CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES

C.M. (45) 28th Conclusions, Minute 4 - Monetary Awards

30th Conclusions, Minute 7 - Palestine

32nd Conclusions - Tripolitania: Colonial Trusteeship

35th Conclusions, Minute 1 - Council of Foreign Ministers
The War Cabinet had before them a Note by the Prime Minister (C.P. (45) 126) raising the question whether monetary awards should be made to the principal Service leaders at the end of the war. At the end of the last war monetary grants totalling £555,000 had been made.

The Prime Minister said that his own view was that grants of this nature were now out of date and that the last war precedent should not be repeated on this occasion.

All Ministers expressed agreement with this view.

The suggestion was, however, put forward that there might well be a case for making an increase in the pensions of a limited number of officers in the highest ranks who had borne exceptional responsibilities and had rendered exceptional services in the present war. In this connection it was pointed out that while the emoluments of other ranks and of the lower commissioned ranks had been increased on several occasions in this war, nothing had been done for the higher ranks the value of whose remuneration had been progressively increased owing to increases in taxation and the rise in the cost of living.

The Cabinet —

(1) Agreed that no monetary grants should be made to the principal Service Leaders at the conclusion of the present war.

No announcement of this decision should be made for the present. The matter would probably be dealt with by means of a reply to a Parliamentary Question when Parliament reassembled.

(2) Took note that the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Service Ministers would investigate the suggestion that increased pensions should be awarded to a limited number of Service chiefs of the highest ranks who had held posts of high responsibility and had rendered very distinguished services in the war.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
The Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Lord President of the Council, Chairman of the Palestine Committee, to which there was attached a report (C.P. (45) 155) giving the recommendations of the Palestine Committee on the short-term policy to be adopted in that country.

The Lords President of the Council, in introducing the report, emphasised the importance of maintaining the utmost secrecy, both as regards the Committee’s recommendations and, indeed, as regards the fact that a Palestine Committee of the Cabinet had been constituted.

The quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants permissible under the provisions of the White Paper of May, 1939, was now within 3,000 of exhaustion, and it was now a matter of urgency to reach conclusions as to a short-term policy which would bridge the period between the complete exhaustion of the immigration quota and the devising and implementation of a long-term policy. The position was one of great difficulty and we were unlikely to escape criticism whatever policy we adopted. The position was aggravated by the internal situation in Palestine which showed signs of deterioration, Jews and Arabs alike being armed and very much on the alert against one another.

It seemed essential that we should, in accordance with the pledge given in the White Paper obtain the acquiescence of the Arabs of Palestine in the continuance of any Jewish immigration after the exhaustion of the quota, but even if we could get the Arabs to agree to the continuation of immigration on a very restricted scale (of which there seemed some likelihood through the good offices of the Arab states), the Jewish feeling both here and in the United States would be that not enough had been done. It was significant that the Jewish Agency, when offered the 3,000 immigration certificates remaining from the White Paper quota to be expended at the rate of 1,500 a month, had flatly rejected this and had demanded a figure of 100,000. The Committee, in these circumstances, had, after exhaustive discussion unanimously reached the view:
(i) that we should continue to conform to the existing arrangements, as prescribed in the White Paper, in respect of immigration during the interval between the exhaustion of the quota therein prescribed and the promulgation of a long-term policy, every effort being made to persuade the Arabs to agree to a continuation of immigration during this interval at the rate at present permissible.

(ii) that before the approach was made to the Arabs, the United States Government should be informed of the fact that His Majesty's Government were urgently considering the formulation of a new long-term policy for Palestine, that they intended to refer this policy to the World Organisation in due course, and that they proposed in the meantime to act as in (i) and,

(iii) that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to take immediate steps to reinforce the Middle East garrison to the extent necessary to meet the military commitment involved in (i).

The matter had since been discussed in the Foreign Secretary's Middle East Conference which now recommended that any announcement should be postponed until the Pilgrimage to Mecca took place in November because of the risk of Arab feeling becoming inflamed at that time and of the necessity for making certain military preparations.

A general discussion took place, in the course of which the following points were made:

(a) The view was strongly expressed that it would be very difficult to justify the suspension of immigration until after the forthcoming Mecca Pilgrimage. The proposal in this sense represented a material modification of the Report of the Palestine Committee. A complete suspension might well be represented as being inconsistent with the spirit of the undertakings we had given in the White Paper. It might encourage Arab truculence and while it might ease matters with the Arabs for the actual period of the Pilgrimage, it might well prove to be a very expensive concession. While full justice should be done to Arab claims, it was possible to exaggerate their importance.

