Prime Minister's view would be that the HUSKY Operation should have priority. He took the reference to carrying out an operation against the Islands "within the next three or four weeks" as in the nature of a general directive to the Chiefs of Staff, that this operation should be carried out as quickly as possible, rather than as specifying an exact period.

It was pointed out that the main advantage of the plan outlined in PENCIL 159 was that we should not give the Portuguese time to increase the Islands' power of resistance. As against this, it was argued that the plan favoured by the Prime Minister did not provide for complete surprise, since it was proposed that the Portuguese Government should be told the night before that occupation was about to take place.
Some doubt was expressed as to whether the Portuguese would be able to take any very effective measures to increase the power of resistance of the Islands, even if the diplomatic approach was first tried and failed.

(a) As regards the argument that the possession of those Islands would save us a million tons of shipping, it was pointed out that such a figure would only accrue gradually. Furthermore, if we were to carry out the operation against the Islands in the near future, this would mean taking away escorts from the Atlantic convoys at a time when those escorts were still in need of strengthening. After September, however, our strength in escort vessels would rise rapidly, and we should better be able to afford such a diversion.

It was also pointed out that various recent public statements which had been made as to the progress of the Battle of the Atlantic would make it difficult to argue that the seizure of those Islands at this moment was absolutely necessary. While the War Cabinet would not shrink from the course proposed if they were satisfied that it was essential to the winning of the war, they did not feel convinced that this was the case.

(b) It was also urged that the course of action proposed would hardly seem consistent with the fact that we had refrained from seizing the ports in Southern Ireland.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS thought that, so far as the Dominion Governments were concerned, it would not be possible to adopt the course proposed without prior consultation at any rate with the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

(c) THE HOME SECRETARY said that, so long as it did not prejudice HUSKY, he felt that there was much to be said in favour of the project for taking those Islands by force, without warning. The Chiefs of Staff had shown that their possession would be of very substantial benefit to us in the Battle of the Atlantic. It seemed to him to be most unlikely that the Portuguese Government would grant us these facilities, on the basis of a diplomatic approach; and to make such an approach without success would forewarn the Portuguese of our intention and make the military operation more hazardous. Though the Portuguese were our oldest Allies, their conduct during the present war had not been such as to call for any special consideration on our part. Finally, he believed that bold action, on the lines suggested in the Prime Minister's telegram, would not be received unfavourably by public opinion in this country. He was confirmed in that view by the public reaction to earlier acts of the same kind, e.g., the capture of the "Altmark" and the landing in North Africa.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the strong objections which they felt to the course proposed should be communicated to the Prime Minister, who should be asked that a decision on this matter should be postponed until the whole question could be discussed with him after his return.

The terms of the telegram to the Prime Minister in this sense were then discussed and settled (See ALCOVE 334).
The War Cabinet met to consider three telegrams from the Prime Minister (PENCIL Nos. 166, 167 and 161) about relations between General de Gaulle and General Giraud.

In PENCIL 166 the Prime Minister had reported that a very stormy situation was developing about General de Gaulle. He thought that urgent consideration should be given to the question whether General de Gaulle should now be eliminated as a political force, the French National Committee being told that we would have no further relations with them, nor give them any money, so long as de Gaulle was connected with them.

PENCIL 167 contained a series of memoranda handed by the President to the Prime Minister, making various allegations against General de Gaulle and the French National Committee.

PENCIL 161 contained a further expression of the Prime Minister's views.

The War Cabinet were informed of the present position as to the negotiations between General de Gaulle and General Giraud. General de Gaulle had been invited by General Giraud to visit Algiers, subject to two conditions which it seemed probable that he would accept. General Catroux had returned to this country on the 21st May with a letter from General Giraud and supplementary explanations. It was thought that General de Gaulle would shortly apply for transport facilities to go to Algiers to conclude an agreement.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that this was confirmed by information reaching him that certain influential members of the French National Committee had decided that General de Gaulle and General Giraud must now conclude an agreement.

The War Cabinet took the view that it was extremely difficult to see how we could break with General de Gaulle at the moment when he was on the point of reaching agreement with General Giraud. If General de Gaulle made trouble after an agreement had been reached we should be in a stronger position to insist upon his withdrawal, should this later prove necessary.

The War Cabinet were given information as to a number of specific matters which would have to be taken into consideration before a decision could be reached to break with General de Gaulle; e.g.

(a) There were 80,000 Fighting French troops in different parts of the world. We should experience particular trouble in French Equatorial Africa (where the troops were virulently de Gaullist), and also in Syria and North Palestine, if we were now to break with the General.
(b) The First Lord of the Admiralty said that there were 47 French Officers and 6,000 other ranks of the Fighting French Navy, which manned 4 efficient submarines, 15 destroyers, corvettes and sloops; in all, 57 ships. The view of the Admiralty was that a break with General de Gaulle would certainly cause some temporary difficulties and inconvenience.

(c) Particulars were given of the difficulties which had arisen as the result of members of the crews in North African French ships wishing to join General de Gaulle. The number of cases in which difficulty had arisen was very small. The point was not of special importance.

(d) The Minister of Labour and National Service informed the War Cabinet that opinion among French Trade Unionists showed considerable fear of growing United States influence. They did not altogether like General de Gaulle himself, but the de Gaullist organisation was looked upon as more likely than any other body to stimulate the resistance of the French working classes.

(e) The Deputy Prime Minister said that if we were to take action against General de Gaulle, many Frenchmen who were now opposed to him would rally to him. The name of "de Gaulle" was regarded as a symbol of the Republic, and the de Gaullist movement stood for the Entente.

(f) It was also pointed out that if we broke with General de Gaulle during or immediately after the Prime Minister's visit to the United States, the inference would be drawn that we had done so under pressure from the United States.

(g) It must be recognised that United States policy towards the French had not met with success, and there was increasing recognition of this fact in the United States itself. This was probably responsible for some of the pressure which was now being exercised in favour of getting rid of de Gaulle.

(h) A break with de Gaulle at this moment might have an unfortunate effect on the Allied Governments resident in London and dependent upon us for financial support and other facilities. Might this not create the impression that these Governments were within our power and could be broken at will?

The effect on political opinion in this country should also be borne in mind.

The War Cabinet then considered three draft telegrams to the Prime Minister which had been prepared in the Foreign Office. Various amendments were agreed upon, to incorporate points made in discussion.

The War Cabinet

Approved the three draft telegrams to the Prime Minister, as amended, and authorised their despatch.

# Despatched as ACOVE Nos. 370, 371 and 372.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM
NOT ONE TIME TABLE.

ALCOVE No.370
TOD 2130Z/23
TOD 2340Z/23

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE
From: Air Ministry
To: Britman Washington

ALCOVE No.370 23rd May 1945.

Following for Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Your telegrams Nos. PENCIL 166, 167 and 181 (of the 21st May: British-U.S. relations with the French) have been considered by the Cabinet and the following represents our unanimous view.

