Most Confidential Record (MCR)

CC (85) 3rd ✔
CC (85) 6th ✔
CC (85) 17th ✔
CC (85) 32nd ✔
CC (85) 36th ✔

CAB 128/82
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC(85) 3rd Conclusions</td>
<td>Thursday 24 January 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TYPE 22 FRIGATES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As you will see these draft minutes contain no explicit record of Mr Heseltine's dissent. Although he made his dissent very clear at the end of the discussion he did not, in our hearing, actually ask for it to be recorded. He may, however, have made a request to you or to the Prime Minister. The practice, as you know, is to avoid, wherever possible, the recording of dissent from Cabinet Conclusions except when a Minister resigns. May we leave it to you to do what you judge necessary in the circumstances?

I think that we had better make this an MCR.

No copies outside his office. Please clear amended minutes with PLO.

PL GREGSON

24 January 1985
Mr. Wiggins has placed the prime responsibility of producing its next paper on Mr. Tebbit rather than Mr. Hereshine. This is logical, since, as several Ministers pointed out, it would be C.I. much as to confine to ROD work. Moreover it is Mr. Tebbit who actually has responsibility for C.I.

But I think not C.I. at all and Mr. Hereshine would stand but it went on guard to line, in consultation with Mr. Tebbit.

My inclination, in balance, would be to put it this way round, despite its logic.
The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry about the Ministry of Defence orders for two further Type 22 frigates (C(85) 3). They also had before them minutes to the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State for Defence of 18 December 1984, by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry of 21 December 1984 and by the Secretary of State for the Environment of 18 January 1985, together with a minute of 23 December 1984 from the Prime Minister's Private Secretary to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE recalled the circumstances which had resulted in the Cabinet's decision at their previous discussion in July 1984 to call for a third round of tendering for the two Type 22 frigate orders. Simply on the basis of the third round tenders, those orders would go to the Swan Hunter (SH) yard. In this view, however, it would be wrong to accept this course of action, essentially because the third round of tendering had been carried out on a basis other than that which had been agreed by Cabinet. Plans already in course of implementation by British Shipbuilders (BS) at the time of the Cabinet's previous discussion had deprived Cammell Laird (CL) of the capacity to build both ships, but if all their overhead costs had to be loaded on to the price of one of the ships, they could never compete against the other yard. In these circumstances the Government could be represented as having deceived the management of CL, and the moderate members of the workforce who had been striving with some success to overcome militancy and to bring about improved industrial relations and better productivity in the yard, by allowing them to believe that there was a possibility of their winning the contract for the two frigates when the possibility did not in fact exist. On the two previous occasions CL had been the lowest tenderer, without any interference from Departments or from BS central management. The least the Government should do now should be to give CL one of the orders despite the extra costs. There was an unenviable choice between preserving a given number of jobs on Merseyside or in the North East; but whereas giving both orders to SH would definitely result in the closure of CL (which was extremely important to the economy of Merseyside), splitting the orders would not mean the closure of SH. For these reasons he proposed that one order should go to CL and one to SH.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY said that he did not accept that the third round of tendering had been carried out on a false basis. BS had permitted CL to make favourable assumptions about other work over which they could spread their overheads, even though there seemed to be little prospect of these assumptions being realised. Permitting CL to undertake both orders would have resulted in CL taking on fresh labour while SH had to impose a comparable number of additional
redundancies. Splitting the order between the two yards, as proposed by the Secretary of State for Defence, would mean in effect spending £47 million - £7 million directly by the Ministry of Defence, and a further £40 million through BS - to divert jobs from the North East to Merseyside. If the orders were split, it would be clear that substantial additional costs were being incurred essentially for political reasons, and this would add to the bitterness which would be felt in the North East if SH's better record of productivity and industrial relations was seen to be ignored. The closure of the Austin and Pickersgill yard would give rise to 700 shipbuilding redundancies in the North East in the near future, and would make the further 1,200 redundancies resulting at SH if CL received one of the Type 22 orders all the harder to bear. In industrial terms the correct course was undoubtedly to place both orders with SH. If nevertheless the Cabinet decided that one of the orders should go to CL, they should at the same time decide how the additional costs this would impose on BS should be financed; his Department had no funds available to meet these costs. He recognised that there was a very strong moral and political case for some Government action to support the workforce at CL. Some such action would have been possible if CL had received the order for the conversion of the Balder London, and it would also have been possible to have had the submarine HMS Otter refitted there. Some measures on these lines which enabled the yard to continue in operation and demonstrate its improved productivity and industrial relations record could be implemented at relatively modest cost, and so help CL to justify its own survival following privatisation.