(b) We were in the unfortunate position that whatever action we took we were likely to find ourselves exposed to sharp criticism from one side or the other. It was important in this connection, so far as practicable, to take the United States with us. While opinion in that country was at the moment very free in its criticism of our policy in Palestine, the United States Government had not so far been prepared to accept any responsibility for helping in the handling of the situation.
(c) Was it not clear that the Palestine issue was one that would ultimately have to go to the World Organisation? This being so, would not the wise course for us be to make it clear at once that it was our intention to refer it to the World Organisation? A declaration of this kind should ease the position as between the Arabs and ourselves, for the Arabs had tended to complain in the past that their case had never been properly heard. We should be able to make it clear to them that if the matter went before the World Organisation they would have the fullest opportunity of making their case before world opinion. Equally, a declaration in this sense should help us with the Jews, since Jewish opinion would realise that matters were taking a new form, and it might be hoped that there would be a tendency to concentrate on preparation of the case of the World Organisation with a corresponding easing of the situation in Palestine.

(d) If any statement on the lines suggested in (c) above was to be made by His Majesty's Government, was it not desirable that it should be made within the minimum of delay? That would make it clear that the initiative still rested with us and it would be our answer to criticism, whether in this country or elsewhere. It would also greatly strengthen our hands in the event of outbreaks in Palestine, whether Jewish or Arab.

(e) Should we not do better to approach the Jewish Agency and tell them that we had it in mind to put this whole matter to the World Organisation and acquire their understanding and support for such temporary suspension of immigration as might be necessary pending the working out of such a policy?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES said that he had been in constant touch with the Jewish Agency, but that body, which was now under considerable pressure by extreme elements, had adopted a quite uncompromising line and was, he felt, primarily concerned to make it clear that the White Paper was dead. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that the news that the Jewish Agency had declined to accept the 3,000 immigration certificates offered to them, and demanded a quota of 100,000, which he had now communicated to the Americans, had clearly made a marked impression on them.
(f) THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER emphasised the importance of pressing on with economic development as a contribution to the solution of the Palestine problem. While he accepted that it did not figure in the proposals in the Palestine Committee's Report since that Report dealt with short-term policy only, he hoped that it might be possible now to say something about it being our intention not merely to deal with Jewish immigration, but to arrange for full support, including reasonable financial assistance, for the economic development of this backward area.

(g) Attention was drawn to the military problems involved in the handling of the Palestine issue.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR and THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR informed the Cabinet of the position as regards the availability of forces and possible timetables for their moves. It was generally felt that given the very threatening situation disclosed by the letter circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the annex to C.P. (45) 165, the Chiefs of Staff should again be invited to review the security aspects of this matter and the arrangements for moving troops.

(h) Attention was drawn in this same connection to the great importance of bringing the Palestine Police Force up to strength. The Cabinet were informed that the Colonial Office and the War Office were already in contact as regards the possibility of employing men now due for demobilisation for this purpose.

(i) The point was also made that while we must, of course, take whatever security measures were practicable and necessary, it would be most unfortunate were the need to garrison Palestine to result in further serious delays in demobilisation and still more in the deaths of British soldiers. The reactions in either event, both in this country and among the troops might be very unhappy.

(j) The view was expressed that the letter circulated as an enclosure to C.P. (45) 165 showed a certain lack of objectivity and might be read as indicating a bias on the part of its writer towards the Arab rather than the Jewish case. It was pointed out in this connection that while isolated phrases in the letter might bear that construction other parts of the letter were strongly critical of the Arabs and that the document must be judged as a whole.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
drew attention to the extreme difficulties
which faced the Palestine Administration
and to the skill and resolution with which
it had dealt with them.

After further discussion, THE PRIME MINISTER
said that it was clear that there were strong
arguments for a public statement on the policy of
His Majesty's Government and of their intention in
due course to put this matter to the World Organisation.
The question of timing was, however, of critical
importance and he suggested that the simplest course
would be that the matter should be discussed further
between the Lord President of the Council, the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, and himself, with a view to further
discussion once the position in relation to timing
had been clarified. Meantime, there would be
advantage in a further review by the Chiefs of Staff
of the security aspects of this problem.

The Cabinet...

(1) Approved the Prime Minister's suggestion
at 'X' and invited the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, in consultation
with the Lord President and the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, to make
arrangements on the lines proposed.