1. It is disturbing that such a stream of American reports should have gone to Washington without the Ambassador having spoken to the Foreign Secretary about them. We had no idea that de Gaulle situation was rankling so much just now. We are fully conscious of the difficulties which de Gaulle has created for us, and of your position under heavy pressure from the Americans. We do not however consider that the policy which you so strongly recommend is practicable for the following reasons.

2. The latest phase of the Giraud-de Gaulle negotiations indicates that union is nearer than it has been at any time. De Gaulle has been invited by Giraud to Algiers subject to the acceptance of two conditions and it seems probable that he will accept. Catroux arrived on the 21st May with Giraud's letter and supplementary oral explanations. We anticipate an early application from de Gaulle for transport facilities. It has been the policy of H.M.G. and the U.S.G. for the past four months to bring the two generals together and this policy was blessed by the President and yourself at Anfa. If, as we believe, it was the right policy then, it is in our view even more the right policy now when both generals appear to be on the point of achieving the union which they were then pressed to bring about. Our information is that the failure of the two generals to reach agreement has caused disappointment in France. There is much evidence that de Gaulle's personal position in France is strong. Vienot brought a message from Herriot
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MOST SECRET. Copy No ______
in which the latter says he regards de Gaulle as the only leader, while the presence of Queuille, Massigli, General Cochot and others shows that de Gaulle's supporters in France are not confined to the radical elements. Mr Macmillan reported on the 4th May that local opinion in Algiers was becoming more and more insistent on the need for immediate union and we understand that the postponement of de Gaulle's proposed visit to Algiers at the beginning of April caused considerable excitement in North Africa and did not enhance Giraud's position. He has also reported that the Frenchmen in Tunisia were predominantly gaullist in the broadest sense. Moreover the wider interest of France render union between the two bodies a necessity. What prospects would there be of union in France itself after the liberation if the Frenchmen outside France are now incapable of reaching agreement between themselves?

3. We are advised that there is no likelihood of any of the present members of the French National Committee continuing to function if General de Gaulle were removed by us. The same is probably true of the Free French Fighting Forces. The Committee will automatically disappear when union has been achieved between the two movements and de Gaulle should be more controllable by a committee of which he is only joint President, than he is in his present position. New agreements would then have to be concluded between the U.S. and British Governments and the united French body.

4. Is there not also a real danger that if we now drove de Gaulle out of public life at this moment when a union between the two French movements seems on the point of being achieved we would not only make him a national martyr but we would find ourselves accused by both gaullists and giraudists of interfering improperly in French internal affairs with a view to treating France as an Anglo-American protectorate? If so, our relations with France would be more dangerously affected than by a continuance of the present unsatisfactory situation.

5. On the other hand we are equally with the President and Mr Hull alive to the unsatisfactory character of the present arrangement but having regard to the developments mentioned at the beginning of paragraph 2, surely this is not the moment to try and tackle it by the drastic measures proposed by the President. If de Gaulle now refuses to meet Giraud or if he failed to reach agreement at a meeting or if having reached agreement he then proceeded to wreck it by a failure to collaborate loyaly, then we agree that we should certainly have to have a showdown with him and might have to eliminate him in order either to establish or maintain French unity.
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MOST SECRET.  Copy No
6. We are sending you in a separate telegram comments on the various memoranda. They contain little that is not known to us and they can hardly be said to have been written by unbiased and objective observers. In particular, Cambon and Comert expressed the view, to British representatives when they were in Algiers, that Giraud was finished unless he took certain measures at once and that his position depended on early union. We suspect that Murphy is becoming impressed by the evidence of rising gaullism in North Africa which must be reaching him and that he prefers to ascribe this to gaullist propaganda rather than admit that he was as wrong about gaullist strength in North Africa as he was about anti-British feeling there. The fact is that Giraud's retention of unpopular men and Murphy's continued reluctance to insist on their removal have helped de Gaulle very considerably in North Africa.

T.O.O. 21307/23

(Circulation)

Deputy Prime Minister
Foreign Secretary
Lord President of the Council
Minister of Labour
Minister of Production
Home Secretary
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr Martin
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(MOST SECRET.)
UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

NOT ONE TIME TABLE

ALCOVE 371
TOC 2200Z/23
TOC 0055Z/24

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE

From:- Air Ministry
To:- Britman Washington

ALCOVE 371 23rd May 1943

Following for Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Your PENCIL No. 167 (of May 21st).

Following are our comments on the memoranda and telegrams which the President gave you.

Memorandum A.

(1) It is true that Left Wing elements in the National Committee doubtless encouraged by de Gaulle himself are conducting an active propaganda campaign in North Africa. There has always been a Gaullist element there which has won steadily increasing support since the Allied landings. But all our information indicates that its success is due mainly to popular impatience at the continuance in office of men like Nogues and Peyrouton rather than to de Gaulle's propaganda.

(2) We do not subscribe to the view that the people of France are behind the Free French movement rather than the person of de Gaulle. There is a great volume of evidence from diverse sources to show that the National Committee means little to the resisters and that it is de Gaulle's name alone that counts with them. The de Gaulle whom they follow is of course an idealised semi-mystic figure very different from the man we know. But nothing that Allied propaganda could do would convince the French that their idol has feet of clay and the removal of de Gaulle would probably have a disastrous reaction on the whole resistance movement. The resisters would consider that the Anglo-Saxons had betrayed their leader and a further swing towards Russia would be inevitable. (We must remember that the resistance movements in France today incline strongly towards the Left and that the Communists play a leading part).

/(3) We know
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MOST SECRET.
We know from most secret sources that some of the Fighting French in North Africa are toying with the idea of rallying Giraud's forces on a large scale. On the other hand there seems little doubt that men in some of Giraud's units are very dissatisfied with the Vichy outlook of some of their officers and would willingly come over. We have heard stories both of spontaneous defection and of active propaganda by the Fighting French but have no definite evidence of either.

Memorandum B.

(1) The first sentence of paragraph 3 is misleading. Fighting French propaganda from British territory is certainly financed from British funds but in return every effort is made to keep it within bounds. All broadcasts from British-controlled stations have to conform with the principles of our own propaganda directives. We have insisted on this from the outset and it has led to many fights with de Gaulle and the frequent censoring of undesirable material. Three times has de Gaulle been refused access to the B.B.C. We are powerless to control propaganda from the Free French colonies. Nor do we finance it as these colonies are self-supporting in everything except military expenditure.

(2) Paragraph 4 seems to us somewhat ungenerous. It disregards Bir Hakim and Leclerc's great march from Chad, and the admirable work of two Free French brigades at El Alamein.

(3) We entirely agree that the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will be to their government may best be obtained is a fundamental question on which it is essential that our two governments should be in agreement. We had assumed that both governments were agreed:

(a) that the French people themselves should be free to settle their own future.