The following were among the main points made in discussion:

a. Giving both orders to SH would be seen as a means of improving the prospects for privatisation; it could be politically damaging if the Government were thought to be giving higher priority to privatisation than to the social and industrial fabric of Merseyside.

b. The Government had been ready to spend very large amounts of money to resist militancy elsewhere in the economy; the miners' strike and the DHSS computer strike at Newcastle (which had cost £150 million) were both examples of this. The CL workforce's achievement in overcoming militancy was second in importance only to the struggle in the coalmines.

c. Postponing economic change, and maintaining excess capacity, as would result from splitting the orders between the two yards, simply increased the costs of measures which would at some point be inevitable.

d. The Government had arguably held out to the CL workforce the prospect of competing for a prize which was beyond their grasp. This added to the strength of the argument for some action to assist CL if SH received both orders.
THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of view in the Cabinet was in favour of both orders going to SH. At the same time there was a strong feeling that the Government should take action to recognise the value and importance of the stand taken by the moderate workforce at CL. There should therefore be a further examination of the scope for other action to help CL; the Departments concerned should consider this urgently, and a further paper should be prepared for discussion at an early date.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE said that he would be ready to co-operate in the further examination proposed, but wished to put on record that, if it was not possible to find work for CL which would be broadly equivalent to an order for a Type 22 frigate, he would not be able to accept a decision by the Cabinet to put both the Type 22 frigate orders to SH.

The Cabinet -

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the preparation of a paper assessing the scope for action to assist Cammell Laird to continue in operation, in the event of a Cabinet decision to place both Type 22 frigate orders with Swan Hunter.

Cabinet Office

25 January 1985
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC(85) 6th Conclusions</td>
<td>Thursday 14 February 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECONOMIC STRATEGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (C(85) 4) on economic strategy.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that the development of the United Kingdom economy during the past year had been dominated by the miners' strike and the appreciation of the United States dollar against all other major currencies. More recently the weakness and uncertainty of oil prices had had a substantial impact. In most respects the United Kingdom economy had been fairly resilient; despite the miners' strike, the current account balance had remained in surplus, and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had increased by about 2½ per cent, as against the earlier forecast of 3 per cent. Inflation had been held to about 4½ per cent despite the depreciation of sterling, as against the earlier forecast of 4½ per cent. Not all of the overshoot of the 1984-85 Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) could be attributed to the miners' strike; this factor had however probably influenced sentiment in financial markets, and the resulting increase in interest rates had further exacerbated the PSBR problem.

For 1985 the prospect was for 3 per cent growth in GDP, with inflation remaining at about 5 per cent, although it might go somewhat higher during the first half of the year, particularly as a result of the impact of higher mortgage interest rates. There were considerable uncertainties, both external and domestic. The very large United States budget deficit and the high level of dollar interest rates, with the dollar remaining extremely strong against all other currencies, represented a threat to the world economy; the United States were in effect importing other countries' savings and exporting their own inflation, while the debtor countries were facing an increasing real burden of debt service. On the domestic front one main worry was that earnings were rising substantially faster than prices, with productivity stagnant; the result was rising United Kingdom unit labour costs, while those of other major countries were static or falling. This factor was preventing the economic recovery from giving rise to an increase in numbers of people employed. The other main worry was the continuing upward pressure on public expenditure. A larger overshoot of the 1984-85 planning total as in the recent Public Expenditure White Paper was now expected than could be attributed to the continuation of the miners' strike beyond the end of 1984. Higher interest rates would mean higher debt service payments, and local authority overspending now seemed likely to exceed earlier forecasts. These pressures were expected to continue in 1985-86 and thereafter. Because of these difficulties he thought it prudent to increase the size of the Contingency Reserve for 1985-86 and the two subsequent years, which would necessitate parallel increases in the planning totals. Great efforts would still be needed to keep public expenditure within these somewhat higher totals. The financial markets sensed these difficulties, and
this made it all the more important that the Government should stick to their economic strategy. Against this background there seemed likely to be much less room for a fiscal adjustment in the Budget than had been foreshadowed the previous autumn; whatever scope there was should be devoted to measures which would help the growth of employment.