(2) Invited the Chiefs of Staff to review
the security aspects of the problem.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
C.M.(45) 30TH CONCLUSIONS

Confidential Annex

(15th September, 1945 - 11.15 a.m.)

...at their meeting on 11th September the Cabinet had approved proposals by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the line to be taken by him in discussions in the Council of Foreign Ministers as regards the disposal of Italian colonies and of Italian Mediterranean Islands.

The Foreign Secretary now reported the progress of discussions in the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had found himself confronted with great difficulties in respect of the Italian colonies. There had been general agreement that they should be placed under international trusteeship. The question in issue was however whether that trusteeship should be that of an individual state or collective trusteeship.

There were indications that Russia might be anxious to establish herself on the African continent. She had been very successful in establishing her position, consequent on the end of the war, in the various territorial areas in which she was interested in Europe and in the Far East, and she was in a very strong negotiating position. There were however, from certain points of view, arguments of substance against encouraging, or allowing, her to establish herself in Africa.

So far as the Dominions were concerned, the Union of South Africa, which with its small population had since 1914 had to fight in two wars against Germany in both of which Africa had to a greater or less extent been directly in issue, felt strongly that no risk should be run of a situation arising at any future date in which, because of the establishment of any fresh Great Power in Africa, contingent arrangements would again have to be made to protect her interests; and she would be opposed accordingly to granting any special place to Russia on the African continent. Australia and New Zealand which though interested in the safety of the sea-routes were geographically more remote, were attracted in principle by the idea of collective trusteeship.

The United States, who, he thought, realised the possible trend of Russian interests, favoured a solution on the basis of collective trusteeship.
In these circumstances, Mr. Byrnes had proposed in the Council of Foreign Ministers arrangements as regards Libya under which that area would receive a promise of independence after a 10-year period of trusteeship under an Administrator appointed by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. All States members of the Council of Foreign Ministers would have a voice in the selection of this Administrator. He would be assisted by an Advisory Committee including representatives of all States members of the Council of Foreign Ministers except China, and also representatives of Libya and Italy, who would be able to provide information relating to the territory which would be of value to the Committee. If the Administrator failed to discharge his responsibility to the satisfaction of any of the States represented on the Committee, any one of them would be entitled to bring the matter before the Trusteeship Council.

This arrangement would, it was suggested, give an assurance to all that the former Italian Colonies would not be developed to the military advantage of any one nation. It would be left to the Security Council to determine where, if necessary, any strategic bases might be located.

Mr. Byrnes had urged that such a plan would give heart to the peoples of the world, since it would show that the Great Powers sincerely intended to give them at the earliest possible opportunity freedom to determine the type of government under which they wished to live.

Mr. Byrnes' proposal was of course an attractive one from the point of view of public opinion; and, realising the importance attached by the Chiefs of Staff, with their responsibility for defending Egypt, and for the position there, to securing our position in Cyrenaica, he, the Foreign Secretary, had thought it wise to play for time and avoid taking too definite a line on it for the moment. He had accordingly pointed out that the United States memorandum referred to Libya; but that Libya in fact comprised two territories - Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and had asked whether these territories could be named separately? To this Mr. Byrnes had agreed.

He (the Foreign Secretary) had then enquired whether, if this matter were remitted for examination to the Deputies, it could be understood that the Deputies were empowered to study not only the proposals in the United States memorandum, but also any such other proposals as might be put forward by other States members of the Council or by other United Nations at war with Italy? He had emphasised further that he would like the governments of the British Dominions to be given an opportunity of putting their views to the Deputies, and he had touched on the fact that it was not yet known what form collective administration would take, e.g. whether there would be an international administrative service for this purpose, and a system for sharing the costs of collective administration. He had added that this was a new experiment which, if adopted, we would try to make work, but that His Majesty's Government would be placed in a great difficulty if they were to be committed to this method of trusteeship without the possibility of altering it if it were found unworkable.
A long discussion had followed. M. Molotov, while agreeing that the principle of international trusteeship might be applied to the Italian colonies, had expressed the view that the American scheme presented difficulties, and had pressed very strongly that this should be on the basis of individual trusteeship by a single Allied nation chosen by the United Nations and that the Soviet Government should be made responsible for the trusteeship of Tripolitania. He had justified this on the grounds, first, that Russia had suffered greatly at the hands of Italian troops fighting on the side of the Germans, and secondly, that the Soviet had wide experience in establishing friendly relations between different nationalities which they could turn to advantage in one of the Italian colonies, in which they would undertake to use the authority given them by the United Nations in such a way as not merely to maintain but to enhance the prestige of the United Nations.