(b) that the body to be set up in Algiers will not be recognised by us as the government of France or even as the provisional government of France; and

(c) that this body would not be authorised to speak for France or recognised as responsible for French interests or territories other than those which have rallied or may rally to it. Its functions must, however, be more than advisory since it will be responsible for administering all the territories of the French overseas empire with the exception of Indo-China and, at present, the Antilles.
It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

**IMPORTANT.**

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**MOST SECRET.**
(4) As to the means whereby the will of the French people is to be obtained after the liberation we are prepared to examine any suggestions that may be submitted to us by Giraud, de Gaulle and their advisers in due course. We are disposed to favour Giraud's suggestions (Conseils Generaux) in this matter which are in accordance with the laws of the Republic.

(5) But in any case we agree with the U.S.G. that when Allied forces enter France the Allied C. in C. must be supreme. It is not possible to say now how long it will be possible for him to maintain that position, but the President's idea that a proud people like the French will submit to a "military occupation run by British and American generals" for "six months or even a year" is surely not practical politics and it is disturbing that his mind should run on these lines.

(6) We hope that you will agree to put the policy outlined above to the President and Mr Hull.

Memorandum C.

We too have heard reports that a personal oath of allegiance to de Gaulle is required from all his followers: but we have failed to find any proof of this and both the National Committee and de Gaulle himself have categorically denied it, the former in a public statement. Two senior officers of resistance organisations in France to whom the matter was recently mentioned said that they had never seen this form of oath or heard of anyone being asked to sign it. So far as we have been able to ascertain, the actual text of the formula of enlistment signed by French volunteers who apply to join the forces or services of Fighting France is in fact as follows:-

"The undersigned has declared that he has acquainted himself with the statutes affecting the personnel of the Fighting French forces and that he engages himself to serve with honour, fidelity and discipline in the Fighting French forces for the duration of the present war plus three months."

Telegram D.

We find it incredible that de Gaulle could ever have said that he would base his policy solely on Russia and perhaps on Germany. He uses the Russians in his political game but a permanent association with communism would be alien to his whole nature. (Incidentally he is a devout Catholic). There is surely no warrant for suggesting that he has ever contemplated dealings with the Germans.

/Telegram E.
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MOST SECRET.
Telegram E.

We see nothing sinister in this. It is surely natural that de Gaulle should want his chief lieutenants around him when he comes to do business with Giraud.

Telegram F.

The first sentence is contradicted by paragraph 4 of memorandum V. It is untrue that any of Giraud's ships have sailed without guncrews. In the "Fort de Douamont" a second French guncrew was trained by British naval personnel before she sailed. If guncrews desert from other of Giraud's ships and there is no time to train a fresh crew the Admiralty intend to replace them by trained British naval personnel. The Admiralty are taking strong measures to prevent further desertions.

Telegram G.

Cambon and Comnart have a bitter personal prejudice against de Gaulle and will say almost anything to discredit him. In this case their language to the U.S. Embassy seems to have been very different from what they told British officials after their return from Algiers. To the latter they expressed the deepest misgivings about Giraud, who they said was like Lebrun though with more than his intelligence. They deplored Giraud's seeming incapability to check dishonesty and corruption in his administration.

Telegram H.

We know nothing of the incident to which the first paragraph refers.

See also my immediately following telegram.

TOO 2200Z/23

Circulation

Deputy Prime Minister
Foreign Secretary
Lord President of the Council
Minister of Labour
Minister of Production
Home Secretary
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr Martin
Unparaphrased version of a Most Secret Cypher Telegram NOT One Time Table

ALCOVE 372
TCD 22302/23
TOD 0115Z/24

MOST SECRET CYpher TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE

From: - Air Ministry
To: - Britman Washington

ALCOVE 372 23rd May 1943

Following for Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Our telegram ALCOVE No. 370, paragraph 3.

We must remember that during the 18 months before the U.S. came into the war, when de Gaulle represented all that was of French resistance, we entered into a number of agreements with the General. To break with de Gaulle would mean the automatic cancellation of the agreements concluded with him personally before the formation of the National Committee. As we should not expect the National Committee to survive his removal the later agreements between H.M. Government and the Committee would also probably become void. At this moment there are 80,000 Free French French troops in various theatres. There are 6,000 Free French Officers and men manning 47 ships, including 4 submarines, 16 corvettes, etc. Free French help in the air has also been most effective. The facilities given us by the Free French in e.g. Equatorial Africa contributed to the building up of our forces in the Middle East.

2. The following are the main agreements recognizing the authority of de Gaulle and the National Committee over their own followers and the French territories which have rallied to them:

(i) The exchange of letters of August 7th, 1940, between yourself and de Gaulle providing for the establishment of the Free French land, sea and air forces.

/(ii) Your letter
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IMPORTANT.

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Your letter to de Gaulle of August 27th, 1940, giving an undertaking that H.M. Government would do everything in their power to maintain the economic stability of all French overseas territories provided they stood by the alliance; and more particularly those territories which rallied to de Gaulle.

(iii) The exchange of letters of January 15th, 1941 between the Foreign Secretary and de Gaulle governing the exercise of jurisdiction over the French forces and empowering the Fighting French to establish their own military courts in the United Kingdom.

(iv) The Financial Agreement concluded between the Treasury and the National Committee in 1941, providing for the financing from British funds of all the Committee's military expenditure and of their other expenditure in the United Kingdom (The Free French colonies meet their civil budgets out of their own revenues).

(v) The agreement of December 14th, 1942, between H.M. Government and the National Committee governing the relations between the British military authorities and the Free French authorities in Madagascar.

(vi) Various exonomic agreements and less formal arrangements with the National Committee regulating import and export programmes in respect of French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons and Madagascar.

3. The invalidating of these agreements would in many cases cause us serious embarrassment. Without agreements (i) and (iii) the Free French Forces would be left completely in the air. Agreements (i) and (vi) form the basis of our important trade with the Free French African colonies and their cancellation would at once jeopardise if not destroy all the machinery that we have built up whereby they supply a number of commodities of first importance to the Allied war effort in return for the consumption goods and other imports which they formerly obtained from France. The U.S. would be as much affected as ourselves as they now receive a large share of Free French African exports. Agreement (v) has a considerable strategic importance since it provides for our use of Diego Suarez and the Madagascar airfields.

/4. We think
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MOST SECRET.

IMPORTANT.

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4. We think it well to bear all this in mind. It shows that apart from the political objections to the course which the President advocates a precipitate break with de Gaulle would have far-reaching consequences in a number of spheres which the Americans have probably never thought about. Indeed an impossible situation would be created unless steps could be taken in advance to ensure that some other French authority was able and willing to take over these commitments which the National Committee has entered into with us.

5. We are sorry not to be more helpful, but we are convinced that the Americans are wrong in this and advocate a line which would not be understood here, with possible evil consequences to Anglo-American relations. We do hope that a decision on this question can await your return.