In discussion, the following main points were made –

a. There was general agreement on the need for caution in setting the 1985-86 PSBR: restraining borrowing to the level consistent with the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) was a minimum requirement. An adverse reaction from financial markets would add to the difficulty of managing economic policy. It would be important to avoid creating expectations that the Budget would have a substantial impact on unemployment.

b. The outlook for public expenditure was extremely serious, and the fact that major difficulties would remain after the miners' strike was over would be extremely disappointing both to the financial markets and to the Government's supporters. The Government risked getting the worst of both worlds: unpopular expenditure cuts were being made over a wide range of services, while at the same time the Government were unable to keep total expenditure within the prescribed limits. The problem could be resolved only if changes were made in the structure of demand-led programmes, although even here the scope was limited by previous pledges to maintain the real value of certain benefits. It was nevertheless essential to find ways of reducing social security expenditure and expenditure by local authorities.

c. There was a widespread feeling that this was not the year in which to embark on radical changes in the tax structure which would attract the hostility of powerful interest groups or increase the general price level.

d. Much of the responsibility for the upward movement in unit labour costs was attributable to ineffective managements. Recent improvements in profits, and the greater profitability of exports resulting from the depreciation of sterling, seemed to have made companies more reluctant to resist excessive wage claims and risk interruptions in production. The effects then spilled over into the public sector, by creating pressure for "catching up" pay settlements. Although the climate of opinion was changing, there were still far too many examples of workforces pressing for pay increases very damaging to the international competitive position of the companies employing them.

e. Rather than look for further tax concessions to business, the Government should now be seeking a greater contribution from business towards reducing unemployment and providing better training facilities for young people. Employers should recognise that the United Kingdom Government provided far more financial assistance to training than the Governments of the United States, Germany and Japan.
f. Despite the high level of unemployment, it remained difficult to fill vacancies for lower-paid workers. This in part reflected the fact that the differential for men with families between income from social security benefits and income from work was very small. If the problem were to be overcome, it would be necessary to consider reductions in entitlement to benefit as well as increases in tax thresholds for the lowest paid. However, not all the burden of restraining public expenditure could be placed on the poorest sections of the population; while for the lowest paid the proportion of income taken in tax had increased, the higher income groups had seen their tax burden reduced under the present Government.

THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the Cabinet recognised that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had little room for manoeuvre in his forthcoming Budget. There was general agreement on the need for a new effort to secure better control over public expenditure, and on the need to secure further reductions in the rate of inflation; 5 per cent a year inflation was still far too high. The objective of restoring the PSBR to the path set out in the MTS was generally endorsed, and within this constraint the Cabinet agreed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should concentrate on measures which would contribute to the growth of employment. The need to give full and clear explanations of the Government's policies, both to the Government's supporters in Parliament and to the wider public, was generally recognised. Inquirers from the media about the Cabinet's discussion would be told that the Cabinet had considered the economic situation and the approach to the Budget, and reaffirmed their commitment to the central objectives of the Government's economic strategy: lower inflation, firm control of public spending and a continuing reduction in public sector borrowing.

The Cabinet -

1. Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister's summing up of their discussion.

2. Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to take account of their discussion in preparing his forthcoming Budget.

Cabinet Office

18 February 1985
## SUBJECT

**MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CC(85) 17th Conclusions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Thursday 16 May 1985</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC AFFAIRS: RETAIL PRICE INDEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT said that the increase in the Retail Price Index (RPI) for April, which would be announced the following day, would be 6.9 per cent. It had been expected that the figure would be higher than that for March (6.1 per cent) for several reasons: the second instalment of the increase in mortgage rates; increases in rents and rates; and the effect of taxation changes in the Budget. In the event the magnitude of the increase had been higher than predicted, probably because companies had found it possible to reflect taxation increases in retail prices more quickly than the previous year. The May figure was also likely to be high and this would have an unwelcome effect on the social security upratings and on public expenditure. Later that year the monthly increase would fall, reflecting the strengthening of the sterling exchange rate and the reduction in mortgage interest rates which ought to occur before long. The line to take in public would be that the Government still adhered broadly to the view of inflation prospects taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech which forecast a rise in the RPI to over 6 per cent but a fall to 5 per cent by the end of that year.

The Cabinet -

Took note.

Cabinet Office

17 May 1985

SECRET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC(85) 32nd Conclusions</td>
<td>Thursday 14 November 1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, since the Cabinet's previous discussion, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had obtained further improvements in the package which had been negotiated with the Irish Government.

The Irish side had been brought to agree to a firmer statement about continuing and enhanced co-operation in combating terrorism. The Irish Government had agreed to announce that it would accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; the Irish Attorney General had advised that there would be a risk of constitutional challenge if the Irish Government signed the Convention before the required legislation was passed in the Dail, with a view to ratifying it afterwards. The United Kingdom Government had said that the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference could not be housed in Stormont, but a reasonably secure building not far from there had been identified, which might be purchased and converted for the Secretariat. The United Kingdom Government had made clear to the Irish Government that, if the reaction in Northern Ireland to the Agreement was worse than expected, these matters would have to be discussed again. With regard to the risk of legal challenge to the proposed Agreement, which the Cabinet had discussed on 7 November 1985, the Attorney General had advised that an application for judicial review could be launched but that the Government would have a good defence and it should not succeed.