Mr. Byrnes had therefore indicated that in his view it was important that the Council before referring this question to the Deputies should themselves discuss it, since there were questions of policy that must be determined before the Deputies could consider the details. He had urged that in particular the Council should themselves decide:

(i) whether the Colonies were to be taken from Italy;

(ii) whether they agreed that the principle of trusteeship should be applied to these territories - on this the French had expressed some reservations, but the other Powers appeared to agree;

(iii) whether, if there were to be a trusteeship arrangement, it could be limited to a ten-year period for Libya and Eritrea;

(iv) whether the colonies were to be administered by particular States or by individuals selected by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations;

(v) if the colonies were to be administered by individual States, which States should be responsible for which colonies.

Mr. Byrnes had pointed out further that there was no hope of securing reparations from these areas (in reply to which M. Molotov had said that he had no such intention), and that there were strong arguments against their being developed militarily (in reply to which M. Molotov said that nobody had suggested using them for military purposes).

The Foreign Secretary continued that the discussion had come back to the question whether we were going to have individual or collective trusteeship. It had been adjourned until this afternoon and, while he had emphasised the importance of our interests, he had refrained from committing himself in any way. But the point that now had to be settled, and on which he wished for the guidance of the Cabinet, was what was the position of the British Commonwealth if we decided to have collective trusteeship on the model proposed by Mr. Byrnes, excluding any individual trusteeship. If he was to take a definite line (as he felt he would have to) he must have a clear lead from the Cabinet.
In this connection he wished to add—

(1) That the Conference of H.M. representatives in the Middle East which was at present sitting in the Foreign Office had made it clear to him that they were not a little concerned about the position of the Senussi. We had to deal with an extremely delicate position in Egypt, and the Senussi, though no more than a nomadic ruler, played, it now appeared, a larger part in the Egyptian mentality than we had in the past been inclined to accept. There was the risk of a storm in Egypt and the Middle East unless we handled this whole issue tactfully and we must remember that we had not only in the West the Senussi, but in the East the still more intractable problem of Palestine and the Jews.

(ii) The reaction of our decision in this matter on the project for a Greater Somalia had also to be borne in mind.

The Cabinet first considered the general arguments for and against collective trusteeship on the basis proposed by Mr. Byrnes as against individual trusteeship, with particular reference to the case of Cyrenaica.

The following points were made:

(a) Was it not premature to take this issue at the present stage? Surely the question of collective trusteeship should come up in connection with the World Organisation? We ought to refuse to allow ourselves to be rushed, and should first see that the framework into which collective trusteeship was to be fitted was established. The Foreign Secretary, while accepting the force of this argument, suggested that in dealing with the question of timing we should bear in mind the feeling which he thought he detected in the minds of Mr. Byrnes and the Americans that it was only if a conclusion could be reached at this moment that Congress were likely to accept obligations such as those now in view. He thought the American leaders were trying to reach a settlement while United States public opinion was in a mood for one. If there was delay, that opinion might very well cease to take active interest in, or be prepared to take a share in, the settlement of these problems. He had not therefore thought it wise to urge postponement until the World Organisation position was clearer.

(b) Security. The Chiefs of Staff had strongly pressed the importance on strategical grounds of our securing responsibility for Cyrenaica. Would it not be better to concentrate on securing this, even at the cost of giving Russia a free hand in a single neighbouring territory such as Tripolitania, rather than accept a system of collective security which would entitle Russia, while not in sole control of any single ex-Italian colony, to have a hand, as one of the United Nations, in the affairs of every one of them? The Chiefs of Staff explained that their object in pressing for Cyrenaica was rather to deny it to other Powers whose presence there might represent a potential liability for us than necessarily to acquire it for ourselves if that could be secured for us only at

[Handwritten notes:]
- Applied as a base for influence to all the ex-Italian colonies.
- Colony
the cost of having Russia responsible for Tripolitania, a different situation would arise. Our policy was so far as possible to keep any potentially hostile Power away from the shores of the Mediterranean, and the entry of Russia, or a Russian base in the Mediterranean, would be most undesirable from the strategic angle. It was suggested in this connection that the application of a system of collective trusteeship, under which no individual nation would be free to establish bases, would be much the best safeguard against ambitions that might be strategically embarrassing to us.