Circulation

Deputy Prime Minister
Foreign Secretary
Lord President of the Council
Minister of Labour
Minister of Production
Home Secretary
Sir Edward Bridges
Mr Martin
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**MOST SECRET.**

This report contains information of the highest secrecy and MUST NOT BE QUOTED in any circumstances.
W.M.(45) 76th Conclusions,
Confidential Annex.
(24th May, 1945 - 5.0 p.m.)

The War Cabinet considered a telegram from the Prime Minister (Pencil No. 216) expressing his regret at the conclusions which had been reached at their meeting on 21st May and embodied in their telegram ALCOVE 534.

In this telegram the Prime Minister put forward the suggestion that the expedition should be prepared and sailed at the earliest convenient date and that, not more than 56 hours before its arrival off the Islands, the Portuguese should be informed that a descent in overwhelming force was imminent and invited to submit to our occupation of the Islands under protest and without resistance. The negotiations would be conducted by a Minister of the Crown who would go to Portugal for that express purpose; the Portuguese would be given no hope that they could avert the occupation of the Islands, and it would be made to appear that their only choice was to prevent bloodshed and to gain the benefits which we should offer in return for the lease. If, however, this bluff failed and the Portuguese refused our request and made it clear that they would back their refusal by armed resistance, then the expedition could be called off at the last moment.

The Prime Minister was proposing to put this suggestion to the President that day, and asked that he might be authorised to inform him on the following day that the War Cabinet endorsed it.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that, if the plan now suggested by the Prime Minister were adopted, it was most unlikely that the expedition would, in the event, be called off, even if the Portuguese showed that they would resist the occupation.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the War Cabinet in their telegram had given no reason for thinking that a diplomatic approach had some chance of success. It seemed as though the Prime Minister's plan was based, in part at least, on the view that a diplomatic approach, with no show of force behind it, was almost certain to be refused. In this connection the following points were made:

First, H.M. Ambassador at Lisbon, who was not inclined to optimism, had advised that it should not be regarded as impossible to obtain Dr. Salazar's consent. All previous experience of Dr. Salazar indicated that he was much more likely to react favourably if we asked the Portuguese to give us facilities in the Islands in pursuance of their obligations under the Treaty of Alliance. He was certain to resent very strongly any appearance of an ultimatum or a threat. This view was endorsed by Ministers who had personal knowledge of Dr. Salazar.
Secondly, it could be made clear to the Portuguese that, if they acceded to a request for facilities in the Islands, the forces to be sent there in that event would be exclusively British. This was a factor which might influence the Portuguese towards acceding to the request, especially if they had any suspicion that, in default of their agreement, there was risk of a joint Anglo-American occupation of the Islands.

Thirdly, if we had invoked the Alliance and failed to obtain by this means the facilities which we required, we should be in a far stronger position, in the eyes of the Portuguese and of the rest of the world, to justify taking other measures to secure our requirements.

It was the general view of the War Cabinet that we should not be justified in taking, without warning, action contrary to our Treaty of Alliance with Portugal unless such action was vital to the effective prosecution of the war. The War Cabinet considered that this had not yet been shown to be the case and that they must therefore adhere to their view that a diplomatic approach should be made to the Portuguese Government in the first instance. They next considered whether they should recommend that such a diplomatic approach should be made in the near future, or whether it should be deferred until the expedition had been mounted so that, if it were refused, the Islands could be occupied by force at short notice.

Under the second alternative, the suggestion put forward was that the diplomatic approach should be made as soon as the expedition had sailed, i.e. about 8 days before the landing. THE VICE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that, from the military point of view, it would have been preferable, if possible, to avoid giving any warning as this would forfeit the element of surprise; but, if any warning were to be given, there was little practical difference between the 36 hours which would be given under the Prime Minister's proposal and the 7 or 8 days which would elapse if a diplomatic approach were made when the expedition was about to sail. If, however, a diplomatic approach were made some months before the expedition was mounted then there was a risk that steps would be taken to strengthen the defences of the Island; on the other hand it was possible that the longer interval would allow time for the suspicions raised to subside. But in any event he did not think that the delay involved would seriously prejudice the chances of military success. THE VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF pointed out that if the Portuguese were to tell the Germans that they had reason to suspect an attack on these Islands, 8 days would give the Germans ample time to concentrate a force of U-boats in the vicinity.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that it was essential that we should, in the first instance, make a diplomatic approach to Dr. Salazar, unaccompanied by threats of force, and based on an invocation of the Alliance. This was the method best calculated to obtain what we wanted without recourse to force. Moreover, if this approach was rejected, Dr. Salazar would have shown that the Alliance was of little value, and we should be in a stronger moral position than if, without any preliminary approach, we were suddenly to threaten to seize by force the territory of an Ally. Moreover, it was not thought that the delay consequent upon recourse to the diplomatic approach would seriously prejudice the chances of military success.
The question how long an interval should elapse between the diplomatic approach and (in the event of its refusal) a military operation for seizure of the Islands was one to be determined later in the light of military considerations. It should be made clear that, in our view, a British expedition would meet with less resistance and resentment than an American expedition.

The War Cabinet:

Invited the Foreign Secretary to prepare, in the light of the discussion a telegram informing the Prime Minister of the War Cabinet’s views at "X".

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.

* The terms of this telegram, despatched as ALCOVE 387, were considered and approved at a subsequent meeting of the War Cabinet held later the same day (W.M.(43) 77).
TUNISIA

General Alexander's Statement.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he and all his colleagues felt the greatest admiration for General Alexander's military achievements, and were very pleased to have him among them that afternoon. The operations in Tunisia were, however, only a prelude to heavy work ahead. In all amphibious operations the accidents of weather conditions introduced an element of the incalculable. During his visit to North Africa the previous week he had, however, been greatly cheered by the opinions of those who would have to carry out this further task. They wore all full of confidence that the operation would meet with success.

The Prime Minister then asked General Alexander to give an account of the recent fighting in Tunisia and to say something about the plans of future operations.

GENERAL ALEXANDER said that when he had been summoned, in February last, to take charge of operations in Tunisia, the situation had not been by any means favourable. The Germans had been attacking, and with some success. The first need had been to stabilise the front and to separate the British, United States and French forces into their component parts. The second stage had been to regain the initiative and to plan how to turn the Axis forces out of North Africa. For this latter task the first essential had been to get the Eighth Army through the Mareth gap and into contact with the First Army, in order to bring superiority to bear against the enemy. When this had been done, the next step was to drive the Axis forces back within the smallest possible perimeter. Our air forces were greatly superior to those of the enemy, and it was desirable to develop their strength to the fullest possible extent. For this purpose, however, it was necessary to get possession of the airfields in the coastal strip South of Tunis. By making use of our air superiority we could give our Navy fighter cover by day and thus enable our Naval forces to cut the enemy's sea communications.

To help the Eighth Army through the Gabes gap he had ordered the United States Second Corps to Gafsa and to Maknassy. This had served two purposes. In the first place, dumps of petrol had been accumulated at Gafsa to chase the Eighth
Army's supply position, since they were relying on very long lines of communication. In the second place, they would draw off the enemy reserves from opposite the Eighth Army. In this they succeeded, but they could not quite accomplish the extra task which he had set them, namely, of cutting off completely Rommel's forces, which were resisting the Eighth Army's passage through the Gabes gap.