The Prime Minister said that the Agreement maintained two important features previously noted by the Cabinet: that the Intergovernmental Conference would have no executive powers and that there would be no derogation from United Kingdom sovereignty.

Although a very difficult situation had now arisen, because of revelations in the Irish media of much of the contents of the Agreement, she and the two Secretaries of State were in no doubt that it was right to go ahead with the proposed Agreement.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND said that there had been a long series of major press leaks from the Irish side. The resulting reports in the media had been slanted, in that they had concentrated on elements in the package which were welcome to the Republic of Ireland. The actual package was more favourable to United Kingdom interests than the press stories had suggested. For instance, the Irish willingness to accede to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism had not featured in the media. Once the Agreement had been published, the Government should emphasise that the Irish Republic was recognising for the first time that the status of Northern Ireland would not change unless a majority there so wished and that the present wish of a...
majority was for no change; that there was no derogation from sovereignty and that the Agreement could encourage devolution in Northern Ireland in due course, a development which the unionists wanted.

In discussion the following points were made -

a. If the expert advice on security risks made it necessary the arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit would be changed.

b. The Prime Minister had invited the Leader of the Opposition, the leaders of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party to call on her before the Anglo-Irish Summit for a strictly confidential briefing on Privy Council terms about the general contents of the proposed Agreement. The Leader of the Opposition would be accompanied by Mr Roy Hattersley MP.

c. Briefing about the Agreement would be sent to all Cabinet Ministers that evening, strictly for their personal use only.

d. After the Anglo-Irish Summit, the Agreement, the Summit Communiqué and the press release summarising the Agreement would be sent to Members of Parliament on both sides of the House who had shown particular interest in Northern Ireland affairs. Similar material would be sent to members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and to a number of influential persons in Northern Ireland.

e. The texts of the Agreement and the Communiqué would be made available to Members of Parliament at Westminster at the time when the Prime Minister was beginning her press conference with the Taoiseach at the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Summit. This would ensure, among other things, that Members of Parliament had access to the texts no later than members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

f. Given all the leaks in the media, there was a risk that in the House of Commons on that day or the following day Unionist Members would mount some kind of demonstration; or that insistent moves would be made to call for a statement by the Government on the proposed Anglo-Irish Agreement or to table a Private Notice Question. A move to table a Private Notice Question was already being resisted.

g. A form of words should be agreed for the use of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at Question Time that day. If asked when or where the Agreement would be signed, Ministers would say that they were unable to comment. If asked whether the Cabinet had taken decisions on the proposed Agreement, Ministers should reply that a statement would be made in due course. If there was pressure on the Government to give an assurance that no Agreement would be signed before a full debate had taken place in the House of Commons, Ministers could reply
that, if there was to be an Agreement, it would enter into force before a full debate or without the approval of Parliament.

h. If pressed in the House of Commons on the following day, the Lord Privy Seal, and other Ministers as necessary, could say that the Prime Minister would make a statement to the House on Monday 18 November and that the text of the Agreement and of the Communiqué on the Anglo-Irish Summit would be available in the Vote Office from the moment of publication.

i. The debate on the Agreement in the House of Commons was likely to take place in the week beginning 25 November. The debate in the House of Lords would follow later in the same week or on Monday 2 December. It was probable that few members of the House of Lords would oppose the Agreement.

The Cabinet -

1. Confirmed its decision that the proposed Anglo-Irish Agreement should be signed by the Prime Minister.

2. Invited the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to propose a form of words for his use and that of the Prime Minister in case there were questions in the House of Commons that afternoon, about the proposed Agreement.

3. Invited the Secretary of the Cabinet to arrange for copies of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Summit Communiqué to be made available in the Vote Office of the House of Commons at the time when the Prime Minister was starting her press conference at the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Summit.

Cabinet Office
15 November 1985
SUBJECT

MOST CONFIDENTIAL RECORD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC(85) 32nd Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thursday 14 November 1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEACHERS' PAY DISPUTE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TEACHERS' PAY DISPUTE

Previous Reference: CC(85) 29th Conclusions, Minute 1

THE PRIME MINISTER said that she hoped that colleagues concerned with education matters would be giving careful thought to the situation regarding teachers' pay.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL said that he had that morning convened, at the request of the Secretary of State for Education and Science, a meeting of Ministers to consider the situation. The meeting had concluded that it would be useful for a group of Ministers, with appropriate official support, to consider the present situation and suggest possible courses of action.