(c) It was strongly urged, that we had everything to gain by supporting a proposal such as that put forward by the U.S. Government, unless decisive objections could be established to it. If it were accepted it would mean that the United States were committed to playing their part in the affairs of this part of the world and to taking a share in responsibility for it. There might be a possibility of their providing an Administrator for certain of these territories. Not only would they be carrying a share of political responsibility; we might also reasonably hope that they would bear a part of the cost.

(d) We must consider also the probable attitude of public opinion generally. The American proposal was superficially a very attractive one from that point of view, while the arguments that could be urged against it were not such as could all of them very easily be stated in public. Had we not made it clear too at San Francisco that the Great Powers would not struggle for ascendancy in the application of systems of collective trusteeship? We must run no risk of our attitude being misunderstood.

(e) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS said that the Dominions, while not objecting to the principle of trusteeship, attached the utmost importance to a clear prior understanding as to what the form of such trusteeship was to be. They wished to see what exactly was involved. Who, for instance, would appoint the Administrators? What would their nationality, and their powers be? The Charter contemplated two or three different forms of trusteeship. The Dominions were anxious, therefore, that whatever was referred to the Deputies should be referred as an open and not a decided issue. The said that the form of trusteeship which would, on the American basis, be remitted to the Deputies to examine, would be collective trusteeship, and that they would not be free to examine any other form of trusteeship.

(f) THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY FOR THE COLONIES said that the Secretary of State for the Colonies felt that a very complicated form of trusteeship was involved. International administration in territories under the supervision of an international body with no fund of experience to draw on and inexperienced in the technique of administration was likely to be very difficult.
The Cabinet next considered the reactions of the proposals now under discussion on the proposals for a Greater Somalia and the disposal of the Italian colonies in Eritrea and elsewhere in East Africa. Under the American scheme Eritrea would be accorded the same treatment as Libya, though there would be a territorial concession to Ethiopia which would give Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Assab. In the case of Italian Somaliland there would be a similar trusteeship arrangement, but without any fixed date for independence.

The Prime Minister enquired whether it was necessary to deal with all the ex-Italian colonies on precisely the same basis? Need a decision in favour of collective trusteeship for all rule out e.g., consideration of a project for a Great Somalia?

The following points were made in this connection:

(a) A Greater Somalia could not easily be established without the inclusion of British Somaliland. While there were arguments for such inclusion, the policy to which the late Government, with the approval of the House of Commons, had been working, had been that subject possibly to minor rectifications we should neither acquire nor surrender any territory as part of the peace settlement. While that policy had not been formally reaffirmed by the present Government, it stood at the moment on record.

(b) British Somaliland was not an Italian colony and did not fall to be disposed of consequent on the terms of the peace treaty. The Somalis could make up their own minds whether to stay with us or (assuming that we could safeguard arrangements for feeding them) to become part of a larger territorial unit.

(c) The Chiefs of Staff said that Somaliland was of importance in terms of security. It was on the long sea route to the Middle East if the Mediterranean were out of our control, and it was also on the short sea route to India, Australia and the Far East via the Red Sea. An unfriendly administration installed in it might be very embarrassing to us. The point was made in this connection that the conception of trusteeship was trusteeship under the United Nations organisation; that that organisation was for collective security and that military bases etc., would fall to be settled on the advice of the United Nations and not in terms of the interest of a particular country.

(d) In the case of British Somaliland we were committed by repeated pledges given in the House of Commons that there should be no transfer of this territory save after consultation with its people.

The Foreign Secretary pointed out that no question of the transfer of British Somaliland arose. Would it be well that he should take the line that in respect of the Somali areas the Cabinet had worked out a plan intended to give a better economic unit, in which the people could graze and live under conditions
not at the moment possible; and that in consideration of this arrangement he would be prepared to allow the position of British Somaliland to be considered by the Deputies? He would commit himself to nothing beyond examination and it would of course be for the Chiefs of Staff to advise on the strategical aspect. He could, on the other hand, play for time over the whole question of Somalia and could in accepting, if that was the sense of the Cabinet, Mr. Byrnes's scheme for collective security, say that there might be territorial considerations which governments might like to put to the Deputies? If the matter went to the Deputies on this basis that would provide an opportunity for the Dominions and India to come in and have their views heard.

After further discussion, THE PRIME MINISTER said that the general sense of the Cabinet was clearly that on a balance of considerations the advantage rested with supporting the scheme put forward by Mr. Byrnes for collective trusteeship and was against the allocation of responsibility for trusteeship to individual separate States. Our assumption was of course that if we supported the United States plan, and it was accepted, the United States would play its part. That was vital. Equally we should have to take full account of the guarantees which we had given to the Senussi as regards associating him with the administration and the honouring of our pledges, the return of Italian administration, and most fully honour our pledges to him. Subject to this, and to the points raised in the discussion, he suggested that the Foreign Secretary should be authorised to support the proposal that Mr. Byrnes' plan for collective trusteeship should be remitted for examination to the Deputies.