As soon as the Eighth Army had got through the Gabes gap they moved up very quickly to the Enfidaville position, thus forcing the enemy back to a relatively small perimeter covering Bizerta and Tunis. This perimeter, however, which was 120 miles long, was too large for the enemy to hold as a permanent defensive position. He thought that General von Arnim had made a mistake in not shortening his perimeter still further.

General Alexander added that the enemy forces comprised some 15 Divisions, although most of these were weak and under strength, opposed to 17 Allied Divisions. But the Allied air superiority had been very great.

General Alexander said that he had next had to decide at what point on the perimeter the attack should be made. Both in the North and in the South there was very difficult country, not at all suitable for tanks. The obvious line of attack was on the plain stretching Westwards from Tunis. This, however, had seemed to him too obvious a place for attack, and he had therefore decided to launch his first attack somewhat to the South of the central plain. If this attack had been completely successful, he had intended to force a break-through in this sector. But, although it had gone well and much ground had been gained, it had not gone quite fast enough to achieve a complete break-through. He had therefore decided to detach from the Eighth Army the Fourth Indian Division and the Seventh Armoured Division, which he had concentrated with other forces behind Medjaz-el-Bab.

In the meantime, the United States Second Corps had been moved up to the coastal sector in the North, and had been given Bizerta as their objective. They had fought very well in this sector and had captured Bizerta almost at the same time as Tunis had been captured.

Returning to the central sector, the attack here had been concentrated on the smallest possible front, and a great weight of artillery, tanks, and the full power of the Air Force had been employed. The infantry had attacked by night and had gained their first and second objectives. The Germans had fought well, but as daylight came while our attack on the second objective was still in progress they had seen two Divisions of tanks following up the infantry. This had proved too much for their morale; they had broken and run, and had not stopped until they had reached Tunis. 36 hours had elapsed from the time of the first attack on Medjaz-el-Bab until our troops had entered Tunis, a distance of 30 miles. General von Arnim had been taken prisoner by the Fourth Indian
Divisions. He had spoken to him for a few minutes and had ascertained that his orders had been to stay and fight it out to the end and not to evacuate. The total number of Axis prisoners was 248,000 and only 632 had escaped by sea.

As soon as Tunis had been captured, the 78th Division had been sent up to occupy the town. Other Divisions had turned northwards and southwards to complete the break-up of the enemy's forces. This had quickly been achieved.

General Alexander then turned to Operation HUSKY, and expressed himself as optimistic as to the outcome. Much, no doubt, would depend on the weather, but it should be good at this time of year. It was estimated that there were some 9 Italian Divisions in the Island, 4 mobile and 5 second-class. In addition, there was the equivalent of one German Division. So far there had been no signs of other German reinforcements. The success of the Operation depended upon our ability to get our troops ashore in fighting trim. Once that had been done, he was very confident of the outcome. Our troops were training hard and were in terrific heart. We had never had such a good Army as we had today. The HUSKY plan was a good one, and the preparations were all going ahead well. He therefore felt justified in his optimism as to the success of the Operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Alexander could rest assured that he would be judged by the quality of performance rather than by the actual results. He had shown himself undaunted by the gruelling ordeal he had undergone in Burma. It was his conduct of these operations which had given Ministers such confidence in his leadership - a confidence which had been fully borne out.

The Cabinet were most grateful to him for the statement which he had given to them, which would always remain in their memories.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.
The Prime Minister said that when he had been in Washington he had found no disposition to argue that military targets in Rome should not be bombed. Indeed, Mr Hopkins had said that there might be some political difficulties if we abstained from doing so.

The matter had accordingly been raised at the Algiers Conference on the 3rd June, when it had been agreed that the Prime Minister and General Marshall should be invited to recommend to the British War Cabinet and the United States Chiefs of Staff respectively, that General Eisenhower should be empowered to take action at his discretion against the marshalling yards at Rome, as soon as he thought best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY.

The Prime Minister said that military opinion was clearly in favour of bombing the marshalling yards at Rome, on the ground that this would seriously impair the enemy's reinforcement route to South Italy.

There were two marshalling yards in Rome, the San Lorenzo railway marshalling yard and the Littorio marshalling yard. These yards were about 3½ miles from the Vatican City, which was on the other side of the Tiber.

The bombing would be carried out by Portresses, which had shown great accuracy in the clear atmosphere of the Mediterranean, and were expected to inflict severe damage to the yards.

The Prime Minister added that we had never agreed to refrain from bombing Rome. There was the possibility that if we did so the enemy would bomb Cairo from Crete and Greece. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had, however, expressed confidence that any such attacks could be dealt with.

The question was raised whether it would be more effective to attack viaducts on the Italian railways.

The Chief of the Air Staff said that he was satisfied that an attack on the marshalling yards was a much more effective method of hampering the enemy's communications.

The War Cabinet —

Agreed that General Eisenhower should be given authority to order the bombing of the marshalling yards at Rome at the moment which he thought best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY, and invited the Prime Minister to send a message in this sense to the President.
TRAD DISPUTES ACT

(Previous Reference: W.M.(42) 57th Conclusions, Minute 2).

The War Cabinet considered the position which might arise from the application of the Union of Post Office Workers for affiliation to the Trades Union Congress.

At their Annual Conference in May the Union had resolved to apply for affiliation to the T.U.C. In addition, the Branches of the Union were recommended to seek affiliation to the industrial, but not to the political, sections of local Trades Councils. On 28th May the Union had formally applied for affiliation with the T.U.C.; and on the following day Sir Walter Citrine, in a public speech, had said that the T.U.C. had decided that, whatever the risks, organic connection with Civil Service Trade Unions would be re-established, and that the Congress were determined to use their power to see that no vindictive punishment and no deterrent measures were imposed without the power of the Trade Union movement being placed "in protection" of the individual Civil Servant.

Applications for affiliation by local Branches of the Union of Post Office Workers had been accepted by the Blackpool Trades Council and the London Trades Council on 26th and 28th May respectively.

The War Cabinet were reminded that under section 5 of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, Regulations regarding the conditions of service in His Majesty's civil establishment must include Regulations prohibiting established Civil Servants from being members, delegates or representatives of any organisation whose primary object is to influence or affect the remuneration and conditions of employment of its members, unless the organisation (i) is confined to persons employed by or under the Crown; and (ii) complies with provisions in the Regulations for securing that it is independent of, and not affiliated to, any such organisation which is not confined to persons employed by or under the Crown or any federation comprising such organisations and (iii) complies with provisions in the Regulations for securing that its objects do not include political objects and that it is not associated directly or indirectly with any political party or organisation.