The Cabinet -

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for a group of Ministers to consider the present situation in the teachers' disputes in England and Wales, and in Scotland, and the possible courses of action open to the Government, and report.

Cabinet Office

19 November 1985
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC(85) 36th Conclusions</td>
<td>Thursday 12 December 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thursday 12 December 1985 WESTLANDS PLC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WESTLANDS PLC

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE reported on developments since the meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on Economic Affairs (E(A)(85) 24th Meeting) on 9 December had considered certain proposals relating to the future of Westlands. He suggested that those developments were such as to make necessary a further meeting of Ministers, to which he could circulate a memorandum.

The meeting on 9 December had agreed that time should be given until 13 December for a consortium of British and continental European firms to make firm and fully worked out proposals for participation in Westlands, so that these could be properly considered along with the proposals by United Technologies and Fiat. The European firms' proposals would need to be presented to Westlands by 3.00 pm on Friday 13 December 1985. Significant progress had been made. British Aerospace (BAe) and Mr Alan Bristow had expressed willingness to join the European consortium. One of BAe's reasons was that, if a United States corporation gained control of a British firm like Westlands, this would prejudice the interest of BAe and other British companies in European programmes such as the European Fighter Aircraft and Airbus. As well as the industrialists concerned with a possible European offer and the National Armaments Directors of the countries involved, the Ministers of Defence of those countries were also in touch with each other. If the European consortium was to make a firm offer, it would have to be based on the goodwill of the Defence Ministers and the knowledge that it was in line with their future procurement policies. It followed that his own views must be presented to Lloyds Merchant Bank, which was leading the European consortium, and also to United Technologies. Before doing this, he needed the agreement of other Ministers to the views he would be putting forward.

In discussion, it was pointed out that the minutes of the Sub-Committee's meeting on 9 December 1985 recorded the decision that, if a viable European package which the Westlands board could recommend were not available by 4.00 pm on Friday 13 December, the United Kingdom Government would not thereafter be bound by the recommendation of the National Armaments Directors of the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Italy, to the effect that the Governments of all four countries should in future meet their helicopter requirements in three specified classes by equipment designed and built in Europe. The discussion in the Sub-Committee on 9 December, for part of which Sir John Cuckney, the Chairman of Westlands had been present, had been the third meeting of Ministers on this subject. No further decisions were needed at the present time. The Westlands Board had legal duties towards shareholders and employees and must take the ultimate decision between the proposals of Sikorsky and a possible European option. There was a real danger that, if the Government intervened, it would incur a degree of
responsibility for the company which could prove to be extremely expensive.

The following points were also made in discussion -

a. Neither the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who was the Minister responsible for Westlands, nor the Prime Minister had been warned that the question of Westlands would be raised at the present meeting of the Cabinet.

b. Sikorsky, with their present British partner, Short Bros Ltd, had tried a year previously to sell their Blackhawk helicopter to the Ministry of Defence. This offer had been rejected, since the Ministry had neither a requirement nor the funds for such a helicopter. Sikorsky had now made clear to the Ministry of Defence that they would expect to sell the Blackhawk if it was manufactured by Westlands. Without orders in the United Kingdom, Westlands was unlikely to be able to sell the Blackhawk overseas in markets which were not the property of Sikorsky.

c. If the Ministry of Defence were to buy the Blackhawk helicopter from Westlands, it would be thought that the Government, having resisted pressure from Short Bros despite the economic problems of Northern Ireland, had succumbed to pressure for the west of England. On the other hand, the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office had been present at the meeting on 9 December, and had not reserved his Secretary of State's position on the decision taken.

d. The decision reached by the Sub-Committee on 9 December had been based on the expectation that a serious European offer to Westlands could be put forward. No such offer could be made without a full discussion of Ministers. Such a discussion had apparently been envisaged by the Cabinet Office, which at 10.00 am on 10 December had telephoned Ministers' offices about the possibility of such a meeting but had later rung to say that no meeting was being called. Against these points, it was pointed out that the Cabinet Office often made exploratory enquiries about Ministers' availability in case a meeting should be required.

The Prime Minister, summing up a short discussion, said that E(A) had taken a decision at its meeting on 9 December. The matter had been raised at Cabinet without notice. Cabinet could not properly consider the matter or take decisions without papers and without time for preparation. There was nothing in the developments since 9 December or in the discussion in Cabinet to invalidate or give grounds for reconsideration of the decision reached on 9 December.

The Cabinet -

Took note.

Cabinet Office

13 December 1985