The Cabinet -

Agreed with the Prime Minister's suggestion at 'X', and invited the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to proceed accordingly.
C.M.(45) 35th CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1

Confidential annex

(25th September, 1945 - 2.45 p.m.)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he had felt it right to consult his colleagues with regard to the position which had arisen at the Council of Foreign Ministers. He would explain first the disagreement on procedure which had arisen.

When the conference had begun it had been arranged that the representatives of France and China should attend all the meetings and this arrangement had held for some fifteen sittings. In connection with the discussion of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria and Roumania, however, the Soviet Delegation, basing themselves on the terms of the Protocol of the Berlin Conference, had taken the view that France and China should be excluded from the discussions. While the actual terms of the Protocol strictly interpreted, lent some support to the Soviet view, he felt no doubt that the intention had been that all members of the Council would take part in all its deliberations. Both the United States and the United Kingdom Delegations were opposed to the exclusion of France and China. Moreover, it was clear that any such exclusion would be entirely unacceptable to France and that if it were persisted in the French Delegation would be withdrawn. The Prime Minister had communicated with Premier Stalin but the reply received showed that the attitude taken by the Soviet Delegation was fully supported by Premier Stalin. This disagreement on procedure was, of course, only the outward manifestation of the fundamental disagreements on principle which had arisen with the Soviet Delegation, who were obviously determined to oppose any proposals which might affect the territories within what they regarded as their zone of influence. For this reason it had been found impossible to make any progress with constructive proposals for the rehabilitation of Europe, such as the provision of food supplies for Austria or the control of inland waterways. Moreover, we were faced with increasing hostility and distrust between the United States and Soviet Delegations, each of whom sought to strengthen its own position without regard to our point of view. He had a long private talk with M. Molotov on Sunday in the hope of bringing him round to a more reasonable frame of mind, but had come to the conclusion that there was little or no hope of making further progress at the present Conference and that the right course was to adjourn.
In discussion there was general agreement that we should not yield to the Soviet demand for the exclusion of France and China, and that nothing would be gained by prolonging the present Conference. The suggestion was also made that it would be desirable to transfer discussion of the outstanding questions to a conference on a wider basis, in which all the United Nations, including the Dominions, could take part. The inclusion of the Dominions would, among other things, strengthen our position vis-a-vis the United States and the discussion of the matters at issue at a wider conference would enable the force of world opinion to be brought to bear more effectively on the Russian attitude. On the other hand, it was pointed out that there was a danger that a wider conference would result in the alignment of most of the smaller Powers in support of Russia or the United States. We should, of course, seek the support of other nations by making clear our determination to stand for an international settlement by open discussion, but care would have to be taken to avoid any action which might bring us under the suspicion of attempting to set up a Western Bloc.

With regard to the adjournment of the present Conference, it was felt that it might be undesirable to break on the narrow issue of the proposal to exclude France and China from the discussions on the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria and Romania and that it would be preferable to take the line that, since it had become apparent that, because of the lack of time for the necessary preliminary work, the interests of the peoples concerned in the peace settlement were not being adequately safeguarded, it had been decided to adjourn the Conference in order to give more time for the preliminary work to be done, and to enable the Governments concerned to explore what would be the best procedure for carrying on the work of preparing the peace settlement. We should in any event take all possible steps to make it clear to the world that our desire was for a peace settlement reached by full international discussion and that we were averse to playing power politics. For this purpose the Foreign Secretary should have a Press conference when the Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned.

Other points in discussion were:

(a) We should make it clear to the United States Government that it was impossible for us to work with them if they constantly took action in the international sphere, affecting our interests, without prior consultation with us.

(b) The possibility of giving publicity to our attitude through the world Trade Union Congress which was now meeting in Paris should be considered.

(c) Attention was drawn to an embarrassing broadcast on the subject of the Council of Foreign Ministers which had been given at 9.15 on the previous evening.

The Foreign Secretary undertook to look into the question whether anything could be done to remedy the impression which had been created by this broadcast, and, in particular, to consider whether some guidance could not be given to the B.B.C. with regard to the further broadcast on the same subject which was due to be made in the following week.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.