Regulations made under this section provide that no established Civil Servant may be a member of such an organisation unless there is in force a certificate, granted by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies with the approval of the Treasury, certifying that the organisation is an approved association. The Regulations provide that a certificate of approval must be cancelled if at any time the Treasury is not satisfied that the organisation fulfils the relevant conditions.
If the Union of Post Office Workers became affiliated to the Trades Union Congress, the certificate of approval would have to be cancelled; and all established Civil Servants belonging to the Union would thereupon be in contravention of section 5(1) of the Act. By section 5(2) of the Act they would have to be warned forthwith by the Head of their Department and, if within one month after that warning they had not resigned from the Union, they would in the words of the Act be "disqualified for being members of the Civil Service".

It was pointed out that these consequences would follow by the automatic operation of the law. The Treasury was required by the statute to make Regulations in this sense; and had no discretion to avoid these consequences by amending the Regulations or by failing to enforce them. There were only three possible means by which these consequences could be averted:

(i) A decision might be reached, either by the Union or by the T.U.C., not to proceed with this proposal for affiliation.

(ii) It was open to any member of the Union to apply to the courts for an injunction to prevent the Executive Council of the Union from proceeding with their application for affiliation. If such an injunction were granted, it would be contempt of court for the Executive Council to proceed with the application.

(iii) If neither of these courses were adopted, the consequences described above could only be averted by fresh legislation amending section 5 of the Act of 1927.

The main points in discussion were:

(a) The applications of local branches of the Union for affiliation to local Trades Councils did not raise any serious question. It was doubtful whether such affiliation contravened the Act of 1927. The Law Officers were considering that point. And, from the point of view of policy, there was no serious objection to such affiliation with local Trades Councils.

(b) The Minister of Labour and National Service said that the Act of 1927 had aroused strong feelings in the Trade Union movement; and for some time it had been the policy of the movement to press for the repeal of the whole Act. More recently, however, the main objective of the Trade Union movement had been to secure the repeal of sections 5 and 6 of the Act; and, if those sections could be dealt with to their satisfaction, there was a reasonable prospect that they would not challenge the remainder of the Act.
He recognised, however, that in the Conservative Party there was strong feeling against any modification even of these sections of the Act. He doubted whether a solution could be found by discussion between the political Parties; and he thought that, in order to take this question out of politics, it would be preferable to arrange for some enquiry by an independent body, charged with the duty of examining the operation of these two sections of the Act and submitting recommendations to the Government as to the modifications which might be made. The Minister recognised, however, that the application made by the Union of Post Office Workers and its reception by Sir Walter Citrine has made it more difficult to make any progress towards a settlement of the general issue. The Government could not yield to a threat to contravene the existing Act, and could not therefore take any further action, whether by appointing a Committee of enquiry or otherwise, until that threat had been withdrawn.

(c) In discussion, it was confirmed that there was strong opposition among members of the Conservative Party to proposals for the repeal of sections 5 and 6 of the Act of 1927. Moreover, this opposition had now been strengthened by the threat of the Union of Post Office Workers and Sir Walter Citrine to defy the law. A situation has thus been created in which it was even more difficult than before to put forward any proposals for modification of these sections of the Act.

(d) It was pointed out that the application of the Union of Post Office Workers could not be formally considered by the Trades Union Congress until their Annual Conference in September next. There was, therefore, a substantial interval during which wiser counsels might prevail. In this connection it was noted that the Post Office Engineering Union were meeting on the following day to consider whether they should make a similar application for affiliation to the T.U.C. It was possible that they might take a somewhat different view from the Union of Post Office Workers. It was also possible that other Civil Service Unions might indicate that they were not proposing to seek affiliation while the law remained unchanged. Such developments might cause the Trades Union Congress to modify its present attitude.

The general conclusion of the War Cabinet was that the Government could not take any action with a view to modifying the Act of 1927 until the threat implied by the decision of the Union of Post Office Workers and Sir Walter Citrine's acceptance of it had been withdrawn. Meanwhile, nothing should be done, or said, on behalf of the Government which might tend to exacerbate the feelings of either of the parties to this controversy. The Press might be advised to avoid discussion of the matter, and all other practicable steps should be taken to prevent the issue from being brought to a head. Means might
also be found to make clear to the Union or the T.U.C. the dangers of the course on which they had embarked. If, as a result, the present threat to flout the law were withdrawn, and a favourable opportunity arose for considering some modification of the Act, the War Cabinet would wish to see whether some means could not be found of arriving at agreement regarding the modification of sections 5 and 6 of the Act. If, however, the Union and the T.U.C. persisted in their present attitude, the Government should not fail to make it clear to the members of the Unions concerned what their position would be if their Unions became affiliated to the T.U.C. while section 5 of the Act of 1927 remained unaltered.

The War Cabinet agreed to review the position again in three weeks' time.

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.
The War Cabinet met to consider Telegrams Nos. 931, 932 and 933 from our Ambassador at Lisbon, reporting a recent conversation with Dr Salazar. In this conversation, Dr Salazar had expressed the view that the conclusions reached in London conversations, which had been based on the premise that Germany could and might invade the Peninsula and that Great Britain was not then strong enough to meet the threat, no longer held good. Sir Ronald Campbell thought that Dr Salazar's conversation might indicate that he hoped that we would make an appeal to the Alliance.

The Foreign Secretary said that he thought that the right course was that we should now make a diplomatic approach to Dr Salazar. He thought that, in order to make a success of the diplomatic approach, we should have to be prepared to meet Portuguese demands on certain points on which they would feel anxiety, namely:

(a) We should have to agree that their ships should join our convoys.

(b) We should have to offer some fighter support for the defence of the mainland.

(c) We should have to give some kind of undertaking in regard to the future of the Portuguese Empire.

The Foreign Secretary then read to the War Cabinet two telegrams to our Ambassador at Lisbon which had been prepared on the above lines.

The Prime Minister said that he was still rather sceptical of obtaining our requirements by means of a diplomatic approach unsupported by a threat of force. He agreed, however, that Sir Ronald Campbell's interview with Dr Salazar introduced a new factor, and he agreed that a diplomatic approach should be made on the broad lines suggested by the Foreign Secretary.

The programme which he envisaged was as follows:

(i) Instructions should be sent to Sir Ronald Campbell as to the lines on which he should make a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government asking for the facilities which we required in the Islands.
Before Sir Ronald Campbell could act on those instructions, it would be necessary to obtain the concurrence of the United States Government in the course of action proposed.

The Prime Minister said that he would be ready to send a personal telegram to President Roosevelt on this matter at once. In particular, the President should be asked not to bring the Brazilian Government into this matter for the time being.

The main points which Sir Ronald Campbell should make in his approach would be as follows:

(a) We should make it clear that we would return the Islands at the end of the war, together with the improved facilities which we should have introduced. We might even offer to lease the Islands for the duration of the war, on very beneficial terms.

(b) We should offer facilities for the protection of Portuguese shipping, e.g., in convoy.

(c) We should give assurances regarding the future of the Portuguese Colonial Empire.

(d) On the other hand, we could not offer any help on the Portuguese mainland, save perhaps a few Spitfire Squadrons to assist in the defence of Lisbon.

Generally, the Prime Minister thought that it was important to make rather more of the advantages we could offer, than had been done in the Foreign Office draft, and further, that it would be a mistake at this stage to include anything by way of a veiled threat of possible consequences to the Portuguese Colonial Empire. At this stage our policy should be inducements and no threats.

It would be necessary to obtain Field Marshal Smuts' concurrence in the terms of the assurance covering the future of the Portuguese Colonial Empire.

The Prime Minister thought, however, that it was unnecessary at this stage to consult the Commonwealth of Australia about Timor.
(vii) If the diplomatic approach should prove successful, it was important that no time should be lost in establishing ourselves in the Islands. A Brigade of troops with auxiliaries should immediately be prepared, and shipping should be collected so that the force could embark any time after the 18th June. The advantages of being ready to take up the lease at once outweighed any disadvantage in collecting and holding the necessary shipping and escorts. This force would, of course, be prepared for an occupation and not for an assault, and if the diplomatic approach failed it would have to return to these shores.

(viii) Should the diplomatic approach fail, our Ambassador should give the impression that we had reluctantly deferred to the Portuguese refusal. Preparations would, however, steadily on for a full-scale operation LIPKELT, to sail about the 20th August. On this hypothesis, he would propose to warn Dr Salazar a few hours in advance of the assault that we were about to seize the Islands, but that it lay within his power, by the despatch of the necessary telegram, to avert bloodshed and the termination of our 600 years old Alliance. In return for this action on the part of Dr Salazar, we should be prepared to give the assurances which we were now about to offer.

General agreement was expressed by the War Cabinet with the course of action proposed by the Prime Minister.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF asked that the Chiefs of Staff might be given an opportunity of considering the military implications of the Foreign Office instructions to Sir Ronald Campbell. With regard to any offer of air protection, we could not hope to do more than provide a few squadrons for the defence of Lisbon. The protection of other ports in Portugal would be beyond our resources.

THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that there would probably be no difficulty in providing a garrison Brigade at this short notice. The limiting factor would probably be the time required to provide and load a M.T./Store-Ship, but every effort would be made to have the expedition ready to embark within the time suggested.

The War Cabinet's Conclusions were as follows:

(1) It was agreed that a diplomatic approach should be made on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister; and that if this failed we should take military action to obtain our requirements later in the year.

(2) The Prime Minister undertook to send an immediate telegram to President Roosevelt seeking his concurrence in our making a diplomatic approach on the lines indicated.

*Despatched as T 777/3.*
(3) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was invited to re-draft his telegram to H.M. Ambassador at Lisbon in the light of the discussion, and to send it to the Chiefs of Staff for their comments.

(4) The telegrams referred to in ( ) would then be submitted to the Prime Minister for his approval and despatch, without further reference to the War Cabinet.

(5) The Chiefs of Staff were asked to issue instructions for the immediate preparation of an expedition of the approximate strength of a Brigade, which should be ready to embark by the 18th or 19th June. This Brigade would be an occupying, and not an assault, force.

(6) The Foreign Secretary and Dominions Secretary would arrange for the preparation of a draft telegram for the Prime Minister to send to Field Marshal Smuts.

* Despatched as No. 791 from Dominions Office to South Africa (H.C.)

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.,
10th June, 1943.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he wished to discuss with his colleagues the succession to the Viceroyalty and also certain changes in the system of Command in India.

He had reached the conclusion that a change in the system of Command was called for in order to ensure vigorous and effective prosecution of the operations against Japan. The United States had great interests in this area from the point of view of sending supplies to China by air. He had decided that the Command of operations in South East Asia should be separated from the statutory office of Commander-in-Chief in India. This division between the operational Command and the control exercised by the statutory Commander-in-Chief in India had been recommended by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1929 in the event of a major campaign having to be conducted with India as its base of operations.

As regards the Command in South East Asia, there were two models which might be followed - the model of the Middle East Command, where there were three co-equal Commanders-in-Chief, and what might be called the North African model, namely, a Supreme Commander-in-Chief having under him a Naval, an Army and an Air Commander. He thought that for South East Asia the latter was the right form of organisation.

Turning to the Viceroyalty, the Prime Minister said that, as his colleagues would be aware, the question of a successor to Lord Linlithgow had been under almost continuous consideration for about six months. From many points of view it would have been desirable that a member of the War Cabinet who was familiar with the Cabinet's policy should have been appointed to this post. But he had come to the conclusion that it would be a great pity to make changes now in the War Cabinet. After much consideration he had recommended to His Majesty, who had been pleased to approve, the appointment as Viceroy of Sir Archibald Wavell. Sir Archibald had a great record of solid achievement behind him. He was a man of wide views, and had served for eighteen months on the Viceroy's Council. Since he had made this recommendation to His Majesty, he had been interested to find out that Sir Archibald Wavell had expressed the opinion that not enough had been done for social reform in India and that he would be in the fullest sympathy with striking this note.
There was the further consideration, that our first duty at the present time was to defend India, and that political reforms must wait until the military situation in the Far East had improved.

It was proposed to offer Sir Archibald Wavell the appointment of Viceroy for a period of three years.

As his successor as statutory Commander-in-Chief, he proposed the re-appointment of Sir Claude Auchinleck. He was sure that there was no one who had better qualifications for the Command of the Indian Army, by whom he was held in the greatest respect.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped it might be possible to make an announcement towards the end of the week of the appointments of Sir Archibald Wavell and Sir Claude Auchinleck, and, in principle, of the setting up of the South East Asia Command, although the details of the organisation of this Command would not be completed for some time.

The Secretary of State for India said that he agreed that the functions of Commander-in-Chief, India, and of the Commander-in-Chief of South East Asia should now be divided. It was essential that the statutory Commander-in-Chief should spend much of his time in exercising influence on his colleagues on the Executive Council and in the work of organisation, training, inspection and consolidation of the greatly expanded Indian Army. In his view, General Auchinleck was ideally suited for the post.

He also favoured the appointment of a single Supreme Allied Commander for the South East Asia front. At the present moment difficulties were arising because of the number of United States organisations which required to be fitted into a regular framework. Thus, General Stillwell was on occasion consulted by the U.S. Government as to the extent to which demands for the Indian front should be met.

Sir Archibald Wavell was a man of wide outlook, who had had considerable contact with political affairs in the Middle East and had proved himself a valuable member of the Viceroy's Council. It was also relevant that, at the present time, public opinion in India did not expect very much in the way of reforms in the political sphere. On the whole, he thought that General Wavell would be able to lead and control the Executive Council and to keep India's mind on the war. These were the two most important qualities required of a Viceroy appointed at the present time.

The Minister of Labour and National Service thought that it would be a great pity if the appointment of the new Viceroy was made on the basis that he was a "safe" man and that no progress was to be made during the next three years. He thought that there was not enough economic advice at the Viceroy's disposal, and that the present was a first-rate opportunity for turning the minds of the people of India from political agitation towards economic progress. Further, consideration should be given to India's place in the scheme of defence of the British Commonwealth. For this purpose he thought that India might form part of some larger defence grouping.
Generally, the Minister of Labour and National Service was anxious to see India taking a more prominent position in the Eastern world.

The Minister of Labour also stressed the importance of the new Viceroy not maintaining the somewhat isolated position of the present Viceroy.

THE MINISTER OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION stressed the point that Sir Archibald Wavell should not be regarded as a stopgap. It was an advantage that he would regard his task mainly as a non-political one, and it was important that he should have good advice on the economic side of his duties.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that a number of difficult issues would arise which would involve, for example, conflicts over priorities in connection with administration which would arise between the Supreme Commander and the Indian authorities. These would have to be settled as they arose, on the authority of the Viceroy, acting on behalf of His Majesty's Government. The Viceroy would have under him for this purpose a Senior Administrative Officer with a small Handling Section to settle, on his behalf, the day to day problems.

The War Cabinet:

(1) Took note, with approval, of the proposed separation of the Command of Operations in South East Asia from the Office of Commander-in-Chief, India, and of the proposed appointments to the Viceroyalty and to the office of Commander-in-Chief in India.

(2) Asked the Secretary of State for India, the Minister of Aircraft Production and the Minister of Information to prepare a draft statement, which should be submitted to the Prime Minister, for use by the Press when these two new appointments and the setting up of the new Command were announced.

(3) Approved the suggestion that the principal newspaper proprietors should be seen before the appointments were announced.

(4) Took note that the Prime Minister proposed to telegraph to The King as to the proposal to re-appoint General Sir Claude Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief in India, and also to Commander-in-Chief in India, and also to General Sir Archibald Wavell had definitely accepted the post of Viceroy.

(5) Agreed that there should be no statement as to Sir Archibald Wavell’s tenure being for three years. There was no statutory term of office for the Viceroy and Sir A. Wavell had only been given the indication that the appointment might be only for three years in order to leave the Government free to ask for his resignation without any sense of disappointment on his part if the circumstances made it desirable.
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W.W.(43) 87th CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 4

Confidential Annex

(21st June, 1943, 5.30 p.m.)

THE PRIME MINISTER read to the War Cabinet a telegram which he had had from President Roosevelt (No. 268 of 17th June) and two telegrams which he had sent in reply (Nos. 316 and 318 of 18th June) regarding General de Gaulle's relations with the French Committee of National Liberation and his apparent desire to obtain control of the French military forces in Africa.

The essential points in these telegrams were as follows:-

The President had sent to General Eisenhower a telegram defining the policy of the United States Government in respect of the control of the French Army in Africa. This made it clear that, during their military occupation of North Africa, the United States Government would insist that the French Army should be under the command of someone in whom they had complete confidence and should be subject to the directions of the Allied Supreme Commander. They could not tolerate any French jurisdiction, civil or military, which might in any way endanger the safety of Allied troops or lines of communication or otherwise interfere with Allied military operations. At the present time they "would not permit General de Gaulle to direct himself, or to control through partisans on any Committee, the African French Army either in the field of supplies, training or operations".

In communicating to the Prime Minister the text of this instruction to General Eisenhower the President had suggested that the time had come to break with General de Gaulle and to encourage the creation of a Committee of Frenchmen who "really wished to fight the war and were not thinking too much about politics". As a first step, he suggested that every effort should be made to postpone any further meeting of the French Committee of National Liberation.

In his reply, the Prime Minister had welcomed the President's instructions to General Eisenhower regarding the control of the French Army in North Africa. It was essential that the command of this Army should be in loyal and trustworthy hands and properly subordinated to the Supreme Allied Commander. At the same time, he had made it clear that he would not at this moment favour breaking up the Committee of Seven, or forbidding it to meet. If General Eisenhower carried out the policy laid down in his instructions, the Committee would be forced to choose between accepting that decision by a majority or placing themselves in definite opposition to the British and
United States Governments. If they accepted the decision General de Gaulle and the other dissentients would have to decide whether to submit to that decision or to resign. Our position would be fully safeguarded if we prescribed the conditions essential for the safety of our forces and placed on General de Gaulle the onus of deciding whether he would accept our decision, or resign.

The War Cabinet were also informed that a meeting had been held between General Eisenhower and Generals Giraud and de Gaulle at 10 a.m. on Saturday, 19th June. General Eisenhower had informed the two Generals that, in view of his responsibilities and impending operations, he must insist on effective control of the French forces being in the hands of General Giraud, with whom he had worked during recent months. He appealed to both Generals, as a soldier to soldiers, to accept this view. General de Gaulle had taken the view that this demand constituted a breach of French sovereignty. It had been agreed that General Eisenhower's statement should be put into written form and presented to the two Generals so that it could be considered by the Committee of Seven at a meeting to be held on Monday 21st June.

The War Cabinet held a preliminary exchange of views on the position disclosed by these telegrams.

The view was expressed that while it was understandable that the United States Government should lose patience with General de Gaulle, it must not be overlooked that he exercised a considerable influence among those in Metropolitan France in whom the spirit of resistance had not been quenched. To force a break with him now would not restore American prestige in France and might damage ours; and it would certainly discourage those in France for whom the name "de Gaulle" was a symbol of resistance to the enemy.

On the other hand, it was the general view of the War Cabinet that we could not conscientiously assure the United States Government that, if General de Gaulle were in control of the French Army in North Africa, the Allies could rely confidently upon his loyal co-operation and support in the Allied military operations now impending. That being so, we could not challenge the American view that it must be a primary objective of our policy to ensure that General de Gaulle did not himself direct, or control through partisans on the French Committee, the French Army in Africa.

At the same time, it was most desirable that this objective should if possible, be attained, not by any direct break with General de Gaulle but through a majority decision of the French Committee. When the Committee of Seven had been appointed we had formally transferred to it the relations which we had previously maintained with General de Gaulle's Committee in London. While in the last resort considerations of military security must prevail, there was no reason why we should not continue to recognise and support the Committee of Seven, as representing the forces of French resistance to the enemy provided that it was willing to make arrangements for the control of the French Army in Africa which satisfied General Eisenhower.
It was agreed that it was vitally important to prevent this issue from clouding our relations with the President and the United States Administration. If, however, the French Committee accepted General Eisenhower's conditions regarding the control of the French Army, it would be possible to avert any acute difference of view between ourselves and the U.S. Government, and at the same time to avoid taking action in respect of General de Gaulle which would probably have a serious effect on French opinion.

The War Cabinet -

Agreed to defer further discussion of this situation until it was known how the French Committee of National Liberation had reacted to the statement which General Eisenhower had made to Generals Giraud and de Gaulle.

Offices of the War Cabinet
S.W.1.